42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not make an employer liable for acquiescing in harassment unrelated to a protected characteristic.

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc. · filed 2012-02-09(a)(2)

There is evidence that Ketterer was harassed, at least in part, for reasons unrelated to his association with his minorities. He had disagreements with union officials about a work slow-down and may have antagonized certain coworkers. Yellow Transportation’s acquiescence does not violate Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexual harassment claim when an employer fails to respond appropriately to a resident’s sexual conduct toward employees; liability depends on the circumstances, including the employer’s control over the resident’s environment.

Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc. · filed 1997-08-15(a)(1)

Focus Homes’ liability thus turns again on a fact-intensive consideration, this time whether Focus Homes’ response was immediate or timely and appropriate in light of the circumstances, particularly the level of control and legal responsibility Focus Homes has with respect to J.L.’s behavior.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the harassment is based on the employee’s gender.

Johnson v. Community Nursing Services · filed 1996-05-28(a)(1)

Same-sex sexual harassment, based on gender, should not be treated differently than the more common male versus female sexual harassment. Accordingly, this court holds that a cause of action exists under Title VII for victims of same-sex sexual harassment.

Same-gender harassment can violate Section 2000e-2(a)(1) when it is directed at an employee because of the employee’s sex.

Wehrle v. Office Depot, Inc. · filed 1996-06-12(a)(1)

Although the issue has not been previously determined by the Tenth Circuit, this Court finds that under proper circumstances same-gender harassment may be actionable under Title VII. However, to be actionable, the harassment must be because of the employee’s sex, that is, because plaintiff is a male.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment by a person of the same gender when the harassment is because of the employee’s sex.

Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc. · filed 1996-04-12(a)(1)

After carefully considering the matter, however, we conclude that Title VII does protect employees against same-gender sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-gender sexual harassment when the harassment occurs because of the employee’s sex.

Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(a)(1)

It follows, therefore, that the statute prohibits an employer of whatever gender from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee’s gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex hostile work environment harassment when an employee faces disadvantageous working conditions because of sex.

King v. Hanover · filed 1996-05-17(a)(1)

Indeed, neither the text of Title VII nor the Supreme Court's recognition of a cause of action based on a hostile working environment places a restriction on the gender of the discriminator.

Section 2000e-2(a) can cover sex-based verbal harassment, but an employer’s investigation of sexual misconduct allegations does not necessarily amount to actionable sexual harassment.

Mary Pat McDonnell and Thomas W. Boockmeier v. Henry G. Cisneros, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development · filed 1996-05-20(a)

Although we conclude that a claim of sexual harassment might arise from verbal harassment of a pair of male and female employees falsely accused of sexual hanky-panky in derogation of their duty to their employer, we do not think it can do so in the circumstances detailed at such length in the complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim based on sexual harassment, but merely offensive conduct does not establish harassment.

Garrett v. Executive Fund Life Insurance Company Penncorp Financial Inc. Penncorp Financial Group, Inc. · filed 1996-02-15(a)(1)

We agree with Garrett that because her complaint alleged sex discrimination, she may proceed on a sexual harassment theory. ... The conduct complained of does not appear to have been more than "merely offensive" after testing that conduct against the standards of Meritor and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the harassment is because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc. · filed 1996-01-23(a)(1)

Based on a review of the law, the court finds, as a matter of law, that same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the harassment occurs because of the victim’s sex.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-02-05(a)(1)

The text of this statute is gender neutral and contains no suggestion that the sex of either gender is a prerequisite to maintaining a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive work environment.

Currie v. Kowalewski · filed 1993-01-07(a)(1)

Although these activities were inappropriate they do not rise to the point of being sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from creating or condoning a sexually discriminatory work environment even when the employee loses no tangible job benefits.

Bundy v. Delbert Jackson, Director, D.C. Department of Corrections · filed 1981-01-12(a)(1)

Though no court has as yet so held, we believe that an affirmative answer follows ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations where an employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimination.

Section 703(a)(1) permits an employee to charge that discrimination against others affected her own right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-11-12(a)(1)

We hold no more than that, provided she meets the standing requirements imposed by Article III, Summers may charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer that knows or should know of recurring racial harassment to take reasonable affirmative steps to end it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1980-04-02(a)(1)

If management knows or should know of incidents of racial harassment that are more than sporadic, it has a responsibility to take reasonable affirmative steps to eliminate such incidents.

Section 2000e-2 requires more than coworkers’ disrespect and prejudice to establish unlawful employment discrimination.

Howard v. National Cash Register Co. · filed 1975-01-06(a)

Absent a showing of something other than disrespect and prejudice by his fellow workers, plaintiff cannot bring himself within the terms of either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a supervisor’s patterned religious harassment when it alters an employee’s conditions of employment.

Compston v. Borden, Inc. · filed 1976-03-29(a)(1)

To the extent that Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161 (D.Ariz.1975) holds that a supervisor and his company are not liable under Title VII for patterned and discriminatory harassment and verbal abuse of employees by the supervisor, this Court declines to follow it. Title VII has from its enactment proscribed discrimination “against any individual with respect to his . conditions ... of employment, because of such individual’s religion ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) covers an employment condition demanding sexual favors when the employee would not have faced that condition but for her sex.

Barnes v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1977-07-27(a)

Thus gender cannot be eliminated from the formulation which appellant advocates, and that formulation advances a prima facie case of sex discrimination within the purview of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to be held liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment if it fails to investigate a complaint and address the misconduct.

Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co. · filed 1977-09-09(a)(1)

The Court agrees that an employer may be liable for the discriminatory acts of its agents or supervisory personnel if it fails to investigate complaints of such discrimination. ... The Court does hold that an employer has an affirmative duty to investigate complaints of sexual harassment and deal appropriately with the offending personnel.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits conditioning an employee’s job status on a supervisor’s sexual demands when the employer knows or should know of them and fails to take prompt, appropriate remedial action.

Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. · filed 1977-11-23(a)(1)

Applying these requirements to the present complaint, we conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job status evaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from imposing a sex-based condition of employment, including a supervisor’s demand for sexual favors.

Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. · filed 1977-11-23(a)(1)

This distinction recognizes two elements necessary to find a violation of Title VII: first, that a term or condition of employment has been imposed and second, that it has been imposed by the employer, either directly or vicariously, in a sexually discriminatory fashion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment, but a claim fails without evidence that the conduct affected employment conditions, substantially interfered with work, or created a hostile working environment.

Walter v. KFGO Radio · filed 1981-08-04(a)(1)

Viewing the circumstances as a whole, there is no evidence to demonstrate that Voight’s conduct had the effect of substantially interfering with plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a working environment dominated by racial slurs, but infrequent racial comments in casual conversation do not establish a violation.

James JOHNSON and Benjamin White, Appellants, v. BUNNY BREAD COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1981-10-16

After a painstaking review of the transcript, we conclude that as a matter of law the racial slurs, if any, used at Bunny Bread did not violate Title VII. We find no steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment. The use, if any, of racial terms was infrequent, was limited to casual conversation among employees, and with possible rare exceptions was not directed toward appellants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from creating or condoning a substantially discriminatory work environment through sexual harassment, even when the employee loses no tangible job benefits.

Hayden v. ATLANTA NEWSPAPERS, ETC. · filed 1982-02-26(a)(1)

In the absence of Fifth Circuit precedent, we find this reasoning compelling and adopt the Bundy court’s holding that sexual harassment violates Title VII when an employer creates or condones a substantially discriminatory work environment regardless of whether the complaining employee loses any tangible job benefits as a result of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment even without a promotion, pay, or discharge decision.

Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc. · filed 1982-05-04(a)

Thus, plaintiff may claim a cause of action if defendants’ actions toward her impact areas other than a “term or condition of employment,” and she has done so here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that creates a hostile work environment even when the employee suffers no tangible job detriment.

Barbara J. HENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DUNDEE, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-08-09(a)(1)

A pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee because of her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treatment upon a member of one sex with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. There is no requirement that an employee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in addition that she has suffered tangible job detriment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a work environment made abusive by repeated racial slurs, even when many are not directed at the affected employee.

Walker v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1982-09-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, we find no error in the court's conclusion that the work atmosphere at the Northgate dealership violated § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a racially abusive work environment created by repeated slurs, even when some slurs are not directed at the employee.

Walker v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1982-09-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s conclusion that the work atmosphere at the Northgate dealership violated § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer that learns of hostile-workplace sexual harassment to investigate and take prompt remedial action.

Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1982-11-18(a)(1)

I find that the defendant first received knowledge of the sexual harassment by Benjamin Webb on April 10, 1980, the day plaintiff told Armand Pelliccione, the PACT terminal manager, about her harassment by Mr. Webb in a conversation at the Town Grill. At that point, the defendant had a duty to investigate the complaint of sexual harassment and to take prompt remedial action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from permitting a racially hostile work environment, including racial harassment by supervisors.

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte · filed 1983-01-07(a)(1)

Defendants here have permitted a racially-charged atmosphere to develop and continue in the B.P.D. They have permitted their supervisory personnel to participate in such racial harassment. This constitutes discrimination in the “terms, conditions, and privileges” of black officers’ employment, and consequently, a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that pervades the workplace or is condoned or carried out by supervisors as a discriminatory condition of employment.

Katz v. Dole · filed 1983-06-01(a)(1)

When such harassment pervades the workplace, or is condoned or carried out by supervisory personnel, it becomes an illegal and discriminatory condition of employment that poisons the work environment. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2 can cover serious sexual harassment by a co-worker during work travel even when the conduct is confined to one trip.

Barrett v. Omaha National Bank · filed 1983-07-13(a)(1)

While the usual rule is that trivial or isolated events do not give rise to liability, this Court feels that the instant case warrants a different result. Not only was the harassment by Mr. Day of a serious nature, but it also took place away from home and, for a period, inside a vehicle from which there was no escape.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment that affects a condition of employment and discharge for refusing an employer’s sexual demands.

Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc. · filed 1983-08-15(a)(1)

Henson thus controls and Title VII claims were properly stated both as to sexual harassment during appellee’s tenure and the wrongful termination resulting from the harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits conditioning a promotion on sexual favors when that practice discriminates against a qualified applicant because of sex.

Toscano v. Nimmo · filed 1983-08-31(a)(1)

For the reasons that follow, I find that granting sexual favors was a condition to receiving the position of Chief WAS, an employment practice which discriminated against Toscano on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to recall an employee because he rejected a supervisor’s unwelcome same-sex sexual advances.

Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation · filed 1983-11-18(a)(1)

After considering the evidence introduced at trial, the Court concludes that plaintiff has carried this burden and defendant’s decision not to reinstate plaintiff to his former position when it became available violated Section 703 of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from creating or condoning a racially hostile work environment that significantly harms an employee’s psychological well-being, even without another tangible job detriment.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1983-11-29(a)(1)

A working environment dominated by racial hostility and harassment constitutes a violation of Title VII, regardless of any other tangible job detriment to minority employees. An employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the work place which significantly and adversely affects the psychological well-being of an employee because of his or her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from allowing known sexual harassment to create a hostile work environment when the employer fails to take effective corrective action.

Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co. · filed 1984-07-23(a)(1)

When an employer fails to protect an employee from sexual harassment, thereby forcing the employee to endure an offensive environment or to quit working, the harassment becomes a “condition of employment” prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a refusal to hire someone because she rejected a prospective employer’s unwelcome sexual advances.

Jean SIMMONS, Et Al., Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Robert LYONS, Individually and as Sheriff of Washington Parish, Defendant · filed 1984-11-12(a)(1)

Although this circuit has never expressly held yet that sexual harassment may constitute employment discrimination under Title VII, every other circuit that has passed upon the issue has held that conduct of this nature constitutes employment discrimination because of the victimized individual’s sex. ... We can perceive no reason why this circuit should reach a contrary conclusion.

Repeated, offensive religious slurs by a co-worker and supervisor can alter an employee’s conditions of employment in violation of § 2000e-2(a).

Weiss v. United States · filed 1984-10-18(a)

Nonetheless, when an employee is repeatedly subjected to demeaning and offensive religious slurs before his fellows by a co-worker and by his supervisor, such activity necessarily has the effect of altering the conditions of his employment within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not necessarily make sporadic or isolated racial slurs a Title VII violation.

Ellison v. BEST FOODS, a DIV. OF CPC INTERN. · filed 1984-11-14(a)(1)

But the Court believes that the mere existence of some sporadic or isolated racial slurs does not necessarily establish a Title VII violation.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sexual harassment claim when a supervisor’s conduct affects an employee’s promotion and the employer knows of the conduct but fails to correct it.

Blessing v. County of Lancaster · filed 1985-01-10(a)

Plaintiff here clearly alleges that defendant Reedy, a supervisor, persistently harassed female employees, Amended Complaint ¶ 21, and that the employer, Lancaster County, through its officials, knew that Reedy violated proper personnel procedures but did nothing to correct the situation, Amended Complaint ¶¶ 18, 19.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats sexual harassment as unlawful sex discrimination.

Vinson v. Taylor · filed 1985-05-14(a)(1)

Once we accept the proposition that sexual harassment is illegal discrimination — as, after Barnes and Bundy, we must — efforts to eradicate it should proceed with as much fervor as has been directed toward other violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 does not make a single derogatory remark that is not racially or ethnically charged unlawful employment discrimination.

Torres v. County of Oakland · filed 1985-03-19

We hold that the district court correctly ruled that as a matter of law a single incident of using derogatory language, which is not in itself racially or ethnically charged, does not constitute unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII or Sec. 1981.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits a racially hostile working environment, but infrequent and sporadic racial slurs do not establish a violation.

Pierson v. Norcliff Thayer, Inc. · filed 1985-04-04

An infrequent and sporadic use of such language among employees does not trigger Title VII's protections, however. ... Plaintiff could only point to four specific instances when racially derogatory language was used. This Court is not convinced that plaintiff was subject to such discriminatory working conditions as are violative of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff alleging a supervisor-created hostile work environment to prove that the employer knew of the harassment.

Jeppsen v. Wunnicke · filed 1985-04-04(a)(1)

This court concludes that employer knowledge is not an element of this Title VII sex discrimination case.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits inferior employment conditions caused by racial or national-origin harassment when an employer ignores the harassment or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent it.

Snell v. Suffolk County · filed 1985-06-05(a)(1)

They have proved that their conditions of employment have been inferior. They have regularly been defamed, harassed and demeaned because of their race, color and national origin by their co-employees; defendants have ignored or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent these abuses.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment or unequal treatment that is sufficiently patterned or pervasive to become a condition of employment, even without sexual advances.

Iris McKinney v. Honorable Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Transportation · filed 1985-07-02(a)(1)

Rather, we hold that any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers demeaning or hostile workplace conduct directed at an employee because of sex, even without sexual advances.

Delores D. BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRACKIN GOOD BAKERS, INC., Harvey Powell, and Don Bass, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1985-12-11(a)(1)

Such harassment can be of at least two kinds: (1) a threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of the victim of such conduct; or (2) “unwelcome sexual advances” generally known as a “quid pro quo” ground.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers a hostile work environment when sexual conduct becomes a pervasive condition of employment and adversely affects an employee’s work or psychological well-being.

H. Finley DOWNES, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondent · filed 1985-10-18(a)

Even discounting the trivial nature of some incidents, these few instances, which we assume to have occurred, do not establish a pattern of harassment directed to “female employees” or to a particular employee. They do not show that conduct has been repeated to the point where it is “routine” or “of a generalized nature,” i.e., has become a “condition” of anyone’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a racial harassment claim, for which the usual Title VII burden-shifting analysis is inappropriate.

Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc. · filed 1985-10-21(a)(1)

This analysis, which allows an employer to articulate a justification for its actions once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case would be inappropriate in the harassment situation, because once a plaintiff establishes that she was harassed and that the employer was involved via respondeat superior, it is hard to see how an employer can justify harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require employers to establish anonymous, confidential grievance procedures for sexual harassment complaints.

Whitaker v. Nancy C. Carney, Director of Employee Relations for the City of Garland · filed 1985-12-10(a)(1)

We must conclude, therefore, that Title VII places no affirmative requirement upon the employer to institute an anonymous and confidential grievance procedure.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer aware of a racially hostile workplace to take reasonable steps to eliminate the harassment.

Snell v. Suffolk County · filed 1986-01-22(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold today that once an employer has knowledge of a racially combative atmosphere in the workplace, he has a duty to take reasonable steps to eliminate it.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for a supervisor’s racial or sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment, even without notice of the harassment.

Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc. · filed 1986-03-05(a)(1)

Since the Court has previously found that Mitchell has proved the first four elements of the Henson test, the Court’s present holding that strict employer liability replaces the respondeat superior element requires judgment in favor of Mitchell on both the sexual and racial discrimination claims arising under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers persistent sexual harassment that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment, even without a loss of tangible job benefits.

Vermett v. Hough · filed 1986-01-29(a)(1)

The second category of sexual harassment claims, and that involved herein, involves suits challenging the persistent subjection of female employees to an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Loss of tangible job benefits, employment, or promotion are unnecessary to prove this form of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · filed 1986-06-19(a)(1)

For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that is sufficiently pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Volk v. Coler · filed 1986-07-08(a)(1)

We find that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving the fourth element: that Ms. Volk was in fact subject to harassment that was so pervasive as to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment.

In an individual sexual harassment claim, incidents involving other employees bear on the claim only if they affected the plaintiff’s psychological well-being.

B.T. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLAGSHIP INTERNATIONAL D/B/A Sky Chefs, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-07-09(a)

Such testimony, though relevant in a class action suit, does not bear on Jones’ individual claim of sexual harassment in the absence of evidence that such incidents affected Jones’ psychological well-being.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to support a hostile work environment claim.

Maxine SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-08-12(a)(1)

She fails to show the conduct she complains of was so intimidating, offensive or hostile that it affected the “terms, conditions or privileges” of her employment at Sears.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim to be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in similar circumstances.

Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, a Division of Texas-American Petrochemicals, Inc. · filed 1986-11-13(a)(1)

To accord appropriate protection to both plaintiffs and defendants in a hostile and/or abusive work environment sexual harassment case, the trier of fact, when judging the totality of the circumstances impacting upon the asserted abusive and hostile environment placed in issue by the plaintiff's charges, must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under essentially like or similar circumstances.

Section 2000e-2 requires hostile work environment harassment to be based on sex and sufficiently pervasive to alter working conditions.

Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza · filed 1987-01-16(a)(1)

Plaintiffs simply have not demonstrated the existence of a pervasive, sexually hostile atmosphere. They have not shown that LTP management created or condoned an environment which significantly and adversely affected employees because of their sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based harassment severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment.

Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc. · filed 1987-03-06(a)(1)

She allegedly was subjected to crude comments and humiliating treatment and was told by Spears that her opinion was not respected because she was a woman, all of which continued in various forms and could be found to create “a hostile or offensive environment”.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits patterned verbal abuse based on sex when it creates a hostile work environment.

Delgado v. Lehman · filed 1987-03-24(a)(1)

Sexual harassment need not take the form of overt sexual advances or suggestions, but may consist of such things as verbal abuse of women if it is sufficiently patterned to comprise a condition and is apparently caused by the sex of the harassed employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based harassment that creates an abusive work environment, even without complete psychological harm.

Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc. · filed 1987-04-01(a)(1)

Basically what these sources are saying is that the trial court should look at the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the harassment is so egregious that it will create an abusive work environment. The abusive work environment, naturally can be created through psychological, emotional, or physical abuse.

A few isolated racial slurs do not necessarily violate Section 2000e-2(a)(1), although derogatory language can be evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere.

Rodney POWELL, Appellant, v. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Appellee · filed 1987-07-02(a)(1)

Racially derogatory language in the workplace can be evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere, and is certainly not to be condoned. Title VII, however, is not necessarily violated by a few isolated racial slurs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits workplace sexual harassment, but a claim fails when the alleged advance is not proven and the challenged transfer was for legitimate job performance reasons.

Fontanez v. Aponte · filed 1987-04-13(a)(1)

For this reason, Mr. Aponte, on the basis of his own observations and discussions with Ms. Cora, transferred plaintiff to the photocopy area. We therefore find that Mrs. Del Valle Fontanez failed to establish a case of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment under agency principles when the employer should have known of the harassment and its policy failed to address it effectively.

Charlotte Lynn Rawlins YATES and Cheryl Jenkins Mathis, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AVCO CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1987-05-21(a)(1)

Here we have a company with a sexual harassment policy that did not function properly, coupled with a twenty-eight year supervisory employee who harassed women on a daily basis in the course of his supervision of them. Thus, even under traditional agency principles, Avco should be liable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that creates a hostile working environment when the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1987-09-02(a)(1)

In the present case, plaintiff has plainly failed to show, even if every allegation about Gerstein’s misconduct were to be fully credited, that the sexual harassment to which she was subjected was so pervasive or abusive as to be actionable in and of itself, and without any further injury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits courts to consider racial and sexual hostility together when assessing whether workplace harassment was pervasive.

Hicks v. The Gates Rubber Company · filed 1987-11-25(a)(1)

The third question is whether, in determining the pervasiveness of the harassment against a plaintiff, a trial court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility. We conclude that such aggregation is permissible.

Section 2000e-2(a) provides relief for quid pro quo sexual harassment and sexual harassment that creates a hostile or offensive work environment.

Pease v. Alford Photo Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-09-03(a)

Title VII provides relief for 1) quid pro quo sexual harassment; and 2) sexual harassment which results from a hostile or offensive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to affect an employee because of sex; conduct equally offensive to men and women does not establish a hostile work environment claim.

Bennett v. Corroon and Black Corp. · filed 1987-12-15(a)(1)

It did not create a working environment which significantly and adversely affected plaintiff because of her sex and thus, was not a violation of Title VII or LSA-R.S. 23:1006.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits consideration of sex-based harassment in a hostile work environment claim even when the conduct is not explicitly sexual.

Darla G. Hall, Patty J. Baxter and Jeannette Ticknor v. Gus Construction Co., Inc. And John Mundorf · filed 1988-03-25(a)(1)

We agree with the rationale expressed in McKinney, and we hold that the district court correctly considered incidents of harassment and unequal treatment that would not have occurred but for the fact that Ms. Hall, Ms. Ticknor and Ms. Baxter were women. Intimidation and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual advances.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for coworker sexual harassment when it knows or should know of the harassment and fails to take prompt, effective remedial action.

Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp. · filed 1988-03-01(a)(1)

The critical issue in determining whether defendants are liable for the harassment plaintiff suffered is the question whether defendants’ supervisory employees took prompt remedial action which was effectual and reasonably calculated to end the harassment. ... This court holds that defendants’ investigation and resolution of plaintiff’s complaint about the July 20 incident falls far short of this standard.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment when a supervisor withholds job benefits because an employee refuses sexual advances.

Shrout v. Black Clawson Co. · filed 1988-04-13(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s refusal to submit to the demands of her supervisor resulted in his continued withholding of performance evaluations and salary reviews, with the result that plaintiff received no pay increases between 1981 and 1985. ... The foregoing analysis, based upon our findings of fact, clearly supports the conclusion that plaintiff has proven a cause of action in quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a sexual harassment claim based on isolated actions that are insufficient to establish harassment.

Strickland v. Sears Roebuck and Co., Phyllis M. Strickland v. Sears Roebuck and Co. · filed 1988-04-14(a)

Our review of the record and other materials before us indicates that the district judge correctly determined that the actions complained of were isolated and insufficient to support a sexual harassment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a hostile work environment claim based on isolated conduct when the employer takes immediate corrective action.

Strickland v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1988-05-22(a)(1)

Accordingly, since defendant has shown that the disturbing actions were isolated and remedial steps were taken immediately, plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for proving a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make harassment actionable under this opinion’s hostile work environment analysis when it does not create an environment hostile to the employee’s sex.

Goluszek v. Smith · filed 1988-07-15(a)(1)

In fact, Goluszek may have been harassed “because” he is a male, but that harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a) holds an employer responsible for national origin harassment when its agents or supervisors knew or should have known of it and failed to take reasonable steps to remedy it.

Mlinaric v. Parker Hannifin Corporation · filed 1988-08-05(a)

It must also be shown that the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes employer liability for coworker sexual harassment depend on notice of the misconduct and the employer’s corrective action.

Carole L. Page v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company · filed 1988-09-07(a)(1)

The requirements are that knowledge of the alleged incident of sexual impropriety be brought to the attention of the employer and that the employer take action to reprimand the offending employee and to take appropriate steps to prevent a recurrence of the impropriety.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim when pervasive sex-based harassment changes the work atmosphere, even without proof of impaired job performance or psychological injury.

Bennett v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 1989-02-03(a)(1)

Thus, in order to satisfy this requirement of Vinson, Bennett need show only that the discriminatory hostility was sufficiently pervasive to change the work atmosphere, rather than being merely episodic, and thereby to change also a condition of employment. ... Although Bennett often said that she did not let an individual incident affect her job performance, and although she could not remember any of the names of the psychiatrists who treated her, that failure of Bennett’s evidence simply forecloses a few avenues of compensation; but it does not bar her claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a work environment dominated by racial hostility and harassment.

Ways v. City of Lincoln · filed 1989-04-03(a)(1)

A work environment must be dominated by racial hostility and harassment to rise to the level of a Title VII violation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from creating or condoning a racially hostile work environment that significantly and adversely affects an employee’s psychological well-being.

Ways v. City of Lincoln · filed 1989-04-03(a)(1)

To prove a Title VII violation, an employee must establish that his or her employer has created or condoned the continuing existence of a work environment that significantly and adversely affects the psychological well-being of an employee because of the employee’s race.

Section 2000e-2 requires a hostile work environment claimant to prove unwelcome sex-based harassment affecting employment terms and that the employer knew or should have known of it and failed to take proper remedial action.

Perkins v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1989-04-10(a)(1)

In order to establish a sexually hostile work environment sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII, plaintiff must prove each of the following elements: 1) that she belongs to a protected group; 2) that she was subjected to “unwelcome sexual harassment” 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the harassment affected a “term, condition or privilege” of her employment; and 5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.

For a supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment, a corporate employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. · filed 1989-03-15(a)(1)

Corporate liability, therefore, exists only through respondeat superior; liability exists where the corporate defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action against the supervisor.

For a claim based solely on a supervisor's hostile-environment harassment, an employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding · filed 1989-04-19(a)(1)

Liability attaches to a corporate defendant in a pure hostile environment case through respondeat superior. This corporate employer is not liable under respondeat superior because it took prompt remedial action against Bucknole.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination by employers; an alleged campaign to punish an employee for rejecting a supervisor’s sexual advances can state a sexual harassment claim.

Bertoncini v. Schrimpf · filed 1989-05-04(a)

Plaintiff therefore has stated a timely claim for sexual harassment continuing through May, 1988. ... Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (b).

After a consensual relationship ends, an employee alleging sex discrimination based on a former lover’s adverse treatment must show that continued sexual contact was demanded under threat of punishment.

Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86 · filed 1989-06-20(a)(1)

Because the two had engaged in a prior consensual relationship, Ms. Keppler could establish sexual discrimination only by rebutting the presumption that Dr. Miller penalized her not because she was a woman, but instead because she was his former lover. To do this, she had to show (at this stage, provide evidence from which a jury could find) not merely that Dr. Miller wanted their relationship to continue, but that Dr. Miller threatened punishment if copulation or some form of erotic engagement was refused.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that creates a hostile work environment even without a tangible job detriment.

Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1989-08-28(a)(1)

Although the jury and the court independently conclude that the Plaintiff did not suffer any tangible job detriment, ... such a finding does not in itself preclude a hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.

Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc. · filed 1989-09-06(a)(1)

Rather, sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee’s working conditions and to create an abusive or hostile environment alone violates Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an actual denial of a tangible employment benefit for a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim; a threatened detriment alone is insufficient.

Watts v. New York City Police Dept. · filed 1989-09-26(a)(1)

Absent the pleading of facts showing an actual, rather than threatened, employment decision resulting in denial of a tangible employment benefit, Watts fails to state a claim of sexual harassment premised upon the quid pro quo theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits unwelcome, gender-based conduct that is sufficiently pervasive to create an offensive working environment.

Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1989-11-14(a)(1)

A complaining employee is required to prove that such conduct was unwelcome, that the conduct was prompted simply because of the employee's gender, and that the conduct was sufficiently pervasive to create an offensive environment antithetical to the priority of merit--not sex or some other prohibited criterion--in the workplace. ... We are satisfied that defendant Peterson's conduct created for appellant a hostile working environment in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that alters employment conditions when an employer knows or should know of it and fails to take effective remedial action.

Morris v. American Nat. Can Corp. · filed 1989-12-18(a)(1)

Plaintiff has proven that she was subjected to unlawful sexual harassment which defendants' ineffectual measures failed to curtail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexually hostile work environment claim when intentional, pervasive discrimination harms the employee, would harm a reasonable person in the same position, and is attributable to the employer.

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1990-02-08(a)(1)

We hold that five constituents must converge to bring a successful claim for a sexually hostile work environment under Title VII: (1) the employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; 3 (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sexual harassment claim to proceed when disputed evidence could show persistent, unwelcome advances that created a hostile or abusive work environment.

Zowayyed v. Lowen Co., Inc. · filed 1990-04-17(a)(1)

Because Zowayyed alleges the existence of persistent, continuous, and unwelcome sexual advances which resulted in the creation of a hostile and abusive work environment, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment ... against Zowayyed’s Title VII claim should be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable when severe or pervasive coworker sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment and the employer knows or should know about it but fails to take corrective action.

Baker v. The Weyerhaeuser Company, a Washington Corporation · filed 1990-05-30(a)(1)

As above stated, the district court found that the sexual harassment of Baker by A.L. Caldwell was so severe and continuous as to create a hostile and abusive work environment establishing a Title VII claim, and that Weyerhaeuser either knew, or should have known of such fact, and failed to take corrective measures. We think the district court’s findings are sufficient for appellate review, and, in our view, the record supports such findings.

Section 2000e-2(a) and (c) permit a sex discrimination claim based on sufficiently alleged sexual harassment affecting employment conditions.

McLaughlin v. STATE OF NY, GOV. OFF. OF EMP. REL. · filed 1990-06-11(a), (c)

Without discussing the factual allegations which have been made by the plaintiff once again, it is evident that she has alleged sufficient facts necessary to support a claim of Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation against both Puma and Bischert.

Sections 2000e-2(a) and (c) permit a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when the alleged harasser has authority to affect the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

McLaughlin v. State of New York, Governor's Office of Employee Relations · filed 1990-06-11(a), (c)

At least on this motion for summary judg-mént, it is evident that Puma’s alleged authority as a member of the four-person executive committee of the QWL Committee placed him in a position where he could have a direct impact on the terms, conditions, and existence of plaintiff’s employment. Therefore, the element of responde-at superior, along with all the other elements of a quid pro quo cause of action, have been sufficiently alleged against defendant Puma in a manner which makes out a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes employment-related racial harassment actionable as discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.

McKnight v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1990-06-29(a)(1)

Second, employment-related racial harassment of the type McKnight alleges he suffered is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches racial harassment when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.

Nelms v. Montgomery County Combined Health District, Richard A. Parsells, and Melanie Cutlip · filed 1990-10-12(a)(1)

Because claims of harassment are grounded in the prohibition of practices that affect "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," cf. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), harassment does not rise to an actionable level unless it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' " Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 67. ... Because the magistrate's finding is not clearly erroneous, the plaintiff's harassment claim must fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment to be gender-induced and sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a sex-based hostile-work-environment claim.

Porras v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 1990-07-12(a)(1)

Even assuming the inadmissable hearsay allegations contained in the affidavits submitted on Porras’ behalf, there is no sufficient evidentiary basis on which a trier of fact could conclude that the level of harassment was gender-induced and such that it could be characterized as pervasive or severe.

Section 2000e-2 requires a hostile work environment claim to show harassment based on the employee’s sex.

Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, Inc. · filed 1990-07-24(a)

When the comments creating a sexual harassment claim are not linked in any way to the recipient’s gender, there has been no disparate treatment under Title VII. Thus, to prove a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that she was treated differently than similarly situated persons of the other gender. The plaintiff has made no such showing.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based harassment that creates a hostile work environment and affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Jew v. University of Iowa · filed 1990-08-28(a)(1)

I find and conclude that plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence the five elements of her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, as set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Hall, supra.

A hostile work environment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment.

Raley v. Board of St. Mary's County Commissioners · filed 1990-09-07(a)(1)

This Court finds that Raley fails to meet her burden of showing harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create an abusive working environment, the necessary third element.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for workplace sexual harassment when it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc. · filed 1990-09-10(a)(1)

Therefore, because there is no genuine issue of material fact that AMCI neither knew nor should have known about Mr. Shkrutz’s acts of harassment, and because once informed of his conduct AMCI took remedial action reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment, Ms. Juarez cannot prove that AMCI is liable for Mr. Shkrutz’s actions. Summary judgment must be entered in AMCI’s favor on Count I of Ms. Juarez’s complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to discharge or demote a harasser in every case; a reprimand, brief suspension, or other remedial steps may be sufficient.

Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department · filed 1990-10-12(a)(1)

An employer notified that an employee is engaging in hostile work environment sexual harassment is not obligated to discharge or demote the harasser in every case. While there may be egregious cases where such action is the only option for an employer, in less serious cases a reprimand, brief suspension, or other remedial steps may be sufficient to remedy the situation.

An employer is not liable for an employee’s sexual harassment under a scope-of-employment theory when the employee acted outside the scope of employment.

Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department · filed 1990-10-12(a)(1)

The district court in this ease held that Captain Galvan was an agent of the Department, but that the Department was not liable under section 219(1) because he “was not acting within the scope of his employment in his actions toward plaintiff.” Dist. Ct.Op. at 18. The record firmly supports the district court’s conclusion. Therefore, we find no error in the district court’s holding that defendants are not liable for Galvan’s actions under section 219(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers quid pro quo sexual harassment when submission to sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment benefits.

Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc. · filed 1990-09-20(a)(1)

This type of sexual harassment describes situations in which submission to sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment benefits. ... Our examination of the record reveals, however, that Ms. Dockter’s actual job duties and responsibilities — that is, those duties which she actually performed — did not change from the period before Gannon’s sexual overtures to after.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee for rejecting a supervisor’s sexual advances.

Katherine M. CHAMBERLIN, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. 101 REALTY, INC., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants · filed 1990-11-01(a)(1)

We conclude that the evidence supported a finding that Chamberlin’s employment was not terminated due to deficiencies in her employment qualifications or her work performance, but in retaliation for stonewalling Zsofka’s sexual advances.

An employer violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) when supervisors know of persistent sex-based harassment in the workplace and fail to take effective corrective measures.

Danna v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1990-11-17(a)(1)

In the instant case, Danna has proved each of the necessary elements to find Telco liable for subjecting her to a hostile environment in violation of Title VII. Danna offered evidence that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexually explicit graffiti directed specifically at her which were displayed in various workplace locations. The graffiti remained on the walls for at least two years. Telco supervisors were aware of this graffiti but failed to take effective measures to stop the graffiti writing or to have what was already written removed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars unwelcome harassment based on sex; vulgar arguments between coworkers of opposite sexes alone do not establish a violation.

Weinsheimer v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1990-11-23(a)(1)

Title VII bars unwelcome harassment based upon sex. It would seem to be stretching the language and aims of the statute were it to now apply per se to any argument between coworkers of opposite sex that involves vulgarities or sexual comments.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to remove a harasser when the harasser’s mere presence continues to create a hostile work environment.

Ellison v. Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury · filed 1991-02-05(a)(1)

If harassers are not removed from the workplace when their mere presence creates a hostile environment, employers have not fully remedied the harassment.

Repeated, personally directed sexual remarks can constitute sexual harassment affecting a term, condition, or privilege of employment under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Noblet v. Reproduction Systems, Inc. (In re Reproduction Systems, Inc.) · filed 1991-05-29(a)(1)

In this case, two factors are critical to my finding that the series of remarks by Mr. Cash constituted sexual harassment which affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from promoting or condoning a pervasive racially hostile work environment that adversely affects an employee because of race.

Dickerson v. New Jersey, Department of Human Services · filed 1991-07-10(a)(1)

In applying these factors to the instant claim, it becomes clear that DHS promoted or condoned a racially hostile work environment which significantly and adversely affected the psychological well-being of plaintiff because of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination in employment.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1991-06-06(a)(1)

Sexual harassment is, therefore, a form of sex discrimination, and as such, falls within Title VII’s prohibition of employer discrimination “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for coworker sexual harassment if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Marshall v. Electric · filed 1991-06-21(a)(1)

However, the Court also finds that although Noah was a foreman, he was not a supervisory employee within the meaning of Title VII. Thus, Nelson Electric is not automatically liable for the acts of Noah under Title VII. Rather, Nelson Electric is liable for the acts of Noah only if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment as forms of sex discrimination.

Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc. · filed 1991-07-31(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination because of sex in employment situations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... The Court finds that both plaintiffs were subjected to sexual harassment. The harassment can be characterized as both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires unwelcome conduct for a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment.

Reed v. Shepard · filed 1991-08-08(a)(1)

The trial court's conclusion that Reed welcomed the sexual hijinx of her co-workers is strongly supported by the evidence presented at trial. This showing that she welcomed the activity is fatal to her claim, particularly where Reed admits that the "harassment" did not adversely affect her ability to do her job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires pervasive religious hostility for a hostile work environment claim; workplace friction unrelated to religion does not suffice.

Man-Of-Jerusalem v. Hill · filed 1991-08-14(a)(1)

To establish a hostile atmosphere, plaintiff must demonstrate that the religious enmity was pervasive. ... However, the friction of which plaintiff complains was not motivated by religious discrimination; plaintiff does not allege even a single hostile comment pertaining to his religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits hostile work environment sexual harassment and can make an employer liable for harassment by its agent.

Nichols v. Frank · filed 1991-09-04(a)(1)

The court finds that Nichols has carried her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII, and that under the circumstances of this case, the Postal Service is liable for the actions of its agent who committed the sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment even without a quid pro quo or constructive discharge.

Cuesta v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 1991-11-01

In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established all the elements of a prima facie sexual harassment case. Her claim is based on a hostile environment only, with no showing of quid pro quo or constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostile-environment harassment to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1992-02-07(a)(1)

Even if Richardson teased Saxton about her relationship with Altaji, and spoke in a condescending manner, this does not rise to the level of affecting the “terms, conditions, or privileges [of Sax-ton’s] employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim without proof that the employee lost tangible job benefits.

Pamela Kotcher and Barbara Davis, Pamela Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., and Herbert Trageser · filed 1992-02-24(a)(1)

To show actionable sex discrimination, the plaintiff must first prove that discriminatory harassment occurred with respect to “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), though she need not show that she lost any tangible job benefits as a result thereof.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a racial hostile work environment claim when harassment affects employment conditions and an employer that knows or should know of it fails to take prompt, effective remedial action.

Coney v. Dept. of Human Resources of State of Ga. · filed 1992-03-27(a)(1)

The court concludes that plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s racial harassment claims were adequate and effective enough to avoid liability under Title VIL .

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostile workplace conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive working environment.

Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1992-04-08(a)(1)

To affect a term, condition or privilege of employment, the conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes severe or pervasive, unwelcome harassment based on membership in a protected class actionable as a hostile work environment.

Bishena v. Marriott Corporation, a Corporation, and Host International, a Corporation · filed 1992-04-09(a)(1)

Although it is analyzed somewhat differently than disparate treatment, discrimination in the form of harassment creates a hostile working environment actionable under section 703(a)(1). ... A hostile working environment requires the existence of severe or pervasive and unwelcome verbal or physical harassment because of a plaintiff's membership in a protected class. ... Outside of the Yarmulke incident, there is no evidence of severe or pervasive verbal harassment based on Bishena's religious faith or race. Accordingly, Bishena failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on a hostile working environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination that creates a hostile or abusive work environment.

Stockett v. Tolin · filed 1992-04-24(a)(1)

A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a discriminatory hostile work environment.

Julian E. VALDEZ, Appellant, v. MERCY HOSPITAL, an Iowa Non-Profit Organization and Corporation, Appellee · filed 1992-04-27(a)(1)

Clearly there were personality conflicts between Valdez and other MARC staff members, including Hughes, during Valdez’s term of employment with Mercy, but these conflicts, even taken with Hughes’s ethnic humor, did not rise to the level of severity or pervasiveness necessary to demonstrate a discriminatorily hostile work environment actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to have known or had reason to know of sexual harassment for hostile work environment liability.

Sparks v. Regional Medical Center Board · filed 1992-05-12(a)(1)

Employer liability in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases exists only when the corporate defendant knew or should have known of the harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) evaluates a racially or sexually hostile work environment from the perspective of a reasonable person of the same gender and race or color.

Stingley v. State of Ariz. · filed 1992-07-27(a)(1)

Based on Ellison, a “reasonable person of the same gender and race or color” standard will be applied in deciding this Motion.

Section 2000e-2 permits a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim when an employer’s agent conditions initial or continued employment on sexual favors.

Giordano v. William Paterson College · filed 1992-10-23(a)(1)

However, the alleged circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s hiring and first year of employment are sufficient to support a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. It is enough that an agent of the College conditioned Giordano’s initial and continued employment on sexual favors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes an employer liable for sexual harassment when it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.

Lorey Ann DAVIS, Appellee, v. TRI-STATE MACK DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellant · filed 1992-12-08(a)(1)

Under Title VII, an employer is liable for sexual harassment if the employer “knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.” ... Here, the district court’s finding that Tri-State failed to take prompt remedial action is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment.

Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc. · filed 1992-12-17(a)(1)

Applying the above principles, the court is convinced that Cronin was sexually harassed by Webster and that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the working conditions and create an abusive working environment at United Service’s Day Street store.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a quid pro quo harassment plaintiff to show that she was denied an economic benefit because of her gender or because she rejected a supervisor’s sexual advance.

Johnson v. Tower Air, Inc. · filed 1993-07-08(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that she was denied an economic benefit either because of her gender or because a sexual advance was made by a supervisor and rejected by her. ... Furthermore, although plaintiff clearly is a member of a protected group, she has failed to show, or to provide any evidence to indicate, that Paladines’s Report was sexually motivated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim based on discriminatory harassment affecting employment conditions without a loss of tangible job benefits.

Anderson v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Center · filed 1993-07-12(a)(1)

In order to show actionable sex discrimination, “the plaintiff must first prove that discriminatory harassment occurred with respect to ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), though [the plaintiff] need not show that [he] lost any tangible job benefits as a result thereof.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sexual harassment plaintiff to prove a hostile work environment by a preponderance of the evidence.

Locastro v. East Syracuse-Minoa Central School District · filed 1993-08-19(a)(1)

Thus, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of a hostile work environment by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore, need not reach the issue of respondeat superior liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sexual harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment.

Ball v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo. · filed 1993-10-29(a)(1)

Whether Renner’s harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive is “quintessentially” a question of fact and summary judgment is not appropriate unless, accepting plaintiffs evidence as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that Renner’s conduct was so severe or pervasive as to create an abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require psychological injury when a work environment is reasonably perceived, and actually perceived, as hostile or abusive.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. · filed 1993-11-09(a)(1)

So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, Meritor, supra, at 67, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.

Section 2000e-2 allows workplace statements and discriminatory promotion practices to support a prima facie hostile work environment claim based on race and sex.

Coleman v. State of Tenn. · filed 1993-12-01

However, when the statements are coupled with Dr. Coleman’s allegations regarding discrimination in promotional opportunities, the Court finds that Dr. Coleman has established a prima facie case of hostile work environment race and sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches a sexually hostile work environment, but prompt corrective action after harassment on an isolated work trip can defeat a showing that the claim is likely to succeed.

Anderson v. Kelley · filed 1993-12-15(a)(1)

In view of this prompt corrective action and the fact that the harassment occurred on an isolated trip, Anderson has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of a claim of a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from a racially hostile work environment created by a supervisor’s racial slurs and epithets.

Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Company, Cross-Appellee · filed 1993-12-17(a)(1)

Title VII does not guarantee stress-free employment, but it does protect employees from toiling in a hostile working environment created by their employers use of racial slurs and epithets.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require proof of psychological injury for a sexual harassment claim, though such injury may help show a hostile work environment.

Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1994-02-03(a)(1)

However, while psychological harm may be taken into account as one of several factors relevant in determining whether an environment is hostile or abusive, proof of such injury is not needed to prevail in a sexual harassment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers conditioning women’s employment benefits on submission to sexual demands.

Dirksen v. City of Springfield · filed 1994-02-09(a)(1)

Thus, unlike DeCintio, the alleged discriminatory conduct here is “gender” based discrimination—submission to sexual demands on the part of women is a condition to tangible employment benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sexual harassment; an employee’s objections and reports can create a factual question about whether the conduct was unwelcome.

Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Authority · filed 1994-05-12(a)(1)

Saville’s conduct — -telling Shanks to stop and reporting the incidents to co-workers and her supervisor— raises a factual question as to whether she did not welcome the conduct.