42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination by an employer; child welfare employees involved in custody proceedings are not the parent's employers under this provision.

NWANI v. DELAWARE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES · filed 2023-02-28(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). Nwami, however, seeks to assert claims under Title VII against individuals who are not his employer, namely, the DHS employees involved in custody proceedings involving his sons and the removal of his sons from his custody. They are not “employers.”

A Title VII claim against a league for its member clubs’ hiring decisions requires facts showing the league could influence those decisions; alleged awareness or tacit approval is insufficient.

Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-02-16(a)

Hill also brings Title VII and Section 1981 claims against USL. ... Importantly, Hill alleges no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that USL was responsible for its members’ hiring practices. ... Without anything more concrete regarding the USL’s ability to influence these hiring decision, Hill’s claim must fail.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination by an employer must show an employment relationship with the defendant.

Faush v. Tuesday Morning · filed 2015-11-18(a)

Accordingly, in order to prevail on his Title VII claim, he must demonstrate the existence of an “employment relationship” with Tuesday Morning.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim against the employer, not an individual who is not the employer.

Cooper v. Murphysboro Board of Education · filed 2001-04-26(a)(1)

In this case the Murphysboro Board of Education, not Mugge, was Cooper’s potential employer. Mugge therefore should have been dismissed from this action on that independent ground.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on employees of an agency who merely process an employment discrimination complaint.

Nadimi v. Brown · filed 2001-05-17(a), (b), (c)

In addition, Ms. Nadimi failed to state a claim under Title VII against the CCHRO defendants because they were not her employers but, rather, employees of the agency who processed her administrative complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), and (c) (imposing liability for certain acts of discrimination by an “employer,” “employment agency,” or “labor organization”).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a protected employment relationship for a discriminatory discharge claim; evidence of the defendant’s control over the plaintiff can create a factual dispute on that issue.

Elie v. Hilton · filed 2001-01-10(a)(1)

Because we conclude that there exists an issue of material fact with regard to plaintiffs employment relationship, or lack thereof, with defendants, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

An entity is a worker’s employer for a religious discrimination claim if it controls the means and manner of the worker’s employment.

Corry v. Analysts Int'l Corp. · filed 2000-06-06

The district court properly instructed the jury that AIC was Corry’s employer if it controlled the means and manner of Corry’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for discrimination liability; an organization’s control over the worker’s conditions of employment is relevant to whether that relationship exists.

Brown v. American Legion Cortland City Post 489 · filed 1999-08-31(a)

A determination of whether Post 489 is an agency of the American Legion, however, is not dispositive of the present motion: the germane issue is the relationship between the American Legion and the plaintiff and whether the former controlled at least some of the latter’s working conditions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship with a defendant for a Title VII discrimination claim against that defendant.

Buerger v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1997-08-21(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the ADA or Title VII against any Defendant in this action except for Defendant Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, because he does not have an employment relationship with any defendant besides Southwestern Bell.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees and potential employees, and a law firm partner may qualify depending on the partnership relationship.

Margarita SERAPION, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Fred H. MARTINEZ, Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1997-07-18(a)(1)

Having completed that task, we conclude that while Title VII’s employment-related shelter might in certain circumstances extend to a person who is a partner in a law firm, plaintiff-appellant Margarita Serapión, a partner in the now-disbanded law firm of Martinez, Odell, Calabria & Sierra (the Firm), is not entitled to such shelter here.

A franchisor that provides payroll services but does not control a franchisee’s labor relations is not an employer liable for discrimination under this section.

Hatcher v. Augustus · filed 1997-03-01(a)(1)

The fact that South-land provided a payroll service to Augustus for paying the employees of the Wantagh 7-Eleven does not in any manner create an indicia of control over labor relations sufficient to demonstrate that Southland is an employer of Hatcher.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect a physician who is an independent contractor and has no employment relationship with the hospital or his patients.

Dr. Mark F. Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Center · filed 1997-02-07(a)(1)

Given that Doe’s holding is inconsistent with Knight and Ost, Dr. Alexander’s status as an independent contractor precludes him from bringing a Title VII action against the hospital, and thus the entry of summary judgment against Dr. Alexander would have been appropriate.

Related entities are not a single employer under Title VII when the evidence does not establish a sufficient relationship between them.

Tatum v. Everhart · filed 1997-02-03(a)(1)

Here, the evidence establishes that UWA and UWWC should not be viewed as a single employer for Title VII and ADEA purposes. Because the court finds UWA is not Tatum’s employer, the Title VII and ADEA claims against UWA must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-2(a) can treat officials with authority over hiring as an employer when they are sued in their official capacities.

LeBoeuf v. Ramsey · filed 1980-09-16(a)

These defendants in their official capacities may be taken to be “an employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies only to employment practices by an employer, which the Act defines as a person with fifteen or more employees.

Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo · filed 1975-10-16(a)

This is so because section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act applies only to employment practices by an “employer,” and section 701(b) ... defines an employer as “a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees . . . .” It is neither alleged nor in any way suggested that any of the owners employ this number of persons. There is thus no violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2 covers public school boards as employers.

Roseboro v. Fayetteville City Board of Education · filed 1977-08-16

The defendant board of education is now an “employer” within the contemplation of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can make a parent company liable for its subsidiary’s discriminatory practices if the subsidiary acted as the parent’s agent.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Upjohn Corp. · filed 1977-12-09(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws discrimination by an “employer” on the basis of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Under these sections, if it may be shown that LPS operated as an agent of Upjohn, the liability for the discriminatory practices becomes the responsibility of Upjohn as “employer” and LPS as “agent”.

Section 2000e-2 can reach an entity that controls access to a plaintiff’s job market even if it does not directly employ the plaintiff.

Gill v. Monroe County Department of Social Services · filed 1978-06-19

Even if the state defendants do not directly employ the plaintiffs, they are within the reach of Title VII if they control access to the plaintiffs’ job market.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) may reach a parent corporation that controls a subsidiary as its agent or instrumentality.

Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. · filed 1979-05-18(a)(1)

Second, if a parent corporation so controls the subsidiary as to cause the subsidiary to become merely the agent or instrumentality of the parent, then the parent may be liable under the ADEA or Title VII for the discriminatory employment practices of the subsidiary.

Section 2000e-2(a) reaches discriminatory conduct by an employer’s agent, including a state agency that supervises the state’s employment merit system.

Cannon v. State of Del. · filed 1981-09-28(a)

But I need not conclude that the Personnel Commission is an employer in the usual sense, because the Act expressly reaches the conduct of “any agent” whose conduct may violate the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This explicit language impels me to the conclusion that the Personnel Commission may be liable under Title VII, because it is an agent of the State of Delaware, responsible for supervising the operation of the merit system under a legislative mandate.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; a franchise relationship alone does not establish one.

Miss Greater New York City Scholarship Pageant v. Miss New York State Scholarship Pageant · filed 1981-10-05(a)

This section only applies in an employer-employee situation. The City Pageant as an affiliate of the West Side Community Alliance, incorporated, was at best a franchisee of the State Pageant. They were not employees of the State Pageant, of Robert W. Brooks or of MAP. Since there was not, nor could there be, an employment relationship between these plaintiffs and the defendants, there is no basis for a claim of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 addresses unlawful employment practices by employers, rather than by their officers or employees.

Padway v. Palches · filed 1982-01-11

We note that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 speaks of unlawful practices by the employer, and not of unlawful practices by officers or employees of the employer.

Section 2000e-2 places liability for back pay on the employer, not its officers or employees.

Snow v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 1982-06-28

Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 speaks of unlawful practices by the employer, and not of officers or employees of the employer; therefore such officers or employees cannot be held liable for back pay. Back pay awards are to be paid by the employer.

Section 2000e-2 can cover a hospital’s discriminatory denial of staff privileges when the hospital controls a physician’s access to prospective patients.

Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hospital · filed 1982-08-27(a)

In light of Congress’ intent to reach all forms of discriminatory employment practices that affected employment opportunity, it seems apparent that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged an employment relationship covered by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not reach an insurer that merely advises an employer about its health plan and has no control over employment or benefits decisions.

Crowder v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. · filed 1983-08-31(a)(1)

Title VII provides that discrimination by an “employer” against any individual in the terms and conditions of employment is an unfair employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The evidence before the Court plainly shows that Equitable is not an “employer” under the statutes in question here. It exercises no control or authority over plaintiff or any other Fieldcrest employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability on a supervisor who is not an employer, even when the claim is brought through § 1983.

Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Services · filed 1983-09-13(a)(1)

Rader was not an employer and thus did not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 covers discriminatory conduct by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1984-08-22(a)-(c)

Title VII reaches discriminatory conduct only by an “employer,” an “employment agency,” or a “labor organization.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers a statutory employer’s discriminatory interference with a worker’s employment opportunities even when another company directly employs the worker.

Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. · filed 1984-10-10(a)(1)

Even if Amarnare were an employee only of Mature Temps, she may invoke the statute on the ground that Merrill Lynch interfered with her employment opportunities with Mature Temps.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make university officials who are not the employer proper defendants to a Title VII claim.

Hoferek v. University of Missouri · filed 1985-02-15(a)

Uehling and Zanders are not proper party-defendants to plaintiffs Title VII claim; they are defendants only insofar as Counts 2 and 3 remain. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) [“employer” defined]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits Title VII claims against employees who supervise the plaintiff, but not against employees who do not.

Duva v. Textron · filed 1985-12-11(a)(1)

While supervisory employees fall within the ambit of the term “employer,” the same is not true of employees who do not supervise the Title VII plaintiff. Consequently, if any of the individual defendants was not in a supervisory position with respect to plaintiff, he would not be a person against whom plaintiff could maintain a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to employers, including agents with delegated authority over employment decisions.

Barger v. State of Kan. · filed 1985-12-30(a)(1)

Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). ... Thus, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, defendants must be considered agents of the University and plaintiff’s- “employers” as defined under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship for a discriminatory discharge claim; employee status is determined by economic realities, especially the employer’s right to control the work.

Donnie Sue Coker Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc. · filed 1986-05-16(a)(1)

Courts, logically enough, consistently hold that Title VII contemplates some employment relationship in discharge cases. ... Based on the economic realities test, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Broussard was not an employee for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e-2(a) imposes liability on employers for sex discrimination; a supervisor who is not the employee’s employer has no liability under it.

Saulsberry v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1987-11-20(a)

Although this ground is alleged against Melvin Henderson, it is clearly inapplicable to him. Henderson was not Saulsberry's employer and, therefore, has no liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires alleged discrimination to affect the complainant’s employment relationship, as determined by the economic realities/common law control test.

Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc. · filed 1988-06-21(a)(1)

A Title VII claim must involve discriminatory conduct that affects an employment relationship of the complainant, as determined by application of the economic realities/common law control test.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination arising out of an employment relationship; an employee’s spouse and conjugal partnership cannot sue for discrimination against the employee.

Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc. · filed 1988-08-26

42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2 only prohibits discrimination arising out of an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer to actively participate in a third party's discriminatory benefit program before the employer can be held responsible for it.

Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., and Safeway Arizona Federal Credit Union · filed 1989-09-06(a)

To establish employer responsibility for the discriminatory programs of third parties, the employer must be more than a broker, or other intermediary, that simply enables its employees to enter into arrangements with third parties; the employer must affirmatively, actively participate in the third-party program.

A supervisor may be subject to a § 2000e-2(a) claim as an employer’s agent when the supervisor exercises significant control over an employee’s working conditions.

Hrabak v. Marquip, Inc. · filed 1992-01-02(a)

Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant Opresik exercised sufficient supervisory authority to qualify as an employer. ... Under the circumstances, summary judgment cannot be granted on the issue of defendant Opre-sik’s status as an employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits individual-capacity claims against employer agents who participate in discriminatory decisions.

Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1992-09-01(a)

Therefore the court will follow prior cases in this Circuit, which have assumed that both individual and official liability may be imposed, and plaintiffs may maintain suit against defendants Walker and Kucik in their individual capacities under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship between the alleged discriminator and the person claiming discrimination.

Hill v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1992-11-12(a)(1)

However, this argument ignores the fundamental predicate for Title VII liability — the existence of an employment relationship between the one who discriminates against another and that other who finds himself the victim of that discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can apply to more than one employer when each exercises substantial control over an individual’s employment.

Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. · filed 1992-12-02(a)(1)

An individual may be the employee of more than one “employer” for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make a selling employer liable for its employees’ discriminatory hiring acts when they acted solely for the buyer’s benefit.

Moham v. Steego Corp. · filed 1993-09-28(a)(1)

Instead, they were acting solely for the benefit of Mansfield; and, therefore, their discriminatory acts cannot be attributable to Steego, the selling company.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a defendant liable for sex discrimination as an employer when its connection to the plaintiff’s employment is too tenuous to make it her employer.

Kern v. City of Rochester · filed 1996-08-15(a)

The City had no authority to hire or fire Kern, to supervise her work or conditions of employment, to determine her rate or method of pay, or to maintain records of her employment. Indeed, Kern fails to allege that her employment at Local 1071 was affected by the City in any way. The only connection that Kern alleges between the City and her employment at Local 1071 is that Local 1071—and therefore her job— would not exist without a city fire department. However, we think that this relationship is too tenuous to bring the City under the Title VII definition of employer. Therefore, the district court properly denied Kern’s motions to amend her complaint to add a Title VII action against the City.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on a third party for an employer's alleged sex discrimination when the third party neither employed the worker nor denied her employment.

Porter v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 1996-09-13

Second, Porter does not contend that the federal defendants employed her or denied employment to her. Rather, she alleges that Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. was her sole employer. The district court properly concluded that there is no basis for imposing Title VII liability on any of the federal defendants under these circumstances.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from discriminating based on sex; individual supervisors and entities that are not the employee’s employer are not proper defendants.

Farrell v. State of NY · filed 1996-11-25(a)

Accordingly, no individual defendant may be named as a defendant to the Title VII claim. Moreover, as the State of New York and the New York State Bureau of Audit and Control are not the employers of the plaintiff, they may not be named as defendants to the Title VII action.

An affiliated corporation is not liable under Title VII when the plaintiff fails to show that it was her employer.

Glover v. Heart of America Management Co. · filed 1999-01-12

Plaintiff fails to show that IMS qualifies as her employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) governs unlawful employment practices by employers; a plaintiff must allege an employment relationship, and individual employees are not personally liable under Title VII.

Emerson v. Thiel College · filed 2002-07-10(a)

Finally, the District Court properly granted the motions to dismiss with respect to Emerson's Title VII claims. Title VII prohibits unlawful employment practices by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Emerson does not aver that any of the defendants employed him. In addition, individual employees are not liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a connection between the defendant and the plaintiff’s employment or access to employment.

Small v. Chao · filed 2003-01-15(a)

Plaintiff has not alleged any relationship of employment with any of the Defendants. He has failed to allege that Defendants interfered with his access to employment with any specific employer. He has failed to show that any of the Defendants had any connection whatsoever to Plaintiffs potential employment. Since Plaintiff has failed to establish an employer-employee relationship, the case must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not impose employer liability on a temporary employment agency that does not control workers’ duties once they are assigned to a client.

Watson v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc. · filed 2003-03-06(a)

For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims against Adecco, who is not Plaintiffs’ “employer” for Title VII purposes under the urged joint employer theory of liability.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a health insurer liable for discrimination in compensation when the insurer neither employs nor compensates the plaintiffs.

Klassy v. Physicians Plus Insurance · filed 2003-06-09(a)

Moreover, defendant Physicians Plus did not discriminate against plaintiffs “with respect to [their] compensation,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), because it did not provide plaintiffs with any compensation.

Section 2000e-2 requires a connection with an employment relationship before an entity can be liable for workplace discrimination, including under a joint employer theory.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Maritime Association · filed 2003-11-24

For the foregoing reasons we conclude that there was no legally sufficient basis for the jury to find a connection with an employment relationship between PMA and Jones. Accordingly, the district court erred when it denied PMA's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a discrimination claim against an entity when the complaint alleges no employment relationship between that entity and the plaintiff.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2004-08-09

The Diocese contends that the plaintiff is unable to maintain a Title VII action against it because it is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. The Court agrees. The complaint does not allege that the Diocese is her employer or even that an employment relationship exists between it and the plaintiff or to any other party in this action. Thus, the complaint must be dismissed as to the Diocese.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; community supervision staff employed by judicial districts are not employees of the department.

Yowman v. Jefferson County Community Supervision & Corrections Department · filed 2005-01-28(a)(1)

In light of the fact that, under Texas law, the district judges “participate in the management of the department, appoint the department director, and employ and pay district personnel,” the court concludes that the JCCSCD staff are officers and employees of the judicial districts in which they serve.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship; participation in hiring alone does not establish one.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2005-07-05(a)

The mere fact that the Church of the Advent took part in the decision to hire the Plaintiff cannot alone sustain a claim against it under Title VII.

A disparate impact claim under § 2000e-2 cannot proceed against a state agency that is not the plaintiffs’ employer under Title VII.

Lopez v. Massachusetts · filed 2009-12-03(k)(1)(A)(i)

Our holding that the state defendants are not plaintiffs' "employers" for purposes of Title VII means that we dismiss plaintiffs' suit only against these defendants.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, with control over the worker a key factor.

Justo Roque, Jr. v. Harrah's Casino New Orleans, e · filed 2010-07-22

Two steps are required to determine whether a defendant is an employer under the statute: (1) the defendant must fall within the statutory definition, and (2) there must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. ... Therefore, although Roque was working in Jazz Casino’s physical plant, neither Jazz Casino nor Newell exercised the requisite control over Roque to establish an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship for a Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hospital · filed 2012-11-16(a)

It is well-settled, however, that to make out a claim for relief under Title VII, it must be shown that there existed an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. ... Turning to this case, Dr. Brintley was never an employee of SMMH.

Section 2000e-2(a) imposes employment discrimination liability only on an employer.

Davis v. Ricketts · filed 2014-08-27(a)

Title VII imposes liability for employment discrimination only on an “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Because we agree with the district court that Hugo and OEF are not sufficiently integrated enterprises to combine their employees to meet the statutory numerosity requirement, the Appellants’ Title VII and NFEPA claims cannot survive and we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employers; an entity that never employed more than 14 people during the relevant period is outside its discrimination prohibition.

Vazquez v. Orange County Service Unit · filed 2015-03-26(a)

Title VII prohibits “employers” from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... The District Court found that OSCU was not an employer because it did not employ fifteen or more employees during the relevant time period. Vazquez challenges this finding. We find no error. Viewed in the light most favorable to Vazquez, the evidence showed that OSCU never employed more than 14 employees during the relevant time period.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination by employers; an entity excluded from Title VII’s definition of employer is not liable under it.

Daniels v. Chugach Government Services, Inc. · filed 2016-03-07(a)(1)

Chugach is therefore exempt from the definition of employer under Title VII and Mr. Daniels’ claim for discrimination based on national origin fails.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim must plausibly allege that the defendant had at least fifteen employees for twenty or more weeks.

Dubie v. Buffalo Concrete Accessories, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

Dubie therefore has failed to plead that Buffalo Concrete is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. And for that reason, she has failed to state a claim under Title VII.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires plausible allegations that the defendant employed at least fifteen people for twenty or more weeks of the year.

Dubie v. Buffalo Concrete Accessories, Inc. · filed 2022-12-20(a)(1)

Dubie has not plausibly alleged that Buffalo Concrete had fifteen or more employees for twenty or more weeks of the year. She therefore has failed to plead that Buffalo Concrete is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, and her Title VII claim is therefore dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses workplace discrimination by employers.

Emrit v. Jules · filed 2023-07-24(a)

Title VII addresses only the conduct of “employers.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming sex discrimination to establish that the defendant was her employer.

Salatas v. Lake County Government · filed 2023-08-02(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing that any of the named defendants in this case were her employer for the purposes of Title VII, and therefore they cannot be held liable for any employment discrimination she may have encountered.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not apply to an Alaska Native Corporation excluded from Title VII’s definition of employer, and that exclusion cannot be waived.

Balli v. Akima Global Services, LLC · filed 2023-10-26(a)(1)

Title VII thus does not apply to Defendant, who is an Alaska Native Corporation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) imposes employment discrimination liability only on an employer, including an entity that qualifies as a joint employer.

Stokes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc · filed 2024-03-28(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Title VII claims directed at Defendant IDOC must be dismissed as only an employer can be liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not apply to discrimination claims against defendants who were not the plaintiff’s employer.

Shackleford v. Pirro & Church, LLC · filed 2024-04-23(a)

The defendants are not his employer so Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” is inapplicable.

Section 2000e-2 applies to a defendant only if it qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

EEOC v. Village at Hamilton Pointe LLC · filed 2024-05-09

Finally, the district court ... correctly held that TLC was not an employer within the mean- ing of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses unlawful employment practices by employers or potential employers; a job applicant who alleges no application to a defendant states no claim against that defendant.

Clarence Jenkins, Jr. v. Office of South Carolina Governor · filed 2025-01-27(a)(1)

We further conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the claims against the remaining Defendants without prejudice and without service of process. Title VII and the ADEA prohibit unlawful employment practices by employers or potential employers, and Jenkins did not allege that he applied for any positions with the remaining Defendants. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employers and does not cover discrimination involving a customer's gym membership.

Green v. Argent Companies · filed 2025-11-05(a)

While plaintiff seeks to bring discrimination claims against defendants under both Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII only applies to employers and, therefore, is not applicable in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employers, so it does not cover a gym customer’s discrimination claim against the gym.

Green v. Fitness Ventures LLC · filed 2025-11-05(a)

While plaintiff seeks to bring discrimination claims against defendant under both Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII only applies to employers and, therefore, is not applicable in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).

Section 2000e-2(h) permits different compensation standards under a system that measures earnings by the quantity or quality of production.

Beasley v. Kroehler Manufacturing Co. · filed 1976-01-21(h)

Title VII specifically provides that “it shall not be an unlaw...ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation . . . pursuant to a . system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production ...” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Plaintiff and her witnesses did not have their earning potential affected by the assignment of preferred sewing schedules to Caucasian sewers.

Section 2000e-2(h) allows compensation based on quality of work as a defense to a Title VII claim; the plaintiff need not anticipate that defense in the complaint.

Miller v. Advanced Studies, Inc. · filed 1986-05-08(h)

Moreover, compensation based on quality of work is a defense to a Title VII complaint, ... and thus need not be anticipated in a complaint.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects a compensation system that measures quantity or quality of production from a disparate-impact challenge unless the system itself was adopted with discriminatory intent.

McReynolds v. Lynch · filed 2012-09-11(h)

The import of § 703(h) is that disparate racial impact is insufficient under Title VII to invalidate a “bona fide seniority or merit system,” or a “system which measures earnings by quantity or quality ... of production.” Plaintiffs challenging an employment practice or compensation system of this type must establish intent to discriminate.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discharge because of race; an employee challenging a stated nondiscriminatory reason must offer evidence of pretext and discriminatory animus to avoid summary judgment.

Pearson v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2013-07-15(a)

We read the record as showing that Pearson has not shown a material dispute of fact as to pretext, and thus side with the district court in rejecting the claim that racial discrimination motivated his firing.

A racial discrimination claim based on failure to promote or termination requires evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretextual.

Whitaker v. Nash County · filed 2013-01-11(a)(1)

We conclude that Whitaker has failed to demonstrate that the Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for failure to promote and her termination were pretextual, either for racial discrimination or retaliation.

A Title VII claim alleging intentional race discrimination in hiring requires proof that the employer discriminated because of race.

Edwards v. Galveston-Texas City Pilots & Galtex Pilots Service Corp. · filed 2002-05-08

Finally, Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees or applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, while the TCHRA provides for the execution of Title VII in the state of Texas. ... Thus, in order to recover under any of these claims, Edwards must demonstrate that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race.

A Title VII race discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s reason for denying an opportunity was a pretext for racial discrimination.

Booker T. Warren, Plaintif-Appellant v. Marvin T. Runyon, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service · filed 1997-06-06

As there is no evidence that the Postmaster's rationale for not permitting him to train was a pretext for racial discrimination, summary judgment was appropriately granted.

An employee alleging race discrimination may establish a prima facie case despite deficient performance by showing that similarly deficient employees of another race received more favorable treatment.

Farmer v. Continental Insurance · filed 1997-02-24(a)(1)

Although surprised by her position, the Court agrees that Farmer’s method is a valid means of establishing a prima facie case, assuming that she can show that the white supervisors were similarly situated, i.e., that they performed in a similarly deficient manner.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers adverse employment treatment alleged to be because an employee is white.

Holiday v. Belle's Restaurant · filed 1976-01-30(a)(1)

Thus the plaintiff’s allegation that the discrimination occurred because of her race, in itself, complies with the proscriptions of the statute.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects white employees from employment discrimination based on race, color, or national origin.

Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.(America), Inc. · filed 1976-01-29(a)(1)

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is denied. In the section of the complaint which alleges discrimination against whites because of their race, the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1981 as well as Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits racially discriminatory salary practices, including unequal starting pay and merit increases.

Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc. · filed 1976-06-22(a)(1)

Plaintiff, therefore has shown racial discrimination in the effect of defendant’s arbitrary application of salary policy, and the Texas Educational Foundation has failed to show a legitimate business purpose for this discrimination. Plaintiff must prevail on his claim of racial discrimination in payment of salaries at the Gary Job Corps Center.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects white employees from racial discrimination on the same terms as other employees, including when an employer disciplines employees for serious misconduct.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. · filed 1976-06-25(a)(1)

We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson white. ... While Santa Fe may decide that participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for employment, this criterion must be “applied, alike to members of all races,” and Title VII is violated if, as petitioners alleged, it was not.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits racial segregation of employees that deprives or tends to deprive them of employment opportunities.

Kennerly v. ARO, Inc. · filed 1977-09-28(a)(2)

ARO segregated its black employees by classification in such a way that deprived, or tended to deprive, them of individual employment opportunities because of their race.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects black women from discrimination based on the combination of race and sex; an employer’s treatment of black men and white women does not defeat such a claim.

Dafro M. JEFFERIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARRIS COUNTY COMMUNITY ACTION ASSOCIATION Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-04-21(a)

Therefore, we hold that when a Title VII plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against black females, the fact that black males and white females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant and must not form any part of the basis for a finding that the employer did not discriminate against the black female plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; disparate treatment may support an inference of discrimination unless the employer proves a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.

Brazer v. St. Regis Paper Co. · filed 1980-08-22(a)(1)

In a Title VII action discrimination may be inferred from disparate treatment unless the defendant proves a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment. ... Brazer’s claim under either theory can be discussed together because the evidence did not show disparate treatment let alone intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars demotion because of race; a demotion that would have occurred regardless of race does not violate it.

Worthy v. U. S. Steel Corp. · filed 1980-12-08(a)(1)

Had Curtis Worthy been a white crane operator, he would have been demoted. That being the case, the Court cannot find that defendant treated Worthy less favorably as to the “terms, conditions, or privileges in employment, because of [his] race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment decisions based on race, including discrimination against white applicants.

Leftwich v. HARRIS-STOWE STATE COLLEGE, ETC. · filed 1982-05-05

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 states that employment personnel decisions cannot be based on race. This includes any race, black or white.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racial discrimination in employees’ terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

McKenzie v. Sawyer · filed 1982-07-27(a)(1)

On liability, we find that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper in all respects save the determination that GPO had discriminated in hiring journeymen after 1971. ... Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating among their employees on racial grounds in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race.

Gates v. ITT Continental Baking Co. · filed 1984-01-09(a)

Accordingly, in order to find racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII, an individual must show that an employer discharged him because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits racial discrimination against white applicants as well as Black applicants.

Walters v. City of Atlanta · filed 1985-05-28(a)

Plaintiff is protected by section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which prohibits discrimination against whites as well as blacks.

Section 2000e-2(a) supports a race discrimination claim when a plaintiff alleges that similarly situated employees of another race received different treatment at work.

Barlow v. Pep Boys, Inc. · filed 1985-10-04(a)

For a Title VII claim, the factual allegations must show that plaintiff is a member of a class entitled to protection under the Act and that he was treated differently in his employment from persons otherwise similarly situated who are not members of the class.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from denying a work assignment because of other employees’ racial attitudes.

Royal v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1986-06-12

The court finds that management personnel knew of these incidents prior to the selection of the crews, and the defendant, through management personnel, yielded to the expressed or unexpressed known racial feelings of other employees selected for the trips.

Section 2000e-2(c) prohibits a labor union from discriminating against a worker because of race, even when its hostility stems from his participation in a racial quota program.

Denton v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers · filed 1986-09-05(c)

Second, the court concludes that in the context of this case, discrimination against or harassment of Denton because he was the beneficiary of a racial quota filled in part by referrals from the Third World Clearinghouse would constitute discrimination or harassment based on race proscribed by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based employment discrimination; an employee who cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual cannot prevail on that claim.

Peterson v. King Tree Center, Inc. · filed 1989-05-25(a)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against an individual on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... In response, the Plaintiff has failed to discharge her burden to demonstrate that the Defendant’s articulated, legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for her discharge were merely pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits racially motivated adverse employment actions, including a salary downgrade of a white employee.

Crowley v. Prince George's County · filed 1989-11-29

This claim of a racially motivated adverse employment action states a cognizable cause of action under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits a race discrimination claim when an employee alleges that an adverse employment action was taken because of the employee's race.

Crowley v. Prince George's County · filed 1989-12-28

He contends that the downgrading of his position was racially motivated in that it was ordered to avoid a charge of racial discrimination by a black employee. Thus, he argues, his position never would have been downgraded had he not been white. This claim of a racially motivated adverse employment action states a cognizable cause of action under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from withholding performance criticism and counseling because of an employee’s race, even if a later discharge decision appears neutral.

Vaughn v. Robert Edel, Texaco, Inc. · filed 1990-12-06(a)(1), (a)(2)

Because Texaco’s behavior was race-motivated, Texaco has violated Title VII. Texaco limited or classified Vaughn in a way which would either “tend to deprive [her] of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Texaco has also “otherwise” discriminated against Vaughn with respect to her “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim requires proof of discriminatory intent.

Allen v. City of Yonkers · filed 1992-04-15

Race was the controlling negative factor in unfavorable aspects of plaintiffs treatment throughout his relationship with the institutional defendants, including absence of severance pay provisions in his contract and his dismissal, while any claimed deficiencies in plaintiffs performance were not factors and were pretextual. ... A plaintiff proceeding under Title VII or § 1983 must prove discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from constructively discharging an employee or denying a promotion because of race.

Berry v. Chevrolet · filed 1992-09-24(a)(1)

Under Title VII it is unlawful to discharge or discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of his race or color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... I conclude that Chevrolet West constructively discharged and failed to promote Berry because he is black. Berry has proven his Title VII claim and is entitled to relief under this statute.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim even when the employee and supervisor are of the same race.

Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Department · filed 1992-09-30(a)(1)

For the reasons expressed below, this court holds that intraracial discrimination is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover an employer’s race-based failure to respond to an employee’s complaint as discrimination in the privileges of employment.

West v. Boeing Co. · filed 1994-01-05(a)(1)

Assuming this specific allegation is true, it could show “discrimination against [plaintiff] with respect to [her] ... privileges of employment, because of [her] race,” in contravention of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Therefore, under the liberal federal pleading standards, it would be improper for the court to dismiss plaintiffs race discrimination claim at this stage of the litigation.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of race in discharge or other conditions of employment.

Shelton v. Babbitt · filed 1994-04-26(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 provides, among other things, that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the areas of hiring, discharging, compensating, or otherwise subjecting an employee to conditions or privileges of employment. ... The Court finds that, indeed, Mr. Shelton was a victim of racial discrimination.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) survives summary judgment when evidence of disparate treatment establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine issue about the employer's stated reason.

Loiseau v. Department of Human Resources of State of Or. · filed 1994-04-29(a)(1)

This pattern of hostility together with different treatment of white supervisors establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. And although Loiseau's employer proferred evidence that it demoted Loiseau because he was a bad supervisor, the rapid production of negative evaluations before Loiseau's demotion raises a genuine issue of fact that the evaluations were pretextual. We conclude that summary judgment also was improper on the discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees of every race, including white employees, from racial discrimination.

Cianfrano v. Babbitt · filed 1994-04-28(a)

As to the first prong, plaintiffs member­ship in a protected class, it is important to note that a plain reading of the statute re­veals that the protection of Title VII extends to all individuals, regardless of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based discrimination in compensation and other employment terms, but a claimant must prove the alleged discrimination.

Christian v. Merchants Service Corporation · filed 1994-12-27(a)

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of ... race." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a). ... Thus, we do not believe that the district court committed clear error in holding that Christian failed to prove her allegations of racial discrimination.

A race discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when evidence of favorable performance, stronger qualifications, and unequal treatment of Black managers supports an inference of racial discrimination.

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-04-11(a)(1)

Based on this presentation by the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to withstand Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to her claim that Defendants’ decision was based on racial considerations. Plaintiffs evidence tends to show that her performance evaluation was good in February, 1993, and that her qualifications surpassed those of Ms. Bowers. Moreover, Plaintiffs evidence suggests that Defendants demoted a disproportionate number of black managers, while allowing whites to remain in, or to attain, managerial positions.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee claiming race discrimination to prove that race motivated the employer’s decision.

Hall v. City of Brawley · filed 1995-05-23(a)

This testimony is insufficient to persuade the Court that the Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff either in undertaking the second interview process or replacing Plaintiff with Tony Verdugo after that second interview process, or that race was a motivating factor in these regards.

Section 2000e-2(a) and (m) prohibit employment discrimination based on race, including practices for which race is a motivating factor.

Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. · filed 1995-09-20(a), (m)

Count II alleges that the City of Fort Lauderdale discriminated against Plaintiff while he was employed as a fire fighter. These allegations, if true, constitute prohibited conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (m).

Section 2000e-2 permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence allows a jury to infer that an employer used impermissible criteria in discharging an employee.

Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle · filed 1996-12-09

Based on this evidence, a jury could infer that the employment decisions were made according to impermissible criteria. The conflicting evidence submitted by the parties creates a triable issue of fact that may only be resolved by a jury.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits unequal treatment based on race; different treatment alone does not establish race discrimination.

Wright v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department · filed 1997-04-22

First, plaintiff gives no indication that the individuals allegedly accorded differential treatment were non-minorities. Title VII does not require employers to treat all employees equally; it merely prohibits employers from meting out unequal treatment based on race.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment, and a plaintiff must show a triable issue that race played a role in an adverse employment action.

Clay v. Interstate National Corporation · filed 1997-08-07(a)

Title VII establishes that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race in hiring, firing, or setting the terms and conditions of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... By failing to rebut Interstate's substantial evidence of his deficient performance, and for lack of relevant evidence of racial discrimination, Clay presented no genuine issue of material fact.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise disadvantaging an employee because of race.

Norris v. Housing Authority of City of Galveston · filed 1997-11-03(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to that person’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or to otherwise adversely affect the person’s status as an employee, because of that person’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an objectively measurable degree of association for an employee’s race discrimination claim.

Larry D. Drake and Rosalie E. Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company · filed 1998-01-21(a)(1)

Contrary to 3M’s assertions, we do not believe that an objective “degree of association” is relevant to this inquiry.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of race.

Goodwin v. M.C.I. Communications Corporation · filed 1998-02-04(a)(1)

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to "discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the trial court's ultimate determination that Goodwin's discharge was racially motivated is not clearly erroneous.

A Title VII race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment without specific evidence supporting the claim or showing that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Ali v. Brown · filed 1998-03-23

This claim cannot survive summary judgment, however, because (1) it is not backed by specific evidentiary facts, and (2) Ali presents no evidence that requiring this documentation was a pretext for race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based employment decisions; a plaintiff challenging a demotion must present evidence of discrimination or pretext to survive summary judgment.

Jones v. General Electric Information Services · filed 1998-04-27(a)(1)

Therefore, Jones fails to present any competent evidence to show that Register or Skerya, who had formal authority over the decision to place Jones on the plan or demote her, were racially discriminatory. Accordingly, the court grants GEIS’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from reducing an employee’s hours because of race.

Charles COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.J. KIBORT and Educational Therapy Center, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1998-05-01(a)

Drawing all reasonable inferences from this evidence in Collins’ favor, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that intentional race discrimination motivated Collins’ reduction in hours.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming race discrimination to show that the employer acted against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s race; more favorable treatment of someone of another race alone is insufficient.

Williams v. CJ Gayfers and Co. · filed 1998-07-23(a)(1)

The precise language of Title VII does not give a cause of action to an individual for discrimination committed against someone else. Nor does the language provide a cause of action simply because a person of a different race than plaintiff is treated more favorably. Instead, Title VII gives an individual a claim only if discrimination is directed against that particular individual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when evidence of a policy against promoting Black workers supports an inference of discriminatory motive.

Allder v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons · filed 1998-09-11(a)(1)

Evidence that such a policy may have existed, regardless of whether that policy was alleged to be of a spoken or unspoken nature, constitutes evidence of racial animus and discriminatory motive sufficient to enable Plaintiff to survive Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both his federal and state claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars race discrimination in employment, but isolated racial epithets without a causal link to a promotion decision cannot support a discrimination verdict.

Boyd v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1998-11-11(a)

Absent a causal link between the references and the conduct complained of, such epithets become stray remarks that cannot support a discrimination verdict.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers an employee discharged because his child is biracial.

Fred E. TETRO, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELLIOTT POPHAM PONTIAC, OLDSMOBILE, BUICK, AND GMC TRUCKS, INC., Defendant-A · filed 1999-04-06(a)(1)

A white employee who is discharged because his child is biracial is discriminated against on the basis of his race, even though the root animus for the discrimination is a prejudice against the biracial child.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employment discrimination claim based on a combination of impermissible factors, including race and sex.

McHenry v. Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education · filed 1999-05-11(a)(1)

This court Has held that a Title VII discrimination claim may be based on a combination of impermissible factors. ... Therefore, we find that the Plaintiff has properly brought his claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming race discrimination in a pay decision to produce evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Freeman v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Ex Rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1999-05-28(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... In the plaintiffs claim of discriminatory failure to give a pay raise in 1994, the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that he was treated differently than similarly situated non-minority employees at the time the employment decision was made.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits firing an employee because of race.

Sanders v. Alliance Home Health · filed 2000-01-27

As there was substantial support in the record for the finding of intentional discrimination, we hold that the District Court was not clearly erroneous in finding for the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show that she was qualified and that the adverse action occurred under circumstances suggesting race discrimination.

Ricks v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. · filed 2000-04-25(a)(1)

Ricks satisfies the first and third prongs of the McDonnell test because she is African-American and she was terminated from her employment. She cannot, however, satisfy either the second or fourth prongs of the test.

For a Title VII race discrimination claim, an employee must offer evidence of pretext after the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Runnels v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-07-20

However, she set forth no evidence to call into doubt Armstrong’s sincerity in relying on O’Brien’s and Blanchette’s unfavorable impressions of her performance in terminating her. Thus, she has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, and Armstrong is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim of race discrimination as well.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the complaint does not allege that an adverse job action was motivated by race.

Byrd v. Baltimore Sun Co · filed 2000-09-29

Byrd simply failed to allege that any adverse job action taken against him was motivated by racial animosity.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race disparate treatment plaintiff to show protected class membership, an adverse employment action, more favorable treatment of similarly situated white employees, and qualification for the job to establish a prima facie case.

Mason v. City of Tampa · filed 2000-12-01(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based upon race, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated white officers more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that an employee was discharged because of race.

Lamberson v. Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. · filed 2000-12-07(a)(1)

Here, the record does not contain sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could draw an inference that Lamberson was discriminated against on the basis of race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can prohibit racial discrimination even when the employee and the person discriminating against him are the same race.

Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska · filed 2000-12-11(a)(1)

Given the Oncale decision, we have no doubt that, as a matter of law, a black male could discriminate against another black male “because of such individual’s race.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; a plaintiff must show circumstances supporting an inference of racial discrimination.

Brown v. Triboro Coach Corp. · filed 2001-06-01(a)(1)

Also, Brown is not able to meet the fourth requirement of a prima facie case because he is unable to show that he was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on his race. Under Triboro’s drug testing agreement, it was within Triboro’s authority to terminate Brown for failing to complete the required rehabilitation after his second positive drug test. Thus, Triboro terminated Brown based on a valid, non-discriminatory reason.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a race discrimination claim to go to a jury when ample circumstantial evidence supports it.

Bass v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-07-09(a)

Even though Chief Moody's statements are not direct evidence of discrimination, we believe that Bass has put forth ample circumstantial evidence of discrimination to permit his Title VII, § 1981 and Florida Civil Rights Act claims to go to a jury.

A racial discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employer provides evidence of legitimate reasons for its actions and the employee offers no facts in response.

Curtis v. Translogic Corp. · filed 2001-07-27(a)(1)

In light of Translogic’s evidence supporting its contention that there were legitimate reasons for its actions against Mr. Curtis and in light of Mr. Curtis’s failure to respond to this evidence, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Translogic.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff alleging race discrimination to use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach when she lacks direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

Hall v. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' International Ass'n Local Union 143 · filed 2001-09-13(a)(1)

Because Hall has not offered any direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, she must proceed under the McDonnell Douglas approach.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based differences in employment treatment; different remedial assistance does not violate it when the difference was not due to race.

Kidd v. Illinois State Police · filed 2001-12-21(a)

Yet, having reviewed the record for a second time, we find no basis to disturb Judge Rosemond’s finding that the differential treatment was not due to Kidd’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits demoting employees because of race or sex; holding them responsible for poor performance does not violate it unless they are singled out on either ground.

Patton v. Indianapolis Public School Board · filed 2002-01-04(a)(1)

It does not violate sec. 1981 or Title VII for Gilbert to make them "scapegoats" (or less pejoratively, hold them responsible), unless they were singled out because of their race or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer took a challenged action because of the employee's race.

Burke, Kenneth M. v. Gould, William B. · filed 2002-04-12(a)(1)

Therefore, even assuming that the personnel actions Burke challenges are adverse employment actions, Burke fails to show that the Board took the challenged actions because of his race and so summary judgment was appropriate on his discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging a race-based discharge to present sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Curtis v. TeleTech Customer Care Management (Telecommunications), Inc. · filed 2002-06-17(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to point to sufficient evidence indicating that the reasons proffered by Tele-Tech are but a pretext for unlawful race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; inconsistent discipline does not establish disparate treatment without evidence supporting an inference of race discrimination.

Wynn v. Whitney Holding Corp. · filed 2002-09-13(a)(1)

The court finds that plaintiff has not shown disparate treatment. Some White employees have been treated more harshly, some less so harshly. The bottom line is that some White employees of Whitney have been terminated for comparable conduct. That it might be said that plaintiff possibly should have been disciplined short of termination is of no moment in this proceeding. The only question before this court is whether or not plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated non-Black employees when she was terminated. Although Whitney may not have disciplined with absolute consistency, plaintiff has not shown such inconsistency from which it may be inferred that she was disparately treated because of her race, Black.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires the plaintiff’s own protected trait to motivate an adverse employment action.

Brunson v. Bayer Corp. · filed 2002-12-27(a)(1)

Thus, Bayer’s alleged failure to take action against White because of White’s race cannot constitute discrimination against Brunson on account of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge to establish differential treatment, such as replacement by someone outside the protected class or more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee.

Thomas v. Alabama Council on Human Relations, Inc. · filed 2003-01-15(a)

As previously explained, Plaintiff must show either that he was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or that a similarly situated employee who was not a member of the protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not discharged. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of his protected class, nor is there any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of the protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not discharged.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race-discrimination plaintiff to show protected-class membership, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances suggesting discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

Banks v. Potter · filed 2003-03-31

To establish a pri-ma facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for continued employment, (3) an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected characteristics individually or in combination, including race and sex together.

Jeffers v. Thompson · filed 2003-05-08(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on any of the named characteristics, whether individually or in combination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers adverse employment action based on race-specific expectations about how an employee should dress.

Bryant v. Begin Manage Program · filed 2003-08-26(a)(1)

Accordingly, to the extent that any adverse employment action arose out of Sekou’s views of how a black employee should dress (or not dress), the resulting adverse employment action would be actionable under Title VII.

A race discrimination claim may survive summary judgment when evidence of disparate treatment and pretext raises a genuine factual dispute.

Crosdale v. Indian River Memorial Hospital · filed 2003-10-21(a)(1)

Plaintiff, however, has shown that the Defendant failed to document or formalize any counseling or correction and treated Plaintiff in a “unique” manner, thus providing sufficient evidence of pretext. This evidence, in addition to Ms. Cleary’s alleged statement regarding employing nurses “just fresh out of school,” is sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

A race discrimination claim based on a denied transfer fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for its decision and the employee offers no evidence to rebut them.

Hands v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2003-10-27(a)(1)

Upon review of the record, the Court finds no evidence rebutting Defendant’s proffered justifications as to why it did not transfer Plaintiff to a clerical position and thus will grant summary judgment to Defendant on the race discrimination claim in Count I.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit adverse treatment motivated by personal animosity rather than race.

Baker v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY · filed 2003-12-19(a)(1)

Regardless, as previously stated, the Plaintiff essentially concedes that Nall's motivation was personal animus, not race. Thus, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted as to Baker's claim of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires race to motivate the alleged discrimination; mistreatment driven by personal animosity does not establish a race discrimination claim.

Baker v. Alabama Department of Public Safety · filed 2003-12-19(a)(1)

Regardless, as previously stated, the Plaintiff essentially concedes that Nall’s motivation was personal animus, not race. Thus, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted as to Baker’s claim of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment privileges; a reasonable interpretation of a vacation policy does not, by itself, show discriminatory intent.

Wu v. Southeast-Atlantic Beverage Corp. · filed 2004-01-23(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer, from discriminating against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of that employee’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Moreover, Newlon was entitled to interpret the vacation policy as he saw fit, and where, as here, his interpretation is reasonable, no inference of discriminatory intent arises. ... For all of these reasons, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Newlon’s decision to deny plaintiffs vacation request was motivated by plaintiffs race.