42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires an inmate alleging inadequate medical treatment to show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Johnson v. Winebrenner · filed 1988-02-02

In order to state a Sec. 1983 claim based on inadequate medical treatment, an inmate must show that a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 requires proof that officers actually knew of an urgent medical need caused by a known risk, and does not impose liability for merely negligent or reckless conduct.

Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Bell v. Middleton · filed 2010-01-15

In summary, in order to establish liability under Section 1983 based on a claim of inadequate medical care, Appellants must show the officers had actual knowledge that Bell had an urgent medical need because of a known risk. Conduct that is merely negligent, or even reckless, is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming inadequate medical care to show a serious medical condition, deliberate indifference, and resulting injury.

Gayton v. McCoy · filed 2010-01-28

In order to sustain a § 1983 claim for violation of Taylor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right to adequate medical care, the plaintiff must show that: (1) Taylor had an objectively serious medical condition; (2) the defendants knew of the condition and were deliberately indifferent to treating her; and (3) this indifference caused her some injury.

Section 1983 requires a claimant challenging inadequate medical care to prove deliberate indifference to a sufficiently serious medical need.

Estate of Terry Gee, Jr. v. Johnson · filed 2010-02-16

To ultimately succeed on its § 1983 claim, the Estate must show deliberate indifference to Gee’s medical needs, which involves proving both an objective component--a sufficiently serious medical need--and a subjective component--a sufficiently culpable state of mind on the part of the defendants in denying medical care.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff claiming deliberate indifference to show that officials knew of a substantial risk of serious injury and failed to protect him.

Shields v. Dart · filed 2011-12-14

The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim. To prove deliberate indifference, Shields needed to show that the defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious injury to him and failed to protect him from that danger.

Section 1983 permits civil liability for prison officials who are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees.

Mantell v. Health Professionals Ltd. · filed 2015-05-12

Prison officials may be held civilly liable under § 1983 if they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees.

Section 1983 requires proof of intentional wrongdoing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill. · filed 2011-07-12

The federal-law claim, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, requires proof of intentional wrongdoing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), but defendants do not contend that the evidence on that issue was deficient.

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind for a prisoner's deliberate-indifference claim.

Lor v. Kelley · filed 2011-12-21

To do so, Lor must show not only that his conditions were serious (which the defendants do not contest), but also that the “prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Feliciano v. Penzone · filed 2018-12-13

This deliberate indifference can form the basis for a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require a prisoner to present expert testimony to prevail on a constitutional claim.

Leon v. Celaya · filed 2021-06-18

There is no requirement that a prisoner present expert testimony to prevail on a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim alleging that inadequate prison medical treatment caused death from a sophisticated medical condition requires expert testimony to prove causation.

Alberson Ex Rel. Estate of Alberson v. Norris · filed 2006-08-15

Where the complaint involves treatment of a prisoner’s sophisticated medical condition, expert testimony is required to show proof of causation. ... Therefore, Ms. Alberson’s failure to produce expert testimony to prove that a lack of proper medical treatment caused Mr. Alberson’s death is “fatal to [her] deliberate indifference claim as a matter of law.”

A § 1983 claim alleging inadequate treatment of a prisoner's sophisticated medical condition requires expert testimony to prove causation.

Albersson v. Norris · filed 2006-08-15

Where the complaint involves treatment of a prisoner's sophisticated medical condition, expert testimony is required to show proof of causation.

A prisoner bringing a Section 1983 claim for denial of adequate medical care need not present expert medical testimony when the facts support a finding of deliberate indifference.

Hathaway v. Coughlin · filed 1994-09-29

We have never required plaintiffs alleging a denial of adequate medical care in a Section 1983 action to produce expert medical testimony. The inquiry remains whether the treating physician or other prison official was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs, not whether the doctor's conduct is actionable under state malpractice law. Expert testimony certainly could have bolstered Hathaway's case at trial, but the absence of such expert proof does not mandate dismissal of his action where the facts support a finding of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires an inmate alleging a prison medical claim to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Jackson v. Wharton · filed 1988-06-20

Estelle v. Gamble, supra, sets forth two basic requirements which a plaintiff must meet in alleging a claim under § 1983. First of all, the defendants must have been “deliberately indifferent.” Secondly, they must have been deliberately indifferent to his “serious” medical needs.

In a § 1983 claim alleging delayed medical care, expert testimony on causation is unnecessary when a jury can determine from other evidence whether the delay caused additional harm.

King v. Patt · filed 2013-05-10

We agree with the authorities cited above holding that expert testimony is not required in cases where the jury can determine from the non-expert evidence presented whether the delay caused additional harm.

Claims concerning medical care received in federal prison are governed by Bivens rather than § 1983.

Gessa v. Robert LeGrand, Jr. · filed 2015-08-17

As the magistrate judge determined, because Gessa raised claims pertaining to the medical care received while in federal prison, his claims did not arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but were governed by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

A criminal defense attorney, including an appointed public defender, does not act under color of state law when representing a defendant and therefore cannot be sued under Section 1983 for that representation.

Williams v. LaPorte County Superior Court No 1 · filed 2022-09-14

The actions of a criminal defense attorney, even an appointed public defender, aren’t fairly attributable to the State and the attorney isn’t acting under color of state law.

Criminal defense attorneys are immune from § 1983 suits for acts taken in their role as defense counsel.

WOLTER v. CARTER · filed 2022-05-02

As all of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the actions or inactions of Defendants in their capacity as his criminal defense attorneys, Defendants are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983.

A public defender or court-appointed defense counsel acting in that capacity is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Undiandeye v. Jackson · filed 2019-10-22

A public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a court-appointed lawyer’s acts in furtherance of representation because those acts are not performed under color of state law.

Jordan-Bey v. Musich · filed 1983-04-08

It has been held repeatedly that the acts of court appointed counsel in furtherance of his duties are not performed under the color of state law. ... Therefore, it must be concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not treat private defense attorneys or public-defender investigators as acting under color of state law, but it reaches private participants in a conspiracy with a state official and public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within their professional duties are absolutely immune.

BLACK, Lloyd, Appellant, No. 81-1646 v. BAYER · filed 1982-02-08

We hold that the reasoning of Polk County applies a fortiori and thus reaffirm a long line of decisions of this court recognizing that private attorneys do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. ... We therefore hold, guided by Polk County, that an investigator acting at the instance of a public defender does not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983. ... We therefore hold that the complaint was not subject to dismissal under the reasoning of Polk County, because it averred a conspiracy with a state official, the state prosecutor. ... We therefore reaffirm, based on our re-examination of prior decisions in this and other courts in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Polk County and Ferri v. Ackerman, the longstanding rule in this circuit: public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.

Court-appointed public defenders do not act under color of state law under Section 1983 when exercising independent professional judgment in their traditional role as counsel.

Harris v. Beynon · filed 1983-09-14

All those actions were taken in their traditional role as counsel exercising independent professional judgment. ... such conduct is not “under color of ... [state] law,” the essential ingredient for Section 1983 cognizance.

Public defenders performing traditional defense functions do not act under color of governmental authority for purposes of § 1983.

Bruce v. Fletcher · filed 1984-04-25

Public defenders, performing the traditional functions of defense attorneys, are not acting under color of governmental authority within the meaning of Section 1983, as plaintiff alleges.

State public defenders are not immune from § 1983 liability for intentional misconduct under color of state law through conspiracy with state officials that deprives clients of federal rights.

Tower v. Glover · filed 1984-06-25

We conclude that state public defenders are not immune from liability under § 1983 for intentional misconduct, “under color of” state law, by virtue of alleged conspiratorial action with state officials that deprives their clients of federal rights.

A public defender’s refusal, in the course of representing indigent clients, to provide them free transcript copies does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Eling v. C. Paul Jones, Minnesota Public Defender · filed 1986-08-08

We hold only that the refusal of the public defender’s office to furnish free copies of transcripts to indigents does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public defender ordinarily does not act under color of state law while representing a client; a conspiracy with state officials can support Section 1983 liability only if pleaded with specific facts suggesting a meeting of the minds.

Sutton v. Calhoun · filed 1986-09-09

Although a public defender generally does not act “under color of” state law in exercising his function as a lawyer, an allegation that a public defender conspired with state officials to deprive an inmate of federal rights may state a claim under Sec. 1983, ... but it must be pleaded with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest a “meeting of the minds.” ... He made no particularized showing that a conspiracy existed, and as a result, he failed to make an adequate allegation of conduct “under color of” state law to support a Sec. 1983 action against Calhoun.

A purely private act does not become action under color of state law under Section 1983 merely because the actor is a public official.

Santine v. Roberts · filed 1987-06-16

It is well established that an act purely private in nature cannot be made the basis of a section 1983 action simply because it is carried out by one who happens to be a public official.

Defense counsel do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under § 1983 for their representation of a criminal defendant.

Bostic v. Stephens · filed 1987-09-17

If the attorneys were serving as defense counsel, they would not act under color of state law and so would not be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against court-appointed defenders for their work as defenders because they do not act under color of state law.

Hayes v. David Cooper Mark Beveridge Joy Sims · filed 1988-04-28

Furthermore, court appointed defenders do not act under the color of state law so as to give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a public employee’s alleged constitutional torts arising from dismissal by an arm of the state.

Vega v. Martinez · filed 1988-07-01

The fact that plaintiff’s former employer, the Sugar Corporation, is an arm of the State and that he has sufficiently alleged constitutional torts brings this case fully within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 which states in pertinent part as follows.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor.

Borsello v. Leach · filed 1990-05-23

The Supreme Court has held that a public defender acting in his official capacity is not a state actor pursuant to § 1983. ... Thus, plaintiff has not stated a claim which may be maintained against this defendant in either his official or individual capacities.

Section 1983 requires a public defender to act under color of state law; absent allegations of conspiracy with state officials, the claim lacks that prerequisite.

Tyler v. Kuglitsch · filed 1991-10-24

Mr. Tyler fails to present an arguable claim for relief against attorney Kuglitsch under § 1983 because he has not alleged that attorney Kuglitsch was engaged in any conspiracy with state officials to deprive him of his federal rights. Absent such allegations, Mr. Tyler’s complaint lacks a necessary prerequisite of § 1983 liability — that attorney Kuglitsch acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders acting as counsel to criminal defendants because they do not act under color of state law in that role.

Allen v. Josephine County Defense Lawyers · filed 1992-08-28

Public defenders are private individuals for purposes of section 1983, and do not act under color of state law when acting as counsel to defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as a state actor for a claim that the defender refused to file an appeal.

Rector v. Garland County, Ark. · filed 1993-04-14

Rector's claim that defendants refused to file an appeal may be dismissed because a public defender is not a state actor within the meaning of section 1983.

Appointed defense counsel does not act under color of state law in the normal course of defending a criminal case; a Section 1983 claim on that basis requires an allegation of conspiracy with state officials.

Ewing v. Public Defender Office, Olathe, Kansas · filed 1993-05-06

In reaching that conclusion, the district court's reliance on Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984), was appropriate. The Court has held that "appointed counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by the State, does not act 'under color of' state law in the normal course of conducting the defense." Id. at 920 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). Thus, Plaintiff failed to allege "a conspiracy with state officials to deprive [him] of federal rights." Id.

Under § 1983, judges are immune from damages claims arising from their judicial rulings, and a private landlord who is not a state actor cannot be liable.

Scott v. Johnny Morrison S. Lee Morris Salvage Delacy Stith · filed 1993-06-18

"To the extent that Scott requested money damages, the judges are immune from suit under § 1983, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and Stith is not a state actor, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), so these claims were properly dismissed"

Under Section 1983, factual allegations that a public defender conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of civil rights require further proceedings to determine whether the action may proceed.

Butler v. Leen · filed 1993-09-07

If the complaint sets forth facts showing that the public defender conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of his or her civil rights, a further proceeding would be necessary to determine whether the case could proceed.

A public defender or court-appointed defense counsel acting in that capacity is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Zurla v. Thomas · filed 1993-10-05

Zurla's complaint fails to satisfy the second requirement. It is well-settled that a public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions does not act under color of state law, but may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials where facts show an agreement to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Hogan v. Karen Brazier, Deputy State Public Defender · filed 1993-12-06

A public defender "performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a state criminal proceeding" does not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under section 1983. ... A public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). To prove conspiracy under section 1983, an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights must be shown. ... He failed to allege any facts showing an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed his conspiracy claim.

Section 1983 treats public defenders as state actors when they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of protected rights.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1993-12-09

It is clear that public defenders do not constitute state actors, however, if they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of his rights, they are constructively deemed to be state actors for purposes of section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against public defenders requires specific facts showing that they conspired with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of rights.

Bieros v. Nicola · filed 1994-04-28

It is clear that public defenders do not constitute state actors, however, if they conspire with state officials to deprive a person of his rights, they are constructively deemed to be state actors for purposes of section 1983. ... In this case, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to show how defendants specifically conspired with the District Attorney's Office and/or Probation Department. As such, plaintiff's section 1983 claim against defendants is dismissed.

Court-appointed counsel ordinarily does not act under color of state law while conducting a defense, but a public defender may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials.

Zichko v. Idaho Department of Health, Education and Welfare · filed 1994-05-17

Court-appointed counsel does not generally act under color of state law when engaged in the ordinary course of conducting the defense. ... However, a cause of action exists for the purposes of Sec. 1983 if the plaintiff can plead and prove that the public defender actually conspired with state officials. ... Because Jones represented Zichko as a public defender by handling post-conviction relief proceedings from January to May 1989, and because Zichko failed to present any specific evidence that Jones engaged in a conspiracy with state officials, Zichko's Sec. 1983 claim against Jones is deficient.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a judge entitled to absolute judicial immunity or private parties who did not act under color of state law.

Warner v. Linda Roberts Misty Andrae Lee Hotchkins Mills Lane · filed 1995-11-09

We agree with the district court that Warner's amended complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact or law and further amendment would not create a cognizable federal constitutional claim under section 1983 because Judge Lane is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and the remaining defendants were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not allow a damages action against a court-appointed state public defender for the defender’s representation of a criminal defendant.

Peterson v. Barnes · filed 1996-08-07

In dismissing the action, the district court found Peterson could not maintain a civil rights action for damages against state public defenders. ... The rulings made by the district court on the issues presented are dictated by well-settled law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against public defenders because they are not considered state actors.

Powell v. Stephen Harris State of Maryland Public De Fenders Office State of Maryland Prosecutors Office · filed 1996-10-10

To the extent that Appellant's claim against the Maryland Public Defender's Office was intended as a damage action rather than a habeas action, we note that public defenders are not considered state actors for § 1983 purposes; thus, no award of damages would have been proper.

Section 1983 does not treat the Legal Aid Society as acting under color of state law merely because it receives state benefits, but a public defender may be liable for conspiring with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Ige v. United States Attorney's Office, Keith D. Krakauer, Mark A. Kirsch, Thomas J. Farrell · filed 1996-11-08

In general, the Legal Aid Society does not "act under color of state law" by virtue of the financial or other benefits it receives from the State. ... However, a public defender is not immune from liability for allegedly conspiring with state officials to deprive a criminal defendant of his federal constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a contract psychiatrist whose detention decisions are closely intertwined with county officials’ work, and the psychiatrist is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Jensen v. Lane County · filed 2000-08-23

On the facts of this case, we hold that Dr. Robbins was a “state actor” for the purposes of being a defendant in a § 1983 action. ... Dr. Robbins’ conduct constituted “state action,” and he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Public defenders are not state actors against whom claims can be asserted under Section 1983.

West v. Lambert · filed 2001-02-06

The defendant public defenders are not state actors against whom claims can be asserted under § 1983.

Public defenders generally do not act under color of law and can be sued under § 1983 only if the plaintiff proves they conspired with state actors.

Logan v. Laterzo · filed 2001-11-21

Public defenders do not generally act under “color of law,” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), so they cannot be successfully sued under § 1983 unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that they conspired with state actors, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923-24, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), which Logan has been unable to do.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a public defender conspired with state actors to support a claim against the defender’s law firm for conduct in representing a criminal defendant.

Louis Hamilton, II v. Law · filed 2002-05-10

Hamilton could not state a § 1983 claim against the Wold Johnson Law Firm unless Wold Johnson Attorney Beauchene conspired with state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender as a state actor when the defender acts as a lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2002-07-13

Under Polk County, a public defender is not a “state actor” when he acts as a lawyer on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant.

A public defender sued for conduct during representation of a criminal defendant is not a state actor under Section 1983.

Pearson v. Horenstein · filed 2002-07-30

The district court appropriately found that the named defendant could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he is not a state actor.

Section 1983 treats a county public defender as a state actor when acting as an administrator who allocates the office’s resources.

Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada Morgan Harris Thomas Rigsby · filed 2003-02-03

We thus conclude that Harris was acting on behalf of Clark County in determining how the overall resources of the office were to be spent, and he qualifies as a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a public defender’s defective representation while performing traditional defense functions without collusion with state prosecutors.

Hart v. Braun · filed 2004-05-04

Hart does not qualify for relief under section 1983, because Braun’s allegedly defective representation was not tainted by collusion with state prosecutors and occurred during the performance of his “traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

WMATA acts under color of state law when operating its police force and is not immune from § 1983 suits under the Eleventh Amendment.

Heffez v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1983-09-09

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that WMATA acts under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the operation of its police force. ... Thus, WMATA is not shielded by the Eleventh Amendment, or Section 80 of the Compact, from suits brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Wilson v. Nash · filed 2004-12-17

A public defender is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability “when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

A public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983.

Graham v. Pinal County · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Boyd Johnson, because a public defender, when appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role, is not a state actor and therefore not a proper party to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits claims against defendants acting under color of state law, subject to applicable immunity limits.

Amidon v. Student Ass'n of the State University · filed 2005-11-07

Defendants acted under the color of state law, and are therefore subject to liability under § 1983. They are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from such liability because the SA may not be considered an arm of the state.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against court-appointed defense counsel for performing traditional lawyer functions because counsel is not acting under color of state law.

Tommy Pearson, Sr. v. Myles · filed 2006-07-05

Because Myles was performing traditional lawyer functions in her representation of Pearson, she was not acting under color of state law. Therefore, Pearson has no § 1983 cause of action against Myles in connection with her representation of him.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for acts protected by quasi-judicial immunity or for conduct by a private attorney who does not act under color of state law.

Sutton v. Llewellyn · filed 2008-08-05

The district court properly dismissed the section 1983 claims because defendant Galdos, the court clerk of the Monterey County Superior Court, has “absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations” when performing “tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process,” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987), and defendant Nicora, a private attorney, did not act under color of state law, even though he was appointed by the court to represent the eonservatee, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (noting that a private attorney, even one appointed by the court, does not act under the color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional role of an attorney).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against defendants who did not act under color of state law or who are immune from liability.

Cormier v. Siegler · filed 2013-06-20

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cormier’s request to proceed IFP because it properly concluded that Cormier’s action was frivolous, failed to state a claim, and sought monetary relief from defendants who did not act under color of state law or were immune from liability.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Telepo v. Martin · filed 2009-04-22

The Court agrees. The Supreme Court has held that court appointed counsel, including public defenders, do not act “under color of state law” when performing a traditional lawyer’s function as counsel to a defendant and, therefore, are not amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Boyd v. Culpepper · filed 2019-10-16

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Tyler or Rogers acted outside a lawyer’s traditional functions as public defenders. Thus, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants Tyler and Rogers were not acting under color of state law while representing him.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney for performing the functions of defense counsel.

Townsend v. Missouri Public Defender System · filed 2019-12-18

Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the Missouri Public Defender’s Office or his attorney Kerina Ibarra because a criminal defense attorney is not suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed defense attorney for representing an accused person because that work is not done under color of state law.

Stoll 604135 v. France · filed 2019-12-20

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court- appointed attorney does not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against her.

A public defender representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Ward (ID 125883) v. Astrab · filed 2019-12-31

Therefore, while plaintiff may challenge his incarceration in a petition for habeas corpus, his claim against the defendant public defender under § 1983 is barred by the holding in Dodson.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender representing a client in criminal proceedings because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Gutierrez v. Unknown · filed 2020-01-15

To the extent that plaintiff purports to raise a federal civil rights claim against a public defender who has represented plaintiff in criminal proceedings, such individuals are not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against public defenders for acts performed in their traditional role as defense counsel.

Miles v. Aldredge · filed 2020-02-28

However, Miles does not address the district court’s pertinent findings that, as public defenders performing traditional legal functions, Aldredge and Gonzalez-Falla could not be sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), or that Miles’s claims are, in any event, barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). ... Finally, because Miles’s appeal is frivolous in light of Polk County and Heck, and because the merits of his appeal “are so intertwined with the [IFP] certification decision as to constitute the same issue,” Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24, we exercise our discretion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, see 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a defense attorney performing the ordinary work of counsel does not meet that requirement.

Perales (ID 118983) v. Mamalis · filed 2020-03-06

Plaintiff has not shown that his state court defense attorney was acting under color of state law as required under § 1983.

Court-appointed public defenders acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors and cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

Galloway v. Wages · filed 2020-03-27

But attorneys, even court-appointed public defenders, acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors and, therefore, cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

A public defender performing the traditional duties of counsel is not a state actor subject to Section 1983 liability.

Conley v. Alexander · filed 2020-03-30

Because Mr. Conley has not asserted that Special Public Defender Kaatz acted outside the scope of his responsibilities as a special public defender appointed to represent him during his criminal cases, Special Public Defender Kaatz was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A court-appointed public defender providing legal representation does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for alleged ineffective assistance.

Cornille, Sr. v. Popit · filed 2019-12-19

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s case fails to state a claim against Popit, thus, his complaint must be dismissed. In Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a court-appointed attorney, even if employed by the state, may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for legal malpractice, because such an attorney does not act “ander color of state law.”

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders as state actors when they perform traditional duties as counsel in criminal proceedings.

Sangster v. Clark County Public Defender · filed 2020-03-31

The defendants thus were performing the role of attorney for Sangster and communication with the client is a traditional function within that role. The defendants therefore are not state actors under these allegations.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on a public defender performing traditional criminal defense work because that work is not done under color of state law.

Phillips v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2020-04-01

Thus, even though he was employed by a public agency, he was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

A public defender performing traditional criminal defense duties does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Morris v. Canyon County Public Defenders Office · filed 2020-04-02

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s claims are based entirely on the conduct of his criminal defense attorney. But “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... Thus, Plaintiff’s claims fail for lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel duties because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Morris v. Canyon County Courthouse · filed 2020-04-02

As a result of the foregoing precedent, Plaintiff cannot sue the public defender under § 1983.

A public defender acting as counsel in a criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Manygoat v. Heinman · filed 2020-04-07

Public defenders do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Fletcher v. Pierce · filed 2020-04-20

Harrison was not acting under color of state law while representing Fletcher in his criminal proceedings. ... Thus, Harrison is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for conduct while representing a client because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Williams v. Stover · filed 2020-04-21

Plaintiff cannot maintain an abuse of process claim under § 1983 against his public defender because public defenders do not act under color of state law in representing their clients.

Public defenders representing clients are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Whitt v. Thornton · filed 2020-04-22

Additionally, even if Plaintiff could maintain a § 1983 claim for damages based on the fact of his current incarceration, he could not maintain suit against the allegedly responsible parties, Public Defender William Harold and/or Public Defender Dorthy Buck, as a public defender is not a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed public defender because the defender is not a state actor.

Lee v. State of Illinois, Illinois Attorney General · filed 2020-05-13

Plaintiff’s claims against Willis also must be dismissed because “a court-appointed public defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” McDonald v. White, 465 Fed. Appx. 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2012).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for performing a criminal defense attorney’s traditional duties because that work is not under color of state law.

TAYLOR v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2020-05-26

As such, Price cannot be considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A public defender performing traditional duties as criminal defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Harris v. Gentile · filed 2020-06-03

Because a public defender performing traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding—as Defendant Craig is alleged to have done here—does not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Craig.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for their traditional work as criminal defense counsel because they do not act under color of state law.

Granado v. State of New Mexico · filed 2020-06-09

Because Granado’s claims are all based on allegations regarding the functions of counsel in his criminal case, Defendants Worley, Shattuck, Aragon, and Kerr are not state actors and the complaint against them fails to state a § 1983 claim for relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions without facts showing a conspiracy with a state official.

Hinton v. Dewolfe · filed 2020-06-18

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A public defender performing traditional advocacy for a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Gomez v. Norris · filed 2020-06-26

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Plaintiff’s claims against his public defenders all relate to their function as Plaintiff’s advocates (i.e. refusing to present certain defenses and evidence and recommending a plea bargain). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Roth and Sark fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Bowman v. Hass · filed 2020-06-29

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Ondo, Plaintiff’s former public defender, are implausible because Ondo is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s traditional work as criminal defense counsel because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Arrington v. Levi · filed 2020-07-01

Nothing in plaintiff’s complaint indicates that Levi was acting outside the traditional functions of a defense counsel in a criminal case. That is, his allegations, such as they are, touch on matters of client visitation, plea discussions, and contacting witnesses, all of which are part of a defense attorney’s representation of a client.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s acts and omissions while performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

RIOS v. SNYDER · filed 2020-07-10

Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because Defendant, as his public defender, was not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because that work is not done under color of state law.

Bailey v. Denny Hyslip, Public Defender · filed 2020-07-15

They were not acting under color of state law while representing Bailey in his criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense functions as acting under color of state law.

Hinton v. Jones · filed 2020-08-29

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, because they do not act under color of state law.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 2020-08-31

Criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, cannot be sued under § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law; they are the adversary of the State.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Hampton v. City of St. Louis · filed 2020-09-09

The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A public defender performing the traditional role of defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Bradley v. St. Lucie County · filed 2020-10-30

Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Plaintiff’s only allegation against the public defender involves his traditional function as defense counsel, and a public defender does not act under color of state law as required under § 1983 in that context. Id. at 4. ... This Court agrees.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a court-appointed defense attorney representing a client is not a state actor.

Hess v. Webb · filed 2020-11-06

This means that because a criminal defense lawyer’s duty and loyalty are to his client, not the state, a court-appointed attorney is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Public defenders do not act under color of state law for § 1983 when representing a criminal defendant.

Jackson v. Wolcott · filed 2020-11-30

Defendants Buchanan and Barrett were not acting under color of state law while representing Plaintiff in her criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Clark v. Rogers · filed 2020-12-17

Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing an individual in his criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a criminal defendant because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Clark v. Rogers · filed 2021-01-05

Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing an individual in criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Kirchner v. Marshall · filed 2021-01-25

It follows that a prerequisite to any relief under Section 1983 is a defendant who is a state actor. ... “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff does not state a plausible Section 1983 claim against these two Defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit an individual-capacity claim against a public defender for representing a criminal defendant because that work is not done under color of state law.

Hastings v. Brasel · filed 2021-03-10

Defendant Tinkes, a public defender who represented Plaintiff during his criminal proceedings, is not subject to suit in his individual capacity under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed against immune state actors or private defendants who did not act under color of state law, and conspiracy claims require sufficient supporting facts.

Moskovits v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2021-03-12

In the January 20, 2021 order, the Court held that the original complaint could not proceed because: ... the complaint did not state viable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the state actor defendants were immune from suit, the private defendants had not acted under color of state law, and the facts in the complaint were insufficient to state a conspiracy claim; ... The amended complaint is inadequate for the same reasons stated in that order.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender performing the traditional functions of counsel because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

PASSARELLA v. STACKOW · filed 2021-04-19

Despite his desire to assert these claims, he cannot do so because public defenders are not state actors for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for representing a criminal defendant because that work is not performed under color of state law.

BREWSTER v. GUZMAN · filed 2021-04-21

Thus, Defendant Jose Guzman is not acting under color of state law in representing Plaintiff in his criminal case and, therefore, is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender’s office based on its employees’ traditional work as counsel in a criminal proceeding.

Washington v. Broome County District Attorney's Office · filed 2021-04-28

After granting in forma pauperis status, Judge Lovric conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, as well as a review of the motion for summary judgment, and issued the R&R, which recommends dismissal with leave to replead with respect to Washington’s claims against DAO and Endicott Police, and without leave to replead insofar as Washington brings claims against PDO “based on actions taken by [its] employees for performing traditional functions as counsel.” (Dkt. No. 12 at 16-17.) ... Accordingly, the R&R is adopted in its entirety.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders for their work as criminal defense counsel because they do not act under color of state law.

(PC) Johnson v. Solano County Public Defenders Office · filed 2021-05-03

Generally, criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, are considered private parties who did not act under color of state law. ... Accordingly, plaintiff cannot state a claim against attorneys Ju and Boyles who were briefly appointed to represent him.

Public defenders performing traditional defense work do not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Lawrence v. Jefferson Parish Public Defenders · filed 2021-05-03

As such, none of them was acting under the color of state law when he or she represented Plaintiff.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Bernard-Ex v. Molinar · filed 2021-05-03

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant’s conduct fell outside the traditional functions of a public defender in state criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel in a criminal case.

Jones v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-05-10

The claim against counsel Kelley arises from Kelley’s alleged conduct while performing the traditional functions of a lawyer as counsel to Plaintiff in a criminal case, which is not actionable under § 1983.

A court-appointed defense attorney does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when representing a criminal defendant.

Westfall v. Tichnell · filed 2021-06-15

Defense attorneys do not act under color of state law even if they are appointed by the court.

Section 1983 does not make a court-appointed defense lawyer liable for representing a criminal defendant because the lawyer is not acting under color of state law.

Stern v. Marston · filed 2021-06-21

Because the lawyer’s duty and loyalty are to the client, not the state, a court appointed attorney is not “acting under color of state law” for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief against a public defender for performing traditional functions as criminal defense counsel because that work is not under color of state law.

Buckelew v. Gore · filed 2021-06-22

Buckelew fails to state a claim against Valdovinos upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. ... “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

TRAPP v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2021-06-30

Because a public defender “is not liable under § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions,” Plaintiff’s claims against Konzelmann are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for conduct in the course of defense duties because that conduct is not under color of state law.

Durand v. Coffee · filed 2021-08-25

The Court agrees that the allegations in the Complaint relate to Defendant while she was acting in the course of her duties as his public defender, not while performing another function that would bring her conduct under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for alleged errors made while performing a defense lawyer’s traditional functions.

ROBINSON v. PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE · filed 2021-10-05

Thus, as Plaintiffs claims derive from alleged errors made by his criminal attorneys performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, both Krakora and the Public Defender’s Office are immune from suit under § 1983 for these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an appointed public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Foss v. Marshall County · filed 2021-11-01

Her appointed public defender is not a “state actor” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore cannot be sued under the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders for performing traditional functions as counsel because they are not acting under color of state law.

RALSTON v. CONNELL · filed 2021-12-13

Accordingly, they were not acting under color of state law and Ralston cannot state a plausible § 1983 claim against them.

A public defender providing legal advice in a criminal case does not act under color of state law and cannot be liable under § 1983 for that advice.

Parry v. Tomlin · filed 2021-12-14

To that end, plaintiffs public defender cannot be found to be liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing her with legitimate legal advice relative to the criminal case against her.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against defense attorneys, including appointed public defenders, for their work as a party’s attorney because they are not state actors.

Reynolds v. 3rd District Arresting Officer · filed 2021-12-31

Defense attorneys, whether public defenders or privately retained counsel, are not “state actors” and cannot be held liable under §1983 for their actions as a party’s attorney.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s representation of a criminal defendant because that work is not performed under color of state law.

McPherson v. Zweig · filed 2022-01-27

However, private attorneys and public defenders do not act under color of state or federal authority when they represent defendants in criminal proceedings. ... Therefore, Defendant Scartz is not a person amenable to suit in § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against an appointed public defender or the defender’s office for conduct within the defender’s traditional role as criminal counsel.

Little Coyote v. Tinker · filed 2022-01-31

As such, neither Mr. Tinker nor the Office of the State Public Defender can be sued in a § 1983 action and the claim against them will be dismissed.

A public defender representing a criminal defendant is not subject to suit under § 1983 as a state actor absent allegations of a conspiracy with state officials.

Rigsby v. Great State of Arkansas · filed 2022-03-15

We also agree with the district court that defendant Parker is not subject to suit under § 1983 because he was not a state actor at the time he represented Rigsby in the Arkansas state criminal proceedings, and there are no allegations in Rigsby’s complaint that Parker conspired with any state officials to deprive Rigsby of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for performing traditional criminal defense functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Thompson v. Luttrull · filed 2022-03-21

The actions described by Thompson all fall within the traditional functions counsel provides to a criminal defendant during the pendency of a case, so the public defenders are not liable to Thompson under section 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a claim against a public defender’s office for representing an indigent defendant because defense counsel does not act under color of state law in that role.

(PC) Rojas v. County of Sacramento · filed 2022-04-12

Generally, criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, are considered private parties who do not act under color of state law. ... Thus, the office of the conflict defender is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Private attorneys and public defenders are not state actors for purposes of Section 1983.

Myers v. King · filed 2022-06-02

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to meet the second element of a Section 1983 claim because private attorneys and public defenders “are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.”

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not subject to liability under § 1983 because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

PERRY v. FREDERICK · filed 2022-06-02

As there is no basis for concluding that Frederick is a state actor, she is not subject to liability under § 1983 and Perry’s claims against her are not plausible.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a client when the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Longino v. Martinez · filed 2022-08-11

In short, Section 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle to sue the Defendants for their representation of Plaintiff during his Jimmy Ryce hearing.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing traditional defense work because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Hawkins v. Altenhof · filed 2022-08-15

Mr. Hawkins’s claims can’t proceed because his public defender isn’t a state actor who can be sued for constitutional violations.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a public defender requires facts suggesting an agreement with a state actor to deprive someone of rights.

Scharnhorst v. Helder · filed 2022-09-28

The Court finds this allegation is conclusory and does not include any facts to suggest the public defenders “reached any agreement” with the sheriff’s deputies, or any other state actor, to deny Mr. Scharnhorst his rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding because that work is not under color of state law.

Cox v. Renken · filed 2022-09-30

The law is clear that a public defender does not act “under color of state law” for purposes of a § 1983 action when serving as counsel for a defendant in a criminal proceeding, even though the defender was appointed by a state court.

A public defender representing a client in a criminal case does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Lott v. Metzger · filed 2022-10-14

Therefore, even if Lott’s allegations that Metzger deprived him of his constitutional rights are true, she cannot have done so while acting “under color of state law,” which is one of the two elements of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for conduct undertaken while representing a criminal defendant.

Huskic v. Boise Police Department · filed 2022-10-24

Huskic’s court-appointed defense counsel was not acting under the color of state law at the time the alleged violation occurred, and so § 1983 does not provide Huskic a cause of action against him or the Public Defender’s office for constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not support an instruction that a defendant's reliance on an attorney's advice automatically exonerates the defendant from liability.

Blessum v. HOWARD CTY. BD. OF SUP'RS · filed 1980-08-27

We do not believe that defendants' requested instruction is a proper statement of the law in the context of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Defendants do not cite, nor are we able to find, any authority that would support the requested instruction as a proper statement of the law to be applied in this case.

A § 1983 excessive-force injury need not be permanent or severe when the force was gratuitous and the other elements of the claim are satisfied.

Bowman v. Casler · filed 1985-11-22

If a plaintiff had to show permanent or severe injury, police and prison officers would be able to routinely inflict minor injuries such as breaking fingers. Officers should be held liable for such practices. This court holds that the injury inflicted in the present case is sufficient to uphold a § 1983 claim if the other elements of the claim are satisfied.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for an arresting officer's slaps that cause no injury, bleeding, need for medical attention, or fall.

Everett R. Mark A/K/A Howard Van Zandt Williams, 296711 v. Caldwell · filed 1985-03-11

Assuming the truth of his account, and however reprehensible such conduct by a policeman may be, it does not rise to such a level that redress may be had for it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations and does not impose liability when force used in a lawful arrest is reasonable under the circumstances.

Melton v. Shivers · filed 1980-08-29

The Fourteenth Amendment likewise protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and has been held to prohibit ... the use of excessive and hence “unreasonable” force in making an arrest. ... This Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of a police officer in the field under the circumstances of this case. Although the Court is concerned by the extent of force employed in this particular case, it cannot say that such force was excessive in light of the facts and as defined in the cases interpreting § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. ... Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights were not violated; therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A law enforcement officer may be liable under Section 1983 for violating constitutional rights by using excessive force while completing an arrest.

James Keith Bauer and Mary Ellen Bauer v. Mark Norris, Individually and as Deputy of the McCook County Sheriff's Office, · filed 1983-08-08

A law enforcement official’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights through the use of excessive force in completing an arrest is well established.

A police officer may be liable for damages under § 1983 for using unreasonable force to make an arrest.

Sprague v. City of Burley · filed 1985-11-19

It is well-established that a police officer can be found liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the use of unreasonable force in effecting an arrest.

Section 1983 does not provide a Fourth Amendment claim for unsuccessful deadly force that neither apprehends nor seizes a fleeing suspect and does not cause his injury.

Cameron v. City of Pontiac · filed 1985-12-27

The decedent was neither apprehended nor seized as a result of Officer Roberts’ use of lethal force.

A Section 1983 excessive-force claim may reach a second shot fired at a wounded, partially down fleeing suspect when further warning or identification could have preceded the shot.

Carter v. Rogers · filed 1986-11-26

A jury might reasonably think it excessive for a law enforcement officer to keep firing until the suspect is motionless-that Carter was sufficiently immobilized from the first shot that the second shot was unnecessary to subdue him--or it might reasonably conclude that further verbal warnings, including belated identification of defendant McClain as a law enforcement officer, were due before McClain could justify a second blast.

Police may use force to stop a fleeing car when they reasonably believe it contains a dangerous person they have lawful grounds to arrest.

McNeil v. T.C. Dunn, Raleigh Police Officer Unknown Raleigh Police Officer, Defendants · filed 1987-06-04

We hold that the district court was justified in holding that the police held a genuine belief that plaintiff's brother was in the car; thus, their attempt to arrest him and their use of force to stop the fleeing car was warranted.

Section 1983 allows an excessive-force claim against officers making an arrest, and instructions describing unprovoked, unjustified, malicious, wanton, or oppressive conduct adequately identify excessive force.

Jones v. Board of Police Commissioners · filed 1988-04-01

Jones contends that the District Court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that law enforcement officers may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive force in completing an arrest. ... Using the expressions “unprovoked,” “without just cause or excuse,” “maliciously,” “wantonly,” and “oppressively,” instruction 17A correctly described the type of conduct that constitutes excessive force.

Section 1983 claims of excessive force during an arrest are assessed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.

Martin v. Gentile · filed 1988-06-17

Faithful adherence to this established fourth amendment standard of objective reasonableness when dealing with claims of the use of excessive force during arrest will not make police officers subject to Sec. 1983 liability at one end for "every push and shove" they make nor at the other end for every serious injury they inflict during an arrest.

Section 1983 requires proof of a significant injury to recover money damages for excessive force during an apprehension.

Wisniewski v. Kennard · filed 1990-05-29

In Morel, we insisted upon proof of a significant injury as a threshold for the recovery of money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where excessive force in an illegal arrest was claimed. ... The record is plain that Wisniewski’s injuries are not significant within the meaning of Morel.

Section 1983 permits a person to seek relief for a Fourth Amendment excessive-force violation by an official acting under color of state law.

Stephens v. Nick Degiovanni, individually · filed 2017-03-30

Accepting Stephens’s version of the events involved in his arrest, this is an obvious-clarity case under the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and our circuit for a § 1983 Fourth Amendment, excessive-force claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for an individual’s emotional-distress claim based on alleged violations of the individual’s spouse’s civil rights.

Buikema v. Hayes · filed 1983-05-20

The Court therefore holds that an individual’s claims of emotional distress arising from alleged violations of his or her spouse’s civil rights are not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a claim when defendants, acting under color of state law through foreclosure proceedings, deprive borrowers of federal statutory rights.

Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane · filed 1988-06-27

These allegations present the elements of a section 1983 claim. In other words, defendants, under color of state law, have deprived the Harpers of their federal rights under the 1987 Act.

Section 1983 supports a claim based on substantive rights under the Rehabilitation Act when defendants are alleged to have established a custom, policy, and consistent practice of denying those rights.

Jacob Todd, by Father, Jim Todd, and Mother, Patsy Todd v. Elkins School District No. 10 John R. Smith Jane Vaught Marsh · filed 1997-01-10

As to the section 1983 claim, the Todds alleged that defendants "established a custom, policy, and consistent practice" of denying Jacob his rights. We find that they stated a sufficient section 1983 claim based on the substantive rights in the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for deprivation of ADEA or ADA rights, though independently supported Section 1983 claims may proceed.

Martell v. Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico · filed 1999-03-29

Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1983 claim for deprivation of his ADEA and ADA rights should be dismissed. We shall assess, therefore, whether plaintiff has alleged facts which could independently support a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim when the asserted rights depend entirely on the ADA.

Moates v. Hamilton County · filed 2013-09-04

Because Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is wholly dependent on the rights derived from her ADA claim, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s motion as to this claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the ADA or Section 504 when those statutes have their own enforcement mechanisms and no distinct constitutional violation is alleged.

Parent v. Pittsford Central School District · filed 2017-02-17

Furthermore, “[a] § 1983 action may not ... bé brought to vindicate rights conferred only by a statute' that contains its own structure for private enforcement.” ... In the instant case,'both Section-504 and the ADA. contain them own enforcement mechanisms, and the Amended Complaint does not allege any “distinct violation of a constitutional - right.”