42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability; a plaintiff must allege that each official’s own actions violated the Constitution.

Bowell v. Nguyen · filed 2020-11-05

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a supervisor liable solely for another person's actions or omissions.

Hopkins v. California Forensic Medical Group · filed 2020-11-16

There is, however, no respondeat superior liability under section 1983 solely because a defendant (such as Defendant Ahern, who is the Alameda County Sheriff) is responsible for the actions or omissions of another.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Pethtel v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services (TV2) · filed 2020-11-20

Even so, Section 1983 does not support claims based on respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Leyva v. Baldwin · filed 2020-12-07

Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under Section 1983, his claim against Wexford for the actions or inactions of its employees fails.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation acting under color of state law liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

BARKER v. TALBOT · filed 2020-12-18

As Wexford notes, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that private corporations acting under color of state law are not liable under respondeat superior in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. ... And under that precedent, Barker's claim based on respondeat superior liability must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make a private medical contractor liable solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a detainee’s rights.

Huffman v. St Joseph County Jail · filed 2020-12-21

Huffman attempts to hold the company liable because it employs the Jail’s medical staff. However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for an employee’s actions without wrongdoing by the employer.

Bray - RESTRICTED - ACCEPT NO FILINGS v. LaPorte County of Indiana · filed 2021-01-06

Moreover, even if they were, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability, which holds an employer liable for the actions of its employees without any wrongdoing on the part of the employer.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for an employee’s conduct.

Best v. Baltimore County · filed 2021-01-14

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

THE ESTATE OF JERMAINE COLE v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF · filed 2021-01-22

In light of the current state of the law in the Seventh Circuit, which has been acknowledged by the Estate, the Court grants Wellpath's Motion on the Section 1983 claim because such a claim is not available on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Stanton v. Aramark · filed 2021-02-16

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for an employee’s actions solely because it employs that person.

Hoffman v. Getachew, M.D. · filed 2021-02-17

A corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs people who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Fogarty v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2021-02-23

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely because it employs the medical professionals involved in Mr. Fogarty’s care.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Ngambo v. Christopher · filed 2021-03-05

Additionally, even if we were to conclude that Ngambo’s claims against the other defendants passed muster under Rule 8, his complaint would nonetheless be subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), and based on the fact that liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated solely on a respondeat superior theory, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a city for its officers’ conduct.

Gill v. Magan · filed 2021-03-11

While there is no respondeat superior for § 1983 claims, the City can face liability for state law torts via respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit constitutional claims against an employer based solely on its employee’s conduct.

Mayek, Gerald v. Gundersen Hospital-Boscobel, WI · filed 2021-03-15

But claims based on a respondeat superior theory of liability are not allowed for constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior when officials lack personal involvement in the alleged deprivation.

GUNTER v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC. · filed 2021-03-15

Even if the medical staff were negligent or committed medical malpractice, Plaintiff’s arguments that Public Defendants had a non-delegable duty to provide medical care to Plaintiff, (id. at 12-13), are, at best, an argument that Public Defendants are liable under a respondeat superior theory, which is not permitted in § 1983 claims, Wright, 766 F.2d at 850.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for its employee’s actions under respondeat superior.

Aples v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Trust · filed 2021-03-24

To the extent Sodexo’s liability is premised on Sodexo Doe’s actions, “the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions.”

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Fultz v. Pearcy · filed 2021-04-01

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior liability.

Clark v. Gallion · filed 2021-04-05

Plaintiff proceeds against both defendants on a theory of respondeat superior liability. This theory of liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ actions solely under respondeat superior.

Resper v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc · filed 2021-04-14

A private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability solely because a defendant is responsible for another person’s actions or omissions.

Peace v. Wu · filed 2021-04-26

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, that is, there is no liability under § 1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based on respondeat superior.

Terrell v. Carter · filed 2021-05-06

And respondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely for an employee’s alleged constitutional violation.

Gohre v. Lezama · filed 2021-05-25

There is no respondeat superior under §1983—in other words, an employer cannot be sued based on the alleged misdeeds of an employee.

Section 1983 does not make a medical provider liable for another provider’s inadequate treatment solely through respondeat superior.

Lindsay v. Schwartz · filed 2021-06-01

She cannot be held liable for “inadequate treatment by other medical personnel because respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ actions solely because it employs them.

Curtis v. DPSCS · filed 2021-06-14

In other words, Defendant Wexford is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory or respondeat superior liability on an entity solely because it employs someone who violated constitutional rights.

Walker v. Pohlmann · filed 2021-06-23

The Court has already observed (and the plaintiffs agree) that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; no entity may be liable simply because it employs a person who has violated the plaintiffs’ rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation acting under color of state law.

Woodson v. Unknown · filed 2021-08-02

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold Corizon accountable simply because they employed Nurse Tarry and Nurse Bonnie, the Court notes that respondeat superior is inapplicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employed the person responsible.

Fogarty v. Wexford Medical Services · filed 2021-08-05

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely as the employer of the medical professionals involved in Mr. Fogarty’s care.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff or sheriff’s department solely because they employ an officer.

Placencia v. Tamez · filed 2021-08-24

Finally, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department cannot be held liable simply because they employ Sergeant Tamez.

Section 1983 does not make a corporate employer liable for its employees’ actions solely under respondeat superior.

Moon v. Green · filed 2021-08-30

In any event, a corporate entity is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state merely because it employs the officials accused of violating a plaintiff’s rights.

Volner v. Lewis · filed 2021-08-30

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff attempts to hold the State of Missouri liable for merely employing defendants, the Court notes that respondeat superior is not available in a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable merely because it employs people who may have violated constitutional rights.

Freeman v. Carter · filed 2021-09-13

Therefore, Wexford cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employs individuals who may have violated Mr. Freeman’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on an employer for its employees’ conduct.

Frison v. Obassi · filed 2021-09-30

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a proper defendant and does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

White v. Prime Care LLC · filed 2021-10-06

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Aloi found that defendant Prime Care LLC is not a proper defendant because Prime Care LLC is not “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and respondeat superior does not apply. ... Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [Doc. 6] is hereby ORDERED ADOPTED for the reasons more fully stated in the magistrate judge’s report, and plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. □□ □□ hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 does not allow liability for a subordinate’s misconduct based solely on supervisory status or respondeat superior.

Prindable v. Chambers · filed 2021-10-06

The City of Belleville and Richard Watson are not mentioned in connection with this claim, and they cannot be held liable for the misconduct of a subordinate under a theory of respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer solely for another officer’s actions.

Stein v. Gunkel · filed 2021-11-02

Gunkel cannot be held liable for the actions of the other officer who changed Webster’s classification. Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002) (“It is well settled that § 1983 liability will not be imposed solely on the basis of respondeat superior.”) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not allow a claim based on respondeat superior liability.

Dang v. Johnson · filed 2021-11-03

Furthermore, a § 1983 claim cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for its employees’ alleged negligence.

Edwards v. Wexford Health Sources Inc · filed 2021-11-03

Plaintiff may not bring a §1983 claim against Wexford based merely on the alleged negligence of its employees.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability.

Branstetter v. State of Hawaii Adult Correctional Officer Lorenzo · filed 2021-11-29

There is no respondeat superior liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely because it employed a person who allegedly violated someone’s rights.

Perkins v. Brown · filed 2021-12-07

The corporation cannot be liable on this basis because respondeat superior, or supervisory, liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a hospital or corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Harris v. Tritt · filed 2021-12-15

Finally, the Court will dismiss Waupun Memorial Hospital and Agnesian Healthcare. Harris’ complaint does not include any factual allegations against these entities, and there is no respondeat superior liability under §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a prison healthcare contractor; the contractor must itself cause a constitutional violation.

Donald E. Weaver, Jr. v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2022-01-06

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983—which answers Weaver’s suggestion that Corizon should be liable for harms its employee-doctors caused—but Weaver could proceed if he had evidence that Corizon itself caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely because its employees allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Knight v. Watts · filed 2022-01-06

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or private medical corporation solely for the conduct of its employees.

Wilkins 759458 v. Corizon of Michigan · filed 2022-01-07

Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Corizon and Morrison are premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, they are properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or employer solely because of a subordinate’s conduct.

BUTLER v. CFG HEALTH SERVICES INC. · filed 2022-01-12

As explained below, the Court dismisses these Defendants without prejudice because respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation acting for the state liable solely for its employees’ conduct; liability requires a policy, custom, or practice that causes a constitutional deprivation.

Burkins v. Corizon Resident Agent · filed 2022-01-20

As in this case, a private corporation that steps into the shoes of a state actor cannot be held liable for a § 1983 claim solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s conduct.

Van Hook v. State of Idaho · filed 2022-02-04

There is no respondeat superior liability under §1983. Id. For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against ALPS fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Bessler v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2022-02-04

Wexford moves for dismissal of this count by arguing it is legally impermissible as the Seventh Circuit has held respondeat superior is not a basis for rendering private corporations liable under § 1983. ... The Court’s own analysis confirms this conclusion as well.

Section 1983 does not permit liability under respondeat superior.

Torres v. Ishee · filed 2022-02-07

To the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to hold the Defendants liable for his § 1983 claims under a respondeat superior theory, such cannot proceed because respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on private corporations.

Kruger v. Lashbrook · filed 2022-03-29

The law of this Circuit is that respondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Woodie v. McFadden · filed 2022-04-25

His apparent reliance on respondeat superior fails to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its employees’ conduct solely through respondeat superior.

Shicks v. Fort Wayne City of · filed 2022-05-03

It is well-established that “[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions.”

Section 1983 does not make a private jail medical provider liable solely because it employs the staff who treated a prisoner.

Werry v. Fulton County Jail · filed 2022-05-11

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Quality Corrections Care cannot be held liable solely because it employed the medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior.

Fulbright v. Hodges · filed 2022-05-12

Rather, this claim appears to be based on respondeat superior, which does not apply in actions brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs the medical staff whose conduct is challenged.

Pangallo v. Oaklawn · filed 2022-05-16

He also sues Dr. Vanderstoop’s employer, Oaklawn, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Oaklawn cannot be held liable solely because it employs Dr. Vanderstoop or other medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not make a private medical provider liable solely because it employs the staff who treated a detainee.

Pangallo v. Wellpath · filed 2022-05-17

He also sues Dr. Foster’s employer, Wellpath, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Wellpath cannot be held liable solely because it employs Dr. Foster or other medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Huger v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2022-05-23

But, Section 1983 claims based on the doctrines of respondeat superior or vicarious liability are precluded.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely because of its employees’ conduct.

Blakes v. Foley · filed 2022-05-27

As stated above, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on employers for their employees’ misconduct.

Pocrnich v. Finn · filed 2022-06-02

Moreover, he seeks to hold the employers of Berg, Finn, and Welling liable for the misconduct of its employees when respondeat superior liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Hoots v. Miller · filed 2022-06-08

His apparent reliance on respondeat superior fails to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose general respondeat superior liability for employees’ actions.

Neal v. Lake County Courts · filed 2022-06-30

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior liability.

Andrews v. The City of Rochester · filed 2022-06-30

Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private jail medical provider liable solely because it employs the staff whose conduct is challenged.

Pangallo v. Wellpath · filed 2022-07-01

As to Wellpath, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Wellpath cannot be held liable solely because it employs medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not make a private medical provider liable solely because it employs the staff who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Pangallo v. Oaklawn · filed 2022-07-01

As to Wellpath, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Wellpath cannot be held liable solely because it employs medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated someone’s constitutional rights.

Dordon v. Kosciusko County Jail · filed 2022-07-13

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means Quality Correctional Care cannot be held liable solely because it employs medical staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely because an employee violated someone’s rights.

Wilkins v. State of California · filed 2022-07-20

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he employs a person who has violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private entity acting as a state actor.

Williams v. THE KINTOCK GROUP, INC. · filed 2022-08-02

Defendant is correct that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a private corporation providing jail medical services.

HARRINGTON v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC. · filed 2022-09-01

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Southern Health Partners is premised upon respondeat superior liability, the claim must and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely for its employees’ conduct.

Ervin v. Corizon Health · filed 2022-10-03

It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable solely because its employees committed a constitutional violation.

Del Rio v. Laporte County Sheriff's Dept · filed 2022-10-12

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which means neither Quality Corrections Care nor the county defendants can be held liable solely because they employed staff at the jail.

Section 1983 does not permit a corporation to be held liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior.

Nelson v. Siddiqui · filed 2022-11-01

Wexford cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in §1983 cases.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a claim alleging that prison officials delayed or deprived him of incoming mail in violation of constitutional rights.

Taylor v. Leidig · filed 1980-02-29

Taylor’s third claim for relief states a claim that at least is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and thus should not be dismissed.

Isolated two- or three-day delays in prisoner mail on only two or three occasions do not amount to a constitutional deprivation cognizable under Section 1983.

Tracy v. Sheriff Philip Heffron · filed 1987-07-06

Plaintiff thereby admitted that his complaint was limited to delays of no more than two or three days on no more than two or three occasions. Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that plaintiff has not asserted a constitutional deprivation cognizable under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for an inadvertent violation of a prisoner’s mail rights without explicit proof of damages.

Pickett v. Schaefer · filed 1980-08-11

Without explicit proof of damages, an inadvertent violation of a prisoner’s mail rights does not state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 constitutional claims for which a jury trial is demanded cannot be resolved through a non-jury hearing.

Lucy SANFORD, Shirley Black, Mari Pritchard, Patricia Sullivan, Carolyn Carter, Brenda Williams and Ernestine… · filed 1980-03-06

Moreover, another compelling reason for vacating the summary judgment here is that the plaintiffs demanded a jury for trial of their constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The February 27, 1979 hearing, since it was conducted without a jury, could not properly resolve the parties' contentions. The district court never considered in its opinion the relationship between the plaintiffs' § 1983 and Title VII claims or the need for a jury trial.

Section 1983 creates legal rights and remedies enforceable in damages actions, so a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial when the issues are sufficiently substantial to warrant a trial.

Dolence v. Dennis Flynn, Sheriff of Laramie County and Jerry Enos, Individually and in Their Official Capacit · filed 1980-08-26

We agree that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 meets these prerequisites, thereby entitling appellant to a jury trial.

A § 1983 suit seeking actual damages entitles the defendant to a jury trial, and monetary damages cannot be awarded without notice that damages are sought.

Segarra v. M.J. McDade Ralph Edwards · filed 1983-04-26

Further, in a § 1983 suit that seeks actual damages, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial. ... If a plaintiff was allowed to receive monetary damages without requesting them, a defendant could be deprived of his right to trial by jury because of a defect in notice; to allow this result can hardly be just.

Parties have a jury-trial right on legal issues in a Section 1983 action, but a plaintiff seeking only equitable federal relief such as an injunction and back pay is not entitled to a jury.

Fleming v. Department of Public Safety · filed 1985-04-11

In conclusion, while parties are entitled to a jury trial of legal issues raised in a § 1983 complaint, Fleming raises only equitable issues in the federal component of this action disallowing him his jury demand.

Section 1983 issues must be tried to a jury if the plaintiff properly demanded a jury trial.

Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea · filed 1990-07-10

First, the district court should determine if the plaintiff properly demanded a jury trial, and, if so, grant a jury trial on the § 1983 issues.

When a legal § 1983 claim and an equitable Title VII claim are tried together, the § 1983 jury verdict binds the judge’s factfinding on the Title VII claim.

Bruno v. City Of Crown Point · filed 1992-01-31

However, when, as in this case, a "legal" § 1983 claim and an "equitable" Title VII claim are tried together, the jury's verdict binds the judge and he is not required to make separate factual findings.

A litigant seeking legal relief in a § 1983 action has a right to a jury trial on those issues.

Hohman v. Dunning · filed 1993-04-15

A litigant involved in a § 1983 action seeking legal relief has a right to a jury trial on those issues.

A debtor’s § 1983 claim for damages is a legal claim triable by jury when it does not arise from claims allowance or the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations.

Walton v. Ag Credit, ACA (In re Walton) · filed 1993-06-02

Additionally, this Court finds that Debtors are entitled to a jury trial because Debtors’ adversary proceeding represents a legal action which does not involve the adjudication of public rights. Debtors have not submitted themselves to this Court’s equity jurisdiction for determining their legal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a jury trial and compensatory damages for legal claims alleging discrimination by state actors.

Richardson v. Leeds Police Department · filed 1995-12-15

The distinction between the Title VII and § 1983 causes in the present case was in the availability of a jury trial and compensatory damages under § 1983, but not with respect to the Title VII equitable claims, which were tried to the court.

Section 1983 gives plaintiffs who bring an action at law the right to a jury trial.

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., and Monterey-Del Monte Dunes C · filed 1996-09-13

Logically then, plaintiffs who bring an action at law under section 1983 have the right to a jury trial.

Prisoner relief under § 1983 does not carry a right to a jury trial.

Martin v. State of Oklahoma · filed 1998-08-28

The right to a jury trial does not apply to applications for habeas corpus nor for prisoner relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and referral of these matters to a magistrate judge is proper within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Section 1983 does not itself confer a right to a jury trial by authorizing an “action at law.”

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. · filed 1999-05-24

We decline, accordingly, to find a statutory jury right under § 1983 based solely on the authorization of “an action at law.”

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive damages ordinarily has a right to a jury trial; a claim seeking only injunctive relief or back pay does not.

Hildebrand v. Board Of Trustees Of Michigan State University · filed 1979-09-17

If the remedy sought is injunctive relief and/or back pay, no jury trial right attaches. In the ordinary case, if the relief sought includes compensatory and/or punitive damages, then there does exist a right to trial by jury.

Section 1983 does not itself confer a right to a jury trial.

Mr. Darryl J. Simmons v. Sheriff Hal Turner · filed 2004-11-17

As stated above, the Supreme Court has determined that the availability of a jury trial in § 1983 claims stems, not from the text of that legislation, but from the Seventh Amendment, a portion of the Bill of Rights not made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.

Section 1983 does not itself provide a statutory right to a jury trial.

Simmons v. Turner · filed 2004-11-17

Neither does the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [4] provide a statutory right to a jury under that statute.

Plaintiffs seeking compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983 are entitled to a jury trial when their claims are legal in nature.

Richards v. Smoltich · filed 1973-01-16

Therefore, the issue is whether an action under Section 1983 is “in the nature of a suit at common law.” ... Therefore, it is apparent that this case meets all of the tests established for application of the Seventh Amendment and that plaintiffs are entitled to a trial by jury.

Section 1983 has no express jury trial provision, and civil actions under it follow customary jury trial practice.

Van Ermen v. Schmidt · filed 1974-05-02

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its predecessors contain no specific provision for jury trial. ... I find it unnecessary to delve into the legislative background since I conclude that the Act recognized that some civil actions arising under it would be tried to a jury and implied that the courts were to follow customary practice on the right to jury trial.

Section 1983 plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their claim.

Molthan v. Temple University—of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1979-07-23

Second, plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their section 1983 claim, whereas “the courts have consistently held that neither party [to a Title VII action] has a right to a jury trial.” Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, - U.S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (footnote omitted).

A plaintiff seeking only equitable relief under § 1983 is not entitled to a jury trial.

Susan Mills v. Garcia · filed 2016-05-31

Because Mills has sought only equitable relief under § 1983, she is not entitled to a jury trial.

A § 1983 claim seeking declaratory relief and no damages does not give defendants a right to a jury trial.

McClanahan v. Wilson · filed 2019-07-31

Here, under the above framework, regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief would be considered equitable or legal, Defendants are not entitled to a jury.

Section 1983 claims are triable by jury.

(PC) Camposeco v. Stamper · filed 2019-10-01

Consistent with Plaintiff’s request, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are triable by jury.

Section 1983 does not independently confer a statutory right to a jury trial.

Tellis v. LeBlanc · filed 2020-01-13

In this case, Defendants do not argue that they are statutorily entitled to a jury trial, and the statutes at issue do not grant Defendants such a right. In C2ty of Monterey, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not independently confer a statutory right to a jury trial upon actions filed under this statute.

A plaintiff in a § 1983 civil rights action has a right to a jury trial.

Hussell v. Boggs · filed 2020-02-14

However, to the extent that the court has also construed Hussell’s petition as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is a right to a jury trial in such proceedings.

Section 1983 does not preserve a right to a jury trial on damages after default judgment.

KD v. Robeson · filed 2020-02-20

Unlike § 1874, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specifically preserve the right to a jury trial after default.

A plaintiff seeking only equitable relief under Section 1983 has no right to a jury trial.

VAMOS, Concertacion Ciudadana Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2020-09-24

Also, plaintiffs’ only claims are equitable in nature and pursuant to section 1983, they have no right to a jury trial.

A Section 1983 challenge to a prison misconduct finding cannot be dismissed as frivolous for lack of finality if prison administrators have reached a definitive position that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.

Brown v. Department of Corrections Officer Englers · filed 1989-07-28

We shall therefore remand the case to the district court for a determination as to whether the misconduct finding against plaintiff is "final," in the sense that the prison administrators have arrived at a "definitive position" that is inflicting on the plaintiff "an actual, concrete injury." We note that the dismissal of the complaint as frivolous cannot be affirmed unless the misconduct finding against the plaintiff lacks finality in this sense.

Section 1983 provides a right to sue for a deprivation of federal rights only when the challenged state action is final.

Welch v. Smith · filed 1980-03-07

Despite the Vermont Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]n the matter of examining and grading applicants . . . the members of the [B]oard are the exclusive judges,” id., we conclude that under Vermont law the Board’s adverse recommendation cannot cause a “deprivation” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only the final action of the supreme court, whatever form it may take, effects such a deprivation, if any.

Section 1983 permits only nominal damages for a procedural-due-process deprivation absent proof of an independent compensable injury.

Taliaferro v. Willett · filed 1978-12-06

In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 and n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), decided after the district court's judgment in this case, the Supreme Court disapproved Thomas and Burt. Carey held that, absent proof of other compensable tort injury, a plaintiff deprived of procedural due process can recover only nominal damages. ... Taliaferro's claim is essentially an action for contract damages arising from the alleged violation of a tenured professor's right to teach until reaching the age of seventy. Neither here nor in the district court has she suggested that procedural deprivations caused her independent injury. In light of Carey, therefore, the controversy over the alleged breach of contract presents no substantial federal question. ... Consequently, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of a substantial federal question.

A § 1983 plaintiff deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proving actual injury.

Takeall Ex Rel. Rubinstein v. Ambach · filed 1985-03-21

plaintiffs in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 who are deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proof of actual injury. Plaintiff has established that the actions of defendant Board of Education of the City of White Plains denied him due process. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff denied procedural due process is entitled to nominal damages even when the underlying action was justified and no actual injury is proven.

Clarence E.. Okeson v. Tolley School District No. 25 · filed 1985-04-19

A plaintiff is therefore entitled to nominal damages because of the defendant's failure to give adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard even if the action taken is shown to be warranted.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff may recover only nominal damages when the adverse employment action would have occurred even with adequate notice and a hearing.

Stein v. The Board Of The City Of New York · filed 1986-05-22

The district judge, therefore, should have instructed the jury to award only nominal damages if it found Stein would have been discharged by ACJ even had he received adequate notice of his disqualification proceeding from the state.

A § 1983 plaintiff whose procedural-due-process rights were violated is entitled to nominal damages without proving actual injury.

Marty O'Shea Franklin, Cross-Appellant v. Max Aycock, Cross-Appellees · filed 1986-07-15

However, even if the district court finds that the same result would have occurred, or finds that Franklin has not shown actual injury and damages, Franklin will be entitled to recover nominal damages of not more than one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation without proof of actual injury.

Harrison v. Sobol · filed 1988-12-08

Under the rule of Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), plaintiffs in suits under sec. 1983 who are deprived of procedural due process may recover nominal damages without proof of actual injury.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the plaintiff proves no actual, compensable injury, but compensatory damages require such injury.

Hardin v. John Makowski, Kenney Roberson, Dorothy Bigelow, Jonnie May Bass, Defendants · filed 1988-12-09

The court concluded that because plaintiff would have been found guilty of insolence had he been notified of the hearing, he did not suffer any actual, compensable injury. The court therefore found that he was not entitled to compensatory damages. ... However, the court did award plaintiff nominal damages of $1.00 for the violation of his due process rights. ... Having carefully reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we find that the district court's opinion correctly resolved all of the issues presented by this case. For this reason, we adopt the opinion of the district court and AFFIRM its judgment.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation even without proof of actual injury.

Taylor v. Jordan · filed 1991-01-02

If the district court, on remand, finds that Taylor's due process rights were violated, it may award nominal damages regardless of whether he is able to prove actual injury.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process claim even after the property has been replaced.

Pablo Jose Ramon Morales v. L. Patrick, Correctional Officer · filed 1992-06-17

The fact that the original television was replaced does not moot Morales' claim for property without procedural due process. He can at least recover nominal damages.

Section 1983 requires proof of actual injury for compensatory damages from denial of procedural due process but permits nominal damages without proof of actual harm.

Morrison v. Stepanski · filed 1993-12-03

Actual injury must be shown before a section 1983 plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for the denial of procedural due. process. ... Nominal damages are, however, recoverable for violation of the right in the absence of proof of actual harm.

Section 1983 requires nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the plaintiff proves no actual injury.

Grounds v. Tolar Independent School District · filed 1994-04-26

Since the trial court’s judgment in July 1989, the Supreme Court has held that the award of nominal damages is mandatory when the plaintiff establishes a procedural due process violation but fails to prove actual injury. ... We thus reform that portion of the judgment of the trial court in which no damages were awarded, to award Grounds nominal damages of $1.00.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a denial of procedural due process without proof of actual injury.

Bryant v. Lanham · filed 1994-08-01

Finally, it is well established that nominal damages may be recovered for a denial of procedural due process, without a showing of injury.

Section 1983 allows only nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when the underlying decision was proper, unless the plaintiff proves harm caused by the procedural defect itself.

Fairbairn v. Board of Education · filed 1995-01-13

Moreover, it should be noted that under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), only nominal damages can be obtained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a procedural breach if the decision itself was proper, unless the plaintiff suffered damages specifically caused by a procedural infirmity, as opposed to the loss of her job.

Section 1983 limits recovery to nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would not have prevented the termination.

Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon · filed 1995-08-10

As such, although defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with sufficient notice of termination and a pre-termination hearing violated his right to procedural due process, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted insofar as it seeks to bar plaintiff from recovering more than a nominal amount.

Section 1983 limits recovery for a procedural due process violation to nominal damages when the plaintiff proves no actual injury.

Kellas v. Peters · filed 1996-03-05

Having carefully examined the record, we agree that Kellas failed to show any actual injury flowing from the denial of procedural due process. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of Kellas, but modify the award of damages to one dollar.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages when a plaintiff’s procedural due process rights have been violated.

Laudermilk v. Fordice · filed 1996-12-12

Nominal damages are available to the plaintiffs by virtue of the mere fact that their procedural due process rights have been violated.

Section 1983 allows nominal damages for a deprivation of procedural due process even when the plaintiff cannot prove actual injury.

Laurido v. Simon · filed 1980-03-07

Recovery of damages under § 1983 is contemplated by the statute itself; ... and absent proof of actual injury, nominal damages are available for a deprivation of procedural due process.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against state prison officials who deprive an inmate of procedural due process by using extraneous criteria to deny work release.

WINSETT v. McGINNES · filed 1980-03-24

We can only conclude that in considering the extraneous criteria, Superintendent Anderson and Commissioner Keve violated the procedure to be accorded Winsett's work release application, and that Winsett has a cause of action against them for the alleged deprivation of procedural due process.

Section 1983 provides relief for a due process violation only to the extent the plaintiff suffered actual injury from the denial of due process.

Skomorucha v. Wilmington Housing Authority · filed 1980-12-11

A plaintiff whose due process rights were violated is entitled to relief in a § 1983 action only to the extent that he suffered actual injury as the result of the denial of due process.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action for the denial of constitutional rights, including minimum procedural due process.

Bush v. California Conservation Corps · filed 1982-09-30

We merely hold that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for denial of their constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and, upon that basis, may also seek a writ of mandate to compel defendant to comply with procedural due process and a declaration of rights.

Section 1983 may permit damages when officials deliberately defy a state-court judgment and thereby subvert state process to deprive a person of property.

Donald Roy, of Waterville, Kennebec County, State of Maine v. The City of Augusta, Maine · filed 1983-07-28

Where its result was to leave Roy without the license the Maine court said he was entitled to, and ultimately to destroy his business, we think he might be able to recover damages under section 1983.

When a deprivation was justified but the procedures were deficient, Section 1983 does not compensate the justified loss, and only nominal damages are available absent proof of a separate actual injury.

Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, Sangamon County, Cass County, and Richard Austin, Individually and in His O · filed 1985-08-07

Where there has been a justified deprivation of a protected interest through deficient procedures, the injury caused by the justified loss is not properly compensable under section 1983. ... Without proof of actual injury, the denial of procedural due process is actionable only for nominal damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by a constitutional violation to recover compensatory damages; without actual injury, only nominal damages are available.

Adams v. Wolff · filed 1985-12-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a violation of his constitutional rights actually caused him injury before he may recover compensatory damages. ... A plaintiff who has established a violation of his rights, but not actual injury resulting therefrom, may collect only nominal damages.

A Section 1983 plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages for a justified deprivation merely because the procedures used were constitutionally deficient.

Akbar v. Fairman · filed 1986-04-22

Where there has been a justified deprivation of a protected interest though deficient procedures, the injury caused by the justified loss is not properly compensable under section 1983.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim may proceed when a state official's violation of established procedures could have occurred pursuant to municipal custom or usage rather than as a random and unauthorized act.

Young v. Municipality of Bethel Park · filed 1986-10-28

In the present case, plaintiff may be able to prove a custom or usage on the part of defendants which would remove defendant Kletch’s action from the category of random and unauthorized acts. Therefore, we will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A public employee with a property right to continued employment until a pretermination cause hearing may obtain reinstatement and backpay under Section 1983 until a proper hearing occurs.

Skeets v. Johnson · filed 1986-11-12

We therefore hold that because Skeets had a property right to continued employment until his “cause” hearing, the district court was correct in awarding him reinstatement and backpay until a proper hearing is held.

A short student suspension does not violate § 1983 when school officials give notice of the contemplated discipline and an opportunity to respond.

Bystrom Ex Rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School · filed 1987-06-30

Dr. Ingvalson met with each student individually, and informed each that he was contemplating suspending them for advocating violence against the homes of teachers. Although Dr. Ingvalson asked each student if he or she had any questions or comments concerning the proposed suspension, each of the students felt nothing could be said to change the administrators’ minds. The students did assert their belief that suspension would be inappropriate.

A plaintiff whose procedural due-process violation caused no actual injury is entitled only to nominal damages under § 1983.

Rogers v. Kelly · filed 1987-10-02

It follows that under all possible versions of due process in this case, Dr. Rogers is entitled only to nominal damages.

A § 1983 plaintiff deprived of property without procedural due process may recover compensatory damages when the deprivation was unjustified, but only nominal damages when the deprivation itself was justified.

Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, Lawrence M. Loveless and Jane Doe Loveless, and the Marital Community Composed · filed 1987-11-18

A plaintiff deprived of a property interest without procedural due process can recover compensatory damages if the deprivation is determined to have been unjustified. ... However, only nominal damages are recoverable for a deprivation of property determined to be otherwise justified.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for an unauthorized deprivation when adequate state postdeprivation remedies satisfy due process.

Utke v. City of Houston · filed 1988-04-26

Because the posttermination state law remedies available to Utke were adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process, he is precluded from bringing this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits liability for depriving a public employee of her position without due process of law.

Harvey v. Treder · filed 1988-05-18

This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted two claims: (1) race discrimination in defendants’ having discharged plaintiff from the Suffolk County Police Academy and the position of police officer, and (2) denial of a property right without due process of law in defendants’ having refused to reinstate plaintiff as a community service aid. ... With respect to the second claim, for reasons stated on the record on May 15, 1988, this court found defendants liable for having deprived plaintiff of her position as a community service aid without affording her due process of law.

A Section 1983 procedural due process claim fails when postdeprivation reinstatement with full back pay provides meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process, even though additional relief could be available under the section.

Dorsey v. State of Md., Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 1988-08-02

Whatever deprivation this may have constituted, however, was cured when the Secretary of Personnel reinstated him with full back pay. Postdeprivation remedies can satisfy due process requirements. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981). Although additional relief, including attorney fees, would be available under Sec. 1983, Dorsey got meaningful relief sufficient to satisfy due process. Id. at 544. Therefore, summary judgment on his Sec. 1983 claim was appropriate.

Section 1983 permits damages for denial of procedural due process even if the plaintiff later receives a hearing.

Schall v. Joyce · filed 1989-11-24

Moreover, although a hearing is an element of the relief available in a procedural due process suit, the Supreme Court has held that denial of the process due is itself compensable by damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Thus, although Schall has received a hearing, she may still be entitled to monetary relief if due process required that she be given a hearing more timely than the one that she ultimately received.

In a § 1983 procedural due process claim, once the plaintiff proves a violation, the defendant must prove that the same termination would have occurred with due process to avoid damages for lost employment.

Hough v. Dane County · filed 1990-06-07

Once Hough established a violation of his procedural due process rights, the burden shifted to the county to prove that the board would have terminated Hough's employment if no due process violation had occurred.

In a § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process, damages cover injury caused by the denial of process itself; absent proof of such injury, only nominal damages are available.

Royal Russell Long v. Shillinger · filed 1991-03-06

Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot recover for any injury caused by the extradition; he can only recover for any injury, such as emotional distress, caused by the deprivation of due process itself. ... Since plaintiff did not allege, much less prove, that he suffered any injury as a result of the deprivation of due process alone, he was entitled to receive only nominal damages on his claim.

Section 1983 permits a damages suit for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Mateen v. Carl Nink Ray Polanco Sherry Burright Jim Cecil · filed 1993-04-15

A party may sue for damages under section 1983 for procedural or substantive due process violations.

Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff to at least nominal damages when a municipal policy terminates water service without constitutionally required notice.

James v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 1993-10-22

Appéllees’ policy of disconnecting water service to a property without giving prior notice of termination to actual users constitutes a denial of due process and entitles appellant to at least nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging deprivation of procedural due process to show a protected life, liberty, or property interest and the absence of due process.

Farber v. City of Paterson · filed 2004-06-07

To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the individual interest of which she claims she was deprived is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to her did not provide “due process of law.”

Section 1983 permits damages for a procedural due process violation when conduct under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of life, liberty, or property without due process.

Schultz v. Egan · filed 2004-07-06

“To award damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of procedural due process, a court must find that, as the result of conduct performed under col- or of state law, the plaintiff was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a federal action for deprivation of constitutional rights when state officials fail to provide required predeprivation process.

Berlanti v. Bodman · filed 1985-12-26

As we held in Stana, "if the government entity could have, but did not, provide predeprivation procedures, a Sec. 1983 action complaining of the lack of procedural due process may be maintained in federal court, notwithstanding the availability of state judicial routes as well." Stana, 775 F.2d at 130.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue a state or local government actor for depriving them of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Hughes v. City of Bethlehem · filed 2008-10-02

We agree with the District Court that Hughes failed to make out a claim against the City that she was deprived of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for deprivation of procedural due process during a prison disciplinary proceeding when the claim does not necessarily invalidate the conviction.

White v. Fox · filed 2008-10-06

A claim for damages based on a failure to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under §1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations when success would not necessarily invalidate good-time credits.

Cox v. Clark · filed 2009-04-08

However, Cox’s claim for damages based on the failure to provide advance notice of the claimed disciplinary violation is not barred by Edwards, because a decision in Cox’s favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of the good-time credits.

Section 1983 permits nominal damages for a procedural due process violation when a proper hearing would have produced the same result, but does not permit compensatory damages without resulting injury.

Parks v. Goff · filed 1980-01-08

The Court finds that plaintiff has not sustained any actual damages attributable to the lack of procedural due process, for the reason that a proper hearing would have resulted in the same disposition. Under such circumstances, reinstatement and backpay are not proper remedies, and an award of compensatory damages is not justified. ... Judgment will, therefore, be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of one dollar, representing nominal damages for such deprivation of procedure.

Section 1983 permits actual damages for a procedural due process violation if injury is proved, and nominal damages if no actual damages are shown.

Russell v. Dr. Robert Harrison, President of the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 1984-07-16

Thus, if upon remand, the district court finds a denial of procedural due process, actual damages ... may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and nominal damages are appropriate in the event that no actual damages are shown.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, but a public employee cannot use it to challenge a transfer that changes job functions without terminating employment.

Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German · filed 2009-09-30

Since the plaintiffs allegations in this case do not involve the termination of his employment, but merely a change in his functions, i.e. a transfer from one division of the municipal government to another, the plaintiff cannot obtain redress for a due process violation, even if the defendants’ alleged actions would constitute adverse employment actions. ... Therefore, the court must GRANT the defendants’ motion on this ground and dismiss the plaintiffs section 1983 due process claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or laws, and a procedural due process claim requires denial of available state process.

Copper ex rel. Copper v. Denlinger · filed 2010-01-29

As such, even assuming arguendo that the 6 October meeting was constitutionally deficient and deprived the student of his right to procedural due process, the complaint fails to make the additional requisite allegation that the injury was completed when Ms. Denlinger, acting under color of law, refused to provide or somehow denied the student due process following the initial alleged deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 114. The sole relevant allegation as to Ms. Denlinger, that she “purposefully postdated her letter... to cut off Todd’s right to appeal,” even when taken as true, is insufficient to establish that he was denied his right to appeal. Simply put, the student can show no claim under § 1983 for violation of procedural due process when his own allegations reveal that he and his mother failed to avail themselves of the due process offered under state law.

Section 1983 permits a procedural due process claim when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.

mark East v. Clayton Coumty, GA · filed 2011-08-01

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of procedural due process, an individual must show “the state refuse[d] to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation.”

Section 1983 permits procedural due process relief only when the plaintiff shows deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and a lack of process.

Fellowship v. County of San Diego · filed 2011-12-23

To obtain relief on § 1983 claims based upon procedural due process, the plaintiff must establish the existence of “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] ... (3) lack of process.” ... Without such a deprivation, procedural due process claims are moot.