42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 intentional sex discrimination claims use the same standard as Title VII claims.

Starchvill v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2018-07-18

The standard for Title VII and § 1983 intentional sex discrimination claims is the same.

Section 1983 applies in Puerto Rico and permits civil suits in the federal district court there.

United States v. Gerena · filed 1977-04-29

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico may therefore entertain civil suits for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a means for inhabitants of Puerto Rico to seek protection of constitutional rights.

Feliciano v. Barcelo · filed 1979-04-25

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has categorically stated that regardless of whether the rights of its inhabitants are afforded protection under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, such protection is available through suits filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, and jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C., Section 1343.

Section 1983 permits prospective declaratory relief against a judicial officer when the plaintiff has standing to seek it.

Kurtenbach v. Codington County · filed 2021-11-01

Mr. Kurtenbach’s complaint seeks prospective declaratory relief as he seeks to invalidate the future actions of Judge Means. That relief is available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not bar a suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief from judicial officers in these circumstances.

Rud v. Dahl · filed 1978-06-05

This is a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which plaintiff Rud attacks the facial constitutionality of the Illinois statutory scheme under which he was adjudicated incompetent and a conservator appointed to manage his person and estate. ... Although we agree with plaintiff that, because no monetary damages are sought, the defendants are not immune from suit in the circumstances of this case, Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1975), we affirm the district court's judgment without reaching the comity and abstention issues raised on appeal because plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim to relief.

Section 1983 permits a suit for declaratory relief against state judicial defendants.

Person v. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York · filed 1977-06-14

We hold further that this suit for declaratory relief is maintainable against defendants-appellants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Absolute judicial immunity from Section 1983 damages does not bar prospective equitable relief against a state judge when important First Amendment rights are implicated.

First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. State of Ohio · filed 1983-10-24

We decline to hold that the doctrine of absolute immunity bars plaintiffs’ claim for prospective equitable relief in the context of this case, which implicates important First Amendment rights.

A judge retains absolute § 1983 immunity when directing charges against a witness based on evidence in a pending case because the resulting arrest and detention are judicial acts within subject-matter jurisdiction.

Harris v. Deveaux · filed 1986-01-21

We hold: (1) this court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of absolute judicial immunity and (2) a judge does not lose immunity by directing the entry of charges against a witness appearing before the judge in a pending case and based upon evidence before him.

A judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for acts performed in a judicial capacity.

Lassiter v. Ellis · filed 1987-10-20

A judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.

Federal judges have judicial immunity from § 1983 damages claims based on their handling of pending cases.

Rodman v. Joseph P. Kinneary and John P. Holschuh · filed 1987-11-10

The district court, with a nonparty judge presiding, dismissed plaintiff's Sec. 1983 action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). In so doing, the district court relied on the principle of judicial immunity discussed in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1975). Based on our review of the record and appellant's arguments, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's action.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a state judge despite judicial immunity from damages.

Olson v. Gerald W. Hart, Judge · filed 1992-06-03

The appellee, as a judge, has absolute immunity, and the appellant therefore may not obtain the damages he seeks. ... However, injunctive relief against Judge Hart remains available under section 1983.

Judicial immunity ordinarily does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief under § 1983.

Davis v. Bayless · filed 1995-11-21

The district court's order provides no meaningful basis for review of its dismissal of the Davises' claim for preliminary injunctive relief under § 1983, which would ordinarily survive a finding of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against officials entitled to absolute judicial immunity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mitchell v. Fishbein · filed 2002-08-12

Like judicial officers, officials entitled to absolute immunity may not be sued for injunctive relief under § 1983 if the plaintiff fails to allege that either a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief despite a Heck bar to related damages claims.

Whitaker v. Garcetti · filed 2003-11-17

A Heck defense is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' § 1983 declaratory relief claim.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity unless they violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kuhn v. Thompson · filed 2004-01-29

Thus, unless “declaratory relief was unavailable” Section 1983 specifically provides that injunctive relief is not available against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken in then- judicial capacity.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief for constitutional violations.

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Robert Taft, Governor of Ohio · filed 2004-09-27

These constitutional violations entitle the ACLU to declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Huminski v. Corsones · filed 2004-10-07

We conclude in light of the foregoing that Corsones is immune 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks injunctive relief, provided declaratory relief remains available, and she has not violated a previous declaratory judgment, and 2) under the judicially established judicial-immunity doctrine, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks monetary relief with respect to her role in the issuance of the May 24 and May 27 Notices.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Huminski v. Corsones · filed 2005-01-18

We conclude in light of the foregoing that Corsones is immune 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Huminski's suit insofar as it seeks injunctive relief, provided declaratory relief remains available, and she has not violated a previous declaratory judgment, and 2) under the judicially established judicial-immunity doctrine, from Huminski's suit insofar as it seeks monetary relief with respect to her role in the issuance of the May 24 and May 27 Notices.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless the officer violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti · filed 2006-10-10

Plaintiff has not alleged that the Judicial Defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable at any relevant time. Accordingly, his request for an order directing the Judicial Defendants to follow the law does not overcome their immunity from the present suit brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 suits for declaratory relief against public officials are not barred by absolute or qualified immunity.

Thomas v. Lehman · filed 2007-05-15

Neither absolute nor qualified immunity extends to § 1983 suits for declaratory relief such as this one.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge unless the judge violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Robinson v. Smyth · filed 2007-12-18

In addition, Robinson’s claims for injunctive relief against Judge Smyth were also barred because Robinson did not allege that the judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was not available in his case.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Lawrence v. Kuenhold · filed 2008-03-27

Section 309(c) of the FCIA bars injunctive relief in any § 1983 action “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for actions taken in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; unfavorable rulings do not make declaratory relief unavailable.

Hoai v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia · filed 2008-03-28

Section 1983 immunizes judicial officers from injunctive relief for actions taken in their judicial capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since plaintiffs do not contend that our local courts violated any “declaratory decree,” they are left to demonstrate that “declaratory relief was unavailable.” Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, a failure to get one’s desired decisions in our local courts does not constitute such “unavailability” and the suit must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 judicial immunity bars an injunction against a judge for acts within the judge’s judicial jurisdiction.

Town of Hopkins, SC v. Cobb · filed 1979-03-22

This Court must conclude that the Plaintiffs seek to collaterally attack the decision of the Defendant Judge by seeking to enjoin him from enforcing his judgment by way of contempt and holds that he is judicially immune from actions seeking to enjoin him from acts which will be taken within his judicial jurisdiction.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity in this case.

Roth, Pamela v. King, Rufus · filed 2006-06-09

Therefore, because a number of the Superior Court appellants acted in a “judicial capacity” in selecting attorneys for inclusion on the panels, those appellants are immune from suits for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against officials acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Churchill v. University of Colorado at Boulder · filed 2010-11-24

Instead, we choose to follow the great weight of authority that has concluded that the term "judicial officer" found in section 1983 extends to quasi-judicial actors-thereby barring claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash · filed 2012-04-10

With respect to their claim for injunctive relief, Tamaya and Santa Ana have failed to demonstrate that “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Judge Nash did not violate a declaratory decree, nor do Tamaya or Santa Ana contend that she did. Second, Tamaya and Santa Ana do not allege, nor does it appear, that declaratory relief was unavailable in the state proceeding. Accordingly, their claim for injunctive relief against Judge Nash is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize a declaration of innocence standing alone as a cognizable form of relief.

Teichmann v. New York · filed 2014-10-20

Moreover, § 1983 — while broad in its equitable and legal remedies — does not recognize a declaration of innocence, standing alone, as a cognizable form of relief.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief against judicial officers in their official capacities.

Ward v. City of Norwalk · filed 2016-02-03

However, the plain language of § 1983 contemplates a declaratory judgment against judicial officers like Judge Ridge and Clerk Boss in their official capacities.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief against a state judge, but requires a violation, a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury, and no adequate remedy at law.

Wells v. Judge Karen Miller · filed 2016-06-17

State judges are not immune from declaratory relief in a § 1983 action. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). To warrant such relief, a plaintiff must show: (1) that there was a violation; (2) that there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if relief is not granted; and (3) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 1242. Appealing a judge’s ruling or seeking the extraordinary writ of mandamus both constitute adequate remedies at law. See id. at 1243.

Section 1983’s limit on injunctive relief against judicial officers does not protect executive officers who enforce court orders.

Moore v. Urquhart · filed 2018-08-16

Section 1983 (as amended by the FCIA) therefore provides judicial officers immunity from injunctive relief even when the common law would not. ... We conclude that the FCIA does not limit injunctive relief against an executive branch officer enforcing a court order, and that the Sheriff is not entitled to immunity from plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a parole board official for quasi-adjudicative acts unless the official violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Flores v. Stanford · filed 2019-09-20

Pursuant to Section 1983, this immunity also extends to claims for injunctive relief against a parole board official arising from the official’s quasi-adjudicative function, see id., “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” to the plaintiff, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not allege any defendant violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable to plaintiffs when they commenced this action. Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, their claims must be dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; seeking a declaration about past acts does not satisfy the declaratory relief exception.

Klayman v. Blackburne-Rigsby · filed 2021-06-28

Asking the Court to declare defendants’ past actions to be unconstitutional and to enjoin them does not transform his claims into an action for “declaratory relief” within the meaning of the section 1983 exception.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Hueter v. Kruse · filed 2021-10-19

Judicial officers are immune from claims for injunctive relief under § 1983 “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2021-11-17

Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief against Chief Judge Wolfson is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because Plaintiffs have failed to plead Chief Judge Wolfson violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 does not allow retrospective declaratory relief against judicial officers for past acts.

LaTulippe v. Harder · filed 2021-11-23

As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for retrospective declaratory relief is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits declaratory relief against judicial and quasi-judicial officers despite absolute immunity.

Civil Rights Corps. v. Cushman · filed 2022-05-05

First, the amended text of Section 1983 explicitly allows for suits seeking declaratory relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Dean v. Schooley · filed 2022-09-22

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts suggesting that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, absolute judicial immunity bars any request for injunctive relief against Judge Schooley.

Section 1983 does not permit declaratory relief for a past violation without an alleged continuing violation of federal law.

Cosby v. Mayfield · filed 2022-10-28

The plaintiff may not use §1983 to obtain a judgment against the defendants “declaring that they violated federal law in the past.”

Threats and intimidation, without an actual infringement of a constitutional right, do not state a Section 1983 claim.

Hughes v. Carter · filed 1986-11-17

Although his claims of threats and intimidation are, indeed, unfortunate, they do not state an actual infringement of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not make verbal abuse or harassment, without more, actionable as a constitutional violation.

Coyle v. Hughs · filed 1977-06-28

The use of words, however violent, cannot constitute an assault actionable under § 1983. ... Allegations of verbal harassment and profanity without more simply do not show the invasion of any federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for verbal harassment or abuse, even when the defamation is malicious and committed by a state official.

Gomez v. Hug · filed 1982-06-03

Verbal harassment or abuse is insufficient to support a § 1983 action, as in defamation. ... This is true even where the defamation is malicious and committed by a state official.

A prisoner need not suffer physical injury to state a section 1983 claim based on an unprovoked guard's racially charged death threats and retaliation for court access.

Willie Burton, Jr. v. Livingston · filed 1986-05-08

The day has passed when an inmate must show a court the scars of torture in order to make out a complaint under § 1983. We hold that a prisoner retains at least the right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodians.

Verbal harassment or abuse alone is not a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983.

Charles J. Oltarzewski, Jr. v. Ruggiero · filed 1987-10-14

“[vjerbal harassment or abuse ... is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal harassment.

Harris v. C.J. Lawler · filed 1994-11-04

First, claims of verbal harassment are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal threats unless the threats are premised on a protected interest.

Fontenot v. McLeod · filed 1995-06-06

As for plaintiffs concerns regarding threats, verbal threats are not cognizable under section 1983 unless premised on a protected interest.

Claims of verbal abuse are not cognizable under § 1983.

Lee v. Coleman · filed 2000-06-19

To the extent Lee asserts claims of verbal abuse, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires more than verbal abuse to support a cause of action.

Harvey v. Stalder · filed 2005-03-11

The judgment of the district court is affirmed because the precedent of this circuit requires more than verbal abuse to raise a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a claim for verbal harassment or abuse alone.

White v. Bon · filed 2005-04-11

The district court properly dismissed White’s claim that Chaplain Bon spoke rudely to him because verbal harassment or abuse is generally not enough to constitute a claim under section 1983.

Verbal harassment alone is not actionable under § 1983.

Askew v. Jones · filed 2005-12-13

Although we agree with the District Court that Askew’s verbal harassment claim is not actionable under § 1983, see, e.g., Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9 th Cir. 1987), Askew’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal abuse by a prison official alone.

Todd v. Walters · filed 2006-01-12

Finally, Todd’s verbal abuse claim against Nurse Farmarie is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a viable claim for a prisoner’s verbal harassment allegations without more.

Richardson v. Sherrer · filed 2009-09-11

The District Court correctly concluded that Richardson’s claim against Westry and Nicolai regarding their alleged verbal abuse of him was not viable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Verbal harassment of a prisoner, without more, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

A jailer’s verbal abuse alone does not support a § 1983 claim, and taunts accompanying objectively reasonable force do not overcome qualified immunity.

Dawson v. Anderson County, Texas · filed 2014-05-06

We have held previously that verbal abuse by a jailer alone does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. ... We have already held that the use of the pepperball gun in this case was objectively reasonable, and we do not find that her assertions about laughter and taunts combine to overcome defendants’ qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for verbal harassment or abuse, even when racially motivated.

Hubbard v. Johnson · filed 2019-10-29

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This is so even if the verbal harassment is racially motivated.

Section 1983 does not make verbal abuse or harassment actionable.

Aliahmed v. Kondash · filed 2022-05-31

Verbal abuse or harassment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a person whose constitutional rights are violated by state officials to vindicate those rights in federal court.

Show-World Center, Inc. v. Walsh · filed 1977-06-28

It was entitled under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to vindicate its constitutional claims in a federal forum.

Section 1983 claims may be removed to federal court despite state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction.

Gleichauf v. Ginsberg · filed 1994-08-01

No Act of Congress expressly provides that § 1983 causes of action should be treated as nonremovable.

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; a claim must rest on a violation of the Constitution or another federal law.

Boody v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1997-12-18

Section 1983 does not itself provide any substantive rights, and a claim under the statute must be grounded on a violation of the United States Constitution or some other federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of an existing federal right; a claim fails when the asserted underlying right was not violated.

Jacobsen v. Tillmann · filed 1998-08-31

The plaintiff has, necessarily, premised her § 1983 claim on her asserted ADA deprivation. One cannot premise a claim of constitutional deprivation on an asserted right which one does not possess. Therefore, in light of the dismissal of her ADA claims, the plaintiffs § 1983 claim necessarily fails as well.

Section 1983 does not provide general federal review of state agency decisions affecting labor disputes; intervention requires a clear and unequivocal violation of a federal right.

Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. O'Connor · filed 1999-09-28

It is clear, however, that the violation of a federal right must be clear and unequivocal, so that the power of federal law and federal courts to override the decisions of state agencies is exercised only in extraordinary circumstances.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, and a surviving Fourth Amendment claim can support a Section 1983 claim.

Warren v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis · filed 2001-08-23

The Court has found, however, that Plaintiff's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation survives summary judgment. Thus, Plaintiff's alleged Fourth Amendment violation provides the independent constitutional right necessary to support a § 1983 claim. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this ground therefore fails.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for asserting federal rights, so a claim under it cannot survive when the underlying causes of action are precluded.

J.S. Ex Rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District · filed 2002-02-15

Because Appellants’ underlying causes of action are precluded, their § 1983 claims are no longer viable. A § 1983 claim is not a cause of action separate from the underlying federal right, but rather, a vehicle for asserting one’s rights.

Filing the same claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission waives the right to sue a state employee under § 1983.

Talley v. Webb · filed 2002-09-13

Nonetheless, it is noted that the district court’s ruling was proper because Talley waived his right to sue this defendant state employee under § 1983 because he filed a claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission involving the same claim asserted herein.

A § 1983 claim must allege a specific federal right violated by the defendant.

Miller v. Conway · filed 2011-06-15

Second, Miller challenges the dismissal of his claim that Craig offered and then failed to advise Miller about the investigation of Land’s alleged retaliation, but Miller failed to “allege a specific federal right violated by” Craig.

A plaintiff may waive the right to sue individuals under § 1983 through a voluntary agreement that provides a personal benefit and does not adversely affect public interests.

Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center · filed 2013-02-25

Applying those principles in this case, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs waiver of his right to file suit against the individual defendants by signing the agreement to be bound by the Bylaws is enforceable. It is not a blanket provision prohibiting suit against Gila Regional; it limits suing only individual staff members and third parties who participate in physician evaluation and discipline, thus it does not adversely effect important public interests.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue to vindicate their own constitutional rights without guaranteeing the same outcome for every other affected citizen.

Wolf v. Walker · filed 2014-03-24

Plaintiffs have the right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a lawsuit to vindicate their own constitutional rights. I am aware of no authority that would impose as a prerequisite to obtaining relief a guarantee that every other Wisconsin citizen obtain the same outcome.

Section 1983 allows people to sue to vindicate their own constitutional rights.

McGee v. Cole · filed 2014-11-07

Finally, Plaintiffs here “have the right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a lawsuit to vindicate their own constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff the right to remove a state court case to federal court.

Jones v. Grantham & Properties · filed 2020-06-12

Plaintiff’s reading of the statute is not accurate. Section 1983 concerns only civil actions for deprivation of rights, while the right to remove a case remains governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Castro v. Santwier · filed 2021-08-02

On June 2, 2021, the Court dismissed this action because Plaintiff had failed to: (1) pay the filing fee or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”); (2) present sufficient facts in the Complaint to determine whether venue is proper in the Southern District of California, as the only Defendant was alleged to reside in the Central District of California; and (3) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As noted in the prior Dismissal Order, the Complaint in this action does not state a claim and is essentially incoherent.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a specific federal right that the defendant violated.

Doe v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company · filed 2021-08-03

As to the Section 1983 claim, that fails because the Plaintiff never alleges a specific federal right that the Defendants violated.

Section 1983 cannot support federal jurisdiction without a predicate claim alleging a deprivation of federal rights.

Rotter v. Bauer · filed 2021-10-22

And § 1983 confers no subject matter jurisdiction unless there is predicate claim alleging a deprivation of federal rights. But, as noted above, there is no underlying actionable federal claim in the complaint.

Section 1983 protects the right to travel, but it does not provide a cause of action when a pension board’s statutory recall for medical reexamination imposes no unreasonable burden.

Danaher v. Michaw · filed 1977-07-25

It is clear that the right to travel does provide a right protected by the Civil Rights Act. ... However, as will be more fully discussed, plaintiff has not stated a cause of action based on a violation of the right to travel in the case at bar. ... Assuming, however, that the right to travel is at issue here, plaintiff still has failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the right to travel. ... The Pension Board’s action in calling plaintiff back was clearly sanctioned by statute and theoretically could have been taken even if plaintiff had moved to a foreign country. It is difficult for the Court to see how the exercise by the Pension Board of the right to call back a fireman who was put on disability in order to determine whether or not the disability still exists could be considered unreasonable. ... Assuming that this constitutes a burden on his right to travel, it is not an unreasonable burden on that right.

Section 1983 requires police officers to take reasonable steps to protect people exercising constitutional rights from violence, even when community hostility is involved.

Dunlap v. City of Chicago · filed 1977-07-19

Section 1983 imposes an affirmative duty upon police officers to protect speakers who are airing opinions which may be unpopular. “A police officer has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a heckler’s veto, nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable action to protect from violence persons exercising their constitutional rights. [Citations omitted] And, in the absence of a speaker’s exhortation to violence, in carefully defined circumstances, 'state officials are not entitled to rely on community hostility as an excuse not to protect, by inaction or affirmative conduct, the exercise of fundamental rights.’ ”

Section 1983 permits liability for law-enforcement officers who, by failing to perform a statutorily imposed duty, deny equal protection to people exercising fundamental rights.

W. J. A. Productions, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 1977-10-31

It is clear that law enforcement officers can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when by inaction they fail to perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws and thereby deny equal protection to persons legitimately exercising fundamental rights.

Section 1983 permits claims alleging unconstitutional extradition, but a claim is premature before an arrest or extradition proceedings begin.

MacGuire v. Alan Rasmussen Robert Q. Harris Gerald Baliles, Governor Robert Martinez, Governor · filed 1989-05-03

MacGuire's complaint contained no allegation or proof that he was ever arrested in Virginia, or that extradition proceedings had commenced in that state as of the complaint's date. Thus, although constitutional infirmities with extradition are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, see Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1984); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 33 (1978), MacGuire's suit was premature.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state actors abuse extradition power by failing to comply with applicable law and thereby violate rights protected by federal law.

McBride v. Gary Soos and Lamar Haney, Individually and as Elkhart County Policemen · filed 1979-02-22

Under these circumstances where plaintiff has alleged violation of rights protected by federal law, and violation of rights protected by state law derived from federal law, we hold that a complaint which charges abuse of the extradiction power by noncompliance with applicable law states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of extradition safeguards derived solely from state law, but extradition conduct sufficiently shocking to the conscience to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process can support a civil-rights claim.

Raffone v. Sullivan · filed 1977-09-08

But since the safeguards derive from state rather than federal law, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for their breach. ... Conduct sufficiently “shocking to the conscience” to require invalidation of a conviction on due proces grounds also supports a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 permits a claim for forced extradition in violation of the Extradition Clause and federal extradition statute, but the plaintiff must identify the officers responsible for the alleged violation.

Patino v. State Of South Dakota · filed 1988-07-19

Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir.1980), holds that allegations by a prisoner that he was forcibly seized and transported from a holding state to the demanding state by police officers in violation of the extradition clause and federal extradition statute state a cognizable section 1983 cause of action. ... Nonetheless, we agree with the district court that in the present case Patino did not clearly identify any of the three listed "unknown named" Lawrence County officers or officer Novak as the parties responsible for the alleged extradition violation. Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice of this aspect of the complaint.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings.

Joseph v. Charlotte County Sheriff's Department Glen E. Sapp Mike Gandy H.M. Turbeville Gary Martin · filed 1993-07-06

As to the extradition hearing claims, we find that the magistrate judge and the district court failed to consider this Court's ruling in Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978), that "a complaint alleging the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings does create a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order dismissing the extradition hearing claims against Turbeville and Martin and remand for further proceedings consistent with Wirth.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that an official arrested and transported a fugitive without extradition proceedings.

Wirth v. R. R. Surles, Officer, State Highway Patrol · filed 1977-09-22

While recognizing that failure to comply with state or federal extradition laws does not constitute a defense to a criminal prosecution, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), we nevertheless hold that a complaint alleging the arrest and transportation of a fugitive without extradition proceedings does create a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when an official acting under color of state law denies a person the federal right to a pre-extradition habeas corpus hearing.

Crumley v. Roy Snead, Individually, and as Sheriff of Calhoun County, Alabama · filed 1980-06-30

Any denial of this right gives rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; for Section 1983 protects all rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process when a non-tenured public employee is stigmatized in connection with a failure to rehire.

Dennis v. S & S Consolidated Rural High School District · filed 1978-07-31

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that stigma to reputation in conjunction with a failure to rehire a non-tenured employee states a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest without due process.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging racially disparate membership procedures to show both a disparate burden and a discriminatory purpose.

Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, Inc. · filed 1979-02-08

To make out a claim under § 1983, Walker must show that the recruiting and membership procedures burden blacks more than whites and that those procedures were instituted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Section 1983 does not permit an equal-protection violation to be established by disparate impact alone; discriminatory intent must be shown.

Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Association · filed 1979-06-25

These decisions established the rule that violation of equal protection may not be established in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a mere showing of disparate impact of governmental action; there must be a showing of an intent to discriminate.

A § 1983 claim based on sex discrimination requires proof that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Campbell v. Ramsay · filed 1980-02-13

Plaintiff’s disparate-treatment claim must fail. Her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 likewise must be rejected for failure to prove discriminatory intent.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent for a disparate-treatment claim against a state employer, and liability under Title VII on that theory corresponds to liability under § 1983.

Grano v. Department of Development · filed 1980-12-10

A plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment by a state employer is bringing essentially the same claim under Title VII as under § 1983. If there is liability under Title VII, there should be liability under § 1983. Similarly, if there was no discriminatory intent, there cannot be liability under either Title VII, on a disparate treatment theory, or § 1983.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent, not merely racially disproportionate impact, to support a claim that official action violates equal protection.

Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1981-01-20

Proof of a racially discriminatory intent is required to hold such official acts violative of the Equal Protection Clause, ... and of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires proof of discriminatory intent for a claim based on sex discrimination.

Gillespie v. BD. OF ED. OF N. LITTLE ROCK, ETC. · filed 1981-12-08

Nor did she establish any violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 likewise must be rejected for failure to prove discriminatory intent.

A plaintiff bringing a discrimination claim under Section 1983 must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1982-08-13

The plaintiff in a § 1983 action must also prove discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant.

A Section 1983 discrimination claim fails without proof that disparate treatment was caused by race or religion.

Agarwal v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, John Q. Imholte, Gordon R. Bopp, Laird H. Barbar, Ernest D. Ke · filed 1986-04-10

In sum, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Agarwal failed to state a claim under either § 1983 or § 1985(3), because he did not establish that he was treated differently due to his race and religion.

A Section 1983 sex discrimination claim requires proof of discriminatory intent.

Parker v. The Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis · filed 1984-03-13

The plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must also fail because discriminatory intent is a prerequisite to a § 1983 prima facie ease.

Section 1983 employment discrimination claims require facts supporting discriminatory intent; conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Stone v. Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University · filed 2014-08-05

Stone conclusorily alleges that the three extensions of time and the failure to provide an explanation for the final decision on the grievance were based on her age and/or gender, but those are not adverse employment actions and conclusory allegations are insufficient under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim based solely on improprieties in prison grievance procedures.

Glenn v. Delbalso · filed 2015-04-15

Access to prison grievance procedures is not a constitutionally-mandated right, and allegations of improprieties in the handling of grievances do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of jail grievance procedures.

Blank v. Anuligo · filed 2020-03-09

However, “[a]lleged violations of jail grievance procedures state no claim under § 1983.”

Section 1983 generally does not impose personal liability on a prison official merely for denying an inmate’s grievance about an alleged constitutional violation.

Anderson v. California Department of Correction · filed 2020-09-28

Therefore, a prison official’s denial of an inmate’s grievance generally does not constitute significant participation in an alleged constitutional violation sufficient to give rise to personal liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a prison official liable solely for denying a grievance or failing to follow grievance procedures after another official’s alleged misconduct.

Lloyd v. Pettit · filed 2020-10-08

Inspector Free’s alleged failure to follow proper grievance procedures and his denial of plaintiff’s grievance are not sufficient to render him liable under §1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison official merely for responding to a grievance or participating in the grievance procedure.

Harris v. Kamp · filed 2021-09-08

In addition, responding to a grievance or otherwise participating in the grievance procedure is insufficient to trigger liability for a prison official under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not recognize a claim based solely on the review and denial of grievances or on the administrative exhaustion procedure itself.

WILSON v. PA. STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION GRATERFORD/PHOENIX S.C.I. · filed 2021-09-30

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant based merely on the review and denial of grievances or based on the administrative exhaustion procedure itself, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for denial of access to a grievance procedure because that procedure creates no substantive right.

Hockman v. Cooley · filed 2022-08-04

Fourth, plaintiff's claims regarding grievances or the grievance process are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the grievance procedure does not provide him with a substantive right.

Section 1983 does not redress a Contracts Clause violation or reputational injury unless the plaintiff also alleges a plausible state-law property interest or Bill of Rights liberty interest.

Poirier v. Hodges · filed 1978-02-02

Consequently, the Court holds that the prohibition in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, against impairing legitimate contractual obligations, is not a right redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Unless a plaintiff alleges the infringement of a property interest under state law, or a liberty interest under the Bill of Rights, in conjunction with injury to his reputation, he will not state a claim for stigmatization under § 1983, but at most a state-law claim for defamation, libel or slander. ... The Court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff has not stated a remediable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim when intentional retaliatory advice to prospective employers directly interferes with employment opportunities, even though defamation alone would not suffice.

Reussow v. Eddington · filed 1980-01-29

Such “advice” standing alone would support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a due process claim for reputational harm alone without deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest.

Wade v. Tommy Goodwin, Director of Arkansas State Police · filed 1988-05-18

These allegations do not state a § 1983 claim. One’s reputation alone is neither a “liberty” nor a “property” interest proteetible by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 permits damages for reputational injury when an unlawful arrest violates a protected liberty interest, although reputational injury alone does not establish liability.

Charlesworth R. Martin v. Theodore Thomas, Milo K. Shepard, Robert L. Prater and L.L. Clarkson · filed 1992-09-30

The Court held that injury to reputation alone is not enough to establish a claim under § 1983. The present case is substantially different because Dr. Martin is suing because his liberty interest to be free from an illegal arrest was violated. As damages for this violation, the jury granted monetary relief due to injury to reputation. Officer Shepard’s contention confuses the issue of damages with the issue of liability for loss of a protected liberty.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights protected by the Contracts Clause.

Lipscomb v. Columbus Muninicipal Separate School District · filed 2003-05-01

In so asserting, the Defendants ignore both United States Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent holding that Contracts Clause rights fall within the protection of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a protected right; reputational harm alone does not state a claim.

Partington v. Gedan · filed 1992-07-02

Partington, on the other hand, has not indicated that the Hawaii Supreme Court's statement in State v. Clarke deprived him of any constitutionally protected property or liberty interests or caused him any harm other than that allegedly done to his reputation. That allegation is not enough to sustain a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for reputational injury unless the injury is connected to a federally protected right or causes its denial.

Kanahele v. Gawlik · filed 2021-01-07

To the extent Plaintiff intends to claim Defendant Gawlik defamed him by making “false accusations,” this claim is not actionable under § 1983. ... Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any injury to his reputation was inflicted in connection with a federally protected right or that it caused the denial of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim unless state action deprives the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest; procedural fairness alone does not establish a property interest.

Maloney v. Sheehan · filed 1978-06-27

Plaintiff bases his claim of a property interest on the CETA regulation which required written notice and an opportunity to respond to charges before termination. ... But the CETA regulation allowed an employer to discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. A guarantee of procedural fairness does not establish a property interest. ... The allegations of the complaint do not establish a deprivation of a liberty or property interest to which the due process clause may apply. Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim under the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for a public-employee termination claim only when the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest in the employment status.

Northrop v. Kirby · filed 1978-06-30

It is well established that, in the context of terminations of employment of public employees, there is no constitutional requirement of a hearing and there is no federal right of action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff had a “property” or “liberty” interest in his employment status.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state officials terminate a tenured public employee without the pre-termination hearing required by due process.

Busche v. Bosman · filed 1979-08-15

The August 12, 1974, termination of plaintiff was in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it was accomplished without a pre-termination hearing and constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a due process claim when the plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc. · filed 1980-02-26

We hold that, under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, Rodic had no liberty or property interest in attending races at Thistledown on which to base a due process claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not warrant remand of a public employee’s due-process claim when factual findings show that the dismissal was justified and not arbitrary, even if the employer did not follow its usual procedures.

Delores TEAGUE, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Appellee · filed 1980-03-21

In this case the findings of fact of the trial judge preclude the possibility that he would find plaintiff’s dismissal was arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, he found that plaintiff could not be found in her assigned area on at least four occasions, and that she was docked several times for unexcused absence. He found she refused to work alone at least twice, even though it was defendant’s policy that exterior inspectors should work alone. In addition, on one occasion she refused to work in the field, claiming it was too dangerous for a woman to work without a car. Based on these findings, defendant clearly was justified in firing her. No matter what its usual procedures were, defendant is not required to keep employees who skip work and refuse to perform the normal duties of the job. This is especially true in a job such as this one, where employees evidently remain unsupervised most of the time. ... Since we find the district judge correctly decided the Title VII claim, and since we can find no purpose for a remand under § 1983, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking relief for a due-process violation to show that a state actor deprived it of a property interest without the procedural protection required by due process.

J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol · filed 1980-10-06

In order to secure the relief it seeks under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that the Township deprived it of property without according it the procedural protection required by the due process clause.

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural-due-process claim for denial of a permit when the applicant has no constitutionally protected property interest in the permit.

CONTRA COSTA THEATRE, INC. v. City of Concord · filed 1980-11-26

Under California law, plaintiff had no protected property rights in its application for a use permit. Therefore, it cannot state a claim under Section 1983 for denial of such a permit without due process.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process claim for a random, unauthorized deprivation of property when state law provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.

Whorley v. Karr · filed 1981-10-16

Therefore plaintiff may bring an action in the courts of Virginia to recover for defendants’ alleged negligence in losing his wristwatch. In the alternative, if plaintiff claims defendants stole his watch, then he may maintain a suit against defendants under Virginia law because sovereign immunity does not shield those who commit an intentional tort. Thus, regardless of whether defendants negligently lost or stole plaintiff’s watch, plaintiff possesses a remedy to pursue in the state courts which is able to compensate him for his loss and provides him with a “meaningful opportunity subsequent to the initial taking for a determination of rights and liabilities.” Plaintiff has not been deprived of property without due process of law.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action when state actors deprive a person of liberty without procedural due process.

Huff v. County of Butler · filed 1981-10-26

Although plaintiff still bears the burden of proving these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, he has at this juncture succeeded in stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not provide a due-process deprivation claim for property in which the plaintiff has no property interest.

Reimer v. John Smith, Individually and in His Capacity as an Officer of Texas Rangers · filed 1981-12-14

Because Reimer is estopped from claiming a property interest in the car crusher, he could not, as a matter of law, succeed on a § 1983 claim based on a deprivation of the ear crusher. One cannot be deprived of property without due process unless one has a property interest in the thing allegedly taken away.

Section 1983 does not provide a procedural-due-process claim for deprivation of public employment absent a constitutionally protected property interest.

Zurek v. Hasten · filed 1982-10-28

This opinion deals only with Complaint Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for claimed due-proeess-violative infringements of Zurek’s alleged property interest in continued public employment. Because no such property interest existed as a matter of law, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I is granted.

Section 1983 provides a federal claim when state officials, acting under color of state law, arbitrarily interfere with pursuing an occupation in violation of due process liberty interests.

Rose Ann Wilkerson, Ray Wilkerson and Sharon Sutton v. Harold Johnson, Fred Bush, Roy "Bud" Nail, Jr., and Lola Wooldrid · filed 1983-02-09

In the instant case the infringement caused by the defendant officials was harassment and delay in allowing plaintiffs to pursue their occupation. They brought about the delay by enforcing a costly rule known to be invalid. The jury found that they did so in order to deter plaintiffs from opening their shop next to Johnson’s barber shop. No arguments are made in defense of the rule’s enforcement. The infringement is sufficiently serious, and the reasons given in justification for the delay so lacking in substance as to constitute a due process violation of plaintiffs’ “liberty” interests. We therefore need not decide whether the delay in the licensing process also infringed plaintiffs’ “property” interests.

Section 1983 provides no procedural-due-process claim for an intentional deprivation of a prisoner's property when state law supplies an adequate remedy.

Tydings v. Department of Corrections, James River C.C. Superintendent A. Baskerville Major Melton · filed 1983-08-08

Tydings has a remedy under Virginia law in the form of a suit for conversion or detinue for any intentional deprivation of his property by prison officials. That remedy satisfies the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Property owners outside the notice perimeter established by local law have no Section 1983 due-process claim based on failure to receive mailed notice of a public hearing.

Simons v. Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency of the U.S.A. · filed 1983-08-30

Therefore, we approve the district court’s determination that appellants were not improperly denied notice of the public hearings.

For a local licensing decision, Section 1983 permits review of procedural adequacy but does not guarantee that the state or local decision was correct.

Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1983-08-23

In summary, this court is of a view that the federal inquiry into the propriety of a decision of a city council to grant or deny a license or permit is limited to reviewing the procedural adequacy of the local laws and procedures under § 1983. If the state and local procedures meet procedural due process, the federal inquiry ends.

Section 1983 provides no procedural-due-process claim for confiscation of prison property when formal regulations create no entitlement and lax enforcement creates only a unilateral expectation.

McWhorter v. Jones · filed 1983-09-27

Lax enforcement by TSP employees of formal TDOC policy gave plaintiff no more than a unilateral expectation in the property confiscated. Thus, plaintiff had no legitimate entitlement to the property confiscated and was not entitled to a due process hearing prior to its confiscation.

A tax-sale scheme does not violate Section 1983 or due process when it requires actual notice to reasonably ascertainable current owners before proceedings that may conclusively affect their property rights.

White v. Lee · filed 1983-10-21

We conclude that RSA chapter 80, when read in conjunction with the notice requirements mandated herein, is not unconstitutional. The statutory scheme, as interpreted by this court, contains sufficient safeguards to insure that a current owner of property will be notified sufficiently in advance of any tax sale proceeding which may adversely and conclusively affect his rights, so as to afford him the opportunity to present his objections. Accordingly, we hold that the provisions of RSA chapter 80 do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the due process mandates of either the Federal or New Hampshire Constitutions.

A section 1983 due process claim fails unless the challenged government action actually caused the deprivation of a protected property interest that the plaintiff alleges.

Mapama Corp. v. New York City Department of Cultural Affairs · filed 1984-08-30

Mapama can claim no Due Process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the certification process, therefore, because the alleged impairment of its property interests resulting from coverage by MDL Article 7-C are not triggered by certification. Mapama’s complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state-created property interest in public employment supports § 1983 due-process liability when the employee is discharged without effective notice or a hearing.

Zamore v. Dyer · filed 1984-10-01

In Count Four, the plaintiff has alleged violation of her due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming entitlement to her position by virtue of the reinstatement provisions of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D). ... She was discharged without effective notice and without a hearing from a job in which she had a state-created property interest. Although plaintiff’s property interest in continued employment after her maternity leave was granted by the provisions of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D), her right to minimum procedures before losing that property interest is a matter of federal law.

Municipal officials do not deprive an employee of a property interest without due process for purposes of Section 1983 when the employee receives a full and fair termination hearing.

Aldana v. City of El Paso · filed 1984-12-31

Furthermore, as previously noted, Plaintiff was afforded a hearing with respect to his termination that fully complied with the requirements of due process. Therefore, no action by Hickock. or Davis deprived the Plaintiff of a property interest without due process of law.

A contract dispute over benefits supports Section 1983 only if state law creates a legitimate entitlement amounting to Fourteenth Amendment property and the state denies adequate process.

Gendalia v. Gioffre · filed 1985-03-29

Only if the benefits alleged to have been deprived the Town Employees are property interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can the Employees condition a § 1983 claim upon the alleged denial without due process.

Wage attachment for an existing child-support order satisfies due process when the obligor receives adequate notice and can promptly seek a postattachment stay.

Varner v. Bard · filed 1985-12-03

Because we find, based on undisputed facts, that Varner was afforded proper notice and an opportunity to be heard in conformity with the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, we will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Discharging an at-will public employee for alleged incompetence without public disclosure does not deprive a federally protected liberty interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Pealer v. Secretary of Agriculture · filed 1985-12-04

Accordingly, plaintiffs due process claim must fail because the state did not violate his federally protected liberty interests.

A procedural-due-process claim under Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

Economic Development Corp. v. Stierheim · filed 1986-02-20

As with the contract termination claim, the beginning point in assessing whether EDCO has stated an actionable claim under § 1983 for denial of procedural due process is the question whether it has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when the plaintiff shows neither a protected property interest nor a protected liberty interest.

Mahfouz El Shahawy, M.D., Etc. v. William T. Harrison, Jr., Etc. · filed 1986-03-11

Shahawy’s civil rights claims were properly dismissed because his complaint did not demonstrate the existence of a protected property or liberty interest.

A Section 1983 due-process claim fails when a discretionary liquor-license scheme creates no protected property or liberty interest in receiving a license.

Ralph Scott and Henriette Scott v. Village of Kewaskum and Village Board of Kewaskum · filed 1986-03-21

Because the decision to deny a license deprived the Scotts of neither “liberty” nor “property,” the village board did not need to give an evidentiary hearing and state reasons.

A Section 1983 procedural-due-process claim requires an actual deprivation, so an unauthorized official's mistaken statement that a permit is void cannot support liability when the permit remains legally effective.

Kerley Industries, Inc. v. Pima County · filed 1986-04-03

While plaintiff had a sufficient property interest to invoke procedural due process protections, it has suffered no deprivation. ... Kerley's mistaken belief that the Deputy Air Quality Control Officer’s letter constituted an annulment of its permit does not give that letter operative legal effect and therefore cannot constitute the basis of a claim of deprivation of property without due process.

An illegally issued building permit creates no vested property right capable of supporting a Section 1983 due-process claim.

Gunkel v. City of Emporia, Kansas · filed 1986-05-07

The court concludes that permit # 0852 did not create a vested property right, therefore plaintiff may not bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner cannot state a Section 1983 due-process claim over parole procedures when state law leaves parole officials with discretion and creates no liberty or property interest in parole.

Huggins v. John Isenbarger, Chairman, Indiana Parole Board · filed 1986-08-08

Under the analysis of that case, the new Indiana regime (as the Executive Branch of Indiana interprets and administers that regime) is no different from the old, and a prisoner has neither a liberty nor a property interest in his application for parole.

Procedural rules governing an internal military investigation do not themselves create a substantive property interest supporting a § 1983 due-process claim.

Sebra v. Neville · filed 1986-10-03

Procedures, such as rules governing the National Guard’s internal investigations, do not by themselves confer underlying substantive property rights. When a substantive property interest does not independently exist, rules for procedural fairness do not create such an interest.

A Section 1983 procedural due-process claim requires the plaintiff to identify an implicated life, liberty, or property interest.

Schwartz v. Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary of New York · filed 1986-10-14

To establish a denial of a federal right to due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a life, liberty, or property interest is implicated.

A Section 1983 due-process claim based on prison regulations requires a protected liberty interest.

Morgan v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-10-30

Plaintiff must first establish that he has a protected liberty interest for the due process clause to apply.

A public university may revoke a fraudulently obtained degree without violating due process when it gives the degree holder adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Crook v. Baker · filed 1987-03-05

However, we are satisfied that the Regents of the University of Michigan had the authority to revoke Crook’s degree and that, in doing so, they did not deprive him of due process of law under the federal Constitution.

A discretionary prison work-release program creates no liberty interest enforceable under § 1983 when its statutes and regulations lack mandatory language or substantive limits on officials' selection authority.

Mahfouz v. Lockhart · filed 1987-08-25

Applying these standards in the instant case, we hold that the Arkansas statutes do not create a protected liberty interest in participation in the work/study release program.

A § 1983 procedural-due-process plaintiff has a protected interest in existing rates for past services before a retroactive rate increase, but no protected interest in rates for future services.

Rr Village Association, Inc., Jay Stanleigh and Authur L. Penzel, Plaintiffs v. Denver Sewer Corporation and Town of Rox · filed 1987-08-26

Turning to the merits, we conclude that defendants were entitled to judgment insofar as plaintiffs sought relief from the increase in the rates for future sewage services, because plaintiffs had no protectable property interest in future rates. On the other hand, plaintiffs did have such an interest in the rates they had been required to pay in the past, and they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Town could properly approve a retroactive rate increase.

A § 1983 due-process claim may proceed when a licensing official rejects credibility findings and recommends revoking a medical license without affording the licensee a meaningful hearing.

Blake v. Ambach · filed 1987-12-21

By doing so, the Commissioner may have deprived Blake of his significant right to property in the form of a medical license without affording him the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. ... Since it appears from the record currently before the Court that the Commissioner recommended the revocation of Blake’s license without affording him due process, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Section 1983 does not support a procedural due process claim for an investigation of medical staff privileges when the investigation does not restrict those privileges.

Setliff v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County · filed 1988-07-01

Accordingly, he suffered no unconstitutional deprivation of his medical privileges simply because he was not granted a hearing during the investigation.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue an individual acting under color of state law for depriving them of rights protected by the Constitution or federal laws.

Simmonds v. TDCJ · filed 2010-02-24

For the same reason, we hold that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply and that, based on the meager record before us, Simmonds’s section 1983 claim against O’Reilly, Roddey, Simmons, and Castleberry has an arguable basis in law and in fact and should not have been dismissed as frivolous.

Section 1983 lets a person sue state actors for violating constitutional rights, including the right to procedural due process.

Assenov v. University of Utah · filed 2008-04-22

Mr. Assenov’s first claim is for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In sum, the court finds that Mr. Asse-nov’s procedural due process claim may proceed against both individual Defendants. The court’s legal analysis indicates that Mr. Assenov was constitutionally entitled to process before he was dismissed from the NEP, that Dr. Krahenbuhl and Dr. Slaughter were in a position to provide it, and that there is a genuine fact dispute about whether they did so.

Section 1983 protects against municipal land-use actions that violate due process when the plaintiff has a cognizable or vested property interest.

Hilburg v. New York State Department of Transportation · filed 2016-04-27

The 42 USC § 1983 cause of action was properly dismissed, but on a ground different than that relied upon by the Supreme Court. “In the land-use context, 42 USC § 1983 protects against municipal actions that violate a property owner’s rights to due process” (Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 626 [2004]). In order to establish a violation of due process rights in this context, a plaintiff is required to establish “a cognizable or vested property interest, not the mere hope of one” (Sonne v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Suffern, 67 AD3d 192, 201 [2009]; see Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 627; Leonard v Planning Bd. of Town of Union Vale, 136 AD3d 873 [2016]; Zahra v Town of Southold, 48 F3d 674, 680 [2d Cir 1995]). Here, even accepting the factual allegations asserted by the appellants as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the Village respondents and the DOT respondents correctly contended that, as a matter of law, the appellants do not have a cognizable or vested property interest in maintaining a parking prohibition on a state highway (cf. Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41, 52-53 [1996]). Accordingly, the appellants failed to state a cause of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits an actionable claim when a state official fails to act despite a duty to do so.

Dimarzo v. Robert E. Cahill, Frank A. Hall, James Dimarzo v. Robert E. Cahill · filed 1978-05-19

Failure to act where there is a duty to act can give rise to an actionable claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on state officials’ failure to act when they had an affirmative duty under state law.

Walker v. Rowe · filed 1982-01-27

The consequence of state officials’ failure to act when they had an affirmative duty to do so under state law is sufficient to support a valid § 1983 claim.

An officer who is present while other officers use unnecessary force has a duty to intervene and may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to do so, even if the offending officers are superiors.

Webb v. Hiykel · filed 1983-08-08

Stanzel accompanied Webb from the lineup room to his cell. If Stanzel did not subject Webb to unnecessary force, he was nonetheless under a duty to prevent the use of such force, even if the officers beating Webb were his superiors.