42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for a disciplinary finding that cost time credits until the finding has been overturned.

Harris v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) · filed 2022-01-05

Plaintiff may seek money damages once he has successfully overturned the disciplinary finding.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Lake v. Hammond Police Department · filed 2022-01-25

Mr. Lake does not allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that his murder conviction has been vacated on appeal, set aside, or otherwise called into question. Indeed, Mr. Lake’s habeas petition was dismissed by this court. Unless and until that occurs, Mr. Lake cannot pursue a claim that would undermine the validity of his 2011 murder conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Toomer v. Robinson · filed 2022-01-31

This § 1983 claim will therefore be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, until such time as Toomer has the revocation invalidated via appeal, post-conviction relief, habeas corpus relief, or otherwise.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

LAWRENCE v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2022-01-31

Because Lawrence’s conviction and sentence have not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, his damages claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 damages claim for confinement past a maximum release date is barred unless the confinement has first been invalidated.

Jackson v. Cuomo · filed 2022-02-02

Here, although Plaintiff alleged that he was confined past his maximum release date, he has not alleged that his confinement was a deemed excessive by a state court or by a successful habeas petition. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Collins v. Carroll · filed 2022-02-02

Therefore, an individual may not raise claims in a civil rights action if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect the validity of his conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply a conviction is invalid unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Lampley v. McCurry · filed 2022-02-07

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his criminal proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Court, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless he alleges and can show that conviction has already been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been invalidated; a general Kentucky pardon did not invalidate West’s conviction.

West v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2022-02-15

Absent invalidation of that conviction, he cannot pursue his Section 1983 claims, which will therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 damages claims attacking a prison disciplinary conviction are barred by Heck until the conviction is invalidated.

Thompson v. Jeter · filed 2022-02-16

Here, Plaintiff argues he was falsely accused and is innocent of the disciplinary charges. Heck bars these claims.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages that would imply a conviction or sentence is invalid must first show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Towery v. Miller Jr · filed 2022-02-17

As noted in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, and as is set forth in Heck, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions which would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must show the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the loss of parole eligibility when the claim does not challenge the validity of the conviction.

Ricker v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2022-02-22

Because Ricker is not challenging the validity of his conviction, his claims are not barred by Heck and he may pursue his claims in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Ward v. City of Middletown Police Department · filed 2022-02-24

With that in mind, the Court concludes that pro se Plaintiff’s § 1983 damages claims arising from the alleged unreasonable search based on the purportedly illegal warrant are barred by Heck and must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement unless that confinement has been favorably invalidated.

Todd v. Silverman · filed 2022-02-25

The rule articulated in Heck—also known as the “favorable termination rule”—therefore precludes the use of § 1983 to seek damages if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a prior state or federal criminal conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 permits damages claims arising from a vacated conviction when success would not necessarily invalidate a later conviction.

GLADDEN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2022-02-28

He may seek damages under section 1983 related to the constitutional violations leading to his 1999 conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would invalidate a parole revocation unless the revocation has been overturned or invalidated.

McGhee v. Nottingham · filed 2022-03-01

Therefore, Mcghee cannot proceed with a Section 1983 claim for money damages against the defendants until the Prison Review Board’s decision is overturned or invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would imply his conviction is invalid unless the conviction has previously been invalidated.

Jones v. Floyd · filed 2022-03-07

To the extent that Mr. Jones is seeking monetary damages, “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” ... In short, Mr. Jones’ claim for monetary damages is not yet ripe.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would necessarily undermine a prison disciplinary sanction unless the sanction has been invalidated.

SMITH v. WEDDELL · filed 2022-03-07

Any claims pertaining to Mr. Smith's allegation that Officer Weddle falsified a conduct report must be dismissed because they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when the plaintiff was never convicted and success on the claims would not invalidate a pretrial diversion agreement.

Mitchell v. Kirchmeier · filed 2022-03-14

The success of Mitchell’s § 1983 claims would imply nothing at all about whether his pretrial diversion agreement with the state was a valid contract. Therefore, the favorable-termination requirement does not come into play, and Mitchell’s § 1983 claims are not Heck-barred.

Section 1983 claims are barred by Heck unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside.

Ahmadi v. Lumpkin · filed 2022-03-14

Moreover, Ahmadi’s proposed arguments do not establish that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. His § 1983 claims are therefore barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims challenging continued incarceration after a conditional-release date are barred by the Heck favorable-termination rule unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Crawford v. Iccari · filed 2022-03-14

The Court understands Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants arising from their alleged failure to release Plaintiff into postrelease supervision status on his conditional-release date. These claims are barred at this time, however, by the favorable-termination rule first articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed under Heck when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Garig v. Travis · filed 2022-03-22

Importantly, Plaintiff has not alleged or identified any facts suggesting that her conviction—that is, her participation in the Pre-Trial Intervention program—was reversed on direct appeal, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question in a habeas proceeding. Thus, for the same reasons outlined in the Court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court is compelled to conclude that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims may not proceed because a judgment in her favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply that a revocation of supervision is invalid unless the revocation has been overturned.

Woodland v. Ross · filed 2022-03-25

In this instance, the court must dismiss Woodland’s § 1983 complaint. ... If he successfully gets his revocation overturned at the state level, he may refile his § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary proceeding when success would imply the invalidity of a loss of good-time credits, even if the proceeding also imposed other sanctions.

Hebrard v. Nofziger · filed 2022-03-25

Allowing plaintiff to abandon any claims affecting the duration of his imprisonment is no solution because, where both causes of action arise from the same disciplinary process, success in a § 1983 action targeting the former sanction “would implicitly question the validity” of the latter.

A § 1983 action barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement is subject to dismissal without prejudice.

(PC) Guzman v. Superior Court of California, County of Orange · filed 2022-03-29

The assigned magistrate judge found Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the magistrate judge determined the action was barred by the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1994). ... The Findings and Recommendations issued on January 31, 2022 (Doc. 16), are ADOPTED in full.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would imply that a conviction is invalid until the conviction has been set aside.

Jackson v. Gantner · filed 2022-03-30

Accordingly, because Jackson can prevail on her access-to-the-courts claim only if she shows that her challenge to her conviction has merit and that her conviction is therefore invalid, she may not pursue such a claim until after her conviction is set aside.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction extending a prisoner’s sentence unless the conviction or sentence increase has already been invalidated.

Scally v. Flores · filed 2022-03-30

Because Plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims are based on allegations that Defendants’ actions in falsely charging him with possession of a deadly weapon have required him to serve an additional year in custody, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 with those claims unless and until the increase in his sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s claim that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Fraly v. Phillips · filed 2022-04-21

If successful, Plaintiff’s claims that he was falsely charged with criminal sexual conduct would imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. His claims against defendants Nessel, CPS employees, and John Doe Traverse City police officers are therefore barred by Heck and will be dismissed on that basis.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Herndon v. Maher · filed 2022-04-22

Because plaintiff's complaint for damages fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 under the rationale of Heck, it must be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred until the conviction is invalidated; such claims must be dismissed without prejudice.

Podlucky v. Commissioner of Internal Reven · filed 2022-05-02

“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a [42 U.S.] § ... 1983 suit should be dismissed when ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.’” ... Because his criminal judgments have not been vacated, these claims are barred by Heck. However, the District Court erred in dismissing these claims with prejudice as he may bring them later if his convictions are invalidated.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Bryant 463608 v. Michigan, State of · filed 2022-05-03

Therefore, unless Plaintiffs show that their convictions or sentences have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” their claims “[are] not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor shown that their sentences have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question. Accordingly, under Heck, Plaintiffs’ complaint is properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly invalid conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Goodwin v. United States · filed 2022-05-03

Because plaintiff does not allege, nor does it appear, that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question, his claims are barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck, and this action will be dismissed accordingly.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence to pursue a due process claim over lost good-time credits when success would not necessarily shorten confinement.

(PC) Richson-Bey v. Moreno · filed 2022-05-09

Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is indeterminately sentenced and the loss of good-time credits will not necessarily lead to a shorter confinement. Thus, based on the information presented for the time in the objections, the Court will vacate the Findings and Recommendations and allow Plaintiff to proceed on his due process challenge against Defendant Saucedo as well as the retaliation claim against Defendant Moreno.

Heck does not bar a prisoner’s § 1983 challenge to a disciplinary sentence that does not affect the fact or duration of imprisonment.

Atwater v. Nickels · filed 2022-05-10

Because Heck does not apply when a prisoner challenges a disciplinary sentence that does not affect the fact or duration of his imprisonment, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary loss of custody credits that extends confinement unless the loss has been invalidated.

Scally v. Flores · filed 2022-05-12

The Heck favorable termination rule applies to prison disciplinary action which results in the loss of custody credits or otherwise extends a prisoner’s sentence.

A Section 1983 suit may be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Ealy v. Evans · filed 2022-05-26

It is therefore ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED with prejudice as malicious and until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 damages claims require a favorable termination under Heck only when they challenge a conviction or imprisonment or would invalidate a conviction or sentence.

Doyle L. Heard v. Governor of Florida · filed 2022-05-31

But this requirement only applies to claims seeking damages “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” or for harm caused by actions that would invalidate a conviction or sentence. Id. at 486. Some of Heard’s remaining claims may fall under this category, but without specific factual allegations, that is far from certain. As the complaint currently stands, we find that the district court erred in denying Heard’s claims for damages based on Heck.

A plaintiff cannot bring a Section 1983 claim that would invalidate a conviction or sentence without first showing that the criminal judgment has been invalidated.

Williams v. Sheahan · filed 2022-05-31

If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

IN RE: TYSHEED DAVIS · filed 2022-06-07

Since success on Mr, Davis’s claims challenging the trial that led to his convictions and imprisonment would necessarily imply the invalidity of those convictions, these claims are not currently cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unlawful sentence unless the plaintiff can show that the sentence has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Cleburn County Courthouse · filed 2022-06-30

Under Heck, such a claim is not cognizable unless the plaintiff can “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at 486–87. ... As such, his claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a conviction or recover damages that would call its validity into question unless the prisoner first obtains relief from the conviction.

Haymer v. Minor · filed 2022-07-07

If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against Defendant Minor under Section 1983, he must first win relief from his conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary loss of good-time credits until the disciplinary decision has been invalidated.

Goings v. C/O Gunder · filed 2022-07-13

Claims that necessarily imply the invalidity of the loss of good-time credits are not cognizable under Section 1983 until the prison disciplinary decision has been invalidated. ... Accordingly, based on the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim related to the alleged fabricated disciplinary report is barred by Heck, and as to that part of the retaliation claim, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted and the retaliation claim as it relates to the discipline Plaintiff received on July 17, 2018, is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983’s favorable termination requirement does not bar a prisoner’s claim over lost custody credits when the loss cannot affect the duration of the sentence.

Nogales v. Burke · filed 2022-07-18

Unless a loss of custody credits inevitably affects the duration of a prisoner’s sentence it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest sufficient to invoke the Wolff procedural protections. ... In that situation, Heck and Balisok do not bar a prisoner’s claim.

A § 1983 damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a sentence must be dismissed unless the sentence has already been invalidated.

Thomas v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2022-07-19

Because Plaintiff has not shown that his convictions or sentences have been invalidated, this action must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a criminal conviction are barred until the conviction has been invalidated.

Hull Jr. 828926 v. Tahvonen · filed 2022-07-21

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck until his criminal conviction has been invalidated.

Section 1983 damages claims that would undermine a conviction may be pursued only after the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Haymer v. Minor · filed 2022-07-22

In short, despite Plaintiff's new (post-dismissal) allegations about his firearms conviction, it remains the case that Plaintiffs claim to relief from his convictions must be pursued in habeas corpus, and his Section 1983 claim to damages against his prosecutor may only be pursued if he “can demonstrate that [his] conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Carr v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 37 F.4th 389, 392 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction until that conviction is set aside.

MCGILLVARY v. GALFY · filed 2022-07-28

Moreover, Plaintiff’s due process and conspiracy claims are barred by Heck even though Plaintiff seeks only damages and does not explicitly seek to invalidate his conviction or seek release from confinement.

Section 1983 access-to-the-courts claims are barred by Heck when a favorable judgment would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Nguyen v. Floyd · filed 2022-08-02

A favorable judgment on Plaintiff’s claim would require a finding that he had a viable argument to present in either his motion for en banc reconsideration or a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. But that viable argument would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s convictions because the claims that he was raising in his habeas appeal asserted that his convictions were invalid. Heck therefore bars his claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to a disciplinary conviction that cost an inmate good time credits and whose invalidity the claim would imply unless the conviction has already been invalidated.

Carter v. Bentley · filed 2022-08-04

Finally, while the loss of good time credits may implicate a protected liberty interest, Carter’s due process challenges to the disciplinary conviction resulting in the loss of credits are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for a conviction or imprisonment that would imply the conviction’s invalidity unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Jimenez v. Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 2022-08-15

If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then no cause of action under § 1983 exists. ... The complaint and supplements fail to allege that the convictions or sentences have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an appropriate state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Mr. Jimenez’s claim must be dismissed because the Court is without jurisdiction under Heck.

Section 1983 claims that challenge a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Parker-Reed v. Machicek · filed 2022-08-24

Plaintiff Terry Parker-Reed, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit complaining of alleged violations of his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report, and being satisfied that it contains no clear error, the court accepts its findings and recommendation. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 6) is granted. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is dismissed, with prejudice, until such time as plaintiff shows that his conviction has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise set aside.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a sentence credit forfeiture unless the result has already been invalidated.

Stewart v. Ayala · filed 2022-09-20

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 due process claim is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a probation revocation when success would necessarily imply its invalidity and the resulting sentence has not been invalidated.

Durand v. Probation and Parole · filed 2022-09-21

Success on Durand’s § 1983 claims in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying revocation proceedings and any term of imprisonment resulting from them. ... Moreover, Durand admits that his sentence resulting from the probation-revocation proceedings does not satisfy Heck’s favorable termination rule.

For these § 1983 false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims, the underlying criminal charges must terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.

Chapdelaine v. Desjardin · filed 2022-09-23

Because these underlying charges have not terminated, Chapdelaine’s § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are not cognizable at this time.

A prisoner’s § 1983 claim challenging a disciplinary proceeding is barred unless the proceeding’s result has been overturned.

Greathouse v. Meddaugh · filed 2022-09-27

In short, Edwards bars a prisoner’s § 1983 claim related to a disciplinary proceeding unless the results of the proceeding have been overturned, either through prison administrative channels or in a habeas corpus action in state or federal court.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated.

Pittman v. Martinez · filed 2022-10-26

Clearly, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on this Eighth Amendment claim would imply the invalidity of his sentence. Pursuant to Heck, the claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

A plaintiff must wait until the criminal prosecution ends favorably before bringing a § 1983 deliberate fabrication claim arising from it.

(PC) Garces v. Gamboa · filed 2022-10-27

In addition, a plaintiff must wait until the criminal case finishes before bringing the action. ... Further, Plaintiff received favorable termination in the criminal prosecution via a directed verdict. These allegations plausibly state a claim for deliberate fabrication.

Section 1983 damages claims that would render a conviction or sentence invalid require the plaintiff to show that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

Cromey, Jr. v. Bingham · filed 2022-11-02

As previously explained, however, a plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 for actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for slander.

Scott v. McMinn County Sheriffs Office · filed 2022-04-15

Also, Plaintiff’s claim for slander is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for injury to reputation alone without deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Marner v. City of Aurora · filed 2015-12-02

Finally, Mr. Marner complains of the dismissal of his § 1983 claim based on alleged defamation when various defendants published an article incorrectly stating that he was part of a criminal enterprise. But, as pointed out by the district court, injury to reputation is not a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty right.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for slander or libel, which are matters of state law.

Waddleton v. Blalock · filed 2001-11-19

Rather, the magistrate judge correctly dismissed the claim because, under the law of this circuit, claims involving slander and libel are state law matters which are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a defamation-plus claim for statements connected to an unconstitutional arrest even when the statements follow the constitutional deprivation.

Crowe v. County of San Diego · filed 2001-06-27

However, when Stephan spoke to 48 Hours in 1998-1999, it was clearly established that defamatory statements made “in connection” with an unconstitutional arrest was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if the statements were made after the constitutional deprivation.

Defamation alone does not state a Section 1983 claim unless it also prevents the plaintiff from enjoying or exercising a constitutionally protected right or interest.

Burden v. Counselor Pollack · filed 1987-06-23

Unless coupled with an averment that the purportedly defamatory communication also prevented plaintiff's enjoyment or exercise of a right or interest of a constitutional magnitude, it is insufficient to give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation by a state official, even when the defamation is malicious.

Cook v. Brockway · filed 1977-01-17

it is well established that libel or slander by a state official — even if malicious— does not generate a cause of action under the federal civil rights statutes, for the right to be free of defamation and to secure the redress for its infliction is within the province of state law and is not an incident of federal citizenship.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federally secured right, and harm to reputation alone is insufficient to state a claim.

Reilly v. Leonard · filed 1978-10-23

The plaintiff’s allegation of harm to his reputation is insufficient by itself to allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone without more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States · filed 1983-03-25

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under § 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for defamation standing alone absent more tangible harm.

Hall v. United States of America · filed 1983-04-29

Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under Sec. 1983, absent more tangible harm.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone.

Barlau v. City of Northfield · filed 1983-06-22

This claim states a cause of action in defamation, if anything, and claims sounding in defamation are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defamation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Anthony Miner and Eric Simmons v. Rick Brackney · filed 1983-10-28

Miner’s contention that Brackney’s report falsely labeled him an informant among his peers is not actionable; claims for defamation and slander are not cognizable under § 1983.

Defamatory statements by state officials do not state a § 1983 claim unless accompanied by deprivation of another constitutionally protected interest.

Stephens v. James E. Word, Michael T. Brunner, Wayne K. Scharber, Joe A. Covington, Earl C. Leming, and Jame · filed 1985-12-10

Mere defamatory statements by state officials, absent the deprivation of other constitutionally protected interests, will not state a claim under Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 claim for deprivation of a liberty interest through reputational stigma must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement was false.

Rice v. Vigil · filed 1986-07-16

“In order to state a claim for a deprivation of a liberty interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the stigmatizing or defamatory statement is false.”

A municipal official's allegedly libelous or slanderous statements, without an accompanying federal-right deprivation, do not create a § 1983 claim.

LaBate v. Butts · filed 1987-10-30

Thus, plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983 against Mayor Young for his statements.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation that harms reputation alone without depriving the plaintiff of a protected liberty or property interest.

Thomas v. Kippermann · filed 1988-06-09

Such allegations merely implicate Thomas’s reputation and are insufficient to establish a cause of action under § 1983. Damage to one’s reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employment, does not implicate any “property” or “liberty” interest sufficient to invoke the due process clause. More must be involved than defamation to establish a § 1983 claim under the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone by a state official.

Peace v. Baker · filed 1988-06-21

Nevertheless, even assuming that Defendants Baker and Hurta would be liable for Green’s statements, the Supreme Court has held that defamation alone is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for conduct that amounts at most to defamation.

Parate v. Isibor · filed 1989-03-16

As the district court correctly noted, the defendants' actions on October 4, 1985, rise at most to the level of a tort of defamation which is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for libel or slander absent further injury.

Ernest Ralph Ellis, Sr., Jean Ellen Ellis v. Jeffersonian Newspaper · filed 1989-11-13

Torts such as libel and slander do not give rise to a cause of action under the civil rights act absent further injury.

A defamation-plus claim under § 1983 requires a cognizable constitutional wrong in addition to defamation.

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1992-07-01

To state a defamation-plus claim, Buckey must join a defamation claim to a recognizable section 1983 wrong such as the denial of equal protection and substantive due process here hypothesized.

Section 1983 cannot be used to assert a claim of defamation.

Wildauer v. Frederick County · filed 1993-05-05

However, § 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle for asserting a claim of defamation.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable; reputational injury must be accompanied by injury to another interest.

Malmin v. Kay Manweiler, Boise State Bar, Individuals: Does I - X, Inclusive, Roes I - X, Inclusive · filed 1995-08-15

Defamation by itself is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 may cover a defamation claim that alleges injury to a constitutionally protected right.

Goodall v. Hodges · filed 1996-12-19

We write separately only to note that although claims of defamation may sometimes be cognizable under § 1983 by alleging in- jury to a constitutionally protected right, Appellant's defamation claim was nonetheless properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not make defamation alone actionable.

Jackson v. Caton · filed 1997-04-23

Defamation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 defamation claim requires stigma plus infringement of another interest.

Price v. Cty Ct Clk Hill Cty · filed 2003-06-25

Price cannot avoid the Heck bar by arguing that his cause of action is based solely on the dissemination of the allegedly false information because, to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defamation claim, Price must demonstrate “a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest.”

Section 1983 does not provide an independent action for defamation by a state official.

Schulte v. Schmetzer · filed 1985-12-24

No independent action for defamation by a state official is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Muhammad v. Weikel · filed 2019-09-26

Moreover, Defendants are protected from Plaintiff’s defamation claim under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; Wicker v. Shannon, No. 3:CV-09-1629, 2010 WL 3812351, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2010) (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522), and such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone.

Harris v. The City of Texarkana, Arkansas · filed 2019-10-17

Judge Bryant recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim because defamation is not actionable under section 1983. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Bryant’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s section 1983 defamation claim should be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation and harm to reputation alone.

Muhammad v. Henesh · filed 2020-02-26

Plaintiff again asserts that Defendants have defamed him and caused harm to his reputation. As the Court has previously informed Plaintiff, ... such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for defamation alone; the plaintiff must allege deprivation of a federal right.

(PC) Boddie v. Martel · filed 2020-03-09

Defamation itself does not support a cause of action under Section 1983.

An alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Fishbourne v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2020-05-28

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise a claim for defamation, the magistrate judge correctly found that an alleged defamatory act is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for slander or defamation alone.

Bower v. Village of Marblehead, Ohio · filed 2020-06-26

Most obviously, slander and defamation are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a libel claim based solely on harm to reputation.

Gorawara v. Caprio · filed 2020-08-28

In addition, insofar as Gorawara seeks to assert a libel claim under Section 1983, see ECF No. at ¶ 57, such a claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a remedy for defamation unless the reputational injury is connected to the denial of a federally protected right.

Kanahele v. Gawlik · filed 2021-03-09

As the Court explained in the previous screening Order, defamation is generally not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for defamation alone, even when the conduct occurs under color of state law.

Terry v. Dorsey · filed 2021-03-19

Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim of defamation of character is not cognizable under § 1983. Defamation alone does not state a constitutional claim, even when done under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support a civil rights claim based on defamation allegations alone.

Jackson v. Twin Falls City Idaho · filed 2021-04-14

Defamation-type allegations cannot support a civil rights claim under § 1983.

In a Section 1983 political retaliation claim, once the plaintiff shows that political conduct motivated the termination, the defendants must show they would have made the same decision regardless of that conduct.

Siwek v. Farley · filed 1988-03-21

Once she has shown this, the defendants must show that the decision would have been the same irrespective of her political conduct.

A public employer violates section 1983 by refusing reappointment because employees supported and campaigned for the employer’s political opponent.

Kyle v. City of Oak Forest · filed 1986-06-20

This Court finds that Mayor Malecky’s decision not to reappoint plaintiffs was politically motivated in violation of plaintiffs’ rights granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

An assistant prosecutor may not obtain Section 1983 relief for politically motivated dismissal when political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for effectively carrying out the prosecutor’s policies.

Livas v. Petka · filed 1983-08-05

For this reason, Petka was entitled to demand absolute loyalty from his assistants, including Livas. That Petka lost confidence in Livas, for whatever reason, is therefore sufficient justification for Livas’ dismissal.

Section 1983 reaches arbitrary, politically motivated dismissal of a public employee when carried out under color of state law and depriving the employee of First Amendment association rights.

Matta v. De Choudens · filed 1977-02-25

This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants’ actions were performed under color of the Personnel Law of Puerto Rico, 3 L.P. R.A. 641 et seq. Said actions subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. ... Accordingly, an employee of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not be dismissed solely on the grounds of political affiliation. ... In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that defendants José Alvarez de Choudens and José E. Soler-Zapata violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to free association under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

A newly elected sheriff may decline to reappoint deputies in a small rural office for political disloyalty when loyalty is necessary to carry out the personnel and policy change voters elected the sheriff to make.

Dove v. Fletcher · filed 1983-11-09

We hold that Fletcher is in reasonable compliance with those principles when he reappointed 14 of the 31 employees of his predecessor. The interest of the voting public demands that he enjoy the privilege of replacing the employees who might be disloyal to him.

A nonpolicymaking public employee may prevail under § 1983 when political affiliation substantially motivated dismissal and party loyalty was not a legitimate job qualification.

Paradise v. O'LAUGHLIN · filed 1984-05-04

As City Clerk, Mrs. Paradise performed non-policy-making tasks. She has also demonstrated that her political affiliation was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind dismissal.

In a mixed-motive § 1983 political-discharge claim, proof that political affiliation motivated the dismissal shifts the burden to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision anyway.

Barnes v. Bosley · filed 1984-12-14

In the instant case, therefore, once the plaintiffs established that their political affiliation was a motivating factor in their dismissals, the burden shifted to the defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs would have been discharged in any event.

A Section 1983 political-discharge plaintiff must prove that the impermissible motive was a but-for cause of dismissal.

Wagner v. Hawkins · filed 1986-04-28

In other words, the court must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiffs would not have been discharged except for the operation of the impermissible motive.

Section 1983 permits an at-will public employee to seek damages for a hiring decision based solely on political belief or association without justification by a vital government interest.

Epps v. Clarendon County · filed 1991-05-06

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) allows a civil action for damages against a government official who deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected right. A public employee, even one employed at-will, may state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment rights by alleging damages from hiring decisions that are based solely upon political belief or association and are unjustified by a vital government interest.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action to be brought in state court under concurrent jurisdiction, but a state court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction when another available forum exists.

Kish v. Wright · filed 1977-03-30

It seems obvious that the federal statute gives original, but not exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts; therefore, it should be concluded that there exists concurrent jurisdiction under the federal statute. ... We hold, therefore, that civil rights actions arising under Sec. 1983 of the United States Code can be properly brought within the jurisdiction of this state. ... While we find that the trial court does have concurrent jurisdiction and the power of discretion as to whether or not it will invoke that jurisdiction in a particular case, we are here confronted with a motion which was granted with prejudice. ... The court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to assure that the appellant’s right to seek relief in the federal court under Sec. 1983 was protected.

Actions arising under § 1983 may be brought in either state or federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.

DiAntonio v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 1978-08-30

Concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists in the state and federal courts.

Section 1983 claims may be heard by Illinois state courts concurrently with federal courts.

Holmes v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1981-01-12

In this case, careful review of relevant case law reveals that the Illinois state court does indeed have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s civil rights claims concurrent with the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1983 permits Maryland state courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil-rights actions brought under it.

De Bleecker v. Montgomery County · filed 1981-04-13

We align ourselves with the above-cited cases and hold that Maryland courts have jurisdiction to try actions based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 permits an action in state court for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Santana v. Registrars of Voters of Worcester · filed 1981-09-01

Claims under § 1983 are fully cognizable in our State courts. ... Without commenting on the merits of the contention, we cannot say that the plaintiffs’ allegation of the defendants’ systematic and wilful violation of two election laws, resulting in the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ right to vote, fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts, which exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil-rights actions.

Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Department · filed 1981-11-13

The action is comparable to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is a well-accepted rule of law that state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal civil rights actions.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court, where state courts are proper forums for vindicating the civil rights those claims enforce.

Royer v. Adams · filed 1981-11-20

We continue to believe that our State courts should have the opportunity to address the crucial civil rights issues which § 1983 cases raise rather than require all of our State governmental units to have to defend their actions only in front of our two federal judges.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state as well as federal courts, and state courts may grant relief under federal standards.

Miller v. Carr · filed 1982-04-08

There is nothing which would bar that Court from resolving the § 1983 questions at issue here, and, if appropriate, granting relief under federal standards.

Section 1983 allows federal constitutional-rights suits to be brought in state court because state courts have jurisdiction over them.

Shields Ex Rel. Shields v. Gross · filed 1983-05-13

State courts have jurisdiction over suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal constitution is the law of the land governing the state court to the same extent as the federal court.

State courts have concurrent general subject-matter jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Snuggs v. Stanly County Department of Public Health · filed 1983-07-05

It is well established that State courts have concurrent general subject matter jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 claims.

State courts adjudicating Section 1983 claims must apply federal law to determine whether the complaint sufficiently pleads a federal cause of action.

Bach v. County of Butte · filed 1983-09-29

In this case we hold that California state courts should apply federal law to determine whether a complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983, referred to hereinafter simply as “§ 1983”).

Pennsylvania § 1983 claims fall outside the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction and must be brought in a court of common pleas.

Martin v. Jeffes · filed 1985-11-20

Petitioner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the U.C.C. will be transferred to the appropriate court of common pleas.

Section 1983 due-process claims are cognizable in Illinois state courts and require a protected entitlement to the plaintiff’s job.

Messina v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-06-30

Clearly, Federal due process claims are cognizable in Illinois courts under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. ... For procedural due process to apply, plaintiff must establish that he had an entitlement to his job.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims under sections 1983 and 1985.

Poling v. Goins · filed 1986-06-30

We are persuaded that citizens of the state should have access to state courts, if they desire, to assert claims arising under the various federal civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

State courts may not refuse to hear § 1983 claims when the same type of claim arising under state law would be enforceable there.

Willbourn v. City of Tulsa · filed 1986-07-15

If the same type of claim, if arising under state law, is enforceable in state court, state courts may not arbitrarily refuse to enforce the federal claim. ... We express no opinion on the merits of Willboum’s civil rights action, however, it was error for the trial court to refuse to hear his § 1983 claim.

State courts may hear Section 1983 actions, but a state and its agencies are not persons subject to liability absent waiver of sovereign immunity.

Adams v. Myers · filed 1986-10-31

State courts may entertain actions brought under section 1983. ... However, states and their agencies are not “persons” subject to liability under section 1983 unless there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity by the state. ... Since there has been no applicable waiver of sovereign immunity by the State of Texas, the TDC is not amenable to suit under section 1983.

A state statute barring all personal-capacity civil actions against correction officers in state court does not violate the Supremacy Clause as applied to Section 1983 when a federal forum remains available.

Cepeda v. Coughlin · filed 1987-03-19

In any event, subject matter jurisdiction of its courts is exclusively a matter for the State ... and since Correction Law § 24 prohibits ... all ... civil actions against correction officers in their personal capacities, we perceive no violation of the Supremacy Clause ...). Moreover, as defendants note in their brief, plaintiffs are free to pursue their claim in Federal court, and several apparently have done so.

A § 1983 claim is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 despite state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction because neither statute prohibits removal on that basis.

Aben v. Dallwig · filed 1987-05-12

Nothing in the civil rights statute expressly prohibits removal. ... Similarly, nothing in the removal statute suggests that the court should imply a prohibition against removal from the grant of concurrent jurisdiction.

State courts share concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 civil-rights actions.

Seibring v. Parcell's Inc. · filed 1987-08-18

As the defendants acknowledge, Illinois courts have concurrent jurisdiction with Federal courts in adjudicating section 1983 civil rights actions.

State courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts over actions brought under § 1983.

Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass'n · filed 1987-09-30

The courts of this State have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the federal courts over actions brought under 42 U.S.C., § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in circuit court despite a state law making direct appellate review the exclusive remedy for state law challenges to prison discipline when that review cannot provide the relief sought under § 1983.

Davis v. Toombs · filed 1988-08-10

With respect to plaintiffs section 1983 claims, however, the question is different, because plaintiff seeks relief that this court could not afford him on direct review under ORS 421.195. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court has jurisdiction of plaintiffs section 1983 claims and, therefore, erred in dismissing those claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 civil rights suits may be filed in either state or federal court.

Weber v. Willard · filed 1989-02-03

That rule means a plaintiff may file a civil rights suit either in federal court or in state court.

State courts have jurisdiction to hear actions brought under Section 1983.

Bible Truth Crusade v. City of Bloomington · filed 1989-03-29

It is well settled that state courts have jurisdiction to hear actions brought under section 1983.

State trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Page v. Valentine · filed 1989-09-06

A fired municipal policeman timely appeals an order that held that the state trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) actions. We reverse.

Section 1983 actions may be heard in state courts of common pleas.

Christian v. Dayton · filed 1990-05-17

The sole issue in this appeal is whether a common pleas court has jurisdiction to entertain an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. We answer this question in the affirmative.

Section 1983 claims may proceed in Ohio common pleas court without first filing in the Court of Claims for a state employee immunity determination.

Besser v. Dexter · filed 1990-07-11

While a litigant may be bound by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure if he or she chooses to utilize the state court forum in filing a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, there can be no state requirement that a plaintiff first file in the Ohio Court of Claims under R.C. 2743.02 to determine whether the defendant employee's conduct was outside the scope of his or her employment, or was in bad faith, wanton, or reckless in nature.

State trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Town of Lake Clarke Shores v. Page · filed 1990-11-08

We agree with the court below that state trial courts do have subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against municipalities.

Mississippi chancery courts may hear Section 1983 claims.

Hood v. Dept. of Wildlife Conservation · filed 1990-11-28

We have held that our chancery courts in particular may hear Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 suits may be brought in Arkansas state courts.

Burris v. City Of Little Rock · filed 1991-08-15

Furthermore, § 1983 suits may be brought in the Arkansas courts.

Section 1983 permits state courts to hear Commerce Clause claims alleging that a state tax violated a taxpayer’s rights.

Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Meehan, No. 387601 (Sep. 19, 1991) · filed 1991-09-19

Accordingly, state courts must entertain Commerce Clause claims brought under 1983.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under § 1983.

Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Chapman (In Re Chapman) · filed 1991-09-20

The Civil Rights statute itself does not expressly indicate whether State courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases brought pursuant to it (42 U.S.C. § 1983), but authorities on the subject have generally held state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in Ohio common pleas courts even when the same conduct may fall within the state labor board’s exclusive unfair labor practice jurisdiction.

Weinfurtner v. Nelsonville-York School District Board of Education · filed 1991-09-25

We are persuaded that the Supremacy Clause as well as the applicable case law required that the court below overrule appellees’ motion to dismiss the federal civil rights action pursuant to Section 1983 and exercise its concurrent jurisdiction in hearing the matter.

A state tax court with exclusive jurisdiction over a § 1983 tax claim must exercise that jurisdiction; the Tax Injunction Act, equitable restraint, and an exclusive state remedy do not bar it.

Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue · filed 1991-12-06

The court therefore holds the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over Harlan Sprague's § 1983 claim is compulsory. The court's further finds its compulsory exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is not barred by the Tax Injunction Act's standard, the doctrine of equitable restraint, or the presence of an exclusive state remedy.

State courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 suits but may decline to exercise it.

Thomas v. Allen · filed 1992-01-30

State courts have jurisdiction to hear civil rights suits based on § 1983. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to assume jurisdiction of the § 1983.

Illinois circuit courts lack original jurisdiction over Section 1983 employment-discrimination claims when the alleged discrimination is covered by the Illinois Human Rights Act.

Faulkner-King v. Wicks · filed 1992-03-31

Although circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, the legislature, by authority of the State Constitution, has restricted that jurisdiction when the claim involves a controversy covered by the Act. Courts have consistently ruled the Act is the exclusive source of a remedy for an employment-discrimination claim. Circuit courts cannot be compelled to accept such cases under the guise of Federal authority.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under Section 1983.

Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster · filed 1992-07-22

Because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought under § 1983, the state district court in which Plaintiff chose to file its complaint may hear all of Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court, so a claim omitted from an earlier state action may be barred by claim preclusion.

Untracht v. West Jersey Health System · filed 1992-09-10

Because the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), Dr. Untracht could have brought his Section 1983 claim in his state court action. Accordingly, it is now barred.

Section 1983 adds a federal remedy while leaving state courts with concurrent jurisdiction over the claims.

Oliver v. Fort Wayne Education Ass'n · filed 1986-12-17

It is clear that concurrent jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims exists.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts, and federal courts apply the most appropriate state limitations period when no federal limitations period applies.

Dean v. Nunez · filed 1987-02-12

Federal jurisdiction of § 1983 claims is concurrent with that of the state courts rather than exclusively federal. State courts may thus hear and decide claims raised under the civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ford v. Stone, 599 F.Supp. 693 (M.D.La.1984), affirmed at 774 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.1985). Because no federal statute of limitations relating to civil rights actions applies to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., federal courts must apply the most appropriate period supplied by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.

An expectation of keeping a particular prison job is not a property or liberty interest cognizable under § 1983.

El-Hajj Ali Hakim Majied v. Brown · filed 1986-09-24

The district court correctly held that an "expectation of keeping a particular prison job does not amount to either a property or a liberty interest cognizable under Sec. 1983."

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for removal from a prison job when the inmate has no protected property or liberty interest in that assignment and receives any due process hearing required.

Gardner v. Johnson · filed 1977-03-30

As such, plaintiffs removal from his job assignment on the psychiatric ward is not a cognizable claim under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It should be further noted, however, that plaintiff was given the opportunity to speak with the Clinic Action Committee about his assignment as an inmate nurse in the clinic. Such a hearing fulfilled any due process requirements that may have been present when he was terminated from his work assignment.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the procedure used to assign him to a prison housing unit.

Barrett v. Belleque · filed 2006-11-15

He challenges only the procedure followed in assigning him to the IMU. Such a challenge can be brought as an action under 42 USC section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for employment discrimination on account of sex when the deprivation is committed under color of state law.

Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee · filed 1977-07-18

The Court holds that Count III states a cause of action under Section 1983 for discrimination in employment on account of sex.

Section 1983 permits a direct claim for intentional sex discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause, including a pervasive sexual-harassment course of conduct, without requiring a Title VII claim.

Woerner v. Brzeczek · filed 1981-07-21

Upon analysis this Court has determined that though the conceptual route to be traveled under Section 1983 is different from that under Title VII, the result is the same. ... Here Woerner has alleged a long and pervasive course of conduct that clearly constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against defendants who, acting under color of state law, deprive a plaintiff of constitutional rights, including the right to be free of sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.

Scott v. City of Overland Park · filed 1984-09-11

This statute clearly provides relief when the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. Among those rights is the right to be free of sexbased discrimination.

Section 1983 permits a sexual harassment claim against a state employer for an equal protection violation even when the employee cannot pursue that claim under Title VII for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan. · filed 1988-12-02

While plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment against defendant Cameron in his official capacity under Title VII must fail, that claim is still contemplated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person of any constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 1983 sex discrimination claims use the same liability standards as Title VII claims; to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find termination because of sex.

Steinhauer v. Laura Degolier and State of Wisconsin · filed 2004-02-24

To avoid summary judgment on his sex discrimination claims, Steinhauer must present facts from which a reasonable juror could find that the defendants terminated him because of his sex. ... This applies under both Title VII and Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires discriminatory intent for an equal protection claim based on sex discrimination.

Henrikson v. Town of East Greenwich ex rel. Raposa · filed 2015-03-23

Finally, Count III claims sex discrimination as a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... This contention affords Ms. Henrikson no greater relief than she gains through Count I, which claimed sex discrimination under Title VII. Section 1983 adds nothing to the equation. ... In order to prevail as a § 1983 plaintiff claiming a denial of equal protection, she must “show that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.” ... The Court has already found that no genuine issue of fact exists that would permit, in the context of a Title VII claim, an inference of discriminatory intent on the record before it. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Town entitled to summary judgment on Count III.