42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional sex discrimination in a public school system.

Vorchheimer v. School District Of Philadelphia · filed 1976-03-16

We need look no further than this legislative finding in order to find a violation for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy.

Section 1983 actions may receive the same equitable remedies, including retroactive seniority relief, as Title VII suits.

Gurmankin v. Costanzo · filed 1977-04-25

There is no distinction in the law of equitable remedies between suits brought under Title VII and suits brought in reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or directly on the fourteenth amendment. ... The equitable relief of an award of a retroactive seniority date was, on the record before us, entirely appropriate.

Section 1983 is unavailable to enforce a governing statute when that statute provides an exclusive remedy for its violations.

Garrity v. Gallen · filed 1981-08-17

As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available where the “governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of the Act”, ... and as review of the enforcement mechanisms incorporated into the DD Act reveals that the remedies therein provided are exclusive, we conclude that plaintiffs herein are precluded from proceeding with a § 1983 suit against the defendants herein named.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights secured by federal law, but it cannot be used to obtain damages or attorneys’ fees when the EAHCA supplies an exclusive remedy.

Calhoun v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF EDUC., ETC. · filed 1982-07-07

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own, but rather is a remedial statute imposing liability upon those who, under color of state law, work a deprivation upon a person’s rights, privileges or immunities otherwise granted by the Constitution and laws of the United States. ... Therefore, plaintiffs may not recover damages or attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1983 for the alleged violations of the EAHCA. ... Since the EAHCA is an exclusive remedy for violations of its provisions, the section 1983 claim must be dismissed.

Title VI and its implementing regulation do not foreclose a § 1983 suit.

Powell et.al v. Ridge · filed 1999-08-25

Instead, we hold that a § 1983 suit is not incompatible with Title VI and the Title VI regulation.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act’s remedial scheme forecloses it.

Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Easttown Township · filed 1999-11-02

The Board’s violation of the TCA does not give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. The TCA’s remedial scheme is “sufficiently comprehensive to infer Congressional intent to foreclose a § 1983 remedy.”

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act’s wireless facility siting provisions because the Act’s remedial scheme impliedly forecloses it.

PRIMECO PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. City of Mequon · filed 2003-01-27

Thus, I also conclude that the TCA contains a remedial scheme that is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate that Congress impliedly foreclosed resort to § 1983.

Section 1983 remedies are available for Telecommunications Act violations because the Act does not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme that forecloses them.

Abrams v. City Of Rancho Palos Verdes · filed 2004-01-15

Thus, in this case, where the TCA contains no remedies at all, we must conclude that Congress did not intend to foreclose § 1983 remedies.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory relief against officials sued in their official capacities, while damages claims require individual-capacity liability and are subject to qualified immunity.

Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford, Inc. v. Chaucer · filed 1978-05-08

The defendant city is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As such, they are subject to jurisdiction in an action for injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983, ... but only if sued in their individual capacities can they be held to respond in damages, ... As public officials they enjoy a qualified immunity to actions for damages under § 1983.

A state-administered and initially state-funded Medicaid program acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes even though federal matching funds and requirements are involved.

Mitson by and Through Jones v. Coler · filed 1987-12-01

The Court also affirms its previous determination that the actions of HRS are properly characterized as "under color of state law” so as to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Florida’s ICP Program is entirely state-administered and is, in the first instance, state-funded. The only federal involvement in the state Medicaid program is triggered by the state’s request to receive matching funds.

Members of a parole board are absolutely immune from damages suits under § 1983.

Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles · filed 1976-03-23

It is the judgment of this Court that Defendants Robinson, Ussery, Lambert and the Board of Pardons and Paroles are absolutely immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 suits against parole board officials are barred by absolute immunity when the officials are processing prisoners' parole applications.

Sellars v. Procunier · filed 1981-04-09

The question remains whether parole board officials are entitled to the greater immunity afforded judges, and those performing judge-like roles within federal agencies. In our view, parole board officials are entitled to absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken when processing parole applications.

Parole officials have absolute immunity under Section 1983 for adjudicatory acts, but only qualified executive immunity for disseminating information outside the parole board’s immediate sphere.

Anderson v. Boyd · filed 1983-08-30

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of those counts in the Andersons’ section 1983 complaint relating to the imposition of parole conditions, the revocation of parole, and the dissemination of information to parole board officials and the governor. We reverse the dismissal of those portions of the Andersons’ complaint alleging knowing dissemination of false information to the Idaho Racing Commission and local law enforcement officials and remand the cause to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Cogswell and Boyd acted in good faith and are thus entitled to a more limited executive immunity.

Parole-board members are immune from § 1983 damages for a later crime committed by a released parolee when the injury is too remote from the parole decision to constitute state action.

Sellers v. Thompson · filed 1984-05-11

It was therefore error for the trial court to deny summary judgment in their behalf on the § 1983 claim also.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole officials are barred by absolute immunity for official actions taken in an adjudicatory proceeding.

Walker v. Prisoner Review Board · filed 1984-09-27

The Board argues that “Illinois Prisoner Review Board officials are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their official activities in processing parole applications.” ... Within the context of an adjudicatory proceeding parole officials enjoy absolute immunity for official actions. ... Therefore, Irving is immune from damages.

Parole-board members are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages for official actions taken while processing parole applications, including denying access to a parole file.

Walker v. Prisoner Review Board, James R. Irving, Chairman · filed 1985-07-26

It is clear that the Board’s decision to deny plaintiff access to his parole file was an official action made in the course of processing plaintiff’s parole application. Therefore, the Board members are absolutely immune from suit for this decision, and we affirm the ruling of the district court so holding.

State parole-board officials have absolute immunity from section 1983 money-damages claims based on actions taken in their official adjudicatory role.

Vinson v. Barkley · filed 1986-06-30

I find this reasoning compelling, and therefore hold that Mr. Rodriguez is entitled to absolute immunity in his role as Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole from claims for money damages based on actions taken in his official capacity.

State parole-board members have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages for actions within the proper scope of their official duties.

Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Board Members · filed 1987-03-31

Given the small degree of contrary thought, we join those circuit courts which have addressed this issue and conclude that the defendant parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983 action for actions taken within the proper scope of their official duties.

Parole commission officials are immune from damages liability in a Section 1983 action challenging their parole decision.

Blunt v. Dantes · filed 1987-05-21

Ernest Blunt, a Maryland inmate, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Here, the district court's dismissal was entirely justified. First, the officials from whom Blunt sought damages were immune from liability for damages.

Parole officers performing administrative and investigative supervision receive only qualified immunity under § 1983, unlike parole-board members performing quasi-judicial functions.

Doe v. United Social & Mental Health Services, Inc. · filed 1987-10-09

The connection of these defendants to the Parole Board does not extend the Board’s absolute immunity to them. ... Thus, as with a police officer’s decision, public policy requires only qualified immunity for the parole officer’s function.

Parole-board members have absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages liability for official actions concerning the grant or denial of parole.

Knoll v. Gary L. Webster, in His Private and Personal Capacity, (Chairman Utah Parole Board) · filed 1988-02-02

We conclude that as a member of the Board of Pardons, the defendant is absolutely immune from damages liability for actions taken in performance of the Board’s official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole.

State parole officers who prepare reports for parole boards have qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, from Section 1983 suits over those reports.

LaFrance v. Rampone · filed 1988-02-05

For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the defendant parole officers are entitled to a qualified, not an absolute, immunity from suit for the actions alleged by plaintiff.

Parole board members acting pursuant to their official duties are immune from damages suits under § 1983.

James C. Judge, Jr. v. Gloria J. Richardson, Thomas L. Patten, Jacqueline E. Moss, and Sandra J. Johnson · filed 1988-05-18

In a complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiff alleged that defendants, members of the Michigan Parole Board, improperly revoked his parole without first establishing that he had violated the conditions of his parole. ... The district court determined that parole board members acting pursuant to their official duties are immune from suit for damages. ... Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal, filed November 23, 1987, is hereby affirmed for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board members for decisions to revoke parole are barred by absolute immunity.

Miller v. Edward Murray, Virginia Department of Corrections, Robert Vassar, Virginia Parole Board · filed 1988-07-25

Michael Eugene Miller, a Virginia inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 seeking dismissal of his parole violation conviction and damages for his incarceration as a parole violator. ... Parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from damage claims arising out of the decision to revoke parole.

State parole board members are immune from damages suits under § 1983.

Jasper Buchanan v. Carroll Campbell, Grady A. Wallace, Frank Burke · filed 1988-11-04

We agree with the district court that the parole board members are immune from suits for damages under Sec. 1983.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for judicial acts involving the issuance or recommendation of parole warrants.

Conner v. Alston · filed 1988-11-23

Applying the Butz factors to this claim, the court concludes that the actions of which plaintiff complains were judicial in nature and entitled to absolute immunity: ... State parole officers must be able to issue or recommend issuance of parole warrants without fear of harassment or intimidation.

State parole board members enjoy absolute immunity from damages suits under Section 1983.

Howard v. Helan Hughes, Parole Board Members Dr. John Runda, Chairman Parole Board Members Wallace Wilkinson, · filed 1989-06-14

First, members of state parole boards have been found to enjoy absolute immunity from suit for damages under Sec. 1983.

Members of state parole boards are immune from suits for damages under § 1983.

Murray v. Linda Miller, Charles Traughber, Ron Bishop, Donna Blackburn, Tom Biggs · filed 1989-12-12

The district court correctly concluded that the defendants are immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a Section 1983 suit, parole board members have absolute immunity for decisions in individual parole cases but only qualified immunity when enacting parole rules under their statutory rule making authority.

Walter v. Torres · filed 1990-11-29

Relying on the distinction between administrative and adjudicative functions for immunity purposes drawn in Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.1988), we hold that parole board members have absolute immunity when acting in specific cases under their rules in parole cases but only qualified immunity when enacting rules pursuant to their rule making authority granted by the state legislature.

Parole board members are immune from § 1983 damages for issuing a parole violation warrant within their authority even if they mistakenly conclude that parole has not expired.

Garner v. Ray Justek, Member, Indiana Parole Board · filed 1990-12-12

If as Garner says his parole expired before the Board issued its warrant, and this terminated the Board's authority over him, a mistaken contrary decision is at most a grave error. ... Immunity is designed to deal with the errors inevitable in the operation of a complex system; errors accordingly are not sufficient grounds on which to overcome the immunity. Whether to issue a warrant was a question properly before these defendants, and their mistakes should be dealt with by requests for release rather than by demands for damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against parole board members for acts or omissions within their official parole eligibility duties because they have absolute immunity.

Swisher v. Joan Hamilton and Elwaine F. Pomeroy · filed 1992-04-24

Actions or inactions of members of the parole board in connection with their official duties to determine eligibility for parole do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. They have absolute immunity for their actions within the scope of their state law duties.

A parole officer who decides to hold a parolee pending a revocation hearing has qualified, rather than absolute, immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Mee v. Ortega · filed 1992-06-18

We hold only that Mr. Ortega's decision to hold Mr. Mee pending the parole revocation hearing is protected by qualified rather than absolute immunity.

A parole officer has only qualified immunity for at least some actions connected to revoking parole.

Russ v. Paul Uppah, Rod Cozzetto, and John R. Enright · filed 1992-07-29

Thus, Upah is entitled to only qualified immunity for at least some of his actions.

Section 1983 damages are barred by sovereign immunity for a state parole board and officers sued in their official capacities, and by absolute immunity for parole board members acting in their official duties and a governor performing judge-like functions.

Williams v. Governor Robert D. Orr, Indiana Parole Board, Gregory Lewis, Patricia A. Ravinet, Harlan C. Hicks, J · filed 1992-09-16

Even if Williams had raised a viable claim, he could not collect monetary relief from any of the named defendants because each defendant is immune from damages. The Parole Board and the officers in their official capacities are protected by sovereign immunity. See Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 846 (1987). The officers in their individual capacities possess absolute immunity 1 : the Parole Board members for "all actions taken in the course of their official duties" Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 790 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir.1985) and the governor for any judge-like functions. Mother Goose, 770 F.2d at 668; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1976). Governor Orr exercised such judge-like functions when he ruled on the merits of Williams' criminal case.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for official duties, including parole hearings and revocations.

Swisher v. Stovall · filed 1992-10-13

Similarly, the defendants in this action are shielded by immunity while performing their official duties. Parole hearings and revocations are official duties, and therefore no alleged facts regarding this revocation can state a claim.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from claims under § 1983 for decisions to revoke parole.

Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole · filed 1993-07-06

The district court correctly concluded that members of the parole board were entitled to absolute immunity in deciding to revoke Cole’s parole.

Parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 when deciding to revoke parole.

Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole · filed 1993-08-12

The district court correctly concluded that members of the parole board were entitled to absolute immunity in deciding to revoke Cole's parole.

Under § 1983, parole board members have absolute immunity for adjudicatory conduct and share a parole officer’s qualified immunity when they participate in or authorize conduct protected by that immunity.

Kaufhold v. Bright · filed 1993-09-30

It is equally clear that the board is either qualifiedly or absolutely immune under the circumstances presented here. If the plaintiff is asserting that the conduct of the “unknown” Board members was adjudicatory, which plaintiff does not appear to be asserting, absolute immunity attaches. If, on the other hand, plaintiff seeks to recover on the basis of supervisory liability under § 1983, i.e., that these defendants either participated in or authorized the conduct, the same protection extended Bright should attach to these unknown defendants.

Parole board members are absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for their actions when processing parole applications.

Kato v. Faatz · filed 1993-10-01

The district court, however, reasoned that the claim for money damages under § 1983 should not be stayed because the defendants, as parole board members, were absolutely immune from suit for money damages. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (parole board members are absolutely immune from liability for damages for their actions when processing parole applications). Therefore, Kato cannot allege a § 1983 claim against the defendants, and the claim lacks an arguable basis in law. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. The claim for money damages was therefore properly dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Parole officials have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 liability for actions taken in granting, denying, or revoking parole.

Drapeau v. Vernon · filed 1994-03-02

Parole officials are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability for actions taken in granting, denying or revoking parole. ... Thus, they are entitled to absolute immunity regarding Drapeau's civil rights claim that they wrongfully denied his parole.

Parole board members have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages suits for adjudicative conduct in parole revocations, while their administrative conduct receives only qualified immunity.

Hulsey v. Owens · filed 1995-08-17

Since then, we have repeatedly held that parole board members are absolutely immune when performing their adjudicative functions, distinguishing such decision-making activities from administrative functions for which parole board members are entitled to only qualified immunity. ... The conduct of which Hulsey complains is conduct for which the Board members are absolutely immune from suit.

Parole board officers have absolute immunity from damages under Section 1983 for their quasi-judicial acts.

Smith v. Illinois Parole Bd. · filed 1995-11-15

We have carefully reviewed the record and briefs in this matter and affirm the judgment for the reasons detailed by the district court in its September 12, 1994 Order, attached hereto. ... Parole board officers, as quasi-judicial officials, enjoy absolute immunity from damages.

Section 1983 affords parole board members absolute immunity from damages liability for decisions made in the parole decision process.

Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Board · filed 1996-03-15

Officials whose responsibilities are functionally comparable to those of a judge are absolutely immune from damage liability in a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. ... Thus, we conclude that the Board and its members were performing a quasi-judicial function when they denied Belcher parole following his November 17, 1993, hearing; consequently, they are accorded absolute immunity from civil liability.

Parole board officials deciding whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims and, unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable, claims for injunctive relief.

Montero v. Brion Travis, Commissioner Kenneth Graber, Commissioner · filed 1999-03-26

For the reasons set forth above, parole board officials, like Graber, are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 for their decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole. Parole board officials performing such functions are also entitled to absolute immunity against claims for injunctive relief in circumstances where there is no allegation that the defendant violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Members of administrative boards performing judicial functions are immune from § 1983 damages claims for acts in their judicial capacities.

Vakas v. Rodriguez · filed 1984-03-07

However, it is well established that members of administrative boards who perform judicial functions are immune from damages in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action when acting in their judicial capacities.

Section 1983 suits cannot proceed against parole board members for actions taken in their adjudicative functions because they are absolutely immune.

Rogers v. Dept of Corrections · filed 2001-06-13

Members of the Louisiana Board of Parole are absolutely immune from suit when performing adjudicative functions.

State parole board members are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability for acts performed in their official duties.

Gillette v. New Mexico Parole Board · filed 2002-06-24

The court found that the individual defendants were absolutely immune from damages liability for actions taken in performance of their official duties as members of Board, and that plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Board were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Having conducted a de novo review, we agree with the district court’s analysis with respect to plaintiff’s claims for damages.

Judicial immunity protects a parole board official from a § 1983 suit for recommending a parole set-off date as part of her official duties.

Hammond v. Quick · filed 2003-07-31

In short, we hold that Ms. Quick’s action in recommending a set-off date for Mr. Hammond, which was accepted by the Board, was part and parcel of her official duties in deciding whether to revoke, grant, or deny him parole, and that she is protected from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Section 1983 shields parole authorities and related state officials from damages claims absent a showing that they acted in bad faith when denying parole.

Bennett v. Gilligan · filed 1974-10-21

In Joyce v. Gilligan, et al., 383 F.Supp. 1028 (1974), a case almost factually identical to this one, this Court held that absent a showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the parole authority by acting in bad faith in denying an inmate parole, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority and various state officials connected with it, have immunity from damage suits brought under § 1983. ... This Court concludes that there is no showing or allegation of bad faith in the present case such as to reach behind the shield of immunity held by the parole authority.

In a § 1983 suit, parole board members have absolute immunity for decisions to grant parole, while a parole officer performing an arrest-like function has only qualified immunity.

Linda A. Nelson, Paul R. Nelson, Evelyn Philbert, Laura Moore, and Charles Moore v. Denise Balazic, Dick Moore, and Bill · filed 1986-10-10

Since Duncan and Moore performed a quasi-judicial function when they paroled Nave, they are entitled to absolute immunity. ... Since Balazic’s actions were functionally equivalent to those of a police officer she is only entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board members are barred by absolute immunity for actions taken in their official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole.

Giese v. Scafe · filed 2005-06-07

It is also well-established that parole board members have absolute immunity “for actions taken in performance of the [b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole." Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988)).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for challenges to the manner in which a parole board decides parole and executive clemency requests.

Davis v. Clarence L. Jackson Edward Murray, Director David Smith Virginia Parole Board · filed 1995-12-27

He also seeks relief under Sec. 1983 because he challenges the Board's manner of decision-making in denying him parole and not recommending that he be granted executive clemency.

A psychologist who evaluates a parole applicant and prepares a report at a parole board’s request to aid its decision is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability.

Williams v. Consovoy · filed 2006-06-29

We also conclude that Gibbons is entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability because his actions of evaluating Williams and preparing a report of that evaluation were performed at the Parole Board’s request to assist in its adjudicative function of evaluating Williams’s eligibility for parole.

Section 1983 claims against these parole board defendants are barred by absolute immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Payton v. Owens · filed 2006-10-24

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Payton’s complaint on the bases (1) that all defendants were immune from liability based on absolute immunity or Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) that Payton has no liberty interest in parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause.

Section 1983 does not immunize parole board members from suit for failing to perform a mandatory duty to verify information pertinent to a parolee’s record.

Jones v. Johnson · filed 1975-10-29

The failure to perform this duty, as explicitly and specifically mandated in the laws of Pennsylvania, is not protected from civil rights suits by any form of governmental immunity which has been suggested to us.

Absolute immunity and the Eleventh Amendment can bar punitive damages and injunctive relief sought under § 1983 against a state parole board chairman.

Davis v. Dennison · filed 2007-03-02

Upon a review of the record, and substantially for the reasons set forth in the portions of Magistrate Judge Treeee’s ruling that were adopted by the District Court, we conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages and injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, defendant’s absolute immunity from suit, and § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against parole board members are barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when the challenged decision is part of their discretionary parole function.

Reed v. Iranon · filed 1996-09-13

Accordingly, the court finds that the HPA Defendants are shielded from Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Parole Board members are immune from damages claims under § 1983, but that immunity does not bar claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning parole review.

Cheatham v. Muse · filed 2015-07-06

Accordingly, while Cheatham’s claims against Muse for damages were properly dismissed as barred by Muse’s immunity, the district court erred in dismissing Cheatham’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief which sought rulings requiring his eligibility for parole review.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board officials for actions taken in processing parole applications are barred by absolute immunity.

Brisken v. Whiteing · filed 2020-09-25

Officials of the Hawaii Paroling Authority enjoy absolutely immunity for actions taken in processing Plaintiff’s parole application.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against parole board members for actions taken in their quasi-judicial role in parole decisions.

Nordlund v. Beesley · filed 2021-06-29

Thus, like judges, they are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken with respect to parole decisions,31 such as the actions challenged by Mr. Nordlund.

A § 1983 claim against a state official requires purposeful discrimination or at least knowing or reckless misconduct when the official’s judgment and discretion are at issue.

Williams v. Patton · filed 1976-03-25

Where a state official’s judgment and discretion are of vital concern, we require a showing of purposeful discrimination or at least an allegation that his misdeeds were knowing or reckless.

Federal law, rather than state law, determines who may be held liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983.

Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College · filed 1977-05-18

The question as to who is liable is determined by federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for actions under color of state law and therefore does not apply to federal agencies or federal officials acting under federal authority.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Elm Medical Laboratories Inc. · filed 1981-08-11

Federal agencies are not sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that section imposes liability for actions "under color of state law”. It therefore excludes Federal officials acting under color of their authority.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on the merits on a state that intervenes solely to defend a statute when no state official acted to deprive the plaintiffs of federal rights.

Nash v. Delbert Chandler, the City of Tyler, Texas, and Willie Hardy, Chief of Police, Etc., and the State of Texas · filed 1988-06-30

There was no “action” by state officials which deprived the plaintiffs of rights guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The action with respect to the State of Texas consisted solely of defending the constitutionality of state statutes. This is not sufficient to subject the state to liability on the merits.

An official-capacity claim under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show that an official policy, custom, or practice caused the injury.

Johnson v. Carroll · filed 1988-09-01

To maintain an official-capacity suit under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from the execution of an official policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 permits suits against local officials in their official capacity for actions implementing an official policy that allegedly violates federal rights.

Capodagli v. Wilson · filed 1989-03-10

Local governing bodies and local officials in their official capacity may be sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for monetary damage, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief where the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.

States and state officials sued in their official capacities for damages are not “persons” under § 1983.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police · filed 1989-06-15

We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a state official when the complaint alleges that the official used delegated authority or governmental approval to discharge an employee for constitutionally protected speech.

Nix v. Bobby Norman, Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training and the State of Arkansas · filed 1989-07-19

Thus, in an official-capacity suit, a plaintiff states a legally cognizable claim under section 1983 if she alleges that a state official, acting pursuant to his delegated authority or with the tacit or implied approval of the governmental entity, discharged her because of an exercise of constitutionally protected speech.

Section 1983 liability of state prison officials for alleged constitutional violations in a county jail must be assessed with guidance from state law governing their responsibilities.

In Re William P. Clements · filed 1989-08-11

It is evident that in order to decide the merits of the third-party complaint, the district court will have to first decide ... whether the Harris County inmates’ rights under the United States Constitution are being violated and then whether, and if so to what extent and in what respect, the third-party defendants are legally responsible for such violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In making this latter determination, the district court, though it does not enforce state-created ... rights, must nevertheless look to and at least to a large extent be guided by state law.

A § 1983 judgment against a school principal in his official capacity is a judgment against the school district.

Barter v. Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Community School District · filed 1989-10-03

Any judgment against the High School principal in his official capacity is in fact a judgment against the School District.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a state official acting in an official capacity.

Swigert v. Arthur Tate, Jr., Supt. · filed 1989-10-04

And in any event, a state official acting in his official capacity is not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing city employees in their official capacities to establish a municipal policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Morton v. City of Little Rock · filed 1989-12-26

In order to recover against city employees in their official capacities, plaintiff must establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom that was the “ ‘moving force’ behind,” or caused the alleged constitutional violation.

A Section 1983 suit against government employees in their official capacities is a suit against the governmental entity they represent.

Farred v. J.M. Hicks, Officer, Dekalb County Police Department, A.B. Blaisdell · filed 1990-10-31

Where, as here, a section 1983 plaintiff sues government employees (such as police officers) in their official capacities, the suit is in actuality against the governmental entity that the individuals represent.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a jail supervisor only where an unconstitutional policy or practice is in effect at the jail.

Bryant v. Winston · filed 1990-11-26

Furthermore, Sergeant Winston may be held liable in his official capacity as Sergeant at the Richmond City Jail only where an unconstitutional policy or practice is in effect at the jail.

Section 1983 does not allow damages suits against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons within the statute.

Roby v. Mr. James G. Strieby and Mr. Jenkins · filed 1991-03-01

They are not subject to an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because they are not "persons" within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability requires a link between the alleged deprivation and an official policy or custom.

Griffin v. Fairman · filed 1991-07-23

Griffin has not offered any argument, much less evidence, that any arguable denial of procedural due process was linked to an official policy or custom.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a county treasurer requires evidence that the county implemented, executed, or acquiesced in a policy or custom intended to deprive constitutional rights, or knew or should have known its action or inaction would do so.

Mooney v. Smith · filed 1991-09-16

Inasmuch as Mooney failed to present any evidence that Hughes County implemented, executed, or acquiesced in any policy or custom with the intention of depriving others of their constitutional rights or that the county knew or should have known that such action or inaction would violate or deprive others of their constitutional rights, the court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of Smith in his official capacity as the Hughes County Treasurer.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against South Carolina sheriffs or deputies in their official capacities because they are state officials.

Cone v. Nettles · filed 1992-04-27

Given this authority, we hold that Deputy Frier is a state official and, pursuant to Will, supra, is not liable in his official capacity for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official-capacity section 1983 judgment is not the public official’s personal liability, so the official’s individual bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish the official-capacity claim.

Pelkoffer v. Deer · filed 1992-08-31

In sum, this court rules that Deer’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge does not absolve him of any liability incurred in his official capacity, because Deer would not be personally liable for such a section 1983 judgment and because he is not considered to be the same legal entity when acting in his official capacity as opposed to his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability only when the alleged deprivation is connected to an official policy or custom.

Laws v. Dewey White, in His Official Capacity as Trustee of the Town Board of Rockville, as Chief of Police, an · filed 1992-09-29

With regard to Laws' official-capacity suit, since there is no evidence connecting White to the alleged harassment, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the alleged harassment was part of an official "policy or custom." Thus, there can be no official-capacity liability.

Section 1983 claims may not be maintained against a state or state agents acting in their official capacities.

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo · filed 1992-10-20

Defendants have also moved to dismiss all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 1983 claims may not be maintained against a state or against agents of the state acting in their official capacity. ... Defendants are correct on both counts.

Section 1983 claims against state government defendants must seek prospective or injunctive relief.

Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Employees' Retirement System · filed 1993-01-05

For the plaintiffs to make a valid section 1983 claim against these government defendants, the remedy sought must be prospective or injunctive.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a sheriff only when an unconstitutional jail policy or practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.

McNeal v. Harper · filed 1993-03-31

Sheriff Harper may be held liable in his official capacity only if the implementation of an unconstitutional policy or practice at the jail caused McNeal’s injury.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity judgment against a county treasurer’s office when the treasurer set policy for that office; the judgment does not make the county itself liable.

Manns v. Julie Curry, in Her Official Capacity as Treasurer of MacOn County · filed 1993-04-12

Only the "Macon County Treasurer's Office", not Macon County itself, is liable on the judgments. ... Curry, as the incumbent Treasurer, has no legitimate objection to requiring the "Macon County Treasurer's Office" to satisfy the judgment; Edgcomb plainly set policy for the Office within the meaning of Jett v. Dallas, 491 U.S. 701 (1989), and Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.1992).

Section 1983 permits government liability through an official-capacity claim only when an official with final policymaking authority causes the deprivation of federal rights.

James v. Jones · filed 1993-05-05

Only those officials who possess “final poli-cymaking authority” may subject the government to Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a police chief in his official capacity to show that a policy or practice maintained by the chief deprived the plaintiff of a specified constitutional right.

Johnson v. Ft. Pierce Police Department · filed 1994-02-25

In order for Chief Kerlikowske to be hable to the Plaintiff, when sued in his official capacity, the Plaintiff must show that the Chief of Police established and/or maintained a pattern, practice or policy, the enforcement of which deprived the Plaintiff of a specified constitutional right.

Section 1983 claims against police officers in their official capacities require an allegation of a municipal policy or custom.

Woodard v. Hardenfelder · filed 1994-03-15

As pointed out in the Order, plaintiff sued the Police Defendants in their official capacity and because of the absence of an allegation of municipal custom or policy the complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 does not subject the State to liability in the New York Court of Claims.

White v. State · filed 1994-07-01

The State is not subject to liability in this court under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1988 (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58; Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn., 83 AD2d 723, affd 56 NY2d 656), and this court lacks jurisdiction to award money damages against an individual.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing an official in his official capacity to allege an official policy that caused the deprivation.

Stone-El v. Fairman · filed 1994-09-28

For Fairman to be liable in his official capacity, Stone-El must allege the existence of an official policy which resulted in the deprivation alleged.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Singer v. State of Maine · filed 1994-10-04

The State of Maine and the individual Defendants, sued in their official capacities, are immune from Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Westmoreland v. Brown · filed 1995-03-21

The state cannot be liable because state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity damages claim against local officials to link the alleged deprivation of a federal right to a governmental policy or custom.

Askew v. Fairman · filed 1995-03-22

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action taken under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability for a county official is another way of imposing liability on the county and does not support additional damages against the official.

Winters v. Mowery · filed 1995-04-19

We note initially that our holding today does not assess additional damages against Mowery, since Mowery’s liability in her official capacity is merely another way of naming the responsible entity’s (Marion County) liability.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require a deprivation of a federal right linked to the government entity’s policy or custom.

Ware v. Fairman · filed 1995-04-24

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action taken under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against a local government to link the alleged deprivation of a federal right to the entity’s policy or custom.

Summers v. Sheahan · filed 1995-04-25

Therefore, in order for a plaintiff to succeed on an official capacity claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the action alleged to be under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right and can be definitively linked to the governmental entity’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits liability for unequal prison opportunities caused by a corrections department policy decision.

Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-08-14

The Court holds that the Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) for not providing equal opportunities in the areas of recreation, work details and work training at the Annex because this inequality results from the implementation of a policy decision of the Department of Corrections to provide unequal opportunity in these areas.

Section 1983 excludes states and state officials sued in their official capacities as defendants in damages actions.

Abordo v. State of Hawaii · filed 1995-08-25

The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excludes States as parties defendant in § 1983 actions. Moreover, because an official-capacity suit is simply another way of pleading an action against a legal entity of which the officer is an agent, and is thus treated as a suit against the entity, Defendants in their official capacities are also excluded from actions under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an official-capacity claim against local government officers to allege that a government policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation.

Stone-El v. Sheahan · filed 1995-09-20

Indeed, Stone-El’s complaint does not at all mention any policy, custom, or practice of any government entity. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a § 1983 cause of action against the defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 official-capacity liability requires evidence of a policy or custom behind the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Pyka v. Village of Orland Park · filed 1995-11-08

The plaintiffs have not offered any evidence of a policy or custom behind the alleged deprivations of Pyka’s constitutional rights. The defendants are therefore entitled to immunity in their official capacity on all counts.

Section 1983 requires officials sued in their official capacities to be at fault for the alleged wrongdoing.

Lucero v. Hensley · filed 1996-03-18

Even in their official capacities, however, defendants must somehow be at fault to be liable under Section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity is nonfrivolous when the existence and use of unconstitutional jail facilities suggest a prison custom or policy.

McCormick v. West · filed 1996-04-18

Moreover, the existence and use of such facilities clearly suggest a custom or policy of the prison implicating the sheriff in his official capacity. As such, McCormick has stated a nonfrivolous claim that must be remanded for further development.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state or its employees acting in their official capacity.

Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Board · filed 1996-07-10

We nevertheless believe that summary judgment was properly granted on this claim because neither a state nor its employees acting in their official capacity may be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires direct participation by a state agency, such as through a policy, for the agency to be liable for a constitutional violation.

Salas v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections · filed 2006-04-25

Section 1983’s “personal participation” requirement extends to state agencies. Unless an agency can be shown to have participated directly in the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights, through the promulgation of a policy, or in some other formal fashion, the agency is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a state liable for its employee’s conduct under respondeat superior.

State v. Hall · filed 1980-09-24

Nor can states be sued under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute, and it does not authorize recovery against the state under respondeat superior principles.

Carlson v. State · filed 2011-09-08

The State is not a “person” amenable to suit within the meaning of section 1983 (Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58 [1989]), and recovery against the State under respondeat superior principles is not authorized under that statute (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 691-694 [1978] [municipality not vicariously liable as employer for section 1983 violation by employees]).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state.

Robison v. Touchette · filed 2021-01-06

The State is not subject to damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not extend policy-or-custom liability to state governments or their agencies.

Benton v. Layton · filed 2022-09-15

Monell has not been interpreted to extend § 1983 liability to policies or customs made by state governments or its agents.

An involuntarily committed patient challenging forced antipsychotic medication under Section 1983 must show that treating professionals failed actually to exercise professional judgment.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Stuart Silvers, Dr. Dr. Blomberg Leo Brown · filed 1988-01-12

Johnson has failed to demonstrate that the defendants did not exercise professional judgment in fact when they required that Johnson take antipsychotic medication over Johnson's objections.

Forcing an involuntarily-committed mental patient to take antipsychotic drugs against his will, by a defendant acting under color of state law and without exercising professional judgment, establishes a deprivation of liberty actionable under Section 1983.

Robert Clifton Johnson, Jr. v. Silvers · filed 1984-08-28

If it is determined in those proceedings that a properly identified defendant, acting under color of state law, has effectively caused Johnson to take anti-psychotic drugs against Johnson’s will, this will establish a deprivation of liberty within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation has standing to assert First and Fourteenth Amendment violations through § 1983.

Advocates for the Arts v. Meldrim Thomson, Jr., Etc. · filed 1976-03-31

That Granite Publications is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Since we thus find a justiciable controversy between Granite Publications and the defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we find it unnecessary to consider either whether there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with its “amount in controversy” requirement, or whether any of the other plaintiffs besides the publisher have standing.

Section 1983 claims must be adjudicated by a court or magistrate, not by a special master or monitors.

William Johnson, Jr. v. Dan v. McKaskle Acting Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1984-03-23

In accordance with our prior mandate, any adjudication of § 1983 claims must be by the court or magistrate and not by the special master or monitors.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a person deprived of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law under color of state law.

Medical Society of New Jersey v. Mottola · filed 2004-06-08

Plaintiff may only maintain a Section 1983 action where the rights sought to be vindicated are unambiguously conferred.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations sufficient to state a claim, and a parent or guardian cannot bring a minor child's action without a lawyer.

Peters v. Guajome Park Academy Charter School · filed 2008-08-07

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice the § 1983 claims that Peters attempted to bring on behalf of her son. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1997) (“[A] parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.”).

Section 1983 does not allow a family member to bring a claim for a relative's civil-rights violation.

Rios v. Castillo · filed 2007-08-28

While true that a family member cannot raise claims under section 1983 for the violation of a relative’s civil rights, see Garcia v. Royal Bank of Canada, 178 F.Supp.2d 74, 76 (D.P.R.2001), Torres’ claims are cognizable under the Puerto Rico general tort statute, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141, which plaintiff has raised under the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Torres’ claims.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, but an emergency commitment without a prior hearing does not by itself state a § 1983 claim when due process permits the hearing to be delayed.

Mignone v. Vincent · filed 1976-04-13

Consequently, Mignone’s commitment without benefit of a prior hearing does not violate his Due Process rights and, therefore, does not state a claim under § 1983.

An involuntarily committed patient may have a § 1983 damages claim when forced medication in a nonemergency substantially departs from accepted professional judgment or mandatory treatment procedures.

Jarvis v. Levine · filed 1987-07-02

If the substantive and procedural criteria are not adhered to by mental health professionals, or if a decision to medicate substantially departs from accepted “professional judgment, practice, or standards” in nonemer-gency cases, an institutionalized mental patient might have a claim for damages.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for denial of counsel at a prison disciplinary hearing when inmates have no constitutional right to retained or appointed counsel, even when the charges involve conduct punishable as a crime under state law.

Frankos v. J. Edwin Lavallee, Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility · filed 1976-05-25

In the opinion of this court on March 23, 1976, slip op. 2747, we held that the complaint stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellees LaVallee and Czarnetsky on the basis that it alleged they had deprived appellant of counsel’s assistance at prison disciplinary proceedings involving serious criminal conduct which culminated in a state murder charge against appellant. ... The Court has thus apparently extended Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), to the situation where the disciplinary charges involve conduct punishable as a crime under state law. Accordingly, our holding, in reliance on the court of appeals cases reversed in Baxter, supra, has been negated and the original judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint must be affirmed.

There is no right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action, although a court may appoint counsel in exceptional circumstances.

Gomez v. Myers · filed 1985-11-12

No right to counsel exists in § 1983 actions. ... A district court has the discretion to appoint counsel in a civil rights action if the case presents exceptional circumstances.

Allegations that a prison misconduct report lacked seized physical evidence and that subsequent administrative segregation involved dirty cells without cleaning materials are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Rickey Rimmer-Bey Ervin Mayer v. Gary Barker M. Michael David Jamrog A.D. Palmer · filed 1988-07-22

The basic argument advanced by the two prisoners is that a misconduct report was written without seizing the evidence. As a result, at the hearing on this report involving a knife, there was no physical evidence to be introduced. Both prisoners were found to have violated prison regulations at the hearing and both were reclassified to administrative segregation. They claim that this area where they were confined was dirty and they were not given the necessary materials to clean the cells. Accepting the facts as true we believe them to be insufficient to raise a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge disciplinary proceedings that impose significant sanctions beyond lost sentence credits when restoring those credits would not directly affect the prisoner's sentence.

Hemphill v. California Department of Corrections · filed 1993-08-02

Nonetheless, a prisoner may bring a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action to challenge disciplinary procedures having "only a speculative or incidental effect" on the length of his sentence. Sisk v. CSO Branch, 974 F.2d 116, 117 (9th Cir.1992) (quotations omitted). Thus, a prisoner who loses sentence credits at a prison disciplinary hearing need not first pursue habeas relief if (1) significant sanctions, such as an increased security classification, were imposed in addition to the loss of the credits, and (2) restoration of the credits would not directly impact the prisoner's sentence. Id. at 118 (no direct impact on sentence because prisoner received indeterminate term).

A litigant in a Section 1983 case has no right to counsel and cannot obtain appellate relief based on counsel’s alleged deficiencies.

Cole v. Mel Rouf Jane Doe, Nurse D. Wagner Lynn Wright Brad Hansen · filed 1995-12-07

Finally, Cole is not entitled to any appellate relief based on his counsel's alleged deficiencies. See Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir.1988) (in section 1983 cases there is no right to counsel).

Section 1983 permits damages claims challenging the procedures used to deprive prisoners of good-time credits when those claims do not question the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Armento-Bey v. Harper · filed 1996-01-19

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not "call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement," and again recognized that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," are cognizable.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages for procedural defects in a disciplinary hearing when success would not imply the invalidity of his confinement.

Armstrong v. McGinnis · filed 1996-04-30

Consequently, because the success of Armstrong's claim did not impugn the validity of his confinement, his claim remains cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for procedural due process violations in prison disciplinary hearings when success would not necessarily invalidate the disciplinary outcome.

Umar v. Johnson · filed 1997-06-09

In sum, this Court finds in light of Heck and Edwards that Umar’s damages action for procedural due process errors in the Adjustment Committee hearing is cognizable under Section 1983. Both of those decisions carry forward the Wolff recognition that due process deprivations that do not necessarily connote the invalidity of the prison’s disciplinary outcome are independently actionable.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily imply that a loss of good-time credits was invalid.

Gary v. Jernigan v. Jack Regan D.W. Nelson E.S. Alamedia, Jr. B.L. Jackson B.O. Daniels Ray Brown M.H. Tristan R. Mejia · filed 1997-09-24

The determination whether a cause of action based on allegedly unconstitutional prison hearing procedures may be cognizable under § 1983 must be based upon whether "the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment." Edwards, 117 S.Ct. at 1587.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison disciplinary proceedings when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of revoked good-time credits.

Lusz v. Scott · filed 1997-10-07

These two contentions, like Lusz’s drug test contention, cannot go forward because, if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of Lusz’s conviction, i.e., his revocation of good-time credit.

Section 1983 does not permit review of a prison disciplinary board’s credibility determinations when no procedural due process violation is implicated.

Reed v. Jago · filed 1986-02-25

Although issues of credibility are not normally resolvable on summary judgment motions, the district court here never had to reach that issue, since where no procedural due process violations are implicated, the credibility determinations made by a prison disciplinary review board are not reviewable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy to people deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law, but does not extend a federal forum to another plaintiff asserting only a related state tort claim.

Washco v. Darby Borough Police Department · filed 1988-04-14

Despite these differences in posture, however, it is fair to conclude that Congress did not authorize the federal courts to hear claims like Mrs. Washco’s. The remedy provided by § 1983 is available to a specific class of plaintiffs — those who have suffered deprivations of their constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not support pendent party jurisdiction over private defendants facing only related state-law claims.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1988-04-19

Here, as in the cases cited immediately above, plaintiffs with section 1983 claims against various state actors, seek to have the court exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ purely state-law claims against different parties who are merely private individuals or entities. I will follow the clearly established trend of case law in this circuit and in others. “[Ujnder § 1983, Congress intended the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only when the defendants have acted under color of law_ The inference is clear: Congress intended to negate the exercise of jurisdiction over all parties who have not acted under color of law.”

Section 1983’s municipal policy or custom requirement precludes pendent party jurisdiction over a municipality when that requirement is unmet.

Phipps v. City of Chicago · filed 1989-08-14

The court finds that this custom or policy requirement implicitly negates the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over municipalities in § 1983 cases where the requirement is not met.

Section 1983 does not grant pendent-party jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a party with no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners ex rel. Avery · filed 1991-08-28

However, our task is an easy one because the Aldinger court resolved for us in the negative the issue of whether section 1983 grants pendent-party jurisdiction.

Section 1983 itself does not authorize pendent party jurisdiction over defendants against whom no federal claims are asserted.

Gibson v. City of Glendale Police Department · filed 1992-03-10

It has long been settled that no such jurisdictional authorization exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not affirmatively grant pendent party jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional parties.

Meyers v. Trinity Medical Center · filed 1993-01-14

We agree with the district court that neither the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contains an affirmative grant of pendent party jurisdiction as required by Finley.

A state university sufficiently distinct from the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, along with its governing board, is a person amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Kovats v. Rutgers · filed 1986-04-24

Both the University and the Board of Governors are “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipal departments are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Landon v. County of Daviess · filed 2020-06-03

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants must be dismissed because municipal departments are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on the wrongful disposition of personal property.

Kircheis v. Long · filed 1976-12-06

Initially, the claim of a wrongful disposition of personal property can be heard under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover claims arising in the Trust Territory because the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within the statute.

Thompson v. Kleppe · filed 1976-12-15

However, the Trust Territory is not a State or Territory within § 1983 and, therefore, this action may not be brought under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 applies in American Samoa and does not require filing an administrative claim under territorial tort law before suit.

Tuivai v. Pele · filed 1984-06-05

Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 et seq. apply in the Territory of American Samoa. In order to proceed under those statutes it is not necessary to file administrative claims under the government tort liability act.

A civil rights damages claim can survive a prisoner’s transfer even when the transfer moots requests for prospective relief.

Boatman v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2006-03-23

The order under review is affirmed as to the disposition of those claims for which the appellant sought only declaratory or injunctive relief. But because the trial court erred in concluding that the claims for which the appellant sought money damages were inappropriately raised in a civil rights complaint and also erred in failing to address these claims, the order is otherwise reversed and this case is remanded.

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for injuries caused by an unconstitutional ordinance even after the ordinance is amended, so the amendment does not moot the claim.

George Phillips Philip Vitale v. Borough of Keyport Victor Rhodes Board of Adjustment · filed 1997-02-21

Contrary to the defendants' suggestion, the issue of the constitutionality of this version of the Ordinance is not moot. Phillips and Vitale have a § 1983 damage claim based on the 500 foot version of the Ordinance. They seek damages for defendants' refusal to permit them to operate an adult bookstore on Lot 61 from July 28, 1992, when Ordinance 31-92 was first adopted, to the date in the fall of 1993 on which the 300 foot version of the Ordinance was adopted. If the 500 foot Ordinance is unconstitutional, Phillips and Vitale are entitled to any damages they can establish to have been occasioned by it.

Section 1983 personal-liability claims against individual defendants are not mooted by a plaintiff's graduation, while individual injunctive-relief claims under it are.

Zentgraf v. TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY · filed 1981-03-02

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s individual claim under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and her individual claim for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court will not dismiss as moot Plaintiff's claim for personal liability against the individual Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A Section 1983 claim seeking to undo a state-court child-custody judgment is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel after the constitutional issues were fully litigated in state court.

Yow v. Crater · filed 1981-11-18

Were the Court able to overcome its reluctance to rule on domestic relations matters, it would still be unable to grant the requested relief, since plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for the alleged denial of law-library access, work assignments to a state prisoner held at a county jail, or minor property loss where state remedies exist.

Falzerano v. Collier · filed 1982-01-08

The facts alleged on this count, taken in their most favorable and lenient reading, fall far short of a § 1983 claim. ... This claim raises no federal claim under § 1983. ... But whatever the imperfections may be, they do not rise to § 1983 claims.

A § 1983 damages request remains a live controversy after the challenged disciplinary proceedings have ended, even if injunctive relief becomes moot.

Henson v. The Honor Committee of U. Va., the Rector and Visitors of U. Va. · filed 1983-12-05

Henson sought both injunctive and monetary relief in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the University. Thus, his request for damages remained a live controversy even after the disciplinary proceedings were dropped.

Ordinary tort-law principles of causation, including the rule that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, govern claims for constitutional torts brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parrett v. City of Connersville, Indiana · filed 1984-08-22

These are general principles of causation in tort law but they are applicable to constitutional torts litigated under section 1983.

A section 1983 claim for damages is not mooted merely because the defendant later remedies the underlying deprivation, since the damages claim survives independent of any request for injunctive relief.

Delancy v. Terry Caldwell, Official Court Reporter, Tulsa, Ok · filed 1984-08-29

The district court’s holding that plaintiff’s action is moot is correct to the extent that plaintiff sought injunctive relief. However, plaintiff also sought damages for the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights flowing from the delay in receiving the transcript. If plaintiff can establish a deprivation of his rights and damages as a result thereof, his claim is not mooted merely because he is supplied a copy of the requested transcript.

A reviewing court may sever a Section 1983 claim into a separate proceeding when resolving it requires evidence beyond the limited record permitted in administrative review.

Jahn v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1986-03-11

To the extent that a resolution of Jahn’s § 1983 claim would require the judge to hear further evidence, the judge properly concluded that this cause of action should be maintained in a separate proceeding.

A defendant's promise not to repeat challenged conduct does not moot a viable Section 1983 claim for damages already sustained.

Stokes v. Village of Wurtsboro · filed 1987-05-08

The Village’s stipulation, that it would not apply Local Law 5-1983 to the Sullivan Street property in the future, did not address and therefore does not preclude an action for damages allegedly sustained by the Stokes when water service was terminated. Thus, the section 1983 cause of action was not mooted when the Village entered into the stipulation.