42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a prison warden who can implement the requested order.

Paz v. Ramirez · filed 2020-04-23

The Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s naming of the state of Idaho to include an official capacity claim for injunctive relief against Al Ramirez, the warden of the Idaho State Correctional Institution, where Plaintiff is housed, because Warden Ramirez has the authority to order implementation of a court order regarding Plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment.

Section 1983 permits claims against officers in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages.

Frickx v. Venegas · filed 2020-05-28

Section 1983 only permits a plaintiff to sue individual officers in their official capacities for injunctive relief or individual capacities for damages. Also, as noted above, supervisory officers are not typically liable for the actions for their subordinates. However, given that Plaintiff has alleged his arrest and the search of his car was unreasonable and lacked probable cause, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful arrest and illegal search and seizure to be made against the four named officers in their individual capacities and permit it to proceed past screening.

State officials sued in their individual capacities may be sued for damages under § 1983.

Russell v. Butcher · filed 2020-07-17

The Amended Complaint, however, clearly sues Defendants Butcher, Jividen, Ballard, and Ames in their individual capacities. ... Dismissal on this basis is therefore improper.

Section 1983 allows suits against state officers in their individual capacities.

Foley v. Pacchiega · filed 2020-07-22

However, Section 1983 does allow suits against state officers in their individual capacities. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest is permitted to proceed against Pacchiega, Mikalonis, and Gillespie in their individual capacities, along with against LVMPD, and CCDC.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities when the plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief.

Ruggles v. Ige · filed 2020-09-21

As Plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive relief, see Dkt. No. 1 at 68–70, the Court considers his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against State Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against an official when the complaint and a prompt clarification give the official sufficient notice despite an imprecise caption.

Duncan v. Wayne County of Detroit · filed 2020-10-26

In light of the variations in captioning by both parties since this suit was filed and Plaintiff’s speedy clarification, Defendant Pfannes will not be dismissed in his individual capacity merely because of Plaintiff’s imprecise language.

Section 1983 allows an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against a warden responsible for carrying out that relief.

Thornton v. Jeffreys · filed 2020-11-18

The First Amended Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief and Plaintiff has filed a separate motion for injunctive relief. Anthony Wills, in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard Correctional Center, is a proper defendant for that claim.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, but permits such claims against them in their individual capacities.

Plumb v. University of Utah · filed 2020-12-02

Mr. Whitaker cannot be sued for damages in his official capacity as director of the School of Computing. But a government official sued in his personal capacity is a “person” under § 1983, so Mr. Plumb’s request for damages for deprivation of his due process rights can be asserted against Mr. Whitaker as an individual.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity claim against a state official when the complaint’s caption clearly states that the official is sued in that capacity.

American Atheists Inc v. Rapert · filed 2020-12-15

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ complaint includes the requisite clear statement that State Senator Rapert is being sued in his individual capacity.

A § 1983 claim naming an official and alleging only her personal actions may be construed as an individual-capacity suit.

WADE v. MILLS · filed 2021-02-23

To the extent that Plaintiff names only Defendant and alleges only her personal actions, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s claim as a suit against Defendant only in her individual, not official, capacity.

Section 1983 does not require a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation for an official-capacity claim seeking injunctive relief.

Peoples v. Leon · filed 2021-03-16

A defendant need not have been personally involved in a constitutional violation to be properly named in her official capacity for purposes of injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits individual-capacity claims against prison officers based on allegations of their own conduct under color of law.

Autin v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2021-03-31

The course of proceedings and allegations indicate that Wallace and Goings are being sued in their individual capacities because the complaint contains allegations that are specific to the defendants’ alleged actions and not generally aimed at the state entity. Therefore, the excessive force claims against Goings and Wallace may proceed at this time.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against public officers sued in their official capacities, but not against defendants sued only in their individual capacities.

The New Mexico Elks Association v. Grisham · filed 2021-05-13

It is well-established that “Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.”

Section 1983 allows a claim against a state officer in his individual capacity when the complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of federal rights caused by conduct under color of state law.

Paez v. Nutsch · filed 2021-06-28

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. ... In sum, the court concludes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant in his individual capacity.

In a § 1983 damages action against state officials, the officials are presumed to be sued in their individual capacities.

Doe v. County of Sonoma · filed 2021-07-01

However, the district court erred in dismissing Doe’s claims for damages against defendants MacDonald, Walker, and Santos on the ground that Doe sued them in their official capacities. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Where state officials are named in a complaint which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their individual capacities.”); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying on the “basis of the claims asserted and ... nature of relief sought” to determine capacity in which defendant is being sued); see also Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342 (pro se pleadings are construed liberally).

A §1983 claim against a state officer may proceed in the officer’s individual capacity even when the complaint also sues the officer in an official capacity.

Hammonds v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2021-07-16

Likewise, accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, the court concludes that Defendant is sued in both his individual and official capacity.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity suit against a government actor as a suit against the actor’s employer; an individual-capacity suit concerns the actor’s own conduct.

Hernandez v. Hain · filed 2021-08-16

An "official capacity" suit against a governmental actor is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental actor's employer—in this case Kane County. It is abundantly clear that Hernandez is not asserting a claim against Kane County, which would require him to establish the elements of a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See, e.g., McCann v. Ogle Cty., 909 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2018). Rather, he is asserting individual-capacity claims against the Kane County defendants for what he contends they did or failed to do.

A § 1983 plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously plead that a public official is sued in an individual capacity; otherwise the suit is treated as an official-capacity claim.

Weeks v. City of Lake Norden · filed 2021-10-26

However, “[i]n order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.” Id. (emphasis added). ... Because the plaintiff has failed to properly plead against Murphy in his individual capacity, has not asked this Court for leave to amend his complaint, or even discussed this matter in his responsive brief to Murphy’s motion to dismiss, this Court cannot and does not find Weeks has properly made clear he has filed suit against this defendant in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his official capacity.

Amacher v. State of Tennessee, The · filed 2021-10-28

Therefore, Plaintiff’s action could still be successful against Tre Hargett in his official capacity, even if it would be unsuccessful against the other two Defendants due to the sovereign immunity they (allegedly) possess.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking monetary damages from government officials to sue them in their individual capacities.

A. D. v. Cuomo · filed 2021-12-17

It is hornbook law that, in order to pursue ... claims for monetary damages against government officials under § 1983, a plaintiff must sue those officials in their individual capacities.

In a § 1983 claim against a county commissioner, an official-capacity suit is a suit against the commissioner’s office; suing the commissioner individually requires a basis for personal liability.

Bloomberg v. Blocker · filed 2022-02-17

Bloomberg has not articulated any reason to sue Blocker in his individual capacity. He should be sued in his official capacity alone, which is the equivalent of suing his office.

Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue individual officers in their individual capacities for alleged violations of federal rights under color of law.

Grae-El v. City of Seattle · filed 2022-02-28

However, Monell does not limit the ability of plaintiffs to sue individual officers in their individual capacities for allegedly violating their federal rights under color of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in her official capacity to stop unconstitutional conduct despite sovereign immunity.

Immelt v. State of Washington Department of Licensing Real Estate Appraiser Program · filed 2022-02-28

Immelt correctly points out that one may assert a § 1983 claim against a state official acting in her official capacity—notwithstanding the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity—to the extent she seeks to prospectively enjoin that official’s unconstitutional conduct.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek injunctive relief against a warden in his official capacity for an ongoing need for constitutionally adequate medical care.

Fogarty v. Livers · filed 2022-03-22

Therefore, Mr. Fogarty will be allowed to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against the Warden in his official capacity for injunctive relief related to his ongoing need for medical care.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue a state agent in his individual capacity for a constitutional deprivation.

Blue v. Western Illinois University · filed 2022-04-19

A plaintiff, however, can sue a state agent in his individual capacity, which Blue has done here.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief.

Alvarez v. O'Brien · filed 2022-06-30

Thus, it appears for purposes of initial review that Plaintiff may bring a section 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against Defendant O’Brien in his official capacity as an employee of the NDHHS.

Section 1983 permits an official capacity claim for permanent injunctive relief against a warden responsible for a prisoner's constitutional care.

Clark v. Boren · filed 2022-07-08

The Warden will be added as a defendant and Mr. Clark will be granted leave to proceed against him on an official capacity claim for permanent injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an individual-capacity suit against a state official for acts performed under color of state law.

Crider v. Williams · filed 2022-08-30

So under § 1983, the Parents can state a claim only if they complain of “official” acts that Williams took. ... Just because an officer inflicts an injury in her official capacity does not mean that any suit brought against her for that injury must be considered a suit against her in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits suits against state officials in their individual capacities for deprivation of federal rights.

Nash v. State of Maine · filed 2022-10-17

Unlike Title VII and the MHRA, which apply only to employers, section 1983 pennits suit against a person in their individual capacities.

A § 1983 complaint that does not specify a public official’s capacity is construed as suing the official only in an official capacity.

Young v. Mendez · filed 2022-11-02

Because plaintiff’s complaint is silent about the capacity in which the defendant is being sued, the Court must interpret it as including only official capacity claims. ... Thus plaintiff’s official capacity claims against defendant Wilkes must be dismissed.

Section 1983 reaches race-based denial of prison visitation privileges.

John-Tyrone Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections · filed 1976-01-08

The refusal to permit visitation privileges because the visitor and the visitee are of different races constitutes racial discrimination within the meaning of...Henry v. Van Cleve.

A prisoner states a viable § 1983 claim by alleging that visitation was denied arbitrarily based on officials’ mistaken belief that a visitor violated prison rules.

Morgan v. DeRobertis · filed 1984-04-06

In this case, however, Morgan has alleged facts which, if proven at trial, would entitle him to relief. Morgan alleges that he has been denied visiting privileges because of defendants’ mistaken belief that Morgan’s wife violated legitimate prison rules. Morgan, therefore, has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

Section 1983 permits an arguable claim that prison officials fired an inmate from a prison job because of his race, depriving him of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Rodriguez v. James C. Spaulding Van Skike James Blodgett · filed 1992-10-27

Liberally, construing Rodriguez's complaint, however, Rodriguez states an arguable section 1983 claim that prison officials discriminated against him on the basis of race, a deprivation of his constitutional rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 complaints filed by pro se inmates receive liberal construction and are subject to the rigorous standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Hudspeth v. Donald Figgins, Sergeant Nesselrodt, Correctional Officers of Virginia Department of Correction · filed 1978-10-05

This “concededly rigorous standard,” ... applies to pro se inmate complaints filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A pro se prisoner's pleading alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights may be construed as a Section 1983 civil-rights complaint regardless of its label.

Bin-Rilla v. Israel · filed 1983-07-01

This petition could also be construed as a complaint alleging violations of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

A pro se § 1983 complaint alleging overcrowded and unsanitary pretrial detention cannot be summarily dismissed as frivolous without meaningful consideration merely because similar class litigation is pending.

John v. Norris v. E. Paul Slothouber · filed 1983-10-04

For the reasons we have indicated, however, Norris’ complaint should not have been dismissed without any real consideration. We therefore reverse the district court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Prisoner § 1983 complaints must be construed liberally on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

McIntosh v. Carter · filed 1983-12-05

The Supreme Court has directed lower courts to view prisoner complaints under Section 1983 in a liberal manner under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

A pro se prisoner's section 1983 complaint must be read liberally and may be dismissed only when no provable set of facts could entitle the prisoner to relief.

Potter v. Herman C. Davis, Warden · filed 1985-04-26

Dismissal of a civil rights complaint is proper if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts in support of a claim which would entitle him to relief. ... That determination must be made through a liberal reading of Potter's pro se prisoner complaint.

A pro se prisoner need not cite a constitutional provision by name when the facts alleged in a § 1983 complaint state a constitutional claim.

Toombs v. Hicks · filed 1985-09-26

We vacate the order of dismissal and remand.

A court may treat a suit alleging constitutional violations under color of state law as a § 1983 action even when the complaint does not cite the statute.

Smith v. Onondaga County Support Collection Unit · filed 1985-10-09

it is a suit to redress constitutional violations inflicted under color of state,law and the court will treat the action as one commenced pursuant to § 1983.

A pro se prisoner's § 1983 allegations of prehearing solitary confinement, coerced evidence, threats, and denial of court access cannot be dismissed when the record does not conclusively establish that no relief is available.

Owens v. Maschner · filed 1987-02-17

These allegations may have been sufficient to state a claim for which relief could be granted. ... The record does not conclusively show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.

A pro se § 1983 plaintiff must use a reasonable opportunity to amend and particularize vague allegations; the district court need not litigate the claim for him.

Albert McThadus Perry, Jr. v. Kincaid · filed 1987-11-13

Although a pro se litigant must be given a reasonable opportunity to amend his complaint and particularize his claims the district court is not required to litigate the claims for him. ... We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in dismissing this complaint and, accordingly, affirm.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to overturn a state criminal conviction or clear the plaintiff’s record.

Raney, Kenneth v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2021-04-20

As an initial matter, Raney’s request that this court overturn his conviction and clear his record is unavailable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support expungement of isolated, valid convictions that are accurately recorded and no longer affect the plaintiff’s incarceration.

Carter v. Ray Hardy, District Clerk of Harris County, Texas · filed 1976-02-25

Under the circumstances, we find that Carter’s complaint falls outside the “exceedingly narrow scope” of expunction mentioned in...Rogers...and that it fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim under Section 1983 seeking expungement of a prison disciplinary conviction for escape is frivolous.

Miller v. Thomas · filed 2002-02-22

The district court did not err in concluding that Miller’s contention that the disciplinary conviction for escape should be expunged from his record was frivolous.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations such as excessive force during arrest and unreasonable restraint or force in police custody.

Classon v. Krautkramer · filed 1977-11-03

It has long been clear that the use of excessive force in making an arrest is actionable under § 1983 and under the Fourth Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Applying the above standard to the instant case, it is clear that the conduct alleged by plaintiff does constitute a violation, under color of law, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is therefore actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover for unjustified use of force without proving actual malice.

Ladnier v. Murray · filed 1983-09-27

Accordingly, the Court holds that actual malice is not an essential element of a § 1983 claim for unjustified use of force.

Section 1983 liability based on a deficient policy requires the policy itself to repudiate constitutional rights and be the moving force of the violation.

Morgan v. State of Mississippi · filed 2011-06-03

And, certainly, the claims failed to show that the defendants implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself was a repudiation of constitutional rights and was the moving force of the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 liability based on an unconstitutional policy requires proof that the policy was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Peters v. Singh · filed 2020-02-20

Establishing liability based on an unconstitutional policy under § 1983 requires a showing that the challenged policy was the moving force of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not cover court-appointed attorneys performing traditional functions as counsel in state criminal or habeas proceedings because they do not act under color of state law.

Jaynes v. Sweeney · filed 2022-07-01

Court-appointed attorneys do not act “under color of state law” when they perform a lawyer’s traditional function as counsel to an indigent client in state criminal or habeas corpus proceedings.

Section 1983 can reach defense attorneys or investigators who conspire with state actors to violate a client’s rights, but speculative allegations of conspiracy are insufficient.

Gooch v. Charles · filed 2022-06-06

Although there is an exception to these rules when defense attorneys or investigators conspire with state actors to violate their client’s rights, Plaintiff only alleges the existence of such a conspiracy in speculative and conclusory terms.

A court-appointed criminal defense attorney performing traditional counsel duties is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Cooper v. Gelfand · filed 2022-05-26

Thus, Defendant is not a state actor amenable to suit under § 1983.

Court-appointed defense counsel acting as advocates for their clients do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Jackson v. Barrett · filed 2021-07-27

On June 14, 2021, the assigned magistrate judge screened plaintiff’s complaint and found that plaintiff had failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against defendant, his court-appointed defense counsel in his pending state court criminal proceedings, because “it is well established that court appointed attorneys are not acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes but rather act as an advocate for their client.” ... Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including plaintiff’s objections, the court concludes that the findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis.

A defense lawyer representing a client in court does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Maxin v. Heartfor · filed 2021-06-24

As Maxin’s allegations show that Heartford did not act under color of law, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a damages claim against court-appointed defense counsel for ineffective assistance because the attorney is not a state actor.

Palmer v. Harris County · filed 2020-07-31

Palmer’s claims against Lourdez Rodriguez for ineffective assistance of counsel cannot support a damages suit under section 1983 because the attorney is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense counsel performing the traditional role of representing the accused because that counsel does not act under color of state law.

Raab v. Lambros · filed 2020-01-10

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court- appointed attorney does not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against her.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a public defender for acts performed in the public defender's judicial function.

Austin v. Armstrong · filed 1979-07-06

A public defender is absolutely immune from damage claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts done in the performance of his judicial function as a public defender.

Section 1983 gives a public defender absolute immunity from damages actions for acts within the scope of official duties, while allowing liability for acts outside that scope.

Caruth v. Geddes · filed 1978-01-16

In view of these considerations, we hold that a public defender enjoys an absolute immunity from § 1983 actions for damages when acting within the scope of his or her official duties. Liability may attach only when the acts complained of were done outside the scope of duty.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages action against a court-appointed attorney for conduct within the scope of the attorney's function because the attorney has absolute immunity.

Minns v. Paul · filed 1976-08-09

In addition to contending that he did not act under color of state law so as to give the district court jurisdiction under § 1983, Paul argues that by virtue of his position as a court-appointed attorney, he should enjoy absolute immunity from suits alleging that he violated § 1983. Because we agree with the latter contention, we do not reach the question of whether Minns acted under color of state law.

A conclusory ineffective-assistance allegation does not state a § 1983 claim against public defenders.

Gilbert v. Honorable James S. Corcoran, Individually and as Judge of the 22nd Judicial Circuit · filed 1976-03-03

We hold that dismissal as to the public defenders was also proper. We need not reach the question of whether public defenders have any form of immunity from liability for damages; Gilbert’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are too conclusory to state a claim against the public defenders under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on a public defender for acts performed in the defender's judicial function, including plea bargaining.

Miller v. Joseph Barilla, Ass't District Attorney · filed 1977-01-31

We believe, like the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit, that a public defender should be accorded absolute immunity from § 1983 damage claims for acts done in the performance of his judicial function as a public defender.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a public defender for actions taken in the quasi-judicial capacity of representing a client.

Nash v. Signore · filed 1981-05-28

In each of these instances the purported misconduct by Signore occurred while he was discharging his duties as a public defender, and the law is plain that a public defender is immune from liability for any civil rights claim predicated upon actions taken in the course of representation of a client.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions as acting under color of state law.

Rogers v. Neil J. Bruntrager, Janet Fanetti, Brendan Ryan, Charles D. Kitchin, Philip Kramer, James L. Sanders, · filed 1988-03-14

The claims against the public defender were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Public defenders do not act “under color of state law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing the traditional functions of defense counsel.

A public defender performing traditional counsel functions in a criminal case does not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Claybourn v. Rouse · filed 1988-11-01

To maintain this lawsuit, Claybourn must establish that Rouse’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct amounted to state action. ... Consequently, Claybourn cannot sue Rouse under § 1983 based on any actions she took while representing Claybourn.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders acting in their traditional role of representing a criminal defendant because they are not acting under color of state law.

Depineda v. Garcia · filed 1991-04-24

An individual acting in his or her traditional role of representing a criminal defendant is not a person acting under color of state law and therefore is not subject to an action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against a public defender for actions taken on behalf of a client because the defender does not act under color of state law.

Driver v. Howard County Public Defender's Office · filed 1991-06-18

Under the statute, a party is not entitled to recover damages unless he or she was deprived of a right under color of state law. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public defender does not act under color of state law when acting on behalf of a client, even if the defender's actions on behalf of the client are arguably negligent and subject to state tort remedies.

Public defenders are private persons for purposes of § 1983, so allegations that they rendered ineffective assistance of counsel do not state a claim under the section.

Blevins v. Philip S. Vavalides, Maricopa County Deputy Public Defender · filed 1992-06-17

Blevins does not state a section 1983 claim because public defenders are private persons for purposes of section 1983.

A public defender who conspires with state officials may be liable under § 1983, but vague allegations of conspiracy do not state a claim.

Irk v. Harris · filed 1992-08-14

Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983. ... Here, Irk makes only vague allegations that public defenders conspired to secure his conviction. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public defender who conspires with state officials because the conspiracy constitutes action under color of state law.

Smith v. Clark County Public Defender's Office · filed 1993-06-04

Nevertheless, a public defender who conspires with state officials does act under color of state law and may be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against an attorney who essentially occupies the position of a public defender while providing legal services to inmates.

Pilon v. Taylor Braslow Gary L. Banning Ruben Cedeno Chase Riveland · filed 1994-11-25

Summary judgment also was appropriate as to defendant Symone Scales, a private attorney employed by the State of Washington to provide legal services to inmates. As the magistrate judge concluded, Scales essentially occupied the position of a public defender and therefore was not subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an assistant public defender performing ordinary defense counsel duties as a state actor.

Beacham v. Annerino · filed 1996-04-11

His only acts alleged were those normally performed by counsel. An assistant public defender is not a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for actions as a defense attorney because those actions are not under color of state law.

Bell v. State of Okl. · filed 1998-09-15

The district court dismissed appellant's claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, adopting the magistrate's conclusions that ... the public defender is not subject to § 1983 liability because her actions as a defense attorney are not "under color of state law," see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). Upon review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court.

Section 1983 does not reach a state public defender representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding because the defender does not act under color of state law in that role.

Lynn v. Kunen · filed 1998-10-19

The court also found that as a state public defender involved in a criminal proceeding, Kunen did not act under color of state law and thus was not susceptible to a claim under § 1983. ... We have reviewed the record and considered plaintiff’s arguments and find his arguments unpersuasive. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for substantially the same reasons as stated in the district court’s July 25, 1997 order.

Section 1983 claims against a prosecutor for filing a charge are barred by prosecutorial immunity, and claims against an appointed defense lawyer require action under color of law.

Rogers v. Bruntrager · filed 1984-03-05

The former claim is barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and the latter claim fails to allege any action “under color of law” as is required in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender for traditional work as criminal defense counsel because that work is not performed under color of state law.

Langston v. Littlefield · filed 2000-11-28

The Supreme Court has held that the public defender is not subject to § 1983 liability because “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Because Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Wright was based on such activities, the district court properly dismissed it.

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders or court-appointed defense counsel as state actors while they act in that capacity.

White v. Robertson-Deming · filed 2001-05-16

It is firmly established that a public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a court-appointed attorney performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Taylor v. Windsor Locks Police Department · filed 2003-07-22

First, the district court properly dismissed all claims against Davis because a court-appointed attorney “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding” and therefore, is not subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not cover an attorney acting in the traditional role of defense counsel in a criminal proceeding because that attorney is not acting under color of state law.

William Washington, Sr. v. Sautter · filed 1989-02-03

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because an attorney who serves in the capacity of public defender and who is acting within the traditional function of counsel in a criminal proceeding is not acting under color of state law.

A public defender appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for that representation.

Wilson v. Pima County Superior Court · filed 2004-07-15

Dismissal of Wilson’s claims against Alicia Cata was proper because a public defender, when appointed to represent an indigent defendant in the traditional adversarial role as here, is not a state actor and therefore not a proper party to a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s traditional criminal defense work because the defender does not act under color of state law.

Nicholson v. Lenczewski · filed 2005-02-16

Because public defenders do not act under color of state law while defending a criminal action, these claims against defendant McWhiter are not cognizable under section 1983.

Public defenders and court-appointed attorneys performing traditional functions as counsel do not act under color of state law and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that work.

Browdy v. Karpe · filed 2005-05-16

First, public defenders and court-appointed attorneys “performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel” to a defendant do not act “under color of state law” and, therefore, are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because that work is not under color of state law.

Karboau v. Lawrence · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly entered judgment for defendant Deborah Burdzik because Karboau’s allegations failed to state a cognizable claim against Burdzik under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not act under color of state law).

A public defender sued for inadequately defending state criminal charges is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Stackhouse v. Kravich · filed 2007-04-18

We agree with the District Court that Kravich is not a proper party to this action, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), and that even if he were, the instant challenge to the validity of the state conviction would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state-appointed public defender for representing a client because the defender is not a state officer.

Vasquez Arroyo v. Kaul · filed 2008-05-09

As the district court explained, it is well settled in this circuit that public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are not state officers.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Padilla v. Enzor · filed 2008-05-13

Thus, Padilla’s public defenders are not state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional functions as defense counsel as acting under color of state law.

Calhoun v. Young · filed 2008-08-01

Accordingly, Calhoun’s claims against Young regarding his ineffective representation were properly dismissed because it is well established that a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant is not acting under color of state law.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Martin v. Lori Adkins Edie Freeman Roger Bourne George Parham August Cahill · filed 1994-01-10

A public defender, although paid by the state, does not act under color of state law for Sec. 1983 purposes when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

A public defender is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Thomas v. Pugh · filed 2001-05-09

The Supreme Court has determined that a public defender is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Therefore, defendant Johnson is simply not subject to suit at all under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for actions taken while representing a defendant because those actions are not under color of state law.

Burns v. Jorandby · filed 2009-08-25

Therefore, taking the allegations in his complaint as true, neither defendant was acting under color of state law, and neither may be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Nelson v. Dauphin County Public Defender · filed 2010-05-24

As noted by the District Court, criminal defense attorneys, including public defenders, do not act “under color of state law” and are not liable under section 1983 when performing traditional functions as defense counsel.

A public defender performing traditional defense functions is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Santos v. State of NJ · filed 2010-08-31

Finally, the District Court properly held that Santos fails to state a claim against his public defender, who is not a state actor for ... purposes of § 1983 when performing his traditional functions.

A public defender representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Townsend v. Jacks · filed 2011-06-03

After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), we agree with the district court that Townsend failed to state a claim because ... the public defender was not acting under color of state law when representing Townsend, see Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

A court-appointed public defender is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983 for representing a criminal defendant.

McDonald v. White · filed 2012-02-15

In any case, it is frivolous because a court-appointed public defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions are not state actors subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ceasar v. Public Defender Service for Dc · filed 2012-06-11

The complaint does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction because PDS and its attorneys are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

Public defenders are not state actors subject to damages liability under Section 1983 for their defense work.

Smith v. Leibovitz · filed 2012-06-22

Second, the named public defenders are not subject to suit for constitutional violations because they are not state or federal actors who may be held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or its federal analogue established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions because they are not state actors.

Rodriguez v. Creed · filed 2012-07-11

The district court properly dismissed Rodriguez’s § 1983 claim against defendants Bratty and Brinkley because public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions are not state actors.

A public defender does not act under color of state law for § 1983 when representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Rogers v. Denecke · filed 2012-10-23

The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because, as set forth in Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), Defendant, as a public defender, was not acting under color of state law when he represented Plaintiff in the criminal proceeding. ... Nothing in Plaintiff’s brief or the appellate record persuades us there was any error in the magistrate judge’s analysis or the district court’s order. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons given by the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender who was not acting under color of state law.

LaGordian Brown v. Dove · filed 2013-04-17

The public defenders cannot be sued under § 1983 because they were not acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for conduct arising from their representation of a client in parole revocation proceedings.

Harris v. Fulwood · filed 2013-05-30

Since plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Edmonson and Douglass is predicated on their representation of him during the revocation proceedings, it fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for actions taken while representing a defendant in court because they do not act under color of state law in that role.

Grider v. Cook · filed 2013-06-17

Consequently Cook and Azfal may not be sued under § 1983 for their actions taken in connection with representing Grider before the state trial and mental health courts.

A § 1983 claim against a public defender requires facts showing that the defender acted under color of state law or participated in a conspiracy.

Hall v. Tallie · filed 2015-01-15

The dismissal of Hall’s claim against the Public Defender was appropriate because Hall’s allegations that the Public Defender inappropriately hindered his trial through mental health assessments are fleeting and conclusory. Hall failed to illustrate facts sufficient to show that the Public Defender either acted under color of state law or participated in a conspiracy.

A public defender performing traditional legal representation for a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.

Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2015-06-03

Third, the district court also correctly concluded that Wusiya failed to state a claim against Public Defender Martinez: in representing Wusiya, the Public Defender’s office was not acting under color of state law for purposes of secion 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender or public defender’s office for traditional criminal defense work because neither acts under color of state law.

Dorn v. Aguilar · filed 2016-03-30

As explained by the District Court, Dorn did not ... state a claim for relief against his public defender and the public defender’s office because neither is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders acting as defense counsel because they are not state actors.

Rolle v. Glenn · filed 2017-10-19

Further, the district court properly determined, as to the public defenders, that they are not liable because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender for inadequate representation while performing traditional defense counsel functions.

Smith v. McElveen · filed 2017-12-14

Thus, when the claim is merely that the public defender failed to adequately represent the client in his criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a public defender’s work as counsel to a criminal defendant because that work is not under color of state law.

Logan v. Ramsey · filed 2018-02-09

Second, the public defender, Robert Allen, is not subject to suit under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal right.

A public defender representing a client does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Rudolph v. Hanson · filed 2018-09-12

It dismissed defendant Karen Stam on the ground that public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing clients. ... The district court’s decision is soundly based on legal precedent and principles, and Plaintiff’s brief on appeal offers no authority or argument that calls the decision into question. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment below.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against public defenders for representing a defendant in criminal proceedings because they are not acting under color of state law.

Kaylor v. Stevens · filed 2018-10-05

Defendants Stevens, Mitchell and Woods were not acting under color of state law while representing Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings.

A public defender does not act under color of state law while performing ordinary representation of a criminal defendant.

John M. Terry, Jr. v. Oby T. Rogers, PLLC · filed 2018-11-15

As the trial court noted, a public defender does not act under color of state law in the normal course of his or her representation of a criminal defendant, even if counsel is liable for malpractice under state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional defense counsel duties as a state actor.

Byerly v. Idaho Board of Correction · filed 2019-08-14

Finally, Plaintiff’s public defender is not a state actor under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders for representing defendants in criminal proceedings because they do not act under color of state law.

Pretty v. Efird · filed 2019-09-26

Private attorneys and public defenders do not act under color of state or federal authority when they represent defendants in criminal proceedings.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders for performing traditional attorney functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Schlosser v. Elzia · filed 2019-10-22

It is well-established that claims against public defenders are not cognizable in a section 1983 action because public defenders do not act under color of state law when representing their clients and performing traditional attorney functions.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not permit a claim against a public defender because the defender does not act under color of state law when representing a client.

Rembold v. Lettau · filed 2019-10-23

An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, ordinarily does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow claims against public defenders performing traditional defense counsel functions because they do not act under color of state law.

Hinton v. Atkins · filed 2019-11-26

In addition, public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing traditional defense counsel functions because those acts are not under color of state law.

Moment v. Iowa, State of · filed 2019-12-04

For purposes of § 1983, the Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ... That is a traditional attorney function. Accordingly, Moment’s state public defender, Scott Nelson, is immune and he is dismissed from this case.

A state-appointed defense attorney representing a criminal defendant is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Wallace v. Marshall · filed 2019-12-04

Marshall is not a state actor. This was undoubtedly correct. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against criminal defense attorneys for representing clients because they are not government actors.

West v. Huvelle · filed 2019-12-03

Criminal defense attorneys, like defendant Johnson, are not government actors and ... as such are not proper defendants in either § 1983 or Bivens actions.

A court-appointed defense attorney does not act under color of state law when representing a criminal defendant, so that representation cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Tadgerson 714794 v. Rahilly · filed 2020-01-16

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court-appointed attorney, Defendant Rahilly, does not act under color of state law. For the same reason, Defendant France does not act under color of law by taking an unspecified part in Plaintiff’s criminal defense. As a result, no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against them.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defense attorneys for traditional lawyer functions, such as choosing which motions to file, because they do not act under color of state law.

Gregory v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2020-05-11

Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against these Defendants regarding any performance of a traditional lawyer function, such as determining what motions to file.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense attorneys absent facts showing they acted with state actors.

Romero v. Brown · filed 2021-05-28

The magistrate judge then recommended dismissal of Romero’s § 1983 claims against his court-appointed defense attorneys because such attorneys are not state actors and because Romero advanced no factual support for his conclusory allegations that they conspired with state actors. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments in each case for substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s recommendations, as adopted by the district court in its orders of dismissal, and we affirm the denial of Romero’s Rule 59(e) motions for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s orders denying them.

Court-appointed lawyers ordinarily are not state actors under § 1983, and conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish their liability.

Gossett v. Helphinstine · filed 2021-06-08

Court-appointed lawyers usually are not considered state actors for section 1983 purposes. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). Public defenders, however, are not immune from liability with regard to alleged conspiratorial action with state officials to deprive a criminal defendant of his federal constitutional rights. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-21 (1984). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not demonstrate § 1983 liability for his appointed counsel.

A criminal defense attorney is not subject to suit under Section 1983 without plausible, specific facts showing that the attorney acted with state officials to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Ayers v. Gabis · filed 2021-09-23

But without some plausible and specific factual showing that the person acted in concert with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of some constitutional right, a criminal defense attorney is not a “state actor” and is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a criminal defendant’s attorney as a state actor merely because the attorney was appointed by the court.

Waldrup v. Maginnis · filed 2021-09-29

A criminal defendant’s attorney, whether retained or appointed, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed criminal defense attorney acting as counsel because the attorney is not a state actor.

Kameroff v. Leaders · filed 2021-11-02

Mr. Taylor, as court appointed counsel to the indigent, is not a state actor as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Criminal defense attorneys do not act under color of state law when performing traditional legal duties and cannot be sued under § 1983 for those actions.

ABREU v. CARTER · filed 2021-11-03

Criminal defense attorneys, however, are absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which Plaintiff seeks to proceed, for actions they take within the scope of their professional duties as criminal counsel as they do “not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); see also Carter v. Kane, 717 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2017); Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a criminal defense attorney who did not act under color of state law.

Puckett v. Haley · filed 2021-11-17

Consistent with the foregoing authority, there is no section 1983 liability for the only named defendant in this case because she did not act under color of state law.

A defense attorney is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Paratore v. Unger · filed 2022-02-15

Paratore’s claims against his defense counsel are also frivolous because a defense. attorney is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a criminal defense attorney for legal representation absent special circumstances indicating concerted action with the state.

Nieves v. Turchi · filed 2022-03-02

Defendant Turchi is a private party, and his representation of Plaintiff does not render him a state actor. The allegations of the complaint also do not suggest any special circumstances. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Turchi under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on appointed or retained defense counsel performing traditional defense functions because they do not act under color of state law.

McChester v. Behm · filed 2022-03-11

But it is well-settled that appointed and retained attorneys performing traditional functions as defense counsel do not act “under color of state law” and are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

A criminal defense attorney, whether retained or court-appointed, does not act under color of state law when representing a client and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that representation.

Lawson v. Curn · filed 2022-03-14

Accordingly, Lawson cannot pursue this § 1983 action against his defense attorney and the court will dismiss Lawson’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an appointed or retained defense attorney for performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Clark v. Borowiak · filed 2022-03-30

As the cases cited above demonstrate, an attorney, whether appointed or retained, does not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing these functions. Because Clark fails to allege any state action, an essential element of a § 1983 claim, the Court dismisses Clark’s complaint.

A defense attorney representing a criminal defendant is not a state actor under Section 1983 unless the attorney engages in concerted action with a state representative.

Wilkins v. Willner · filed 2022-04-04

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Willner took certain actions that Plaintiff viewed as collaborating with the prosecutor (e.g., waiving Plaintiff’s right to appear before the Grand Jury, and urging Plaintiff to accept prosecutor’s plea offer), but Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendant Willner conspired to violate his rights or took “concerted action” of the type that would render defense counsel a state actor. Because Defendant Willner is not a state actor, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him under section 1983, and the Court dismisses these claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on appointed defense counsel for conduct that is not fairly attributable to the state.

Tsuma v. Costello · filed 2022-04-06

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Costello fail to state a claim because Costello is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against court-appointed defense counsel for acts undertaken in representing a criminal defendant because counsel is not a state actor.

Miller v. Peterson · filed 2022-06-03

Defendant Lockwood, as court appointed counsel to an indigent defendant, is not a state actor as a matter of law. Therefore, he cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a criminal defense attorney performing traditional defense counsel functions because the attorney is not a state actor.

Marchant v. Richardson · filed 2022-06-03

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s defense attorney is not a state actor under § 1983, and Plaintiff should omit Attorney Smethers from any amended complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against defense attorneys for conduct in representing a criminal defendant when that conduct is not attributable to the state.

Simpson v. Schwartz · filed 2022-06-15

Therefore, the allegations in the complaint cannot establish that plaintiff’s federally-protected rights were violated by a person acting under color of state law. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat court-appointed defense counsel acting as an advocate as a state actor.

Peters v. Altig · filed 2022-06-16

Altig, acting as Peters’ appointed counsel in his criminal case, is not a state actor when the attorney’s role is of an advocate.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against criminal defense counsel for performing traditional defense work because they are not state actors.

Robinson v. State of Nebraska · filed 2022-09-20

Additionally, Plaintiff’s criminal defense counsel cannot be characterized as “state actors” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they were performing the traditional role of defense counsel.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against federal officials acting under federal rather than state authority.

Sebastian v. United States of America · filed 1976-03-08

Sebastian seeks redress against employees of the Fort Roots Veterans Administration Hospital for actions taken under federal, and not state, authority.

Section 1983 provides relief only for injuries inflicted under color of state law, not federal law.

Jihaad v. Carlson · filed 1976-03-30

The actual difficulty with plaintiff’s action is that § 1983 relief is available only to those injured under color of state — not federal-law.

Section 1983 does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law.

McNally v. The Pulitzer Publishing Company and Ted Gest · filed 1976-03-30

In the instant case, the alleged unlawful official conduct is that of a ... federal ... official and private parties and is thus not subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires federal law, rather than state law, to determine the adequacy of defenses in a civil-rights action.

Carl Qualls, Administrator of the Estate of Billy Don Trull and Manual Daniel Bunch v. Parrish · filed 1976-04-19

We begin our legal analysis by observing that federal, not state, law applies and determines the adequacy of defenses asserted in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not extend to the Federal Government itself.

Hill v. McMartin · filed 1977-05-09

To the extent that the Amended Complaint seeks to rely on the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, such provisions do not extend to the Federal Government itself, against whom the present equitable relief is sought.

Section 1983 permits constitutional claims against private parties acting under color of state law but creates no analogous cause of action for private parties acting under color of federal law.

Cohen v. President and Fellows of Harvard College · filed 1983-08-04

Although a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights may be made against private parties acting under color of ... state ... law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no analogous cause of action against private parties acting under color of ... federal ... law.

Section 1983 provides no cause of action against federal officers or private persons acting under color of federal law.

Betlyon v. Shy · filed 1983-10-25

Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims, therefore, must fail.

Section 1983 applies only to conduct under color of state law and does not govern federal tax-collection procedures.

Richcreek v. Grecu · filed 1985-06-17

Section 1983 applies only to actions taken under color of state law; it does not govern federal tax collection procedures.

Private employers following IRS withholding instructions act under color of federal, not state, law and therefore are not liable under § 1983 for those actions.

Wise v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service · filed 1986-01-09

Any actions taken by the defendants in compliance with the instructions of the IRS were done under color of ... law, and thus are not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 applies to state actors rather than federal actors.

Schmidt v. Hardman · filed 2006-07-18

As the district court held, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to state rather than federal actors, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to claims of racial discrimination, the Fourth Amendment to searches and seizures, the Sixth Amendment to the rights of the accused in a criminal case, the Eighth Amendment to cruel and unusual punishment, and Fourteenth Amendment to state action. The complaint raises no issues relevant to these legal provisions.

Section 1983 permits a student to sue a school official acting under color of state law for sexual harassment that violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Parks v. Wilson · filed 1995-01-11

A plaintiff may bring an action, pursuant to § 1983, against a school official, acting under color of state law, for sexual harassment that violates rights protected by the equal protection clause.