42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to seek remedies for violations of Indian Child Welfare Act rights that the Act’s § 1914 remedy does not cover.

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik · filed 2014-01-28

The court finds § 1914 does not bar plaintiffs from seeking remedies under § 1983 for violations of ICWA to which § 1914 is inapplicable.

Section 1983 permits individuals to enforce these Medicaid Act assistance-payment provisions because they create enforceable rights and the Act’s enforcement scheme does not preclude individual suits.

Wheaton v. McCarthy · filed 2015-09-01

Suffice it to say that we have no reason to distinguish the provision in Harris from the provisions here, which means they presumptively create a right enforceable under § 1983. ... The plaintiffs therefore can proceed with their action under § 1983.

Section 1983 can be used in the Seventh Circuit to enforce rights under the IDEA.

Allison W. v. Oak Park & River Forest High School District 200 · filed 2016-05-27

To be sure, Stanek, id. at 644, then went on to say that its own earlier decisions “may need to be revisited in light of City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005),” ... but what controls this Court is that the availability of Section 1983 to enforce rights under IDEA remains circuit law here.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV.

Koss v. Norwood · filed 2018-03-29

The court therefore concludes that the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV are privately enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because the Act’s remedial scheme does not preclude that remedy.

Blair v. SUNY University at Buffalo · filed 2020-02-11

This Court therefore finds that Blair’s RA claims against Street pursuant to § 1983 are not barred.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights established by the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides an exclusive remedy.

Costabile v. NYCHHC · filed 2020-02-25

We conclude that the comprehensive remedial scheme of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that Congress did not intend that § 1983 be an available remedy.

Section 1983 does not allow an individual-capacity claim against a state official to enforce rights created by Title II of the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Craig v. CDCR · filed 2020-05-15

A due process claim under § 1983 against individual defendants for failing to comply with the ADA also is unavailing. “[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Rehabilitation Act rights because that Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes the remedy.

Blair v. SUNY University at Buffalo · filed 2020-07-07

Because Blair’s Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim against Street cannot be brought under §1983, this Court finds dismissal of that claim appropriate.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue a state official individually for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Steele v. Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc. · filed 2020-11-01

Because the Act creates a comprehensive remedial scheme that permits disabled individuals (and their representatives) to vindicate their rights, the Court agrees that a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official in her individual capacity for violations of the Act.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the Child Welfare Act’s case review system requirement.

Wyatt B. v. Kotek · filed 2021-09-27

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the “case review system” requirement established by §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(5)(A) are subject to enforcement under § 1983.

Section 1983 has no venue provision, so the general venue statute governs where a claim may be brought.

Azubuko v. Irish · filed 2011-10-14

Because § 1983 does not contain a venue provision, we must resort to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1983 has no specific venue provision, so the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 apply.

SCOTT v. DEPUTY CLOSE · filed 2021-06-28

Because § 1983 contains no specific venue provision, the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are applicable to this suit.

Section 1983 has no specific venue provision, so the general venue rules in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 apply.

Ford v. 19th Judicial District Court East Baton Rouge Parish of Louisiana · filed 2021-09-10

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a specific venue provision, venue is determined under the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1983 has no venue provision, so venue is determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Pham v. Unidentified DEA Agent · filed 2022-02-01

Section 1983 does not contain a venue provision; thus, venue is determined under the general venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1983 permits liability for a public official who is an integral participant in another official's constitutional violation, even if the first official's own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Hernandez v. Skinner · filed 2019-05-29

A public official whose individual actions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation may nonetheless be held liable under § 1983 if the official was an "integral participant" in the violation of someone's rights. ... Here, Justice Hernandez was an integral participant in the violation of Miguel's Fourth Amendment rights because Deputy Skinner detained and arrested Miguel based almost entirely on Justice Hernandez's words and direction.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knowingly and actively participates in a search, even if the officer does not directly carry out the constitutional violation.

Newberry v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2018-09-18

“Integral participant” liability does not require a showing that an officer’s actions played a direct role in the occurrence of a constitutional violation. ... It is necessary only that the officer be knowingly and actively involved — for example, “privy to any discussions, briefings, or collective decisions” and party to “a collective decisionmaking process.”

Section 1983 can impose liability on officers who play an integral part in an unlawful search even if their own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Bravo v. City of Santa Maria · filed 2011-12-09

Section 1983 liability extends to those who perform functions “integral” to an unlawful search, even if their individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

An officer who actively participates in alleged excessive force may be liable under § 1983 as an integral participant even if he did not personally point a gun at the restrained plaintiff.

Green v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2014-05-12

The only reason Sergeant Kim was not pointing his weapon at Green while she was restrained is that he was the one restraining her. Even if Sergeant Kim was not one of the officers actually holding Green at gunpoint once she was restrained, he was plainly an active participant in this activity and a jury could find that he was an “integral participant” under Blankenhorn.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer whose integral participation in an alleged constitutional violation is sufficiently pleaded.

Johnson v. Shasta County · filed 2015-01-06

Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the allegations of plaintiffs’ amended complaint with respect to their § 1983 claim are sufficient to suggest each defendant was an integral participant in the alleged violation. Accordingly, the Sutter defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against defendants Casner, Maples, and Gwinnup is DENIED.

An officer with fundamental involvement in excessive force may be liable under § 1983 as an integral participant, even if the officer did not personally apply the force.

Rosales v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2016-05-27

Other deputies who had “some fundamental involvement” in that conduct would also be liable as integral participants.

Section 1983 permits liability for an official who meaningfully participates in a collective decision that violates constitutional rights, even if the official’s own actions do not independently violate the Constitution.

Keates v. Koile · filed 2018-03-06

These defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct. ... Accordingly, we conclude that this is sufficient—though just barely—to make a plausible allegation that Lensche and Rountree were integral participants in violating Keates’s and A.K.’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits liability when an officer integrally participates in a constitutional violation, even if the officer is not solely responsible.

Nicholson v. Gutierrez · filed 2019-08-21

A police officer need not have been the sole party responsible for a constitutional violation before liability may attach. “An officer’s liability under section 1983 is predicated on his ‘integral participation’ in the alleged violation.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be an integral participant in the alleged constitutional violation; performing preliminary tasks and handing responsibility to others does not suffice.

Keates v. Koile · filed 2020-01-22

As the Court of Appeals recognized, Rountree cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he was an integral participant in the allegedly unlawful conduct—the seizure of Amber. ... Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find Rountree was an integral participant in the seizure. Rountree is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is an integral participant in another officer’s use of excessive force by effectively authorizing it.

Laney Sweet v. Langley · filed 2020-03-13

Because it is alleged that Langley effectively authorized his subordinates to use excessive force against Shaver, he was an integral participant in Brailsford’s ultimate decision to shoot Shaver.

An officer’s proximity to an alleged violation and provision of backup alone do not establish integral participation for § 1983 liability.

Cook v. City of Fremont, California · filed 2020-10-28

Cook’s allegations that Romley was “close by, armed, and providing back up,” Compl. ¶ 24, are insufficient to support a theory of integral participation.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim based on alleged violations of workers’ compensation laws or breach of contract.

Ferrell v. Norris · filed 2011-12-12

Contrary to Ferrell’s assertions, he cannot base a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on alleged violations of workers’ compensation laws or breach of contract.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a claim based on an alleged violation of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Pedraza v. Alameda Unified School Distric · filed 2017-01-26

The district court did not err in dismissing Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, because a plaintiff cannot predicate a § 1983 claim on an alleged violation of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Section 1983 claims arising from an IDEA violation require a factual basis beyond the IDEA violation and related allegation of discrimination.

S.B. ex rel. S.B. v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2015-06-25

The Second Circuit has likewise determined that where, as here, defendants have violated the IDEA, a “factual basis other than the alleged IDEA violations and the related allegation of discrimination” is required to support a section 1983 claim. ... Accordingly, I grant summary judgment for defendants as to the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and section 1983 claims.

Oregon’s ten-year statute of ultimate repose for negligence claims does not apply to Section 1983 actions.

Cannon v. Polk County District Attorney · filed 2012-10-23

By its express terms, Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.115(1) only applies to negligence claims and, therefore, is inapplicable to these Section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 constitutional tort claims are subject to the state’s personal injury statute of limitations, rather than South Carolina’s medical malpractice statute of repose.

Heaton v. Stirling · filed 2020-02-18

But there is no authority to support Carney’s general contention that the statute of repose also applies to claims “arising under” § 1983, nor does Carney point the Court to any such authority.

Section 1983 claims use federal accrual rules, so North Carolina’s ten-year statute of repose in § 1-52(16) does not apply.

Canady v. Holder · filed 2021-07-08

In consequence, North Carolina General Statute § 1-52(16), as an accrual provision, does not govern plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove the constitutional deprivation underlying the claim and produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment.

Hawkins v. Mitchell · filed 2012-11-15

Further, “[i]n a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary judgment.”

A political subdivision cannot assert its own rights under § 1983, but it may sue on behalf of third parties with whom it has a close relationship.

Board of Education v. Memphis City Board of Education · filed 2012-11-27

Although a political subdivision is prohibited from asserting its own rights under § 1983, it may bring suit on behalf of third parties with whom the subdivision shares a'“close relationship.”

A municipality cannot bring a § 1983 equal protection claim against another political subdivision of its state because it cannot invoke Fourteenth Amendment protection against the state.

The City of Berkeley, Missouri v. Ferguson-Florissant School District · filed 2019-11-04

The Court finds the City of Berkeley, as a political subdivision of Missouri, may not bring a claim for violation of a right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the § 1983 action by the City of Berkeley against Defendants must be dismissed.

A party may assert § 1983 rights in an answer to a county’s certiorari petition without that pleading form barring relief.

Cheatham County, Tennessee v. Cheatham County Board of Zoning Appeals and Randall and Margaret Mooneyhan · filed 2012-11-30

Due to the unique circumstances of this case the Mooneyhans’ assertion of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claim for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was made in their Answer to Cheatham County’s petition rather than in a complaint in which they were plaintiffs. We see no reason that this procedural anomaly should preclude them from relief.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner's damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary loss of good conduct time unless that sanction has been invalidated.

Petermon v. Purdue · filed 2021-02-23

Edwards and Heck will prevent a prisoner from maintaining a civil rights lawsuit for damages if a judgment in favor of the prisoner would necessarily imply that he was wrongly disciplined with a loss of good time – unless the inmate has first obtained an order or judgment invalidating the good-time revocation.

A prisoner’s Section 1983 challenge to a disciplinary hearing may be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Adams v. Davis · filed 2020-06-18

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s challenges to his prison disciplinary hearing are DISMISSED with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge a retaliatory disciplinary ticket when the resulting punishment was only segregation.

Antoine v. Ramos · filed 2012-12-05

Antoine’s contention that the disciplinary ticket was fabricated in retaliation for engaging in protected speech therefore is properly within the scope of a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge discipline that imposed only segregation; the Edwards and Heck bar does not apply.

Dixon v. Tolley · filed 2013-03-25

These decisions may foreclose a civil-rights suit if a judgment in favor of the inmate necessarily would imply that he was wrongly disciplined with a loss of good-time credits, see Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584; Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir.2011), but the bar imposed by Edwards and Heck does not apply to an inmate who was punished only with segregation, see Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir.2006).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary conviction and resulting loss of time credits.

Zepeda v. Peterson · filed 2014-12-18

To the extent that Zepeda alleged a due process claim related to his disciplinary hearing and monetary sanction for the destruction of library materials, the district court properly dismissed the claim as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on this claim would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction for the destruction of state property in excess of $400 and resulting loss of time credits.

The Heck rule does not bar a section 1983 challenge to prison discipline when the inmate has not alleged that the discipline affected the duration of the sentence.

Florence v. Stephanie Cox and Cody Miller · filed 2018-11-20

Because Florence has not alleged that this disciplinary action affected the duration of his sentence, the Heck rule does not bar his claims as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary conviction that cost good conduct credit when success would imply that the duration of confinement is invalid, unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

(PC) Belmonte v. Palomares · filed 2020-10-02

Because plaintiff is challenging multiple disciplinary convictions for which he was sanctioned with the loss of good conduct credit, these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge prison discipline without first overturning the disciplinary decision when it does not threaten the prisoner’s conviction or sentence length.

Anderson v. Kelley · filed 2021-09-16

While Heck applies in cases where the prisoner’s challenge to a prison disciplinary decision would threaten his underlying criminal conviction or the duration of his sentence, Anderson did not state that he lost any good-time credit as a result of his disciplinary convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to pursue a procedural due process claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of lost good time credits unless that loss has been invalidated.

CORDERO v. EMRICH · filed 2022-01-04

Similarly, while Plaintiff in this case does not specifically challenge the loss of his good time credits, a ruling his due process rights were violated by Cortes during his hearing for failure to allow Plaintiff to call witnesses would necessarily imply the invalidity of Cortes’ decision to deduct good time from Plaintiff. Accordingly, like in Schreane, this Court finds Heck/Edwards preclude Plaintiff from proceeding on this procedural due process claim against Cortes at this time.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary conviction that cost credit time when success would imply the conviction’s invalidity and the conviction has not been invalidated.

Lee-Bey v. Shaver · filed 2022-02-28

Here, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on his claim that the disciplinary charge was unfounded, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim based solely on an agency regulation because regulations cannot independently create enforceable federal rights.

Thurman v. Medical Trans Mgmt, Inc. · filed 2020-12-15

Accordingly, we join the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that Thurman cannot sue MTM under § 1983 based solely on the non-emergency medical transportation regulation.

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of an implementing regulation that imposes duties beyond those imposed by the controlling statute.

John B. v. Emkes · filed 2013-03-14

That a statutory provision is privately enforceable, however, does not necessarily mean that a regulation that implements the provision is privately enforceable as well. To the contrary, an implementing regulation is not privately enforceable—even if its controlling statute is—when it “imposes an obligation or prohibition that is not imposed generally by the controlling statute.” Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). Section 441.61(c) does precisely that: it requires that TennCare coordinate its services with other agencies, even though subsection 43(C) says nothing of the sort. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating these paragraphs.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid applicants to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable-promptness and fair-hearing provisions.

Koss v. Eagleson · filed 2018-03-29

The court therefore concludes that the Medicaid Act provisions cited in Counts I, II, and IV are privately enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce an agency regulation that does not define a federal right created by statute.

Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Authority · filed 2019-08-02

Because 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) is unmoored from any federal right, we conclude it cannot be the basis for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a California prisoner to seek injunctive relief for his own denied medical treatment when the claim does not duplicate a pending class action seeking systemic reform.

David Pride, Jr. v. Correa · filed 2013-07-16

Thus, we conclude that where a California prisoner brings an independent claim for injunctive relief solely on his own behalf for specific medical treatment denied to him, Plata does not bar the prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief.

A Section 1983 claim survives the claimant’s death if it accrued before death and state law authorizes a survival action.

George v. Morris · filed 2013-07-30

“A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent’s death, and if state law authorizes a survival action.” ... Carol's complaint alleges that she is the personal representative of her husband’s estate in full compliance with California law. She therefore may litigate his Fourth Amendment claim.

A Section 1983 claim that accrued before the claimant’s death may be litigated by the claimant’s personal representative if state law allows the claim to survive.

George v. Morris · filed 2013-09-16

“A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the decedent’s death, and if state law authorizes a survival action.” Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)). Carol’s complaint alleges that she is the personal representative of her husband’s estate in full compliance with California law. She therefore may litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. See id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 377.30, 377.32.

State law determines who receives a decedent’s Section 1983 claim.

Estate of Cornejo Ex Rel. Solis v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2015-07-23

State law governs who receives a decedent’s § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim for Medicaid benefits can survive the claimant’s death under Ohio law.

Price v. Medicaid Director · filed 2015-09-01

Mrs. Hilleger’s § 1983 claims survive her death under Ohio law, and Mrs. Saunders’ claims are not mooted by her departure from an approved assisted living facility.

Section 1983 adopts the forum state’s survivorship law; under Nevada law, only an estate’s executor or administrator may bring a claim on behalf of the deceased.

Romero v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections · filed 2016-12-08

Section 1983 adopts as its law of survivorship the law of the forum state, Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), which here is Nevada. Under Nevada law, only the “executor or administrator” of the deceased’s estate can sue on the deceased’s behalf. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100(3). Romero has adduced no evidence that Beltran’s children have been appointed as executors or administrators of Beltran’s estate. Thus, the children may not assert § 1983 claims on Beltran’s behalf.

An estate administrator may bring a decedent’s § 1983 claims when those claims survive under applicable state law.

Haberle v. Troxell · filed 2018-03-20

Haberle has standing to bring her § 1983 claims on behalf of Nixon as the administrator of his estate.

State law determines who may bring a surviving § 1983 claim for a decedent; a personal representative’s appointment may relate back to when the suit was filed.

London v. Miller · filed 2018-07-02

In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that state law determines both whether a § 1983 cause of action survives the death of the party entitled to bring the claim and who is entitled to bring a surviving § 1983 claim on behalf of the decedent’s estate. ... Thus, this Court applies South Dakota law to resolve this issue.

Section 1983 permits California’s survival statute to govern claims brought on behalf of a deceased person.

Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara · filed 2018-07-03

Therefore, California’s survival statute is not inconsistent with § 1983 and applies to this action.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death.

DeLeon-Reyes v. Guevara · filed 2019-03-14

The parties here do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action survives. Nor could they.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death.

Solache v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-03-14

The parties here do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cause of action survives. Nor could they.

Section 1983 allows survivors to assert a deceased person’s claim when the law of the state hearing the action permits it.

(PS) G.M. v. Poole · filed 2019-09-12

In section 1983 actions, survivors can assert a claim on a deceased individual’s behalf if permitted by the law of the state in which the action is sitting.

Section 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death when the forum state’s applicable survivorship law preserves them.

Powell v. Oldham · filed 2019-10-22

Tennessee law applies to Powell’s § 1983 claims. Under Tennessee law, the claims survive.

A person bringing a decedent’s § 1983 claim on behalf of an estate must meet the relevant state’s survivorship requirements.

Eyre v. The City of Fairbanks · filed 2020-06-10

Accordingly, Plaintiff must meet Alaska’s survivorship requirements to maintain a § 1983 claim on behalf of the Estate.

A decedent’s § 1983 claim may be brought by a personal representative or a successor in interest authorized by state law.

Bradley-Aboyade v. Crozier · filed 2020-08-04

Therefore, because Plaintiff may only bring a claim with respect to the action she succeeds and she is not a successor-in-interest to Decedent’s community property, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this § 1983 cause of action on behalf of Decedent.

Section 1983 claims survive a party’s death when applicable state law preserves personal injury actions.

Macklin v. Serrano · filed 2020-10-28

Even though Macklin’s claim against Flynn survives Flynn’s death, “[a]s a general rule, the substitution of parties consistent with Rule 25(a)(1) cannot be ordered ‘where the person for whom the substitution is sought died prior to being named a party.’”

Section 1983 excessive force claims survive a plaintiff’s death when Nebraska law preserves pending personal injury actions.

Cotton v. Stephens · filed 2020-12-22

Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claims are not extinguished by his death, as pending actions for personal injury do not abate by death of the plaintiff under Nebraska Law.

Section 1983 claims follow state law on survival after a plaintiff’s death.

(PC) Stribling v. Lucero · filed 2021-02-11

Section 1983 litigation follows state law with regard to survival actions.

Section 1983 claims are personal injury claims that survive a plaintiff’s death under Ohio law.

Cole v. Coverstone · filed 2021-03-17

Applied here, Evan A. Cole’s §1983 claims survived his death.

A § 1983 claim survives a plaintiff’s death under Arizona’s survival law and may be pursued by the estate’s personal representative.

Figueroa v. Centurion of Arizona LLC · filed 2021-03-31

Furthermore, the Court finds that Mr. Figueroa’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ADA claims survive his death pursuant to both Arizona state and federal law.

Section 1983 does not provide for survival of claims; state survival law determines whether an estate may bring them.

Wattley v. City of Charlotte · filed 2021-03-31

“As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for survival of claims, we consult the law of the forum state—the North Carolina survival statute—to determine whether the claim survives.” ... Therefore, under either statute, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the putative claims under either Section 1983 or state law.

Indiana law causes § 1983 false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against a deceased defendant’s estate to abate.

CAMM v. CLEMONS · filed 2021-06-16

Because Indiana's survival statute establishes that false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims do not survive the death of a party, the Court concludes that Camm's two remaining claims against the Estate abated upon the death of Faith.

A Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious dental needs survives the plaintiff’s death under the Illinois Survival Act.

Wilkins v. Overall · filed 2021-10-08

In accordance with the Rule 25, Wilkins’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference is not extinguished by his death, and the motion to substitute was timely filed.

Section 1983 claims for loss of life damages survive the injured person’s death despite Wisconsin’s wrongful death law.

Estate of Devin Katzfey v. Dittman, Michael · filed 2022-01-05

Because I agree that Bell forecloses defendants’ argument regarding the survival of plaintiff's § 1983 claims for loss of life, I am denying defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.

Section 1983 allows California’s bar on surviving claims for pain, suffering, or disfigurement damages when the plaintiff’s death is unrelated to the alleged violation.

Moody v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2022-02-03

Plaintiff Jones’ claims for pain, suffering, or disfigurement damages under his § 1983 causes of action are dismissed with prejudice.

Federal courts apply state law to determine whether a Section 1983 claim survives a party’s death.

(PC) Simmons v. Alcantara · filed 2022-02-11

Under California law -- which federal courts apply in determining survival of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- a cause of action against a person is generally not extinguished by that person’s death.

In Kentucky, a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim does not survive the defendant’s death.

Graham v. Todd County · filed 2022-03-15

A Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim is characterized as a personal injury action. ... Accordingly, Graham’s claims for malicious prosecution do not survive the deaths of Silfies and Morris.

Pending § 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death when the applicable state abatement law allows them to continue.

Farley v. Bearden · filed 2022-05-11

The abatement of § 1983 claims is determined with reference to state law, so long as it is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). ... Accordingly, the Court applies the plain language of § 37-2-4 and finds that Mr. Ortiz’s claims did not abate at his death.

Section 1983 permits a stand-alone Fourteenth Amendment claim when fabricated evidence used at trial was reasonably likely to have caused the plaintiff’s conviction.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer · filed 2014-04-24

Accordingly, we hold that if a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim based on fabricated evidence; such claims are not categorically limited to state malicious prosecution law.

Saunders-El v. Rohde · filed 2015-01-30

Accordingly, the district court erred in holding, categorically, that a claim of evidence fabrication cannot form the basis of a due process claim under § 1983 and must instead be brought as a state law malicious prosecu- tion claim.

Section 1983 permits a parent to pursue suppression of exculpatory evidence as part of a deliberate fabrication claim arising from a child dependency proceeding.

Patterson v. Arizona Department of Economic Security · filed 2020-04-03

Lorraine’s suppression allegations are therefore actionable, as they are within the scope of her deliberate fabrication claim.

Section 1983 permits a deliberate fabrication of evidence claim, but an inaccurate police report alone does not establish deliberate fabrication.

Winchester v. Ward · filed 2020-06-03

A plaintiff may bring a section 1983 claim on a theory that the “government violated [his] due process rights by subjecting [him] to criminal charges based on deliberately-fabricated evidence.” ... While technically inaccurate, the statement does not include quotation marks, nor does plaintiff proffer any evidence to suggest Officer Ward deliberately framed him, misrepresented his words, or otherwise fabricated evidence. Without any evidence to support this claim, plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for fabrication of evidence is dismissed.

Section 1983 fabrication of evidence claims require the underlying criminal case to end in a manner favoring the accused.

Earl v. Taylor · filed 2021-11-02

Section 1983 actions alleging fabrication of evidence also require resolution of the plaintiff's underlying criminal case in a manner favoring the accused.

Section 1983 does not permit a fabrication-of-evidence claim while the related criminal proceedings are ongoing.

Burley v. Sumner County 18th Judicial Drug Task Force · filed 2022-04-25

Because Burley cannot “bring a fabricated-evidence challenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal proceedings are ongoing[,]” McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2158, amending his complaint to assert claims based on fabrication of evidence would be futile.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violation of Article 36 consular rights, and qualified immunity did not bar this claim at the pleading stage.

Villars v. Kubiatowski · filed 2014-05-05

The Seventh Circuit has held that there is a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grounded in viqlations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. ... Here, accepting Villars’s allegations as true, his consular rights clearly were violated. ... For this reason, the VRLB Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XV is denied and their claim of qualified immunity is rejected at this time.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff whose constitutional rights were violated to seek back pay as part of equitable relief.

Voss v. City of Key West · filed 2014-10-17

Having found the City’s policy to have violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, irrespective of her status as an applicant or an employee, the Court must similarly reject the City’s argument that this distinction affects her entitlement to relief for that violation. Further, the City’s claim that Plaintiff should only be entitled to injunctive relief does not conflict with an award of back pay; the damages Plaintiff seeks in the form of back pay is “an integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement.” Harkless, 427 F.2d at 324. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, if she can prove them.

Section 1983 provides a statutory damages remedy that may be impaired and discharged in a municipality’s chapter 9 bankruptcy without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

In re City of Detroit · filed 2014-12-31

The § 1983 remedial scheme may “emanate” or “flow from” the Fourteenth Amendment, as the § 1983 creditors argue. This does not, however, elevate that remedy to a constitutionally protected status.

A § 1983 civil rights claim is not properly disposed of as incident to an Article 78 claim.

Matter of Holistic Resources, Inc. v. Del Valle · filed 2021-01-14

However, a claim for violation of petitioners' civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not properly disposed of as incident to an article 78 claim ( Raykowski at 368).

Section 1983 does not allow a separate district-court challenge to conditions on a preliminary plat when the approval must be reviewed by certiorari.

Zweber v. Credit River Township · filed 2015-03-16

Therefore, because Zweber’s constitutional claims are not distinct from the 2006 preliminary-plat-approval decision and cannot be addressed without examining the facts considered in that decision, he was required to assert those claims by way of certiorari appeal, rather than before the district court. The fact that Zweber now asserts those claims through a federal civil-rights statute does not change our resolution of this issue.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed while the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence remains outstanding and must await invalidation.

Belniak v. Florida Highway Patrol, etal · filed 2015-03-27

The Plaintiff’s claims cannot be brought as long as his convictions are outstanding. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994) (Section 1983 claims); ... In other words, in order to bring these claims, the Plaintiff must first have his sentence or conviction invalidated.

Section 1983 allows an injured person to seek damages from an individual who violates federal rights under color of state law, but Heck bars the claim when success would imply that an existing conviction is invalid.

Havens v. Johnson · filed 2015-04-15

To determine the effect of Heck on an excessive-force claim, the court must compare the plaintiff’s allegations to the offense he committed. ... Havens’s plea is incompatible with his § 1983 claim. ... Because Havens’s only theory of relief is based on his innocence, and this theory is barred by Heck, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Johnson.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim is barred when success would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Clement v. Lively · filed 2017-09-05

Under Heck, if a judgment in favor of a plaintiff on a § 1983 claim “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[,] . . . the complaint ... must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. The district court properly determined that Mr. Clement’s false arrest claim was barred by Heck. His claim would clearly imply the invalidity of his convictions because it is based on the assertion that there was no probable cause to believe he had committed the offense for which he was convicted.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Gonzalez v. Yepes · filed 2019-09-09

Any objection to the use or veracity of that evidence must be raised by direct or collateral challenge – ... not a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence may proceed after the underlying conviction is invalidated if the claim will not impugn an existing conviction or ongoing prosecution.

Jones v. City of Syracuse · filed 2021-09-17

Applying these principles to the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, the Court concludes that there is no risk that his § 1983 denial of a fair-trial claim "will impugn an existing conviction or the basis for an ongoing prosecution" id.; and, thus, he has alleged "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would call an unoverturned conviction into question.

Russell v. Guilford County Municipality · filed 2015-03-31

We conclude that Russell’s claim is not cognizable because his state conviction has not been overturned or called into question.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim arising from a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Nelson v. Fort Worth Texas · filed 2004-06-22

A civil rights claim arising out of “a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

O'Brien v. Town of Bellingham · filed 2019-11-22

In this case, the record reflects that O'Brien's excessive force claims arising from the incident in the woods are "so interrelated factually" with his state convictions arising from those events that a judgment in O'Brien's favor would "necessarily imply" the invalidity of those convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Stills v. Wells · filed 2021-04-15

A prisoner may not recover damages in a § 1983 suit where the judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, continued imprisonment, or sentence unless the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim challenging a stop, seizure, or arrest when success would undermine a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Bowden v. City of Buffalo · filed 2021-08-02

Finally, although Plaintiff makes passing reference to an illegal seizure (see Dkt. 90 at 9), he is barred from asserting a § 1983 claim with respect to the constitutionality of his stop, seizure, and arrest, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which bars a collateral attack through a § 1983 action on a prior conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a fabricated evidence fair trial claim to establish a causal connection between the evidence and a deprivation of liberty.

Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. City of New York · filed 2015-04-29

In order to have a cognizable claim for denial of the right to a fair trial under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the fabricated evidence and a deprivation of liberty.

Section 1983 claims challenging parole determinations are barred unless the determination has been overturned through habeas corpus.

Simons v. Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners · filed 2015-04-30

Second, § 1983 claims based on parole determinations are categorically barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) unless and until the determination is overturned via writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits claims challenging parole procedures when success would result in a new parole determination rather than immediate release.

Taylor v. Henderson · filed 2015-11-19

Taylor properly asserted his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the ADA rather than in a habeas petition because success on his claims that the Board relied in part on impermissible factors would result merely in a new parole determination and not immediate release from prison.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to seek a new parole hearing when success would not necessarily lead to earlier release.

Woods v. Valenzuela · filed 2017-09-18

On remand, Woods should be afforded leave to amend his petition to assert his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims alleging personal injuries from parole officials’ conduct can be heard by Pennsylvania courts of common pleas, even though parole decisions themselves are not reviewable.

Carrington Keys v. Parole Agent Everette, SCI Forest, Parole Agent McKay and Parole Agent Everette · filed 2018-01-04

Because we hold that Keys’ Section 1983 claims are subject to judicial review, we deny Board Employees’ application.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek a new parole hearing when success would not necessarily shorten confinement or invalidate the conviction or sentence.

Cunio v. Brown · filed 2020-02-20

Like Dotson, Plaintiff would receive only a new hearing or hearings at which a state entity would consider whether to shorten his prison term. Plaintiff properly contends that Defendants would still have the authority to deny his requests for release for the rest of his life if he failed to establish his rehabilitation at those hearings. The Court finds that Plaintiff properly brings these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims seeking damages or declaratory relief are barred when success would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation that has not been invalidated.

STOKES v. N.J. STATE PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS · filed 2021-09-27

Heck also applies to a § 1983 action that would imply the invalidity of a decision to revoke parole that has not already been invalidated, including where a plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. ... Therefore, Heck bars Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a due-process danger-creation claim based only on negligence or inaction.

Saenz v. Lovington Municipal School District · filed 2015-04-30

Failure to supervise, however, is inaction, and not an affirmative action. Inaction is insufficient to establish a danger-creation claim.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy when state officials violate constitutional rights by deliberately destroying exculpatory evidence that causes a deprivation of liberty.

Armstrong v. Daily · filed 2015-05-11

Our conclusion that Armstrong has alleged a constitutional violation actionable against Daily and Campbell under § 1983 'causes us to disagree with some of the Tenth Circuit’s broad language in Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir.1999), but not necessarily with its holding.

Section 1983 permits a reputation based procedural due process claim only when the loss of reputation is coupled with deprivation of a more tangible interest.

Cohane v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 2015-05-15

While “[a] person’s interest in his or her good reputation alone, apart from a more tangible interest, is not a liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause or create a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” the loss of reputation may be the basis for a constitutional claim “if that loss is coupled with the deprivation of a more tangible interest.”

Section 1983 permits due process claims for reputational harm when the injury includes deprivation of a more tangible interest.

Maloney v. Singas · filed 2015-05-22

Ordinarily, a claim based solely on a plaintiffs loss of reputation must be brought as a state defamation claim, and cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim. ... However, a plaintiff may assert a Section 1983 due process claim based on reputational harm if his injury is coupled with the deprivation of a more tangible interest; such claims are known as “stigma plus” claims. ... The Court grants summary judgment to the District Attorney on Count Three because Maloney cannot establish the first element of his “stigma plus” claim as a matter of law. ... The factual accuracy of the “disclosure” made by the District Attorney is thus fatal to his claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim for libel or slander alone, though a stigma plus claim may be pleaded.

Smith v. Town of Lewiston · filed 2020-09-02

Judge Foschio correctly found that libel and slander alone do not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for harm caused by government officers fabricating evidence, regardless of which constitutional amendment supplies the right.

Morse v. Fusto · filed 2015-09-11

The district court ultimately concluded, however, that "[rjegardless of which constitutional amendment prohibits government officers from fabricating evidence ..., these cases clearly establish that the harm caused by such conduct is redressable through a § 1983 action for damages.” ... We agree with the district court, and therefore do not further address the issue here.

Section 1983 permits a fair trial claim when an officer fabricates information and forwards it to prosecutors, even if the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.

Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039 · filed 2016-09-30

In short, a Section 1983 claim for the denial of a right to a fair trial based on an officer’s provision of false information to prosecutors' can stand even if the officer had probable cause to arrest the Section 1983 plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits a fair trial claim against an officer who fabricates evidence and relays it to prosecutors through an intermediary.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 2022-03-14

An officer who has fabricated evidence cannot escape liability simply because he relayed the information to prosecutors through an intermediary.

Section 1983 claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Parvin v. Campbell · filed 2016-01-08

Parvin’s resisting arrest conviction barred his excessive force claim because he did not raise excessive force as a defense. Parvin’s excessive force claim challenges his underlying conviction and is, therefore, barred under Heck.

Section 1983 permits damages claims challenging unconstitutional post-judgment enforcement practices without requiring the underlying convictions to be invalidated.

Cain v. City of New Orleans · filed 2016-04-21

Defendants cannot seriously argue that the facts necessary to support plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims (ie., the Criminal District Court judges’ failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the criminal defendants’ good-faith ability to pay) contradict or undermine the factual bases for plaintiffs’ state-court guilty pleas for theft, battery, and “simple criminal damage.” Therefore, Heck does not apply.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment unless the challenged sentence has been invalidated through specified legal means.

Harris v. William Stephens, Director · filed 2016-04-25

To recover damages under § 1983 for his “allegedly unconstitutional . . . imprisonment,” Harris must prove that the challenged sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Section 1983 damages claims are barred when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the challenged confinement unless that confinement has been invalidated.

Varner v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2016-04-26

Consequently, Mr. Varner’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages is dismissed without prejudice, in accordance with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 permits damages claims for constitutional rights violations, but a claimant cannot recover when success would imply that an existing conviction is invalid.

Ducksworth v. Rook · filed 2016-04-29

Ducksworth’s excessive-force claim was properly dismissed under Heck. ... In short, Ducksworth’s allegations of a wanton attack by police officers directly challenge the validity of his subsequent convictions and thus his excessive-force claim is barred by Heck. ... Heck therefore bars recovery for his false arrest claim as well, because his convictions necessarily imply that there was probable cause for his arrest. ... Because we find that the district court properly applied Heck to bar Ducksworth’s § 1983 claims, we AFFIRM.

Section 1983 permits a suit unless success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Hoeft v. Anderson · filed 2011-01-21

Heck holds that, “unless a plaintiff can demonstrate his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” the plaintiffs § 1983 suit must be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Section 1983 does not allow damages for harm whose unlawfulness would invalidate a conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Nasir v. Gwinnett County State Court · filed 2017-03-16

“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487 (emphasis omitted). It is undisputed that Nasir’s criminal disposition has not been invalidated, and he did not allege otherwise in his complaint. Therefore, any claims arising from his arrest and prosecution are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated.

Y. Weinacker v. Baer · filed 2017-05-25

A section 1983 claim for damages must be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim whose success would invalidate an outstanding conviction unless that conviction has been set aside.

Bagley v. Ortiz · filed 2018-07-24

Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for criminal defendants to collaterally attack an otherwise valid criminal conviction.

Section 1983 search and seizure claims are barred by Heck when success would necessarily undermine the plaintiff’s conviction, but a conviction does not bar every such claim.

Shipman v. Sowell · filed 2019-03-21

Thus, Shipman’s Fourth Amendment claim against Sclider is barred by Heck. ... We do not hold that Heck bars a 1983 claim for every search and seizure that results in some ultimate criminal conviction.

A § 1983 claim challenging an outstanding conviction may be dismissed without prejudice while the plaintiff seeks to invalidate it.

Mayer (ID 116515) v. Emporia Police Department · filed 2019-08-14

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s contemplation of filing a state habeas action does not justify a continuation of the stay in this case. The Court finds that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a dismissal of this case without prejudice.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred if success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated.

Gause v. Murray · filed 2019-09-09

Here, given the allegations in the Complaint, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that his conviction has been reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, his claims remained barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Waggoner v. State of Missouri (Linn) · filed 2019-09-23

Finding in plaintiff’s favor would certainly imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, and he has not demonstrated they have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or otherwise called into question. His claims are therefore Heck-barred, and will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a conviction or imprisonment are barred until the conviction or sentence is invalidated.

Mathis v. Collier · filed 2019-10-30

Having not done so, Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages is barred by Heck until he can show the conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged or otherwise set aside, including through calculating the sentence as concurrent rather than consecutive.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Neufville v. McGann · filed 2019-11-18

Because the Court finds that judgment in favor of Mr. Neufville would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction (that has not already been invalidated), it must dismiss these claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Charles v. McBride · filed 2019-11-25

A finding in Charles’ favor in this case would necessarily imply that he is unlawfully confined. Therefore, he is entitled to proceed with his § 1983 claim only if the judgment against him previously has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid.

Section 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Osborn v. Horry County Police Department · filed 2020-07-14

Thus, in a § 1983 suit, a district court is required to consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction; if so, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Section 1983 relief for a claim that would necessarily challenge a conviction or sentence is unavailable unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned.

Hubbard v. Knox County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-11-06

Under Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny, Hubbard is barred from bringing a civil rights case that would necessarily challenge the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence, unless that conviction has already been overturned.

A § 1983 damages claim is barred if success would imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Scott v. Thorpe · filed 2020-11-10

Under Heck, a plaintiff is barred from bringing a § 1983 suit for damages if a favorable judgement would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

A § 1983 claim that would undermine a criminal conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has been overturned; the plaintiff may refile after invalidating it.

Poulson v. Wheeler · filed 2020-12-14

The Court dismisses Poulson’s § 1983 claims without leave to amend. The Court’s dismissal of Poulson’s § 1983 claim is without prejudice to his right to refile those claims should he successfully invalidate his criminal conviction in the future.

A plaintiff who could have challenged a conviction while in custody cannot avoid Heck’s bar on § 1983 damages claims by waiting until custody ends.

Chapman v. Nassau County · filed 2021-05-21

It would be a dangerous precedent to allow an exception to Heck where a plaintiff has forgone the possibility of overturning his conviction in favor of a chance to extract a money settlement. ... Since the latter scenario is the one present in this case, I conclude that Heck is applicable to plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction must be dismissed until the Heck conditions are met.

Farrier v. Louisiana State · filed 2021-06-01

A judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim that his conviction by a non-unanimous jury was unconstitutional would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state court conviction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim must be dismissed with prejudice until such time as the Heck conditions are met.

Section 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction require the plaintiff to show that the conviction has been invalidated.

Hayes v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2021-07-19

If a § 1983 case seeking damages alleges constitutional violations that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, the prisoner must establish that the underlying sentence or conviction has been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through a similar proceeding.

Section 1983 damages claims must be dismissed under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Jordan v. Newman · filed 2021-08-02

In sum, because the redress that the Plaintiff seeks in this action would call into question the validity of his criminal convictions, the Court concludes that the present civil suit must be dismissed pursuant to Heck.

Section 1983 claims that would undermine a criminal conviction are premature while the conviction remains in force.

Chong Lee v. City of Appleton, Wisconsin · filed 2021-09-03

So long as that judgment stands undisturbed, litigation under §1983 is premature.

A related conviction does not necessarily bar a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when distinct acts by the officer could support civil liability.

(PC) Hatcher v. Junes · filed 2021-09-22

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims—unlike the claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution discussed in Heck and Wallace—will not necessarily be extinguished or barred by a conviction in state court. Excessive force claims are not inherently inconsistent with convictions for resisting arrest or battery against an officer, because a single altercation may involve acts of the accused that support a criminal conviction and distinct acts of the officer that support civil liability.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim for a wrongful conviction unless the conviction has been overturned through judicial or executive action.

Keith v. Wisconsin Department of Workf · filed 2022-03-10

As for Keith’s claim for damages for wrongful convictions, he cannot bring this claim in federal court unless those convictions are overturned through judicial or executive action.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is barred by Heck when the plaintiff’s account of the encounter is inconsistent with an outstanding resisting arrest conviction.

Martin v. Roy · filed 2022-03-25

Consequently, nothing in the Amended Complaint shows that this case involves anything other than a “single violent encounter throughout which [Defendants] used excessive force,” id., and Plaintiff’s claim is thus barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims cannot use the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to extend the chain of causation for damages.

Campbell v. Casey · filed 2016-02-29

Similarly, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine cannot appropriately be applied in the context of § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not permit the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to establish liability for acts following an unlawful entry; liability for those acts must be established separately.

Hardigree v. Lofton · filed 2019-07-30

For these reasons, the Court finds that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine cannot be used to establish liability for Plaintiff’s other claims against Officer Lofton. Instead, Plaintiff must still establish Officer Lofton’s liability for his subsequent acts.

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Davis v. Baker · filed 2019-11-18

However, this Court and many others have refused to extend the doctrine to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to false arrest claims, so evidence found after an unlawful stop may establish probable cause for an arrest.

Smith v. DeGirolamo · filed 2020-09-25

Under Second ... Circuit precedent, even if Officer DeGirolamo lacked any reasonable basis to stop plaintiff’s vehicle, that fact—though possibly meriting suppression of any subsequently acquired evidence in a criminal proceeding—does not taint the discovery of the forged license in plaintiff’s wallet to establish probable cause in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a false arrest claim based on an allegedly unlawful search.

Besley v. Elmira Police Department · filed 2022-04-15

Further, as noted in the Screening Order, Docket Item 5 at 10, to the extent that Plaintiff may be alleging that the unlawful search led to his arrest and, thus, the arrest was unlawful, said claim does not set forth a cognizable false arrest claim because the “fruit of poisonous the tree” doctrine applied in criminal cases to exclude evidence derived from an unlawful act – e.g., an unlawful search or seizure – does not apply to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims used to enforce § 1981 rights enabled by the 1991 Act are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.

Bryant v. Jones · filed 2010-03-12

The Eleventh Circuit found, in Baker, that § 1981 claims asserted pursuant to the 1991 Act are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658’s four-year statute of limitations. Defendants do not dispute that Bryant’s discriminatory transfer claim, Drake’s discriminatory transfer claim, and Kelley’s discriminatory demotion and hostile work environment claims are all claims asserted pursuant to the 1991 Act. Under Baker, a four year statute of limitations applies to these claims, and thus they are timely.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a claim seeking access to a public library based on an alleged violation of federal law.

Wolf v. State of Washington · filed 2020-12-03

Petitioner’s requested relief, access to the Clark County library, is properly raised in a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 provides an actionable route for a Section 1981 claim against state actors.

Hu v. The City of New York · filed 2022-01-20

Here, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim proceeds under § 1983, see FAC ¶¶ 40–44, and is therefore actionable.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce state prison regulations or policies.

Anthony v. Jeffreys · filed 2021-06-16

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to enforce IDOC regulations and policies.