42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce prison regulations and policies.

Regan v. Wills · filed 2021-06-16

As such, Plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to enforce IDOC regulations and policies.

A violation of prison procedural policy alone does not state an actionable claim under § 1983.

Mack v. Mullins · filed 2020-07-24

Mack’s claims that Mullins’ actions violated various VDOC procedural policies do not rise to the level of constitutional claims so as to be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a prison official’s failure to follow an administrative directive.

Schlosser v. Cook · filed 2020-07-08

Failure to comply with an administrative directive, however, does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of a state administrative policy alone.

Filmore v. Officer Cooper · filed 2020-03-17

A violation of a state’s administrative policy is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on prison officials’ failure to follow departmental procedures.

Fonck v. Allen · filed 2019-10-30

The failure to follow prison directives or procedures is not a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violating prison policy alone.

Cabrera-Asencio v. Young · filed 2018-01-19

Cabrera-Asencio’s claim that defendants are liable for violating SDDOC policy does not preclude summary judgment because “there is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.” Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App’x 759 (8th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 does not establish a violation merely because a defendant failed to comply with state law or an administrative directive.

Harris v. Taylor · filed 2011-09-14

While failure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does not by itself establish a violation of § 1983, see Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child & Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990), the record demonstrates that the defendants complied with the directives Harris cites in his brief.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of a state regulation alone.

Amaker v. Annucci · filed 2018-05-09

In any event, the violation of a state regulation alone does not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not make a failure to follow a state administrative directive actionable by itself.

Page v. Obaisi · filed 2018-05-15

Thus, any purported failure to follow a state administrative directive is not actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violating an internal jail policy without a constitutional violation.

Thomas v. Cook County D.O.C. · filed 2020-01-16

The court agrees that an alleged violation of jail policy is not relevant; Section 1983 provides for challenges to constitutional violations, not violations of internal jail policy.

Section 1983 does not allow liability based solely on violations of state policies.

GRIFFITH v. BRANNICK · filed 2020-02-05

The Defendants correctly argue that violations of state policies cannot give rise to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a violation of a prison administrative directive.

Schlosser v. Walker · filed 2020-08-17

Failure to comply with an administrative directive, however, does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for violations of prison policy or state law alone.

Spann v. Indiana State of · filed 2020-09-03

To the extent Mr. Spann is claiming that the lack of manual locks violates prison policies or guidelines, the violation of prison policy or other state law does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Patton v. Shelby County Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2021-02-18

Also § 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

A violation of prison policy or state law alone does not state a claim under § 1983.

McCants v. Calloway · filed 2021-03-30

He states that Sergeant Calloway “did not follow safety and security protocol,” but a violation of prison policy or other state law does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations alone.

Lee v. Corizen Mental Health Provider · filed 2021-04-08

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations.

Section 1983 does not remedy a violation of state law or prison policy alone.

Allen v. Williams · filed 2021-08-05

But Plaintiff did not specify to what law he was referring, and regardless, a violation of a state law or prison policy, in and of itself, does not violate the Constitution. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Section 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state law or . . . departmental regulations”).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state law alone.

(PC) Muhammad v. Azevedo · filed 2021-08-05

First, plaintiff’s allegations amount to a violation of state law. Section 1983 is, by its terms, limited to federal constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law or policy alone.

Churn 165703 v. Black · filed 2022-03-17

Claims under § 1983 do not provide redress for a violation of a state law or policy.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on a violation of an administrative directive.

Dupas v. Mulligan · filed 2022-05-08

“[f]ailure to comply with an administrative directive . . . does not on its own give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not provide a supplemental remedy for violations of rights created by the IDEA.

I.H. v. Cumberland Valley School District · filed 2012-02-08

Instead, Defendants argue quite correctly that Supreme Court has held that the cause of action and attendant remedies provided under the IDEA are the exclusive remedy for violations thereof, and that Congress did not intend Section 1983 to serve as a supplemental remedy for violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that duplicates an IDEA claim because the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Dizio v. Manchester Essex Regional School District · filed 2022-03-31

Because the § 1983 and IDEA claims are virtually identical, the § 1983 claim cannot survive. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count 2 will be granted.

Section 1983 requires a release of claims under it to be voluntary, deliberate, and informed.

Tabi v. Ortega · filed 2016-04-21

Tabi failed to establish that his consent to the agreement was not informed. See Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981) (a release of claims under § 1983 must be voluntary, deliberate, and informed).

Section 1983 lets an employee challenge a demotion motivated by preventing protected political activity even when the employer acted on a factual mistake.

Heffernan v. City of Paterson · filed 2016-04-26

We conclude that, as in Waters, the government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here. When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U. S. C. §1983—even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior.

Section 1983 requires a private entity’s policy or custom to cause a constitutional violation; a supervisor must be personally involved or have a sufficient causal connection to the violation.

Wolf v. Sandy · filed 2016-05-02

The district court properly dismissed Wolf’s action because Wolf failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if a constitutional violation was caused by an official policy or custom); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to sue for police behavior that shocks the conscience, including conscience-shocking interrogation tactics.

Cairel v. Alderden · filed 2016-05-05

A plaintiff may sue under §..1983 for police behavior that “shocks the conscience,” including “conscience-shocking interrogation tactics.”

Section 1983 claims alleging constitutional violations are not subject to state medical malpractice damages caps.

Commonwealth v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Grp. Self Ins. Risk Pool · filed 2016-06-23

Clearly not. The statutory cap on damages applies only to state tort or contract claims alleging medical malpractice, not federal civil rights claims alleging constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims against local governments are not subject to Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act damages cap.

Johnson v. City of Annapolis · filed 2022-03-30

The LGTCA cap will therefore apply only to the Johnson class’s state law claim (count VI) but not to the federal claims (counts I-V).

Section 1983 damages claims based on random and unauthorized acts of prison officials are barred by the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.

Kupstis v. Davis · filed 2012-07-10

Kupstis’s claims rest on the purported random and unauthorized acts of prison officials, and his claims for § 1983 damages are barred by the Parratt/Hudson doctrine.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for discrimination in the federal workplace.

Husain v. Shah · filed 2016-08-19

To the extent Count 3 alleges a Title VII claim, it is also dismissed as duplicative, and, to the extent it alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim is dismissed because § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for discrimination in the federal workplace.

Section 1983 claims may be compelled to arbitration when they fall within an applicable arbitration agreement.

Anderson v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. CA4/1 · filed 2016-08-29

On these facts, we conclude that Anderson's section 1983 claim is arbitrable.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to mandatory arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement unless the agreement clearly and unmistakably requires it.

Amalgamated Transit Union v. New Orleans Regional Transit Authority · filed 2022-04-27

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the CBA in this action does not clearly and unmistakably require union members to arbitrate § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for enforcing federal rights against state actors, and a court may construe a pro se complaint seeking that relief as a claim under the section.

Jimenez v. Fourth Judicial District Attorney's Office · filed 2016-08-29

Moreover, Jimenez’s pleadings make clear that he seeks to enforce his federal rights against state actors. Therefore, construing his pro se pleadings liberally, we interpret Jimenez’s complaint as alleging causes of action under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 provides the means for private individuals to enforce Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a court may construe a self-represented plaintiff’s complaint to invoke it without an express citation.

Thornton v. Edwards (PLR1) · filed 2020-11-13

However, rather than dismiss her claims outright, Plaintiff’s complaint will be construed liberally as though she had invoked § 1983 because she is self-represented.

Section 1983 allows recovery for pre-death pain and suffering when the decedent’s death was caused by a violation of federal law, despite California’s restriction on those damages.

Willis v. City of Fresno · filed 2017-03-01

Shortly after entry of judgment, this court held that § 377.34 limits recovery too severely to be consistent with the deterrence policy underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that plaintiffs may therefore seek damages for pre-death pain and suffering under § 1983 when the decedent’s death was caused by the violation of federal law. Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). We must accordingly vacate the judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim and remand the case to the district court so that plaintiffs may present evidence in support of their claim for pre-death pain and suffering damages.

Section 1983 allows recovery for a decedent’s pain and suffering caused by a constitutional violation despite the Florida Wrongful Death Act’s exclusion of those damages.

Howard v. Wilkinson · filed 2019-05-21

Because the purpose of § 1983 is to provide compensation for actual damages-not a subset of those damages-the FWDA is inconsistent with the compensatory purposes of that federal law.

Section 1983’s deterrence purpose prevents Arizona’s survival statute from barring an estate’s pain-and-suffering damages for alleged excessive force that preceded a separate fatal use of force.

Andrich v. Kostas · filed 2020-07-01

Applying A.R.S. § 14-3110 to preclude recovery for the fist strikes and taser use that preceded Mr. Andrich’s death would be inconsistent with the goals underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain and suffering.

WHATLEY v. EDNA MAHAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2021-02-23

Because damages for pain and suffering are cognizable under § 1983, Plaintiff’s request for pain and suffering damages may proceed.

A defense attorney’s representation of a criminal defendant does not make the attorney a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Newson v. Atkins · filed 2021-09-23

However, Newson may not sue his defense attorney under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a criminal defense attorney, even an appointed one, because the attorney does not act under color of state law.

Mayberry v. Keller · filed 2021-09-16

It would be pointless to allege federal question jurisdiction based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a criminal defense attorney, even an appointed one, does not act under color of state law and therefore cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a defense attorney for representing a criminal defendant.

Perez v. Dickison · filed 2020-11-23

Defense attorneys are not “persons” for purposes of civil rights cases such as these.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a suit against a private attorney because private attorneys are not official state actors.

Ingram v. Mooney · filed 2017-03-13

As for Stephenson, to the extent that Ingram intended to allege federal constitutional claims and not simply state-law claims against her, private attorneys are not official state actors and thus are generally not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a private criminal defense lawyer absent facts showing concerted action with a state representative.

Casiano v. Roth · filed 2019-05-21

As Defendant Roth is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against her under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not allow claims against private attorneys, including court-appointed attorneys, because they do not act under color of law.

Curry v. Shumate · filed 2020-03-19

Section 1983 “claims require that the conduct complained of be done under color of law, and private attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.” ... Plaintiff therefore cannot state a § 1983 claim against Defendant.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a claim against a private defense attorney because the attorney is not a state actor.

Craig v. Ritchie · filed 2020-07-21

The claim for ineffective assistance against her is thus not cognizable in a section 1983 action.

A private defense attorney is not a state actor and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for representing a client.

Ruiz v. Hall · filed 2020-07-27

Defense attorneys are private citizens and are not state actors within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present case, Defendant is a private individual and cannot be the object of a civil rights lawsuit.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defense attorneys merely because they are officers of the court.

CRESPO v. MASORTI & SULLIVAN, P.C. · filed 2021-10-27

It is well-settled that “attorneys are not subject to § 1983 claims on the basis that they are officers of the court. This is true whether they are private attorneys or public defenders.” Rushing v. Pennsylvania, 637 F. App’x 55, 57 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that Defendants are liable pursuant to a § 1983 claim, and this claim can be dismissed with prejudice.

An acquittal does not bar a Section 1983 claim for denial of a fair trial or make suppressed defense testimony immaterial.

Park v. Thompson · filed 2017-03-14

We decline to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, and instead reaffirm our binding rule: Park’s acquittal does not render Ayala’s allegedly suppressed testimony immaterial, nor does it preclude her from bringing a Section 1983 action to vindicate her right to a fair trial.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner to pursue claims over retaliatory loss of good-time credits when he sought collateral relief while in custody and Heck and Balisok do not bar the claims.

Whitfield v. Howard · filed 2017-03-28

We therefore find that Whitfield’s claims are not barred by Heck or Balisok, and REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 permits a claim concerning misconduct at a vacated trial when success would not undermine a later conviction based on the same conduct.

Dennis v. City of Phila. · filed 2019-05-15

Because, here, success on Mr. Dennis's § 1983 action would only undermine the validity of his 1992 conviction, where the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations occurred, the Court moves to the second question: has the 1992 conviction been invalidated? Yes. The 1992 conviction was vacated by a federal writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, Heck does not bar this action.

In a Section 1983 constitutional tort claim, the eggshell skull rule applies even when the plaintiff’s preexisting conditions increase the risk of injury.

Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 2017-08-09

As our fellow circuits have noted, the eggshell skull rule “like most principles of the common law of torts is applicable to a constitutional tort case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Accordingly, the plaintiff can show that the use of force was the direct and only cause of Darden’s death.

Section 1983 permits a government volunteer to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim based on the loss of a government benefit or privilege.

Ortiz v. Alvarez · filed 2018-09-21

The court finds that Ramos' volunteer status does not preclude him from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 based upon a claimed deprivation of governmental benefit or privilege.

Section 1983 does not make intervenors liable for a state’s constitutional violation merely because they defend the challenged law in litigation.

Brat v. Personhuballah · filed 2018-02-26

Clearly, simply engaging in the act of litigating and taking a position opposed to the plaintiffs are not violations of § 1983 and the Constitution so as to justify a fee award.

For a § 1983 retaliatory arrest claim against a city based on an official policy of retaliation, the plaintiff need not prove the absence of probable cause; the Mt. Healthy standard applies.

Lozman v. Riviera Beach · filed 2018-06-18

For these reasons, Lozman need not prove the absence of probable cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest against the City. On facts like these, Mt. Healthy provides the correct standard for assessing a retaliatory arrest claim.

Section 1983 generally requires a First Amendment retaliatory arrest plaintiff to plead and prove lack of probable cause, unless objective evidence shows that similarly situated people who did not engage in the same protected speech were not arrested.

Nieves v. Bartlett · filed 2019-05-28

The plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest. ... For those reasons, we conclude that the no-probable- cause requirement should not apply when a plaintiff pre- sents objective evidence that he was arrested when other- wise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.

A wage-discrimination claim under Section 1983 is analyzed under the framework used for Title VII wage-discrimination claims.

Mitchell v. City of Naples · filed 2018-07-10

As an initial matter, although Mitchell’s wage-discrimination claim was brought under § 1983, his claim should be analyzed under the doctrinal framework applicable to wage-discrimination cases brought under Title VII.

Section 1983 does not provide for aiding and abetting liability.

Shao v. Roberts · filed 2019-01-17

To the extent Shao’s aiding and abetting claims against Wang—or Orlando, Fadem, Mitchell, and Sussman—can be characterized as § 1983 claims, the Court dismisses them for failure to state a claim. ... Courts to have addressed the issue have found that because Congress did not explicitly provide for aiding and abetting liability in the text of § 1983, § 1983 does not support aiding and abetting liability.

Section 1983's deterrence purpose weighs against withdrawing a final judgment on a jury verdict merely because the parties settled.

Ostrander v. Kosteck · filed 2019-02-11

Even if the Settlement Agreement provides compensation to Ostrander, it would directly undermine the deterrence goals of Section 1983 to withdraw a final judgment pursuant to that jury verdict merely because the parties have settled their dispute.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim based on constitutional rights distinct from those protected by the Safe Drinking Water Act; that Act does not preempt the claim.

Hootstein v. Amherst-Pelham Reg'l Sch. Comm. · filed 2019-02-11

Thus, the court concludes that the SDWA does not preempt Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff can plausibly plead that a defendant tainted grand jury proceedings, preventing the independent intermediary doctrine from defeating the claim.

In Re: Lucas Babin · filed 2022-05-25

If “it can be shown that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant,” then the doctrine will not apply. Id. at 1428. ... We agree that the complaint contained enough to satisfy the requirement of plausibly pleading a taint in grand jury proceedings, without speculating and before discovery.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim can proceed despite a grand-jury indictment when the complaint plausibly alleges that the officer maliciously tainted the grand jury’s deliberations.

Poullard v. Jones · filed 2022-03-31

As such, the Court finds that the independent-intermediary doctrine does not bar Poullard’s claim.

A § 1983 false-arrest claim against an officer cannot proceed under the independent intermediary doctrine when a grand jury indicts the plaintiff and the complaint does not allege that the officer tainted its deliberations.

Poullard v. Jones · filed 2021-09-17

However, Poullard’s failure to plead that the grand jury proceeding was, in any way, tainted by Jones precludes her recovery under the independent intermediary doctrine.

A grand jury indictment breaks the chain of causation for a § 1983 false arrest claim unless the defendant tainted the grand jury’s deliberations.

Curtis v. Sowell · filed 2019-02-15

So unless an exception to the independent intermediary rule applies, Curtis’s grand jury indictment dooms his false arrest claim. ... Because Curtis failed to present well-pleaded allegations of taint, and because a grand jury found probable cause, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

A prison’s fifteen-day grievance filing period does not limit the scope or damages of a continuing Section 1983 claim when officials reviewed the grievances without objecting to their timeliness.

Jones v. Vowell · filed 2019-02-19

Defendants would have the Court take the requirement of the ADC’s grievance procedure and turn it into a substantive limitation on both the inmate’s ability to pursue his claim and his ability to recover damages. This the Court cannot do.

Section 1983 claims by Texas inmates are subject to the thirty-one-day filing deadline after receipt of a prison grievance decision.

Alton Jordan, TDCJ 000640541 v. Menchaca · filed 2019-03-28

Jordan contends that his suit was timely filed because sections 1983 and 1985 both have a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985. In other words, Jordan is arguing that because he is filing his suit under federal law, he does not have to comply with state procedural rules. We disagree. ... Therefore, Jordan still needed to file his suit within thirty-one days of receiving a response to his Step 2 grievance.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials solely for improperly processing a prisoner’s grievances or appeals.

Kinser v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-07-06

Once again, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to Defendants Ward and Madsen because an official’s allegedly improper processing of a prisoner’s grievances or appeals, without more, does not serve as a sufficient basis for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Ivey v. MSOP · filed 2019-02-19

The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff fails to state a claim with respect to injunctive relief because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit such relief against state officials sued in their individual capacity. ... 2. Magistrate Judge Tony M. Leung’s December 12, 2018 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. [83]) is ADOPTED.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Macdonald v. Strafford County Sup. Court Tina L. Nadeau Mark E. Howard Town of Lee, NH · filed 2019-03-27

Injunctive relief against judges under Section 1983 is also extremely limited. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (only available if “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”). There is no suggestion that the exceptions apply here.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Bennett v. Supreme Court of the State of New York · filed 2019-04-26

As amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This amendment generally precludes a plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against a judge arising from rulings or actions taken in that judge’s judicial capacity because the plaintiff can usually appeal that judge’s rulings or actions in an appellate court.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judge for actions taken in a judicial capacity when those actions can be appealed.

Berrian v. State of New York Unified Court System · filed 2019-07-03

This amendment generally precludes a plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against a judge arising from rulings or actions taken in that judge’s judicial capacity because the plaintiff can usually appeal that judge’s rulings or actions in an appellate court.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Johnson v. Marsiglia · filed 2019-07-15

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Nor is there any indication that either of those situations was the case here. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against Judge Darensberg.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County · filed 2019-07-26

In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that a declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless the judge violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Tarver v. Reynolds · filed 2019-08-16

There is no indication that Judge Reynolds violated a declaratory decree. Nor is there any evidence that declaratory relief is unavailable. Indeed, Timothy himself prays for a declaratory judgment. (No. 18-cv-1034, Doc. # 1, at 13.) That is enough to bar his claim for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Epperson v. Graves · filed 2019-10-07

Because Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief he seeks does not address the actions of Defendants other than in their judicial capacities, his claim for injunctive is barred.

Section 1983 permits a prison director to be named in an official capacity to implement injunctive relief even without personal involvement in the alleged violation.

Pickett v. Valdez · filed 2019-10-10

Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend is granted insofar as he is allowed to add NDOC Director James Dzurenda as a defendant in his official capacity for the limited purpose of implementing any injunctive relief that Plaintiff may obtain.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Gochin v. Markowitz · filed 2019-10-21

Further, because Gochin has not shown that “a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” she is not entitled to injunctive relief against Judge Branca.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

O'Connor v. Chatfield · filed 2019-10-31

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012).

A Section 1983 complaint must allege what each defendant did or failed to do; naming a defendant only in the caption does not state a claim against that person.

Andrews v. Gains · filed 2019-11-18

Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Grant v. Cafferri · filed 2019-12-04

To the extent that Grant is seeking injunctive relief against Judge Zaro, her claims are precluded by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983). This law bars all claims for injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial action or omission unless a declaratory decree was violated, or declaratory relief was unavailable. Grant does not allege that Judge Zaro acted in violation of a declaratory decree.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Taveras v. Schreiber · filed 2019-12-06

Therefore, for injunctive relief to be available, the Court must determine whether Defendant violated a declaratory decree or whether declaratory relief was unavailable to Plaintiff. Defendant is not alleged to have violated a declaratory degree nor has Plaintiff alleged that declaratory relief is unavailable to him.

A prison warden may be an official-capacity defendant in a Section 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief that the warden would carry out.

Taylor v. Sutterer · filed 2019-12-09

Further, as previously noted, Defendant Lawrence, as the Warden of Menard is the appropriate official capacity defendant to address Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Yun v. City of New York · filed 2019-12-19

In addition, as amended in 1996, § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Harris 476889 v. Kitchka · filed 2019-12-31

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012).

A § 1983 complaint must specify the capacity in which each individual defendant is sued.

Spottswood v. Washington County · filed 2020-01-13

Furthermore, for any individual defendant named, the Second Amended Complaint must specify the capacity or capacities in which Spottswood is suing that person for purposes of any § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; courts apply that limit in Bivens actions against federal judges.

Lohnes v. Magistrate Judge John E Martin · filed 2020-01-16

Congress has since amended § 1983 to provide that injunctive relief shall not be granted in an action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. This amendment bars injunctive relief against both state and federal judges because federal courts incorporate § 1983 law into Bivens actions. ... Here, Lohnes is seeking injunctive relief against a federal judge, which is not permitted.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

WILLIAMS v. ANN KLEIN FORENSIC CENTER · filed 2020-02-10

Nevertheless, to the extent plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from Judge Brown, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege that such exception applies in this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims against Judge Brown will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Markham v. Rosenbaum · filed 2020-02-18

Moreover, Section 1983 was amended in 1996 to extend judicial immunity to claims for injunctive relief: “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Judge Dollinger violated any declaratory decree or that any declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Marjamaa v. France · filed 2020-02-19

To the extent this is intended as a request for injunctive relief, such relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, any claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Nieves v. Farber · filed 2020-03-30

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state- court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Justice Farber.

A Section 1983 claim against an individual defendant requires factual allegations concerning that defendant.

Del Campo v. Galleger · filed 2020-07-31

The Court also explained that the Complaint failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Galleger because there are no factual allegations regarding Defendant Galleger.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated.

Brown v. Ludi-Leitch · filed 2020-08-24

To the extent that Brown is seeking injunctive relief, § 1983 has been amended to bar claims for injunctive relief “against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity” unless a declaratory decree was violated.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief for acts taken in a judge’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Gilliam v. Watanabe · filed 2020-09-01

Nevertheless, Congress extended judicial immunity by statute by amending § 1983 in 1996 “to limit the circumstances in which injunctive relief may be granted against judges.” ... The emphasized language is directly on point, and Gilliam’s Complaint does not allege that “a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge acting in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Johnson-El v. Deprospo · filed 2020-09-03

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive against Judge DeProspo.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against judges for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Baquero v. Mendoza · filed 2020-09-16

To the extent that Baquero sought injunctive relief against the judicial defendants, such relief is barred by § 1983 itself, where Baquero has made no allegation that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

McCone v. Thorpe · filed 2020-10-29

Section 1983 states that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Browning v. Grant · filed 2020-11-06

Further, Browning has named as defendants only judges, and “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Browning has not shown that the exception to the general bar on injunctive relief applies.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief for a judge’s acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable; the restriction also applies to Bivens claims against federal judges.

Nieves v. Liman · filed 2020-12-07

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for any injunctive relief against Judge Liman as barred by the 1996 amendment to § 1983, which applies to Bivens actions against federal judges. Plaintiff has not set forth any facts suggesting that Judge Liman violated a declaratory decree, or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Rhoads 504915 v. Booher · filed 2020-12-16

Moreover, injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute, injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 permits a sheriff to be enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional orders even if the sheriff is not a municipal policymaker.

Daves v. Cty · filed 2020-12-28

We see no basis, though, to conclude that enjoining a sheriff from enforcing unconstitutional orders depends on whether a sheriff is a policymaker for purposes of municipal liability.

Section 1983 allows injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Norman v. Lindsay · filed 2020-12-29

With respect to Norman’s request for injunctive relief, § 1983 provides that “injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Blanche Brown v. Friel · filed 2021-01-28

“in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown has not shown that this exception applies.

A Section 1983 complaint against multiple officials must identify the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County · filed 2021-03-05

Accordingly, a complaint that “fails to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant . . . does not provide adequate notice as to the nature of the claims against each,” and is subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

HONE v. THOMPSON · filed 2021-03-29

Most importantly, after Pulliam, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, which amended Section 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Thus, the section of Pulliam on which Plaintiff relies has been overturned by statute.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Williams v. Clott · filed 2021-05-19

The amendment to § 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state- court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against Justice Clott.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against defendants sued in their individual capacities.

Dreyer v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare · filed 2021-09-02

And as Plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief in an individual capacity suit under § 1983, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the injunctive relief Claim against the individual capacity Defendants, with prejudice.

Section 1983’s exception allowing an injunction against a judge when declaratory relief is unavailable does not cover temporary unavailability.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson · filed 2021-09-10

They do, however, focus on this proviso to Section 1983, which states that where declaratory relief is “unavailable,” an injunction may be ordered against state judges. The proviso has no force here because temporary unavailability, which is all the Plaintiffs assert, is not “unavailability.”

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mamot v. Bilingual · filed 2021-09-27

The amendment to Section 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against Judge Oing or the Appellate Term judges because Plaintiff could have appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, and to the New York Court of Appeals.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

MAJERSKA v. United States · filed 2021-10-12

Here, injunctive relief is not available against Chief Judge Wolfson because Plaintiff has not properly pleaded that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

MURRAY v. United States · filed 2021-10-13

Here, injunctive relief is not available against Chief Judge Wolfson because Plaintiff has not properly pleaded that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Nieves v. Best · filed 2021-10-13

The amendment to Section 1983, allowing for injunctive relief against a judge only if a state-court declaratory decree was violated or state-court declaratory relief is unavailable, precludes Plaintiff from seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Justice Best.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

SHIVANANJAPPA v. RAJENDRA · filed 2021-10-27

Shivananjappa seeks an injunction compelling actions by Judge Abode and Judge Corson, such as the rescinding of orders they have entered. Such relief is prohibited by § 1983 itself. “[I]n an action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Ann Klein Forensic Ctr., No. CV189606PGSDEA, 2020 WL 614657, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). Because the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff only addresses the actions of Judge Abode and Judge Corson in their judicial capacities, the court lacks the jurisdiction to proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Washington v. Harder · filed 2021-11-18

Injunctive relief is not available in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a judicial officer for acts taken in that official's judicial capacity "unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 1996 amendments to § 1983). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

LEE v. GALLINA-MECCA · filed 2021-12-03

Section 1983 itself severely limits injunctive relief against a state court judge: “[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for acts in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

BROWNING v. YOUNG · filed 2021-12-15

Browning is not alleging a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Browning does not address the actions of Judge Young other than in his judicial capacity, Browning’s claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 generally bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for a judicial act unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Paddock v. Dixon · filed 2021-12-30

While certain persons will be liable for their actions under § 1983, the statute makes clear that “except [] in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Id. (emphasis added).

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judge for judicial acts unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

WILSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2022-01-20

In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in an action brought against a judicial official for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” ... Here, Plaintiff did not provide what decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against Dr. Mix in her individual capacity.

Allen v. CHP · filed 2022-02-03

For the reasons explained below, the Court overrules the Objections, reaffirms its prior order adopting the Recommendation in full, and denies as moot the Motion to Amend. ... Specifically, Judge Mix determined: ... (2) Defendant Mix is immune from suit for injunctive relief under § 1983 and therefore recommended that Plaintiff’s request to “be put on bottom bunk restriction for the duration of his incarceration” be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it is brought against Defendant Mix in her individual capacity; ... Having received no objections by the applicable deadline, on February 9, 2021 the Court adopted the Recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without prejudice in part and with prejudice in part.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Evans v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 2022-02-25

As a preliminary matter, the claim against Judge Kuhnke must be dismissed because injunctive relief against a judge “shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Lawrence v. Pelton, 413 F. Supp. 3d 701, 711 (E.D. Mich. 2019).

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for an act in a judicial capacity only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Nieves v. Ward · filed 2022-03-03

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Ward under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable. Declaratory relief is available to Plaintiff because he may appeal Justice Ward’s decisions to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, and to the New York Court of Appeals.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Curcio v. Grossman · filed 2022-03-14

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Grossman under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 permits injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Urena v. Roy · filed 2022-05-16

Plaintiff cannot properly seek injunctive relief against Justice Alvarado under Section 1983 because that statute permits injunctive relief against a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Mercado v. Gregory M. Snyder, Judge of the CCP of York County, PA, in his official capacity · filed 2022-05-20

Because Mercado has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by Mercado does not address the actions of Judge Snyder other than in his judicial capacity, her claim for injunctive relief is barred.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a plaintiff’s own losses caused by a violation of his rights, but not for losses suffered by his incorporated business.

Lindsey v. Orlando · filed 2019-03-26

Plaintiff Lindsey filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the losses he suffered as a result of an alleged false arrest. If he establishes a violation of his rights, he is entitled to recover losses he suffered as a result of that violation, including personal injuries, if any; emotional distress; or pay he lost during the time that the arrest and associated legal proceedings prevented him from working. Losses suffered by his incorporated business are separate losses, suffered by any owners or shareholders only as a result of the losses to their business; they are not directly recoverable by Plaintiff himself.

A § 1983 action brought on behalf of a decedent may include survivors’ losses of society and companionship when state wrongful death law supplies those damages through § 1988.

Arthur v. Hepler · filed 2019-10-11

The Michigan Wrongful Death Act applies to this § 1983 action pursuant to § 1988. There is no reason to bar Anderson’s family from seeking survivor’s losses, including the loss of society and companionship.

Section 1983 preempts Texas’s medical expert report requirement for excessive-force claims within a health care institution or against a health care provider or physician.

Ramona Rogers, M. D., Modesto Zambrano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Hern · filed 2019-06-13

Accordingly, in this narrow class of cases, we hold that § 1983 preempts § 74.351 when claims for excessive force occur within a healthcare institution or against a healthcare provider or physician.

Section 1983 does not preempt Texas’s expert-report requirement for health care liability claims brought in state court.

Ramona Rogers, M.D., Modesto Zamorano, Stephanie Cumpian, Rolando Flores, Hector Ontiveros, Priscilla Nieto, Sonia Herna · filed 2021-04-16

Because the TMLA’s expert-report requirement is procedural in nature and would not cause reliably different outcomes in section 1983 cases brought in state and federal court, we hold that section 74.351 is not preempted by section 1983.

A parent may not litigate a minor child’s § 1983 claim pro se.

Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District · filed 2019-07-12

A parent, however, cannot proceed pro se to litigate a child’s claim under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, or § 1983.

A grandparent cannot litigate a minor grandchild’s § 1983 claim pro se.

C.R. v. Missouri Department of Social Services · filed 2021-09-21

If parents cannot litigate pro se on behalf of their minor children in § 1983 actions, grandparents certainly lack standing to do the same.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit for monetary damages against a prison or jail because it is not a suable person.

Harris-Albano (ID 121174) v. Topeka Correctional Facility · filed 2021-04-19

As a governmental sub-unit, a prison or jail cannot sue or be sued because such an entity is not a “person” subject to suit for monetary damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a regional jail because it is not a person amenable to suit.

Johnson v. Yeckley · filed 2021-01-26

However, the RRJ is not a person under § 1983, thus, they are not amenable to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a correctional facility because it is not a person subject to suit.

FORD v. WARDEN CHARLES GREEN · filed 2019-07-18

Insomuch as Ford intends to pursue any § 1983 claims against ECCF, he is precluded from doing so because correctional facilities are not “persons” subject to suit under that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a correctional facility that is not a legal entity susceptible to suit.

RIVERS v. GEORGE W. HILL CORRECTIONAL FACILLTY · filed 2019-09-26

The claims against GWHCF must be dismissed because the facility “is not a legal entity susceptible to suit.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a correctional facility that is not a legal entity subject to suit.

TAFT v. GEROGE W HILL · filed 2019-09-30

Accordingly, Taft cannot state a § 1983 claim against the George W. Hill Correctional Facility.

A county correctional facility is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

FORMAN v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2020-02-07

We dismiss all civil rights claims against the Facility as it is not a proper defendant under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a prison facility because the facility is not a legal entity susceptible to suit.

TRUMP v. PRIME CARE MEDICAL STAFF · filed 2020-03-05

If he intended to bring a claim against the prison based on the events that occurred there, his claims fail because the prison facility “is not a legal entity susceptible to suit” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a prison facility because a building is not a person amenable to suit.

York v. Williamson · filed 2020-07-01

As KERC is a building and not a person amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983, KERC is summarily dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against prison facilities because they are not persons or legal entities subject to suit.

Marbly-Bragg v. Saginaw Regional Facility · filed 2021-06-16

It is well-settled that prison facilities are not person or legal entities subject to suit under § 1983.

A county correctional facility is not a cognizable defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Sitts v. Delaware County Correctional Facility · filed 2021-07-01

Plaintiff's amended complaint, like his original complaint, names Delaware County Correctional Facility as a defendant. See Am. Compl. at 1. For the same reasons as those articulated in the May Order, any Section 1983 claim asserted against that defendant is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a correctional facility because a facility is not a person acting under color of state law.

Robinson v. Bishop Jr. · filed 2021-07-08

Additionally, Western Correctional Institution was named as a Defendant; however, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds do not act under color of state law and are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 defendants may dispute causation, but they may not seek to apportion fault under state comparative fault laws.

Estate of Marc A Moreno v. Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc · filed 2019-08-05

While defendants to section 1983 actions may argue that other people are responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, defendants may not ask the jury to apportion fault among parties and non-parties, including other defendants, under state comparative fault and apportionment laws.

Comparative fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Meagher v. King County · filed 2020-07-09

Comparative fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Contributory negligence or contributory fault is not a defense to a Section 1983 claim.

(PC) Jongpil Park v. Kitt · filed 2021-03-31

Contributory negligence or contributory fault is an inapplicable defense to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not categorically bar restitution or a refund of fines paid because of a Fourth Amendment violation.

Yannotti v. Arbor · filed 2019-10-28

The City fails to demonstrate that restitution damages or a refund of fines paid because of a Fourth Amendment violation are clearly not available to any claimant as a matter of law under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages for an unlawful stop do not cover later incarceration when a lawful arrest follows and those losses do not redress the stop.

Sherard Martin v. Marinez · filed 2019-08-12

We do not go so far as to hold that post-arrest damages may never be recovered, only that here such damages would be inconsistent with the rule in Carey that damages should be tailored to protect the right in question, 435 U.S. at 258.

Section 1983 permits damages for an unlawful search, but injuries resulting from the discovery of evidence and subsequent proceedings are not recoverable as damages for that search.

Brubaker v. Tucson, City of · filed 2020-02-18

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff seeks tort damages for the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment related to an allegedly illegal search of his house. ... Under Lingo, Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation related to anything but the alleged illegal search: September 29 and October 1, 2009. He cannot recover damages related to the seizure and forfeiture (euthanizing) of his cats, his criminal prosecution for animal neglect, or the condemnation proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights claim for a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Bosse v. Blades · filed 2019-11-19

A violation of the terms of the IAD can be the basis for a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 449 (1981).

Section 1983 claims alleging violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and failure to train on its procedures may proceed beyond initial screening.

Baird v. Curtis · filed 2020-01-29

The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as § 1983 claims for violation of the IAD against Defendants Bergenson and Page in their individual and official capacities and for failure to train on the procedures under the IAD against Defendant Bergenson in his official capacity. Upon review, the Court will allow these claims to proceed beyond initial screening.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment retaliation claim alongside FMLA claims when the retaliation claim rests on an independent constitutional violation.

Hopfinger v. City of Nashville, Illinois · filed 2019-12-02

After reviewing the parties’ limited arguments on this issue, the Court finds that Hopfinger is entitled to bring a Section 1983 First Amendment Retaliation claim in addition to her FMLA claims.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional Equal Protection claim based on disability discrimination even when the ADA has its own enforcement mechanism.

Leibas v. Dart · filed 2020-10-19

As the court reads their complaint, however, Plaintiffs are not using Section 1983 to enforce the ADA; they are instead asserting Equal Protection claims based on alleged differential treatment because of their status as disabled persons.

Hawai‘i’s qualified privilege does not immunize a defendant from liability under Section 1983; it applies to state law claims.

Reyes v. Tanaka · filed 2019-12-13

In the Motion, Tanaka erroneously argues that qualified privilege immunizes him from liability for the § 1983 claims. Mot. at 19-21. Qualified privilege applies to state law claims.