42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a conspiracy claim against a private person who willfully joins state officials to violate constitutional rights.

Theodore W. White, Jr. v. Detective McKinley · filed 2008-02-26

Although § 1983 can only be used to remedy deprivation of rights done under the color of law, a private actor can be liable "under § 1983 for conspiring with state officials to violate a private citizen's right[s]. . . . " Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 950 (8th Cir. 2005). The key inquiry is whether the private party was a willful participant in the corrupt conspiracy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private parties who conspire with state actors to violate constitutional rights; the plaintiff must show an agreement between them.

Tebo v. Tebo · filed 2008-11-25

In order to hold them liable on her Section 1983 claim, they must have engaged in a conspiracy with state actors to violate her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits damages against a private person who conspires with state officials acting under color of state law, even if the officials are immune from suit.

Hooshang Kadivar, M.D. v. Stone · filed 1986-11-19

A private person who conspires with state officials acting under color of state law may be held liable for damages in a § 1983 action for participating in the conspiracy regardless of whether the state officials are themselves immune from suit.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 if it conspires with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Hoeft v. Davies · filed 2009-08-20

And though Hoeft does not contend that Derco is a state actor by virtue of employing inmates on work release, a private actor can nonetheless be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if that individual or entity conspires with a state actor to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Private actors may be liable under Section 1983 for conspiring with state officials when the complaint alleges facts showing they acted together to commit an unconstitutional act.

Margaret Zavalidroga and Tomas Zavalidroga v. Joseph S. Cote, Individually · filed 2010-10-06

Although private actors are liable under Section 1983 if they conspired with state officials, to state a claim based on “a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992). The Zavalidrogas’ vague conspiracy allegations do not meet this standard.

A private defendant may face a § 1983 claim when evidence raises a triable issue that the defendant conspired with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.

Robles v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-20

The plaintiffs submissions additionally raised triable issues of fact as to whether the Allstate defendants “engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive [plaintiff] of federal rights” ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the Allstate defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim against a private person must allege an agreement with a state officer to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection District · filed 2013-10-21

Plaintiffs complaint lacks an allegation of an agreement between Welge and one of the state officers to cause a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Consequently, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to bring Welge within the reach of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy between private individuals and state actors to plead facts showing a specific agreement to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

McQuiston v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2014-03-18

To properly allege a § 1983 conspiracy between private individuals and state actors, a plaintiff must set out facts, which if true, demonstrate at least one private individual reached a specific agreement with at least one state actor to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private actor requires facts sufficiently alleging that the private actor acted jointly with a state actor.

Donell Prince v. Orr · filed 2015-07-13

Prince’s failure to adequately plead a conspiracy also precludes his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Orr conspired with state actors to deprive him of his constitutional rights. This is because he has not sufficiently alleged that Orr, as a private actor, acted jointly with Aiellos or any other state actor.

A private actor may be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state actors to violate federal rights, but vague and conclusory conspiracy allegations do not suffice.

Karageorge v. Urlacher · filed 2018-11-27

Miyuskovich is not a state actor, so she can be held liable under § 1983 only if she conspired with state actors to violate Karageorge’s federal rights. ... Yet the complaint’s conspiracy allegations are just that—vague and conclusory—and thus cannot support Karageorge’s § 1983 claims against Miyuskovich.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private party requires facts showing that the party acted with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.

Badwal v. Badwal · filed 2019-03-12

To the extent the complaint may be construed to raise a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Badwal’s former wife, which might be outside the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, any such claim is inadequately pleaded. “To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor who conspires with state officials when the complaint plausibly alleges an agreement and a deprivation of federal or constitutional rights.

Jones v. Arbuckle · filed 2019-09-11

Private actors may be held liable under § 1983 by proving a civil conspiracy between the private and state actors. ... Considering Jones’ complaint as a whole, he has plausibly alleged facts which suggest, but do not prove, a potential agreement between Dowden and Sheriff officials and employees. At this stage, Jones is only required to plead a plausible cause of action, and he has met this standard.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold private parties liable for conspiring with a state actor to allege facts plausibly suggesting that conspiracy.

Zavalidroga v. Hester · filed 2020-02-11

Third, Plaintiff’s argument regarding his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unpersuasive because, despite his reliance on Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), Plaintiff does not in his Complaint allege facts plausibly suggesting a conspiracy by private parties with a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (nor is any such factual allegation likely given its conspicuous omission from Plaintiff’s otherwise detailed Complaint).

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private actor acted in concert with a state actor to commit an unconstitutional act; conjecture does not establish a conspiracy.

Bonds v. County Of Westchester · filed 2020-07-28

To state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private actor, a complaint “must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.” ... Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy is based on conjecture rather than facts.

A private party’s alleged misrepresentations in a contested judicial foreclosure do not establish joint participation with a state judge for a § 1983 claim.

Mitchell v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2020-11-02

In this case, Ms. Mitchell alleged that the Bank abused the judicial-foreclosure process by making misrepresentations to the Mitchell II court about the finality of Mitchell I and urging the Mitchell II court ... to apply Mitchell I as res judicata against her counterclaims. That does not amount to joint participation under Lugar.

Section 1983 requires a state actor to remain a defendant in a First Amendment retaliation conspiracy claim against private parties.

Ferrara v. United Public Service Employees Union · filed 2020-12-29

And the state actor in the alleged conspiracy must be a defendant to sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties requires plausible allegations of an agreement with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Sileoni v. Solo · filed 2021-04-20

To allege a conspiracy between state actors and a private party under § 1983, the plaintiff must bring forward plausible factual allegations showing “an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” ... Plaintiff has failed to state plausible allegations that (1) state actors entered into a conspiracy with the defendant inmates; or that (2) the conspiracy’s object was to deprive Plaintiff of specific constitutional rights.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against defense attorneys requires plausible allegations that they agreed with state actors to commit the alleged violation.

Marcure v. Lynn · filed 2021-04-26

He likewise failed to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he has not plausibly alleged that his defense attorneys—whom he hired months after his arrest—agreed with the police officers and prosecutors to perpetrate the unconstitutional arrest and prosecution that he alleges.

A section 1983 conspiracy claim against a private person requires an agreement with a state actor, concerted action to cause a constitutional injury, and an overt act causing damages.

Naegele v. Fox · filed 2022-06-03

With respect to the theory of liability raised in the counterclaim here, to state a claim against a private individual for a section 1983 conspiracy, the pleading party "must allege (1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages" ( Ciambriello v County of Nassau , 292 F3d 307, 324-325 [2d Cir 2002]; see Pangburn v Culbertson , 200 F3d 65, 72 [2d Cir 1999]).

Section 1983 permits liability for a private actor who willfully joins state officials in a plan to retaliate against protected speech.

McNeally v. HomeTown Bank · filed 2022-06-21

A private actor may be held liable under § 1983 if it is a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... Here, the Complaint’s allegations permit a plausible inference that a meeting of the minds occurred between Puffer and Redmond to retaliate against McNeally for her protected activity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of law who deprive citizens of rights secured by federal law, including due process and equal protection.

Lopez v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors · filed 1974-05-13

The Court does find that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is applicable to persons who, under color of law, have deprived citizens of the United States of any rights secured by federal law, including the right to due process and equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment. See Mansell v. Saunders, 5 Cir., 372 F.2d 573. Defendants concede that the actions of the Board of Supervisors and the Committee are under color of law. Plaintiffs’ allegations, although not as specific as they might have been, together with plaintiffs’ evidence, do raise questions of due process and equal protection.

Section 1983 provides a claim for constitutional-rights violations committed under color of state or territorial law, not under color of federal law.

Greenya v. George Washington University · filed 1975-05-02

We do not suggest that one is without any remedy if an organization acting under color of federal law is depriving a person of his constitutional rights. We only hold that plaintiff has no claim arising under the Civil Rights Statute and that if a claim for damages against a federal instrumentality exists at all it must be created by the Constitution itself.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action when state officials, acting under color of state law, deprive a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Gonzalez v. Young · filed 1976-08-13

The complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for a deprivation, under color of state law, of any “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law, but not for actions taken under color of federal law.

Askew v. Bloemker · filed 1976-12-30

We hold that the ten DALE-agent defendants named herein were acting solely under color of federal law while engaged in the activities complained of by the Askews. Accordingly, the district court properly ruled that the defendants are not subject to suit under § 1983, and we affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutory rights, including a federal right conferred on a tribal Indian.

Beulah Chase v. Roland McMasters Jack Smith, Jr., Wayne Turner, Arlyn Wadholm and Russel Pederson · filed 1978-04-05

We hold, therefore, that Chase’s claim that she was denied rights under 25 U.S.C. § 465 states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal statutory rights, as well as constitutional rights, when the deprivation is under color of state law.

Reynaldo Tongol, Plaintiffs-Appellees/cross-Appellants v. William J. Usery, Jr., Defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees · filed 1979-08-06

Thus, we hold that section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress deprivations of federal statutory rights of the kind alleged by plaintiffs.

Section 1983 provides a legal or equitable cause of action for deprivation of personal or property rights under color of state law.

Cowart v. City of Ocala, Fla. · filed 1979-10-11

It also appears to be settled law that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action, in law or in equity, not only for a deprivation of personal rights under color of state law, but also for deprivation of property rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials for violating rights secured by federal law, including the terms of the Detainer Agreement.

Cuyler v. Adams · filed 1981-01-21

Respondent Adams has therefore stated a claim for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the asserted violation by state officials of the terms of the Detainer Agreement.

Section 1983 reaches claims alleging a deprivation of rights caused by a violation of federal law, and a Department of Public Welfare is a person subject to suit under the statute.

Stanton v. Godfrey · filed 1981-01-27

It is clear the allegations that Stanton et al. violated the Social Security Act causing a deprivation of Godfrey et al.’s rights sufficiently set out a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, the Department of Public Welfare is a person under § 1983 and is a proper defendant. An award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 was not improper.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law; violations of state law alone are insufficient.

Ybarra v. Bastian · filed 1981-02-12

Section 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Only federal rights, privileges, or immunities are protected by the section. Violations of state law alone are insufficient.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts when those breaches do not deprive plaintiffs of federal rights secured by § 13(c).

Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union · filed 1982-06-07

But because we have determined that Congress did not intend that breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts would constitute deprivations of federal rights secured by § 13(c), the union has no cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations of federal rights committed under color of state law, not for actions taken under color of federal law.

Edgar v. Inland Steel Company, a Corporation · filed 1984-09-21

plaintiffs cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a remedy to redress deprivations, under color of state law, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. The statute, by its express terms, is directed only to state wrongdoing. At best, defendant acted under color of federal law when it complied with the IRS instructions; but section 1983 does not protect against such acts.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of law; a claim cannot proceed when the defendants were not alleged or found to have done so.

Blank v. Heineman · filed 1991-01-11

It is clear that to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants must have acted under color of law. As the plaintiffs have failed to allege, and further that the Court fails to find, that defendants acted under color of law, the plaintiffs cannot maintain their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An officer’s off-duty status alone does not establish that the officer acted outside the color of authority for a § 1983 claim.

Cuellar v. City of San Antonio · filed 1991-10-09

Third, assuming we ignore the forgoing objections, Ortiz’s statement that the log sheets reflect that “[a]t the time of the murder of Adolfo Cuellar Jr. ..., Stephen Smith was off-duty from his patrol shift” does not establish as a matter of law, that at the time of Cuellar’s death, Smith was not acting under “color of authority” as appellee contends.

Section 1983 does not make a private party liable for acting under color of law merely because the party used state or local court procedures.

Hoai v. Van Vo · filed 1991-11-19

It is well established that mere recourse to state or local court procedures does not by itself constitute “joint activity” with the state sufficient to subject a private party to liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violations of federally guaranteed rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Gandee v. Glaser · filed 1992-02-24

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create any substantive rights but merely creates a cause of action for the violation of federally guaranteed rights, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), and because this Court has previously concluded that not such violation has occurred, this claim, too, must fail.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for alleged constitutional deprivations committed under color of tribal law.

Sulcer v. Davis · filed 1993-02-18

[N]o action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.... As the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, it follows that actions taken under color of tribal law are beyond the reach of § 1983, and may only be examined in federal court under the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to show that they acted under color of law.

M. Ashley Dickerson, AKA Mahala Ashley Dickerson William F. Bocast William Andrew Mary Andrew v. Duke Williams Jean Will · filed 1994-07-22

The plaintiffs have not asserted a viable federal constitutional claim against the Williamses because they have not shown that the Williamses acted under color of law.

Section 1983 does not govern claims against defendants alleged to act under color of federal law; such claims are properly characterized as Bivens actions.

Dobard v. The United States District Court for Northern California · filed 1994-11-04

Although Dobard designated his action as brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, because the defendants all allegedly were acting under color of federal law, Dobard's action is more properly characterized as a Bivens action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law; a cable operator’s franchise agreement with a city alone does not establish that its programming decision was made under color of law.

Templin v. Times Mirror Cable Television, Inc. · filed 1995-05-22

The franchise agreement between Oceanside and Times Mirror, however, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish Times Mirror acted under color of law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy when success on judicial review establishes that state action deprived a person of federally protected benefits.

Wimley v. Rudolph · filed 1996-10-07

Upon prevailing upon that claim, plaintiff had, by definition, established a deprivation of rights under color of state law, the very basis for recovery under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a declaratory judgment and nominal damages when defendants deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights under color of law.

Doe v. Porter · filed 2002-02-08

The Court will GRANT the plaintiffs’ a declaratory judgment that the policy and practice of promoting religious education in the Rhea County public schools is unconstitutional, and that defendants have deprived plaintiffs of their civil rights under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs will be AWARDED nominal damages of One Dollar ($1.00) along with reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and their costs of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for actions taken under color of federal law.

Buckley v. Meis · filed 2003-09-23

This argument fails because this court’s case law clearly establishes that a § 1983 action is not available to redress actions taken under color of federal law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Howeth Investments, Inc. v. White · filed 2007-02-22

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law.

Howeth Investments Inc. v. the City of Hedwig Village · filed 2007-02-22

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for actions taken under color of federal law.

GANT v. MARLER · filed 2020-09-29

For federal officials, “[i]t is well established that liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under color of federal law.” Brown, 250 F.3d at 800.

A prior New York Article 78 proceeding does not preclude a subsequent § 1983 damages action arising from the same events.

Clow v. Deily · filed 1997-02-10

It is well settled that New York courts would not bar an action seeking damages for a violation of civil rights based on a prior action brought pursuant to Article 78.

Section 1983 actions are subject to the same preclusive effect for prior state court judgments that the rendering state would give those judgments.

Giakoumelos v. Coughlin · filed 1996-06-20

Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give a prior state court judgment the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). This rule applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be precluded by issues resolved in an unreviewed state administrative hearing.

Scott v. Mattingly · filed 1992-08-21

Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the issues before us have already been litigated at least once, and this action is precluded. Any issues which were not litigated and resolved before us or before the district court were litigated and resolved before the Department of Health. An unreviewed administrative hearing can preclude later litigation of the same issues.

A federal court adjudicating a Section 1983 unlawful-arrest claim must give a prior state judgment the same preclusive effect that it receives under state law.

Camarano v. City of New York · filed 1986-10-29

Consequently, New York law would preclude Camarano’s Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, and a federal court is bound under normal circumstances to give the prior state-court judgment the same preclusive effect.

A successful New York Article 78 proceeding does not bar a later § 1983 damages action when the Article 78 court could not properly award the damages sought.

Davidson v. Clement B. Capuano, David R. Harris and Joseph P. Keenan · filed 1986-09-05

Because Davidson could not properly have obtained in the state court Article 78 proceeding the damage relief he seeks here, we hold that his present action is not barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 claims are subject to res judicata when the state and federal proceedings concern the same alleged wrong, but a prior state proceeding does not bar a § 1983 claim based on a different wrong.

E. Robert Gallagher, and Michael Warning and John Houck v. L. Thomas Frye, John E. Peetz, Gerald E. Newfarmer, and Cecil · filed 1980-10-23

In this Circuit, when a party seeks relief in the state court for an alleged wrong, the state court judgment bars the plaintiff from seeking relief on constitutional grounds from the same defendant, for the same wrong, in federal court. ... The rule is applicable to actions brought pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985. ... We therefore hold that plaintiff’s claims for violation of his constitutional rights in connection with the defendants’ attempts to terminate his employment are not barred by res judicata.

Section 1983 actions may be barred by preclusion principles when the same federal constitutional claim was previously litigated to judgment in state court.

Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers · filed 1978-09-29

We agree with the district court that appellant is precluded from proceeding under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not exempt a federal civil-rights action from res judicata or collateral estoppel when a competent state court has already decided the same constitutional issue.

William Thistlethwaite and Sol Lockshon v. The City of New York · filed 1974-05-13

While we recognize the particular nature of the Civil Rights Act and the intent of Congress embodied therein, we are not of the opinion that the trial judge applied the doctrines of res judicata “mechanically” to the facts of this case; further we do not read in the act any intent to foster career litigants. ... Thus, we do not see reason to overturn the judgment of the court below.

Section 1983 claims may be barred in federal district court when the same constitutional claims were actually raised and litigated on the merits in prior state proceedings.

Hammer v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 1977-11-11

When constitutional claims are litigated in state court, res judicata bars their relitigation in federal district court. ... In contrast with the usual rules of res judicata, a constitutional claim is not barred by prior state proceedings simply because it would have been appropriate to litigate the claim in those proceedings. Rather, a constitutional claim is barred only if it was actually raised and litigated in the state court action. ... Accordingly, the instant action is barred by res judicata, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or as a collateral attack on a final state-court judgment when the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional issues in state court.

Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers · filed 1978-01-03

A party who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate constitutional issues before the highest state courts cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a substitute for a right of appeal, or as a means of collateral attack on the final judgment of the state court.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a prior state-court judgment necessarily decided the dispositive issues against the plaintiff.

Winters v. Lavine · filed 1978-01-16

In summary then, we hold that the Appellate Division's decision bars Winters from relitigating here in the context of a § 1983 suit the issue of the constitutionality of the denial of Medicaid benefits for the services of a Christian Science nurse.

Section 1983 permits a federal court to hear constitutional claims that were not actually raised in a prior state-court action; a constitutional issue actually raised there may not be relitigated federally.

Ornstein v. Regan · filed 1978-04-04

On the other hand, our decisions have clearly established that where a constitutional issue has been actually raised in the state court, the litigant has made his choice and may not relitigate that issue in a federal court in a Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to initiate a federal action unless the plaintiff fully presented the federal claims in the prior state court proceeding.

Williams v. Codd · filed 1978-10-24

At the same time, unless it is demonstrated that a plaintiff fully presented his federal claims to the state court he is not barred from initiating a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a substitute for appellate review of a state-court judgment; an independent federal action cannot be used to collaterally attack that judgment.

Barbier v. GOVERNOR, STATE OF NJ · filed 1979-08-22

In the first place, such actions cannot be filed as a substitute for appeal in the usual course.

Section 1983 permits a federal civil-rights action on a constitutional claim despite the plaintiff’s having previously raised that issue in a state criminal suppression hearing.

Johnson v. Alan Mateer, John Holmes, R. A. Dietrich, Steven Crockwell, Betty Lieu, All Individuals · filed 1980-08-07

We hold that Johnson’s assertion in this section 1983 action of his fourth amendment claim that the search of his premises was illegal is not foreclosed by collateral estoppel as a consequence of his earlier assertion of that contention in a suppression hearing in his defense against criminal charges in state court. To rule otherwise in this case would deprive Johnson of his access to a federal forum for his federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata when the constitutional issue was actually raised and passed upon in a prior state-court proceeding.

Rothstein v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1980-09-08

In contrast to the usual formulation of the rule which bars the relitigation of any claim that might have been but was not actually raised and decided, a line of Second Circuit decisions has established that a constitutional claim will only be barred in a civil rights action if the issue was both actually raised and passed upon in the state court proceeding.

Section 1983 claims cannot relitigate an issue already decided in a state criminal proceeding when preclusion principles apply.

Muhammed v. Coburn · filed 1980-12-11

The papers on file in the case show that the issue of voluntariness of the confession was presented and decided, both by the trial court and by the jury, at his New Jersey trial. At least by collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment (since the defendants here were not parties to the criminal cases) this issue is not open for trial in this § 1983 case. It was tried and decided against him.

Section 1983 does not give federal district courts jurisdiction to reverse or modify final state-court judgments.

Kimball v. The Florida Bar · filed 1980-12-18

“This Court has held on numerous occasions that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other theory to reverse or modify the judgments of state courts.”

Section 1983 claims are barred by res judicata only when they were actually decided by a state tribunal, not merely when they could have been raised there.

Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, Etc. · filed 1981-07-06

In a suit brought under section 1983, res judicata will bar only those claims that were “actually decided by the state tribunals,” not those that “could have” or “might have been raised before the state court” but were not.

Section 1983 does not prevent a state-court judgment from having binding effect when the state court had proper jurisdiction and gave the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate their federal claims.

Korup v. Flaherty · filed 1981-10-27

nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights.

State-court judgments receive the same preclusive effect in Section 1983 constitutional litigation that they receive in the rendering state’s courts.

Florian v. Highland Local School District Board of Education · filed 1983-09-15

The doctrine that federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as would be accorded those judgments in the state courts from whence they emerged is likewise applicable in actions bringing constitutional challenges which originate from civil disputes.

A Section 1983 plaintiff is precluded from relitigating issues that were or could have been presented in a prior state-court proceeding.

Merriman Construction Co. v. County of Geauga · filed 1983-10-18

Since ... Allen, ... the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed that a § 1983 plaintiff “is precluded from relitigating not only the issues which were actually involved in the [state] proceeding, but also the issues which he might have presented.”

A factual issue fully and fairly adjudicated in state criminal proceedings may be barred from relitigation in a later Section 1983 action under the state’s collateral-estoppel rules.

Baker v. McCoy · filed 1983-10-14

Turning to the second issue, it is the opinion of this Court that the operation of collateral estoppel in the case at bar establishes, as a matter of fact, that defendants did not beat plaintiff in Room 1 prior to giving his statement. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff bases his claim that his constitutional rights were violated on the alleged beating in Room 1 prior to giving his statement, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A Section 1983 action may be barred by state issue preclusion when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and no special circumstances justify relitigation.

Robert Vance, D.O. v. State of Utah · filed 1984-10-01

We must determine whether Utah law precludes relitigation of the issues presented in his § 1983 action and whether there are any special circumstances which would warrant a departure from the general rule barring such relitigation. ... We agree with the district court that the Utah preclusion law bars the relitigation of the issues raised. ... The appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues to be decided. The case presents no special circumstances which would entitle him to relief.

Collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a Section 1983 action when the issues were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Tyler v. Milt Harper, Cris Egbert and Gary McConnell · filed 1984-10-23

The state court gave Tyler an opportunity to prove that the appellees intimidated his alibi witnesses and he failed; we cannot grant him a second opportunity in this section 1983 action.

A plaintiff who could have raised a Section 1983 theory in prior state litigation cannot omit it there and then bring a separate federal action on the same claims.

Casagrande v. James Agoritsas, Etc. · filed 1984-11-19

Appellants’ decision, therefore, not to include § 1983 as support for their claims in the state court proceeding may not now provide a justification for bringing a separate federal court action.

A federal court may not give preclusive effect in a Section 1983 action to a collective-bargaining arbitration award, particularly when the state court did not decide the underlying state-law property issue after Pullman abstention.

Kovats v. Rutgers · filed 1984-12-04

Since under McDonald a federal court may not give preclusive effect to an arbitration decision, and since the state court, after Pullman abstention, did not address the state law issue properly before it--whether the regulations create a property interest in tenure--the district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the state adjudication. On remand the district court should address the property issue.

A federal court hearing a Section 1983 action must give a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect that the rendering state’s courts would give it.

Brister v. Parish Of Jefferson · filed 1984-12-06

Under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, ... a federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect that a court of the state in which the judgment was rendered would give it. ... This rule applies in all federal litigation, including actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot relitigate claims of bribery and perjury that he had a full and fair opportunity to raise during his state criminal trial and appeals.

Taylor v. Detective Fitzroy Douglas · filed 1985-05-13

Upon consideration of the district court record in light of the arguments presented by the parties in their appellate briefs, this Court concludes that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit because he had a full and fair opportunity to present his charges of bribery and perjury during his state criminal trial and appeals thereof which he failed to do.

A state-court judgment on a constitutional issue precludes relitigating the same issue as the basis for a federal § 1983 damages action when state preclusion requirements are met.

Mears v. Town of Oxford · filed 1985-05-22

All these requirements are met and Mears may not now re-litigate the same issue as the basis for his § 1983 action for damages in federal court.

Federal courts determine the preclusive effect of state judgments in Section 1983 actions under the state's preclusion law.

Beltran v. State of Cal. · filed 1985-09-19

... this court must apply the preclusion ... law of California.

A § 1983 civil-rights claim is not precluded by a prior criminal conviction when it involves different issues and seeks redress for constitutional violations by state officials.

Wall v. Heath · filed 1985-10-17

To accept defendants’ argument on claim and issue preclusion would effectively abrogate § 1983 as a method of challenging unconstitutional action whenever a criminal conviction resulted from such state action. This court cannot wittingly do so.

A federal court assessing preclusion of a § 1983 claim must give a prior state-court judgment the same preclusive effect that the rendering state’s law would give it.

Cimasi v. City of Fenton, Missouri · filed 1986-01-03

a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.

Res judicata bars a Section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating constitutional issues that the plaintiff raised and lost in prior state child-neglect proceedings.

Lesher v. Lavrich · filed 1986-02-18

Appellants raised each of the constitutional issues in their § 1983 action as a defense to the neglect proceedings in the juvenile court. Affirmance of the juvenile court by the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, and dismissal of the appeal by the Ohio Supreme Court, indicate that the courts of Ohio have conclusively found that the challenged child protection proceedings comported with the requirements of the due process clause.

A state-court judgment receives the same claim- and issue-preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that it would receive in the rendering state's courts.

Prizio v. City of Revere · filed 1986-02-28

Thus, the beginning and end of this Court’s inquiry must be whether the Massachusetts courts would find Prizio’s suit barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

A state judgment that has been reversed on appeal loses its preclusive effect and cannot support dismissal of a Section 1983 claim.

Ewing v. Huntington National Bank · filed 1986-03-20

Under Ohio law, a judgment loses all preclusive effect when it is set aside or reversed on appeal.

Prior state-court judgments receive preclusive effect in later federal Section 1983 actions.

Falk v. State Bar of Michigan · filed 1986-04-10

Section 1983 actions in federal court are not immune from the preclusive effect of prior state court judgments.

State-court review of an administrative decision triggers full-faith-and-credit preclusion of a later Section 1983 action, even though administrative proceedings alone would not.

Sharpley v. C.W. Davis · filed 1986-04-15

While the resort to administrative proceedings alone does not preclude subsequent federal action, subsequent state court review will bar a later federal action.

A state-court judgment receives the same preclusive effect in a federal Section 1983 case that the judgment would receive in the rendering state's courts.

Devargas v. Robert Montoya, Antonio Devargas v. Clyde Malley, Roberto Montoya · filed 1986-07-08

The state court judgment is entitled to the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would be given in the New Mexico courts.

A state-court judgment has the same preclusive effect in a federal Section 1983 action that it would have in state court.

St. George's School of Medicine v. Department of Registration & Education of Illinois · filed 1986-07-30

A state court judgment has the same preclusive effect in a § 1983 action brought in federal court as it would have in a state court action.

A state-court judgment receives the same preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that another court of that state would give it.

Freeman v. Ramada Inn, Inc. And Detective Jenney and Detective Balogh, Defendants · filed 1986-10-02

[U]nder the Full Faith and Credit Act [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738] a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.

A prior state-court judgment receives the same claim- and issue-preclusive effect in a later Section 1983 action that the rendering state’s courts would give it.

Dr. Victor L. Leal v. Robert Krajewski, Individually and as Superintendent of Schools of the City of East Chicago · filed 1986-10-14

Even if the present federal suit states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 still applies.

Res judicata bars a § 1983 action when a final state judgment involved the same cause of action and parties or privies, including issues that could have been raised there.

Hartke v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1986-10-16

In short, then, there is privity between the plaintiffs-signatories of this case and the plaintiffs (including a signatory) in the Lipinski case. Since all three prerequisites of res judicata are thus present, res judicata applies and bars this action.

Section 1983 claims brought in federal court remain subject to issue preclusion and claim preclusion based on prior state-court judgments.

Lawrence v. McGuire · filed 1987-01-08

Claims brought in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not exceptions to the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

A state agency’s adverse factual determination precludes a later § 1983 action when the agency acted judicially, the issues were properly before it with an adequate opportunity to litigate, and state courts would give the determination preclusive effect.

Kirkland v. City of Peekskill · filed 1987-01-16

Elliott ... teaches, then, that a state agency’s resolution of factual issues adverse to the complainant will bar a federal court action brought under the Reconstruction civil rights statutes if (1) the state agency was acting in a judicial capacity; (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them; and (3) the courts of the particular state would give the agency’s factfinding determinations preclusive effect.

State-law claim-preclusion rules apply to § 1983 actions, and a § 1983 theory arising from the same factual footing is not necessarily a different cause of action from the prior state claim.

Gregory v. Drury · filed 1987-01-27

The court closed that door in ... Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, ... noting that “the policy concerns underlying § 1983 would [not] justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and the claim preclusive effect of state-court judgments.” ... We rejected the suggestion that a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was necessarily a different cause of action from a state cause of action for tort drawn from the same facts.

A prior New York Article 78 judgment does not claim-preclude a later federal § 1983 damages action arising from the same facts when damages were unavailable in the Article 78 proceeding.

Davis v. Halpern · filed 1987-03-09

Both Davidson and Giano expressly held that a New York plaintiff is not barred from seeking damages, in federal court, on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment on the same underlying facts in an Article 78 proceeding requesting injunctive or affirmative relief. The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights suits such as this one.

A state-court probable-cause finding precludes relitigation of probable cause in a later Section 1983 action when the accused had and used a full opportunity to contest the issue at a preliminary hearing.

Edward Coogan and Margaret Coogan v. City of Wixom, Bruce Kirby and Philip Leonard · filed 1987-06-01

However, where the state affords an opportunity for an accused to contest probable cause at a preliminary hearing and the accused does so, a finding of probable cause by the examining magistrate or state judge should foreclose relitigation of that finding in a subsequent § 1983 action.

State-court preclusion applies in Section 1983 actions only to claims or issues that were actually litigated or could have been litigated with a full and fair opportunity; a dismissed criminal charge does not preclude an unlitigated false-imprisonment issue.

Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court Nickie Hornsby and William Stoll · filed 1987-06-04

This principle applies to civil rights actions under section 1983 with respect to issues actually litigated (collateral estoppel or issue preclusion) and issues which could have been but were not litigated in the state court proceeding (res judicata or claim preclusion). ... Giving preclusive effect to state court judgments is, however, inappropriate “where the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court.” ... Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is not applicable in the present case because neither the validity of the summons nor the legality of the arrest was litigated or decided in the prior state court proceeding.

Issue preclusion applies in Section 1983 actions, but it does not bar relitigation when the prior state court may have applied a different burden of proof to the issue.

Cinelli v. City of Revere · filed 1987-06-11

It is well established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). ... Because it is unclear whether the state courts imposed the proper burden of proof, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude Cinelli from litigating the question of prejudice in this action.

A final state-court judgment can bar a later Section 1983 action when the federal suit merely reasserts the same claims under a new statutory label.

Prince Lewis, Jr. v. East Feliciana Parish School Board · filed 1987-06-26

We have already determined that the allegations presented to the Louisiana courts and the allegations presented here are the same. Accordingly, an identity of demand exists, and res judicata is applicable. ... However, in our case, Lewis does not present a new theory of relief, but only reasserts his previous claims under § 1983.

The ordinary rules of claim and issue preclusion apply to § 1983 actions, with a prior state decision receiving the preclusive effect prescribed by state law.

Wicker v. Board of Education of Knott County, Kentucky · filed 1987-08-14

The Supreme Court has held that the same preclusion principles govern a section 1983 action as any other kind of action.

A state agency's adverse factual findings preclude a later § 1983 action when the agency acted judicially, the issues were properly before it with an adequate opportunity to litigate, and state courts would give the findings preclusive effect.

Kirkland v. City of Peekskill · filed 1987-09-11

Elliott teaches that a state agency's resolution of factual issues adverse to the complainant will bar a federal court action brought under the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 in this case) if (1) the state agency was acting in a judicial capacity, (2) the disputed issues of fact were properly before the agency and the parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate them, ... and (3) the courts of that particular state would give the agency's factfinding determinations preclusive effect.

An unappealed final state-court judgment receives res judicata effect and bars a later § 1983 action challenging the same decisions.

Geyer v. H. Victor Millner, Jr. Andrew W. Todd Clarence Edmonds James F. Ingram B.A. Davis · filed 1987-09-14

The court reasoned that Geyer was likewise precluded from maintaining the Sec. 1983 action in federal court, citing Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984), and Mears v. Town of Oxford. Maryland, 762 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir.1985). We agree and affirm on the well-reasoned decision of the district court.

State law governs the preclusive effect of a prior state judgment in a § 1983 action, and under Tennessee law a judgment remains preclusive until reversed or vacated.

Thompson v. Bruce McDonald Warden · filed 1987-10-21

State law controls res judicata issues. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738; Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). In Tennessee, the res judicata effect of a judgment remains in place until a judgment is reversed or vacated.

Offensive collateral estoppel should not preclude litigation of facts in a § 1983 action when the prior unemployment proceeding presented different issues and gave the parties substantially less incentive to litigate exhaustively.

Sewall v. Taylor · filed 1987-11-04

The Court finds, however, that the use of offensive collateral estoppel to preclude re-litigation of the above factual issues would be inappropriate in this case. ... For both parties, there is less incentive to exhaustively litigate in an unemployment compensation hearing the factual issues that are subject to litigation in a subsequent § 1983 action. It would be unfair to permit the use of collateral estoppel under these circumstances.

A fact adequately determined in a state administrative proceeding can have preclusive effect in a later § 1983 action even though the agency could not adjudicate the § 1983 claim itself.

Shoemaker v. City of Bremerton · filed 1987-12-16

While the Commission could not have adjudicated the section 1983 claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, it may have decided an issue of fact that is common to both Shoemaker's petition for reinstatement before the Commission and to his section 1983 claim. If it did, and if the adjudication was adequate under the Restatement standards adopted here, then the issue has been decided for all purposes.

Issue preclusion cannot bar a § 1983 claim against a new defendant when the relevant issue may not have been decided earlier and a full and fair opportunity to litigate depended on joining that absent defendant.

Doerinkel v. Hillsborough Twp. & Hillsborough Twp. Board of Adjustment · filed 1987-12-29

In these circumstances we are satisfied that the district court’s decision barring the action against the Township because of issue preclusion was unjustified. We think that enforcement of principles of issue preclusion against a litigant is not justified when the full and fair opportunity ... to that litigant to have had the issue determined in the earlier action was dependent on an entity which, in fact, was not a party having been joined in the earlier action.

A Section 1983 claim may be barred when a prior state Article 78 proceeding necessarily resolved the same factual issues after a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.

Gould v. Newton · filed 1992-10-05

Upon review of the record, and upon comparison of the claims presented in the Complaint here and in the Article 78 petition considered by the Appellate Division, I find that the facts and issues are identical and that Plaintiff therefore is barred from relitigating these issues in federal court.

A prior state habeas denial can preclude a prisoner from relitigating a procedural due process challenge in a § 1983 action.

Zarate v. James Rowland, Director B.J. Bunnell, Warden L.R. Snider J. Negrete J.F. Austin Charles D. Marshall, Wa · filed 1998-04-24

The district court did not err by concluding that the state court's denial of Zarate's petition for a writ of habeas corpus precluded Zarate from challenging his placement in the SHU as a violation of his procedural due process rights in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies, but an adverse state administrative decision may preclude a later § 1983 suit.

Hatler v. Tuolomne County · filed 2003-10-30

Hatter was not required to exhaust his remedies in state court-indeed, he could have filed his action immediately in federal court after the building components were destroyed. But when he sought relief before the board, he voluntarily opened up the possibility that, unless he managed to prevail before the board or in his administrative mandamus action, the board’s conclusions would be binding.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil action challenging a warrantless arrest, but a state conviction that necessarily includes probable cause can bar the later claim.

Cameron v. Fogarty · filed 1985-08-20

This same rule applies to a § 1983 action predicated upon a warrantless arrest. ... Thus, although a finding of probable cause to arrest was not necessary to sustain plaintiff’s conviction, see United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), under the law of New York, that conviction, sustained on appeal, necessarily includes a finding that there was probable cause to arrest and thereby bars a subsequent civil suit challenging the existence of probable cause for the arrest.

Section 1983 requires an affirmative link between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation of rights.

(PC)Petillo v. Monique · filed 2022-01-25

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify individual state actors personally involved in or responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation; a generic designation such as “medical staff” is insufficient.

Niewiedzial v. Robinson Medical Staff · filed 2021-08-19

Section 1983 imposes liability on individual state actors for deprivations of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights. ... Liability hinges on personal involvement in or responsibility for a constitutional deprivation, so the plaintiff must identify individual state actors in connection with his claims. ... Plaintiff’s designation of “Robinson medical staff” is insufficient to state a claim against any individual(s), even at screening.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a defendant who violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

CAIBY V. FERGUSON · filed 2020-10-26

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ... However, he has failed to identify a defendant or defendants who violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law; a defendant against whom the complaint makes no allegations is dismissed.

Tallman v. Gugler · filed 2020-05-04

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law. ... There are no allegations against a John Doe defendant, therefore that individual will be dismissed from the complaint.

Section 1983 requires facts plausibly connecting an individual defendant to the alleged harm or linking a private corporation’s liability to its custom or policy.

High v. Silverdale Core Civic of America · filed 2019-09-26

Specifically, the amended complaint again does not set forth specific facts to support Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the mold is making Plaintiff’s mental health problems worse, allow the Court to plausibly infer that any of the named Defendants is personally responsible for the mold at Silverdale and/or the failure to remove the mold, or allege that the mold has resulted from a custom or policy of Silverdale/Core Civic America. In other words, Plaintiff has simply failed to provide any facts, including but not limited to the official positions of the individuals he has named as Defendants, from which the Court can even plausibly infer that that these Defendants may be liable for Plaintiff claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims require personal involvement by the defendant in conduct under color of state law that deprived the plaintiff of federal rights.

McDonald v. McCracken · filed 1974-12-19

It is a fundamental rule of law that an official will not be liable for damages in a civil rights case unless it is demonstrated that he directly and personally participated in the conduct under color of state law which deprived the plaintiff of his rights, privileges or immunities as secured to him by the federal constitution. Indeed it is an essential element in a case of this kind that the particular defendant be personally involved in the denial of the constitutional right.

Section 1983 liability requires an official to have directed or personally participated in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Needleman v. Bohlen · filed 1974-12-20

Liability under § 1983 will lie where it is shown that the official charged directed or personally participated in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 liability may be adequately alleged when defendants are claimed to have known or should have known of, or personally directed, unconstitutional procedures, rather than being named only under respondeat superior.

Black v. Brown · filed 1975-03-20

This is more than a mere respondeat superior theory and it is a sufficient allegation for section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on prison officials without a showing that they were personally involved in the constitutional violation.

Collins v. Bordenkircher · filed 1975-11-03

The Court agreed with defendants Ready and Faulkner that they cannot be held liable for damages without some showing that they were personally involved.

Section 1983 damages liability requires proof that the defendant participated in, or knew of and acquiesced in, the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

United States Ex Rel. Bennett v. Prasse · filed 1976-02-25

These cases require proof of participation or knowledge and acquiescence in the allegedly offending conduct.

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant was personally responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Horowitz v. Anker · filed 1977-09-07

At the outset, it must be noted that liability of a defendant for deprivation of civil rights under § 1983 is predicated only upon a sufficient showing of that defendant’s personal responsibility for the claimed constitutionally impermissible conduct.

Section 1983 imposes liability when a defendant's conduct has a causal connection to the deprivation of federal rights; supervisory officials may be liable when an adopted policy affirmatively causes the violation.

University of Missouri at Columbia-National Education Ass'n v. Dalton · filed 1978-09-11

This “personal involvement” prerequisite to liability under § 1983 is perhaps more correctly stated in terms of a causation test. ... It is, therefore, quite clear that the individual defendants, as members of the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, by adopting a policy of not permitting use of University facilities by unions or associations which have as one of their major goals collective bargaining with the University, caused, or was an affirmative link in causing, Chancellor Schooling and President Ratchford to deny plaintiffs their request that they be permitted to utilize campus facilities for UMC-NEA purposes. ... Consequently, defendants may be held answerable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the actions taken by various University officials which are the subject matter of this lawsuit.

Section 1983 requires personal participation by the defendant in the alleged constitutional violation; a supervisor is not liable solely because of a subordinate’s acts.

Mingo v. Patterson · filed 1978-09-12

This circuit has consistently recognized that “personal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.”

Section 1983 liability requires proof that the official personally acted in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights and cannot rest solely on respondeat superior.

Gardner v. Zahradnick · filed 1978-10-25

Liability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show the defendant's personal involvement in the activities that allegedly deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Carwile v. Ray · filed 1979-11-26

The law is clear that in order to successfully impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show personal involvement by the putative defendant in the activities that allegedly deprived plaintiff of any constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires an individual defendant's personal involvement in the deprivation and does not impose liability merely for failing to prevent unlawful conduct.

Himmelbrand v. Harrison · filed 1980-02-05

An individual defendant’s mere failure to prevent unlawful conduct — despite his knowledge of it and despite his probable ability to prevent it — is not sufficient personal involvement to warrant § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be responsible for the alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Galda v. Bloustein · filed 1980-06-12

The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint against a defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be that the particular defendant is responsible for the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, not that the particular defendant is strategically situated in the bureaucratic structure so that he can provide a convenient channel for communication to the other individuals involved in the litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public officials for a private person's abuse absent affirmative state action or the officials' personal involvement in the deprivation.

Davis v. Casey · filed 1980-07-02

The complaint does not allege that the named defendants abused Rochelle— nor that affirmative state action played any part in her ordeal. The complaint does not allege that Rochelle’s attacker was employed or supervised by — or even known to — the defendants. Accordingly, it fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and the motions of all defendants for summary judgment are allowed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional injury for that defendant to be held liable.

Bruner v. Bates · filed 1980-09-09

The suit is based upon an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as the Civil Rights Act. In order for any of the defendants to be held under that Act, personal involvement must be shown.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation and does not impose liability under respondeat superior.

United States Ex Rel. Sommer v. Dixon · filed 1981-10-09

There has to be a personal involvement and the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires a defendant's personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation for a damages award, and respondeat superior does not apply.

Carter v. Parsons · filed 1981-11-25

Since personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged deprivation would be required ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a prerequisite to an award of damages and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, there could be no recovery against the defendant.

To state a claim under § 1983 for monetary damages, a plaintiff must show the personal involvement of each defendant.

Franklin v. Israel · filed 1982-04-29

With respect to the claims for monetary damages, plaintiff is required to show the personal involvement of each defendant in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking recovery to allege and prove each defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Stoute v. Berman · filed 1982-11-01

Finally, the plaintiff seeks money damages against the defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires allegations and proof of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation as a prerequisite to recovery.

Section 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation and does not permit liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Lowe v. Carter · filed 1982-12-29

Since defendants are the persons responsible for conducting the monthly administrative segregation reviews, it is clear that there is sufficient 42 U.S.C. § 1983 personal involvement in this case. Therefore, the respondeat superior defense is rejected.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages against a defendant who neither participated in nor was responsible for the plaintiff's guilty plea and sentencing.

Stuart v. Lockhart · filed 1983-05-26

In short, even if the trial court, the State, or the plaintiff’s attorney failed to inform him fully of the applicability of Act 93, the defendant in this case neither took part in, nor is responsible for the taking of the plaintiff’s guilty plea and the imposition of sentence. The defendant therefore, cannot be liable for damages pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who did not participate in the challenged conduct.

Barada v. Pioneer Fellowship House · filed 1983-06-01

The other named defendants cannot be made liable under § 1983 for these defendants’ conduct.

Section 1983 liability may be assessed against officials only when they were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation.

Greer v. DeRobertis · filed 1983-07-18

As both sides recognize, Section 1983 liability can be assessed against officials only if they were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, in this case the imposition of disproportionate punishment.

Section 1983 liability for a student's suspension rests on the official personally responsible for the deprivation and not school-board members who did not participate.

Boyd v. Board of Directors of the McGehee School District No. 17 · filed 1985-06-14

Given the fact that it has been the custom and practice of the Board of Directors of the MeGehee School District to delegate to the head football coach the responsibility to supervise the selection of the homecoming queen each year and the proof further demonstrates that the board members did not personally participate in the suspension of Johnson, the Court holds that only Coach Gill may be held accountable to Johnson and Mason for the deprivation of their First Amendment rights under this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant to have personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional violation.

Tucker v. Dickey · filed 1985-07-23

However, such inferences are clearly insufficient to establish personal responsibility as an undisputed fact, and personal responsibility is a requirement for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability for discriminatory public employment requires the defendant's personal involvement or participation in denying civil rights.

McAdoo v. Toll · filed 1985-08-19

... liability under § 1983 is conditioned on a showing of some personal involvement or participation in the denial of civil rights.

Section 1983 liability cannot be imputed through respondeat superior to defendants who were not personally involved in the alleged violation.

Green v. Johnson · filed 1985-11-04

Plaintiff has alleged personal involvement by only one of the named defendants, Nurse Gonzales. The district court correctly noted that liability may not be imputed to the remaining defendants on the theory of respondeat superior.

Mere negligent disregard by supervisory officials is insufficient to establish section 1983 liability.

Flood v. Lane · filed 1986-06-10

mere negligent disregard is inadequate to establish Section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement and cannot rest on respondeat superior; adjudicative officers are also protected by judicial immunity for their judicial acts.

Johnny West v. Roberts · filed 1986-10-20

The hearing officer was properly dismissed from the action on the basis of judicial immunity. ... The Commissioner was not Commissioner at the time of appellant's alleged wrongful deprivation. Having no personal involvement in the proceedings, he cannot be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 damages require a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the constitutional deprivation, ordinarily through the defendant's personal participation.

McDonald v. Krajewski · filed 1986-11-13

It is apparent from the language of the statute that a causal connection must exist between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of constitutional rights before the defendant is liable under § 1983. Under the statute, a deprivation becomes actionable only when the defendant “subjects” or “causes to be subjected” another individual to deprivation of any of his rights, privileges and immunities.

State officials are not subject to Section 1983 liability unless they affirmatively participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Kim King and Kent Norman v. Atiyeh · filed 1987-04-08

State officials are not subject to suit under section 1983 unless they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Beard v. Michael Dutton, James Vandever, Lt. Crary, Rosa Johnson, Joe Sargeant, Charles Tracy, and Alvis Hut · filed 1987-06-11

In an interlocutory order dated November 15, 1985, the district court properly dismissed the complaint regarding those defendants against whom plaintiff did not allege personal involvement in the unconstitutional activities alleged in the complaint.

Section 1983 causation includes setting in motion acts by others that the defendant knows or reasonably should know will cause a constitutional injury.

Merritt v. MacKey · filed 1987-09-16

The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires direct or indirect involvement by the named defendant.

Ross v. Arnold Hopkins, Commissioner of Corrections · filed 1988-02-17

Ross failed to show any direct or indirect involvement on the part of his named defendant, as is necessary to assert a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 damages require the defendant’s personal involvement in or knowledge of the alleged constitutional deprivation; supervisory status alone does not establish liability.

Gomez v. Coughlin · filed 1988-04-20

It is clear that personal involvement or knowledge of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award for damages under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires personal responsibility for an alleged constitutional deprivation; members of a state correction commission with only oversight and grievance review duties are not liable for prison conditions without personal involvement.

Brody v. McMahon · filed 1988-04-27

The express function of the Commission of Correction is to insure public awareness of conditions within the State Correctional facilities. Its responsibility is one of adequate and effective oversight. There is no hiring, firing, or disciplinary power over any supervisory staff or personnel of the correctional facilities. There is no direct power to control or direct the customs and policies of the facilities. To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, there must be some showing of personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional deprivation, and plaintiff has to allege direct and personal responsibility for the purported unlawful conduct of subordinates.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation; merely filling out a disciplinary report at another official’s direction does not suffice.

Salahuddin v. Harris · filed 1988-04-27

Egger, on the other hand, is alleged only to have filled out the disciplinary report at Capuano's direction. This is exactly the lack of personal involvement addressed by Williams. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted dismissing the case against Egger.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrong, which may be shown by personal direction or by actual knowledge and acquiescence alleged with particularity.

Rode v. Dellarciprete · filed 1988-04-28

Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.