42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 conspiracy claims require specific material facts; vague and conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

Haynes v. Harris · filed 1999-05-21

From a review of the allegations contained in Haynes’ complaint, we find that they are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Haynes’ allegations lack the requisite material facts and specificity necessary to sustain a conspiracy claim. His allegations also fail to allege a class-based conspiracy for § 1985(3) purposes. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Haynes’ claims under § 1983 and § 1985(2) and (3).

A reference to § 1983 does not establish a claim unless the plaintiff pleads it.

Lillbask Ex Rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi · filed 2000-09-29

Plaintiff also refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, she fails to actually plead this claim currently. ... For this reason, a § 1983 claim is not recognized.

A complaint sufficiently pleads a § 1983 claim by citing the section and alleging that municipal officials violated federal constitutional rights under color of state law.

Murphy v. Zoning Commission of Town of New Milford · filed 2002-08-30

Thus, it does not make sense to argue that, despite the citation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the allegation that defendants’ acts “were done ... under color and pretense of state law” [Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 27], plaintiffs assert federal constitutional claims but have not sufficiently alleged a claim under § 1983. Rule 8 requires no more notice than what plaintiffs have provided.

A plaintiff seeking relief for a constitutional violation must plead § 1983 when it provides an available remedy.

Mitchell v. City of Houston TX · filed 2003-01-07

Without pleading 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mitchell has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A complaint may be treated as a Section 1983 claim even if it does not cite the statute.

Lucas v. Benny O. Hodges, Administrator, Lorton Reformatory · filed 1984-03-23

It is not necessary that § 1983 be cited in the complaint.

Section 1983 encompasses a claim alleging that defendants acted under color of state law to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Miller v. Henderson · filed 1984-11-20

In its order of 11 October 1983, the court found that plaintiffs complaint alleged the defendant appellees acted under color of state law so as to violate plaintiffs constitutional and other rights, and on that basis the court properly concluded the complaint alleged a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action; vague, conclusory allegations alone are ineffective.

McMillan v. Sheriff Eugene Barksdale, Chief Administrator Tom Lomax, and Joseph McCartie · filed 1986-12-09

Standing alone, such conclusory allegations are wholly ineffective to give use to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides the civil action used to seek relief for constitutional rights deprivations, and failing to invoke it can subject the complaint to dismissal.

Mitchell v. State of Texas · filed 2004-06-30

However, assuming that the claims are not barred, Mitchell’s failure to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 subjects the complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

A pleading must state a cause of action under § 1983 to support a claim under that section.

Westbrook v. Treon · filed 2004-12-16

Westbrook did not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of federally protected rights; a complaint can implicate it by identifying the underlying constitutional right without citing the statute.

Keating v. University of South Dakota · filed 2005-08-22

Although Keating neglected to specify that his action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute does not create substantive rights, it is “merely a vehicle for seeking a federal remedy for violations of federally protected rights.” ... Keating clearly identified the underlying constitutional right allegedly infringed upon by Defendants, thus necessarily implicating § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim must be alleged in the complaint; it cannot first be raised in a cross motion for summary judgment.

Landano v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1994-09-22

The court determines that plaintiff has not properly asserted a Section 1983 cause of action. Plaintiff did not allege a Section 1983 claim in its complaint and cannot raise this on a cross motion for summary judgment.

A § 1983 complaint must sufficiently allege deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution.

Weldon v. Cywinski · filed 2007-03-29

Furthermore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a complaint must sufficiently allege a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights action to proceed when the substance of the claim supports a remedy under it, even if the section was not specifically pleaded.

Jones v. Flowers · filed 2008-04-17

We are persuaded by the overwhelming federal court precedent holding that substance prevails over form when a party fails to specifically plead an action under § 1983.

A petition amended to incorporate a complaint alleging a § 1983 claim can properly plead the elements of that claim.

Guardianship of Hurley · filed 1985-04-16

The plaintiff also filed a complaint which clearly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Probate Court allowed the plaintiff to amend his petition to incorporate this transferred case by reference. ... We conclude that the amended petition properly alleged the elements of a claim under § 1983.

A complaint can state a § 1983 retaliation claim without citing § 1983 if its factual allegations support relief.

Parmelee v. O'NEEL · filed 2008-06-19

Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of Washington's criminal libel statutory scheme, Parmelee established a cognizable retaliation claim in his pleadings. Although he did not cite to § 1983 or case law supporting such a claim, he refers to the "retaliatory intent" of DOC employees repeatedly. ... This language constitutes a claim for retaliation. Parmelee pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to give individual defendants notice that they are being sued under the section.

Giles v. University of Toledo · filed 2008-07-16

the issue in this case is whether the individual defendants had notice that they were being sued under § 1983—not whether the elements of a claim had been presented in the complaint.

A plaintiff need not cite § 1983 by number when the claim alleges that state actors infringed constitutional rights and seeks an injunction.

Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School District of Grand Rapids · filed 1987-12-16

This is so because we have determined that the plaintiffs did in fact assert a § 1983 claim by charging the defendants with the infringement of constitutional rights, in the very language of § 1983, and by seeking an injunction to bring an end to the unconstitutional acts of the state and school board defendants.

A complaint alleging a state actor violated the plaintiff’s privacy does not implicitly assert a Section 1983 claim when it is framed as a claim under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.

Henry v. Myers · filed 2009-02-26

In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint makes no mention of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and we disagree that Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as implicitly including a Section 1983 violation based upon the allegations contained therein.

Section 1983 requires a claimant to allege deprivation of a property or liberty interest without due process of law.

Kahn v. Department of Education · filed 2009-09-08

Applying that standard here, this court finds that petitioner’s claims under 42 USC § 1983 are sufficiently pleaded to survive dismissal. To maintain her claim under section 1983, petitioner must allege that she was deprived of a property or liberty interest without due process of law.

The court reinstated a § 1983 excessive force claim whose pleadings it found sufficient.

Liggon-Redding v. Willingboro Township · filed 2009-09-28

Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs pleadings are sufficient to state an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court shall reinstate this claim on remand.

A pro se complaint focused on state tort claims may still be construed to allege claims under § 1983.

Phillips v. Humble · filed 2009-11-27

We agree with the district court that, despite the fact that the substance of Ms. Phillips’s complaint is based on state tort law, her pro se complaint can be liberally construed to allege claims under § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy complaint sufficiently pleads the claim when it gives defendants notice of the parties, general purpose, and approximate date of the alleged conspiracy.

Cooney v. Casady · filed 2010-01-21

These facts are sufficient to meet the pleading requirements for a conspiracy claim in the Seventh Circuit.

A complaint may be treated as invoking Section 1983 when it cites the related jurisdictional statute and all parties construe it as asserting Section 1983 claims.

Ed Ex Rel. Vd v. Tuffarelli · filed 2010-03-02

Although the Complaint relies solely on the jurisdictional statute and not its remedial counterpart, all parties construe the Complaint as asserting claims pursuant to section 1983. ... Consistent with the mandate of Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P., I will deem the Complaint to have invoked section 1983.

A lone reference to acts performed under color of state law does not adequately plead a § 1983 claim.

Mwabira-Simera v. Howard University · filed 2010-03-10

Even under the liberal pleading standard accorded a pro se plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), this single use of the phrase "under color of state law” in this context does not provide adequate notice to the University that Mwabira-Simera means to allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A Section 1983 conspiracy claim must allege who conspired, how they conspired, and how the conspiracy caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Arruda Ex Rel. Arruda v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2010-04-12

To allege a 42 U.S.C. §1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege “which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”

A complaint may state a § 1983 cause of action without expressly naming the section.

Rhode Island Council 94 v. Rhode Island · filed 2010-04-13

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failure to invoke § 1983 is fatal to their claims. However, the Court will construe the Complaint, ... as having plead a proper cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plausible claim that a state actor deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right through purposeful discrimination.

American Federation of State , County and Municipal Employees Local 2401 v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-12

Read in toto and in conjunction with the documents attached to it, plaintiffs’ amended complaint states a plausible claim of purposeful discrimination. ... Plaintiffs’ complaint contains just enough non-conclusory factual matter to “nudge[] [plaintiffs’] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible.” ... Accordingly, the District’s motion is denied as to Count I.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school board to proceed when the amended complaint supports a board policy or custom and the board admits that the challenged conduct was under color of state law.

Thompson v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education · filed 2012-01-18

The Board admitted in its answer that the actions that deprived Ms. Thompson of her alleged property interest were state action and were under color of state law. Additionally, there can be no prejudice when the Board admitted that the actions alleged were state actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 at the outset of the litigation. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that trial court abused its discretion in granting Ms. Thompson’s ore tenus motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence. With the complaint thus amended, we affirm the denial of the Board’s motion to dismiss.

A Section 1983 claim may survive a challenge to the sufficiency of its pleadings when the allegations could support a claim beyond breach of contract.

LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction, Inc. · filed 2012-02-29

Thus, even assuming without deciding that, as Universal Academy contends, “the law does not recognize a viable action under [section 1983] based upon a breach of contract,” we cannot agree that C2 Construction’s petition is insufficient to plead a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 supports a justiciable civil rights claim based on an alleged arrest and detention by city police without probable cause.

Thompson v. Reichert · filed 2012-10-12

Indeed, forgivingly construing Thompson’s complaint in the light most favorable to him,9 Thompson has stated justiciable claims for false arrest,10 false imprisonment,11 and violation of his civil rights under 42 USC § 1983.

A pleading must give fair notice that it asserts a § 1983 claim; references to “color of law” and “violation of civil rights” did not suffice here.

Walters v. Tdcj · filed 2012-10-25

Accordingly, because there was no indication in Walters’ petition or any other trial court pleading that he was raising a § 1983 claim, the trial court did not err in failing to interpret Walters’ petition as a § 1983 cause of action.

A plaintiff cannot obtain relief under Section 1983 when the complaint does not state a claim under it.

Backus v. City of Parkersburg · filed 2013-11-05

Mr. Backus’s complaint does not mention, much less state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 Monell claim alleging that an official policymaker was deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional practices can survive dismissal when the allegations meet ordinary pleading standards.

Ohlrich v. Village of Wonder Lake · filed 2014-05-20

While the court acknowledges these allegations barely satisfy the federal pleading standards and state a claim that is facially plausible, at this stage in the litigation the court finds them sufficient.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for unlawful state action in appropriate circumstances.

Gage Stidham v. Industrial Commission · filed 2015-05-14

Section 1983 provides, in appropriate circumstances, a cause of action under federal statute for ... unlawful state action. While in his complaint Stidham referenced section 1983 as a basis for the court’s jurisdiction, even under the most liberal reading of his complaint, he stated no facts to support a claim under this section and did not ask for damages as a consequence of unlawful state action. Merely referencing section 1983 under the heading “jurisdiction” does not state a claim under that section.

Section 1983 claims must be pleaded with enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

McLin v. Ard · filed 2015-05-19

McLin’s § 1983 claim that his Fourth Amendment right against unconstitutional search was violated could not prevail on allegations merely referencing an arrest warrant. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint fails to adequately plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,” see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, and we remand for the district court to afford McLin an opportunity to amend his complaint.

Section 1983 supports a takings claim when the complaint invokes it and incorporates that invocation into the takings count, even if the count does not name the section.

Cerajeski v. Zoeller · filed 2015-07-24

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 isn’t explicitly mentioned in Count III of the ... complaint, which is captioned “CLAIM FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF (FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE),” par- agraphs 1 and 11 of the complaint invoke section 1983 and are expressly incorporated in Count III; and paragraph B, on the last page of the complaint, also bases the takings claim on that statute.

A Section 1983 complaint states a claim if it alleges that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Thornton v. State · filed 2015-12-22

A § 1983 claim need only allege that “some person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right” and that person “acted under color of state or territorial-law.” ... Thornton’s complaint stated a claim for relief under § 1983.

A complaint adequately pleads a Section 1983 claim when it alleges that enforcement of a challenged law will violate federal rights and seeks declaratory and prospective injunctive relief.

Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Brnovich · filed 2016-03-23

This argument is flatly rejected. Plaintiffs allege that they bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory relief declaring the Act unconstitutional, and for prospective injunctive relief restraining Defendants, and their employees, agents, and successors in office frpm enforcing the Act, which, unless enjoined, will violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Docs. 1 ¶¶ 1-4.and § VI; 81-1 ¶¶ 1-4,and § VI.) Nothing more is required.

A § 1983 race discrimination claim is not forfeited merely because the plaintiff fails to expressly cite the Equal Protection Clause when the allegations make the claim clear.

Smith v. City of Inkster · filed 2016-03-25

Given this, the district court’s unilateral conversion of Smith’s § 1983 race discrimination claims into § 1983 due process claims was error. And for the same reasons, Smith’s unexplained failure to expressly reference the Equal Protection Clause in the context of his § 1983 claim does not rise to the level of forfeiture.

Section 1983 conspiracy claims need not be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b), but the plaintiff must identify the parties, purpose, and approximate date of the alleged conspiracy.

Thomas v. City of Blue Island · filed 2016-04-04

Despite Defendants’ argument to the contrary, Plaintiff need not allege § 1983 conspiracy claims with particularity under Rule 9(b) because they are not grounded in fraud, although a plaintiff must set forth the parties, the purpose, and the approximate date of the alleged conspiracy.

A complaint must assert or plausibly allege a § 1983 claim before the court will consider whether that claim avoids state governmental immunity.

Lu v. University of Utah · filed 2016-08-16

Lu additionally contends that the district court should have ruled that UGIA immunity is waived for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. But as the district court correctly noted, Lu’s complaint doesn’t assert or plausibly allege a § 1983 claim.

A detainee states a § 1983 claim by alleging that jail personnel denied adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ANDREWS, RICHARD T. v. COUNTY OF CAYUGA · filed 2016-09-30

Accepting as true the facts as alleged in the amended complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Board of Trustees of IBEW Local 43 Elec. Contrs. Health & Welfare, Annuity & Pension Funds v D’Arcangelo & Co., LLP, 124 AD3d 1358, 1359), we conclude that plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights to adequate medical care by jail personnel is sufficient basis for the assertion of a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Powlowski, 102 AD2d at 583-584; cf. Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 281-283, rearg denied 15 NY3d 841).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege conduct under color of state law that deprived the plaintiff of a federal right.

Andrews v. County of Cayuga · filed 2016-09-30

“[I]t is well established that[,] in order to state a claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States” (Kennedy v St. Barnabas Hosp., 283 AD2d 364, 366 [2001]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff made the requisite allegations here.

Section 1983 permits a claim against individual officers when the complaint alleges unlawful entry, physical injury, wrongful arrest, and action under color of law.

Abreu v. New York City Police Department · filed 2017-05-02

Plaintiff alleges that members of the New York City Police Department knocked down the door of his apartment, upon information and belief, without a warrant, struck him repeatedly, causing him injuries, and wrongfully arrested him, and that each of the individually named defendants was acting under color of law. These allegations state a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 (see Delgado v City of New York, 86 AD3d 502, 511 [1st Dept 2011]).

A court may construe a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim pleaded without a reference to § 1983 as a § 1983 claim when the omission is an easily corrected pleading defect.

Doe v. University of Colorado, Boulder ex rel. Board of Regents · filed 2017-05-26

There is no dispute that a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim may be brought under § 1983. ... For purposes of this Order, the Court will construe the second cause of action as a § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 complaint must give the defendant notice of how it deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right while acting under color of law.

Chapman v. AFSCME Council 31, Local 3477 · filed 2019-01-16

Counts II and III clearly fail to put Defendant on notice of the allegations against them, including for example how Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs (Count II) or deprived Plaintiffs of a constitutional right while acting under the color of law (Count III).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the rights violated and provide facts supporting the claim.

Mena v. City of New York · filed 2019-04-29

Thus, in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify which rights were violated and provide sufficient factual allegations to support those claims.

A § 1983 retaliation claim may be dismissed when an amended complaint fails to name the officials who allegedly retaliated or allege sufficient facts to state the claim.

Francis v. City of New York · filed 2019-05-03

And Plaintiff fails to name as defendants any individuals who retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights or allege sufficient facts to state a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

A pro se complaint alleging constitutional violations can be construed as a § 1983 claim even when it does not name the statute.

DOYLE v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH · filed 2019-10-23

Although the Plaintiff does not specify that he is bringing his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, I construe his pro se Complaint alleging constitutional violations as employing this cause of action.

A complaint may be treated as a § 1983 claim to enforce § 1981 when its allegations give the defendant notice of that claim, even if it does not cite § 1983.

Edwards v. City Of Selma · filed 2019-10-24

In sum, based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint is imbued with the hallmarks of a § 1983 claim as described in King and his Complaint should be treated as one in which he seeks redress of a violation of § 1981 "under" § 1983.

Section 1983 claims based on vague, conclusory allegations without supporting facts are subject to dismissal without prejudice.

Sirleaf, Jr v. Clarke · filed 2020-03-16

Therefore, any such vague and conclusory claims under the Equal Protection Clause and “42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 [and] 1985(3)” are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and are subject to dismissal without prejudice.

A pro se complaint alleging violations of federal constitutional rights may be treated as a Section 1983 suit even if it does not name the statute.

DADE v. FERGUSON · filed 2020-04-22

Thus, despite not mentioning it by name, Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the First, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Superintendent Ferguson and other unknown Defendants.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts connecting a defendant’s acts to a deprivation of rights; conclusory assertions that rights were violated do not state a claim.

Cheek v. Lundquist · filed 2020-08-21

As explained above, simply stating a legal cause of action supported by only conclusory statements that one’s rights were violated does not suffice to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a complaint to cite it expressly when the complaint identifies the constitutional right allegedly violated and the city's conduct.

Haddon v. City of Cleveland · filed 2020-08-25

Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Brief in Opposition have clearly asserted the right affected and the allegedly unlawful conduct by the City that caused the violation, the Court finds the Complaint alleges a constitutional violation despite the fact that Plaintiffs never expressly invoked § 1983.

A § 1983 method-of-execution claim that functions as a second or successive habeas petition is subject to the procedural requirements for successive habeas claims.

Felker v. Turpin · filed 1996-11-13

Guided by Gomez v. United States District Court, 503 U.S. 653, 112 S.Ct. 1652, 118 L.Ed.2d 293 (1992), as interpreted by Lonchar v. Thomas, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 1301, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996), we conclude that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is subject to the procedural requirements for bringing a second or successive habeas claim.

A § 1983 claim challenging a method of execution may be treated as a successive habeas petition and subjected to its procedural requirements.

Ellis Wayne Felker, Larry Grant Lonchar v. Tony Turpin, Wayne Garner, John Doe · filed 1996-11-13

We treat Plaintiffs’ § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim as the functional equivalent of a second habeas petition, ... and apply the rules regulating second or successive habeas petitions.

A § 1983 claim that is the functional equivalent of a second habeas petition is subject to the rules for successive habeas petitions.

Hill v. Hopper · filed 1997-04-17

As Hill's § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim constitutes the "functional equivalent" of a second habeas petition, the district court was subject to the law applicable to successive habeas petitions.

A § 1983 challenge to an execution procedure that seeks an immediate stay may be treated as a successive habeas petition.

Nelson v. Campbell · filed 2003-10-08

Pursuant to Fugate, we conclude that Nelson's § 1983 claim also constitutes the "functional equivalent" of a second habeas petition as it seeks an immediate stay to the imposition of Nelson's death sentence.

Section 1983 does not cover a state prisoner's personal restraint petition that would formerly have been filed as a writ of habeas corpus.

In re the Personal Restraint of White · filed 1980-04-21

This action was originally filed as a personal restraint petition under RAP 16.4. Under prior law, this would have been filed as a writ of habeas corpus, and not within the scope of the Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, counsel's motion for attorney's fees is denied.

A court may construe a prisoner’s habeas petition challenging conditions of confinement as a Section 1983 civil rights complaint, but may decline to do so when the petition lacks information needed for that complaint.

Dalton v. Koenig · filed 2019-10-28

A district court may construe a habeas petition by a prisoner attacking the conditions of his confinement as pleading civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Nonetheless, the Court declines to do so here for the following reasons.

Recharacterizing a pro se habeas petition as a § 1983 claim requires warning the litigant of the consequences and giving the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend.

Winburn v. Lindsey · filed 2019-11-01

Here, the Court recharacterized Petitioner’s § 2241 claim as a § 1983 claim. ... Although the Sixth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, this Court finds the reasoning of the Seventh, Eight, and Ninth Circuits persuasive and holds that it erred in recharacterizing Petitioner’s claims without his informed consent.

A district court must consider whether an improperly styled habeas petition can be converted to a § 1983 complaint.

Richardson v. Board of Prison Hearings · filed 2019-11-21

When faced with an improperly styled habeas petition, the district court must still consider whether the claims are amenable to being converted to a § 1983 complaint.

A court need not convert a habeas petition into a § 1983 complaint or allow amendment to pursue § 1983 claims.

Volpicelli v. Warden of LCC · filed 2020-01-21

Nettles does not require this Court to recharacterize the Petition as a § 1983 complaint or to provide him an opportunity to amend so he can attempt to state colorable § 1983 claims.

A court may construe a habeas petition as a § 1983 complaint when the petition is amenable to conversion on its face.

Reed v. Johnson · filed 2020-07-27

When a habeas petition is amenable to conversion on its face, federal courts may construe the petition to plead causes of action under § 1983.

A court may convert a habeas petition into a § 1983 action only if the petition names the proper defendants and seeks proper relief.

Garcia v. R.J. Johnson · filed 2020-08-12

Generally, a court may recharacterize a habeas petition as a civil rights complaint only if the petition is amenable to conversion to a § 1983 action “on its face,” that is, if the petition names the correct defendants and seeks the proper relief.

A court should not recharacterize a habeas petition as a Section 1983 claim.

Dillon v. Wolf · filed 2020-11-12

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that recharacterizing habeas petitions as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is improper.

In a § 1983 employment discrimination claim, a defendant avoids all liability by proving it would have taken the same action without discriminatory intent.

Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 1996-11-20

However, with regard to employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this affirmative defense effects a total avoidance of liability, such that if a defendant proves that it would have taken the same action in the absence of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.

Section 1983 permits a complete defense to an employment discrimination claim when the employer proves it would have made the same decision without considering race.

Peoples v. Florida Department of Children & Families · filed 1998-09-30

It is a complete defense to an action under § 1983 that a defendant employer would have reached the same decision anyway, even in the absence of racial discrimination.

Section 1983 provides no relief for a discrete government decision when the government would have made the same decision without the impermissible criterion.

Texas v. Lesage · filed 1999-11-29

Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.

A § 1983 employment termination claim fails if the employee would have been terminated for a legitimate reason even without the protected conduct.

Gerberry v. Maricopa County · filed 2006-03-28

A § 1983 employment termination claim cannot succeed if the plaintiff-employee would have been terminated for a legitimate reason anyway.

In a § 1983 wrongful-discharge action, the employer may assert failure to mitigate lost wages as an affirmative defense to back pay.

Coleman v. Lane · filed 1996-11-26

The employer may then assert as an affirmative defense the employee’s failure to mitigate his losses.

Section 1983 permits court-ordered reinstatement with back pay to protect a municipal employee’s right to a pretermination hearing.

Kenyon v. Town of Westerly · filed 1997-05-30

Since Kenyon’s purported discharge by the chief was invalid and since the council did not order her reinstated with pay pending the hearing, the action of the court was necessary in order to protect her right to a pretermination hearing. ... This action was properly taken under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 603 U.S. 115, 119-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061,1065-66, 117 L.Ed.2d 261, 269-70 (1992); Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 635 (1978), and therefore the trial justice was correct in holding that Kenyon was entitled to a counsel fee for such legal expense as may have been incurred in order to achieve her reinstatement, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A § 1983 plaintiff must mitigate damages, but the defendant bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Wolfe v. Village of Brice, Ohio · filed 1998-03-17

While it is true that in a § 1983 case, the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages, it is also clearly established that defendant has the burden of proving a failure to mitigate damages properly.

Section 1983 damages cannot be reduced for failure to post bond when doing so would require a detainee to divert rent money and risk eviction.

Lawson v. Dale Trowbridge, Wendell Howland, and Lee Robarge · filed 1998-07-28

This much is certain — while there may be a case wherein the mitigation instruction used here has a place, this isn’t the one. We have found no other court (probably for good reason) requiring a defendant to divert committed funds in order to avoid suffering injury at the hands of his jailors. Creating a bigger crisis (eviction) by solving the immediate one is not an opportunity for mitigation, even if we did not factor in Lawson’s conceded mental illness.

In a Section 1983 damages action, a plaintiff’s alleged failure to mitigate may be submitted to the jury.

Tri Cty Indust Inc v. DC · filed 2000-01-18

Here, we agree with Tri County that its alleged failure to mitigate was an issue properly submitted to the jury.

In a § 1983 damages action, a disputed claim that the plaintiff failed to mitigate its loss is properly submitted to the jury.

Tri County Industries, Inc. v. District of Columbia · filed 2000-03-08

Here, we agree with Tri County that its alleged failure to mitigate was an issue properly submitted to the jury.

Section 1983 damages are subject to a mitigation defense, and the defendant bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff failed to act reasonably under the circumstances.

Tri Cty Indust Inc v. DC · filed 2000-06-09

Moreover, failure to mitigate is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it bears the burden of demonstrating the opposing party's failure to act reasonably under the circumstances.

Section 1983 does not allow back pay damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Baynton v. Wyatt · filed 2006-01-25

A defendant sued in his or her individual capacity is not liable for back pay damages in a § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must mitigate damages by accepting comparable work, but an illegally demoted employee need not accept inferior employment.

Roberson v. Mullins · filed 1995-01-30

Although a plaintiff in a § 1983 action has a duty to mitigate damages and cannot refuse to accept a comparable or substantially equivalent position, ... an illegally demoted employee is not required to accept alternative employment of an inferior kind.

Section 1983 damages claimants may have to reapply to the defendant employer to mitigate damages when only that employer’s jobs are substantially equivalent.

Grace v. City of Detroit · filed 2007-01-31

Courts have generally treated remedies under § 1983 and Title VII as comparable. ... On that issue, we find that the district court did not err in determining that the plaintiffs were required to reapply with Detroit in order to mitigate damages, in light of its finding that employment with Detroit was unique, and the nature of the constitutional violation established.

Section 1983 permits back pay as part of reinstatement, reduced by the plaintiff’s actual interim earnings.

Dean v. Timpson Independent School District · filed 1979-08-21

The decisional law in this circuit, as well as in other circuits, lends equal support to a computation of back pay offset by actual earnings. ... Therefore, the Court awards Ouida Dean back pay in the amount of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE DOLLARS AND FORTY-TWO CENTS ($41,183.42), an amount which represents the total amount of earnings and retirement she would have received, less the ■amount of her actual interim earnings at Angelina College.

Section 1983 makes concurrent civil rights violators jointly and severally liable for an indivisible injury and places the burden of apportionment on a defendant seeking to limit liability, even when other wrongdoers are absent.

Northington v. Marin · filed 1996-12-31

These rules apply in § 1983 actions. Persons who concurrently violate others' civil rights are jointly and severally liable for injuries that cannot be apportioned. ... We conclude the burden of proof also shifts to the defendant under those circumstances, whether or not all wrongdoers are before the court.

Section 1983 requires responsibility for personal wrongdoing and does not permit joint and several liability.

Estate of Smith v. Michigan · filed 2003-02-07

Additionally, there is no joint and several liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 requires a showing of responsibility for personal wrongdoing.

Liability for damages in § 1983 cases is generally joint and several.

Sowell v. Northrop · filed 2011-10-24

The general rule in § 1983 cases, however, is that liability is joint and several.

Section 1983 permits liability for a state actor who willingly participates with another state actor in a deprivation of rights, regardless of the extent of that participation.

Sampson v. Schenck · filed 2013-09-13

It follows then that a state actor willingly participating in a joint action with another state actor can be liable for deprivation of rights under § 1983, no matter the extent of the participation.

Section 1983’s compensation and deterrence purposes preclude defendants in this civil rights claim from using Texas’s responsible-third-party procedure to avoid joint and several liability.

Johnson v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-02

Application of the Texas proportionate responsibility scheme in this case involving allegations of deliberate indifference would frustrate the two primary goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — compensation and deterrence.

Section 1983’s compensatory and deterrent purposes preclude using Texas’s responsible third party designation to reduce defendants’ liability for this civil rights claim.

Wallace v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-02

Application of the Texas proportionate responsibility scheme in this case involving allegations of deliberate indifference would frustrate the two primary goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — compensation and deterrence.

For a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim, defendants cannot use Texas’s responsible third party designation to avoid joint and several liability and full compensation.

Duque v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-02

However, for the purposes of this civil rights claim, the Court finds it would be inconsistent with federal law to permit the defendants to invoke § 33.004 to avoid joint and several liability and in turn avoid fully compensating plaintiff for his injuries.

Section 1983’s compensation and deterrence purposes bar a responsible-third-party designation that would let defendants avoid joint and several liability in this deliberate-indifference claim.

Sink v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-02

Application of the Texas proportionate responsibility scheme in this case involving allegations of deliberate indifference would frustrate the two primary goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — compensation and deterrence.

Section 1983’s compensation and deterrence goals preclude a state rule that would let defendants avoid joint and several liability for a civil rights claim.

Porter v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-03

Application of the Texas proportionate responsibility scheme in this case involving allegations of deliberate indifference would frustrate the two primary goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — compensation and deterrence.

A conviction resulting from a guilty plea is a defense to a § 1983 claim that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Rice v. Barnes · filed 1997-01-15

Application of the common-law principle precludes Plaintiff from maintaining his claim under § 1983 based upon a lack of probable cause for his arrest.

A conviction upon a guilty plea can bar a § 1983 false-arrest claim arising from the same incident.

Tucker v. Gross · filed 1999-03-11

In the Court’s view, under the circumstances presented here, the fact of the plaintiffs conviction upon his guilty pleas prevents him from recovering on a Section 1983 or a New York common law claim for false arrest.

Probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to a false arrest claim under § 1983.

Edwards v. Pretsch · filed 2002-01-11

The existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to a false arrest claim under § 1983.

A conviction for the offense for which a person was arrested is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim that the arrest lacked probable cause.

Bell v. McCord · filed 2000-05-11

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude the District Court’s rulings are proper. See Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 225 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Good reason to deny leave to amend exists if the amendment would be futile.”); Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 11 (8th Cir. 1990) (adopting common-law rule that conviction of offense for which arrest is made is complete defense to § 1983 action asserting arrest was made without probable cause).

A § 1983 false arrest claim may proceed despite an outstanding conviction when success on the claim would not imply that the conviction is invalid.

Reynolds, Richard v. Jamison, Dawn · filed 2007-06-08

In the present case, Reynolds’ § 1983 claim for false arrest does not impugn the validity of his underlying conviction for the offense of telephone harassment. Whether Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest Reynolds has no bearing on the validity of his subsequent guilty plea and criminal conviction.

A criminal conviction establishes probable cause and defeats a Section 1983 false arrest claim unless the conviction was obtained improperly, even if it is later overturned on appeal.

Myrick v. Cooley · filed 1988-09-06

Despite these doubts about the wisdom of the rule we now apply, we nevertheless are compelled by the established precedent to conclude that, in the absence of a showing that the District Court conviction of Myrick was obtained improperly, the conviction establishes, as a matter of law, the existence of probable cause for his arrest and defeats both his federal and state claims for false arrest or imprisonment.

A guilty plea to a lesser charge stemming from an arrest establishes probable cause and bars a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Cintron v. Doe 1 · filed 2019-09-03

His conviction, which “resulted from his guilty plea to a lesser charge, precludes recovery under § 1983 for false arrest since it establishes that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest.” Allison v. Farrell, 97-CV-2447 (DAB), 2002 WL 88380, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002).

Section 1983 provides an adequate remedy for constitutional violations by state actors, precluding a duplicative implied constitutional damages claim.

Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority · filed 1997-03-06

Additionally, a Bivens-type claim is not available to plaintiff, since Bivens was designed to remedy constitutional violations committed by federal agents, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for state action.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce a federal statutory right when the underlying law provides administrative review but no incompatible comprehensive enforcement scheme.

ASW v. Oregon Ex Rel. Department of Human Services · filed 2005-09-12

The mere availability of administrative review mechanisms to protect Plaintiffs’ interests cannot defeat their ability to invoke § 1983.

Pennsylvania state courts and their divisions are not persons subject to suit under § 1983 and generally have Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.

Warren v. Lehigh Cnty. Court of Common Pleas · filed 2019-01-15

State courts in Pennsylvania are not considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983 and, in any event, are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court because they are institutions of the Commonwealth.

Section 1983 treats an Ohio common pleas court as an arm of the state, so it cannot be sued as a county entity.

Mumford v. Basinski · filed 1997-03-07

Consequently, an Ohio common pleas court is not a segment of county government, but an arm of the state for purposes of section 1983 liability and Eleventh Amendment immunity analyses.

A state cannot be sued in federal court in a § 1983 action.

Milligan v. Kitzhaber · filed 1997-05-21

At the time of the motion, Milligan had named only the State of Oregon as a defendant, which cannot be sued in federal court. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion, because Milligan could not demonstrate any chance of success on the merits.

A State is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Auston v. State of North Carolina · filed 1997-06-05

In addition to the Eleventh Amendment hurdle, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Auston's § 1983 suit because the state of North Carolina is not a proper "person" against whom a § 1983 action may be brought.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Wilson ex rel. Hinn v. North Carolina · filed 1997-06-30

Defendant correctly argues that the State of North Carolina is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and that, therefore, plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the state cannot succeed.

States are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Warren v. United States · filed 1997-09-03

Although Warren named the State of Oregon as a defendant, states are not "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Scannell v. City of Seattle · filed 1997-10-24

The district court did not abuse by granting summary judgment to Washington State, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983), ... AFFIRMED.

A state is not a person amenable to suit under section 1983.

Huddleston v. Demo · filed 1997-12-18

It is settled law that a state is not a person amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the State of Illinois because the state is not a person under the statute.

Smith v. Coyne · filed 1998-01-12

As for the State of Illinois, it is not a “person” suable under Section 1983 in any event (Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a school district as a municipal corporation.

Stewart v. Wappingers Central School District · filed 1980-05-16

Thus, in light of Monell, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Wappingers School District was sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss and must therefore be reinstated.

A State is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

White v. State of Colorado · filed 1998-06-23

The State of Colorado is not a “person” subject to suit pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

White v. State of Colo. · filed 1998-06-23

The State of Colorado is not a "person" subject to suit pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state entities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Mattas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · filed 1983-12-15

In addition, state entities are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore, cannot be sued under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against Washington State in state court for its agents’ alleged civil rights violations because the State has not consented to such a suit.

Rains v. State · filed 1983-12-22

Furthermore, we hold the State has not waived its immunity and has not consented to being sued in state court for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against a state or a state official in an official capacity.

United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. Lynch · filed 1999-03-12

Moreover, § 1983 does not even authorize a suit for damages against a state or against a state official in his official capacity.

A state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Re v. New Vistas · filed 1999-04-01

Moreover, Re may not bring claims against the State under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983 because the state is not a “person” within the meaning of these statutes.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a jail because a jail is not a person under the statute.

Preval v. Reno · filed 1999-06-22

Moreover, the Piedmont Regional Jail is not a “person,” and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Bowden Building Corp. v. Tennessee Real Estate Commission · filed 1999-07-20

A state, however, is not a “person” as contemplated by section 1983, and may not be sued under the statute.

Section 1983 permits actions against persons, but a state is not a person subject to suit under the section.

Boise Cascade Corp. v. State Board of Forestry · filed 1999-11-10

Section 1983 actions may be brought against “persons,” but a state is not a “person” for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Randolph v. Maryland · filed 1999-11-18

The State cannot be liable for damages because it does not qualify as a “person” for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a State.

Speers v. State · filed 2000-02-17

First, a State is not subject to suit in section 1983 actions (Cavanaugh v Doherty, 243 AD2d 92) and, therefore, issues relative to a State’s immunity from suit in its own courts were not directly relevant in an action such as Felder which involved a municipal defendant.

A state is not a person that may be sued under § 1983.

Mittendorf v. Purkett · filed 2000-04-03

Finally, we conclude the district court properly denied Mr. Mittendorf permission to add the State of Missouri as a defendant. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (state is not “person” under § 1983); Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (Missouri has not waived sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Pahk v. Hawaii · filed 2000-07-25

Because states are not persons for purposes of section 1983, Pahk’s claims for involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts V, VI, and VII) could not have been brought in either state or federal court.

A state is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Sjuts v. State · filed 2000-12-15

First, the State was not a proper defendant in a § 1988 suit. That statute provides a cause of action against every “person” who under color of state law subjects the plaintiff to a deprivation of his or her civil rights. It is long-settled that a state is not a “person” for purposes of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a direct suit against a state.

Hawkins v. Rhode Island Lottery Commission · filed 2001-01-31

The state, of course, could not be sued directly under section 1983.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Comfort Ex Rel. Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee · filed 2001-02-12

Furthermore, actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not lie against a state because they are not considered “persons” for purposes of the statute.

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against states because states are not persons under the statute.

American Society of Consultant Pharmacists v. Patla · filed 2001-02-27

Moreover, it is well settled that “section 1983 does not authorize suits against states (states not being “persons” within the statute’s meaningf.]”).

Section 1983 does not treat a state as a person who can be sued under the statute.

Arsberry, Katie v. State of Illinois · filed 2001-03-19

The State of Illinois is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.

A state is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Wilde v. Montana · filed 2001-03-28

Upon de novo review of this 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Wilde’s action against the State of Montana.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or a state officer sued in an official capacity as a person subject to suit.

Leland v. State of Maine · filed 2001-04-06

Neither the State of Maine nor Trooper Kaspereen in his official capacity! are “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against a state university or its board when they are arms of the state.

Hosty v. Governors State University · filed 2001-04-30

Governors State and the board are arms of the state and may not be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit civil rights deprivation claims against an arm of a state in federal or state court.

Hill v. State Board of Control · filed 2001-05-31

Because the State Board of Control is an arm of the State of California, the district court correctly dismissed Hill’s claim against the Board because he may not pursue civil rights deprivation claims against such entities in federal or state court.

Section 1983 does not treat a State as a person subject to monetary damages.

Connelly v. Kansas Highway Patrol · filed 2001-07-20

While Goldbarth does not speak of waiver, it is clear that the State cannot become a person under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where monetary damages are claimed.

A state is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.

Welch v. State · filed 2001-08-27

Nevertheless, a state is not a “person” acting under color of law, as defined in 42 USC 1983 (see, Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58; Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn. on Regulation of Lobbying, 83 AD2d 723, affd 56 NY2d 656).

Section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against states, including claims against state agencies and state officials in their official capacities.

Brewer v. Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation Services · filed 2001-10-16

Brewer’s official capacity claims and her claims against the DVR, a state agency, may not proceed because § 1983 does not authorize damages suits against states.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Campbell v. Hamilton County, Ohio · filed 2001-10-17

Indeed, a state is not deemed a “person” who may be sued under § 1983.

A municipality such as the CTA may be sued under § 1983.

Bosco v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2001-10-18

Both parties agree the CTA is a duly organized body politic and corporate and a political subdivision of the State of Illinois created and existing under the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act; therefore, as a municipality the CTA may be sued under a Section 1983 theory.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state university that is a state entity because it is not a “person” under the statute.

Hill v. Board of Trustees of Michigan State University · filed 2001-11-16

In addition, as a state entity, MSU is not a “person” subject to suit for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Marino v. Gammel · filed 2002-03-15

It is well-established that a state is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a state is not a “person” within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a State because a State is not a “person” under the statute.

Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga. · filed 2002-05-13

That is because Lapides’ only federal claim against the State arises under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that a State is not a “person” against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted. ... Hence this case does not present a valid federal claim against the State.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a state because a state is not a “person,” even if it has waived immunity.

Garcia v. Richard Stockton College of New Jersey · filed 2002-07-11

A state is not a “person” that may be sued under § 1983, regardless of whether the State has waived its immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against a State because a State is not a person under the statute.

Lyles v. State · filed 2002-09-26

However, since Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. (436 US 658), it has been settled that the State is not “a person” within the meaning of section 1983. ... Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal constitutional claims set forth in paragraphs 24, 26, and 28 of the claim; therefore they are dismissed.

A state is not a person subject to suit under Section 1983.

Ross v. Illinois · filed 2002-09-26

The State of Illinois is not a “person” under sections 1983 and 1985 and is thus not subject to suit.

Section 1983 does not permit a state to be named as a defendant because a state is not a person under the statute.

Illinois Association of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks and Real Estate and William A. Darr · filed 2002-10-21

Yet a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and therefore may not be named as a defendant in a suit under that law.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons subject to liability.

Bailey v. Blumenthal, No. Cv02-0812552s (Jan. 16, 2003) · filed 2003-01-16

Further, neither state nor state officials sued in their official capacities are persons within the meaning of § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities.

Bank of Lake Tahoe Joseph Bourdeau v. The Bank of America State of Nevada, Financial Institutions Division Robert Geerha · filed 2003-03-14

The constitutional claims for monetary relief fail under the well-established principle reiterated in Lapides: A state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a state because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Baker v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2003-04-29

Furthermore, actions under § 1983 do not lie against a State because they are not considered “persons” for purposes of the statute.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state for deprivation of civil liberties.

Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. Rhode Island · filed 2003-05-28

This Court recognizes that § 1983 often provides a litigant with a federal forum in which the party can seek redress for deprivations of his or her civil liberties, but § 1983 does not permit a litigant to seek a remedy against a state for those same deprivations.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim for money damages against a state because the state is not a person under the statute.

Omosegbon v. Wells · filed 2003-07-14

While we agree that those claims cannot go forward, there is no need to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue, because the state is not a "person" that can be sued in this way under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim for money damages against a state because a state is not a person under the statute.

Howard v. City of Detroit · filed 2003-07-14

To the extent that the plaintiffs seek monetary damages under § 1983 from the State of Michigan, this claim fails because "a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be asserted.”

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against states.

Williams v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2003-07-15

Suits against states for damages should be resolved on the ground that they do not come within § 1983, not because states are protected by the Eleventh Amendment.