42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities when Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.

Pena v. The State of New York · filed 2020-06-24

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks monetary damages under Section 1983 against any of the defendants in their official capacity, such claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Anthony v. Baldwin · filed 2020-06-25

To the extent that Anthony is seeking monetary damages, he cannot pursue official capacity claims against any of the individual defendants.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued only in their official capacities.

Mathis v. Lozier PER LTS PRO SE CAN SUBMIT FILINGS TO THE ECF EMAIL BOX - PER 11 MINUTES - PLT TO BE SERVED BY E · filed 2020-07-02

However, § 1983 monetary damage claims against defendants acting in their official capacities are barred, “either by the Eleventh Amendment or because in these capacities they are not ‘persons’ for § 1983 purposes.”

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Harvey v. Russell · filed 2020-07-07

The court will grant that relief because Harvey may not obtain money damages from defendants in their official capacities under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a policy or widespread custom to hold a county official liable in an official-capacity suit; one plaintiff’s experience alone does not establish such a custom.

Boyes v. Simmons · filed 2020-07-07

That Plaintiff, himself, has been subject to drone surveillance does not constitute a widespread custom.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Sublett v. Smith · filed 2020-07-08

In contrast, claims for money damages brought against defendants in their official capacities are not cognizable in § 1983 lawsuits because neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons for purposes of § 1983. ... Therefore, to the extent Sublett seeks compensatory and punitive damages against any defendants in their official capacities, his claims are DISMISSED.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state, its agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the section.

GRENDELL v. STATE OF MAINE · filed 2020-07-10

Accordingly, the Defendants’ Partial Motions to Dismiss are granted as to the § 1983, § 1985(3), § 1986, and Maine Civil Rights Act claims brought against the State of Maine, the Maine State Police, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Jeff-Anthony Properties, Inc. v. Alviti · filed 2020-07-10

However, insofar as it relates to a claim for monetary damages against the defendants’ in their official capacities the motion is GRANTED.! ... 1 The plaintiffs agree that in their official capacities the defendants are not subject to a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Pagan v. Rodriguez · filed 2020-07-12

State officials sued in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are immune from suit for damages pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Howell v. Kemper · filed 2020-07-13

A state is not a “person” from whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 monetary damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

(PC) Caruso v. Hill · filed 2020-07-15

First, the Eleventh Amendment bars monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state or an arm of the state.8 ... To the extent that the Complaint may be read as seeking monetary damages based on an “official capacity” claim, dismissal of such claims is appropriate.

Section 1983 does not treat states or state officials sued in their official capacities as persons when monetary relief is sought.

Fauconier v. Clarke · filed 2020-07-20

Moreover, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits suit against “every person” who deprives an individual of his or her rights under color of state law, neither States nor state officials acting in their official capacities constitute “persons” within the meaning of the statute when sued for monetary relief.

Section 1983 permits a claim in state court against a sheriff or undersheriff in an official capacity.

Freeland v. Erie County · filed 2020-07-24

We agree with plaintiffs that in state court they can assert a section 1983 cause of action against a sheriff or undersheriff in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against state corrections officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Scott v. Rosenberger · filed 2020-07-24

But “DOCCS officials enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under § 1983 for damages in their official capacities.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a private prison operator when its policy or custom directly causes a constitutional violation.

Bumpus v. Howard · filed 2020-07-30

To sustain an official-capacity claim, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that he suffered a constitutional violation; and (2) that a policy or custom of Core Civic directly caused the violation.

Section 1983 official capacity claims against government employees require an allegation that the challenged acts were carried out under an official custom or policy.

Bryson v. Fruehbrodt · filed 2020-08-03

To state a claim that governmental entities are liable for the acts of their employees, a plaintiff must allege that the “acts were carried out pursuant to an official custom or policy.” Id. ... Regarding the remaining defendants, the plaintiff has not alleged that their actions occurred because of an official custom or policy in the prison. The court will not allow the plaintiff to proceed on any official capacity claims.

Section 1983 does not provide damages against state officials in their official capacities because those claims are against the State.

Jasmaine f/k/a Duane L. Fox v. Haynes · filed 2020-08-10

Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities are barred because these are claims against the State itself.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Worley v. Ewing · filed 2020-08-12

The vehicle for asserting Worley’s claims in federal court is § 1983. Thus, the defendants, in their official capacities, are not persons who can be sued thereunder.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Johnson v. Padin · filed 2020-08-16

To the extent Johnson seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, her claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires an entity’s policy or custom to have played a part in a rights violation for an official-capacity claim against its officers.

Hughes v. Ward · filed 2020-08-19

The claims against Defendants in their official capacities, therefore, will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not override state sovereign immunity from monetary claims against state officials in their official capacities.

BROWN v. WETZEL · filed 2020-08-19

Nor did Congress intend by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a sheriff liable for a constitutional violation to allege a policy or custom constituting deliberate indifference to a constitutional right.

Erickson v. Rick Wells · filed 2020-08-26

To impose liability on the Sheriff, the Ericksons must allege facts that would establish that the Sheriff had a policy or custom that constituted deliberate indifference to a right protected by the Constitution.

Alabama corrections officers sued in their official capacities are immune from § 1983 claims for monetary damages.

Johnson v. Kendrick · filed 2020-08-26

And so, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 claims for monetary damages made against them in their official capacity as employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections.

Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; prospective injunctive relief remains available.

Hulsey v. Jones · filed 2020-03-23

However, as the Magistrate Judge properly concluded, the Eleventh Amendment “shields state officials sued in their official capacity and bars all relief sought against official capacity defendants except prospective injunctive relief.”

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials for actions taken in their official capacities.

Rountree v. Aldridge · filed 2020-04-07

The defendants are protected by immunity against damage claims for actions taken in their official capacities. ... Therefore, the court will grant summary judgment for the defendants on all claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities and on the claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA. This finding does not affect Rountree’s claims for injunctive relief and her constitutional claims for damages under § 1983, however.

Section 1983 damages claims against state employees in their official capacities are barred by immunity.

Mendez v. Witherspoon · filed 2020-04-20

Because Mendez is seeking only damages for relief, the state-employee defendants are immune from his official capacity claims.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against state prison officials for actions taken in their official capacities.

Goins v. Kiser · filed 2020-05-18

The defendants are protected by immunity against damage claims for actions taken in their official capacities.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities, but not in their personal capacities.

O'Brien v. Garcia · filed 2020-05-26

While the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989), it does not bar damage actions against state officials sued in their personal or individual capacities. ... Thus, the Court GRANTS Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages against him in his official capacity.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against state correctional employees are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the APA does not waive for state agencies.

White v. Stephenson · filed 2020-06-01

In addition to Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. White’s amended complaint alleges jurisdiction based on his “suffering legal wrong because of agency action,” a direct quote from § 702 of the APA. ECF No. 11 at 3 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). However, Mr. White is incarcerated at Buena Vista Correctional Complex, a prison operated by the Colorado Department of Corrections, not by the Bureau of Prisons or any other federal agency. The APA does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity for state agencies, so I agree with Judge Neureiter that Mr. White’s official capacity claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities when sovereign immunity applies.

Santos v. Wood · filed 2020-06-15

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against defendants, in their official capacity, are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as Plaintiff seeks relief from defendants—state officials—who are immune from suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows money damages against persons, but a state and its officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under the section.

Young America's Foundation v. Berthelsen · filed 2020-08-28

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for damages (see 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 200) cannot be based on their claims against Berthelsen, Clark, Dussault, or Buhta in their official capacities because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits claims for money damages only against “persons,” and neither a state—nor its officials acting in their official capacity—qualify as “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow money damages claims against state correctional officers in their official capacities.

Scozzari v. Tantillo · filed 2020-08-31

Because both defendants work for the DOC, they are immune from money damages suits in their official capacities.

In an official-capacity § 1983 claim against a private contractor’s employees, the contractor’s action or inaction is relevant even if the employees did not personally set staffing levels.

Pewitte v. Hiniger · filed 2020-08-31

In addition, although Schweitzer and Pratt insist that they were not personally involved in determining the staffing level, “it is CCS’s action or inaction that is relevant.”

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against state officials in their official capacities because they are not suable persons.

Bailey v. Moyer · filed 2020-09-01

As a result, the Complaint fails to state a colorable claim for damages under Section 1983 against these Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability only when a government policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Gutierrez v. Hoffman · filed 2020-09-03

“Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs only when a constitutional injury is caused by ‘a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.’” ... Gutierrez’s Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities because he pleads only that Defendants did not follow official policy when he was removed from the vocational work program.

A defense that the State is not a person under § 1983 may remain relevant when a state trooper is sued in his official capacity.

Huggler v. State of Montana · filed 2020-09-11

Mr. Huggler seeks to strike Defendants’ tenth defense which states “[t]he State is not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” The State of Montana has not been served and is no longer a party in this matter but because Mr. Huggler named Trooper Gane in his official capacity, the Court will not strike this defense.

Section 1983 applies only to persons, and officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under the statute.

Doe v. Purdue University · filed 2020-09-15

Though Plaintiff invokes § 1983, that statute only applies to “persons,” and officials sued in their official capacities are not considered persons under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff for a single failure to investigate a constitutional violation.

DeGraw v. Gualtieri · filed 2020-09-21

A sheriff, however, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single failure to investigate a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims against county officials require allegations tying the challenged conduct to an official policy or practice.

Maddox III v. Sather · filed 2020-09-23

As the R&R aptly notes, Maddox fails to allege, let alone provide for a credible inference of a policy or official pattern guiding the behavior of any Defendant named in his suit.

Section 1983 official capacity liability requires facts showing that a policy or custom caused a constitutional violation; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Causer v. Ard · filed 2020-09-29

Where Plaintiffs do expand on their original allegations, they do so in a conclusory manner that lacks the factual support necessary to make out a claim for official capacity liability on the part of Sheriff Ard. Accordingly, the Court finds that Sheriff Ard’s Motion to Dismiss shall be granted.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars monetary relief under Section 1983 against a state employee in his official capacity, but permits claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.

IN v. STROUP · filed 2020-09-30

Stroup is an employee of SCI-Albion; therefore, In’s claims for monetary relief against Stroup in his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice. To the extent In seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply and In may proceed against Stroup in both his individual and official capacities.

Section 1983 generally bars respondeat superior liability for official-capacity claims.

Byrd v. Bryant · filed 2020-09-30

And respondeat superior liability claims are generally barred under § 1983. See Adams v. Wechsler, No. 0:18-CV-00102-HRW, 2020 WL 3714604, at *4 (E.D. Ky. July 6, 2020) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). As such, Bryant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law to the extent that Byrd’s claims are asserted against him in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against an official who can provide the requested relief.

Williams 124345 v. Ryan · filed 2020-10-01

The only Defendant in a position to address Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is Defendant Shinn in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Johnson v. Kind · filed 2020-10-06

But a state is not a “person” against whom the plaintiff may recover monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability against a sheriff who deliberately chooses to enforce unconstitutional state statutes.

Vigue v. Shoar · filed 2020-10-12

But in the wake of Cooper, and with Sheriff Shoar’s deliberate decision to repeatedly enforce §§ 316.2045 and 337.406, Sheriff Shoar may be held liable under § 1983 in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim for injunctive relief against an official responsible for implementing that relief.

Sloat v. Stevenson · filed 2020-10-14

Kenny Benzing (official capacity) shall remain named as a defendant, in his official capacity, based on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief in the Complaint, and he shall be responsible for implementing any injunctive relief that is ordered in this action.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment absent state consent.

Sheppard v. Roberts · filed 2020-10-16

To the extent that Mr. Sheppard seeks monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims.

Section 1983 damages claims against Pennsylvania correctional officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

MCCURDY v. WETZEL · filed 2020-10-16

Mr. McCurdy may not sue these state actors in their official capacity.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require allegations connecting the officers’ conduct to a government policy or custom.

Moten v. Doe Officers 1-6 · filed 2020-10-26

Moten’s allegations do not give rise to a reasonable inference that either Jones or Mitchell acted under any sort of official policy or custom. Accordingly, he has not stated a claim against these defendants in their official capacities and those claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 official-capacity claims require evidence that the challenged arrest resulted from an official policy or custom.

Tyree Bell v. Officer Peter Neukirch · filed 2020-10-28

The claims against the official-capacity defendants fail because there is insufficient evidence that this particular arrest was the result of an official policy of the police department.

Section 1983 claims for money damages against state officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Ortiz v. McVey · filed 2020-10-28

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Ortiz's claims for money damages based on constitutional violations against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state official sued in an official capacity when Eleventh Amendment immunity has not been waived.

Stuckey v. Sturdevant · filed 2020-10-30

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sturdevant in his official capacity for monetary damages is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Jackson v. Acevedo · filed 2020-10-30

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks monetary damages under Section 1983 against any defendant in his or her official capacity, such claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Nash v. Gray · filed 2020-11-02

A state is not a “person” from whom a plaintiff may recover monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... The court will not allow the plaintiff to proceed on his damages claims any defendant in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Brown v. Pfister · filed 2020-11-02

Section 1983 does not allow suits for damages against state officials in their official capacities. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the state, and a state is not a “person” who may be liable for money damages under section 1983.

In this § 1983 suit over jail conditions, amendment of official-capacity damages claims was futile, while individual-capacity damages claims might remain viable.

Fatah v. Bernal · filed 2020-11-03

Ellawendy Abdel Fatah appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants interfered with the practice of his religion while he was incarcerated at Monterey County Jail. ... While we conclude that amendment would be futile as to Fatah’s requests for injunctive relief and his requests for damages against defendants in their official capacities, it is not entirely clear that amendment would be futile as to claims for damages against defendants in their individual or personal capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a state official sued in an official capacity for past conduct because the state is not a person under the statute.

Cangelosi v. Edwards · filed 2020-11-03

In addition to the insurmountable obstacle presented by the Eleventh Amendment, § 1983 does not allow for an award of damages against a state official in his official capacity to redress past conduct because the state is not a “person” in the context of such a claim.

Section 1983 allows monetary damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Nelson v. Dennison · filed 2020-11-04

However, his claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their individual capacities.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.

Larson v. Trooper J M Ross · filed 2020-11-10

The sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action are brought against them in their official capacities. “Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). These claims are therefore subject to dismissal.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Dunmore v. Roop · filed 2020-11-16

Pinally, to the extent Dunmore brings this action against the defendants in their official capacity for monetary damages, such relief is not available via § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Eason v. Pritzker · filed 2020-11-18

Section 1983 does not allow suits for damages against state officials in their official capacities.

State correctional employees are immune from money damages under § 1983 when sued in their official capacities.

Petitpas v. Griffin · filed 2020-11-21

DOC employees are immune from money damages suits in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against states or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons subject to liability under the statute.

Ledergerber v. Blubaugh · filed 2020-11-30

Under long-established Supreme Court precedent, states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats an official-capacity claim as a claim against the government entity and requires its policy or custom to have caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Moody v. Williams · filed 2020-12-01

Because Defendants official capacity liability under § 1983 is the functional equivalent of a suit against the City, Moody must show that an official policy or a custom or practice of the City was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

Section 1983 official capacity claims against municipal employees require an official policy, custom, or action by a final policymaker to establish entity liability.

Hiller v. Ramsey · filed 2020-12-03

A government entity may only be liable for the actions of its employees if those actions were taken pursuant to “official policy.”

Section 1983 does not permit money damages against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Harvey v. Russell · filed 2020-12-09

But “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” ... Thus, any claims for money damages against Coyner in her official capacity will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages against a state officer sued in his official capacity.

Anthony v. Edwards · filed 2020-12-10

However, money damages cannot be awarded against a defendant who is sued in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Walker v. Kiser · filed 2020-12-15

Finally, to the extent Walker brings this action against the defendants in their official capacity for monetary damages, such relief is not available via § 1983.

A § 1983 claim for prospective relief against an official in her official capacity must connect the alleged constitutional violation to a government policy, decision, or persistent practice.

Olavarria v. Jones · filed 2020-12-17

Here, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a § 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against defendant Cohen in her official capacity. Plaintiff does not point any specific, express policy of NCDHHS, decision by NCDHHS, or persistent practice by NCDHHS that allegedly resulted in a constitutional violation committed as part of the denial of his applications or recertifications for SNAP benefits.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim against a government official sued in his official capacity because the official is not a person under the statute.

Davis v. Pavlik, Jr · filed 2020-12-21

Thus, even if Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Pavlik were not barred by sovereign immunity, they would be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Defendant Pavlik, named in his official capacity, is not a person and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity when the state has not waived it.

GILMORE v. WETZEL · filed 2021-01-05

In addition to the reasons already stated, the official capacity claims against these Defendants for money damages may not proceed because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Harmon, Jr v. Williams · filed 2021-01-06

In addition, the Court DISMISSES any and all claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities in this newly consolidated case.

Section 1983 does not allow monetary damages claims against these state prison defendants in their official capacities.

Harmon v. Kilpatrick · filed 2021-01-06

In addition, the Court DISMISSES any and all claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities in this newly consolidated case.

State officials sued in their official capacities are generally immune from monetary damages in Section 1983 suits.

Myton v. Deal · filed 2021-01-06

Additionally, Plaintiff has not stated plausible claims for monetary damages against Defendants sued in their official capacities. State officials sued in their official capacities are generally immune from suit for monetary damages.

Section 1983 does not permit monetary damages claims against these prison officials in their official capacities.

Harmon v. Johnston-Bennett · filed 2021-01-06

In addition, the Court DISMISSES any and all claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities in this newly consolidated case.

Section 1983 official capacity liability requires a plausibly alleged policy or custom that caused the injury; a single incident and later inaction do not suffice.

Dechant v. Grayson · filed 2021-01-07

After a careful review, Dechant does not plausibly allege an official capacity § 1983 claim based on the theory articulated in Monell against either Sheriff Hanks or Undersheriff Grayson. The only well pleaded facts involve his encounter with Undersheriff Grayson (who was not a final policymaker) and actions taken after that encounter. A single incident is not enough to establish a widespread practice or deliberate indifference, and actions taken after the fact can’t form the policy or custom that caused the injury.

A request for nominal damages cannot save a moot § 1983 claim against state officials sued only in their official capacities.

Prowse v. Payne · filed 2021-01-08

Even if we assume Prowse has adequately pleaded a request for nominal damages arising from this claim, in addition to her request for injunctive relief, such a request cannot overcome mootness because she sued the prison administrators only in their official capacities.

State officials sued in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983.

Engel v. Govener of Missouri · filed 2021-01-13

An individual acting for a state in an official capacity is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, officials sued only in their official capacities may be dismissed as duplicative when another official-capacity defendant already represents the state.

(PC) Caruso v. Hill · filed 2021-01-20

Diaz and Foss are sued only in their official capacities. This is the equivalent of bringing suit against the State of California. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002). Montes is sued in both his individual and official capacities. Again, suing Montes in an official capacity is the equivalent of suing the State of California. Thus, the State of California is named as a Defendant three times in the FAC.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against a state official in his official capacity.

Harris v. Mayeri · filed 2021-01-20

The claim for damages against Dr. Mayeri in his official capacity is dismissed without leave to amend because Eleventh Amendment immunity bars such a claim.

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a municipality, so a separately pleaded direct constitutional claim merges into the Section 1983 claim.

ECOGEN, LLC v. Town of Italy · filed 2006-07-11

Thus, the first cause of action essentially merges into plaintiff’s claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a statutory remedy for deprivation of a constitutional right, so a direct Fourteenth Amendment claim merges into the § 1983 claim.

Jenkins v. Trustees of Sandhills Community College · filed 2003-04-25

The Fourth Circuit has explained that a discrimination plaintiff “cannot bring a claim directly under the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not create a cause of action. [The plaintiffs] claim under the Fourteenth Amendment merges into her § 1983 claim because § 1983 merely creates a statutory basis to receive a remedy for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 n. 6 (4th Cir.1995). Thus, Count XVI is DISMISSED.

Section 1983, when available, supplies the cause of action for a Fourteenth Amendment violation and precludes a direct Fourteenth Amendment action.

Moses v. City of Evanston · filed 1996-09-20

We agree with the City that there is no cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment when § 1983 is available.

A properly pleaded § 1983 claim subsumes a duplicative claim brought directly under the Constitution for the same alleged injury.

White v. Salisbury Township School District · filed 1984-03-22

Where, as here, a proper § 1983 claim is alleged, plaintiffs cannot additionally proceed under the Constitution since the latter claim, insofar as it concerns the suspension in issue, is wholly subsumed by the former.

When § 1983 provides a remedy, an implied cause of action directly under the Constitution is unavailable.

Lehman v. Doe · filed 2003-05-21

However, when § 1983 provides a remedy, an implied cause of action grounded directly in the Constitution is not available.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights by state action; a plaintiff must use it before pursuing a direct claim under the U.S. Constitution.

Rodgers v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-04-25

Section 1983 provides a remedy for any person who has been deprived of a constitutional right by state action. Before pursuing a direct claim under the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must utilize section 1983. ... Hence, the direct claim under the U.S. Constitution fails.

A Section 1983 claim brought in California state court is subject to the state anti-SLAPP motion because state procedure governs unless the federal statute provides otherwise.

Bradbury v. Superior Court · filed 1996-10-01

Spencer asserts that section 425.16 does not apply to the civil rights cause of action because it violates federal substantive law. We disagree. ... Where the action is founded on a federal statute and brought in state court, state procedure controls unless the federal statute provides otherwise.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on challenges to prophylactic investigative procedures without a violation of the right to a fair trial.

Alexander v. City of South Bend · filed 2004-05-18

Because Counts I and TV do no more than challenge prophylactic investigatory procedures, this Court holds that Plaintiffs claims are not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for being banned from private property after an acquittal on trespassing charges.

Taylor v. Danville Sheriff's Dept. Jail Div. · filed 1996-10-25

With regard to Appellant's claim that he was improperly banned from private property after being acquitted of trespassing charges, we affirm the court's dismissal of that claim because it is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to clemency procedures seeking a new hearing when that relief would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.

William Lyle WORATZECK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA BOARD of EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1997-06-24

Since Woratzeck’s requested relief would not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372, his suit is cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing when the claim does not challenge the validity of the guilt determination.

Marsh v. Corrections Corp. · filed 1998-01-28

Because we interpret plaintiff’s due process claims to challenge only the procedure by which defendants found her guilty of the major misconduct violation, rather than challenging the validity of the guilt determination itself, plaintiff may assert these claims in this § 1983 action.

Due process and retaliation claims may be noncognizable under § 1983.

Chavaris v. Prunty · filed 1998-02-13

Chavaris' due process and retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim that is not cognizable under § 1983 is subject to dismissal.

Lemoine v. Stalder · filed 1998-05-12

Because we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the dismissal was correct.

Section 1983 does not cover defamation claims that allege no federal statutory or constitutional violation and amount to no more than negligence.

Allen v. Nelson · filed 1998-09-16

Allen’s defamation claims did not allege a violation of a federal statutory or a constitutional right; nor did the defendants’ actions amount to more than mere negligence. The claims were thus not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge procedures for future parole hearings without exhausting state habeas remedies.

Urdiales v. Texas Board of P & P · filed 1999-04-20

Urdiales is correct that the district court erred in characterizing his § 1983 complaint as a habeas action and dismissing it for exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not allow declaratory or injunctive claims so intertwined with a request to stay an execution that a favorable ruling would likely determine the validity of the death sentence.

Martinez v. TX Court Cr Appeals · filed 2002-07-01

However, we find, pursuant to our decision in Clarke v. Stalder, that these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are “so intertwined” with the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief from their impending executions that a favorable ruling on the Plaintiffs’ challenges to Texas’s system for appointing state habeas counsel is likely to effectively determine the validity of their death sentences. Accordingly, these claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's privacy and inaccurate-records claims rather than a section 2241 petition.

Clark v. Chandler · filed 2003-03-27

The district court’s determination that claims like Clark’s are cognizable only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is correct.

Section 1983 does not cover a prisoner’s claim that sounds in habeas corpus.

Cook v. Miller · filed 2003-04-14

We conclude that Cook’s claim was not cognizable under § 1983, and the district court properly construed it as sounding in habeas.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for public employees’ equal protection claims alleging sex discrimination.

Marshall v. Kirkland · filed 1979-08-01

The evidence raises the question of whether defendants violated the right of female teachers, administrators, and applicants to equal protection of the law, a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause claims as fee-supporting claims.

Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Garamendi · filed 2005-03-09

Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause claims are both properly cognizable, fee-supporting claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 covers claims asserting violations of Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause rights.

Gerling Global Reinsurance Corporation of America v. Garamendi · filed 2005-03-10

Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause claims are both properly cognizable, fee-supporting claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims based on the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.

Gerling Global v. Garamendi · filed 2005-06-03

Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause claims are both properly cognizable, fee- supporting claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims about constitutional deprivations in custody, including claims concerning law library access and visits for legal assistance.

Schwamborn v. United States · filed 2007-06-20

Mr. Schwamborn’s allegations are obviously not cognizable under Section 2255, which pertains only to claims by federal prisoners to be released from wrongful detention, not to claims of constitutional deprivations while in federal custody. Rather, these claims are properly cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims for constitutional violations caused by state actors, including excessive force and denial of medical care, while excluding other asserted claims.

Johnson v. Tedford · filed 2007-11-16

However, the only cognizable causes of action the court can discern under § 1983 are for excessive use of force and denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, to the extent the complaint may be read as asserting other claims, they are dismissed.

Section 1983 permits inmates to seek relief for alleged religious discrimination arising from prison officials’ curtailment of clergy visitation.

Father John J. O'Malley v. Joseph R. Brierley, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh · filed 1973-04-30

The inmates’ complaint that the curtailment of the visitation privileges of Fathers O’Malley and Taylor constituted religious discrimination with racial overtones fits the classic mold of a ... claim cognizable under § 1983 for which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim alleging invidious exclusion from a state jury selection process.

Eckstein v. Kirby · filed 1978-06-09

This Court, therefore, is satisfied that the plaintiff has alleged an equal protection claim cognizable under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims based on allegations that present a potentially cognizable civil rights violation.

Bonilla v. Huffman · filed 2010-01-19

Because Bonilla’s allegations fail to give rise to a potentially cognizable claim under § 1983, the district court did not err in denying Bonilla the opportunity to amend his complaint prior to dismissing it.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for failure to hold a hearing required only by an employee handbook.

Mullen v. CITY OF GRENADA, MISS. · filed 2010-03-31

The failure to provide a hearing, required by a handbook, is simply a breach of contract and such a claim is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for state constitutional violations or negligence.

Russell v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2011-04-14

Finally, Russell’s state constitutional claims and negligence claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action and otherwise lack merit for the reasons given by the District Court.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek changes to evidence procedures before making another attempt to challenge his conviction.

Franklin v. Keller · filed 2011-04-20

The majority of Franklin’s claims were properly raised in a § 1983 complaint because he is seeking to have the evidence procedures changed by the court prior to his making another attempt to challenge his conviction.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for state law claims, and the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state official in his official capacity.

Jackson v. Pfau · filed 2013-04-04

The District Court also properly dismissed Jackson’s state law claims against New York Commission on Judicial Conduct administrators Jean M. Savanyu and Robert H. Tembeckjian as not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and properly dismissed Jackson’s Section 1983 claims against state Department of Correctional Services Commissioner Brian Fischer in his official capacity as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 is not a proper vehicle for a claim that civil commitment proceedings breached a plea agreement.

Day v. Seiler · filed 2014-03-26

In addition, to the extent Day contends the SVP proceedings amount to a breach of his plea agreements, this assertion is unavailing because a § 1983 action is not the proper vehicle to bring this claim.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge clemency procedures when success would not necessarily speed release or invalidate the sentence.

Young v. Gutierrez · filed 2018-07-17

Though that is true, Skinner clearly announced a test for determining when a claim is cognizable under § 1983, and Young's claim meets that standard.

Section 1983 permits claims that a criminal law infringes substantive constitutional rights beyond injuries from arrest or prosecution.

Smith v. Dist. of Columbia · filed 2019-05-16

Plaintiffs' Second and Fifth Amendment claims are cognizable under § 1983 since plaintiffs allege §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 afflict substantive rights beyond their arrests and prosecutions.

Section 1983 permits parolees to challenge how a parole condition is implemented when success would not invalidate their sentences.

Tucker v. Hughes · filed 2019-09-17

Because a victory for Plaintiffs would not invalidate any part of their sentences, but would only change the manner in which IDOC implements the restriction on parolees’ Internet use, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim correctly falls under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an ex post facto challenge to parole procedures when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive or declaratory relief.

Tijerina v. Offender Management Review Committee · filed 2004-01-28

His ex post facto argument challenging allegedly defective parole procedures is cognizable under § 1983 to the extent that he seeks only injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 does not make copyright infringement or other tort violations actionable unless they violate a constitutional right.

Gonzalez-Torres v. Roy · filed 2020-01-23

Finally, to the extent Mr. Gonzalez-Torres seeks to sue Lieutenant Roy for copyright infringement or any other tort violations, such claims are not cognizable under § 1983. Only constitutional violations are actionable and compensable under § 1983.

A Section 1983 damages claim challenging a local zoning decision is not subject to a state rule requiring judicial review of that decision within thirty days.

Board of County Commissioners v. Sundheim · filed 1996-10-28

Similarly, imposing C.R.C.P. 106(b)’s thirty-day filing deadline on the Sundheims’ § 1983 action represents a procedural barrier that hinders the exercise of their federal rights.

A § 1983 claim is not subject to C.R.C.P. 106(b)'s 30-day filing deadline when added to a complaint seeking Rule 106(a)(4) review.

Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District · filed 2000-05-22

Moreover, SundRkeim specifically states that a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 may be brought at any time and is not subject to the 30-day filing deadline of C.R.C.P. 106(b). Thus, it was error for the trial court to deny leave to amend the complaint on this basis.

A claim for monetary damages under § 1983 is not subject to Colorado Rule 106(b)'s thirty-day filing deadline, even when it seeks review of a quasi-judicial decision.

JJR 1, LLC v. Mt. Crested Butte · filed 2007-03-22

However, although plaintiffs' claim against the Town for monetary damages under § 1983 seeks review of quasi-judicial decisions, it also requests a "uniquely federal remedy" and, therefore, is not subject to the filing deadline of C.R.C.P. 106(b).

A Florida § 1983 claim has a four-year filing period, and a pro se prisoner’s complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials.

Billy James Lewis, Jr. v. Barnick · filed 2010-07-06

Lewis’s § 1983 complaint filed on March 13, 2009, was untimely as to the 2004 events. When it adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, however, the district court failed to consider or address the status of the 2007 complaint. The 2007 complaint would be timely under the “mailbox rule.”

Section 1983 claims brought by Texas inmates in state court are subject to the state's grievance procedures and its 31-day deadline for filing suit after a grievance decision.

Rojas v. v. Martinez · filed 2018-07-26

In Gilbert v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the court applied this ruling to Texas state laws on administrative exhaustion requirements and held that even when an inmate is asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, all administrative procedures must be “properly and timely complied with.” ... Therefore, Rojas still needed to file his suit within thirty-one days of receiving a response to his Step 2 grievance.

Section 1983 provides the civil rights complaint vehicle for vindicating substantive constitutional rights against state actors.

Golden v. Curry County Adult Detention Center · filed 2019-12-26

Such a filing, however, is not in proper form to assert such § 1983 claims. And a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive vehicle for vindication of substantive rights under the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed when factual allegations, taken as true, adequately support relief for constitutional deprivations.

Moore v. City of Vallejo · filed 2014-10-17

A careful review of the FAC demonstrates that Defendants’ contention that the allegations are merely conclusory and “completely devoid” of underlying factual content is without merit. Plaintiffs allege very clearly that Decedent was disabled and the officers knew this fact. Yet, upon arriving at Decedent’s home at 2504 Alameda Street in the City of Vallejo on October 12, 2012, they failed to take this into account and unjustifiably shot Decedent multiple times while he was unarmed and naked, killing him. These are sufficient allegations of underlying facts, which taken as true, entitle Plaintiffs to relief. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.

A § 1983 complaint need only identify the rights-violating conduct, its timing and location, and the persons responsible for it.

Boykins v. Ambridge Area School District · filed 1980-05-09

The instant Complaint amply meets the Hall test. It alleges the conduct, expulsion from the drill team, the improper racial motive, the times and places of the activity complained of, and the persons responsible, Mrs. Buk, Dr. Vochko, and the members of the School Board. From the facts alleged we can weigh the substantiality of the claim. No more is required.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show action under color of state law and deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights; conclusory allegations that do not show such a deprivation are insufficient.

Aldabe v. Aldabe · filed 1980-04-30

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the appellant must show that the appellee, acting under color of state law, deprived the appellant of rights secured by the Constitution or other federal laws. ... We need not and do not determine whether the appellees acted under color of state law, however, for we have concluded that the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s § 1983 claim should be affirmed on the clearer ground that appellant simply did not allege any facts showing the deprivation of any constitutional or other legal rights. Appellant’s dissatisfaction with the property settlement reached in her prior divorce proceedings, and her conclusory allegations that the appellees had conspired to prevent her from effectively prosecuting her divorce case, are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 supplies a cause of action for a person alleging deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws, and the claim survives dismissal when cited precedent does not require dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Jones v. City of Janesville, Wis. · filed 1980-04-18

In this present private suit (79-C-477), the plaintiff has undertaken to present a second cause of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he has been deprived of rights secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Nevertheless, I cannot say that any of the cases just cited involved a set of circumstances so closely similar to those described in the complaint in the present case as to require its dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state or local law that deprives a person of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law, and a complaint alleging state-sanctioned de jure school segregation states a claim.

Husbands v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1973-05-22

In Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (1963), the Court held that “The statutory prerequisites to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are: (1) that the defendant act ‘under color of’ state or local law, and (2) that the plaintiff be subjected to a ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ” ... This Complaint, therefore, has thereby come within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment and of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ... Under these circumstances it is clear that the plaintiffs’ first cause of action does state facts which constitute the essential elements of de jure segregation.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action seeking relief for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement in a state institution.

Horacek v. Exon · filed 1973-03-22

Taking the allegations as true for purposes of this motion, I am convinced that the plaintiffs have stated at least one claim which is cognizable for review under the Civil Rights Act. The allegations that the conditions of confinement at the Beatrice State Home are violative of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment would appear to fall within the purview of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not make defamation actionable when the alleged conduct does not implicate a federally protected right.

Rosenberg v. Raymond v. Martin · filed 1973-04-27

To the extent that the complaint might be viewed as stating a cause of action for defamation, such a claim does not implicate any federally-protected rights and is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits federal courts to entertain suits seeking to enjoin enforcement of a state law alleged to be unconstitutional.

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre · filed 1972-09-21

Whatever the precise extent of Mitchum v. Foster, it establishes the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to entertain such cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the present one.

Section 1983 supplies the civil-rights claim for alleged deprivations of Fourteenth Amendment rights by state officials performing election duties.

Silver v. Jordan · filed 1965-06-01

The complaint alleged a deprivation of rights under the California Constitution and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is asserted, and we hold, that this court has jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a person acting under color of state law for depriving someone of constitutional rights, and at the pleading stage the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations and reasonable inferences as true.

Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey · filed 1965-07-27

“In determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the court must assume the truth of plaintiff’s factual allegations and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. ... It is readily apparent that plaintiff’s allegations raise serious and substantial constitutional questions regarding the authority and conduct of the Illinois Director of Insurance. The complaint sufficiently satisfies the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) (2) F.R.Civ.P. to withstand -defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.”

Section 1983 reaches state or municipal officers acting in their official capacity and, as this court then held, abrogates official immunity; a complaint must plead particular facts showing an intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights.

Birnbaum v. Trussell · filed 1965-09-24

The statutory condition of defendant's acting "under color" of state or territorial law contemplates that he act in an official capacity. To the extent that state or municipal officers, such as the defendants Trussell and Mangum, violate or conspire to violate constitutional and federal rights, the Civil Rights Laws, §§ 1979 and 1980(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), abrogate the doctrine of official immunity. ... A complaint in a case like this must set forth facts showing some intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights. ... But plaintiff was bound to do more than merely state vague and conclusionary allegations respecting the existence of a conspiracy. It was incumbent upon him to allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy.

Section 1983 complaints receive liberal construction but must allege specific facts indicating a claim on which relief can be granted.

Reinke v. Walworth County Sheriff · filed 1968-04-02

Complaints under the civil rights act are to be accorded liberal construction. ... Notwithstanding, the plaintiff must allege specific facts which indicate that he has a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 can provide a remedy for a malicious-prosecution-labeled claim when the complaint alleges intentional misuse of state power by officers and states a constitutional deprivation.

Tyree v. Smith · filed 1968-05-01

In sum, the Court holds: (a) That W. B. Tyree cannot recover damages for deprivation of constitutional rights of his minor son. Neither can he recover expenses for investigation and costs of defending the criminal suit against his son, nor expenses for bringing the present action, (b) That although the allegations in the complaint are labeled an action for malicious prosecution, they are broad enough to state a cause of action against the defendants Smith, Catlett, Cunningham, Doyle, Monroe, Shephard, Weaver, and Weaver’s surety, Western Surety Company, under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motions of these defendants to dismiss are, therefore, denied. (c) That the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the members of the Knox County Board of Education and their motion to dismiss is sustained.

Section 1983 requires a civil-rights complaint to allege facts showing the defendant's participation in the alleged constitutional deprivation, not merely conclusions or broad generalizations.

Borchlewicz v. Partipilo · filed 1968-06-14

With respect to the alleged participation of Darrell Heinzen in this transaction, the complaint is insufficient to assert a claim under the civil rights act. The factual contents of the report to the police department are not alleged other than in the conclusory fashion as set forth above. The plaintiff has offered no facts to establish the complicity of Mr. Heinzen in the “conspiracy” other than Mr. Heinzen’s report of the plaintiff’s “suspicious activities”. It is not alleged that Mr. Heinzen participated in any way in the arrest or in the other allegedly illegal acts committed against the plaintiff. A civil rights complaint requires factual allegations, not conclusions or broad generalizations.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public housing authority when its tenant-admission procedures allegedly deny due process.

Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1968-07-18

Clearly there is sufficient in the complaint to state a claim- for relief under § 1983 and the due process clause. ... For this reason alone due process requires that selections among applicants be made in accordance with “ascertainable standards,” id. at 612, and, in cases where many candidates are equally qualified under these standards, that further selections be made in some reasonable manner such as “by lot or on the basis of the chronological order of application.”

Section 1983 permits a physician to sue a public hospital for arbitrary or discriminatory revocation of staff privileges, and a complaint alleging such conduct may be sufficient to state a cause of action.

Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hospital, Inc. · filed 1971-01-05

It is axiomatic that an action under § 1983 can be brought only against public agencies. ... Under applicable case law, this is enough to give the hospital the character of a public agency. ... As recognized by the District Court, a physician may bring an action under § 1983 against a public hospital for arbitrary or discriminatory revocation of staff privileges. ... Accordingly, we hold that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a basis for federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges that state actors deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Epps v. Cortese · filed 1971-05-24

Plaintiffs’ allegations in this respect would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, as there is no question that the Sheriff or his deputies here act under color of State law in executing the writs. See Monroe v. Pape, supra.

Section 1983 generally shields a public prosecutor from liability unless the alleged wrongful conduct is clearly outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction.

Moore v. Milton A. Buck, Assistant Prosecutor of Essex County Superior Court at New Jersey · filed 1971-05-12

A public prosecutor is immune from liability under the Act except where the alleged wrongful conduct is “clearly outside their jurisdiction,” Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 590 (3 Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 457 (1967).

Section 1983 permits a claim against state actors who allegedly deprive a person of federal rights, and plausible allegations of unconstitutional conduct by public employees are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Boulware v. Battaglia · filed 1971-05-20

Plaintiffs’ main argument is that they have stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 since they have alleged that defendants have subjected them to the deprivation of a number of rights secured to them by the U. S. Constitution and federal laws. Interpreting the complaint liberally plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants have deprived them of several fundamental constitutional rights — the right to counsel, the right not to incriminate themselves,8 the right to due process of law and perhaps the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.9 Plaintiffs have alleged these deprivations in conclusory terms. The sole question before the Court is whether the facts alleged support the allegation that these plaintiffs were deprived of their civil rights in violation of § 1983. ... In this opinion, the Court decides only that the allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A civil-rights complaint under § 1983 must include factual allegations identifying the defendants' conduct; broad, conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Heckart v. Pate · filed 1971-04-30

The courts have found that conclusionary allegations fail to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act and render the complaint insufficient. As in Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (Third Cir. 1967), a civil rights complaint requires factual allegations and conclusions and broad generalizations are not sufficient. See also Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1969); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275 (3rd Cir. 1970); Jewell v. City of Covington, 425 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1970).

Section 1983 requires an alleged constitutional violation to be effected through state action.

Eter v. College Misericordia · filed 1982-02-19

This statute... specifically requires that alleged constitutional violations must be effected through state action. There is no such allegation in the instant complaint. Furthermore, actions of private educational institutions do not constitute state actions for the purpose of the 14th Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing action under color of state law, deprivation of a constitutional right, and proximate causation; conclusory allegations of a constitutional deprivation are insufficient.

Martin v. County of Kendall · filed 1983-03-08

To recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must prove that the defendants acted under color of state law, that their actions resulted in a deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and that the action of the defendants proximately caused the constitutional violation. ... But a Section 1983 action requires more than a conclusory, internally refuted allegation of the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a claim against state actors when alleged retaliation or a threat of dismissal violates a public employee's First Amendment right to speak freely.

Thomas v. Farmer · filed 1983-03-04

Thus, the Court concludes that where the threat of dismissal from public employment has a “chilling” or deterrent effect on a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak freely, his rights under the First Amendment have been violated. ... This Court is therefore compelled to conclude that, on the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, a cause of action has been stated for violation of the First Amendment. ... Plaintiffs have, however, set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the First Amendment.

Constitutional claims pleaded separately may be construed as part of a section 1983 claim when they provide the basis for that claim.

Schul v. Sherard · filed 2000-01-24

As a result, the Court will construe the alleged constitutional violations in Counts II, III, and IV of Schul’s Complaint as part of the § 1983 claim set forth in Count I.

A prisoner’s motion cannot be treated as a § 1983 claim when no pleading has been filed against the prison warden or other prison staff.

United States v. Nest · filed 1996-11-05

However, because Nest has never filed any pleading against the ... prison warden or any other prison staff, no § 1983 claim is currently before this court.

A § 1983 claim based on systemic institutional misconduct is adequately pleaded when allegations connect defendants’ deliberate conduct or indifference to a pattern of abuse and identify resulting injuries to the named plaintiffs.

K.L. v. Edgar · filed 1996-12-12

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants acted deliberately or with deliberate indifference and thereby caused the pattern of abuse and neglect that has existed for years within the DMHDD. ... The complaint also contains numerous allegations regarding injuries suffered by the named class representatives. ... These specific allegations, combined with the other, more general allegations in the complaint, are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 supplies a damages remedy for a First Amendment violation, but references to the First Amendment do not assert a Section 1983 claim when the complaint seeks relief only under state tort law.

Shannon v. MTA Metro-North Railroad · filed 1997-01-17

Though the complaint makes repeated references to the First Amendment, plaintiff has conceded in his moving papers that he does not and cannot (given this court’s earlier ruling) seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute upon which plaintiff would have to rely to recover damages stemming from his alleged First Amendment violation. ... All of the causes of action listed in the complaint are grounded in state tort law, and plaintiffs alleged First Amendment right is not relevant to whether or not defendants are liable under these causes of action.