42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must identify the challenged policy or custom and allege a basis for holding the municipality responsible for it.

Kinney v. State Bar of California · filed 2017-01-19

Kinney’s second amended complaint does not specify exactly which “improper custom, policy, and/or practice” he finds objectionable, nor does it assert that the supposedly problematic policy was widespread or condoned by officials with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality; the plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Rife v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety · filed 2017-01-23

Municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. ... Rather, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a policy or custom of the municipality exists and (2) the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for an officer’s conduct only if the officer violated a constitutional right and a municipal policy or custom caused the violation.

Clema v. Colombe · filed 2017-01-25

“A plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 for the actions of one of its officers must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipal actor liable to show that official municipal policy caused the injury.

Sorensen v. Nocco · filed 2017-01-26

A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipal actor liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must prove that official municipal policy was responsible for the action that caused his injury.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for failure to train when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation by the officers.

Carter v. City of Detroit · filed 2017-01-30

Carter’s failure to establish a constitutional violation by the individual officers vitiates his § 1983 claim against the City of Detroit.

To plead municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts identifying a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

Meyer v. Coffey · filed 2017-01-31

As stated above, for Maypearl to be liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must provide proof of: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy or custom; and (3) “a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” ... But she fell short in pleading each of the three elements needed to state a § 1983 claim against Maypearl. On that basis, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Maypearl.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from a municipal custom or policy or from a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

16-490-Cv · filed 2017-02-01

A municipality can be liable for a constitutional violation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell in several ways. Two of those bases are relevant here. First, a plaintiff can establish that “the violation of his constitutional right resulted from a municipal custom or policy.” DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a plaintiff can establish that his constitutional right was violated because of a single decision by a municipal official who is “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to plausibly allege a municipal policy or custom, or a decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Norton v. Town of Islip · filed 2017-02-01

Assuming arguendo that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, Norton failed to allege any plausible basis for municipal liability. Norton did not set forth sufficient factual content capable of establishing the existence of any Town “custom or policy” of facilitating trespass. Norton failed to plausibly allege that Town Attorney O’Connor, whom Norton explains is “chief policy maker of the Town Attorney’s Office,” Appellant Br. 55, was involved in directing Eckert’s investigation. And Norton failed to plausibly allege that Deputy Town Attorney Sidaras had final policymaking authority over Town inspections of private property.

A city is liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Calhoun v. City of Hercules Police Depart · filed 2017-02-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Calhoun’s claim ... under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), because Calhoun failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the city’s policy or custom caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A court may bifurcate a § 1983 municipal liability claim and stay its discovery and trial pending a determination of the individual officers’ liability.

Lindsey v. Orlando · filed 2017-02-02

The City of Chicago’s motion to bifurcate discovery and trial related to Count IV [26], the Monell claim, is granted. Discovery and trial related to the Monell claim alone is stayed pending further order.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless its employees violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Washington v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County · filed 2017-02-06

But the plaintiff must establish that the municipal employees causing the harm violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; otherwise, the municipality cannot be held liable.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability when a county’s policy or failure to train and supervise causes a constitutional deprivation.

Hopper v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff · filed 2017-02-06

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the County's maintenance of a policy permitting the unconstitutional use of prone restraint and its failure to train and supervise concerning the use of such restraint and the high risk of asphyxia that may result from the use of such force.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation by the officer.

Malone v. Hinman · filed 2017-02-07

Because we conclude that Officer Hinman did not violate Malone’s constitutional rights, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability on the part of Chief Thomas and the City.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities but does not make them vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct.

Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a · filed 2017-02-07

Municipalities are persons susceptible to suit under § 1983, but they cannot be found liable on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

A Section 1983 claim against a municipality must adequately plead an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Schnauder v. Gibens · filed 2017-02-10

To state a § 1983 claim for official or municipal violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must adequately plead an official policy or custom that resulted in the violation alleged.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy, custom, or practice causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Case v. City of New York · filed 2017-02-10

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiffs injury is the result of a municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 supervisory and municipal liability claims based on an officer’s conduct fail when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Knight v. City of Fayetteville · filed 2017-02-10

Where plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right by defendant Little, plaintiffs federal claims based upon supervisory liability or policy or custom arising from conduct by defendant Little (seventh and eighth causes of action) must fail as a matter of law.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional violation occurs pursuant to a municipal policy.

Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner · filed 2017-02-15

Moncks Corner would be liable only if a violation occurred pursuant to a municipal policy.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality must identify a municipal custom, policy, or practice that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Fre v. Monk · filed 2017-02-15

Nowhere does Plaintiff identify the custom, policy or practice giving rise to an alleged constitutional violation, and this pleading defect is fatal.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a widespread custom requires evidence of a pervasive practice; the plaintiff’s own experience alone was insufficient here.

Carter v. Sheriff of Cook County · filed 2017-02-15

Aside from the facts of his own case, however, Carter points to no evidence to support a finding of such a pervasive practice-in the Sheriffs Office.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Brokenborough v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-02-17

To establish the District’s liability under § 1983, Thomas must show (1) there was a “predicate constitutional violation,” and (2) that “a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” ... The court agrees, and finds that Thomas has not proffered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the District had a policy or custom of sexual harassment.

Supervisory and municipal liability claims under § 1983 fail without an underlying constitutional violation.

Mendoza v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement · filed 2017-02-21

Additionally, the claims against Davis and the County automatically fail for lack of an underlying constitutional violation. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798-99 (1986). Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Davis and the County on Mendoza's claims of supervisory and municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for unconstitutional acts an official takes under final policymaking authority.

Dempsey v. Johnson · filed 2017-02-22

Because Johnson was given final policymaking authority, she was, in effect, the Village; her actions were the Village’s actions. Therefore, the Village can be liable under Monell for any unconstitutional actions taken by Johnson pursuant to that authority.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or widespread custom that causes the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.

Buckler v. Israel · filed 2017-02-23

Accordingly, the appellants have not provided sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the BSO exhibited a widespread custom or practice of failing to punish deputies for the use of excessive force or other similar misconduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation stems from an official municipal policy or custom.

Town of Tupper Lake v. Sootbusters, LLC · filed 2017-02-23

Further, a municipal body may face liability pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 only where the constitutional deprivation stems from an official municipal policy or custom (see Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 US 658, 690-691 [1978]).

Section 1983 requires a legally sufficient custom to hold a county liable on a custom-based claim.

Benjamin v. Ward County · filed 2017-02-27

After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that summary judgment was warranted because Benjamin’s assertion of a custom, giving rise to Ward County’s liability, failed as a matter of law.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an adequately alleged violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Boseman v. Upper Providence Township · filed 2017-02-27

We have determined that Boseman did not adequately allege a violation of her constitutional rights and therefore we must also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Monell claims against Upper Providence Township.

Section 1983 allows a municipal liability claim to proceed when plaintiffs adequately allege a pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct.

Perros v. County of Nassau · filed 2017-02-24

Moreover, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a pattern and practice on Defendants’ part of withholding good guy letters on the basis of disability retirement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden with respect to their equal protection and Monell claims and Defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims is denied.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability claim to connect the alleged violation to an official policy, practice, or custom.

Herbert v. Balducci · filed 2017-03-01

Moreover, Herbert failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged denial of access to computer workstations resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of defendant King County.

Section 1983 municipal liability can rest on an official’s acts when the official has final policymaking authority over the actions at issue.

Patel v. Hall · filed 2017-03-01

To decide whether a government employee is a final policymaker whose actions can give rise to municipal liability, we ask (1) whether the employee is ... meaningfully constrained by policies not of his own making; (2) whether his decisions are final, i.e., not subject to any meaningful review; and (3) whether the policy decisions and actions at issue in this case fall within the realm of his grant of authority.

Section 1983 treats a county fiscal court as a person that may be sued for federal constitutional violations.

Conn v. Deskins · filed 2017-03-01

Moreover, because the fiscal court is a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983, Conn has a vehicle for pursuing these same claims against the fiscal court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to show that a county custom or policy directly caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Payne v. Sevier Cty., Tenn. · filed 2017-03-03

To bring a successful § 1983 suit against the County, Payne needed to prove not only that employees of the County or First Med had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, but that their indifference was directly caused by a County custom or policy.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff establishes an underlying constitutional violation.

Barnes v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-03-03

As explained above, the plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a lack of probable cause for issuance by a magistrate of an arrest warrant, and thus has not made out a violation of any constitutional right. See supra Part III.A. Consequently, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the District must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or practice causes an injury, but the claim requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Marion Taite, Jr. v. City of Fort Worth, Texas · filed 2017-03-06

Although a municipality can be liable under § 1983 when the allegedly unconstitutional action results from a policy or practice that is responsible for the individual’s injury, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), it is well established that there must be an underlying constitutional violation for there to be a claim under Monell. ... Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City based on Taite’s failure to plead or prove an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when allegations show that police officials consciously chose to enforce a particular state statute as department policy.

Martin v. Evans · filed 2017-03-13

Applying the framework articulated by the Second Circuit, the complaint sufficiently alleges a conscious decision by the BPD to enforce Section 99. ... The plaintiffs adequately plead a Monell claim against BPD Commissioner Evans.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when its policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional injury.

Dr. Allan L. Bergano, D.D.S., P.C. v. City of Virginia Beach · filed 2017-03-14

Municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) when they follow a “custom, policy, or practice by which local officials violate a plaintiffs constitutional rights.” ... Thus, City policy is the proximate cause and the “moving force” responsible for the injury to Plaintiffs, and the City is liable for those injuries.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city when an authorized policymaker ratifies officers’ allegedly unconstitutional actions.

Hernandez v. City of San Jose · filed 2017-03-14

However, the Court finds that Garcia’s statements after the Trump Rally praising the actions of police officers are sufficient to state a claim that the City is liable for the police officers’ allegedly unconstitutional actions in directing Plaintiffs along a particular path after realizing that doing so placed Plaintiffs in danger.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for its policies or training when its officers committed no constitutional violation.

Shaw v. City of Selma · filed 2017-03-15

There being no constitutional violation by the individual officers, the City of Selma can have no § 1983 municipal liability based on its policies and training, as a matter of law.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s conduct when there was no underlying constitutional violation.

Stevens-Rucker v. City of Columbus · filed 2017-03-16

Additionally, summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims against Columbus for Frenz’s shots and McKee’s first two volleys is GRANTED because the Court found no underlying constitutional violations.

A municipal liability claim under § 1983 fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Brooks-Albrechtsen v. Mitchell · filed 2017-03-17

But even if the complaint adequately alleged a Mo-nell claim, it would fail because Brooks-Albrechtsen has not shown any underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 treats an official capacity claim against a municipal officer as a claim against the municipality, which requires a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Amirault v. City of Malden · filed 2017-03-20

Accordingly, an official capacity claim against Molis constitutes another way of asserting a Section 1983 claim against the City of Malden. ... In this case, Amirault has not alleged the existence of a policy or custom that led to the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires a city policy, custom, or practice to cause the alleged constitutional deprivation before the city can be liable.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 2017-03-20

In the absence of such deliberate indifference, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s warrantless-entry claim because any constitutional violation cannot be said to be the product of a City “policy, custom, or practice.” Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1279.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the plaintiffs cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation.

Conrad v. City of Berea · filed 2017-03-20

“[U]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts.” ... Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs cannot show that Defendants violated their constitutional rights, no Monell claims may proceed. ... The Court agrees.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff fails to allege a deprivation of federal rights.

Delamota v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-21

Finally, Delamota challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his municipal liability claim brought under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Having concluded that Delamota failed to allege any deprivation of federal rights, we hold that the District Court properly dismissed Delamota’s Monell claim. See id. at 690–91.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege a constitutional violation and a causal link between an official policy and that violation.

Miango v. Democratic Republic of Congo · filed 2017-03-22

In the absence of any factual allegations that would establish the necessary constitutional violation or the causal connection between an official policy and that violation, the complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim against the District.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise without a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Ferris v. Borough of Baldwin · filed 2017-03-23

Here, the Court has concluded that it must dismiss- all of Ferris’ constitutional claims (Counts I, V, II,-and III), so Ferris cannot prove a -violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Count VI, Ferris’ municipal liability claim against Baldwin, is also dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 requires facts identifying a municipal policy or custom; conclusory allegations do not establish municipal liability.

Ekwunife v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2017-03-24

These conclusory allegations, which merely parrot the standard of liability, are insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an official’s employment decision when another county body can review it and the official lacks final policymaking authority.

Thompson v. Andy Shock · filed 2017-03-28

Our review of Arkansas law and the policies promulgated by Faulkner County reveal that Sheriff Shock did not act as a final policymaker in the employment decisions of the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office because employment decisions made by Sheriff Shock were subject to review by the quorum court.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a custom, policy, or widespread practice caused a violation of the plaintiff’s rights.

Claborn v. Yuma County · filed 2017-03-30

To succeed on the merits of a section 1983 claim against the County, Claborn needed to show that Yuma County had a custom, policy, or widespread practice that led to the violation of his rights. ... Additionally, he had the burden to prove the existence of a municipal act that caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits suits against municipalities but does not make them vicariously liable for their employees’ actions.

Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, et a · filed 2017-03-31

Municipalities are persons susceptible to suit under § 1983, but they cannot be found liable on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to prove a policymaker, an official policy, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom.

Castorena v. Zamora · filed 2017-03-31

“[T]o hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a ‘violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.’”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts supporting a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury; one incident and a conclusory allegation of a pattern are insufficient.

Odom v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-03-31

Defendants contend, and the court agrees, that Plaintiffs’ allegations are not specific enough to state a Monell claim—not under a Harris theory involving an absence of training in the face of an obvious need, nor under a pattern and practice theory. Plaintiffs have alleged one actual incident of use of excessive force—the incident described in the Complaint—and alleged a “pattern” in a conclusory fashion, without pleading any facts that would demonstrate a pattern.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when evidence raises a triable issue that a city policy caused a constitutional injury.

Lloyd v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-31

Plaintiffs claim for municipal liability against the City may proceed to trial because she has raised a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of a municipal policy which caused her asserted constitutional injury.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability principles to private entities performing state functions and requires personal participation or a causal connection for supervisory liability.

Groover v. Broward County Sheriff · filed 2017-04-04

Although Groover alleged sufficient facts to show a violation of his constitutional rights, his allegations were insufficient to show that U.S. Corrections, a private entity, or Sheriff Israel, a supervisor, were liable for those violations under § 1983. ... A private entity generally is not considered a state actor under § 1983, but when it contracts to “perform[] a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state,” it becomes the functional equivalent of a municipality under § 1983. ... To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must allege facts to show “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” ... A supervisory official is not liable under § 1983 simply because his subordinates violated a person’s constitutional rights. ... Instead, a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct” or if there was a “causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

A municipality is generally not liable under § 1983 for a policy or practice when the officers’ conduct violates no constitutional right.

Coleman v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-04-04

Where, as here, the conduct of individual defendant officers does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the municipality is generally not liable for a policy or practice pursuant to which the conduct was performed.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability and requires proof of a policymaker, official policy, and constitutional violation caused by the policy or custom for traditional municipal liability.

Thorn v. McGary · filed 2017-04-05

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 cases, and Thorn has failed to provide any “proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom,” which could support a traditional municipal liability theory. ... Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Thorn’s § 1983 claim against the remaining Defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when the individual official inflicted no constitutional injury.

Cotta v. County of Kings · filed 2017-04-06

Municipalities cannot be held liable when the individual prison official has inflicted no constitutional injury.

Section 1983 claims against a city require a pleaded basis for municipal liability under Monell.

Bentz v. City of New York · filed 2017-04-06

Plaintiffs have not pleaded a claim for municipal liability as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against the City of New York is GRANTED.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Harris v. Jackson County, Mississippi · filed 2017-04-07

Municipal liability under § 1983 ... requires a plaintiff to prove: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.”

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation by the individual defendants.

Moore v. City of Memphis · filed 2017-04-10

If a plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation by the individual defendants, then “the municipal defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 requires municipal liability to rest on a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation, rather than respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Rife v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety · filed 2017-04-12

Municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. ... Rather, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a policy or custom of the municipality exists and (2) the policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because an employee caused an injury; the plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom caused it.

Loftis v. Eades · filed 2017-04-18

However, a municipality is not liable under § 1983 simply because its employee(s) may have caused injury.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires harm caused by a constitutional violation.

Thomas v. City of Columbus · filed 2017-04-19

For a municipality to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show harm “caused by a constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to plausibly allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Brown v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-04-19

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the disciplinary action taken against the plaintiff violated her Fifth Amendment rights, the Court finds that the complaint fails to plausibly allege that a custom or policy of the District was the “moving force behind” any such constitutional violation.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Meyer v. City of Gainsville, Florida · filed 2017-04-21

And without an underlying constitutional violation, the City could not be liable under a § 1983 municipal liability theory.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for its employees’ constitutional violations only when those violations can be traced to county action.

Loertscher v. Anderson · filed 2017-04-28

But the County is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if its employees’ conduct and the resulting constitutional violation(s) can be traced back to County action.

Section 1983 claims against a city and police department fail without an underlying constitutional violation.

Stephens v. City of Englewood · filed 2017-05-03

And, since they have failed to establish an underlying constitutional ... violation, their claims against the police department and Englewood also necessarily fail.

A county may face liability under § 1983 for a district attorney’s office’s failure to train and supervise prosecutors when the district attorney acts as a county policymaker.

Victor v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-05-03

We reject the County’s argument that it cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for the alleged misconduct of the office of the District Attorney.

Section 1983 makes a school district liable for a constitutional deprivation only when a district policy or custom caused it; an employee’s isolated mistake does not establish one.

Yates v. Cobb County School District · filed 2017-05-04

The CCSD cannot be held liable for O’Neill’s actions under a theory of respondeat superior, and evidence of a single incident of misinformation by O’Neill does not show a policy or custom of the CCSD, much less one that was a “moving force” behind any alleged deprivation of Yates’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts identifying an official policy or widespread custom that was the moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.

Residents Against Flooding v. Reinvestment Zone Number Seventeen · filed 2017-05-09

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983 against any of them because Plaintiffs fail to state supporting facts identifying a policy, a policy maker to whom lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority, an ordinance, a regulation, a decision by a policy maker, or a widespread custom that fairly represents a municipal policy to deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally redirect flood waters from the commercial district to the residential areas, and constitute the moving force behind a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a violation of federally protected rights is caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Sullivan v. City of New York · filed 2017-05-10

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff demonstrates (1) an underlying violation of his federally protected rights, and (2) a municipal policy or custom that caused the violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Because there was probable cause for Sullivan’s arrest and prosecution, there is no constitutional violation to support a claim against the city. Moreover, Sullivan provides insufficient evidence that any alleged violation resulted from a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom causes injury and reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; individual officials’ lack of awareness does not by itself defeat that claim.

Hyrum West v. Nye County Detention · filed 2017-05-10

However, West raised a triable dispute as to whether defendants Nye County and Demeo, Marshall, and Rising in their official capacities had a policy or custom of using the old Pahrump jail during construction of the new jail facility despite allegedly inhumane conditions due to rust, black mold, and asbestos. Defendants’ ... discovery responses indicating that individual defendants were unaware of any inhumane conditions at the old Pahrump jail were insufficient to demonstrate the absence of a triable dispute as to whether Nye County’s policy or custom caused injury to West and whether the policy or custom reflected deliberate indifference to West’s constitutional rights.

A Monell municipal liability claim under Section 1983 fails when the underlying constitutional claim fails.

Williams v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-05-18

Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment and Monell claims are dependent on the above Eighth Amendment claim and, therefore, likewise fail.

Section 1983 generally requires an official policy or widespread custom to hold a municipality liable; an isolated allegedly unconstitutional incident is usually insufficient.

Mohamed ex rel. A.M. v. Irving Independent School District · filed 2017-05-18

Accordingly, the court is left with an isolated, allegedly unconstitutional incident, which is generally insufficient to-establish an official policy or custom for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury and reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Call v. Badgley · filed 2017-05-19

Under § 1983, “a municipality may not be held liable for a § 1983 violation under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its subordinates.” ... Rather, to find liability, the plaintiff must show “that a policy or custom led to the plaintiffs injury” and that “the policy or custom reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.” ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to identify any Humboldt County policy or custom that caused Plaintiffs alleged injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that an official policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Johnson v. Curt Vanderkooi · filed 2017-05-23

We conclude that this evidence does not suffice to show that any alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights was the result of an official municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when inadequate supervision amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; repeated complaints that receive inadequate investigation can support that claim.

Coggins v. County of Nassau · filed 2017-05-26

The Supreme Court has explained that a municipal entity may be held liable under Section 1983 where a plaintiff demonstrates that the constitutional violation complained of was caused by a municipal “policy or custom.” ... The Court concludes that this evidence is sufficient for plaintiffs Monell claim to survive summary judgment.

A city is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s discipline or termination on this theory when no official with final policymaking authority made the decision.

Ragavage v. City of Wilmington · filed 2017-06-05

Donald Ragavage appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the Appellee on Ragavage’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims based on his termination because Ragavage was not disciplined or terminated by an official with final policymaking authority. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

A municipality’s failure-to-train claim under Section 1983 must be dismissed when the officers committed no underlying Fourth Amendment violation.

Estate of Juan Bonilla Jr v. City of York · filed 2017-06-06

Since we find that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the City of York and West Manchester Township, based on their failure to adequately train the two officers on the proper use of deadly force, must also be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to allege facts showing that a county policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

Wilson v. Alvarez · filed 2017-06-06

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s claims against Maricopa County Correctional Health Services, Maricopa County Jail, Maricopa County hospital, and Maricopa County, because Wilson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a policy or custom of the county caused him to suffer constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs someone who violated a person’s rights; the violation must be attributable to the municipality itself.

Crigger v. McIntosh · filed 2017-06-08

Plaintiffs cannot hold municipalities liable for employees’ actions under § 1983 based on a respondeat superior theory. ... Instead, municipal liability must rest on violations that are attributable to the municipality itself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plausibly allege an official policy or widespread practice that caused the constitutional violation.

de Veloz v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2017-06-08

As Plaintiffs fail to allege the existence of an official policy or widespread practice of illegal strip searches, Count VIII is dismissed.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if an underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Chaney v. Wadsworth · filed 2017-06-13

Because the officers did not violate Anthony’s Fourth Amendment rights, there is no basis for his Monell claims.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s decision only when the employee has final policymaking authority that the governing body cannot override.

Southern Atlantic Companies, LLC v. School Board of Orange County, Florida · filed 2017-06-14

And that is a problem for Southern Atlantic because, as the district court explained, our precedent makes it clear that a government employee is a final policymaker “only if his decisions have legal effect without further action by the governing body”—in this case, the Board—“and if the governing body lacks the power to reverse the member or employee’s decision.”

A plaintiff alleging municipal liability under § 1983 need not identify the policymaker by name in the complaint.

Balle v. City of Corpus Christi · filed 2017-06-15

We recently held that “the specific identity of the policymaker is a legal question that need not be pled” in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. ... Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Balle was “required to plead the identity of the policymaker.”

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for failure to train its officers only when that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Lawrence v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2017-06-15

As such, even if the City did not train its officers on how to remove an individual from the back of a patrol vehicle, there is no evidence that its failure to do so amounts to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when municipal employees caused no constitutional injury.

Lock v. Torres · filed 2017-06-19

Without a constitutional violation, Harris County is not liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for its officials’ acts only when a municipal policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Kinlocke v. Benton · filed 2017-06-19

Municipalities cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the acts of municipal officials unless the plaintiff can show a “municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiffs injury.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for a municipality’s own unconstitutional or illegal policies.

Ernst v. Creek County Public Facilities Authority · filed 2017-06-19

Instead, a municipality is only liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional or illegal policies.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by a city policy or custom, or by a failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference. The municipal claim fails without an underlying constitutional violation.

Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 2017-06-20

Under § 1983, we may hold a city liable for a constitutional tort “if the injury is caused by a municipal custom or policy, or if the city’s failure to train employees amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Arrington-Bey, __ F.3d at __, 2017 WL 2432389, at *5; see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 694 (1978). The district court permitted the claim against the City to proceed in view of its ruling about the unconstitutional warrant. Having dispatched that claim, we must dispatch this one as well.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county when its policy or practice causes a constitutional injury; an allegation of such a policy can suffice at the pleading stage.

Duronslet v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-06-20

The Court finds this allegation sufficient at the pleading stage. First, assuming that the DCF.S was aware of Plaintiffs transgender status, its treatment of Plaintiff itself gives rise to an inference (albeit a weak one) that the County has such a policy or practice, and that DCFS personnel were acting pursuant to that policy or practice.

A § 1983 claim against a municipal entity based on an official’s conduct requires proof that the official had final policymaking authority in the area at issue.

Crenshaw v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2017-06-20

Thus, because Rivers failed to establish as a matter of law that Rhea possessed “final policymaking authority” regarding work assignments and other personnel issues, Rivers’s claims against NYCHA must be dismissed.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it delegates final authority to an official whose decision violates the Constitution.

Klosowski v. City of Bay City · filed 2017-06-21

Instead, it delegated that authority to Ledesma, see R. 10-2 (Ledesma Aff. ¶ 26) (Page ID #408), a decision that would subject it to municipal liability if a jury determines that Ledesma’s final decision not to call back Klosowski violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when a policy or custom caused the alleged injury; officials’ ratification of misconduct can support such a claim.

Martineau v. Antilus, et al. · filed 2017-06-22

At this early stage, the court finds that the complaint contains sufficient facts to allege a plausible Monell claim against Hillsborough County.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities.

Hicks-Fields v. Pool · filed 2017-06-26

Harris County, as a municipality, may not be held liable under § 1983 on a basis of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or custom for municipal liability under Monell.

Robinson v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-06-27

Similarly, to the extent that Robinson alleged a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim also fails because Robinson suffered no constitutional violation. ... And in any case, Robinson alleges no facts that could give rise to an inference that any official policy or custom led to his constitutional rights being violated.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an unwritten practice is sufficiently persistent and widespread to have the force of law and causes the injury.

Larson v. Napier · filed 2017-06-27

Although the Sheriff does not have a written policy for either responding to reports of domestic violence or call out and containment – the procedure employed at the Larsons’ home – there was ample evidence at trial of “practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” See id.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a municipal policy or an action by a final policymaker caused the injury.

Huimin Song v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2017-06-28

Appellees cannot establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Garmon v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 1983 plaintiffs must establish that a municipal policy or actions by a final policymaker pursuant to a municipal policy caused their injury).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for action taken pursuant to an official municipal policy, not solely because a municipality employs the person who acted.

Williams v. Schismenos · filed 2017-06-28

Because a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, it can only be held liable under § 1983 for action taken pursuant to the municipality’s “official policy.”

Section 1983 does not make municipalities vicariously liable for employees’ constitutional violations; a plaintiff must allege a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Bykov v. Rosen · filed 2017-06-29

The district court properly dismissed Bykov’s constitutional right-to-medical-privacy claim against the City of Seattle because a municipality may not be held vicariously liable for its employees’ alleged constitutional violations, and the amended complaint fails to allege any facts showing that Seattle had a policy or custom that caused Bykov’s alleged injury.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation by the municipality’s officers.

Ryan v. City of Detroit · filed 2017-06-30

However, a municipality or county cannot be liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by its officers.”

A school district cannot be held liable under Section 1983 based on a principal’s knowledge of an assignment when the district has not delegated policymaking authority to the principal.

Brinsdon v. McAllen Independent Sch Dist · filed 2017-06-30

Because there was no delegation of policymaking authority to Cavazos, her knowledge of the pledge assignment cannot be imputed to the District.

Section 1983 requires an official policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation before a school district can be held liable.

Brinsdon v. McAllen Independent Sch Dist · filed 2017-07-03

“[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” ... Brinsdon has failed to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or that the District had knowledge of the assignment. Judgment as a matter of law was proper for the District on municipal liability for any constitutional violation that may have arisen from the assignment or subsequent actions.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s unconstitutional conduct only when a municipal policy or custom caused the violation.

Demetrice Martin v. City of Macon Georgia · filed 2017-07-05

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees only when the county’s “official policy” causes a constitutional violation. ... Defendant therefore cannot be liable to Plaintiff under a Monell theory.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation caused by its official policy or widespread custom; allegations about a single incident do not establish such a policy or custom.

Lordeus v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2017-07-05

The County may be held liable under section 1983 for constitutional torts committed pursuant to an. official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to allege a custom or policy that caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Roosevelt Williams, Jr. v. Monroe County District Attorney · filed 2017-07-11

Williams did not allege facts demonstrating a plausible § 1983 claim against the County because he did not assert that the County had a custom or policy that ... caused a violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a policy or custom reflecting deliberate indifference causes a violation of constitutional rights.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida Properties, L.P. · filed 2017-07-12

As a preliminary issue, municipalities are liable under section 1983 but only if a plaintiff shows: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). As discussed above, Sears’s substantive due process rights were violated, thus satisfying the first prong. Furthermore, Sears has satisfied the second and third prongs because the City formally and expressly created and adopted the unconstitutional Resolution.

An amendment supporting municipal liability under Section 1983 is futile if it does not cure defects in the underlying constitutional claims.

Ellison v. Roosevelt County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2017-07-12

This allegation aimed to support Mr. Ellison’s municipal liability theory, but it did nothing to cure the pleading defects in the underlying constitutional claims.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires evidence of a deficient municipal policy or custom.

Appling v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2017-07-12

Seventh, Appling alleges a municipal liability claim against the City of Los Angeles. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, Appling does not provide evidence of a deficient LAPD policy or custom sufficient to support his Monell claim.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim requires an official policy or custom known to a policymaker that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Darian Baker v. City of Clute · filed 2017-07-12

In order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.”

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because it employs someone who committed a constitutional violation.

Cornell Narberth, LLC v. Borough of Narberth · filed 2017-07-14

A municipality cannot, however, be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a Monell claim without an underlying constitutional violation.

Cairns v. County of El Dorado · filed 2017-07-19

Because the district court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, the Monell claim necessarily fails because there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires allegations linking the claimed constitutional violation to a municipal policy or failure to train.

Roy v. Contra Costa County · filed 2017-07-19

The district court properly concluded that Roy’s Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and failure to train claims did not state a claim of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Roy’s first amended complaint alleges that his arrest lacked probable cause and that the conditions of his confinement were unconstitutional. Roy has not alleged anything that suggests a link to any City or ... County policy to arrest individuals without probable cause or to violate their constitutional rights while in custody, or failure to have a policy to train employees with respect to such rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional tort only when the conduct occurred pursuant to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Olivier v. City of Clarksville · filed 2017-07-21

Instead, a municipal governmental entity may only be liable for a constitutional tort where the action occurred pursuant to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county for an official’s actions when the official acts as an agent of the state.

Miller v. Davis · filed 2017-07-21

Where a local official acts as an agent of the state, her actions cannot be attributed to a local municipality. ... Therefore, Rowan County is not liable for Davis’s actions or Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.

A § 1983 municipal claim fails when the plaintiff has not made the requisite showing for municipal liability.

Thomas v. Town of Chelmsford · filed 2017-07-25

The plaintiffs adequately plead municipal liability for First Amendment retaliation based on the role that municipal policy or custom allegedly played in the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege enough facts to support a plausible Monell claim against a municipality.

Brown v. Sirchie Acquisition Co. · filed 2017-07-25

Mallory and Brown argue that the district court erred in ... finding that their complaint does not set forth sufficient allegations to support a plausible § 1983 Monell claim, ... After careful consideration of these arguments, we find no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to identify a municipal policy or custom from which the alleged injury arose.

Bryant v. Ciminelli · filed 2017-07-26

In order to maintain a § 1983 action against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy or custom” from which the alleged injury arose.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Mehari v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-07-28

Thus, a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for alleged constitutional violations must demonstrate that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional harm.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for its employees’ failures solely because it employs them.

Sanchez v. Young County, Texas, et · filed 2017-07-31

Contrary to plaintiffs’ theory, a plaintiff cannot bootstrap government entity liability from the individual failures of employees because there is no respondeat superi- or liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege that its policy or custom caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Pollard v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-08-01

Counts V and VI fail because the allegations are directed at the District of Columbia under a municipal liability theory. To establish municipal liability, the Witherspoons had to allege that the District had a policy or custom, and that that policy or custom is what caused the violation of their constitutional rights.

A county can be liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff alleges a county custom or policy that caused the claimed violation.

Miller v. County of Centre · filed 2017-08-02

In order to state a claim under § 1983 against Centre County, Parks Miller was required to allege the County had a custom or policy of First Amendment retaliation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Parks Miller made no such allegation and thus failed to state a claim against the County.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against a municipality only when the failure reflects a municipal policy.

Lin v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-08-02

Because failure to train is only actionable under section 1983 if it reflects a municipal policy, which is not alleged here, Plaintiff’s failure to train argument fails. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the District of Columbia will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom behind an alleged constitutional deprivation to hold a municipality liable.

Leonard v. George Washington University Hospital · filed 2017-08-07

In addition, plaintiff has not alleged that the individuals who held him for a mental health evaluation and injected him against his will did so pursuant to a municipal policy or custom, let alone one that is unconstitutional.

A § 1983 claim against a city requires a municipal policy or custom.

Simpson v. City of Little Rock · filed 2017-08-09

... and that Simpson failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to municipal liability, see Keefe v. City of Minneapolis, 785 F.3d 1216, 1227 (8th Cir. 2015) (city liability requires policy or custom); cf. Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013) (failure-to-train pleading standard).

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government for a deprivation caused by its policy or custom, but not solely because it employs the officer responsible.

Pellegrino v. Wengert · filed 2017-08-09

The claims at issue in this appeal are against the Sheriff’s Office, which is considered a municipal local government body that “cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.” ... Instead, “only deprivations undertaken pursuant to governmental custom or policy may lead to the imposition of governmental liability.”

A judge’s decision while presiding over a criminal trial is not municipal policymaking that makes the District of Columbia liable under § 1983.

El-Amin v. Downs · filed 2017-08-09

Plaintiff’s claim against the District rests on the erroneous premise that the decision rendered by the presiding judge at his criminal trial constituted policymaking.

Section 1983 does not allow municipal liability when no municipal officer committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Baer v. Salt Lake City Corp. · filed 2017-08-11

And because “[a] municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers,” Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993), the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the individual officers caused no constitutional harm.

Soler v. County of San Diego · filed 2017-08-11

Because the individual officers did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights, Plaintiffs claim for municipal liability fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision only when the official who made it had final policymaking authority.

Metzler v. Kenner City · filed 2017-08-14

Assuming, as the district court did, that Yenni instructed that Metzler be terminated, Yenni is not the final policymaker, as evidenced by the Kenner Civil Service Board’s subsequent reinstatement of Metzler.

A municipality’s failure to train or supervise supports liability under § 1983 when a pattern of constitutional violations or the obvious consequences of its policies show deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

Estate of Ramos Ex Rel. DeJesus v. City of Lancaster · filed 2017-08-16

Specifically, DeJesus does not offer evidence tending to show either a pattern of constitutional violations (e.g., she does not point to any prior incident resembling what happened in this case) or that the consequences of the City of Lancaster’s policies or practices were so obvious that the municipality thereby exhibited deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for lower-level employees’ conduct to show that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Martin v. City of New York · filed 2017-08-16

To hold a municipality liable under section 1983 for the conduct of employees below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his or her constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy (see Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694 [1978]; Blake v City of New York, 148 AD3d 1101 [2017]).

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Jerome v. Crum · filed 2017-08-17

Because Jerome cannot establish that there was a constitutional violation, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his municipal-liability claim is also affirmed.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable only when an official policy made by a municipal policymaker causes a constitutional violation.

Trammell v. Fruge · filed 2017-08-17

“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.”

Section 1983 liability for an inadequate municipal investigation requires a pattern of violations and a causal link between the municipality’s conduct and the constitutional injury.

Jim David, Jr. v. City of Bellevue, Ohio · filed 2017-08-24

Absent evidence of a pattern of violations, there is no demonstration of causation to show that the allegedly inadequate investigation caused the constitutional violation in question here.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a municipality’s policies or customs and the alleged constitutional injury.

T.D. Perry v. Erie County · filed 2017-08-25

In other words, in order to succeed in his Section 1983 action, it was incumbent upon Perry to demonstrate that intentional acts or omissions by the Warden and the County in regards to the establishment or enactment of official policies, practices, or customs were the direct and proximate cause of the violations that he alleged. ... On review, we agree with the trial court that Perry has failed to demonstrate a causal link between the Prison’s implicated policies, practices, and customs and his assault.

Section 1983 permits municipal and official-capacity liability when a policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent failure in hiring, training, or supervision causes a violation of federal rights.

Glasper v. City of Hughes · filed 2017-08-28

Because Mr. Glasper has not shown a custom, policy, or practice of deliberate indifference and has not shown an inadequacy of police hiring, training, or supervising amounting to deliberate indifference, this Court concludes that the City defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Mr. Glasper’s official-capacity claims against the individual defendants and his claims against the City of Hughes, Arkansas.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a city policy that shows deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and causes the violation.

Mendoza v. City of Vancouver · filed 2017-08-29

In order to successfully plead § 1983 liability on the part of the City, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) they were deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the City had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. ... Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional. claims asserted against the City of Vancouver should be dismissed because they failed to make a showing as to either prong (3) or (4).

Section 1983 requires evidence of a municipality’s own policy causing the alleged violation; an official’s intent cannot simply be imputed to the municipality.

Forbes v. City of Durham · filed 2017-09-05

In order to succeed in a Section 1983 claim against defendant City of Durham, plaintiff would have to produce evidence of the City’s direct culpability and causation; defendant Lopez’s alleged discriminatory intent cannot be imputed to defendant City of Durham.

Section 1983 requires sufficient evidence of supervisory or municipal liability to take a claim against those defendants to trial.

Robertson v. Ferry County · filed 2017-09-06

The Robertsons have not adduced sufficient evidence creating triable issues of fact as to Sheriff Pete Warner’s supervisorial liability or Ferry County and the Ferry County Sheriff’s Department’s municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal custom causes a violation of constitutional rights.

Petrello v. City of Manchester, et al. · filed 2017-09-07

The City is therefore liable for Officer Brandreth’s enforcement of this unconstitutional custom or practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a violation of a federally protected right is attributable to a municipal policy or practice or a final municipal policymaker’s decision.

West v. City of Mesa · filed 2017-09-08

To establish municipal liability in § 1983 actions, the alleged violation of a plaintiff’s federally protected right(s) must be attributable to either the enforcement of a municipal policy or practice or the decision of a final municipal policy maker.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy, practice, or custom that caused the constitutional violation; merely constructing isolation cells does not establish municipal liability.

White v. William Berger, Sr. · filed 2017-09-15

Municipal liability under § 1983 obtains only where “the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered” the constitutional violation at issue. ... Here, mere construction of the isolation units is insufficient to support a claim of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when action taken under an official policy causes a deprivation of rights.

Richmond v. Huq · filed 2017-09-20

To make such a claim, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely through respondeat superior; the alleged violation must result from a municipal policy or custom.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 2017-09-20

However, a municipality “cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability” (Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552 [1999]; see Combs v City of New York, 130 AD3d at 865; Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d at 703).

Section 1983 requires evidence that a municipal policy was a moving force behind the alleged injury to establish municipal liability.

Petersen Ex Rel. L.P. v. Lewis County · filed 2017-09-22

The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to the County on Petersen’s municipal liability claim. Petersen failed to present evidence that any of the County’s policies were a “moving force” behind the shooting.

A municipality’s liability under Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation resulting from its official policy, practice, or custom.

Harper v. Lugbauer · filed 2017-09-22

With respect to Harper’s § 1983 claims that are not time-barred, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the police retaliation, harassment based on gender, “state-created” danger, and equal protection claims because Harper failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her constitutional rights were violated as a result of an official policy, practice, or custom of the City.

Section 1983 permits a claim based on a municipality’s own policy even when the officer whose conduct caused the injury was not acting under color of law.

LaPorta v. City of Chicago · filed 2017-09-29

The City’s color-of-law argument dies a swift death at the hands of Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1519 (7th Cir. 1990). ... As the Seventh Circuit noted, the officer need not have been acting under color of law at the time of the accident because, in this flavor of Monell, the “municipality itself is .the state actor and- its action in maintaining the alleged policy at issue supplies the ‘color of law requirement under § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits county liability when a county policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Wicker v. Lawless · filed 2017-09-30

However, a government body may be liable for its employees’ constitutional violations where the county or municipality itself, through a policy, practice, or custom, caused the constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable merely because it employs the people who allegedly violated someone’s rights; the claim must connect the harm to a county policy.

Gallegos v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2017-09-30

Bernalillo County is not liable for Gallegos’ federal constitutional claims. The Supreme Court has clarified that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.