42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government only when alleged unconstitutional conduct implements an official policy or custom.

Shelton v. St. Louis City · filed 2010-07-09

Upon de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), we find no error in the district court’s dismissal, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (local government body may be held liable under § 1983 only if alleged unconstitutional conduct implements official ... policy or custom); Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006) (court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); Wray v. Ross, 6 Fed. App’x 544, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam) (person committed to SLPRC cannot attack fact or duration of confinement in § 1983 complaint; remedy in first instance is to apply to state court for release).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking liability against a local government body to show an official policy or widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused the constitutional deprivation.

Storay v. City of Little Rock · filed 2011-02-02

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 & n.55, 694 (1978) (plaintiff seeking to impose liability on local government body under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show official policy or widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused deprivation of constitutional rights); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (inadequacy of police training may serve as basis for § 1983 liability only where failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact); Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment reviewed de novo); Herring v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000) (in responding to properly supported summary judgment motion, opponent must come forward with specific facts showing there is genuine issue for trial).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, and a failure to train must amount to deliberate indifference.

Bud Lee v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville · filed 2011-07-18

The question of whether a municipality is liable under § 1983 has two parts: “(1) whether [the] plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (citations omitted). ... In Monell, the Court rejected a respondeat superior theory and held that a municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom “‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 691–92. ... Regarding a municipality’s failure to train employees, the Court later explained that “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 [municipality] liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

Section 1983 provides a remedy for federal law violations committed under color of state law and permits municipal liability for constitutional deprivations caused by official policy or custom.

Nunnery v. City of Bossier · filed 2011-09-26

Nunnery seeks relief from the City’s alleged due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010). Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law when the defendant is acting under “color of any statute, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010). The Supreme Court has held that a municipality may be sued under 1983 only for “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procediere, § 3573.1 (3rd ed. 2011). The City does not dispute that it is being sued for a policy statement or decision officially adopted and promulgated by its officers, and thus that the requirements of section 1983 are satisfied.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law and does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities.

Hofschneider v. City of Vancouver · filed 2016-04-21

§ 1983 provides a remedy for the violation of a person’s constitutionally-protected rights “by any person acting under color of state law.” See id. (emphasis added). The employee actor—the person—who causes a constitutional violation is individually liable to the plaintiff under § 1983. But there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; a municipality is not liable simply because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a deliberate-indifference custom or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Cornelius Martin, II v. Wood · filed 2016-04-22

Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional or statutory rights violation by a person acting under color of state law and limits municipal liability to injuries caused by an official policy or custom.

Goss v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2016-04-26

A § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) violation of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” by (2) “a person acting under color of state law.” ... Thus, a municipal entity may be held liable only for an act it officially sanctioned or for the actions of an official with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for isolated employee acts and requires a policy, custom, or usage causing the deprivation.

Henderson-Jones v. City of New York · filed 2016-04-27

Defendant City may not be held liable for damages under section 1983 if they are caused by a City employee’s isolated acts or omissions. ... The City may be held liable for Van Orden’s violations of federal law only if plaintiffs establish that a policy, custom, or usage of the City or its Police Department produced Van Or-den’s deprivation of plaintiffs’ federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to allege that an official policy or unofficial custom caused the constitutional injury.

Hall v. State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety · filed 2016-04-29

Thus, to establish a government entity’s liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that his constitutional injury was the result of either (1) an officially promulgated policy, or (2) an unofficial custom or practice.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a constitutional violation and, for municipal liability, a policy or custom attributable to the municipality.

Jones v. Onondaga County Resource Recovery Agency · filed 2016-05-04

The court also properly determined that Jones failed to state a § 1983 claim because he did not allege facts stating an equal protection violation or the existence of a policy or custom that would give rise to municipal liability.

A city cannot be liable under Section 1983 for its officers’ conduct unless an official policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Shaw v. City of New York · filed 2016-05-04

Moreover, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 by demonstrating that the plaintiff failed to allege that an official policy or custom of the City caused the police officers to violate his constitutional rights (see Grimes v City of New York, 106 AD3d 441, 442 [2013]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 721 [2003]).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker deliberately chooses the challenged course of action as municipal policy.

Calicchio v. Sachem Central School District · filed 2016-05-05

In other words, “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to prove that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Jung v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2016-05-10

It is well-established that a governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ... For a municipality to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy or custom was the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” ... Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment' on Jung’s § 1983 claim against the City and Count IV is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior, but permits liability based on an officially adopted policy or custom.

Jones v. Perry County Fiscal Court · filed 2016-05-11

PCFC is correct that “a municipality cannot be made liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis.”

Section 1983 permits suits against local governments but does not impose vicarious liability for employees’ constitutional violations.

Brawley v. Punt · filed 2016-05-11

While local governments may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they cannot be held vicariously liable for their employees’ constitutional violations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable to identify a district policy or custom causing a deprivation of federal rights and plead facts showing deliberate indifference.

S.W. v. Clayton County Public Schools · filed 2016-05-12

“It is well established that municipalities, like a school district, may not be held liable under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. To impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, the plaintiff must identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ causing the deprivation of federal rights.” ... Accordingly, there are insufficient factual allegations to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a municipality when its policy or custom deprives someone of a federally protected right.

Cainhoy Athletic Soccer Club v. Town of Mount Pleasant · filed 2016-05-12

A municipality is a person amenable to suit under § 1983, but municipal liability requires the plaintiff to show that the municipal custom or policy deprived a federally protected right. ... There is no dispute that the enforcement of the Agreement’s exclusivity provision constitutes enforcement of a municipal policy under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes the alleged injury, but not solely because the municipality employs the person responsible.

O'Boyle v. Sweetapple · filed 2016-05-17

The Town is correct that a municipality’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on a respondeat superior theory of liability and, instead, a municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its official policy or custom caused the alleged injury.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Yin v. NFTA · filed 2016-05-19

Even if Plaintiff had established that NFTA maintained a custom of failing to require officers to complete a TP-98 form every time they applied handcuffs, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate this alleged custom actually caused the violation of Plaintiffs rights on September 22, 2008.

Section 1983 municipal liability fails when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Willes v. Linn County · filed 2016-05-23

Because no ... constitutional violations occurred, Willes’s municipal liability claim fails.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when its custom, policy, or practice causes a constitutional deprivation.

Boynton v. City of Tallahassee · filed 2016-05-24

“To establish the liability of a city or county under section 1983, the plaintiff must show that [his] constitutional deprivation resulted from a custom, policy, or practice of the municipality.” Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1032.

A county is liable under § 1983 only when the alleged constitutional violation occurs pursuant to county policy or custom.

Washington v. Copiah County · filed 2016-05-25

That complaint named only the County as a defendant, but Washington did not allege that the federal constitutional violations alleged in the complaint occurred pursuant to County policy or custom. ... Thus, Washington failed to state a § 1983 claim against the County.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when a policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights and injury.

Little v. Gore · filed 2016-05-26

To state a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), a plaintiff must allege either a policy, ordinance or regulation or a custom “even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels” that deprives the plaintiff of his constitutional rights and causes injury.

Section 1983 requires a school board’s policy or custom to proximately cause the constitutional injury before the board can be held liable.

Richardson Ex Rel. K.R. v. Huber Heights City Schools Board of Education · filed 2016-06-02

Even assuming that Richardson can show that the Board’s inaction and indifference to the culture of bullying at Wayne High School was a “but for” cause of K.R.’s injury, he cannot prove proximate cause—that is, he cannot show that “it was reasonably foreseeable that the complained of harm would befall [K.R.] as a result of the [Board’s] conduct.” Id. at 609.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional deprivation caused by its official policy or custom; a police chief’s decisions count as municipal policy only if the chief has final policymaking authority.

Armstrong v. City of Greensboro · filed 2016-06-06

For a municipality to be liable under § 1983, the constitutional deprivation must be caused “through an official policy or custom.” ... While the City of Greensboro cannot use a reservation of final authority to the City Manager as a procedural quirk to avoid municipal liability, any final policymaking authority delegated to another actor, such as the Chief, must be true final policy-making authority, rather than mere poli-cymaking authority or general decision-making or implementation authority. ... Further, Plaintiff failed to allege facts plausibly indicating that a delegation took place.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional violation only when an official policy or custom was its moving force.

Rodriguez v. City of Houston · filed 2016-06-09

Municipal liability under § 1983 thus requires “proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for a deprivation attributable to a municipal policy or custom, which a plaintiff must support with factual allegations.

Estate of Osorio v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2016-06-09

The Estate also states a conclusory allegation that the Defendant has a policy of allowing its officers to use deadly force on the mentally ill, but again offers no facts in support of such a conclusion. Therefore, even if the Court considers the Estate’s claims under § 1983 rather than § 1981 or § 1903, the Estate has not plead sufficient facts to support a civil rights violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities; a plaintiff must show that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.

Three Legged Monkey, L.P. v. City of El Paso · filed 2016-06-13

There is no vicarious municipal liability under § 1983; rather, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).

A § 1983 claim against a city or police chief must be supported by facts; conclusory allegations about policies and supervision do not state a claim.

Doe v. City of Pharr, Texas · filed 2016-06-13

Finally, appellants contend Chief Villescas was the policymaker for each of the alleged inadequate practices, and failed to take action after learning of Mata’s alleged misconduct. Beyond those conclusory assertions, appellants present no facts or law in support of their claims in their third-amended complaint. Pursuant to our de novo review, and having considered the briefs, the pertinent parts of the record, and the applicable law, and essentially for the reasons stated in the district court’s comprehensive and well-reasoned orders dated 13 August 2014, and 19 and 24 February and 1 June 2015, as well as its 9 June 2015 Rule 54(b) judgment, appellants fail to state a claim against the three defendants dismissed by the judgment: the city, its police department, and Chief Villescas.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Odeh v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge · filed 2016-06-13

In his opposition (Doc. 90), the plaintiff does not dispute the City-Parish’s argument that he is unable to show an official policy or custom. Nor does the plaintiff dispute that he cannot show that any such policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Both of these elements are necessary to impose independent liability against the City-Parish under § 1983. Indeed, the plaintiff failed to come forth with any evidence of such custom, policy, or practice. Because the plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence of an essential element of his causes of action under § 1983, summary judgment is GRANTED as to all of the plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

A county cannot avoid § 1983 liability for detainees’ medical care by contracting with a private provider.

Burns v. Robertson County · filed 2016-06-13

Thus, that Robertson County contracted with SHP to provide for the medical needs of pretrial detainees in its jails does not allow it to avoid liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Agema v. City of Allegan · filed 2016-06-16

To prevail in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a municipality, a litigant must show a constitutional deprivation that was due to a municipal policy or custom. ... Since the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to find an applicable municipal policy or custom, we need not address the parties’ arguments about whether the complaint plausibly alleged a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a municipal-liability plaintiff to plead facts showing an official policy promulgated or ratified by the legally authorized policymaker, but the plaintiff need not identify that policymaker by name.

Groden v. City of Dallas · filed 2016-06-16

Accordingly, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), we hold that a plaintiff is not required to single out the specific policymaker in his complaint; instead, a plaintiff need only plead facts that show that the defendant or defendants acted pursuant to a specific official policy, which was promulgated or ratified by the legally authorized policymaker.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to support a constitutional claim against a municipality.

Soto v. City of Cambridge · filed 2016-06-20

Here, the undisputed facts fail to establish that there was a municipal policy or custom which would serve as the basis for the plaintiffs constitutional claim.

Section 1983 allows a city to be sued directly for an unconstitutional action that implements an ordinance or regulation.

Bratton v. City of Atchison · filed 2016-06-24

A city or municipality can be sued directly under §1983 for an unconstitutional action which executes or implements an ordinance or regulation.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged injury to hold a municipality liable for its employees’ conduct.

King v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-06-29

We also agree with the District Court that King has not alleged facts sufficient to show that the City or the PPA had a policy or practice of holding hearings in the absence of appellants who have asked to appear, as is required to state a claim for municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government for an official’s conduct when the official had final policymaking authority for the government concerning that act.

Garmon v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2016-07-05

A local government may be liable under § 1983 for an official’s conduct where the official had final policymaking authority concerning the action at issue, and where the official was the policymaker for the local governing body for the purposes of the particular act.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on officers’ conduct when the officers caused no constitutional harm.

Rucinski v. County of Oakland · filed 2016-07-06

Finally, because neither McCann nor Beltz violated Rucinski’s Fourth Amendment rights, we also must dismiss Rucinski’s municipal-liability claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a false arrest claim against a city based on respondeat superior liability.

Espinoza v. City of New York · filed 2016-07-06

However, the alternative remedy of false arrest against the City, premised upon respondeat superior liability, is not viable pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its officers’ constitutional violations.

Yang v. City of Brooklyn Park · filed 2016-07-06

Brooklyn Park cannot be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a municipality’s own unconstitutional actions, but not vicarious liability for the actions of non-policy-making employees.

Merisier v. Ellender · filed 2016-07-06

While municipalities may be liable under § 1983 for their own unconstitutional actions, they are not vicariously liable for the actions of non-policy-making employees.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipal liability claim based on officers’ conduct when the officers committed no constitutional violation.

Eldridge v. City of Warren, MI · filed 2016-07-07

Because Eldridge cannot maintain his municipal liability claim in the absence of a finding that Moore and Horlocker used excessive force against him, ... and because the jury found that the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, any hope Eldridge has for relief depends entirely on the video’s admissibility on his excessive force claim.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on an employee’s conduct when that conduct does not support an underlying constitutional claim.

Barnard v. Lackawanna County · filed 2016-07-08

The court also finds that, because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for First Amendment Retaliation in Count I of the Complaint for the defendant Brian Loughney’s conduct, the plaintiff cannot state a claim for municipal liability resulting from such conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that its policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation; identifying a policy alone is insufficient.

Estate of Thomas v. Fayette County · filed 2016-07-08

As should be clear by now, simply pointing out the existence of an allegedly unlawful policy or custom is not enough to maintain such a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on an employee’s actions; the plaintiff must identify a municipal policy that caused the constitutional violation.

Doe v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2016-07-11

Doe has not identified a District policy that was the moving force behind any constitutional violation that Comacho may have committed, other than to again recite the same failure to train and failure to enforce the two teachers rule allegations discussed above.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a policy or custom only if the plaintiff identifies it, connects it to the municipality, and shows that it caused the injury.

Smith v. Township of Prairieville · filed 2016-07-11

A plaintiff raising a § 1983 claim on the basis of a municipal policy or custom is required to identify the policy, connect the policy to the municipality, and show that the particular injury resulted from that policy. ... Plaintiff has provided no evidence identifying a specific custom, policy, or practice that was the “moving force” behind the alleged violations and, accordingly, neither Prairieville Township nor Barry Township may be held liable under this theory.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

TF by pnf Shannon F v Portsmouth School District · filed 2016-07-12

Nor do the circumstances here warrant such a conclusion, where the plaintiff has not demonstrated that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Portsmouth conspicuously failed to enforce its policies or had a de facto policy or custom that could have caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 municipal failure-to-train liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Sampson v. Gee-Cram · filed 2016-07-12

However, because we conclude that the individual officers did not commit any underlying constitutional violations, Plaintiffs’ municipal claims are foreclosed.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim when the complaint plausibly alleges that a city policy caused the claimed deprivation of rights.

Lewis v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-07-13

These allegations are sufficient to .provide the City with adequate notice of Lewis’s Monell claim and the basis on which it rests.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipality’s own policy or custom deprives a person of constitutional rights.

Henry v. City of Middletown · filed 2016-07-15

A local government entity violates § 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. ... There is no question that Plaintiffs were deprived of their vehicles pursuant to the City’s custom and practice of disposing of seized vehicles under § 4513.61.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional violation is caused by the municipality’s policy or custom.

Garner v. Harrod · filed 2016-07-15

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against the entity defendants under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the plaintiffs must establish that (1) their constitutional rights were violated and (2) “the municipality’s policy or custom led to the violation.” Robertson, 753 F.3d at 622. ... Because the plaintiffs cannot establish that their constitutional rights were violated, their claim fails at step one.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging municipal liability for hiring or retaining an employee to plead deliberate indifference.

Crepea v. Cochise County · filed 2016-07-15

Under the exacting standard for § 1983 municipal liability established by Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), Crepea must allege that Cochise County and Sheriff Dever were deliberately indifferent in hiring Cruver, or in failing to terminate or suspend him. The complaint does not suffice as to either showing.

An isolated incident of alleged misconduct generally cannot establish a municipal policy or custom that creates liability under § 1983.

Corwin v. City of Independence, MO. · filed 2016-07-18

He only alleges that he was denied emergency care, and “[g]enerally, an isolated incident of alleged . . . misconduct . . . cannot, as a matter of law, establish a municipal policy or custom creating liability under § 1983.” Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013).

A school board may be liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional rights violation.

Rayborn v. Bossier Parish School System · filed 2016-07-18

However, only official BPSB policy or custom could expose the school board to liability for constitutional rights violations. ... In light of those failures, Defendant BPSB is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when a municipal policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Chandler Smith v. Borough of Morrisville · filed 2016-07-20

because the Borough of Morrisville is not liable under § 1983 absent a municipal policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation. Smith suggested no such policy or custom. ... We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Smith’s complaint. Even construing his initial pro se submission liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we determine that Smith fails to state any claim for relief for the reasons thoroughly discussed by the District Court.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a governmental entity when there has been no underlying constitutional violation.

Williams v. McKee · filed 2016-07-20

Because a governmental entity may not be held responsible under § 1983 where there has been no underlying constitutional violation, Hinton, 997 F.2d at 782, the district court correctly denied as moot Williams’s motion to file a second amended complaint, the sole purpose of which proposed amendment was to properly name the Board of Commissioners of Delta County as the municipal entity defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged federal violation.

Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli · filed 2016-07-21

A plaintiff raising a municipal liability claim under § 1983 must demonstrate that the alleged federal violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.

A municipal liability claim under § 1983 alleging a widespread practice need not identify another person affected by that practice to satisfy pleading requirements.

White v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-07-21

Together with the individual claim against O’Donnell and the standard printed form that does not require specific factual support for an application for an arrest warrant, this allegation was enough to satisfy the “short and plain statement of the claim” requirement of Rule 8(a)(2). White was not required to identify every other or even one other individual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained through the complained-of process.

A city and its employees in their official capacities are not liable under § 1983 for an official's acts when he does not make city policy.

Snider-Carpenter v. City of Dixon, Missouri · filed 2016-07-22

First, the City of Dixon and its employees in their official capacities are not liable because Marshal Yoakum—the city official who directed the actions of the Dixon police officers—was not a policy maker; the record reflects that his "discretionary decisions [were] constrained by policies not of [his own] making," namely those promulgated by the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Dixon.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a widespread custom of misconduct even when the plaintiffs identify no other specific person who suffered similar treatment.

Mehta v. Village of Bolingbrook · filed 2016-07-25

Even without identifying specific other Hindu or Asian-American persons who suffered similar treatment, the Mehtas have adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that their treatment was the result of “a common practice that is so widespread and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy.” Rossi, 790 F.3d at 737. Monell does not bar the Mehtas’ claims against the Village.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires an identified policy or custom that caused the deprivation of federally protected rights.

Hope v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center · filed 2016-07-26

In sum, Plaintiff fails to identify a municipal policy or custom to support her Monell claim. Therefore, because Plaintiff failed to amend the deficiencies previously identified by the Court as to her original Complaint, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against Fair Acres will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability for an employee’s constitutional injury based solely on vicarious liability.

Wingate v. City of Seattle · filed 2016-07-26

Under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by its employees on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show both a constitutional violation and that a municipal custom, policy, or practice caused it.

Grimes v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-14

DC correctly states in its unopposed motion for summary judgment the two-step inquiry plaintiff must satisfy to establish municipal liability on a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. !d. at 6; Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Regarding the first step, defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot cite any record evidence to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment by any employee of Oak Hill. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., pp. 6-7. Regarding the second step, defendant asserts that, even if the record did contain evidence of an Eighth Amendment violation, plaintiff cannot cite any record evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that a municipal custom, policy, or practice caused the violation. !d. at 7-8. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2), the Court considers defendant's assertions to be undisputed for purposes of the motion.

Section 1983 permits claims against individuals and municipalities only when its liability requirements are met.

Suschanke v. Neske · filed 2013-02-26

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that Suschanke failed to state a section 1983 claim against Thomas Neske for false arrest, see Garionis v. Newton, 827 F.2d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1987) (person who is already under arrest and in police custody cannot be “rearrested”), or for either excessive force or violation of intimate-association rights, see King v. Olmsted Cnty., 117 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (mere verbal threats generally do not support § 1983 claim). Thus, Suschanke failed to state similar claims against the City of St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners (Board). See Moore v. City of Desloge, Mo., 647 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir. 2011) (municipal liability for failure to train or supervise cannot attach unless individual liability is first found on underlying substantive claim); Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires showing of constitutional violation pursuant to official custom, policy, or practice of governmental entity); Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 559 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (§ 1983 claims cannot be based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability).

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference to impose municipal liability for failure to prevent a constitutional violation.

Hurt v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 2016-07-27

The culpable mental state in a failure-to-prevent claim will always be deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional act.

Doe v. City of San Diego · filed 2016-07-29

A local government may be held Hable under § 1983 when an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to allege a constitutional violation caused by the municipality’s deliberately indifferent custom or policy.

Gurrera v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office · filed 2016-08-01

Instead, to impose municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a municipal policy or custom supporting the alleged constitutional violation.

Geissler v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2016-07-28

Having failed to identify any municipal policy or custom in her Complaint, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City of Atlantic City under § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on municipalities for their employees’ acts.

Holland v. City of Auburn, Alabama · filed 2016-08-03

Municipalities are not subject to respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983; rather, there are strict limitations on municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality only when a municipal policy or custom directly caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Flowers v. City of New York · filed 2016-08-05

Here, plaintiff has wholly failed to allege any facts which would support a claim that his arrest was the direct result of a municipal policy or custom. For at least this reason, plaintiffs sixth COA must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county based on its policies or customs, even if the county lacks capacity to be sued under Ohio law.

Cooper v. Montgomery County · filed 2016-08-05

Plaintiff may proceed on his § 1983 claims asserted against Montgomery County.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation before a municipality can be held liable.

Bird v. West Valley City · filed 2016-08-08

Because she cannot establish that she was a victim of intentional gender discrimination, Plaintiff has no underlying constitutional violation on which she can rely to impose municipal liability against West Valley City under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a policymaker, an official policy, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy for municipal liability; authority to approve lesson plans alone does not make a principal a policymaker.

Brinsdon v. McAllen Independent Sch Dist · filed 2016-08-09

“[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” ... Hence, because there was no delegation of policymaking authority to Cavazos, her knowledge of the pledge assignment cannot be imputed to the District.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim based on a custom of tolerating excessive force when the complaint plausibly alleges a widespread practice, policymakers’ knowledge and acquiescence, deliberate indifference, and causation.

Simpson v. Ferry · filed 2016-08-10

Accordingly, I will deny the City’s motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs Monell claim (Count II) for failure to plead an unlawful custom of tolerating excessive force.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of a federal right.

Thompson v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-08-12

Because Thompson seeks to hold the District liable under section 1983, he must show not only that his right to due process was abridged, but that a policy or custom of the District caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for failure to train or supervise when a municipality knew or should have known of a risk of constitutional violations and its inaction caused the violation.

McComb v. Ross · filed 2016-08-12

In other words, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for its deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise where “the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional violations” but “adopt[ed] a policy of inaction.” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A municipality’s consciously designed, routine detention and monitoring practices can constitute a policy or custom for liability under § 1983.

Castro v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2016-08-15

These routine practices were consciously designed and, together, they amount to a custom or policy.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation, a municipal policy or custom, and a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury.

Romero ex rel. Romero v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2016-08-15

As is required to establish municipal liability under § 1983, M. Romero has alleged: (i) that an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation; (ii) that a municipal policy or custom exists; and (iii) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom, and the injury alleged.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its custom, practice, or policy causes the constitutional violation.

Ford v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-08-16

To sustain a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that that the constitutional violation at issue was caused by a city custom, practice, policy.

Section 1983 requires an injury caused by an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom to hold a county liable.

Kirk v. Flores · filed 2016-08-17

First, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Kirk’s claims of inadequate medical care against the Valencia County defendants (Valencia County, Valencia County Detention Center, Board of Valencia County Commissioners, and Valencia County Medical Care) because Kirk didn’t allege an injury resulting from an unconstitutional policy or custom.

A city is not liable under Section 1983 for a sheriff’s employment decisions when the sheriff does not make city policy for those decisions.

Lane v. Anderson · filed 2016-08-17

In sum, we hold that Sheriff Anderson did not act as a Baltimore City policymaker when making employment and personnel decisions. Accordingly, Appellant’s Monell claim was properly dismissed.

A Monell claim under § 1983 cannot proceed after the underlying § 1983 claim has been dismissed.

Durick v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2016-08-17

Having already dismissed plaintiff’s underlying § 1983 claim, plaintiff cannot make out a Monell claim, and that claim is also dismissed.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for an employee’s conduct; a municipal policy or custom must cause the constitutional deprivation.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 2016-08-18

“Under Monell, a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely on a re-spondeat superior theory,” and Plaintiff has failed to show that any municipal policy or custom caused her to suffer a constitutional deprivation.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official municipal policy behind the challenged action.

Kunkle v. Naugle · filed 2016-08-19

Third, the County of Lehigh is not liable because the pilot program was not official municipal policy, which is required under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York.

Section 1983 municipal liability under Monell requires a sufficiently pleaded underlying constitutional violation.

Mattern v. City of Sea Isle · filed 2016-08-24

Because, as explained above, we conclude that the Matterns have not sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment denial of medical care claim, the Matterns’ Monell claim against the City of Sea Isle must also fail.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training only when the plaintiff shows that a municipal policy caused the injury.

Jennifer R. Arnold Rogers v. City of Orlando, Florida · filed 2016-09-01

But for the City to be liable, Arnold-Rogers also had to show that the City adopted a policy of failing to adequately train its officers. And Arnold-Rogers made no such showing.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a federal-right violation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Gavitt v. Born · filed 2016-09-01

Yet, to survive a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 claim for municipal liability based on actions taken pursuant to official policy, practice or custom must include adequate allegations “(1) that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality’s policy or custom caused that violation to happen.” Id. at 660.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation, so the court need not examine the municipality’s customs or policies.

Gohl Ex Rel. J.G. v. Livonia Public Schools School District · filed 2016-09-08

But we need not examine the customs, policies, or practices of the school district if no constitutional violation occurred. See Graves v. Mahoning Cty., 821 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2016). Because J.G.’s constitutional rights remain intact, Livonia Public Schools cannot be liable for violating them.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Jane Doe I v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-09-09

To hold a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the constitutionally objectionable actions of its employees, a plaintiff must show not only a predicate constitutional violation, but also how that municipality’s policy or custom was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. ... Because the undisputed facts require the Court to conclude as a matter of law (1) that the District denied Jane Doe I and Jane Doe III procedural due process, and (2) that the District’s official policy caused that due process violation, the Court will enter judgment for Jane Doe I and Jane Doe III on their constitutional claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality or an official in an official capacity to plead an official policy or custom that caused the alleged violation of constitutional rights.

Johnson v. Dobry · filed 2016-09-12

Johnson’s claims against District Attorney Brown in his official capacity, the Port Authority and its Police Department, and the City all failed because he did not adequately plead an official policy or custom that resulted in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

A municipal liability claim under § 1983 requires an underlying unconstitutional action.

Patino v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2016-09-14

Therefore, there was no unconstitutional action to undergird a Monell claim.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for state laws merely because its officials discussed possible changes with legislators.

Cayer v. Town of Madawaska · filed 2016-09-15

While municipal officials and municipalities may be subject to civil actions for local ordinances that violate individuals’ civil rights, municipal officials speaking to legislators about clarifications or improvements in state law do not render the municipality civilly liable for laws the Legislature may ultimately enact.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on respondeat superior; a single decision can support liability only if an official with final policymaking authority made it.

Integrity Collision Center v. City of Fulshear · filed 2016-09-20

The city can be liable for that decision only if it was made by an official with “final policymaking authority” as determined by state law, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123–24 (1988), as distinguished from “final decisionmaking authority,” Bolton v. City of Dall., Tex., 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs have made no claim nor provided any evidence that the police chief has final policymaking authority. Instead, they plead that he was “acting without guidance from city officials or due consideration of any applicable statutes, code ordinances, or Constitutional obligations,” and the city is liable for that on a respondeat superior theory. Such a theory is not cognizable in a Section 1983 municipal-liability claim.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an arrest when the police chief lacked final municipal policymaking authority over it.

Cullen v. Janvrin · filed 2016-09-21

The district court also properly found that the town could not be held liable for the conduct at issue because its Chief of Police lacked final municipal policymaking authority over this arrest; in this case, that authority was exercised by the Rockingham County Attorney as the delegatee of the State's Attorney General. We agree that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, substantially for the reasons articulated below.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy, custom, or practice causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Mediavilla v. City of New York · filed 2016-09-29

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only if a plaintiffs injury is. the result of municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a municipal policy or custom to hold a county or its officers in their official capacities liable.

Jones v. Westchester County · filed 2016-09-30

Because Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient facts of any policy or custom, the Court dismisses all claims against the County and the individual Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a school district acted with deliberate indifference and that its custom or policy was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

Littell v. Houston Independent School District · filed 2016-09-30

Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that indicate HISD acted with “deliberate indifference” and the district’s custom or policy was the “moving force” behind the student strip searches. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failure to train or supervise requires evidence of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; the claim fails when the plaintiff presents no such evidence.

Mandola v. County of Nassau · filed 2016-09-30

Thus, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County of Nassau failed to train or supervise its employees in arrest warrant execution procedures in deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights.

A county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 without evidence that its policy was a moving force behind the injury.

Petersen v. Lewis County · filed 2016-10-03

The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to the County on Petersen’s municipal liability claim. Petersen failed to present evidence that any of the County’s policies were a “moving force” behind the shooting.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Nigro v. Carrasquillo · filed 2016-10-04

Ms. Nigro’s proposed amendment to add the City of Sunrise as a defendant would be futile because the City cannot be liable if there was no underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when evidence shows that a city’s failure to address a persistent custom of excessive force was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Moore v. City of Ferguson · filed 2016-10-04

The evidence is therefore sufficient to show that Ferguson’s failure to address the persistent use of excessive force by police officers was the “moving force” behind the violation of Moore’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a constitutional deprivation results from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Ouma v. Clackamas County · filed 2016-10-05

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ouma’s claims against defendant Clackamas County arising from his arrest because Ouma failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of Clackamas County.

A § 1983 claim against a county must allege facts showing the county’s involvement in the claimed constitutional deprivation.

Bailey v. Rich Suey · filed 2016-10-06

The district court properly dismissed Clark County because Bailey failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Clark County was involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim based on inadequate discipline or training must plausibly allege constitutional violations and a failure to discipline or train officers.

Holloman v. Markowski · filed 2016-10-07

Importantly, Holloman does not allege any facts showing that any of these incidents involved constitutional violations, let alone that the City improperly failed to discipline or train any officers.

Section 1983 requires a school district’s policy or custom to cause a constitutional injury; the district cannot be held liable solely for employing the wrongdoer.

Campbell v. Dundee Cmty. Sch. · filed 2016-10-13

In order to hold Dundee Community Schools liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must overcome the requirements of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell the plaintiff may not base her claim on a theory of respondeat superior, but must show that the schools’ officials were acting according to a “policy” or “custom” within the system that leads to or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right of bodily integrity, specifically the right not to be sexually molested by her coach.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city when the complaint plausibly alleges that its policies or practices caused a constitutional violation.

Rogers v. City of Atlanta · filed 2016-10-17

Plaintiffs complaint does not seek to impose'vicarious liability on the City for the allegedly unconstitutional actions of Burns; it alleges that the City’s own policies and practices led to those actions. That is sufficient to allege municipal liability under Monell.

Section 1983 does not permit governmental entity liability based solely on a deputy’s isolated act under a vicarious liability theory.

Lewis v. Clark · filed 2016-10-18

Rather, Lewis alleges only one act by an unnamed deputy under a vicarious-liability theory, which isn’t a permissible basis under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes the alleged violation.

Butler v. Pechkurow · filed 2016-10-19

The District Court was correct that the City of Philadelphia could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the alleged violation was caused by an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plausibly allege a policy, practice, or custom that caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Bini v. City of Vancouver · filed 2016-10-28

Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the City. Nonetheless, the Court must dismiss the claims without prejudice and grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege a practice, policy, or custom that was the moving force behind a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because it employs a tortfeasor.

Gallagher v. O'Connor · filed 2016-10-31

He also cannot maintain his claim against the Village for employing O’Connor because a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for employing a tortfeasor.

Section 1983 does not support a municipal liability claim when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional violation.

Stern v. City of New York · filed 2016-11-01

Because we do not disturb the jury’s determination that Stern suffered no violation of his constitutional rights, there is no basis for Stern’s derivative claim against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee's constitutional violation only when it results from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.

Bolderson v. City of Wentzville · filed 2016-11-01

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978): Liability for a constitutional violation will attach to a municipality only if the violation resulted from an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise an official or employee.

Section 1983 requires facts showing an official policy or custom that reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights to support a claim against a police department.

McDaniel v. Powell · filed 2016-11-07

The district court properly dismissed McDaniel’s claim against the Davis Police Department because McDaniel failed to allege facts sufficient to show that ... the Department had an official policy or custom that “reflects deliberate indifference” to her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Dillard v. State of Oregon · filed 2016-11-07

Because Dillard failed to state an underlying constitutional violation, dismissal of Dillard’s Monell claims against defendants Josephine County and City of Grant’s Pass, and his official capacity claims against defendants Campbell, Sanchez, Henner, Brissette, and Gaunt, was proper.

Under § 1983, a delegated final policymaker must have authority to make policy, not merely to make decisions, for a municipality to be liable on that theory.

Jaythan E. v. Board of Education of Sykuta Elementary School · filed 2016-11-08

Such allegations do not suffice to allege that Jones had final policymaking authority under the delegation theory because they fail to suggest that she had the ability to make policies for the District or even Sykuta.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional deprivation is caused by an official policy, custom, or usage.

Dempsey v. Johnson · filed 2016-11-10

To establish municipal liability under section 1983, the plaintiff must establish that (1) she has suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom, or usage of the municipality.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that an unconstitutional policy or custom caused the injury; one officer’s usual practice and another officer’s conduct on a single occasion do not establish a widespread custom.

Meeks v. City of Detroit · filed 2016-11-16

To state a claim against a city or county under section 1983, Plaintiff “must show that his injury was caused by an unconstitutional ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ of the municipality.” ... The court concludes that the testimony of one officer regarding his personal practice, and of a second regarding a single instance, cannot suffice to establish “a practice so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”

Section 1983 does not make a city vicariously liable for its employees’ violations.

Higgins v. City of New York · filed 2016-11-17

It is undisputed, however, that the City cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that an alleged municipal policy or failure to train actually caused the constitutional violation.

Jill S. N. Schaffer v. Beringer · filed 2016-11-21

Because the officers had arguable probable cause, the Schaffers cannot show that the alleged policy or failure to train was the moving force behind or the actual cause of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation caused by a school district’s custom or policy to hold the district liable for negligent hiring, supervision, screening, or training.

L. H. v. Pittston Area School District · filed 2016-11-21

These claims are also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To hold the School District liable under these theories of recovery, however, the Appellants must show that there was a constitutional violation and that the violation was caused by the School District’s custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability without a judgment against an individual employee when a municipal policy or custom caused a violation of a federal right.

Butler v. Lamont · filed 2016-11-28

Rather than obtain a judgment against a municipality’s employee, a plaintiff advancing a municipal liability claim must establish (a) “a violation of a federal right”—which may not necessarily arise from the liability of an individual employee—and (b) a municipal policy or custom that caused the violation.

A city is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

MacKovski v. City of Garden Grove · filed 2016-11-28

Rather, in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a city, a plaintiff must prove that the constitutional injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy, regulation, custom, or usage. ... Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the City of Garden Grove and the Garden Grove Police Department on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 when the complaint fails to allege a deprivation of federal rights.

16-349-Cv · filed 2016-11-29

Having concluded that Urbina fails to allege any deprivation of federal rights, we hold that the District Court properly dismissed Urbina’s Monell claim.

A municipal liability claim under Section 1983 fails when the plaintiff does not plausibly allege a deprivation of federal rights.

Urbina v. City of New York · filed 2016-11-29

Having concluded that Urbina fails to allege any deprivation of federal rights, we hold that the District Court properly dismissed Urbina’s Monell claim.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 if no municipal actor committed a constitutional violation.

Hurlston v. City of Princeton, TX · filed 2016-11-29

As set forth above, Hurlston has not raised a fact issue with respect to the claim that Barnett and Mitchnik conspired to violate Hurlston’s constitutional rights. Hurlston therefore cannot maintain a section 1983 claim against the cities. See, e.g., Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 if no constitutional violation has been committed by a municipal actor).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury and the municipality has the required culpable state of mind.

Blueberry v. Comanche County Facilities Authority · filed 2016-12-01

To establish municipal liability on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that “the municipality itself cause[d] the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). We have identified three elements to such a claim: “(1) official policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.” ... We conclude, as did the district court, that the record fails to establish a basis for holding the CCFA liable for appellants’ alleged injuries.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school board only when the alleged constitutional violation resulted from a municipal custom or policy or the act of a final policymaker.

Hicks v. Benton County Board of Education · filed 2016-12-01

As previously noted herein, in order to impose liability on the BCBOE for a § 1983 claim, the alleged unconstitutional act must have been a custom or policy of the municipality or perpetrated by a final policymaker.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation for municipal or supervisory liability.

Bell v. Cumberland Cty., Tenn. · filed 2016-12-05

Lastly, since Deputy Human did not violate Fish’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, to the extent plaintiff has renewed her municipal and supervisory liability claims on appeal, we affirm summary judgment for Cumberland County and the Sheriff.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for complying with a facially valid court order.

City of El Paso and John F. Cook, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of El Paso v. Tom Brown Ministries, Word of Life Chu · filed 2016-12-07

A governmental entity does not violate Section 1983 by complying with a facially-valid court order.

Section 1983 permits a county to be held liable for a violation of federal rights when a county policy or custom caused the violation.

Katz-Crank v. Haskett · filed 2016-12-08

Marion County is a “person” under § 1983 and may be held liable for violating Katz-Crank’s federal rights if its policies or customs caused the violation.

A county may face § 1983 liability for written policies and customary practices established by judges and a sheriff acting as county policymakers.

Odonnell v. Harris County · filed 2016-12-16

On the basis of the plausible factual allegations in the complaint, (Docket Entry No. 54), Harris County may be sued for the written and customary policies that the County Judges and the County Sheriff promulgate in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an alleged constitutional violation implements an official policy or custom.

Estate of Joseph Fabics v. City of New Brunswick · filed 2016-12-20

Where, as here, “a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts showing that a constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Montgomery v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2016-12-22

The district court properly dismissed Montgomery’s claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because Montgomery failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality or its officers in their official capacities requires facts showing that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

King v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department · filed 2016-12-23

Dismissal of King’s claims against LASD under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and Jackson and Corbett in their official capacities, was proper because King failed to allege facts sufficient to show a policy or custom of LASD resulting in a constitutional violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; it is not vicariously liable for its officers’ violations.

Hussain v. City of New York · filed 2017-01-03

A municipality may not be held vicariously liable for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, but rather may only be liable pursuant to the statute where the municipality itself caused the constitutional violation through an official policy or custom (Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 694 [1978]; Leftenant v City of New York, 70 AD3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2010]).

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a plausibly pleaded policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Gonzales v. Nueces County · filed 2017-01-04

The pleading of a policy, absent here, is a prerequisite to pleading that the policy was the moving force behind the officers’ alleged use of excessive force. The Court must therefore GRANT the motion and DISMISS the Monell claim against Nueces County for the use of excessive force.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes a constitutional injury, but does not make a municipality vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Orellana v. Nobles County · filed 2017-01-06

Since a municipality is not vicariously liable for the acts of its agents, plaintiffs seeking liability against “local governments under § 1983 must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). ... It was Nobles County’s adherence to this policy that resulted in Orellana being detained after he was eligible for release.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes constitutional harm, or when an official with final policymaking authority causes or ratifies the harm.

Fox v. County of Tulare · filed 2017-01-10

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an action taken pursuant to an official policy causes a constitutional harm. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). There is no evidence in the record establishing that the County maintained a policy or practice that harmed Fox or C.M.R., nor did Fox show that an official with final policy-making authority either caused the alleged harm or ratified a subordinate’s action that caused the harm.

Section 1983 authorizes injunctive and monetary relief against municipalities.

Robinson v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2017-01-11

Plaintiff was injured when he was arrested and formally charged with violating D.C. Code § 25-1001(a); that harm is traceable to the District of Columbia, whose legislature passed the law and whose police force made the arrest; and, were the court to hold the law unconstitutionally vague, Plaintiff’s harm could be redressed because Section 1983 authorizes injunctive and monetary relief against municipalities.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when a well-settled custom causes a constitutional violation.

Vandegrift v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2017-01-11

“When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation, or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” ... Ms. Vandegrift provides sufficient evidence of a well-settled custom of sexual harassment within the Philadelphia Police Department.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or widespread practice that causes a constitutional violation; failure to investigate officers on other occasions does not by itself establish such a practice.

Marshall v. Town of Merrillville · filed 2017-01-11

Arguing that the Defendant Officers were not investigated for misconduct on other occasions is insufficient to establish a widespread practice for purposes of § 1983 municipal liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged violation.

Saunders v. Town of Hull · filed 2017-01-11

The record is devoid of facts showing that it was the policy or custom of the Town of Hull to pass over individuals for promotion in retaliation for protected speech. Therefore, defendant the Town of Hull is entitled to summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality only when the alleged constitutional injury results from an official policy or custom; the municipality is not vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Corvetti v. Town of Lake Pleasant · filed 2017-01-12

A local government may not, however, be sued under 42 USC § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory (see Shelton v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1148 [2009]), nor may it be sued "for a constitutional injury inflicted by employees or agents [who were] not acting pursuant to [an] official municipal policy or custom" (315-321 Realty Co. Assoc., LLC v City of New York, 33 AD3d 509, 509 [2006]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege a constitutional deprivation caused by an official policy or custom.

Montelis Peters v. Rob Caplan · filed 2017-01-12

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality deprived or caused an official to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right through an official policy or custom.

Prior shootings cannot establish a municipal policy, custom, or pattern under § 1983 without evidence that they violated the Constitution or a policy.

Velasquez v. City of Santa Clara · filed 2017-01-12

Because Velasquez has never offered any evidence (or even baldly asserted) that the prior shootings violated the Constitution or any policy, the past shootings could not establish that Santa Clara had a policy, custom, or pattern of constitutional violations allowing unlawful excessive force.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation resulting from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Taggart v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept. · filed 2017-01-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Taggart failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Taggart’s health, or whether any constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to prove that its deliberately indifferent policy caused a violation of a federal right.

Denham v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2017-01-13

The standard for holding a municipality liable under section 1983 is high. A plaintiff must prove that a federal right was violated, that the municipality had a policy of deliberate indifference, and that this policy caused the violation of the plaintiffs federal right.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation and a policymaker has actual or constructive knowledge of it.

Mercado v. Dallas County · filed 2017-01-17

Dallas County has failed to point to any specific deficiency in the amended complaint with respect to plaintiffs’ pleading of municipal liability under § 1983. Accordingly, the court denies Dallas County’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint on this basis.

A county is not liable under § 1983 for a constable’s actions when the constable lacks final county policymaking authority and no county policy or custom caused the alleged violation.

Bowden v. Jefferson County, Texas · filed 2017-01-19

Because Constable Saleme is not a policymaker for the County, Bowden’s § 1983 claims must fail.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom caused the alleged violation.

Sye Newton v. City of Wilmington · filed 2017-01-19

As for the organizational defendants, the District Court was correct that the City of Wilmington could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the alleged violation was caused by an official policy or custom.