42 U.S.C. § 1983

An official-capacity § 1983 claim against a municipal officer is treated as a claim against the municipality, which requires proof that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Crawford v. City of Muncie · filed 1995-09-28

As with the claim against Police Chief Scroggins, an action against Officer Hammond in his official capacity as a Muncie police officer is the same as bringing an action against the municipality itself. In order to impose liability, Crawford must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation resulted from a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based on respondeat superior; liability requires a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Kelley v. City of Manchester · filed 1995-09-29

In the absence of some indication of municipal direction via a policy, practice or custom, and given that a respondeat superior cause of action is not cognizable under §1983, Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 1993), the city is entitled to summary judgment.

A municipal defendant is liable under § 1983 only when the alleged violation implements an official policy or amounts to its custom.

Britton v. City of Erie, Pa. · filed 1995-09-29

To prevail, Plaintiff must show as to each Defendant that the allegedly violative behavior “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” or, although not formally adopted, amounts to a custom of the Defendant.

Section 1983 requires an official municipal policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation to hold a municipality liable.

Joiner v. Smith · filed 1995-10-02

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an official municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a causal link between the municipality’s policy or custom and the constitutional injury; a plaintiff’s active complicity can defeat that showing.

Roma Const. Co., Inc. v. aRUSSO · filed 1995-10-03

Because the plaintiffs cannot provide any “moving force” or “causal link” other than their active complicity, there is not sufficient causation to sustain a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a district attorney’s refusal to reappoint an investigator merely because county officials control the investigator’s salary and benefits.

Gunaca v. State of Tex. · filed 1995-10-03

On appeal, Gunaca claims that he "does not dispute the fact that the decision to hire and fire was possessed totally by Esparza," but contends instead, as he did in his response to Esparza's motion for summary judgment, that the municipal officials control investigators' salary and employment benefits. We have previously held that such assertions do not state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for failure to train when the training is inadequate for officers’ tasks, the inadequacy reflects deliberate indifference, and it causes a constitutional injury.

Hilliard v. Walker's Party Store, Inc. · filed 1995-10-04

The elements of municipal liability for failure to train require that: (1) the training program is inadequate to the tasks that the municipal actor must perform; (2) the inadequacy is the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy caused the plaintiffs constitutional injury.

An official-capacity claim under Section 1983 against county employees fails when the complaint does not allege facts implying an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom.

Robinson v. Howell · filed 1995-10-10

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not even allege facts that imply the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against County Defendants in their official capacity.

Section 1983 requires specific factual allegations, not conclusory assertions, to state a municipal liability claim based on inadequate supervision.

Garg v. Albany Industrial Development Agency · filed 1995-10-12

Such conclusory language, unsupported by any specific factual allegations, is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate supervision.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an official’s conduct unless the official had final decision-making authority over the challenged action.

Frank Deguiseppe and Torry Palermo v. Village of Bellwood and Robert Frascone · filed 1995-10-16

Because Frascone was not the final decision-maker with respect to Palermo’s suspension his conduct cannot serve as the predicate to municipal liability, and the claim based thereon was correctly dismissed.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision made by a final policymaker responsible for the activity that caused the constitutional violation.

Brown v. Bryan County, OK · filed 1995-10-23

So, it is clear that a single decision may create municipal liability if that decision were made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate police training when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the police encounter.

Velez v. City of New London · filed 1995-10-31

The first element — official policy or custom — can encompass inadequate police training if “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”

Section 1983 does not make the District of Columbia liable for failing to train or supervise federal officers over whom it lacks the power to direct and control.

Estate of Carter v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-10-31

The District of Columbia cannot be held liable for failing to supervise and train federal law enforcement officers over whom it lacked the power to direct and control.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for excessive force only when its unconstitutional policy or custom caused the injury; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Busch v. Torres · filed 1995-11-01

To succeed in an excessive force claim against defendant County of Los Angeles (“defendant County”), plaintiff must show that defendant County’s unconstitutional policy or custom caused her injury. Municipalities are not subject to Section 1983 liability based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits suit against a municipality for its own unconstitutional or illegal policies, but not for employee acts under respondeat superior.

Coulson v. Washoe County Douglas County · filed 1995-11-01

Municipal governments, such as Douglas County, may be sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 only for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies. They may not be sued for the acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory.

A public entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an employee’s alleged misconduct without evidence of a policy or custom permitting that conduct.

Ascolese v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1995-11-02

Under this standard, SEPTA cannot be held liable for the alleged conduct of van de Beek, as Ascolese has not shown that SEPTA had either a policy or a custom of permitting its medical personnel to harass employees.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest caused by an official municipal policy, custom, or usage.

Scheidler v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board · filed 1995-11-08

Even if a constitutionally protected interest was properly specified, the second element of a section 1983 cause of action for municipal liability requires petitioners to establish that "the deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom, or usage of the municipality.” (Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 402.) The present petition has not alleged any policy, custom or practice that deprived petitioners of their rights.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights caused by an official policy or governmental custom to state a claim against a municipality.

Riley v. Dowling · filed 1995-11-13

The petitioner failed to allege a deprivation of constitutional rights due to official government policy or governmental custom, which is necessary to state a cognizable claim against a municipality under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Monell v New York City Dept, of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 690-691; Lovelace v Gross, 80 NY2d 419, 425-426, n 3).

Section 1983 does not make a school district liable on a final policymaker theory when the employees whose conduct is challenged lacked final policymaking authority.

Plumeau v. Yamhill County School District 40 · filed 1995-11-14

For all these reasons, Moore and Just had no final policy-making authority for the District, nor was Just acting as a policy maker when she allegedly failed to investigate and stop Moore from abusing Amanda. Amanda therefore may not base her § 1983 claim against the District on this theory.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a school district for an employee’s conduct; a claim against the district requires its own involvement, such as a policy or custom.

Sherk v. Lieback · filed 1995-11-22

Since the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in a § 1983 action, in an attempt to establish that the school district directly participated in the alleged violation of Sherk’s civil rights, the plaintiff proceeded primarily on the theory that the school district had a policy or custom permitting or approving violence committed against students in its schools and in engaging in a “cover-up” when such incidents occurred.

A claim against a city under § 1983 fails when the plaintiff does not allege a city policy or custom behind the challenged conduct.

Hosner v. State of Ariz. · filed 1995-11-24

Hosner's claim against the City of Tuscon failed because Hosner failed to allege that the City had an official policy and custom of issuing improper certificates of occupancy.

Section 1983 permits county liability for an unconstitutional decision by a board with final policymaking authority over the matter.

Mood for a Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake County · filed 1995-11-27

As such, the Fair Board’s policy vis-a-vis plaintiff in the instant case may fairly be attributed to the county as its own.

Section 1983 permits liability for inadequate school bus driver training only when the failure to train shows deliberate indifference to the rights of students the drivers encounter.

Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education · filed 1995-12-01

Additionally, the inadequacy of school bus driver training can form the basis of liability under Section 1983 only when that failure to train constitutes deliberate indifference to the rights of those students with whom the school bus driver comes into contact.

Section 1983 usually requires more than a single incident to establish a municipal custom or usage for municipal liability.

Kathy St. Hilaire, Etc. v. City of Laconia · filed 1995-12-01

Evidence of a single incident is usually insufficient to establish a “custom or usage.”

An official-capacity § 1983 damages claim against county jail officials is treated as a claim against the county and requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Hayden v. Jackie Combest, Jailer, Henderson County Detention James C. Cooper, Assistant Jailer, Henderson County · filed 1995-12-01

To the extent Hayden sought monetary relief without stating the capacity in which he was suing the defendants, this court presumes that the defendants are sued in their official capacities. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir.1989). Because the defendants were sued in their official capacity, it is as if Hayden is suing Henderson County. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). Thus, the defendants will not be held liable under Sec. 1983 unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a school district liable for its employees’ acts under a theory of respondeat superior.

Eugene v. Alief Independent School District, Paula Conley and R.F. Griffin, Individually and in Their Official Cap · filed 1995-12-04

A.I.S.D. cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its employees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that a municipal custom or policy caused the deprivation of rights.

Dale v. Kelley · filed 1995-12-06

A § 1983 lawsuit against a municipality must allege that the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights was effected pursuant to the existence of a custom or policy of the municipality.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when the challenged action is taken by officials with final decision-making authority for the municipality.

Arrington v. Dickerson · filed 1995-12-07

The court recognizes that one way to establish the existence of a policy or custom sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on a municipal government is to show that the individuals, from whose actions liability arises, have final decision-making authority.

Section 1983 does not require a municipality to adopt a policy or custom that differs from state law before municipal liability can attach.

Minnesota Council of Dog Clubs v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1995-12-12

The establishment of a policy or custom divergent from state law is not a prerequisite for imposition of section 1983 liability upon a municipality.

Section 1983 does not shield a city from liability merely because its official has qualified immunity from personal liability.

Africa v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1995-12-13

The rulings merely grant Goode qualified immunity on the personal capacity claims, a decision that does not affect the City’s liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a policymaker’s act only when the official has final policymaking authority to bind the municipality.

City of Phoenix v. Yarnell · filed 1995-12-14

The official must have final policymaking authority to bind the municipality to his actions.

Section 1983 requires evidence of an inadequate county training policy to hold a county liable for an officer’s alleged excessive force; an unsupported assertion and one alleged incident do not establish that policy.

Lavergne v. Jefferson County · filed 1995-12-18

The statement points to no specific facts concerning the training policy which demonstrate its insufficiency. The most that can be said about the statement is that it seeks to establish that the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department utilizes improper or inadequate training techniques by extrapolating from a single instance of allegedly unconstitutional use of force. This inductive technique is not a proper manner of defeating defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for a lower-level employee’s unconstitutional act to show that a municipal custom or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Vann v. The City of New York and the New York City Police Department, New York City Police Officer Raul Morrison · filed 1995-12-19

In order to establish the liability of á municipality in an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by a municipal employee below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must establish that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.

Section 1983 imposes liability on a school board for a constitutional injury caused by its express policy, established custom or practice, or an official with final policymaking authority.

Oliver Ex Rel. Hines v. McClung · filed 1995-12-20

Therefore, for Plaintiffs to prevail against the School Board and Gilbert, they must establish one of the following: 1) there existed within the Jay County school system an express policy that when enforced caused a constitutional deprivation; or 2) there existed within the Jay County school system a practice or custom of such unconstitutional conduct; or 3) the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making authority.

A municipality’s inadequate police training supports § 1983 liability only when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the police encounter.

Garrison Ex Rel. Garrison v. City of Texarkana · filed 1995-12-29

The inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a municipality for inadequate training, supervision, or pursuit policies when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Tompkins v. City of Hartshorne, Okl. · filed 1995-12-29

In Webber, we held that once we conclude that the police officer did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, any claim against the municipality for inadequate training, supervision, and pursuit policies must be dismissed. "A claim of inadequate training, supervision, and policies under Sec. 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised." Webber, 43 F.3d at 1344-45; see also Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir.1993). Therefore, having concluded that Officer Day did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the City.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a policy or custom; a series of episodic acts against one person does not establish one.

Trosclair v. Westwego City · filed 1995-12-29

Although Trosclair alleged a sustained series of incidents, such a series of episodic acts against a single individual is insufficient to support a finding of policy or custom under Hamilton v. Rogers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986).

New York City departments cannot be sued independently under § 1983 because they are agencies of the city.

Bailey v. New York City Police Department · filed 1996-01-10

It has been widely held that because the New York City Police Department is an agency of the City of New York, it cannot be sued independently under § 1983. ... This rationale also applies to the New York City Department of Corrections. Therefore, Bailey’s claims against the Police Department and the Department of Corrections must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality solely because it employs officers who allegedly violated a person’s rights.

Armao v. American Honda Motor Co. · filed 1996-01-19

Like the state law claims, the § 1983 claim is based solely on the Town’s employment of Doe and Roe. Re-spondeat superior may not serve as a basis for imposing liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a school district solely because its employee committed a constitutional violation.

Reidenbach v. U.S.D. No. 437 · filed 1996-01-23

Liability under § 1983 cannot rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits a Texas county to be held liable for its sheriff’s actions when the sheriff exercises county authority equal to that of the county commissioners.

Vera v. Tue · filed 1996-01-31

We explained that the Sheriff, an elected county official, had equal authority to the county commissioners in that jurisdiction and that his actions constituted those of the county just as much as those of the commissioners. ... Hale County is therefore liable for Sheriff Tue's actions.

A § 1983 claim against a city must allege that the city was responsible for the alleged violation of constitutional rights.

Zurla v. The City of Memphis Criminal Justice Complex State Court System · filed 1996-02-12

Moreover, plaintiff has not asserted a claim with an arguable basis against Memphis because he did not allege that the city was responsible for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not support a municipal liability claim based on officers’ alleged deliberate indifference when the claims against those officers fail.

Breland v. Abate · filed 1996-02-22

Because the claims against the individual officers fail, Plaintiffs Monell claim that derives from the officers’ alleged deliberate indifference must likewise fail.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for an officer’s conduct under respondeat superior.

Nelson v. Tim Strawn, Officer the City of Moncks Corner · filed 1996-02-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City. First, the City cannot be liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its officer’s conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Nelson v. Strawn · filed 1996-02-28

First, the City cannot be liable under the theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 imposes no supervisory or municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation.

Rutherford v. CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA · filed 1996-02-29

In short, there can be no supervisory or municipal liability when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when a constitutional violation caused the plaintiff’s harm and the municipality is responsible for that violation.

Ernel Foster v. City of Cleveland Heights Martin Lentz, Chief of Police · filed 1996-03-21

When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, two issues must be analyzed: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The district court's analysis concentrated on the second requirement for establishing municipal liability and properly concluded that liability did not attach in this case.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its officials know of sexual harassment and fail to act to end it.

Farris v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County · filed 1996-04-03

The County could be liable under § 1983 if County officials knew of the sexual harassment and failed to take action to end it.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s federally protected rights.

Jenkins v. Wood · filed 1996-04-16

A municipality may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because it employs a person who violated a plaintiffs federally protected rights.

Section 1983 permits school district liability for deliberate indifference when an obvious risk of teacher sexual abuse goes unaddressed, even without actual knowledge of abuse.

Doe by and Through Knackert v. Estes · filed 1996-05-16

It is the judgment of the court that a reasonable jury could find from the evidence in the record on summary judgment that the danger of children being sexually abused at school is so obvious that a school district’s failure to take action to prevent sexual abuse of its students by its teachers—even in the absence of actual knowledge of such abuse— constitutes deliberate indifference, especially where the school district took no steps to encourage the reporting of incidents of such abuse.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only for challenged policies or actions fairly attributable to the municipality, not for an independent private group’s rules and enforcement merely because they occur on public property.

Reinhart v. City of Brookings, a South Dakota Municipal Corporation · filed 1996-05-30

Since the festival committee’s policy and actions may not fairly be said to be those of the City of Brookings, the city may not be held liable under § 1983.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff suffered an underlying constitutional violation.

Coleman v. Grapevine, City of · filed 1996-05-31

Because the police officers had probable cause, the Colemans have failed to establish that they suffered a constitutional injury. We must therefore also affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law with respect to the City of Grapevine.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for unconstitutional acts by an official with final decisionmaking authority over the challenged actions.

Austin v. Neal · filed 1996-06-03

Suffice it to say that in so far as Commissioner Neal had final decisionmaking authority with regard to the challenged actions, the City could be liable for those actions were they unconstitutional.

A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 solely for its employees’ conduct; municipal liability requires fault attributable to the municipality.

Hammer v. Hillsborough County · filed 1996-06-13

The Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), found that a municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. However, liability may attach if some degree of “fault” can be imputed to the municipality.

Section 1983 does not make a police chief or department liable for an officer’s false arrest based solely on the officer’s actions when they did not approve the arrest decision.

Ortega v. Christian · filed 1996-06-25

Taylor and the MDPD cannot be held liable for the unreasonable actions that Christian, the arresting officer, pursued. No evidence exists here that indicates Taylor or the MDPD approved of Christian's decision to arrest based on the limited information he possessed.

Section 1983 requires a municipal defendant’s action or inaction to cause the deprivation of a federal right; administering a grant alone does not make a city liable for a private employer’s unpaid wages.

Jorgensen v. City of Clarksburg · filed 1996-07-02

The question remains therefore whether Jorgensen has alleged any action or inaction by the City of Clarksburg which may be seen as causing that deprivation and thus violating § 1983. ... While HDCA makes Davis-Bacon standards applicable to UDAG projects, we find nothing in the record establishing the City's liability for Anchor Hocking's noncompliance.

Section 1983 does not permit a municipal entity to be held liable solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Barnes v. Maryland National Capital Park & Planning Commission · filed 1996-07-03

Plaintiffs’ attempted 1983 action against MNCPPC also fails because a municipal entity cannot be sued on the basis of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on local governments for their employees’ acts.

McCarn v. Beach · filed 1996-07-15

However, local governments such as Gaston County cannot be liable under § 1983 by virtue of respondeat superior .

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through respondeat superior.

James H. Nation v. Robert W. Wedemeyer James E. Walton Larry D. Wilks City of Springfield Charles R. Ray · filed 1996-08-08

The doctrine of respondeat superior, upon which Nation apparently relies, simply does not apply to § 1983 suits.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation only when its policy or custom causes the deprivation of a federally protected right.

D'Amour v. Burke · filed 1996-09-11

A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation only if its policies or customs cause the deprivation of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely through respondeat superior.

Riley v. Newton · filed 1996-09-11

Under Monell, liability cannot be imposed on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that the challenged actions were taken pursuant to an official city policy or custom.

Howard v. City of Southfield, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1996-09-11

Moreover, where the defendant is a municipality, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's objectionable actions were made pursuant to an official city policy or custom.

A municipality faces liability under § 1983 only when the challenged action was taken pursuant to an official city policy or custom.

Jachyra v. City of Southfield, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1996-09-12

Moreover, where the defendant is a municipality, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's objectionable actions were made pursuant to an official city policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when the complaint alleges a municipal policy of not investigating crimes reported by imprisoned victims.

Johnson v. City of Mesa Arizona Police Dept. · filed 1996-09-12

In addition, the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the City of Mesa, because in his complaint Johnson alleges that the City of Mesa has a policy of not investigating crimes when the victim is imprisoned.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that the government's policy or custom proximately caused the injury.

Kneipp v. Tedder · filed 1996-09-18

A plaintiff must also establish that the government policy or custom was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.

Section 1983 municipal liability for a constitutional violation must be evaluated independently of the claims against individual officers; the municipality can be liable even if no officer is liable.

Kneipp v. Tedder · filed 1996-09-18

The precedent in our circuit requires the district court to review the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 claims against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality based on a custom or policy arising from final decisions by municipal policymakers.

Johns v. Town of East Hampton · filed 1996-09-20

The Court agrees with the plaintiffs’ contention that the Complaint succeeds in stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of East Hampton on the basis of custom and policy, as a result of alleged final decisions made by municipal policymakers Police Commissioner Bullock and Police Chief Scott, in condoning police misconduct towards minors and selectively ignoring civilian complaints.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for its employees’ wrongful acts.

Kelley v. City of Manchester · filed 1996-09-23

A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the wrongful acts of its employees.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s unconstitutional act when a municipal policy, custom or practice caused the rights violation.

Johnson v. City of New York · filed 1996-09-24

In order to establish municipal liability for unconstitutional acts by municipal employees, a plaintiff must show that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy, custom or practice.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, custom, or practice causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Breen v. Salem, NH · filed 1996-09-25

A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 must be based on a municipal policy, custom, or practice that caused, or was a moving force behind, a deprivation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

A county or municipality may be liable under § 1983 only when a constitutional deprivation was undertaken pursuant to its custom or policy.

Hardy v. Bernalillo County · filed 1996-09-25

It is well established that a county or municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when the constitutional deprivation at issue was undertaken pursuant to a "custom" or "policy" of that entity.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on an employee’s acts; the constitutional deprivation must be connected to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

Cordatos v. Skerry · filed 1996-09-26

In the absence of some indication of municipal direction via a policy, practice, or custom, and given that a respondeat superior cause of action is not cognizable under § 1983, the police department and the Town are entitled to summary judgment.

A § 1983 complaint against a municipality must allege a municipal policy that caused the claimed constitutional injury.

Edgar Tatum, Jr. v. The City of New York · filed 1996-09-26

The district court also properly dismissed the complaint for failing to allege a municipal policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when pleaded facts could establish that an unconstitutional practice was a municipal policy or custom.

Roma Construction Company and Peter Zanni v. Arusso · filed 1996-09-27

While a showing that aRusso acted illegally in the exercise of his discretion as Mayor might not by itself give rise to municipal liability, we think that under these pleadings, the plaintiffs could indeed prove a set of facts from which a trier of fact could infer an unconstitutional policy or custom with respect to the Town’s government.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom results in a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Shong-Ching Tong v. City of Pomona Joe Garcia · filed 1996-09-27

The City of Pomona could be liable under section 1983 if it had a custom or policy that resulted in the deprivation of Tong's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show a causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.

Whitcraft v. Township of Cherry Hill · filed 1996-09-30

Even if one assumes that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of Cherry Hill’s custom of not notifying DYFS in a timely manner in certain child-custody cases, and that such custom violates some protected liberty interest, plaintiff is nonetheless unable to satisfy the causation requirement of § 1983 in this case. ... No reasonable juror could conclude that a “direct causal link” exists between the alleged violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights and the Cherry Hill Police Department’s alleged custom of not communicating with DYFS in accordance with the department’s own protocol.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on local governments; the alleged deprivation must result directly from a local government policy or practice.

Mitchell v. Lealman Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 1996-09-30

A local government cannot be held hable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. To be actionable, the alleged constitutional deprivation must result directly from a policy implemented or practiced by the local government.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation only if the deprivation resulted from a municipal custom or policy.

Rose v. Town of Jackson's Gap · filed 1996-10-02

A municipality, however, may only be held accountable for the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights if the deprivation was the result of a municipal custom or policy.

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy that amounts to deliberate indifference.

Lewis v. Sacramento County · filed 1996-10-09

To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits local government liability when a persistent, pervasive practice deliberately pursued by official policymakers causes a deprivation of legal rights.

Salazar v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-10-11

To prevail, Plaintiffs must show a “persistent, pervasive practice, attributable to a course deliberately pursued by official policymakers,” which caused a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ legal rights.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional deprivation only when a municipal custom or policy caused it.

Russell v. Robertson County, Tenn. · filed 1996-10-21

Summary judgment in favor of the City of Ridgetop was proper because municipalities and other governmental entities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless the deprivation resulted from a custom or policy of the governmental entity.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when no municipal officer committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Wilson v. Meeks · filed 1996-10-23

The district court correctly concluded no municipal liability could be found in this case because there was no constitutional violation committed by any of the individual defendants.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; an allegedly improper termination alone does not establish municipal liability.

Krennerich v. Inhabitants of the Town of Bristol · filed 1996-10-24

Mr. Krennerich cannot meet the § 1983 test for municipal liability. Even if the Town of Bristol terminated his employment improperly, Krennerich has failed to identify any conduct that could constitute a custom, policy, or practice of the Town of Bristol which lead to the deprivation him of his employment as the Park Manager.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a continuing, widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct and policymaker authorization or deliberate indifference to hold a police board liable for a custom or practice.

Ryan v. Board Of Police Commissioners · filed 1996-10-25

There was simply no evidence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Department. Further, Ryan and Annechino failed to demonstrate that the Board either authorized or remained indifferent to such a practice. Thus, the district court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Board.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on supervisors or a county for an employee’s alleged First Amendment retaliation without evidence that they approved the threat or acted to restrict the employee’s rights.

Buckner v. County of Napa · filed 1996-10-25

There is no evidence that Pittman, Hill or the County approved of Clemons' alleged threat or acted in any way to limit Buckner's First Amendment rights. Summary judgment in favor of these defendants was therefore proper.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a municipality to allege that its policy or custom caused a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Paul v. City of New Haven, No. Cv95 0378709 (Oct. 31, 1996) · filed 1996-10-31

Accordingly, because the plaintiff's complaint does not allege a policy or custom that resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted because the plaintiff is not entitled to litigate his § 1983 claim under the pleadings.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for ratifying officers’ conduct solely because its council voted to pay punitive damages to victims.

Trevino v. Gates · filed 1996-11-01

Thus, under these circumstances, the Councilmembers’ vote to pay punitive damages does not amount to ratification.

A § 1983 claim against a city requires evidence that an unconstitutional municipal policy, procedure, or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Jag v. City of Warren · filed 1996-11-05

Moreover, the above finding of qualified immunity for the arresting officers naturally flows to the other police officials involved in this case as well as the City of Warren because Jag has failed to proffer any evidence that he was injured as a result of an unconstitutional policy, procedure or custom of the City of Warren.

Section 1983 permits county liability only when the challenged action was taken pursuant to an official county policy.

Sagendorf-Teal v. County of Rensselaer · filed 1996-11-12

Under section 1983, however, the County would still not be liable unless the action in question was taken ... pursuant to its official policy.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to identify a municipal policy or custom that deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Jacobs v. Town of Scituate · filed 1996-11-14

As to Scituate, Jacobs has failed to point out any policy or custom followed by the Town that deprived her of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for decisions by officials authorized to establish binding municipal policy in the area at issue.

Hutchison v. City of Huntington · filed 1996-11-15

Applying these standards, we hold that Mr. Dixon and the Planning Commission had authority to establish binding municipal policy respecting building permits.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s unconstitutional decision when the official has final policymaking authority over the relevant subject.

Thomas v. City of Snyder · filed 1996-11-15

Thus, the key inquiry in determining whether municipal liability attaches to an official’s actions is whether that official has the policymaking authority necessary to make his acts those of the municipality.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only for its own unconstitutional policy.

Schlessinger v. Salimes · filed 1996-11-15

They are liable only for their own policies, and Schlessinger has not tried to identify an unconstitutional policy that the Town or Police Department adopted.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an alleged rights violation results from a persistent policy or a widespread, well-settled discriminatory custom.

Ridley v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-11-18

Further, when that policy or custom is persistent or the result of a widespread discriminatory practice of a state official, permanent and well-settled, then a municipality is subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires proof of an official municipal custom or policy to hold a city liable for unauthorized acts of its employees.

Doty v. City of Tampa · filed 1996-11-18

Because some of the alleged “acts” were committed by Tampa agents acting outside the scope of their authority, the trier of fact could not permissibly hold Tampa hable for such acts without proof of an official custom or pohcy.

Section 1983 requires a town policy or custom for municipal liability and does not make an uninvolved official liable under respondeat superior.

Aylor v. Town of Culpeper Jerry W. Davis, Town Manager C.B. Jones, Chief of Police H.P. Pugh · filed 1996-11-20

First, the district court properly dismissed the claims against the Town of Culpeper because Aylor failed to allege or offer any facts that the alleged acts occurred as a result of a town policy or custom. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Second, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Davis because Aylor conceded he was not "directly involved in the incidents surrounding this action" and § 1983 liability is not available under a theory of respondeat superior. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977).

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation; a municipality cannot be held liable through respondeat superior.

Long v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1996-11-20

Concerning the liability of the County of Los Angeles, in order to state a claim against a municipality under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). The policy or custom must be a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality's final policy-making official, see Penbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986), and cannot be imposed via respondeat superior. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 385. In opposing summary judgment, the Longs failed to set forth sufficient facts to support their claim of municipal liability. See id. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the County of Los Angeles. See id.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a school district or an official in his official capacity liable to show that a governmental policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Hill v. Silsbee Indep School · filed 1996-11-21

He cannot prevail against the district, or against Muckleroy in his official capacity, because he cannot show that his rights were violated as the result of a governmental policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal or official-capacity liability when no underlying constitutional deprivation occurred, regardless of any alleged policy.

Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant · filed 1996-11-21

The court finds that because of its decision that Tom Sova was not deprived of a constitutional right, a claim against Mt. Pleasant, Mt. Pleasant Department of Public Safety and Trombley cannot survive, regardless of any policy they may have had.

Section 1983 requires proof that a city policy caused the alleged harm before a city can be held liable.

Williams v. Morris · filed 1996-11-27

For the City to be liable, Williams must prove that the alleged hostile environment was because of city policy.

Section 1983 claims against supervisors and a municipality fail when the officers committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Edmundson v. Keesler · filed 1996-11-27

Our conclusion that the officers acted reasonably is dispositive of the § 1983 claims against Hill, Morgan, and the City of Goldsboro. In the absence of any constitutional violation by the officers, the claims against Hill, Morgan, and the City of Goldsboro fail.

Section 1983 municipal liability under Monell has no separate viability without underlying individual constitutional liability.

Leone v. Creighton · filed 1996-11-29

The federal claim against the County is dismissed since liability against the County is based upon Monell, which has no separate viability in the absence of underlying individual constitutional liability.

Section 1983 holds a municipality liable for a constitutional deprivation only when the deprivation results from a municipal custom or policy.

Toth v. City of Dothan, Ala. · filed 1996-12-06

A municipality, however, may only be held accountable for the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights if the deprivation was the result of a municipal custom or policy.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaker approves an action that violates constitutional rights.

Police Ass'n of New Orleans Ex Rel. Cannatella v. City of New Orleans · filed 1996-12-10

The evidence in the present case indicates that the Mayor, the Chief Administrative Officer, and the Superintendent of Police each knew of and approved the transfers and promotions. The final decision was made by the Superintendent, who is ultimately responsible for promotions in the NOPD. Further, the Director of the Civil Service Commission approved the promotions and transfers. Given these facts, there is little question that municipal liability may attach in this case. Accordingly, because we find that the City's actions unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiffs in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, we hold that the City violated § 1983.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when a decision by an official with final authority over the action causes a constitutional injury.

Williams v. City of New Orleans · filed 1996-12-10

The final decision was made by the Superintendent, who is ultimately responsible for promotions in the NOPD. Further, the Director of the Civil Service Commission approved the promotions and transfers. Given these facts, there is little question that municipal liability may attach in this case. Accordingly, because we find that the City's actions unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiffs in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, we hold that the City violated § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability for a single allegedly unconstitutional incident only if an unconstitutional policy caused it.

Pisani v. Village of Bentleyville, Ohio Pitts, Police Chief Dave Piekarski Lloyd Nagel Dan Kalk, Glen Pisani · filed 1996-12-12

A single incident of allegedly unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability unless it was caused by an unconstitutional policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision by an official who has final policymaking authority in the relevant area.

Angara v. City of Chicago · filed 1996-12-12

However, municipal liability may attach to a single decision of a municipal official if that municipal official is “responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city’s business.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its officials act as municipal policymakers and their actions constitute municipal policy.

Reed v. Town of Branford · filed 1996-12-13

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, as the Court must do in a motion to dismiss, the complaint may fairly be read to allege that Stallings and Gott were municipal policymakers and that their actions with respect to plaintiff constituted the policy of the town such that the town may be held liable under Monell.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal or official-capacity liability where no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Kelley v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2004-12-30

Because this Court has held that Kelley has not produced evidence that the individual Defendants in their individual capacity violated the Constitution, there can be no liability for the City or the individual Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a city to show that a city policy or custom caused the injury.

Feinthel v. Payne · filed 2004-12-30

Summary judgment must be granted on these claims against the city, because Feinthel has made no showing of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his injuries were the result of a policy or custom of the city.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality vicariously liable for an official act of one of its judges.

Garcha v. City of Beacon · filed 2005-01-03

Judicial acts performed by a duly authorized judicial officer are absolutely immunized, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991), and a municipality is not liable, vicariously, for an official act of one of its judges.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a county or social services agency to allege that its workers acted pursuant to an agency policy or custom.

Moore v. Melesky · filed 2005-01-06

As to the third and fourth causes of action alleging that plaintiff and the child were deprived of their constitutionally protected right to care and custody, we find that no claim is stated under 42 USC § 1983 because there is no allegation that the actions of the DSS workers were pursuant to a policy or custom of either the County or DSS (see Landsman v Village of Hancock, 296 AD2d 728, 730-731 [2002], appeal dismissed 99 NY2d 529 [2002]; Rossi v City of Amsterdam, 274 AD2d 874, 877 [2000]).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that a governmental policy or custom caused the injury.

Kahlich v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms · filed 2005-01-10

To assert a successful § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that a governmental policy or custom caused the injury.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a policy of unconstitutional retaliation when no unconstitutional retaliation occurred.

Tucker v. City Of Richmond · filed 2005-01-10

The City's appeal is inextricably intertwined with the individual defendants' interlocutory appeal because there can be no municipal liability under section 1983 for maintaining a policy of unconstitutionally retaliating against individuals who exercise their First Amendment rights when no such unconstitutional retaliation has actually occurred.

Section 1983 municipal liability for a policy of inaction requires more than negligence.

HARRY A. v. Duncan · filed 2005-01-13

Even so, for municipal liability to exist, a policy of inaction must be more than mere negligence.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a local government for an employee’s acts.

Doe v. Patton · filed 2005-01-14

The discussion must begin by noting that the County Defendants cannot be vicariously liable for Patton’s alleged acts.

Section 1983 liability based on a county custom requires a persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct and proof that policymakers knew of it and were deliberately indifferent.

Sizer v. County of Hennepin · filed 2005-01-14

The Court finds that Sizer has failed to produce evidence of a “continuing, widespread, persistent” custom or practice of unconstitutional overdetention. ... The Court finds that Sizer has also failed to establish that policymakers knew that the outprocessing procedures were routinely causing processing delays or that the policymakers deliberately failed to remedy the system. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Sizer’s Monell claim.

Section 1983 does not permit a custom or practice to be inferred from a single incident.

Estate of Moreland Ex Rel. Moreland v. Dieter · filed 2005-01-14

One cannot infer a custom or practice from a single incident.

Section 1983 requires a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and a constitutional violation caused by that policy or custom to hold a municipality liable.

Kenneth A. Roberson, Jr. v. City of Austin and Jester Development Corporation · filed 2005-01-21

Thus, municipal liability under § 1983 requires three elements: (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy or custom, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for actions by officials with final policymaking authority.

Gerena v. Santini · filed 2005-01-24

Municipal officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their actions subject the municipality to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation to hold a municipality liable.

Coyle v. Coyle · filed 2005-01-24

Moreover, there are no allegations concerning an underlying municipal policy or custom which deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Thus, the Plaintiffs claims for municipal liability also fail against the Police Department and the County.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policy causes a constitutional violation.

Rose v. Saginaw County · filed 2005-01-25

The Court determines that this policy is unconstitutional, and the municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality strictly liable for the acts of its non-policy-making employees under respondeat superior.

Kohler v. Englade · filed 2005-02-01

In a section 1983 action, a municipality may not be held strictly liable for the acts of its non-policy-making employees under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when there has been no underlying constitutional violation.

Mohammed Ex Rel. Mohammed v. School District of Philadelphia · filed 2005-02-04

Because there has been no constitutional harm, the School District cannot be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability for a policy of deliberate indifference cannot be inferred solely from one incident.

Thomas v. Cty · filed 2005-02-09

Doe makes clear that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in proving municipal liability, and he cannot rely solely on a single instance to infer a policy of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom that causes a deprivation of federal rights, and a claim based on failure to prevent that deprivation requires deliberate indifference.

Sauls v. Pierce County School District · filed 2005-02-09

To impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, the plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” causing the deprivation of federal rights. ... Thus, the deliberate indifference standard applies in § 1983 claims alleging a municipality is liable for its failure to prevent a deprivation of federal rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged violation of a federal right.

John Eric Thomas, and Wife, Heather Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee · filed 2005-02-09

To prevail in a § 1983-suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not hold a municipality liable solely because it employs a person who violated someone's rights.

Wahhab v. City of New York · filed 2005-02-10

It is well settled that in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit a municipality may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to show that a municipal policy or custom caused a violation of constitutional rights.

Shevchynski v. Christiansen · filed 2005-02-11

The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Shevchynski’s section 1983 claims because he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a policy or custom of the City of Springfield or the Springfield Fire Department caused a violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires underlying constitutional harm by an officer for a municipal liability claim based on that officer’s actions.

Summer v. San Bernardino County · filed 2005-02-14

Because the district court correctly found that there was no underlying constitutional harm, Summer cannot maintain a Monell claim against San Bernardino County based on the actions of its officers.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a plaintiff to allege that a constitutional violation was part of a governmental policy, custom, ordinance, regulation, or decision.

Wallace v. Suffolk County Police Department · filed 2005-02-15

In order to impose liability against a municipality pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the violation of his constitutional rights was part of a governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation or decision.

Section 1983 permits a direct suit against a local government when the allegedly unconstitutional action implements a municipal policy or custom.

Furst v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1986-04-01

Local governmental units can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when the alleged facts show no constitutional deprivation.

Davidson v. City of Jacksonville, Fla. · filed 2005-02-16

Because the Court has found that there was no constitutional deprivation under the alleged facts, there can be no section 1983 municipal liability.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability when a municipality's own policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Granger v. Slade · filed 2005-02-22

In view of the clear absence of evidence tending to create a triable issue of fact as to the existence of municipal policy, the court concludes that the City is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from an official policy or a sufficiently pervasive custom.

Lazarus v. City of Dumas · filed 2005-02-22

To establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Smith had to show her constitutional rights were violated by an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” or misconduct so pervasive among nonpolicymaking employees of the municipality “as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Niemyjski v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2005-02-22

To establish municipal liability for the alleged conduct of the officers, Niemyjski must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused” an injury.

Section 1983 permits claims against a local government for constitutional violations caused by its employees or municipal policies and customs.

Paredes v. The City of Odessa · filed 2005-02-28

Paredes’s failure to establish that an employee of the City committed the acts that caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights defeats his claims of liability against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipalities to be held constitutionally liable when their policies or customs cause a constitutional violation.

Gremo v. Karlin · filed 2005-03-01

Gremo has satisfactorily stated a claim that defendants the City of Philadelphia and the School District of Philadelphia can be held constitutionally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating plaintiffs substantive due process right to bodily integrity secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 imposes liability for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, including municipal liability based on an official policy or custom that causes the deprivation.

Williams Ex Rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local School District · filed 2005-03-09

The trial court’s § 1983 instruction paraphrases our language in Claiborne and is a correct statement of the law.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation caused by a person acting under color of state law and permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes the deprivation.

Williams v. Paint Valley Local School District · filed 2005-03-09

We find no fault in the trial court's § 1983 instruction. ... The trial court's § 1983 instruction paraphrases our language in Claiborne and is a correct statement of the law.

Section 1983 permits liability for a public agency’s inaction only when its policymakers deliberately condone or ratify a subordinate’s misconduct as agency policy.

Crowley v. Donald McKinney and Berwyn South School District 100 · filed 2005-03-11

Inaction by a public agency is insufficient participation in a subordinate’s misconduct to make the agency liable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the policymaking level at the agency has deliberately decided to take no action against, and thus in effect to condone, to ratify, the misconduct ... and so adopt it as the agency’s (unofficial) policy.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its employees’ acts solely under a theory of respondeat superior.

Esmont v. City of New York · filed 2005-03-16

A city, however, cannot be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under any general theory of respondeat superior.

A § 1983 municipal claim fails when the plaintiff has not made the requisite showing for municipal liability.

Must v. West Hills Police Department · filed 2005-03-16

In order to hold a municipality liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that any violation of Fourth Amendment rights that occurred was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability based solely on respondeat superior.

Gallo v. Suffolk County Police Department · filed 2005-03-17

The doctrine of respondeat superior is an insufficient basis for municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits public entity liability for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom, or by inadequate training amounting to deliberate indifference.

Harvey v. Alameda County Medical Center · filed 2005-03-18

A public entity can only be liable when it commits constitutional violations pursuant to the entity’s official policy or custom, ... or due to inadequate training rising to the level of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits liability against a governmental entity only for injuries caused by its policy or custom.

Harvison v. Greene County Sheriff Dept. · filed 2005-03-22

A governmental entity is only liable under Section 1983 for injuries caused by its policy or custom.

Section 1983 supervisory liability and failure-to-train claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Rivera v. Rhode Island · filed 2005-03-22

Since the plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim at all, her claims against the other defendants for supervisory liability and for failure to train fail.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority chooses to enforce an unconstitutional statute and thereby deprives someone of constitutional rights.

Dennis Reeves Cooper v. Dillon · filed 2005-03-22

However, as a municipal official with final policymaking authority as to law enforcement matters, Dillon did expose the City of Key West to § 1983 liability by choosing to enforce the statute against Cooper.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for an employee’s constitutional violation only if the municipality caused it.

Fernandez v. City of San Francisco · filed 2005-03-22

However, even if there were a constitutional violation, the City and County of San Francisco is only liable if the City and County caused it.