42 U.S.C. § 1983

A municipality cannot ratify a municipal judge’s actions for § 1983 liability when it lacks the power to control them.

Soto v. City of Haltom City · filed 2004-08-10

Because the municipality did not have the power to control the municipal judge’s actions, however, it also did not have the power to ratify them.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single employee action only if the employee was the municipality’s final policymaker for that matter.

Pederson v. City of Haltom City · filed 2004-08-10

Under Pembaur, the City may be liable for Irvin’s failure to take Pederson before a judge or to release her only if Irvin was the final policymaker for the City regarding those matters.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a city council’s part in a conspiracy because the council’s decisions constitute city policy.

Whisenant v. City of Haltom City · filed 2004-08-10

But the City can be held liable for the city council’s part in the conspiracy, because the city council is the City’s policymaking body and, consequently, its decisions constitute City policy.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability under Monell unless the plaintiff was deprived of a federal right.

Farrar v. Bracamondes · filed 2004-08-11

We also enter judgment in favor of the City of Chicago on Farrar’s Monell claim because Farrar was not deprived of a federal right.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when obviously inadequate employee training or supervision is likely to cause, and does cause, a constitutional violation.

Drake v. City of Haltom City · filed 2004-08-11

have recognized that a municipality is subject to § 1983 liability when the municipality’s policies regarding employee training and/or supervision were obviously inadequate, and the resulting lack of training and/or supervision was likely to (and actually did) lead to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims against a municipality or an official in his official capacity require factual support for a municipal policy or practice behind the challenged conditions.

Maxwell v. City of New York · filed 2004-08-12

The District Court accepted her claim that factual issues existed as to such conditions, but correctly ruled that Maxwell had failed to present any factual support that there was a municipal policy or practice of maintaining such conditions. The Court therefore properly granted summary judgment to the City and to Safir in his official capacity on the conditions of confinement claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to allege that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Ibrahim v. District of Columbia · filed 2004-08-17

Although Ibrahim has alleged two predicate constitutional violations, the Court finds that these claims against the District of Columbia defendants' in their official capacities must nevertheless be dismissed because he fails to allege how such violations were the result of a government “policy or custom.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability to present evidence that the challenged conduct was an official policy or widespread custom or practice.

Radloff v. City of Oelwein, Iowa Jesse Paul John Reege and Curt Wilkinson · filed 2004-08-17

As to the grant of summary judgment for the City, to impose municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Rad-loff bore the burden of presenting evidence that warrantless entries and searches were either an official policy or a widespread custom or practice of the City.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by an official policy or custom.

McCall v. Peters · filed 2004-08-18

Because McCall failed to show that his arrest was illegal, he cannot show that an official policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a county for failure to supervise or investigate when the individual officers committed no constitutional violation.

Dillon v. Brown County · filed 2004-08-23

Because Dillon has no viable constitutional claim against the individual officers, his claim against the County for alleged failure to supervise or investigate fails as well.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by official policy, but not on a theory of vicarious liability.

Denton v. McKee · filed 2004-08-24

The Defendants are correct in so far as they contend that a municipality may not be held liable in a § 1983 action under a theory of vicarious.liability. However, a municipality may be held liable if the conduct that caused the unconstitutional deprivation of rights was pursuant to, or furthered by, “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

A city has no municipal liability under § 1983 when its officers did not use excessive force.

Carter v. Denison · filed 2004-08-24

Since we find the officers did not use excessive force as a matter of law, there is no basis for Monell liability against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by a municipal policy, custom, or practice.

Webster v. City of New York · filed 2004-08-27

In order to hold a municipality liable as a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the municipality was at fault for the constitutional injury he or she suffered, see Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 810, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), in that the violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy, custom or practice.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate's constitutional violation, but mere failure to overrule the subordinate is insufficient.

Lytle v. Carl · filed 2004-09-01

A municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation if a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate's actions. ... To show ratification, a plaintiff must show that the "authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it." ... The policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it. A mere failure to overrule a subordinate's actions, without more, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal custom or policy caused a constitutional or federal-law deprivation.

Avalos v. City of Glenwood · filed 2004-09-02

Municipalities are “liable under Section 1983 only if a municipal custom or policy caused the deprivation of the right protected by the constitution or federal laws,” Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537, 1546 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)), or the “municipal policy or custom was the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation,’” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county for officers’ deliberate indifference when it results from an official policy, a widespread custom or practice, or a decision by an official with final decision-making authority.

Wildes v. Cumberland County · filed 2004-09-10

Since plaintiffs are not pursuing a claim alleging inadequate training against the County, they can only prevail against the County if they are able to show that the deliberate indifference allegedly exhibited by the correctional officers in this case resulted either from an officially promulgated policy, a widespread county custom or practice, or a decision by a county official with final decision-making authority.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for an employee’s constitutional violation only when a county policy or custom caused it, not merely because the county employed the person.

Allison v. Utah County Corp. · filed 2004-09-14

Section 1983 imposes liability on a government entity only when the entity’s policy “causes” its employee to violate the constitutional rights of another. It does not impose vicarious liability based upon the employer-employee relationship.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Turney v. Waterbury · filed 2004-09-14

"In a section 1983 action, a municipality may only be held liable for constitutional violations which result from a policy or custom of the municipality."

Section 1983 requires deliberate indifference for a municipality to be liable for failing to supervise its police officers.

Franklin v. Messmer · filed 2004-09-14

Franklin lastly argues that the district court erred in granting Metro summary judgment on his failure-to-supervise claim, insisting that Metro failed to properly supervise Messmer due to his propensity for excessive force. ... Messmer never triggered this “Early Warning System” and there were no complaints against him for excessive force, including his use of pepper spray. Accordingly, Metro engaged in no deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a county to show that a county policy, practice, or custom caused the constitutional violation; it does not impose vicarious liability.

Kane v. Lewis & Clark County · filed 2004-09-14

To state a claim against a county, a plaintiff must allege and establish that a county policy, practice, or custom caused the violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right. ... There is no vicarious or respondent superior liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a direct suit against a municipality for a constitutional deprivation grounded in an official policy or custom.

Carter v. City of New York · filed 2004-09-27

A municipality is considered a “person” subject to direct suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of constitutional rights that are grounded in an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Franklin, Edward v. City of Evanston · filed 2004-09-27

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when a deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by a municipal policy or custom.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its express policy causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Franklin v. City of Evanston · filed 2004-09-27

Because it occurred pursuant to an express City policy that skirted the need for Atwell warnings, the City is liable for a violation of § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires an alleged official policy or custom.

Fike v. Town of Webster · filed 2004-10-01

With regard to their federal claims, even according plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Harrison v Constantino, 2 AD3d 1315, 1316 [2003]), we conclude that they fail to state a viable cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 or the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants maintained an official policy or custom of denying area variances (see Board of County Commrs. of Bryan County, Okla. v Brown, 520 US 397, 403-404, [1997], reh denied 520 US 1283 [1997]), nor have plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating that they have been deprived of any rights guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A plaintiff asserting municipal liability under § 1983 bears the burden of producing evidence to support the claim when the city points out the absence of evidence.

Feurtado v. City of New York · filed 2004-10-04

In sum, because Feurtado bears the burden of proving his Monell claim, the City was entitled to require Feurtado to set forth the evidence in support of his claim — on penalty of having summary judgment entered against him — without itself submitting any evidence to the Court.

A city may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes an injury; a failure to train officers or investigate complaints also requires deliberate indifference.

PHEBUS v. City of Memphis · filed 2004-10-05

Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches only “where the ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury’ complained of.” ... In a case alleging failure to train officers or to investigate, as has been alleged here, a plaintiff must also establish that the “municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” ... Based on its review of the complaint, the Court finds -that the Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Monell and its progeny in alleging municipal liability under § 1983 sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a county liable to show that a county policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Carver v. Mack · filed 2004-10-05

For Richland County to be liable under § 1983, Carver must demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights due to some “policy or custom” of the County.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom.

Avalos v. City Of Glenwood · filed 2004-10-07

Thus, the plaintiffs are unable to show either (1) a deprivation of a constitutional right or (2) a municipal custom or policy that caused such deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipal agency to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged discrimination.

Mitchell v. City & County of Denver Ex Rel. Board of Water Commissioners · filed 2004-10-12

Because Denver Water is a municipal agency, Mitchell must also demonstrate the discrimination was caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional injury; it is not liable merely for its employees’ acts.

Harper v. CITY OF DOTHAN, ALA. · filed 2004-10-15

Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability; a municipality may not be sued under § 1983 for the acts of others.

Section 1983 permits a municipality and individual defendants to be liable for the same conduct.

Weast v. County of Pierce · filed 2004-10-21

We have, however, held both municipal and individual defendants liable for such conduct in § 1983 cases on a number of occasions, ...we see no reason to bar contemporaneous liability here.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with policymaking authority makes the termination decision.

Neubauer v. City of McAllen Texas, Calvin Gibson, C.D. Mussey, and Frank Jurek · filed 1985-08-08

We find that the city manager of the City of McAllen, Calvin Gibson, was the only official who possessed policymaking power in termination proceedings sufficient to hold the City accountable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for a subordinate employee’s discretionary decision merely by treating that decision as municipal policy or custom.

Brown v. Reardon · filed 1985-08-19

If this were the applicable rule, all subordinate or lower echelon public employees would surely be treated as policymakers, whose decisions would, in turn, be those of the governing body of the City. We do not believe Monell or any other opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States permits the use of such a broad sweep in order to infer a policy or custom attributable and chargeable to the City or its governing body.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a mayor’s single unconstitutional act committed within the authority of the mayor’s office.

Hollins v. Powell · filed 1985-09-11

Where a mayor pursuant to the authority of his office violates a citizen’s constitutional rights, it is clear that a wrong may be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers, and a single, unconstitutional act — perpetrated within the scope of authority delegated to the office— will be sufficient to support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its police officers’ conduct solely because it employs them.

Carter v. Three Unknown Police Officers of the Wilmington Police Department · filed 1985-10-04

It is well established that an employer cannot be held liable under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failure to supervise requires evidence of an underlying deprivation of constitutional or federal rights.

Harold Lloyd Shields, Dan Baldwin, Administrator for the Estate of Harold Lloyd Shields, Deceased v. Carol L. Twiss Kerr · filed 2004-10-22

Here, however, Shields has not presented a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Deputy Twiss deprived him of any constitutional or federal rights. Thus, Kerr County cannot be held liable for overworking or not properly supervising Twiss.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a policy of unconstitutional retaliation when no unconstitutional retaliation occurred.

Tucker v. Cty Richmond, KY · filed 2004-10-28

The City’s appeal is inextricably intertwined with the individual defendants’ interlocutory appeal because there can be no municipal liability under section 1983 for maintaining a policy of unconstitutionally retaliating against individuals who exercise their First Amendment rights when no such unconstitutional retaliation has actually occurred.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable to show that an official custom or policy caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Jordan v. New York · filed 2004-10-29

Here, plaintiff does not provide any basis for claiming that the alleged constitutional deprivations were caused by or occurred pursuant to an official custom or policy of the City of Rochester or the County of Monroe, and thus plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Anderson v. City of Dallas Texas · filed 2004-10-29

A municipality like the City cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.”

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a basis for attributing the challenged conduct to the city, such as a city custom or practice or action by a final policymaker.

Sandoval v. Boulder Regional · filed 2004-11-02

Additionally, Sandoval has failed to present any evidence that the City maintained a custom or practice of violating their employees’ liberty interests in their good names or that Koby or other identified City officials were “final policymakers” with regard to the BRCC actions of which she complains.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through ratification merely because policymakers failed to discipline employees after an illegal arrest; their response must show knowing approval of the conduct and its basis.

Milam v. City of San Antonio · filed 2004-11-03

That the policymakers failed to take disciplinary action in response to Milam’s complaints does not show that they knew of and approved the illegal character of the arrest, determining that it accorded with municipal policy.

Section 1983 does not impose county liability solely for employees’ conduct; the plaintiff must show that a county policy, custom, or knowing act caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Payne v. County of Sullivan · filed 2004-11-10

The 42 USC § 1983 claims against the County were also properly dismissed. Indeed, even had some wrongdoing been pleaded with respect to Hogue and Buckner, the County “cannot be [held] liable on the basis of respondeat superior in a section 1983 action” (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 193-194 [1996]) and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that “some affirmative policy or custom or other knowing act on the part of . . . the county has caused the alleged constitutional deprivation” (La Belle v County of St. Lawrence, 85 AD2d 759, 760 [1981]).

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for official policies and established customs.

Mills v. City of Barbourville · filed 2004-11-12

Governmental entities may be liable under section 1983 only for their formal official acts and policies, and also, under some circumstances, for practices “so permanent and well settled” as to constitute established custom.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability solely for employees’ conduct; the municipality itself must be responsible for the constitutional deprivation.

Cash v. Cnty · filed 2004-11-12

Because respondeat superior liability is not available as a means of recovery under § 1983, Doe, 103 F.3d at 507, the plaintiffs cannot base their claims against the City and County solely on the conduct of the workers who effected the sweep of homeless areas.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality solely for its employees’ conduct; the municipality itself must be responsible for the deprivation.

Cash v. Hamilton County Department of Adult Probation · filed 2004-11-12

Because respondeat superior liability is not available as a means of recovery under § 1983, ... the plaintiffs cannot base their claims against the City and County solely on the conduct of the workers who effected the sweep of homeless areas.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for its officials’ conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Contes v. Porr · filed 2004-11-16

A municipality cannot be held liable for the conduct of its officials in a § 1983 suit under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging inadequate municipal training to show that an official policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Shields v. Twiss · filed 2004-11-12

As for Shields’s second failure-to-supervise claim (i.e., that Kerr County did not adequately train Twiss in the use of photographic lineups), Shields can only prevail by showing that an official policy or custom “was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted.”

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for its agents’ actions under a general theory of respondeat superior.

Hicks v. City of Buffalo · filed 2004-11-18

With respect to the first cause of action against the City, we note that the City cannot be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under any general theory of respondeat superior.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 for its officers’ use of force without an underlying use of excessive force.

Ingle v. Yelton · filed 2004-11-19

A city cannot be liable for the acts of its officers where the Court does not find an underlying use of excessive force.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality; a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Armstead v. Township of Upper Dublin · filed 2004-11-23

“A municipality cannot be responsible for damages under section 1983 on a vicarious liability theory, and can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” ... However, there is no evidence in the record even pertaining to a Township policy or custom, nor has plaintiff addressed this issue in its briefs. Therefore, I must dismiss plaintiffs claim against Upper Dublin.

A municipality is entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when there is no constitutional violation and plaintiffs produce no facts establishing municipal liability.

Foutz v. City of West Valley City · filed 2004-11-24

Because the court finds no constitutional violation and because Plaintiffs have failed to produce any facts establishing municipal liability, Defendant West Valley City is also entitled to Summary Judgment.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for an official’s actions only if a municipal policy caused the constitutional violation.

Killinger, David v. Johnson, Don · filed 2004-11-24

Port Byron may be liable for the mayor’s actions under § 1983 only if a municipal policy caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 imposes no municipal liability when there is no underlying constitutional tort.

Liedy v. Borough of Glenolden · filed 2004-11-24

We note for the sake of completeness that because we conclude that there was no constitutional tort in this case, there also is no municipal liability to attach to the Borough of Glenolden.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy causes the constitutional violation; a mayor who administers procedures set by state law does not thereby become a final policymaker for those procedures.

Killinger v. Don Johnson, Individually, and as Mayor and Liquor Commissioner, and Village of Port Byron, Illinois · filed 2004-11-24

Port Byron may be liable for the mayor’s actions under § 1983 only if a municipal policy caused the constitutional violation. ... Because the mayor does not hold final policymaking authority to establish procedural rules, Port Byron is not liable for his actions.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal employee commits a constitutional violation and a municipal policy is the moving force behind it.

George v. City of Wichita · filed 2004-11-29

In order to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that the municipality’s policies are the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a Monell claim when the plaintiffs suffered no deprivation of civil rights.

Graham v. City of Mentor · filed 2004-11-29

However, because the officers were not deprived of their civil rights, i.e., they did not prove that they suffered First Amendment retaliation, Mentor cannot be held liable under Monell.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a constitutional violation results from a municipal pattern or practice or a final policymaker’s decision.

Wimberly v. City of Clovis · filed 2004-12-02

The law is also clearly established that a municipality is a viable defendant under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional violation results from the municipality’s pattern or practice, or a final policymaker for the governmental entity made the decision to violate the rights in question.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely because it employs the officer whose conduct is challenged.

Lawrence, Darrick A. v. Kenosha County · filed 2004-12-02

A municipality cannot be held liable solely on the grounds of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not impose county liability when a response to a citizen complaint fails to show an express policy or widespread practice causing the alleged injury.

Lawrence v. Kenosha County and Louis Vena · filed 2004-12-02

It clearly does nothing to prove that the county had an express policy or widespread practice which condones the use of excessive force on people who refuse to present their driver’s licenses. Lawrence has neither alleged, nor presented, any evidence that would provide a basis for holding Kenosha County liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a county policy or custom directly causes a civil-rights violation.

Blackmore v. Kalamazoo · filed 2004-12-07

A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that his civil rights have been violated as a direct result of that municipality’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, not solely because its employee caused an injury.

McDowell v. Pernell Brown · filed 2004-12-08

Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits a finding of municipal culpability when a city fails to correct known deficiencies in its warrant processing policies despite the risk of violating constitutional rights.

Caldwell v. City of Louisville · filed 2004-12-09

Having found the existence of municipal culpability from the City’s failure to correct its deficient warrant processing and execution polices, we now turn to an examination as to whether the City caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation for municipal liability.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin Human Services Agency · filed 2004-12-10

Municipal liability exists only if “there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Section 1983 generally requires a municipal policy or custom to hold a municipality liable for its employees’ unconstitutional acts.

Brewster v. Nassau County · filed 2004-12-13

A municipality generally cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the alleged unconstitutional actions of its employees who are below a “policymaking level.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only for the municipality’s own conduct, not solely for an employee’s conduct.

Perez v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA · filed 2004-12-14

The fundamental principle in the law of municipal liability under § 1983 is that municipalities may be held liable only for their own conduct, not for the conduct of municipal employees.

Section 1983 requires a municipality’s authorized policymaker to ratify a subordinate’s decision and its basis before that decision can count as municipal policy.

Ashby v. Isle of Wight County School Board · filed 2004-12-15

Defendant did not ratify the decision and basis of Principal Owen’s decision, therefore no policy has been made for the school district.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts of its policymakers or an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Frank v. Harris County · filed 2004-12-15

In order for the county to be liable under § 1983, Frank must show, among other things, either the unconstitutional action of policymakers or an unconstitutional policy or custom.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it delegates final policymaking authority to an official whose decision causes a constitutional injury.

Monistere v. Memphis Police Dept · filed 2004-12-17

It is our judgment that, when applying the standards of Feliciano, Embrey was delegated final policymaking authority which is sufficient to impose municipal liability upon the City under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a constitutional violation by a municipal employee and a municipal policy or custom that caused the deprivation.

Jiron v. City of Lakewood · filed 2004-12-20

A plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 for the actions of one of its officers must prove: (1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a county policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights.

Ashby v. County of Nassau · filed 2004-12-23

Ms. Ashby’s claim hinges upon the existence of a policy or custom of Nassau County which led to the deprivation of Ms. Ashby’s civil rights. Ms. Ashby alleges nothing in her Complaint to demonstrate any culpability whatsoever on behalf of Nassau County related to the EOC’s decision to terminate her employment nor does the Complaint explain how Nassau County deprived Ms. Ashby of her civil rights.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on ratification requires actual ratification; a school board’s refusal to review an employee’s decision is insufficient.

Craig v. Maine School Administrative District 5 · filed 2004-12-28

Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim based solely upon the school board’s refusal to review Demers’ decision to terminate his employment — he must show actual ratification.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a municipality for an official’s conduct when the official did not act as a policymaker for that municipality.

MacE v. City of Akron · filed 1998-01-16

Therefore, the court finds that Defendant Sammon did not, and indeed, could not, act as a policymaker for the City of Akron when she took the actions at issue in this case. As a result, the court shall dismiss Mace’s claims against the City brought under § 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement does not bar municipal liability because municipalities act under color of state law.

Medina v. City of Osawatomie · filed 1998-01-27

Thus, technically, the “under color of state law” inquiry is inapposite to municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for actions taken by a municipal policymaker.

Barbara ANNIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Ernest J. Colaneri, and Anthony M. Mosca, Defendants-Appell · filed 1998-01-28

A municipality is liable under § 1983 where the actions of which the plaintiff complains were undertaken by a municipal policymaker.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability on city council members for merely failing to disapprove a mayor’s allegedly unlawful firing; liability requires affirmative ratification of the decision and its basis.

Bowles v. City of Camden · filed 1998-02-02

Thus, in order to be liable, the City Council members would have had to have had affirmatively ratified Webster’s termination decision, making it final by officially approving and adopting the Mayor’s decision and his basis for it. This is not the case here.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city or its police department when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Joseph Avila Edmond Dadisho v. Seal a and City of Los Angeles Los Angeles Police Department Willie Williams, Chief of Po · filed 1998-02-11

Because the officers' due process rights were not violated by the Board of Rights or by Chief Williams, it necessarily follows that there can be no liability imposed on the City of Los Angeles or the LAPD.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority makes an unreviewable decision that deprives a person of federal rights.

Hennessy v. Santiago · filed 1998-02-20

As Andrews counsels, Appellant needs to demonstrate that an official policymaker with final authority to act made an unreviewable decision that deprived an individual of her civil rights. A fair reading of Appellant’s second amended complaint convinces us that she has met her burden at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 permits claims against town council members who ratify a building official’s unauthorized conduct with deliberate indifference to its illegality.

Pitocco v. Harrington · filed 1998-02-20

Construing this evidence most favorably to plaintiffs, we conclude that defendant town council officials acted to confirm the unauthorized actions of the town’s building official vis-a-vis plaintiffs when they had no legal authority or jurisdiction to intervene in this matter and that, in doing so, they displayed a deliberate indifference to the building official’s illegal conduct.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the alleged injury.

Young v. City of Allentown · filed 1995-03-21

Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy or custom which is the cause of her alleged injuries.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to identify an official policy or custom as the source of the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Reyes v. Granados · filed 1995-03-21

Regarding the inclusion of the City of Laredo as a Defendant, Reyes must identify an official policy or custom as the source of the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits claims against a city and an official in his official capacity to proceed despite the official’s individual qualified immunity when a jury could find an unlawful motive for the official’s conduct.

Morro v. City of Birmingham · filed 1995-03-23

But, if this court is correct in its understanding of the Eleventh Circuit’s view of the qualified immunity defense, the City, and Deutcsh in his official capacity, remain on the § 1983 hook, because a jury may choose not to believe that Deutcsh’s actual motive for administering discipline to Morro was what Deutcsh says it was.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official policy or custom causes a municipal employee to violate a constitutional right.

Kenyon v. Cheshire County · filed 1995-03-31

Plaintiff must show that an official policy or custom caused a Cheshire County employee to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when sufficiently pleaded facts support liability based on an official policy or custom.

Hawthorne v. Lowe, No. Cv 30 13 93 S (Mar. 31, 1995) · filed 1995-03-31

In the present case, the plaintiff, in the sixth count, alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient "Monell" claim.

Section 1983 can redress constitutional violations by a municipal utility even when the municipality acts in a proprietary capacity.

General Textile Printing & Processing Corp. v. City of Rocky Mount · filed 1995-04-03

The court finds defendant’s reliance on Sherman to be misplaced. The court agrees with plaintiff that the constitutional infringements alleged are potentially redressable by way of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable under respondeat superior for officials acting contrary to a city ordinance.

Nicholas Karagozian and Denise Karagozian v. City of Laguna Beach · filed 1995-04-03

As for Laguna Beach, to the extent that Officials are claimed to have acted in contravention of the city's ordinance, no Section 1983 claim can lie against the city itself. Any such claim would require an impermissible application of respondeat superior principles.

Section 1983 municipal liability for inadequate police procedures or training cannot be inferred from a single ordinary incident of misconduct, particularly when the municipality has documented its training.

Signorile by and Through Signorile v. City of NY · filed 1995-04-06

Even assuming that a jury would find that the officers’ actions in the instant case were unsupported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, this lone example of improper conduct was simply not enough proof to avoid summary judgment, particularly in the face of the City’s and the NYCHA’s documentation.

Section 1983 municipal liability for a single act requires a decision by an official with final authority under state law to establish municipal policy for that act.

Cleveland Indus. Square, Inc. v. White · filed 1995-04-06

However, even if we assume that the single instance of conversion about which plaintiff complains amounted to a custom or policy, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986), plaintiff has failed to allege that the decision to undertake the actions was made by a person with final authority under state law to establish municipal policy with respect to the intentional conversion of plaintiff's property.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a public entity liable for a due process denial to show that the denial resulted from its policy and practice rather than a one-time deficiency.

Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division Of The Regional Transportation Authority · filed 1995-04-06

Even if Chaney received no pre-termination notice or a hearing, the plaintiffs will also have to show that the denial of pre-termination due process was the result of Pace's policy and practice and not simply a one-time deficiency.

Section 1983 permits damages against a county for constitutional violations only when they result from an official county policy.

Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County · filed 1995-04-12

As a government entity, Ripley County is liable under § 1983 for damages for constitutional violations only to the extent that such violations are the result of an official policy of the county, a contention which plaintiff has not pled and offers no proof to support.

A § 1983 claim against a municipality requires an alleged municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

Pontier v. City of Clearwater, Fla. · filed 1995-04-13

At no time has Plaintiff alleged that the acts of the Defendant Detectives were the result of a pohcy or custom of the City of Clearwater. As noted above, this is an essential element of a § 1983 claim against a municipality.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires facts supporting a municipal policy or custom; a single incident of individual misconduct does not establish one.

Gallego v. Wilson · filed 1995-04-19

First, a single alleged incident of individual misconduct cannot establish a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional violation caused by a municipal policy or custom, but not vicarious liability for every act of a municipal employee.

Sekor v. Capwell · filed 1995-04-19

A municipality may be deemed liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of Constitutional rights if the municipality causes the violation. It may not be held responsible under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious responsibility for every action of its employees. For a municipality to be found hable, the act must have been pursuant to the municipality’s policy or custom.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a municipality whose policy or custom deprives people of federal rights under color of state law.

Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas · filed 1995-04-20

The City’s AAP, and specifically that provision which provides for skip promotions, is a policy or custom related to the City’s goal of achieving a workforce which reflects the diversity of the community it serves. ... The City adopted and carried out the plan and its individual provisions under its municipal authority and color of state law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, is granted.

A municipality's failure to punish an officer for a discretionary act, without proof that a final policymaker approved the act, is insufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983.

Neill v. City of Concord · filed 1995-04-20

Neill has not offered any proof that the city council approved Runyon's actions. As was the case in Gillette, the most that Neill has shown is that the city council did not punish Runyon for his discretionary act. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. This is insufficient as a matter of law to hold the City liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; respondeat superior alone does not suffice.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston · filed 1995-04-21

Because the City cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory, Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036, Piotrowski has failed to allege facts supporting a § 1983 claim against the City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s rights-violating decision and its basis.

Fuller v. City of Oakland, California George Hart Antonio Romero · filed 1995-04-24

Finally, a plaintiff may show that an official policymaker either delegated policymaking authority to a subordinate or ratified a subordinate’s decision, approving the “decision and the basis for it.”

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for an official’s deliberate choice only if the official has final policymaking authority over the subject matter.

Licari v. Ferruzzi · filed 1995-04-27

Under Pembaur, a municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 “where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” ... Colonial’s claim under Pembaur, however, is deficient because the individual defendants were not, as a matter of law, the responsible policy making officials of the Town, even with respect to zoning matters.

Section 1983 permits county liability for a constitutional deprivation caused by a final policymaker’s action or policy, or by a pervasive practice or custom equivalent to such a policy.

Hale v. Tallapoosa County · filed 1995-05-02

To prevail against the County through Smith in his official capacity, Hale was required to prove that the deprivation resulted from "(1) an action taken or policy made by an official responsible for making final policy in that area of the [County's] business; or (2) a practice or custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker." Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir.1994). Because Sheriff Smith was the County official responsible for making final policy for the jail, the County would be liable if Smith's actions or policies amounted to deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm which resulted in Hale's injury.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s conduct when the jury finds that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.

Crumpe v. Bowman · filed 1995-05-03

The fate of the claims against the County is controlled by Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986). ... The Supreme Court held that in light of the jury's finding, the claims against the City and the Police Commission could not go forward: ... [N]either Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), nor any of our other cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer has inflicted no constitutional harm. ... The interrogatories thus refute the contention that qualified immunity was the basis for the jury's verdict, bringing this case squarely within the ambit of Heller.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for inadequate training only when deliberate indifference in its training causes a constitutional violation.

Hughes v. City of North Olmsted · filed 1995-05-03

A municipality can only be held liable for inadequate training if the failure to train is a result of “deliberate indifference” which leads to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal liability plaintiff to plead a policy of a local government’s final policymaker that caused a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Shankle v. Texas City · filed 1995-05-04

To establish a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, the Plaintiffs must identify in their pleadings: (1) policy (2) of a local governmental entity’s final policy maker (3) that caused (4) the Plaintiffs to be subjected to a deprivation of a Constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires affirmative ratification of a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision and its basis by an official with final policymaking authority to impose county liability.

Keenan v. Allan · filed 1995-05-12

Third, Keenan cannot prove that an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. Note that Keenan argues only that the Commissioners should have stopped the alleged improper conduct; § 1983 requires more: an affirmative ratification.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for failure to train based on a single isolated incident that does not establish deliberate indifference.

Porter v. Jameson · filed 1995-05-12

Thus, this one time, single and isolated occurrence—even if the court concluded that Jameson’s conduct were unconstitutional—is best characterized as aberrational and unusual and, as such, cannot give rise to an actionable section 1983 claim predicated on “deliberate indifference” for failure to adequately train police officers.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 only when action pursuant to an official municipal policy causes a constitutional tort.

Burton v. City of Durham · filed 1995-05-16

A municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless action pursuant to official municipal policy caused a constitutional tort.

A city is liable for damages under § 1983 only when its unconstitutional official policy, or a policy or decision by an authorized decisionmaker, is the moving force behind a deprivation of rights.

Fordyce v. City of Seattle · filed 1995-05-16

We also affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the City of Seattle, dismissing it from the Sec. 1983 damages claims. Fordyce failed to show that the City of Seattle was culpable by virtue of a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by" Seattle that was itself unconstitutional. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Fordyce also failed to show that any Seattle policy or any decision by a governmentally authorized decisionmaker was the moving force behind any deprivation of his constitutional rights.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation; employee misconduct alone does not establish municipal liability.

Browning v. Snead · filed 1995-05-17

Theories of respondeat superior and vicarious liability are inapplicable in claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a municipality may not assume liability under § 1983 for the acts of its employees unless the municipality or its officials are shown to have caused the alleged constitutional deprivation pursuant to the establishment of some policy or custom by the municipality or its officials.

Section 1983 requires a county policy or custom and a direct causal link between that policy or custom and the alleged injury to impose county liability.

Fillmore v. Eichkorn · filed 1995-05-18

To establish the liability of Shawnee County, plaintiff must show 1) the existence of a county policy or custom, and 2) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when officials with final, unreviewable policymaking authority control the conduct that violates a plaintiff’s rights.

Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township · filed 1995-05-26

In the instant case, the Supervisor defendants had clear authority to execute final, nonreviewable actions, as evidenced by their control over the licensing process in the Township. Accordingly, plaintiffs' evidence, if believed, is sufficient to establish Township liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a local government liable for assessments set by another governmental body when it lacks final policymaking authority over the challenged assessment policy and merely receives and levies the resulting taxes.

Greenwich Township v. Murtagh · filed 1995-05-26

Since we have determined that the Local Governments are not the final policymakers with respect to the supervision, manner or method of the assessments upon which the Local Governments levy their taxes, the allegations of Taxpayers’ amended complaint are insufficient to state a cause of action against the Local Governments under section 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a city based on a practice independent of an employee’s conduct requires identifying a specific city practice that could have caused the injury.

Raymond Tapia, Jason Corona v. Daryl Gates, Former Chief of Police Tom Bradley, Former Mayor City of Los Angeles Robert · filed 1995-05-26

Even if city officials can be held liable under section 1983 for injuries inflicted by one of its employees who was not acting under color of state law at the time, compare Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994) with Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs failed to allege a specific city practice, independent of Silva's conduct, that could have caused the plaintiffs' injuries.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it acts with deliberate indifference to citizens’ rights.

Gonzalez v. City of Chicago · filed 1995-05-30

In other words, plaintiff contends (in part) that defendant City acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens, and § 1983 liability may be imposed on a municipal defendant possessing such a state of mind.

Section 1983 claims against a municipality require specific factual allegations that an official policy or custom caused a deprivation of rights.

Pang Hung Leung v. City of New York · filed 1995-06-01

Plaintiff’s broad and conclusory statements, coupled with his failure to allege facts of the alleged offending conduct, are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983. Moreover, the amended complaint does not plead facts showing that a specific custom or policy instituted by defendants caused civil rights violations, and thus his cause of action fails for that reason alone.

A city is liable under § 1983 for an officer’s constitutional violation only when a municipal custom or policy shows deliberate indifference and is the moving force behind the violation.

Gillen v. Gates · filed 1995-06-01

There was insufficient evidence of a City custom and policy amounting to a deliberate indifference that was the moving force behind Gillen's illegal search.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision by a final policymaker responsible for the activity.

Brown v. Bryan County, OK · filed 1995-06-02

So, it is clear that a single decision may create municipal liability if that decision were made by a final policymaker responsible for that activity.

A § 1983 claim against a city requires an allegation that the city adopted a policy or custom authorizing the challenged conduct.

Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless and Charles Gooden v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1995-06-07

The plaintiffs have also failed to allege that City of Cincinnati has adopted a policy or custom authorizing the police to remove homeless individuals from the downtown area simply for exercising free speech rights. Any claim against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must, therefore, fail.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a municipality to plead an official policy or custom that caused the constitutional deprivation.

Liu v. New York City Police Department · filed 1995-06-13

However, plaintiffs failure to specifically plead the existence of an official policy or custom which deprived him of a constitutional right in violation of 42 USC § 1983 is fatal to his claim against the municipality (Jackson v Police Dept., 192 AD2d 641, 642, lv denied 82 NY2d 658, cert denied — US —, 114 S Ct 1370).

Section 1983 holds a county liable only when an underlying constitutional violation was caused by a county policy or custom.

Clinton v. County of York · filed 1995-06-16

To establish liability under section 1983 on the part of the county, the Plaintiff would have to show that an underlying constitutional violation was caused by a policy or custom of the county.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when an official or unofficial municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Marti v. City of Maplewood, Missouri · filed 1995-06-19

In order to make out a Sec. 1983 case against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that a municipal policy or custom, either official or unofficial, was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine factual dispute that a city policy caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Valanzuela v. Snider · filed 1995-06-20

However, when seen in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a policy existed which permitted a known sexual deviant to persist in his misbehavior and resulted in Plaintiff ... being deprived of her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government for an employee’s deprivation of federal rights only when an official policy or custom caused the injury.

A.M. ex rel. Law v. Grant · filed 1995-06-21

Local governments can be held liable for the acts of employees which have deprived a plaintiff of federally protected rights only if the plaintiff can establish that his injuries were caused by actions taken by the employees pursuant to an official policy or custom of the governmental entity.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against municipal defendants when inadequate police training causes a rights deprivation and reflects indifference to the rights of those affected.

Illiano v. Township · filed 1995-06-29

Second, Mr. Illiano alleges that the municipal defendants’ failure to train the officers as to the proper use of force not only resulted in the deprivation of Mr. Illiano’s rights, but also reflected a gross indifference to the rights of those with whom the officers interact. Such allegations, if proved at trial, constitute a § 1983 violation.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for inadequate training or supervision only when the failure amounts to a county custom or policy, reflects deliberate indifference, and is closely related to the injury.

Ayers v. Vera Reynolds, Clerk, Lincoln County, Arkansas · filed 1995-06-30

We agree because Ayers's bare allegation that Lincoln County failed to properly train and supervise Reynolds did not assert that the failure to properly train and supervise amounted to a custom or policy, that is, a deliberate or conscious choice to follow a course of action by county policymakers, of deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the circuit court clerk's office comes into contact and that such a failure was closely related to the ultimate injury so as to be actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city for a county official’s actions without proof that the city ratified or authorized those actions.

Dunklin v. Lowndes County · filed 1995-06-30

The court finds that the actions by a county official may not be employed to exact liability on a city when there is no proof that the latter ratified or authorized the actions of the former.

Section 1983 requires an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom to hold a city liable.

Brinkley v. Skjonsberg · filed 1995-07-03

We agree with the district court that (1) Judge John Quinn and Court Commissioner Maurice Epstein were entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the complained of acts were performed in their official capacities, see Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); (2) Brinkley failed to allege that the City of Boulder City acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom, see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978); 2 and (3) private individuals Katrinka Brinkley, Evelyn Skjonberg, Susan Saltskill, Craig and Tanya Viner were not amenable to suit under section 1983, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988).

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability for an officer’s acts when no officer committed an underlying constitutional violation.

Thompson v. City of Lawrence · filed 1995-07-05

Thompson alleges that the City of Lawrence ("City") is liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the acts of Defendant Ron Olin, the chief of the LPD. The City may not be held liable under this theory, however, if there are no underlying constitutional violations by its officers.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a municipality when its policy or custom inflicts the injury.

Stickney v. City of Sterling Heights · filed 1995-07-13

In order for Stickney to make out a Sec. 1983 claim against the City, Stickney must show that the municipality has a de facto policy or custom which inflicts injury.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Noel v. Town of Plymouth, Mass. · filed 1995-07-14

Municipal liability lies only when a municipal policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires final policymaking authority; an officer’s discretion to make final decisions implementing law enforcement policies does not establish that authority.

Eversole v. Steele · filed 1995-07-14

The discretion to make final decisions to carry out the policies of a local law enforcement entity does not equate to policymaking authority.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a final policymaker theory when the official whose acts caused the injury lacks final policymaking authority.

Angara v. City of Chicago · filed 1995-07-20

Therefore, the court concludes that the Inspector General does not have final policymaking authority and, thus, that the City of Chicago in this ease cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability through an official who lacks final decisionmaking authority over the challenged action.

Leffler v. Meer · filed 1995-07-20

Under this statute, the County Council clearly possesses the final decisionmaking authority to determine the number of jailers and deputies. As a result, plaintiffs could not have established municipal liability through the Commissioners' failure to hire additional personnel.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only if its official policy, custom, or practice proximately caused the constitutional violation.

HBP ASSOCIATES v. Marsh · filed 1995-07-21

In addition, in order for liability to attach to a municipality, such as the County, a plaintiff must show that it was an official policy or custom or practice that proximately caused the constitutional violation.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its policy causes the alleged civil rights injury.

McTigue v. City of Chicago · filed 1995-07-25

The municipality’s policy must be the source of the discrimination.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for inadequate selection or training of jail employees when the deficiency reflects policymakers’ deliberate indifference to inmates’ rights and is closely related to the injury.

Young v. City of Augusta Ex Rel. DeVaney · filed 1995-07-28

Young's claim that jail employees are inadequately selected or trained to recognize the need to remove a mentally ill inmate to a hospital or to dispense medication as prescribed is cognizable, however, if the deficiency reflects deliberate indifference by City policymakers to the rights of inmates and it is closely related to the ultimate injury.

An allegation that a housing authority’s policies and procedures failed to protect a tenant’s federal rights is sufficient to plead municipal liability under § 1983.

Mungiovi v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1995-08-02

Because such an allegation of municipal liability is sufficient under ... we cannot dismiss this claim on the grounds put forward by the CHA.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the constitutional violation.

Jones v. Ziegler · filed 1995-08-03

Finally, in a case of this sort a plaintiff must prove that the custom or policy relied upon proximately caused the constitutional violation. When faced with a claim of alleged municipal liability under § 1983, a court must determine whether there is a direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 holds a local government liable only when its official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Sheppard v. J. W. Fairman, Jr., Michael F. Sheahan, and Richard Phelan · filed 1995-08-11

Since a claim brought under Sec. 1983 cannot survive under a theory of respondeat superior, a local government will be liable only if the plaintiff can show that the alleged constitutional violation resulted from an official policy or custom of the local government.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an officer’s decision only when the officer has final authority to set policy; discretion to carry out existing law enforcement policy does not suffice.

Eversole v. Steele · filed 1995-08-16

Although, as Eversole notes, McQuinley and Sherck held positions of authority within their respective law enforcement departments and as co-directors of the RUFF Drug Task Force, nothing in the record suggests that either was vested with policymaking authority. The discretion to make final decisions to carry out the policies of a local law enforcement entity does not equate to policymaking authority.

Section 1983 holds a county liable for its own policy that causes a deprivation of constitutional rights, but not vicariously for an employee’s acts.

Rideau v. Jefferson County · filed 1995-08-25

A governmental unit cannot be held liable vicariously for acts of its employees solely on the theory of respondeat superior. If the county is to be liable, it will be only as a result of its own action in adopting a policy which caused deprivation of Rideau-Smith’s constitutional rights.

A city is liable under Section 1983 only when an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Ramirez v. City of Robstown · filed 1995-08-30

A city cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless a constitutional violation was caused by an official policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a county; a claim against the county depends on a constitutional violation by an individual actor.

Dawson v. Prince George's County · filed 1995-09-01

Since the Court may not impose vicarious liability under a § 1983 action, the viability of Dawson's claims against the County hinge on his ability to show that Ricker, or another "active" Defendant, violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when a municipal policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional deprivation; employment of the officer alone is insufficient.

DeJesus v. O'Connor · filed 1995-09-05

The City is only implicated in the Complaint as O’Connor’s employer. Municipal liability, however, cannot be based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2035. As Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional deprivation based on government policy or custom, the Complaint must be dismissed as to the City.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability only when a policy of a municipal policymaker causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Barney v. City of Greenville, Miss. · filed 1995-09-06

To impose liability upon a municipality pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a policy (2) of the city’s policymaker (3) that caused (4) the deceased to be subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official municipal policy causes the deprivation of constitutional rights.

Orraca v. City of New York · filed 1995-09-08

However, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 when the deprivation of constitutional rights is the result of action pursuant to an official municipal policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional tort.

Britton v. Maloney · filed 1995-09-10

Rather, a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 only if there is a showing that a “policy or custom” of the municipality caused a constitutional tort.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a local government for acts of nonpolicymaking employees.

Fickes v. Jefferson County · filed 1995-09-13

Governmental bodies cannot be held hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of their nonpolicymaking employees on a theory of respondeat superior.

A plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 must show a constitutional deprivation caused by actions sanctioned by the municipality.

Gallegos v. City of San Gabriel · filed 1995-09-14

To prevail on a section 1983 claim against a municipality plaintiff must show that the alleged injury amounts to a constitutional deprivation, and that actions sanctioned by the municipality caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when inadequate police training, supervision, or discipline reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights and causes the deprivation.

Hogan v. Franco · filed 1995-09-18

Therefore, plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to pass the Walker test and to support the jury's finding that the City of Utica provided inadequate training, supervision, and discipline of their police officers to the extent of being deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of detainees. Also, it substantiated the jury's decision that this inadequate training and supervision was a proximate cause of plaintiff's sufferings and damages from excessive use of force and denial of medical attention.

Section 1983 allows municipal liability for an employee’s final decision when it implements municipal policy, but a decision contrary to that policy cannot be imputed to the municipality.

Greensboro Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3157 Steven B. Zimmerman v. City of Greensboro · filed 1995-09-18

When a final decision by an employee implements municipal policy, then municipal liability may follow. But if a final decision does not implement municipal policy, or is contrary to it, then it is not imputable to the municipality.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim based on the municipality’s direct participation in misconduct without alleging a series of prior acts by subordinate officers.

Jackson v. Marion County · filed 1995-09-19

But where as in this case the complaint charges the mumcipality or other governmental entity with having engaged in improper conduct directly, here a “cover up” that if it actually occurred and was engineered by the county itself ... made the county complicit with the officers, then the drawing of an inference from a series of bad acts by subordinate officers is not required; the method of proof is completely different; and the complaint is adequate to state a claim against the governmental entity.

Section 1983 permits local government liability only when a municipal policy or custom directly causes the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Bekier v. James A. Karnes, Sheriff of Franklin County, Ohio Earl O. Smith John Rachfall · filed 1995-09-20

Thus, an employer will not be held liable under Sec. 1983 unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.