42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of federal administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights action.

James v. Ogilvie · filed 1970-03-20

If a party seeks to avoid Section 2000e-5 and its exhaustion requirement and instead pursues a perceived grievance through Section 1983, which incorporates no such requirement, that is his prerogative.

A § 1983 claim cannot be dismissed for failure to exhaust a state administrative remedy when the plaintiff’s allegations raise a question about whether that remedy is adequate or useful.

Ricciotti v. Warwick School Committee · filed 1970-11-06

I find that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts with sufficient particularity to raise some question in *1012this court’s mind concerning the futility and/or inadequacy of resorting to the arbitration remedy provided by State law. Thus I am not convinced to a legal certainty that he had an adequate State remedy, and if not, then the law is clear that he did not have to resort to that remedy, cf. Houghton, supra. Therefore the motion to dismiss is denied.

A nonprisoner challenging a city ordinance under § 1983 need not exhaust municipal administrative remedies before filing suit.

Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster · filed 2006-06-30

The Supreme Court and this Court have held that there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit under § 1983.

A public employee bringing a § 1983 claim need not exhaust state administrative remedies before suit.

Winters v. Meyer · filed 2006-07-13

The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear that a § 1983 plaintiff is not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing her claim.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Wal Juice Bar, Inc. v. City of Oak Grove · filed 2006-10-23

More fundamentally, regardless of Oak Grove’s failure to provide a hearing, the Supreme Court has clearly held “that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).

Section 1983 does not require employees to exhaust collectively bargained grievance procedures before filing suit.

Henneberger v. County of Nassau · filed 2006-12-06

As such, plaintiffs subject to bargained-for dispute resolution procedures set out in employment contracts need not exhaust those procedures prior to bringing suit under Section 1983.

Section 1983 itself imposes no exhaustion requirement; § 1997e(a) separately requires prisoners with covered prison-conditions claims to exhaust available administrative remedies.

Jones v. Bock · filed 2007-01-22

The PLRA itself is not a source of a prisoner’s claim; claims covered by the PLRA are typically brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983, which does not require exhaustion at all, see Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982).

Section 1983 claims inextricably related to IDEA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims may be dismissed without prejudice pending completion of administrative procedures.

Johnson Ex Rel. Johnson v. Board of Education · filed 2007-03-29

Since Plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 are inextricably related to the claims brought under the IDEA, ADA and § 504, the § 1983 claims are dismissed without prejudice, as well, pending the outcome of the administrative procedures.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust administrative procedures before filing suit.

Rivera v. State Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 2007-04-26

It is well settled that there is no requirement to exhaust stale administrative procedures prior to the filing of a § 1983 claim, McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist., 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).

A service member bringing a Section 1983 claim to challenge a military resignation must exhaust available federal intraservice administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.

Aikens v. Ingram · filed 2007-09-13

In Patsy, however, the Supreme Court did not address the exhaustion of federal intraservice administrative remedies in the military context. ... The court has considered the Mindes foux--part balancing test and concludes that the amended complaint should be dismissed without prejudice so that plaintiff may exhaust his intra-service administrative remedies with the ABCMR.

A plaintiff generally need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.

Ferrel v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2007-10-05

A plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative procedures before instituting an action in reliance on § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal or state court.

Metz v. Laramie County School District No. 1 · filed 2007-10-23

It is more than well-settled that a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. ... This rule is equally applicable in state court.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, but that rule does not excuse a failure to timely object to an allegedly biased hearing officer.

Marable v. Nitchman · filed 2007-12-26

Finally, we reject Marable’s argument that because 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which he sues, imposes no requirement to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit in federal district court, ... he therefore did not need to timely object. As noted above, the general requirement that a litigator timely protest a biased arbiter applies here.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust administrative or state court remedies before bringing suit.

South Lyme Property Owners Ass'n v. Town of Old Lyme · filed 2008-02-04

Generally, a plaintiff with a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not required to exhaust administrative or state court remedies.

A § 1983 claim seeking to vindicate procedural due process rights arising from a D.C. employment action requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Hoey v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-03-31

Hoey argues that administrative exhaustion is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action. ... While that is ordinarily the case, defendants correctly point out that an exception to that principle applies where a plaintiff seeks to vindicate procedural due process rights.

Section 1983 does not generally require plaintiffs to exhaust possible state-law bases for relief before suing.

Manney v. Cabell · filed 1980-04-29

We do not hold that, as a general matter, plaintiffs bringing suit under section 1983 must always exhaust the possible bases of relief provided by state law.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to exhaustion of state administrative remedies under a balancing approach.

Jacobson v. Director, Bureau of Mediation Services · filed 1981-02-06

Under that approach the fact that a claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a factor rather than the determinative factor in determining whether the exhaustion doctrine should apply. ... For reasons set forth above, the court holds that plaintiff must exhaust his state administrative appeal before continuing the prosecution of this suit.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Dusanek v. Joseph P. Hannon, Raymond C. Principe, John O'donnell, M.D., and the Board of Education of the Cit · filed 1982-04-26

These decisions do not amount to a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a predicate to a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.

Dunfey v. Seabrook Sch. Dist. et al. · filed 2008-04-24

As a general rule, however, plaintiffs need not exhaust their state administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 suit in federal court.

Section 1983 generally does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere · filed 2008-09-09

Administrative exhaustion is not generally required in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing suit.

Elsmere Park Club v. Elsmere · filed 2008-09-09

Administrative exhaustion is not generally required in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1986-06-06

Plaintiffs in a § 1983 action are not required to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim to proceed before administrative remedies are exhausted when waiting would cause irreparable harm.

Doe v. Rockingham County School Board · filed 1987-01-16

Thus, the complaint states a cause of action permitting this court to accept jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Under the circumstances, plaintiff would have been irreparably harmed, under the Goss analysis, had he waited until February 13, 1986, for the defendants to provide their proposed administrative remedy.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies when the state proceeding is remedial rather than coercive.

Brown Ex Rel. Brown v. Day · filed 2009-01-13

Other administrative proceedings fill the “remedial” category and remain subject to Patsy’s holding that a federal § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies.

Section 1983 retaliation claims do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit.

LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland · filed 2009-02-03

Exhaustion is not a prerequisite to the assertion of a § 1983 retaliation claim, and Appellees do not argue otherwise.

A nonprisoner bringing a § 1983 claim need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

N Group LLC v. Hawai'i County Liquor Commission · filed 2009-03-03

“[E]xhaustion is not required for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Therefore, Plaintiffs federal constitutional claims in counts I and II are not subject to dismissal for any failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of available administrative remedies.

Weissman v. Fruchtman · filed 1988-11-29

In contrast, the exhaustion of remedies requirement, which does not apply to § 1983 actions, “refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Dashiell v. Montgomery County · filed 1990-03-14

Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that no exhaustion requirement exists in suits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an action after the claims have been exhausted and does not itself bar future assertion of those claims.

Davis v. W. Lee Youngblood, Danny Gerald Davis v. Eddie Zollar Pamela Davis Jerry F. Rivers · filed 1991-03-21

The jurisdictional defense that requires dismissal of No. 90-6203 serves to bar only an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The fact that Davis must first exhaust the claims presented in No. 90-7411 does not bar future assertion of these claims in a Sec. 1983 action.

Section 1983 itself does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Hough v. Shakopee Public Schools · filed 2009-03-30

Section 1983 itself does not, of course, impose an exhaustion requirement.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies that would be futile.

Goetz v. Ansell · filed 1973-04-19

Putting to one side the question whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies still applies in a section 1983 suit, 1 invoking it on these facts was clearly unwarranted.

A § 1983 plaintiff in the Second Circuit may proceed without exhausting state administrative remedies when their adequacy is effectively part of the constitutional claim.

Fuentes v. Adolph Roher, Georgina Hoggard · filed 1975-05-29

One exception is presented where the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy is for all practical purposes coextensive with the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, ... which is clearly the case here.

Section 1983 claims based on an alleged failure to provide an appropriate public education are premature until the plaintiff exhausts the Education for All Handicapped Children Act’s administrative remedies.

Harris Ex Rel. Jordan v. Campbell · filed 1979-06-15

Plaintiff’s claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.), the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are also premature. The basis of all these claims is substantially the same as that of plaintiff’s claim under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975; all of these claims are founded upon plaintiff’s assertion that defendants have discriminated against him by failing to place him in an appropriate educational program at public expense, while providing appropriate public educational programs at public expense to average children.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative or state remedies before filing suit.

Henderson v. Bentley · filed 1980-09-17

Even if the remedies provided in T.C.A. §§ 27 -901 et seq. are available to plaintiff (cf. § 27 914), there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative or state remedies prior to filing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits taxpayers to bring class claims challenging an unconstitutional state tax scheme in state court without exhausting inadequate state administrative remedies.

Kerr v. Waddell · filed 1995-07-13

The taxpayers’ class action claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for the administration of an unconstitutional tax scheme, however, are different. In these particular circumstances, the taxpayers’ failure to exhaust state administrative remedies does not deprive the tax court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the taxpayers’ section 1983 claims.

Failure to exhaust state administrative remedies does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim.

Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md. · filed 1996-01-19

Under these circumstances, mindful of the Supreme Court’s warning that “federal courts are vested with a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” this Court holds that the plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive it of jurisdiction over the Fair Housing Act and § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff with an otherwise good claim to exhaust state administrative remedies.

Reynolds v. City of Dayton · filed 1982-01-04

However, until such time, this Court is bound by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Jones that exhaustion is not required under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative or collective bargaining remedies before a plaintiff sues in federal court.

Mahoney v. Hankin · filed 1984-09-20

Thus, plaintiff needed to exhaust neither the state administrative remedies nor the remedies under the collective bargaining agreement before the case could be heard in this court.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies, including in a federal takings suit.

DLX Inc v. KY · filed 2004-08-26

That administrative exhaustion is not required is part of the general rule that exhaustion is never required in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Outdoor Media Group v. City of Beaumont · filed 2007-11-01

Because exhaustion is not required to pursue a Section 1983 complaint, we find that Outdoor Media’s failure to seek a writ of administrative man- ... damus did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1983 does not generally require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Asociación de Suscripción Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Juarbe-Jiménez · filed 2009-07-27

It is well-established that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a Section 1983 action.

A prisoner seeking damages and injunctive relief for prison conditions under § 1983 must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action.

Cole v. Isherwood · filed 2002-04-09

Because Cole failed to exhaust his remedies under the Act, Cole may not bring an action under § 1983. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Cole’s § 1983 claims and correctly granted the defendants’ demurrer based on this fact.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust postdeprivation procedures before suing when they allege a property deprivation carried out under established state procedures.

Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran · filed 2002-04-16

The parents were not required to exhaust post deprivation procedures prior to bringing this suit. Thus, we hold that they properly stated a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a Section 8 participant to sue in federal court without first challenging her voucher termination in D.C. Superior Court.

Robinson v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2009-09-18

The Court agrees with the holding in Lowery, and therefore concludes that the plaintiff is not barred from bringing an action in this Court under § 1983 despite the fact that she has not first brought her case in the Superior Court.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Boulanger v. TOWN OF OLD LYME · filed 2010-01-07

Specifically, the plaintiffs’ various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims could not be disposed of based on their failure to pursue administrative remedies because “[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies ... is not required before bringing a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 damages claims are not barred by the applicable limitations period and do not require exhaustion of remedies.

Level 3 Communications, LLC v. DeBellis · filed 2010-01-19

Likewise, the causes of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 are not time-barred (see CPLR 214; Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261 [1985]; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552-553 [1999]) and, under the circumstances, are not subject to the requirement of exhaustion of remedies (see Patsy v Board of Regents of Fla., 457 US 496, 500 [1982]; McNeese v Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 US 668, 671-673 [1963]; cf. Prison Litigation Reform Act [42 USC § 1997e (a)]).

Section 1983 claims closely intertwined with state tort claims must await exhaustion of administrative remedies that may resolve the underlying dispute.

Washington v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-01-27

Put more simply, at this stage the plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to their state law tort claims. If they do not prevail in the administrative proceeding, only then may they attempt to vindicate, in this court, the constitutional claims that are closely intertwined with their tort claims.

Section 1983 plaintiffs enforcing Medicaid rights need not request a state administrative fair hearing before suing.

Dultz v. Velez · filed 2010-03-30

Moreover, as noted in Sabree and discussed in more detail above, Plaintiffs are not required to request fair hearings prior to instituting suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 retaliation claims do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Clayton v. City of Atlantic City · filed 2010-06-30

At this stage, the Court cannot find that it is precluded from considering the claims for exhaustion reasons. Furthermore, "exhaustion is not a prerequisite to the assertion of a § 1983 retaliation claim."

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative appeals before filing suit.

Hope for Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren · filed 2010-06-30

Based upon the clear authority of Beaulieu and Patsy, and no contrary law having been cited by Sheriff Warren, a failure to exhaust the appeal remedies permitted in the Second Amended Rules does not preclude judicial review. Sheriff Warren, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment based on his contention that the Plaintiff Charities’ equal protection claim is premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require non-prisoner plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action.

Michigan Chamber of Commerce v. Land · filed 2010-07-23

Nonetheless, as a matter oí federal law, exhaustion of administrative remedies is simply not required in non-prisoner actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for non-prisoner section 1983 actions as it is with some other types of federal-court actions.

Section 1983 does not require a landowner to exhaust administrative review procedures before bringing a takings claim, although the landowner generally must obtain a final decision on the property's permissible use.

Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County · filed 2010-07-30

Thus, a landowner possesses no obligation to exhaust administrative review procedures before asserting a takings claim pursuant to Section 1983.

A landowner with a ripe Section 1983 claim need not take additional administrative steps before filing it.

West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of West Linn · filed 2010-09-23

We do not mean to suggest that, if a section 1983 claim is ripe, a landowner must take additional administrative steps before filing a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a federal due process claim.

Lobato v. New Mexico Environment Department, Environmental Health Division · filed 2011-03-21

The Court need not analyze whether or not Plaintiff in fact did exhaust his administrative remedies, because to bring a federal due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims generally do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Wallace v. STATE EX REL. PERB · filed 2011-08-10

As to the section 1983 claim, defendant concedes that the court erred in dismissing the claim for plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. That concession is well taken, see Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or. 328, 338, 811 P.2d 131 (1991), cert. den., 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.Ct. 867, 116 L.Ed.2d 773 (1992) ("A state generally may not erect procedural barriers such as requiring that state remedies be sought and denied, before the federal remedy is invoked."), and, accordingly, the court erred in dismissing the section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 generally does not require plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

English v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-09-30

There is no general requirement that a plaintiff alleging a section 1983 claim must exhaust his available administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Casiano-Montañez v. State Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 2012-03-05

It is well-established that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to filing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public employee’s failure to pursue available post-termination remedies bars a § 1983 claim for denial of post-termination process, but does not bar a claim for denial of pre-termination process.

Christiansen v. West Branch Community School District · filed 2012-03-22

So, the district court properly dismissed Christiansen's procedural due process claims under Riggins and Winskowski to the extent they allege the denial of post-termination due process. But, Christiansen's complaint also alleges the denial of pre-termination process and, under Keating, the district court should not have dismissed such claims on the basis of Christiansen's failure to pursue post-termination remedies.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies, but the claim must be ripe.

Courtney v. Goltz · filed 2012-04-17

During oral argument, counsel for the Plaintiffs correctly noted that the Courtneys are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 claim. ... The lack of an exhaustion requirement, however, does not relieve the Courtneys of their obligation to establish that their claim presents a ripe controversy.

A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 action in federal court without first pursuing a local administrative appeal when no state judicial proceeding is ongoing.

Fantasysrus 2, L.L.C. v. City of East Grand Forks · filed 2012-07-25

Because Ellis’s denial of Fantasysrus’s permit application did not initiate an ongoing administrative proceeding, the Court concludes that Fantasysrus was free to choose between a local administrative appeal and an action in federal district court.

Section 1983 claims do not require prior exhaustion of administrative remedies under the District of Columbia’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act.

Kelley v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-09-28

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the CMPA is thus not a prerequisite to filing a complaint based on federal claims like Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before suing unless another law imposes that requirement.

Winn v. New Orleans City · filed 2013-01-25

Defendants have not provided this Court with, nor has this Court found, any positive law that explicitly or implicitly requires that Plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, but its claims remain subject to res judicata after a final state-court judgment involving the same transactions.

Bosonetto, et al. v. Town of Richmond, et al. · filed 2013-05-31

Finally, the Bosonettos argue that this result in effect “allows the state to set up procedural hurdles” to their claims under § 1983, when, as they correctly point out, “exhaustion of state administrative remedies [is] not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Patsy v . Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). But this court is not entering judgment against the Bosonettos on their claims for violations of their constitutional rights under § 1983 because they failed to exhaust their state-law administrative remedies for those violations. This court is entering judgment against the Bosonettos on their § 1983 claims because, even though they arise out of the same series of transactions as the state-court suit, they did not raise the § 1983 claims in that suit, which, as just discussed, ended with a final judgment on the merits.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Weigel v. Maryland · filed 2013-06-19

Second, plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies when the claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court.

Plouffe v. Town of Dighton · filed 2013-11-26

Plouffe is correct that, under the circumstances of this case, he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking relief under the circumstances of this case.

Wesson v. Town of Salisbury · filed 2014-04-18

Although neither Wesson nor Woods sought relief in the state court, under the circumstances of this case, neither is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Non-prisoner plaintiffs bringing claims under § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Grason v. State of Illinois Inspector Ge · filed 2014-06-19

He correctly points out that he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies; non-prisoner plaintiffs pursuing civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim need not plead exhaustion of administrative remedies in the complaint.

LeBeouf v. Manning · filed 2014-07-15

However, the plaintiff need not plead exhaustion of administrative remedies when asserting her § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Horsley v. Trame · filed 2014-07-28

Nonetheless, the Court finds it appropriate to follow the general rule stemming from Patsy that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary for § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Villavicencio v. Gure-Perez · filed 2014-10-30

Claims brought under Sections 1983 and 1981 of Title 42 do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a claim in state court.

RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk · filed 2015-01-09

Based on the clear rule articulated in this United States Supreme Court precedent,42 we conclude that Gillam’s federal constitutional claim is saved from dismissal on exhaustion grounds because it was brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before suing to enforce SNAP rights because the SNAP Act imposes no such requirement.

Barry v. Corrigan · filed 2015-01-09

While § 2020(e)(10) imposes notice and fair hearing requirements upon states, defendant points to no indication of an implicit congressional. intent to require § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit, nor can the Court discern any such intent.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim in federal court.

National Harbor Gp, LLC v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2015-08-17

Plaintiff thus need not exhaust its administrative remedies in order to bring its §§ 1981 and 1983 action before this Court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally need not exhaust state administrative review procedures before suing, even when federal law requires states to provide those procedures.

Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Kliebert · filed 2015-10-29

Thus, a congressional requirement that states establish administrative review procedures, as exists here, rarely, if ever, implies that either § 1983 plaintiffs need exhaust them or a case is unripe when the process has not been invoked but an injury plainly looms.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before bringing an action.

Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Flint Community Schools · filed 2015-11-23

Instead, the plaintiff filed suit to enforce its rights under the Protection and Advocacy Acts via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[E]xhaustion of state administrative, remedies [is not] required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).

Section 1983 actions require inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing and to plead that exhaustion sufficiently.

Davis v. Simmons · filed 2004-06-29

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires inmates to exhaust “available” administrative remedies prior to filing an action under § 1983, even where the “available” remedies appear futile at providing the kind of remedy sought.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before filing suit.

Tempest Horsley v. Trame · filed 2015-12-14

There is no general duty to exhaust state judi- cial or administrative remedies before pursuing an action un- der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however.

Section 1983 does not generally require a plaintiff to exhaust state or local remedies before filing suit.

Mechammil v. City of San Jacinto · filed 2016-06-30

There is no general exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee · filed 2016-09-14

And, importantly, the Individual Plaintiffs have no administrative appeal rights and they are not subject to (nor could they be) any administrative exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Fort Des Moines Church of Christ v. Jackson · filed 2016-10-14

The general rule is that exhaustion is not required prior to bringing suit for violations of § 1983.

An inmate bringing a § 1983 claim in Kansas state court must exhaust available administrative remedies but need not file proof of exhaustion with the petition.

Sperry v. McKune · filed 2016-11-23

Hence, when an inmate states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Kansas state court can enforce Kansas' requirement that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit because the same requirement is present in federal law, but it cannot impose a pleading requirement not found in federal law.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Mitchell ex rel. Mitchell v. Community Mental Health of Central Michigan · filed 2017-03-22

The plaintiffs’ federal claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. None of those statutes contains an exhaustion prerequisite.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a plaintiff must still have a final decision to challenge.

Mosley v. City of Wickliffe · filed 2017-03-23

Although there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action, Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982), plaintiffs must still ... answer the conceptually distinct question of whether there is a final decision for this court to review.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to an exhaustion requirement when an adequate administrative remedy is available.

Mangiafico v. Town of Farmington · filed 2017-05-16

Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, even claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee · filed 2017-06-29

And, importantly, the Individual Plaintiffs have no administrative appeal rights, and they are not subject to (nor could they be) any administrative exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require Medicaid patients with no administrative appeal rights to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen · filed 2018-02-21

And the Patients are not subject to an exhaustion requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not let a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in state court bypass the exhaustion requirement when an adequate administrative remedy exists.

Metropolitan District v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities · filed 2018-03-27

This court has rejected that claim in part II A of this opinion. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot ‘‘forestall an invocation of the exhaustion doctrine’’ due to the inclusion of a § 1983 count in its complaint.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Balt. Cnty. · filed 2018-03-27

As to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 action. ... Accordingly, while the Plaintiffs could have pursued the same appellate process as in Ware I , they were not required to do so before filing suit in this Court.

Section 1983 does not require nonprisoners to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before suing.

DuFour v. Matrisch · filed 2018-08-27

But § 1983 does not require nonprisoners to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not allow taxpayers to bypass adequate state tax remedies, including required administrative review.

Holzheid v. Comptroller · filed 2019-03-28

The administrative remedies provided by the Tax-General Article, as described in detail above, including suit before the Tax Court, are “plain, adequate, and complete,” thereby obviating Appellants’ ability to circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court by asserting claims pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing in state court, regardless of the relief sought.

Mangiafico v. Town of Farmington · filed 2019-04-16

Consistent with Patsy, we now hold that a § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative reme- dies, regardless of the type of relief sought in the com- plaint.

Section 1983 allows residents of the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program to sue without exhausting state administrative remedies.

Burch v. Keck · filed 2019-05-24

Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for residents of the Kansas SPTP bringing § 1983 claims, the district court's judgment is reversed and remanded.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an equal protection claim.

NEW HORIZONS REHABILITATION, INC. v. STATE OF INDIANA · filed 2019-07-19

And no exhaustion of administrative remedies is required to bring an equal protection claim, which arises out of the Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek state administrative review before bringing a federal constitutional claim.

Safari Childcare Inc v. Penny · filed 2019-08-02

Accordingly, Plaintiffs could bring their § 1983 claims in federal court without first filing an administrative review action in state court.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies.

Jackson v. St. Charles Parish Housing Authority Board of Commissioners · filed 2020-02-21

To the extent that Defendants are making a jurisdictional argument, as Jackson notes, it is well-established that § 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies.

A nonprisoner need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action.

Joseph v. City of San Jose · filed 2020-03-03

However, Plaintiff is not a prisoner and is not subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Hence, “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Yarrington v. Candor Central School District · filed 2020-03-27

Regarding Defendants’ claims that Plaintiff did not allege a “policy or practice” in these complaints, this does not preclude her from bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court as there is “no exhaustion of remedies” requirement.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court do not require exhaustion of state contractual grievance remedies.

McReady v. Montgomery Community College · filed 2020-09-30

However, Maryland’s requirements for filing a claim do not apply to the filing of a federal claim under § 1983 in a federal court.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Blais v. Washington State Department of Children, Youth, and Families · filed 2020-10-08

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit unless Congress provides otherwise.

Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Community Mental Health · filed 2020-10-29

Exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to suit under § 1983, Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982), and “§ 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement beyond what Congress has provided,” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994).

A § 1983 due process claim challenging an unfinished licensing process can fail while administrative appeals remain unexhausted and other redress remains available.

Seaweed Co. v. Maine Department of Administrative and Financial Services · filed 2021-01-15

Count 3, the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,fails because Petitioners have not exhausted their administrative remedies and because other means of redress are available.

Section 1983 claims brought with a timely, properly perfected Rule 9 appeal of a municipal decision cannot be dismissed solely for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Convent Corporation v. City of North Little Rock, Arkansas, a Municipal Corporation; Joe Smith, Mayor, Individually and · filed 2021-01-28

In its next point on appeal, Convent argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing its constitutional claims, civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and common-law claim of trespass on the basis that Convent had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. ... Accordingly, Convent is correct that the circuit court erred by dismissing Convent’s constitutional, civil-rights, and trespass claims solely on the basis of its failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to pursue available state or other remedies before filing in federal court.

Doe v. University of Connecticut · filed 2021-02-04

Section 1983 includes no requirement that a claimant pursue available state or other remedies before commencing proceedings in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state law remedies or procedures before bringing a civil rights claim.

Creel v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge · filed 2021-03-08

Redress for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not require exhaustion of state law remedies or procedures.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Nuey v. City of Cranston · filed 2021-03-08

No exhaustion is required on the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs challenging an election caucus to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

Whitten v. Rochester Township Republican Central Committee · filed 2021-03-15

Even assuming, arguendo, plaintiffs could have addressed the manner in which the caucus was conducted through an administrative proceeding before an election board, they were not required to do so before seeking judicial intervention to protect their civil rights under section 1983 and section 29-17.

Section 1983 does not require nonprisoner plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Lott v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2021-03-17

Because Plaintiff is not a prisoner, he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing his § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a federal civil rights claim.

Raja v. Burns · filed 2021-03-23

The plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim did not require him to “obtain relief or exhaust [his] remedies through administrative proceedings.”

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Weinstein v. Ryder · filed 2021-03-23

Defendants’ first argument is without merit. “[U]nder section 1983, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to first appeal the NCPD’s decision to revoke his pistol license before filing this case.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff bringing a takings claim to exhaust state remedies before suing.

Petworth Holdings, LLC v. Bowser · filed 2021-03-26

To the extent that the District’s argument relates to exhaustion alone, Petworth is right: the Fifth Amendment imposes no exhaustion requirement for takings claims brought via section 1983, nor facial claims.

Section 1983 does not require a non-prisoner plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

South Grand View Development Company, Inc. v. City of Alabaster, Alabama · filed 2021-06-21

But in non-prisoner civil cases, such as here, “exhaustion of state administrative remedies [is] not [] required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” ... The City’s claim that the matter was not ripe due to SGV’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies unless a statute expressly requires it.

Estancias de Cerro Mar, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority · filed 2021-09-01

And, as indicated above, the United States Supreme Court has stated repeatedly and “categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983” absent a statutory mandate. Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01, 512 (1982). No such mandate exists here.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit; state remedies may matter to a procedural due process claim.

EGGLESTON VS. STUART · filed 2021-09-23

Under Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), a party is generally not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 civil rights claim. Here, the § 1983 claim is, at its core, one for substantive due process, and because the exception for procedural due process claims does not apply, the district court improperly dismissed Eggleston's § 1983 civil rights claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Grise v. Stewart County School System · filed 2021-10-19

Plaintiff is correct that she is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a § 1983 claim.

A prisoner bringing a § 1983 claim in Kansas state court need not plead proof of administrative exhaustion, because that state pleading requirement cannot govern the federal claim.

Matson v. State · filed 2021-12-23

Matson correctly argues that when a state court hears an issue brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution preempts any state laws or regulations that prohibit the prosecution of a claim in a manner different from what would be required in federal court. Sperry, 305 Kan. at 483. Thus, the Kansas requirement to plead proof of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Werner v. Hacker · filed 2022-04-19

To the extent Hacker argues that Werner has failed to exhaust his state administrative remedies, the Supreme Court has stated there is no duty to exhaust state administrative remedies before pursuing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).

Section 1983 does not permit official-capacity claims against state employees when those claims are effectively suits against the state.

Bailey v. Hunter · filed 2021-07-29

The State of Arkansas cannot be subject to claims brought pursuant to § 1983.

In a section 1983 action, the Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive back pay that would be paid from a state treasury.

Gloria E. Barreto Fred v. Roque · filed 1990-10-11

Back pay is a retroactive award, and consequently payment thereof from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not be sought in a federal forum.

Section 1983 permits a damages action against a county when an unconstitutional practice reflects county custom, and the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize the county.

Jones v. Houser · filed 1980-05-05

In Count IV, plaintiff claims that it was the custom of Pemiscot County to deny medical care to its prisoners. This clearly states a cause of action. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A county is not, as defendant Pemiscot County argues, immune from liability imposed via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state, not a county.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials under some circumstances, even when the Eleventh Amendment is invoked.

Broome v. Percy · filed 1979-05-11

I conclude that the plaintiffs in this action could recover damages from the defendant state prison officials under some circumstances.

Section 1983 does not abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, so claims against a state and its agencies are barred.

Verner v. State of Colo. · filed 1982-03-19

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the State of Colorado and its named agencies (C.L.E.-board, Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado State Board of Law Examiners and the Grievance Committee of the Colorado Supreme Court), are barred by the eleventh amendment.

A § 1983 action against officials in their official capacities cannot recover monetary damages from a state treasury because the Eleventh Amendment bars that recovery.

Boyne v. Harrison · filed 1983-02-09

We are mindful that Dr. Boyne in suing President Harrison and the Board of Regents in their official capacities in the federal suit, was precluded from seeking a recovery in the federal court from the treasury of the State. This recovery is precluded in the federal court, hearing Dr. Boyne’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages suit against a state that has not consented because the Eleventh Amendment makes the state immune.

Devernon Le Grand v. Matthew Evan, Clerk, Soal Schnertre, Clerk, City of New York, Kings County, State of New York · filed 1983-03-14

By virtue of the eleventh amendment, the State of New York is immune from a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without its consent.

Section 1983 damages claims brought by a state’s citizens against the state in federal court are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Strong v. Illinois Department of Human Services · filed 2002-08-05

Illinois maintains Eleventh Amendment immunity from actions for damages brought by its citizens in federal court under § 1983.

Section 1983 monetary damages claims against a state, state agency, or state official in an official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment when payment would come from the state treasury.

Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Institute of Culture · filed 2002-08-09

It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars a § 1983 action against a State, State Agency, or any State Official in his official capacity for monetary damages that would have to be paid from the state treasury.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars retroactive injunctive relief and monetary judgments against state officials in a § 1983 action absent a waiver.

Metz v. Supreme Court · filed 2002-08-19

In addition, Plaintiffs claims against the Supreme Court of Ohio and its officials are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ... Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking retroactive relief in the form of an injunction or relief in the form of a monetary judgment against the individual Defendants, such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.

Firestone Park Athletic Assn. v. State of Ohio · filed 2002-08-26

Furthermore, it is clear that Congress did not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims seeking prospective relief against state officials can proceed under the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity even when an injunction would lead to reimbursement from a state fund.

Rossborough Manufacturing Co. v. Trimble · filed 2002-08-26

While it may be argued that the explicit demand for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment is merely a cover for the implicit request for money, we conclude that the Ex Parte Young exception applies. ... Accordingly, we hold that the Treasurer and Administrator are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against a state board of elections.

Iwachiw v. NYC Board of Elections · filed 2002-08-29

Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars the Section 1983 action against the State Board of Elections.

A Nevada school district that is not an arm of the state lacks Eleventh Amendment immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Eason v. Clark County School District · filed 2002-09-11

We reverse the dismissal of the § 1983 and state law claims against all defendants, as well as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the District, because the Clark County School District is not an “arm of the state” and therefore does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Section 1983 claims against the Clark County School District and its personnel are not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity because the district is not an arm of the state.

Eason v. Clark County School District · filed 2002-09-11

The district court erroneously concluded that the Clark County School District is an arm of the state, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. We therefore reverse the dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1983 and state law claims against all defendants, as well as the dismissal of plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the District.

Section 1983 claims against an arm of the state are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Scaglione v. Mamaroneck Union Free School District · filed 2002-09-17

Nonetheless, the § 1983 and § 1985 claims were correctly dismissed as to MUFSD because of MUFSD’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Section 1983 claims against state officials sued in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

McDuffy v. Koval · filed 2002-09-30

The Eleventh Amendment bars section 1983 claims against state officials sued in their official capacities.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars § 1983 claims for compensatory and punitive damages against the state defendants.

Langdon v. Garner · filed 2002-10-07

The district court found Langdon’s claims in that complaint barred under the Eleventh Amendment. To the extent Langdon sought compensatory and punitive damages, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officers acting outside their authority are not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Porter ex rel. Porter v. Board of Trustees · filed 2002-10-08

Based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court dismissed the § 1983 claim with prejudice as to the State and Local Defendants sued in their official capacities. ... We hold further that the district court erred in dismissing with prejudice the Porters’ claims for prospective injunc-tive relief against the defendants acting outside the bounds of their authority.

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief on a § 1983 claim against a state officer acting outside the bounds of the officer's authority.

Dashiel Porter v. Board Of Trustees Of Manhattan Beach Unified School District · filed 2002-10-08

The Porters also challenge the district court's dismissal of their claims against the defendants with prejudice based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, to the extent that they seek injunctive relief against officers who acted outside the bounds of their authority. We agree that the district court erred in this regard. "It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against an officer of the state who acts outside the bounds of his authority." Cerrato v. San Francisco Comty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.1994); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

Section 1983 claims for monetary damages and declaratory relief against state officials in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Strunk v. New York State Insurance Fund · filed 2002-10-09

Although Strunk’s claims seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief from the state officials in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, he fails to state a claim under §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986.

Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for official-capacity claims seeking retroactive monetary damages.

Andrews v. Elkins · filed 2002-10-24

With regard to section 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment cannot be abrogated by an action that arises solely under section 1983. ... Here, Plaintiff seeks solely retroactive monetary relief and bases his claims against Defendant Elkins in his official capacity on section 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff is barred from suing Defendant Elkins in his official capacity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for a state university and its deans sued in their official capacities.

O'Neill v. Suni · filed 2002-11-13

We agree with the district court that the Eleventh Amendment bars O’Neill’s section 1983 claim against the University and its deans in their official capacities, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (§ 1983 does not contain clear legislative statement abrogating states’ immunity under Eleventh Amendment), and that O’Neill cannot bring a section 1983 action to recover for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000) (comprehensive remedial provisions of ADA indicate Congress did not intend violations of Act to be actionable under § 1983).

Section 1983 permits official-capacity suits against California county sheriffs administering county jails because they act for the county rather than the state.

Apollo v. County of Sacramento · filed 2002-12-04

The critical question before us is whether a county official sued in his or her official capacity acts on behalf of the state or the local entity. This question is controlled by Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.1989), which holds that California county sheriffs are amenable to § 1983 suit when administering county jails.

Individual state officials sued in their personal capacities are not immune from Section 1983 claims under the Eleventh Amendment.

Walker v. Clark · filed 2002-12-10

The district court also incorrectly concluded that the individual defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Walker sued these defendants in their personal capacities.

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles are immune from § 1983 suits under the Eleventh Amendment.

King v. Scott · filed 2002-12-13

King contends that the district court erred in determining that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. This argument is without merit.

Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity; an official-capacity claim seeking a declaration that state officials violated federal law in the past is barred.

Rothenberg v. Stone · filed 2002-12-27

The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. ... The Court finds that the plaintiffs complaint makes clear that he is seeking declarations that Stone’s past conduct violated federal law. He is therefore seeking only retrospective declaratory relief. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his remaining claims.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars damages claims under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacities.

McGuire v. Ameritech Services, Inc. · filed 2003-01-15

In his official capacity, Wilkinson, too, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, insofar as Plaintiffs seek damages.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state officials in their individual capacities despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Porter v. Jones · filed 2003-02-06

Jones’s argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against state officials in their individual capacities also fails. ... “[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability on state officials under § 1983.” ... The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs’ suit.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 claims for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief.

Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct · filed 2003-02-20

The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages claims against state officials in their official capacities.

Channer v. Murray · filed 2003-02-20

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. ... Because an award of damages against Blumenthal in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the claims against Blumenthal in his official capacity are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, so a state and its agencies cannot be sued under it in federal court without consent.

Bland v. New York · filed 2003-03-07

The Eleventh Amendment renders OCA and the State immune from suit here under § 1983 or under state law because the State of New York has not consented to suit in federal court, and because no express override of State statutory authority has been enacted by Congress in association with § 1983.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a § 1983 suit against a state itself regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief.

Taggart v. State Bar · filed 2003-03-13

Furthermore, we reject Taggart’s contention that the Bar’s immunity does not extend to his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not depend on the type of relief sought when the state itself is the only party subject to suit.

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim seeking prospective injunctive relief against a state official.

Office of Protection & Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities v. Armstrong · filed 2003-03-31

Finally, Armstrong argues that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the § 1983 claim. There is an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity where a party seeks only prospective injunctive relief. ... Since Connecticut P & A seeks this very type of relief, the Court finds that such immunity is not in order.