42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not allow individual-capacity monetary damages against officers entitled to qualified immunity.

Green v. Zuelke · filed 2022-04-21

Upon review of the record and the parties’ arguments as well as parsing the actions of each Defendant, see FW video; HH video, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages in their individual capacities as to Green’s Eighth Amendment claims against them.

In a § 1983 claim, the court may consider the alleged constitutional violation as part of its qualified immunity analysis; disputed facts about that violation can prevent summary judgment.

Smith v. The City of Pennsboro · filed 2022-04-22

But because the qualified immunity analysis necessarily involves an examination of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the Court will collapse the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the qualified immunity analysis. ... Accordingly, because there are material facts in dispute concerning whether Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest Smith for any of the three offenses charged, the Court DENIES Officer Davis’s motion for summary judgment on this Fourth Amendment claim, and turns next to consider Officer Davis’s motion regarding Smith’s excessive force claim.

In a § 1983 claim, the qualified immunity analysis includes whether the officer violated a constitutional right.

Owens v. The City Of Pennsboro · filed 2022-04-22

But because the qualified immunity analysis necessarily involves an examination of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the Court will collapse the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the qualified immunity analysis.

In a Section 1983 suit, once an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of negating it.

Smith v. Lee · filed 2022-04-22

While qualified immunity is technically an affirmative defense, once it has been raised, it is the plaintiff’s burden to negate the defense.

A prosecutor acting as the state’s advocate in post-conviction proceedings is absolutely immune from damages under Section 1983; qualified immunity also applies when no clearly established right barred the conduct.

Perez v. Teresinski · filed 2022-04-22

Mr. Teresinski acted as an advocate when he contacted Mr. Brown, and no case suggested it was improper for him to do so at the time. He is therefore entitled to absolute and qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Tarter v. The Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority · filed 2022-04-22

Because any right the MNAA officers may have violated in this case was not “clearly established,” the officers are covered by qualified immunity, which means summary judgment in their favor is appropriate on Mr. Tarter’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against individual officials protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Atayde v. Napa State Hospital · filed 2022-04-25

Because a right is not clearly established unless “existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” the court must grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on qualified immunity grounds here.

An officer sued under Section 1983 may receive qualified immunity when reliance on fellow officers’ information to prepare a warrant application was objectively reasonable.

Pickens v. Hendricks · filed 2022-04-25

Defendant Hendricks argues in the alternative that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it was objectively unreasonable for him to rely on information from his fellow officers in completing the warrant application. The Plaintiff has not attempted to rebut Defendant Hendricks’ qualified immunity argument, and the Court finds it to be persuasive. Accordingly, Defendant Hendricks is likewise entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when she had arguable probable cause to initiate the prosecution, even if she acted with malice.

Cornelio v. Connecticut · filed 2022-04-26

Though we conclude that Jeney had arguable probable cause and therefore qualified immunity for her actions in this case, we note that Cornelio plausibly alleges that the prosecution was motivated by malice.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Penate v. Scampini · filed 2022-04-26

Finally, even if a jury reasonably could find that Detective Sullivan’s actions constituted excessive force, Detective Sullivan is entitled to qualified immunity. It would not have been clear to a reasonable officer at the time of the incident that Detective Sullivan’s actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when a jury could find that they violated a clearly established right by using excessive force.

Taylor v. City of Dunbar · filed 2022-04-27

A jury crediting Mr. Taylor’s testimony could find that Officers Barker and Lester violated his clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force.

An officer with arguable probable cause is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

Steinbergin v. City of New York · filed 2022-04-27

The existence of arguable probable cause is enough to dispose of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims because it entitles the defendants to qualified immunity on these claims.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Rose v. Gibson · filed 2022-04-27

Collins, Hodges, and Ellis are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim, however, because Rose’s constitutional right against malicious prosecution was not clearly established when he was arrested in 2013.

A municipality cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Peterson v. City and County of Denver · filed 2022-04-27

And while the City and County of Denver seek dismissal of the claims against them, they are not protected by qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A state officer is shielded from damages under Section 1983 by qualified immunity unless the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right.

FLEMING v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2022-04-27

This defense provides that a state officer is shielded from a suit for monetary damages under § 1983 unless “the official violated a...constitutional right,” and “the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” ... Thus, Jones is entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to intervene claim.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer whose conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony · filed 2022-04-28

In sum, plaintiff has failed to identify existing, clearly-established precedent that would have put Budreau on notice that his actions violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows that they violated clearly established law.

Davis v. Dahlkamp · filed 2022-04-28

In such a case, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show that they violated “clearly established law.”

Qualified immunity shields officers from Section 1983 liability unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established federal right.

Novak v. City of Parma, Ohio · filed 2022-04-29

Qualified immunity protects state officers against section 1983 claims unless (1) “they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time” of the offense. ... Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Novak’s retaliation claims.

Prison officials may be denied qualified immunity from a Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim.

Braxton v. Bell · filed 2022-04-29

Defendants do not object to the Magistrate’s findings that Holland and Marion are not entitled to qualified immunity. See generally Defs.’ Obj. The Court reviews this analysis for clear error and finds none.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity from an unlawful-arrest claim when the alleged arrest was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Polnac v. City of Sulphur Springs · filed 2022-04-29

After considering applicable precedent and Polnac’s Second Amended Complaint, the law at the time of Polnac’s arrest clearly established that it was objectively unreasonable for the Officers to arrest Polnac.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an officer when no clearly established law prohibited the officer’s conduct.

Johnson v. Ortiz · filed 2022-05-02

We can therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the ground that Ortiz is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects public employees from individual damages liability under § 1983 unless they violate clearly established law.

DEPINTO v. SHADER · filed 2022-05-02

Second, qualified immunity applies to § 1983 damages claims against public employees and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Carter, III v. Klemm · filed 2022-05-02

Because Carter failed to establish a First Amendment violation, defendant Wireman is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful pretrial detention claim when arguable probable cause supported the arrest.

Alexander v. City of Danville Illinois · filed 2022-05-03

As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention claim.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim against officials who assert qualified immunity may be required to specify each official’s conduct in a Rule 7(a) reply.

Davis v. Fernandez · filed 2022-05-03

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is GRANTED in part, requiring a fact-focused reply detailing the specific acts of defendants Crosby and Blanchard that allegedly caused a constitutional wrong.

Prison officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law warns that persisting in known ineffective medical treatment violates a prisoner’s rights.

Stewart v. Aranas · filed 2022-05-04

Besides, the prison officials knew that they violate the constitution when they persist in a treatment known to be ineffective. ... Therefore, we conclude that the prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity did not warrant dismissing the § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim against a prison clinician.

Zimmerman v. Todd · filed 2022-05-04

Pautz argues in the alternative that qualified immunity warrants dismissal of this cause of action. The Court disagrees.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Rossi v. Dudek · filed 2022-05-05

This appeal turns on qualified immunity. “[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly ... established statutory or constitutional rights.”

Qualified immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief under § 1983.

Striz v. Collier · filed 2022-05-05

Qualified immunity is not a defense to Striz’s claims for injunctive relief.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim against an officer when a jury could find a constitutional violation and the right was clearly established at the time.

Dayna Lee v. Russ · filed 2022-05-06

Qualified immunity protects Russ unless (1) he violated Groom’s constitutional rights and (2) those rights were clearly established at the time. ... On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Russ used excessive force. ... In the second place, this right was clearly established in this context.

An officer cannot obtain qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when disputed material facts determine whether he violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Wenrich v. Franz · filed 2022-05-09

Trooper Franz is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity, and his Motion is denied as to Wenrich’s claim regarding the OVI investigation.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Davis v. Spear · filed 2022-05-10

Officers are “entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs], establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful.” ... The order denying qualified immunity is affirmed, the partial summary judgment is affirmed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in comparable circumstances.

Cosme v. Faucher · filed 2022-05-10

Absent a controlling decision suggesting that prison officials’ actions in a circumstance similar to the one presented here are unconstitutional, the Court cannot find that the right Plaintiff claims was violated was clearly established. Thus, Defendants are protected by qualified immunity on this claim.

An individual sued under § 1983 may assert qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a clearly established right.

Fields v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2022-05-10

“Individual defendants named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified immunity.” ... Accordingly, Officer Snyder is entitled to qualified immunity as to any federal claim asserted against him in his individual capacity.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the inmate’s evidence supports a violation of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right.

Ross v. Carver · filed 2022-05-10

The Court finds that it was clearly established at the time of the complained-of events that an inmate had an Eighth Amendment right to be protected against the type of force supported by Ross’s evidence. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity in these summary judgment proceedings.

A Section 1983 medical indifference claim can withstand qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the allegations show that prison officials ignored a potentially life-threatening condition in violation of a clearly established right.

Marra v. Quiros · filed 2022-05-11

At this stage, I conclude that Marra has alleged sufficient facts, when taken as true and when all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor, to withstand a defense of qualified immunity as to his colonoscopy claim and therefore, I deny the motion to dismiss as to that claim.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated clearly established law.

Mead v. Burkhart · filed 2022-05-11

Mead has not persuaded the Court that Burkart’s search of his backpack violated clearly established law. Accordingly, Burkart is entitled to qualified immunity on Mead’s Section 1983 claim against him.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages claims when the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established right.

Doe v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska · filed 2022-05-11

Because the plaintiffs have failed to allege any violations of a clearly established equal-protection right that goes beyond labels and conclusions, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and any such claims are dismissed.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not give fair warning that the officer’s specific conduct violated a clearly established right.

Burnett v. Josh Griffith · filed 2022-05-12

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the state of the law at the time that Sergeant Griffith acted did not provide him with fair warning that his actions would violate Burnett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established right.

Paez v. Nutsch · filed 2022-05-12

Any reasonable officer in Nutsch’s position would have known that he could not conduct a roadside strip search without a warrant unless some exception applied, and he does not claim an exception. Consequently, Nutsch’s defense of qualified immunity fails with respect to Paez’s claims involving the strip search.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when his use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

McFarland v. Lee County Adult Detention Center · filed 2022-05-13

As such, he is shielded by qualified immunity, and the court will dismiss the instant case for that reason.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity Section 1983 claim when no constitutional violation occurred.

Griffin v. Mortier · filed 2022-05-13

Because a reasonable juror could not find that Defendant Mortier violated a constitutional right in the first place, Defendant Mortier is also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when, on the plaintiff’s account, they punched and kicked a suspect after he surrendered.

Ramos v. Hy · filed 2022-05-16

And, accepting Plaintiff’s narrative for purposes of this motion, Defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity under those circumstances.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 medical care claim when material facts about the officers’ response are disputed and the detainee’s right to medical care was clearly established.

Tucker v. Brooks · filed 2022-05-16

A pretrial detainee’s right to receive medical care is clearly established. ... This two- day delay of medical treatment under these circumstances is a sufficient showing that there is a material factual issue related to whether the Defendants acted objectively reasonably.

An officer sued under Section 1983 for excessive force is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about whether the officer’s conduct violated clearly established law.

Chambers v. City of Jackson, Mississippi · filed 2022-05-18

Chambers offers summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a genuine fact issue as to whether Short’s conduct in pulling Chambers from his car and slamming him on the ground was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The motion for summary judgment as to Officer Kenneth Short is denied.

An officer sued under Section 1983 meets the initial threshold for qualified immunity by proving that the challenged conduct fell within his discretionary authority.

Saint-Vil v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2022-05-19

Accordingly, putting the alleged constitutional infirmity aside, as it must, the Court finds that Officer Rodriguez was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he interacted with Mr. Saint-Vil.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when the plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a lack of arguable probable cause.

Hernandez v. Wells · filed 2022-05-20

Hernandez fails to allege that Riley lacked arguable probable cause to believe that Hernandez was driving with a suspended license, entitling Riley to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct does not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

CLEMONS v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO · filed 2022-05-19

Accordingly, Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to each of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment search claims, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when prior precedent clearly established that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Andrews v. City of Henderson · filed 2022-05-23

We hold that Blankenhorn clearly established—and thus “put a prudent officer on notice”—that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a “relatively calm,” non-resisting suspect who posed little threat of safety without any prior warning and without attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an official who violates a clearly established right to medical privacy by disclosing confidential information without consent or a public interest.

Grimes v. County Of Cook · filed 2022-05-24

It follows that Judkins is not entitled to qualified immunity on Grimes’s § 1983 claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the officer did not violate clearly established law.

Torres v. Sheriff Rod Howell · filed 2022-05-25

Even supposing the district court was incorrect in finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the record establishes that Deputy Luke did not violate any clearly established law, and therefore is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim at the pleading stage when the complaint plausibly alleges that the arrest ordinance was grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional, leaving no arguable probable cause.

Garin v. Menegazzo · filed 2022-05-25

Defendant’s second argument that there was arguable probable cause and that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity similarly fails. As noted above, by challenging the facial constitutionality of the Noise Ordinances, Plaintiff effectively alleges that there was no arguable probable cause that Plaintiff violated any presumptively valid law.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when existing precedent did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances.

Amaral v. City of San Diego · filed 2022-05-26

The district court correctly granted Williams qualified immunity because “existing precedent” did not “place the lawfulness of the particular [action] beyond debate.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

McMichael v. Diroff · filed 2022-05-26

Since the video shows that McMichael struggled with defendants as they attempted to arrest him, the troopers are entitled to qualified immunity against the excessive force claims.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 excessive-force claim cannot be resolved at summary judgment while relevant factual disputes remain.

TINCH v. LOWER CHICHESTER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2022-05-26

The Court finds that it cannot properly rule on Defendants’ qualified immunity defense until the relevant factual disputes are resolved.

Section 1983 supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity from a failure-to-intervene claim when their alleged liability is not clearly established.

Beaty v. Dunn · filed 2022-05-27

Therefore, unlike the failure to protect claim discussed above, the Court finds that even if there is a violation of law, that violation is not clearly established, and the qualified immunity defense renders repleading futile with respect to the failure to intervene claim as against Culliver, Dunn, McConnell, Lovelace, Naglich, Drake, Jones, and Harris.

A § 1983 claim against a prison officer can survive a qualified-immunity motion for summary judgment when the evidence raises a material factual question about a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Frazier v. Dollar · filed 2022-05-31

While the violation of TDOC policy does not itself prove a constitutional violation, the Court finds that the TDOC’s findings in Morley’s termination letter are sufficient to create a material question of fact as to whether his responses to Plaintiff’s conduct violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights to be free from excessive force and exposure to severe weather.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer whose objectively reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Jones v. City of New York · filed 2022-06-01

Furthermore, the defendants established that Detective Grayson's actions were privileged under the doctrine of qualified immunity, as they were objectively reasonable ( see Boyd v City of New York , 149 AD3d 683, 686; Davila v City of New York , 139 AD3d 890, 893), and his conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known ( see Davila v City of New York , 139 AD3d at 893).

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when no clearly established law prohibits the officer’s use of a leg sweep on a fleeing person.

Larkin v. Derek Kenison, Jr. · filed 2022-06-01

The district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Officer Kenison. At the time, there was no clearly established right for a person fleeing police to be free from a leg sweep.

Section 1983 claims against an officer are barred by qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established.

Cutler v. Nanos · filed 2022-06-01

Because Cutler has not met his burden of establishing that David’s rights were clearly established, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in Deputy Barnes’s favor based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from Section 1983 claims when existing precedent did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful under the circumstances.

Burghardt v. Ryan · filed 2022-06-01

Thus, at the time of this shooting, no case from this court or the Supreme Court made clear that, under these circumstances, the officers could not open fire. Qualified immunity therefore protects Ryan and London as to the federal claims.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when material factual disputes could establish that they violated clearly established rights.

Sims v. Griffin · filed 2022-06-01

More importantly, these facts capture in a nutshell why the officers aren’t entitled to qualified immunity at this point.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity, but dismissal on that ground requires the defense to be established from the complaint at the pleading stage.

D'Onofrio v. Westport/Weston Health District · filed 2022-06-02

But not every violation of the Constitution justifies an award of money damages under § 1983. That is because the doctrine of qualified immunity protects a government official from liability if “(1) his conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act.” ... At this initial pleading stage, Cooper has yet to establish grounds for qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law would put a reasonable officer on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Salter v. Detroit, City of · filed 2022-06-02

As a result, the court finds that a reasonable officer in 2003 would be ... on notice that the use of a single-photo identification along with the remarkable discrepancy between the witness’s description of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s actual characteristics would be unconstitutional and thus, Olsen is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

An official acting within discretionary authority may invoke qualified immunity against an individual capacity Section 1983 claim.

Purvis v. Escambia County Sheriff's Office · filed 2022-06-03

The evidence supports that they were, in fact, acting within the course and scope of their discretionary authority.

An officer’s argument that a plaintiff failed to prove a due process violation addresses the merits of a Section 1983 claim rather than qualified immunity.

Plemmons v. Rokey · filed 2022-06-03

The Rock Falls Defendants also argued that Officer Rokey is qualifiedly immune from suit. Dkt. 96, at 7. The argument rests entirely on the contention that Plemmons has failed to prove his due process claim. But that is not a qualified immunity argument. It is a merits argument, and one on which the Rock Falls Defendants have not met their burden.

Section 1983 permits a federal plaintiff with an otherwise valid § 1983 claim to proceed without exhausting state administrative remedies, and an action under § 1983 falls within the anti-injunction statute’s exception for injunctions expressly authorized by Congress.

Gibson v. Berryhill · filed 1973-05-07

Last Term, after the District Court's decision here, this Court determined that actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U. S. C. § 1983, were within the “expressly authorized” exception to the ban on federal injunctions. ... But this Court has expressly held in recent years that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides an independent federal claim for constitutional deprivations that does not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Davy v. Sullivan · filed 1973-02-16

An action brought under section 1983 to remedy the deprivation of a constitutional right is an independent federal claim, not premised on exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing the federal action.

Castor v. Mitchell · filed 1973-02-23

Exhaustion of the plaintiff and of state remedies is not required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a civil-rights suit.

Snead v. Department of Social Services, City of New York · filed 1973-03-12

In a series of decisions over the last decade, however, the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in cases brought under the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 actions generally do not require exhaustion of state remedies, although a federal court may postpone hearing the claims pending a related state administrative hearing.

Mondell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 1973-03-20

Postponing the hearing of plaintiff’s claims for reinstatement, back pay and damages, even if such postponement was not with the specific agreement of the plaintiff and without objection by the defendant, is not contrary to the general rule that Section 1983 actions in federal court do not require exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 permits direct resort to federal court without exhausting administrative remedies, but a plaintiff who never requested an available administrative hearing is not in proper posture to obtain damages for its denial.

Bowles v. Robbins · filed 1973-04-13

It is, of course, recognized that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 196.9); Carpenter v. Harrison, Civ. No. 5919, D.C.Vt. (June 2, 1970). But having failed to request a hearing and electing to forego that procedure in favor of proceeding directly to this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he is not in proper posture to claim a monetary award based on the denial of an administrative hearing.

Section 1983 permits a civil-rights action to proceed without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies or consideration of abstention.

Owens v. Parham · filed 1972-09-29

Since this action is brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court need not consider questions of abstention or exhaustion of administrative remedies, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 at n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967).

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust state remedies before asserting a claim in federal court.

Matzner v. Brown · filed 1968-05-08

It is recognized that the right to assert a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act in a federal court is not dependent upon exhaustion of state remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing suit.

Kelly v. Wyman · filed 1968-05-17

While this procedure would only have been available to four of the plaintiffs, in my view exhaustion of a remedy of this sort is not required in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies when their constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require a three-judge court.

King v. Smith · filed 1968-06-17

Decisions of this Court, however, establish that a plaintiff in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state administrative remedies before the federal court exercises jurisdiction over the action.

Soglin v. Kauffman · filed 1968-12-13

Defendants have contended that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies made available to them by the state. Such exhaustion is not required as a condition to the exercise of jurisdiction in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a federal action for deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right without exhausting state administrative remedies, although exhaustion is required for claims involving state-law issues or the application of institutional rules.

Griffin v. DeFelice · filed 1971-01-29

Recently, the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have determined that no exhaustion of remedies is necessary when a party seeks redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of a fundamental right. ... By this test the rights sought to be enforced here — whether arising under the due process clause or the equal protection clause — are fundamental. ... With respect therefore to the claims that the penalties meted out by the principal exceeded those fixed by the school board, and that the notices sent the parents of the students who were to be disciplined were inadequate, the plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative appeal before invoking the powers of the federal court. ... However, the plaintiffs need not assert before a state administrative agency their right to be treated equally.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state remedies before bringing the claim in federal court.

Wheeler v. Adams Company · filed 1971-01-25

However, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust state remedies before proceeding in a federal forum under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a state prisoner to bring a federal civil-rights action for an alleged constitutional deprivation without first exhausting state judicial remedies.

Rodriguez v. McGinnis · filed 1969-12-23

The Civil Rights statutes, when relied upon for federal jurisdiction, do not require the exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a federal civil-rights action, although the court may direct the plaintiff to pursue available state remedies when doing so would eliminate the alleged constitutional problems.

Elmwood Properties, Inc. v. Murray Conzelman, the John Allan Company v. Murray Conzelman · filed 1969-11-26

It appears that the due process violations which the plaintiffs allege would be sufficiently overcome by a utilization of the available state remedies. Under Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945), an exhaustion of state remedies is not required; nevertheless, when, as here, an exhaustion of remedies will eliminate any possible constitutional problems, then that route should be followed.

Section 1983 provides a supplementary federal remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, but a plaintiff challenging action by a state criminal court must first exhaust available state post-conviction remedies before seeking federal relief.

Glen Grayson, by His Next of Friend John Grayson v. Montgomery · filed 1970-02-12

After misdemeanor convictions in a Massachusetts state court, plaintiff Grayson sought equitable relief in federal district court under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... We conclude, therefore, that those who wish to challenge the action of a state criminal court must first exhaust available state post-conviction remedies before seeking federal relief whether in the form of a petition for habeas corpus or a suit for an injunction.

Section 1983 provides a federal statutory remedy for deprivation of a personal-liberty right without requiring the plaintiff to exhaust state remedies when the right is not dependent on a property-right infringement.

Crossen v. Fatsi · filed 1970-02-16

It is a recognized precept that whenever the right or immunity invaded affects personal liberty and is not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights, a federal statutory remedy under § 1983 is available, without the plaintiff first being required to exhaust state remedies.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner who seeks relief for cruel or unusual punishment, rather than release from custody through habeas corpus, to obtain relief without first applying to or exhausting state-court remedies.

Krist v. Smith · filed 1970-02-25

Where a prisoner does not seek release from custody on petition for habeas corpus but complains of cruel or unusual punishment he may obtain relief in a proper case under the Civil Rights Act without prior application to or without exhaustion of remedies in the state courts.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit, although prior resort to local institutional procedures may be required to make the claim ripe for adjudication.

Callaway v. Kirkland · filed 1970-12-29

Though plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative state remedies before maintaining an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has required what might be termed “institutional exhaustion.” Where school personnel and management *1137problems are involved, the party seeking relief in federal court must make “such prior reference to local institutional authority as may be necessary to assure that the action complained of is final within the institution in the sense that it is ripe for adjudication.” Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County, Georgia, 426 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1970).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a federal civil-rights action over an administrative deprivation without first exhausting state judicial or administrative remedies, so long as the complaint alleges state action and deprivation of a constitutional right.

Edwards v. Schmidt · filed 1971-01-05

I conclude that exhaustion of state administrative procedures is not required in prisoner suits under § 1983. ... The instant case fits squarely into the extraordinary prisoner suit category. The plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of their adjudication as delinquents by the state courts. Their only challenge is to their transfer to adult penal institutions, which transfer was effected administratively by the State Department of Health and Social Services subsequent to the state court adjudication of delinquency. I conclude that exhaustion of state remedies is unnecessary and that plaintiffs may maintain this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided they state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 plaintiffs ordinarily must exhaust available administrative remedies, but defendants cannot invoke non-exhaustion when they have short-circuited the plaintiff’s statutory procedural rights.

Beattie v. Roberts · filed 1971-01-06

Initially, we are confronted with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: can plaintiff bring this action, having refused to participate in the January 21 hearing? This court has recently indicated that plaintiffs who bring § 1983 actions must normally exhaust available administrative remedies. Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, n. 2 (1st Cir. 1970); Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182, n. 10 (1st Cir. 1970). We require exhaustion, in part, because we hesitate to hold members of school committees liable for tentative dismissal decisions when they are denied the opportunity to view the issue in the light of the facts and argument which the affected teachers might introduce in a formal hearing. Plaintiff argues, however, that the procedure followed by the Committee in considering his case was not the procedure required by state statute. Having recently held that § 1983 defendants who short circuit a plaintiff’s statutory procedural rights cannot assert the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Dunham v. Crosby, supra, we must consider plaintiff’s statutory argument. ... In fact, the Committee may have afforded plaintiff more procedural protection than he was entitled to under the statute. For example, a stenographic record of the January 21 hearing was kept. Under these circumstances, we see no justification for plaintiff’s refusal to follow the proceedings through to the end. ... Furthermore, plaintiff’s dual failures to exhaust his administrative remedies and to present the issue to the district court have foreclosed any analysis of the workings of the present Maine procedures, an exploration we would deem essential to any sensible balancing of the interests of tenured teachers and school committees.

Section 1983 cannot be used by a state prisoner to circumvent the exhaustion requirement applicable to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Denney v. State of Kansas, Its Agent, Sheriff Dayton Evans, Cherokee County, Columbus, Kansas · filed 1971-01-14

Regardless, the Civil Rights statute cannot be used by a state prisoner to circumvent the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing an action.

Payne v. Whitmore · filed 1971-04-07

Exhaustion of state remedies is not a pre-requisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state and administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Kronlund v. Honstein · filed 1971-05-13

Although in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust his state and administrative remedies before coming into federal court, [See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, (1961) and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968)] this Court takes note of the fact that the plaintiff did not seek to avail herself of either of these remedies, but rather chose to come directly into the federal court to question the constitutionality of the statute.

Section 1983 provides a federal forum without requiring a plaintiff to pursue or exhaust available state judicial or administrative remedies first.

Burnett v. Herman Short, Joe H. Dickerson, and J. E. Wiggins · filed 1971-05-20

In dismissing the Section 1983 claim for “failure to exhaust state judicial remedies” the district court committed error for the law on this question is now settled beyond dispute. ... Thus, whatever vitality the exhaustion doctrine possessed prior to the decisions cited above, it is now clear that plaintiff is entitled to a federal forum in a Section 1983 suit without regard to whether state remedies were pursued.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before invoking the federal remedy.

Bally Manufacturing Corp. v. Casino Control Commission · filed 1982-03-09

Second, in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust state judicial remedies.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available state or territorial administrative remedies before commencing an action.

Moorhead v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1982-03-12

However, it has long been established in the federal courts that exhaustion of state (or territorial) administrative remedies is not required prior to the commencement of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before maintaining an action.

Barry v. Blue Springs R-IV School District · filed 1983-02-02

This Court has no “predisposition to favor such a proposition,” and has never required a plaintiff in a case brought under Section 1983 to exhaust state remedies as a prerequisite to maintaining such an action. Indeed such a requirement is generally not necessary in Section 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff alleging a deprivation of substantive constitutional rights to exhaust a state or territorial tort remedy before bringing a federal action.

Moorhead v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 1983-02-08

Given that legislative purpose, the availability of state law remedies is simply immaterial to the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction in an action based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Miguel A. Rivera Rios · filed 1983-03-02

Most important, there is no requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative or judicial remedies before bringing a claim.

King ex rel. Jacob v. Secretary · filed 2002-09-16

As a result, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative and judicial requirements before pursuing a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court.

Johnson v. Collins, et al. · filed 2002-12-04

Although the Johnsons have appealed the School Board’s decision with respect to the June 4th expulsion to the State Board of Education, they need not exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford Township School District · filed 2002-12-10

Because exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we find that CEF’s federal constitutional and statutory claims are ripe for review.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit.

Graffam v. Town of Harpswell · filed 2003-03-26

However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a requirement for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits employees to bring constitutional claims arising from JTPA employment without first exhausting JTPA administrative procedures.

Torres v. Maldonado · filed 2003-03-31

In light of the foregoing, the Court does not find in the statute’s language, the legislative history, or the cases decided under the JTPA and CETA, a unequivocally manifested congressional intent to bar plaintiffs from bringing a § 1983 claim to remedy civil rights violations under the Federal constitution, without first exhausting the statute’s apparent administrative procedures.

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment claim without first exhausting WIA administrative remedies when the WIA does not foreclose that remedy.

Seda v. Rivera · filed 2003-05-09

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that according to the WIA’s language, the legislative history, and the cases decided under the JTPA and CETA, the plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies with regards to their First Amendment § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 action to enforce a federal constitutional claim does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies.

Hornstine v. Township of Moorestown · filed 2003-05-30

There are no state exhaustion requirements for actions brought under the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce a federal constitutional claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.

D.L. v. Unified School District 497 · filed 2003-09-18

At the outset, the court notes that it is “beyond dispute that a plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court under § 1983.” ... The court already found that plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies.

A Section 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust D.C. employee grievance remedies when that process cannot provide a full and fair opportunity to pursue the federal claim.

Crockett v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department · filed 2003-09-23

Although typically an employee grievance must be filed through the OEA pursuant to the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), here the administrative remedy would not have provided him the full relief he seeks in his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, since the administrative forum provided by the OEA could not have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claims, Crockett was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this federal action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but an administrative decision must be final before a court can review a claim based on it.

The Town of Marana v. Aegis of Arizona, LLC. · filed 2003-11-20

Thus, although exhaustion of available administrative remedies is not required in order to bring claims under § 1983, a decision must be final in order for it to be reviewable by a court in the context of a claim brought pursuant to that statute.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs seeking school desegregation to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Brown v. School District No. 20, Charleston, South Carolina · filed 1963-08-22

In addition to the decisions of the Fourth Circuit, holding that Negro children need not comply with administrative procedures prior to instituting suit in the federal courts when the school system is operated on a racially segregated basis, the United States Supreme Court in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622, has put beyond debate the proposition that, in a school desegregation case, it is not necessary to exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking relief in the federal courts.

A plaintiff with a valid § 1983 claim need not exhaust state administrative remedies before suing in federal court.

Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services · filed 1976-03-05

While clearly the plaintiff herein has not exhausted the administrative remedies which are available under Ohio law, in Gibson, the Supreme Court stated specifically that administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states a good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies therefore does not require a dismissal of his claims.

Section 1983 claims to remedy constitutional violations generally do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit.

Jemal's Fairfield Farms, LLC v. Prince George's County · filed 2004-03-26

Assuming that Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit, such action would not prove fatal to its claims. Generally, state law requirements that administrative remedies first be exhausted are inapplicable to § 1983 actions to remedy constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but invoking it does not prevent federal abstention when a state suit begins before proceedings on the federal claim's merits.

Scruggs v. Campbell · filed 1980-09-26

Moreover, the Scruggs' citation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, did not entitle them to prevail in their race to the courthouse. Although no state suit was pending when the Scruggs filed their federal action, federal abstention became appropriate when the board sought review in the state court. After the state suit was brought to the attention of the district court, it properly abstained because no proceedings on the merits of the claim had been conducted in the federal court.

Section 1983 claimants need not exhaust state administrative remedies that are ineffective for the class relief they seek.

Jose P. v. Ambach · filed 1982-01-21

Nor should the plaintiffs have been relegated to state procedures the inefficacy of which in part prompted their section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before suit, even when those remedies could prevent a future deprivation.

Heath v. Cleary · filed 1983-06-17

In light of Patsy, the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Heath had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies for a procedural due process claim.

Corcoran v. Olson · filed 2004-04-30

This is not to say that a procedural due process claim under § 1983 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. ... To the extent that the district court’s holding was based on an exhaustion requirement, it was in error.

Section 1983 claims brought in state court do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies.

Fetterman v. University of Connecticut · filed 1984-04-03

Although we find that exhaustion was not required in this case on the § 1983 claims, we agree with the defendants that alternative grounds sustain the dismissal as to certain of the plaintiffs claims.

Section 1983 permits a suit to enforce substantive rights conferred by a federal statute without first exhausting administrative remedies.

Pushkin v. Regents Of The University Of Colorado · filed 1981-09-04

Thus, under any reading of Thiboutot, plaintiff's cause of action is properly based on § 1983 and no requirement exists that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to court action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing an action in state court.

Maryland National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Crawford · filed 1984-06-06

We agree with the reasoning of these cases and, therefore, hold that Crawford was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Commission prior to instituting her § 1983 action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

A plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 suit.

Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District v. Arthur R. Pontarelli, Commissioner of Education for Rhode Island · filed 1986-04-04

Defendant’s ripeness argument fails because the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required before a § 1983 suit may be filed.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Association For Retarded Citizens Of Alabama, Inc. v. Teague · filed 1987-10-19

Since this claim is brought under Sec. 1983, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust state arbitration procedures before bringing a constitutional claim in court.

Hohe v. Casey · filed 1992-02-10

Thus, the first sentence in subsection (g) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ("exhaustion of state remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983"); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 148, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2312, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (civil rights actions "are judicially enforceable in the first instance " in the courts) (quotation omitted). We hold, therefore, that the first sentence in § 575(g) is constitutionally unenforceable.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing.

Horne v. Clemens · filed 1985-04-08

The court also rejected the argument that Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, requires a judicially imposed exhaustion-of-administrative-remedy requirement. Id. at 512-515. Thus, the assignments of error are without merit.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to seek an available state administrative hearing before bringing a claim.

Houghton Ex Rel. Houghton v. Reinertson · filed 2004-08-24

Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing suit.

Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster · filed 2004-09-24

The court also rejects the defendants’ second procedural argument because the exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Elliott v. Dedelow · filed 2004-10-19

While it is true that a plaintiff suing under Title VII or the ADA must first have exhausted his administrative remedies, § 2000e-5; § 12117(a), there is no exhaustion requirement applicable to § 1983, see Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 551 n. 13 (7th Cir.2002).

Section 1983 does not require administrative exhaustion, including for federal takings claims.

Dlx, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · filed 2004-10-28

This sparse precedent is unavailing in the face of clear Supreme Court precedent that exhaustion is never required in a § 1983 case (except pursuant to Congressional reform) and that there is no exception for takings claims.

State courts may require taxpayers to use available tax review procedures before maintaining a section 1983 damages action challenging a property reassessment.

Raschke v. Blancher · filed 1986-03-06

If section 1983 actions based on alleged unconstitutional reassessments such as those in the instant case may not be maintained in Federal courts, there is even more reason for requiring and applying our own principles of administrative and judicial review which have been held to be a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” Rosewell v. La Salle National Bank (1981), 450 U.S. 503, 512, 67 L. Ed. 2d 464, 473, 101 S. Ct. 1221, 1228.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, but that rule does not prevent Younger abstention when the state proceedings are coercive.

Moore v. City of Asheville NC · filed 2005-01-25

Generally, claimants bringing suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust their administrative remedies. ... The administrative proceedings against Moore were unquestionably coercive, as were those in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and the Patsy principle is therefore inapplicable.

Section 1983 generally does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but Younger abstention applies when a plaintiff bypasses review of a coercive state administrative proceeding.

Moore v. City Of Asheville · filed 2005-01-25

Generally, claimants bringing suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust their administrative remedies See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). In Ohio Civil Rights Commission, however, the Court distinguished remedial state administrative proceedings, which it had addressed in Patsy, from those that are coercive, concluding that Younger requires federal courts to abstain in favor of pending state administrative proceedings that are coercive in nature. 477 U.S. at 627 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2718. The administrative proceedings against Moore were unquestionably coercive, as were those in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and the Patsy principle is therefore inapplicable.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to obtain relief or exhaust administrative remedies before suing.

Murray Ex Rel. Murray v. Mills · filed 2005-02-01

In this case, the Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim did not require the Plaintiffs to obtain relief or exhaust their remedies through administrative proceedings.

Section 1983 claims alleging a state’s deprivation of federal rights do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies.

Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. v. Director of Revenue of Illinois Department of Revenue · filed 1986-10-22

Apollo’s administrative action was based on allegations that the state deprived Apollo of rights secured by federal laws. Thus, the action could have been characterized as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Since the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted in such actions, see, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1222, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963), Apollo could have brought its claims in federal court in the first instance and thus avoided the preclusive effect of res judicata that it must now face on account of the prior administrative adjudication of the tax refund claim in the state proceedings.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit unless a statute provides otherwise.

Arc of Washington State Inc. v. Braddock · filed 2005-03-29

In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim.

Konikov v. Orange County, FL · filed 2005-06-03

As for the distinct question of whether a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim, Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents has already answered in the negative.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust an available school board appeal before suing.

McGreevy v. Stroup · filed 2005-06-28

There is no exhaustion requirement under § 1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs challenging a military promotion or retention decision must exhaust available military remedies before seeking judicial review.

Furman v. Edwards · filed 1987-04-16

A plaintiff seeking review of a military promotion or retention decision must exhaust his or her military remedies before coming to the court.

Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing suit, and abstention cannot be used to impose that requirement.

Lemon v. Tucker · filed 1987-05-08

The Court in a footnote issued a reminder that abstention should not be used to force a plaintiff in effect to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing a section 1983 suit since such exhaustion is not required under Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 [102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172] (1982).

State exhaustion requirements do not apply to § 1983 actions.

Bloom v. Muckenthaler · filed 2005-08-12

State exhaustion requirements, however, do not apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 does not require a service member to exhaust intraservice remedies before bringing a claim.

Culbreth v. Ingram · filed 2005-09-29

Finding no indication that Congress intended an exhaustion requirement to exist in § 1983 cases in the military context, this court will not impose such a requirement in this case.

Section 1983 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before a procedural due process claim may be brought.

Good Hope Hospital, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2005-11-01

Thus, procedural due process claims may not be brought under § 1983 until administrative remedies have been exhausted.

A plaintiff generally need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim in federal district court.

S.K. Ex Rel. L.K. v. Anoka-Hennepin Independent School District No. 11 · filed 2005-11-10

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ assertion. “Generally, a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a section 1983 claim in federal district court.”

Section 1983 does not require state employees to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a federal action alleging violations of their rights.

Borges-Colon v. Roman-Abreu · filed 2006-02-06

This is clearly incorrect: state employees asserting claims such as these are not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action in federal court.

Section 1983 does not require a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, though the claimant may choose to do so.

Gibson v. Ada County · filed 2006-02-09

However, exhaustion of administrative remedies not being a prerequisite to filing a § 1983 claim is different than a holding that Gibson must file her § 1983 claim and forgo exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Section 1983 plaintiffs bringing Medicaid claims need not exhaust state administrative remedies when the Medicaid Act does not require exhaustion.

Roach v. Morse · filed 2006-03-03

Because the language of the Medicaid Act does not explicitly or implicitly require exhaustion of state remedies before a litigant sues under § 1983, we find no error in the district court's refusal to require plaintiffs to exhaust Vermont's fair hearing process.

Section 1983 claimants need not exhaust a union's agency fee arbitration procedure before bringing constitutional claims in court.

Tierney v. City of Toledo · filed 1990-10-25

We agree with Judge Dowd in Lowary that the exhaustion clause in this case, which largely mirrors the exhaustion clause considered in Lowary, unduly implies a limitation upon the officers' constitutional rights. Accordingly, the clause must be deleted from the plan as it currently is written.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit.

Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township · filed 1993-03-16

We agree that exhaustion of remedies in not a prerequisite to claims under § 1983; however--as the Supreme Court held in Williamson--"[t]he question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct ... from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable." 473 U.S. at 192, 105 S.Ct. at 3119.

Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing.

Katie A. v. Bonta · filed 2006-03-14

Defendants’ argument that the Medicaid appeals process undermines the showing of irreparable injury is also unpersuasive. “[Ejxhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before suing in federal court for a constitutional violation.

Duffy v. City of Stanton, Kentucky · filed 2006-03-24

The City’s argument that Plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before suing in federal court for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is not a correct statement of the law.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but that rule does not extend to an inverse-condemnation claim that does not allege a Section 1983 violation.

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, No. 529192 (Dec. 9, 1996) · filed 1996-12-09

It has been held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing a claim under the statute and, thus, such a claim will not be dismissed on that ground. ... In the present case, the plaintiff has not alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Therefore, the portion of the CT Page 6497 Port Clinton court's reasoning cited by the plaintiff to support its assertion that a party pursuing a takings claim is not required to exhaust its administrative remedies does not apply to the plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim.

Section 1983 permits plaintiffs to bring Medicaid fair-hearing and due process claims without exhausting state administrative remedies when agency review cannot adequately address the alleged defects.

Monez v. Reinertson · filed 2006-04-20

Thus, we conclude plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing either their § 1396a(a)(3) claim or their due process claim under § 1983.

A prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar.

Cole v. Isherwood · filed 2002-12-06

We find this federal authority persuasive and therefore conclude that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement of an action pursuant to § 1983. Rather, a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense which may be raised in a § 1983 action.