29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and says it is not a demanding standard.

Doe v. Horne · filed 2024-06-21(j)(1)(i)

The applicable regulations instruct: “[t]he term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(i). Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they have a disability that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

The regulation broadly construes “substantially limits” and requires comparison of a plaintiff’s limitation in working with most people in the general population.

Love v. Permanente · filed 2024-05-07(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii)

Following the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Still, a plaintiff must plead the elements of the definition. See, e.g., Shields, 32 F.4th at 1225–27. Here, Ms. Love has not pleaded that she is substantially limited in any major life activity. Her statement that she was too sick to work on two days does not allege that she was substantially limited in her ability to work as compared to most people in the general population. Dkt. No. 33 at 9; see, e.g., Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that, under post-ADAAA law, ADA plaintiffs must show that they were substantially limited in their ability to work compared to “most people in the general population.” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii))). Ms. Love does not allege facts to show that she is a person with a disability, and she has thus failed to state a claim for disability discrimination.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Oduro-Amoako v. Delta Air Lines,Inc. · filed 2024-06-26(j)(1)(i)

The term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.”

The regulation makes “substantially limits” a non-demanding standard: an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to qualify as substantially limiting.

Edwards v. Dart · filed 2022-08-17(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii)

But this court concludes that the previous requirement for “severe” and “long-term” or “prolonged” sleeping difficulties cannot survive those amendments. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (an impairment need not “significantly or severely restrict” the major life activity); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (an episodic impairment may qualify as a disability).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly for expansive coverage and not as a demanding standard.

Stinnett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2017-09-30(j)(1)(i)

Under those regulations, “[t]he term substantially limits shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA and is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1) treats “substantially limits” as a low, non-demanding standard and requires a lower degree of functional limitation than the pre-ADAAA standard.

Wilson v. Dollar General Corp. · filed 2015-08-07(j)(1)(i), (j)(1)(iv)

The same is true of Plaifitiff here. The phrase “ ‘[substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... In the post-ADAAA world, "the term 'substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the AD AAA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014).

Section 1630.2(j)(l) requires an individualized assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, measured against most people in the general population and under a lower threshold than before the ADAAA, with broad construction favoring expansive coverage.

Wirey v. Richland Community College · filed 2012-12-21(j)(l)(i), (j)(l)(iv), (j)(l)(ii)

Third and last, the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iv). An impairment is a disability within the meaning of the ADA “if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii), “[I]n making this assessment, the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for “substantially limits” applied prior to the ADAAA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iv).

Section 1630.2(j) defines when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, including that inability to perform one particular job is not enough and that limitations in working are assessed across classes or ranges of jobs.

Richards v. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2000-02-25(j)(1), (j)(2), (j)(3)(i), (j)(3)(ii)(B), (j)(3)(ii)(C)

The ADA regulations define the term “substantially limits” as meaning “(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and § 1630.2(j)(2) identifies the factors used to determine substantial limitation.

Popko v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 2000-02-22(j)(1), (j)(2)

The term "substantially limits” means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). ... The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; and (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

For the major life activity of working, § 1630.2(j)(1) treats a person as substantially limited when an impairment prevents work in a broad class of jobs, not merely a particular job or narrow range of jobs.

Frazier v. Simmons · filed 2000-03-30(j)(1)

Although the ADA does not define the term “substantially limits,” the regulations implementing the ADA define the term as follows: ... (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; ... (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l). ... Although the plaintiffs Multiple Sclerosis is an impairment, that medical condition does not preclude him from performing a broad class of jobs. Instead, Frazier’s medical condition only precludes him from a very narrow range of jobs which require the safe operation + of firearms and arrest or apprehension of persons, and therefore does not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(ii) defines “substantially limits” by comparing a person's ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person in the general population.

Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean · filed 2001-09-10(j)(ii)

"Substantially limits" means that the person cannot perform a major life function or is "significantly [limited in] the condition, manner or duration under which [the] individual can perform a particular major life activity, as compared to the average person in the general population . . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines “substantially limits” by comparing the person's ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person in the general population.

Munoz v. Western Resources, Inc. · filed 2002-09-26(j)(1)

The term “substantially limits” means that Munoz is “(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which he can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.”

The regulation defines “substantially limits” by comparing the individual’s condition, manner, or duration of performing a life activity with that of the average person.

Farrish v. Carolina Commercial Heat Treating, Inc. · filed 2002-09-19(j)(l)(ii)

Substantially limits means “[sjignficiantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can preform a particular life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the person in the average population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii).

Under the pre-2009 standard, “substantially limits” means an inability or severe restriction in performing a major life activity compared with the average person.

Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2013-02-06(1)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ means inability to perform, or a severe restriction on the ability to perform, as compared to the average person in the general population.”

Section 1630.2(j)(l) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly and measured against how most people in the general population perform the major life activity.

Brown v. Humana Insurance · filed 2013-04-30(j)(l)

The term “substantially limits” is to “be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and applies, where an impairment “substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l).

The regulation makes “substantially limits” a nondemanding standard, and an episodic condition may substantially limit a major life activity even when mitigating measures are used.

Jones v. HCA (Hospital Corporation of America) · filed 2014-04-21(j)(l)

As the regulations make clear, “ ‘substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

The regulation directs that “substantially limits” be read broadly when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Blackwell v. Sectek, Inc. · filed 2014-08-05

And according to EEOC regulations, the term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; ... Thus, because the operation of an individual’s circulatory functions is a “major life activity,” Blackwell has sufficiently pleaded a disability under the ADA.

The substantially-limits requirement is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and is not a demanding standard.

Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Services Inc. · filed 2014-07-31(j)(1)(i)

The EEOC has further explained that the “substantially limits” requirement is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) says that determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is not meant to be a demanding standard.

Martin v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2015-01-23(j)(1)(i)

The amended regulations provide that “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), and shall be construed “to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard” that predated the ADAA, id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv).

The term “substantially limits” is not meant to impose a demanding standard when determining whether an impairment qualifies as a disability.

DeAngelo v. Yellowbook Inc. · filed 2015-04-27(j)(l)(i)

However, “ ‘[substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i).

(j)(1)(ii) says an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict an individual from performing a major life activity to be substantially limiting.

Horsham v. Fresh Direct · filed 2015-09-28(j)(1)(ii)

“[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”

The regulation says that “substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard.

Bresaz v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2015-09-30(j)(1)(i)

First, as the Court has noted, the ADAAA instructs courts to interpret the “substantially limits” requirement broadly, and accompanying regulations specify that “ ‘[substantially limits’, is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

An impairment substantially limits a major life activity when the person is significantly restricted in that activity.

Wilson v. City of Gaithersburg · filed 2015-08-03(j)(1)

An impairment “substantially limits” one of these activities if the plaintiff is “ ‘significantly restricted’” in that activity.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive ADA coverage and sets a non-demanding standard.

Duncan v. DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc · filed 2019-08-12(j)(1)(i)

Moreover, the regulations explain the term “substantially limits” is not an exacting standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard”); ... Accordingly, under the summary judgment standard and in light of the liberal standard governing what constitutes a substantial limitation, Duncan’s asthma constitutes a disability under the ADA.

The regulation treats “substantially limits” as a broad, non-demanding standard, so whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity may remain a fact question without a demanding evidentiary showing.

Hebert v. Ascension Parish School Board · filed 2019-08-21(j)(1)

Considering the post-amendment regulations and definitions applicable in this case, and applying the reasoning and analysis set forth by the Fifth Circuit above in Williams, the Court finds that whether Plaintiff herein is disabled for purposes of the ADA is a genuinely disputed material fact. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that whether Plaintiff is disabled, particularly whether any claimed impairments substantially limited a major life activity, under the ADA is a disputed issue of fact best left for the trier of fact to determine.

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive ADA coverage and says it is not a demanding standard.

Cassidy v. Halyard Health, Inc · filed 2019-08-30(j)(1)(i)

"The term 'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. 'Substantially limits' is not meant to be a demanding standard."

Section 1630.2(j) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly, without requiring an impairment to prevent or severely restrict a major life activity, and focuses the inquiry on functional limitations rather than outcomes.

RAMSAY v. NATIONAL BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS · filed 2019-12-31(j)

Indeed, it was the stated goal of Congress in enacting the ADA Amendments Act to make it easier for individuals with disabilities to obtain protection under the Act and to mandate that the definition of "disability" "be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage." See, 29 C.F.R. §1630.1(c)(4), 1630.2(j), and 28 C.F.R. §36.101(b). The Regulations clearly state that "[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of disability." ... It decidedly did not do so in this case. It further appears that NBME either discounted or disregarded entirely the admonition to focus on "how a major life activity is substantially limited, and not on what outcomes an individual can achieve" and apparently ignored the example that "someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially limited in the major life activity of learning because of the additional time or effort he or she must spend to read, write, or learn compared to most people in the general population." 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(4)(iii). NBME's exclusive focus on Plaintiff's prior academic successes and her performance on the ACT and MCAT standardized examinations without accommodations was therefore improper, particularly given that we can discern that no consideration was given to the other evidence produced by Plaintiff, including her lengthy personal statement13.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

Love v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 2020-01-16(j)(1)(i)

“Following the 2008 amendments to the ADA, the term “substantially limits” is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” ... “Applying this standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged two disabilities. First, Plaintiff alleges that due to her torn rotator cuffs, she is unable to lift heavy items. Lifting is one of the “major life activities” expressly included in the ADA’s definition of that term.”

Not every impairment is a disability; an impairment must still substantially limit a major life activity under the ADAAA’s broad standard.

Saenz v. LRC Restaurant Nashville, LLC · filed 2020-02-14(j)(1)(ii)

However, despite this more lenient standard, “not every impairment will constitute a disability with the meaning [of the ADAAA].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.

RICHARDSON v. CITY OF SCOTTSBURG, INDIANA · filed 2020-03-02(j)(1)(i)

“Following the 2008 amendments to the ADA, the term ‘substantially limits’ is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.”

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive ADA coverage when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Rollins v. Banker Lopez & Gassler, PA · filed 2020-07-30(j)(1)(i)

“[C]ourts are instructed that ‘[t]he term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.’” Vaughan v. World Changers Church Int’l, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-0746-AT, 2014 WL 4978439, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2014)(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). “Under this more lenient standard, courts consider whether an impairment ‘substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)). ... But Rollins does not aver that the vision issues and headaches caused by her aneurysm “substantially limit” these major life activities. Additionally, Rollins does not identify in the declaration how frequently she suffers from vision problems and headaches. ... Thus, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Rollins is disabled under the ADA or the FCRA.

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and says it is not a demanding standard.

Houston v. Kelly Services Inc. · filed 2020-10-01(j)(1)(i)

In determining what qualifies as a disability, the Court should apply a definition “in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (“The term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard.”).

The term “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard and must be construed broadly to favor expansive coverage, as far as the ADA permits.

Leibas v. Dart · filed 2020-10-19(j)(1)(i)

The term "substantially limits" "is not meant to be a demanding standard" and "shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA."

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be interpreted broadly in favor of expansive coverage and not as a demanding standard.

Harrison v. Soave Enter., LLC · filed 2020-09-10(j)(1)(i)

Similar to the term “major life activities,” “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

The term “substantially limits” is a nondemanding standard for determining actual disability.

Meade v. Ingram Micro Inc. · filed 2020-12-14(j)(1)(i)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has cautioned that the term “‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and is not a demanding standard, so a temporary impairment may still substantially limit a major life activity.

Wanner v. Under Armour, Inc. · filed 2020-12-21(j)(1)(i)

Moreover, “‘[t]he term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage’ and ‘is not meant to be a demanding standard.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)).

The regulation says that “substantially limits” is a broad, non-demanding standard for determining whether an impairment limits a major life activity.

Sommers v. City of Santa Clara · filed 2021-02-01(j)(1)(i)

Courts are to “interpret the ‘substantially limits’ requirement broadly, and accompanying regulations specify that ‘[s]ubstantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Bresaz, 136 F. Supp 3d at 1134. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)).

An impairment is substantially limiting when it substantially limits a person's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Scheurer-Henry v. Envoy of Richmond, LLC · filed 2021-12-03(j)(1)(ii)

“For a major life activity to be ‘substantially limit[ed],’ the impairment need only ‘substantially limit[] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’”

The regulation says that “substantially limits” is a broad, nondemanding standard for determining whether an impairment limits a major life activity.

Fayyaz v. UHS of Hartgrove Inc · filed 2022-03-31(j)(1)(i)

The EEOC’s regulations interpreting the ADA instruct that “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). ... A jury can readily find that these neurological symptoms substantially limited Fayyaz’s ability to see, concentrate, think, and work, which are all major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Section 1630.2(j)(4) permits a factfinder to consider how an individual performs a major life activity when evaluating whether an impairment substantially limits it.

Bullock, Leon v. Turner Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-01-27(j)(4)

An impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. To evaluate an asserted substantial limitation, a factfinder may consider the manner in which the individual performs the major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires that “substantially limits” be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and assessed on an individualized basis.

ANDERSON v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC · filed 2022-06-14(j)(1)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); Sowell v. Kelly Servs., 139 F. Supp. 3d 684, 698-99 (E.D. Pa. 2015). ... Here, the record demonstrates that Anderson’s anxiety—which was brought on by working at Lowe’s—substantially limited his abilities to sleep and work.

The term “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard for determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Drerup v. Con Nuclear Security · filed 2022-08-12(j)(1)(i)

“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard. ... There is insufficient evidence to show that Drerup’s respiratory system, immune system, breathing, or ability to work were substantially limited. ... While Drerup cannot perform specific jobs, such as a responder, she is not substantially limited in her ability to work a broad class of jobs, as she remains a Fire Captain.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and not as a demanding standard.

HITCH v. THE FRICK PITTSBURGH · filed 2023-04-21(j)(1)

The term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA[]” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)@). The question of whether a given individual is substantially limited in a major life activity is an individualized assessment and is generally a question of fact.

The regulation construes “substantially limits” broadly in favor of expansive coverage, so an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a person from performing a major life activity.

Balchan v. City School District of New Rochelle · filed 2023-07-21(j)(1)(i)

The Court notes Second Circuit precedent holds that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage . . . and is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Kopchik v. Town of E. Fishkill, New York, No. 18-1182-CV, 2018 WL 6767369, at *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. (quoting § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(i) provides that determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is not meant to be a demanding standard and should not require extensive analysis.

Samuels v. City of New York · filed 2023-09-05(j)(1)(i)

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 and its implementing regulations make clear that the term “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard,” and that “the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (iii). “An impairment is a disability . . . if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) requires an individualized and broad assessment of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

KONIAS v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2023-09-12(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)

An individual is substantially limited in performing a major life activity if that individual is unable to pursue that major life activity in a comparable manner ‘to most people in the general population.’ ” Arrington v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 721 F. App'x 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Making this determination requires an “individualized assessment[,]” Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., 679 F. App'x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2017) and “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).

An impairment is a disability when it substantially limits a person's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity.

AUTERI v. VIA AFFILIATES · filed 2023-10-30(j)(1)(ii)

Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii), “[a]n impairment is a disability … if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” (emphasis added.) ... Here too, Plaintiff does not allege that he experienced symptoms or was impaired “as compared to most people in the general population” to qualify as disabled under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II is granted without prejudice.

Section 1630.2(j) requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly, and an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to qualify.

Gonzales v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2024-02-29(j)

The post-ADA Amendments Act regulations provide instructions on how to construe the phrase “substantially limits” and similarly caution that the phrase is not meant to be a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). The regulations instruct courts that the phrase “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the “maximum extent permitted by the ADA;” and shall “be applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.” § 1630.2(i)(iv). Additionally, under these regulations, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, although the standard is construed broadly.

Jacobs v. Mercy Health · filed 2024-03-01(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment that “substantially limits” is construed broadly, however, not every impairment constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); see Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1111 (describing Congress’ expansion of the definition of “substantially limits”). A qualifying condition is one that “ substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Here, Plaintiff admits that her symptoms were temporary and resolved without medical intervention; she did not suffer from any permanent issues or disabilities because of 2019 influenza vaccine; she has received other vaccinations in the past without issue; and she has no known allergy to the COVID-19 vaccine. Doc. No. 43 at ¶¶ 47, 49-52. Thus, like Hustvet and Richardson, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s self-reported claim of an one-time adverse reaction to the influenza vaccine does not constitute an episodic or remissive condition that substantially impaired a major life activity, or otherwise constitutes a disability under the ADA.

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage under the ADA and is not a demanding standard.

Estate of Christopher Temple v. County of Placer · filed 2024-08-09(j)(1)(i)

“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) requires evidence that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Rosenbaum v. Zorn Compressor & Equipment Inc · filed 2025-03-12(j)(1)(iv)

Evidence that the plaintiff’s concentration was “affected,” that the pain was “distracting” and that she believes she was more irritable is not sufficient to establish that her knee injury substantially limited her ability to concentrate at work as compared to most people in the general population. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(iv).

Subsection (j)(1)(i) treats “substantially limits” as a broad, nondemanding standard for deciding whether an impairment limits a major life activity.

Satina v. City Of New York · filed 2025-03-25(j)(1)(i)

The term “substantially limits” should be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 69 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). “[A]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a major life activity compared with most people, without requiring prevention or severe restriction.

Butler v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc. · filed 2026-03-23(j)(1)(ii)

“[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.” ... Upon careful consideration of the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that his hemorrhoids condition substantially limited his ability to sit or stand or pass bowel movements at any point in time prior to his termination.

A learning impairment substantially limits a major life activity when it restricts the person’s ability to perform that activity compared with most people.

Scharffenberger v. Kirkland (In Re Allegheny Health, Education & Research Foundation) · filed 2005-03-11(j)(1)

Accordingly, an individual who attempts to prove that he or she suffers from a disability under the ADA must submit evidence not only that he or she suffers from an impairment — such as, for instance, a learning disorder — but also that such impairment restricts such individual’s ability to participate in an important life activity-such as, for instance, learning — when compared with most people.

Section 1630.2(j) sets a broad standard for substantial limitation that can allow a lifting restriction to support a disability claim at the pleading stage.

Rico v. Xcel Energy, Inc. · filed 2012-09-25(j)

In response to these lower court decisions, Congress passed the ADAA for the express purpose of lowering the threshold for the term, “substantially limits,” and the EEOC has instructed that courts now apply that term to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard applied prior to the ADAAA. ... Under the broadened standards of the ADAAA, the Court finds Plaintiffs allegations as to his disability sufficient to withstand the pleading, requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as one of the alternative reasonable accommodations an employer may offer.

Schmidt v. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. · filed 1996-07-09(o)(2)(ii)

Rather, reassignment is one among many alternative accommodations that an employer reasonably may offer.

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) recognizes reassignment as one method of reasonable accommodation, although the employer need not reassign an employee to an occupied position or create a new position.

MacSuga v. County of Spokane · filed 1999-09-14(o)(2)(ii)

Reassignment is one method of accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). But an employer is neither required to reassign an employee to a position that is already occupied nor to create a new position.

Section 1630.2(o)(2) recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation, but does not require transfer when no qualifying vacant position is available.

Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corporation · filed 1997-09-03(o)(2)

The pertinent regulations about whether an employer is required, as a reasonable accommodation, to reassign a disabled employee to a substantially different position provide that "[r]easonable accommodation may include but is not limited to: ... (ii) ... reassignment to a vacant position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). This regulation was interpreted in Willis v. Conopco, 108 F.3d 282, 284 (11th Cir.1997), to mean that "[r]eassignment to another position is a required accommodation only if there is a vacant position available for which the employee is otherwise qualified." ... It is clear in this case that transferring Plaintiff would not have been a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(o)(2) permits reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, but an employer may use an inferior position only after determining that no equivalent vacant position is available.

Harris v. Foxx · filed 2017-07-06(o)(2)

The Department’s procedure is consistent with the ADA regulations, which require employers to “reassign the individual to an equivalent position, in terms of pay, status, etc.” but provide that “[i]f . . . there are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation” then “[a]n employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded position.” 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App. Both the ADA regulations and the Department’s procedure contemplate that, if no equivalent vacant position is available, an employee may be reassigned to an inferior position. They do not suggest that an employer may assign an employee to an inferior position without first searching for an equivalent position. Here, Mr. Harris has demonstrated at least a genuine of issue of material fact as to whether the acquisitions job was inferior because it provided fewer opportunities to perform interesting and difficult work and reduced his promotion potential. The Court thus concludes that the availability of equivalent positions is a factor in considering whether reassignment to an inferior position may be made as a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2 recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation and requires the employee to have the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related qualifications for the position.

Cartagena v. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. · filed 2019-06-27(o)(2)(ii), (m)

A reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to a vacant position. ... Being qualified for the position includes having "the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position."

A reasonable accommodation may include restructuring the job or reassigning the employee to a vacant position.

Leppek v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-04-30(o)(2)(ii)

Reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring” or “reassignment to a vacant position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). ... The Court finds that Leppek’s placement in Department 61 was indeed an accommodation under the ADA. ... Indeed, there was no evidence there was a vacant funded position to which he could return.

Section 1630.2(o)'s reassignment guidance calls for an equivalent position when the employee is qualified and the position is vacant within a reasonable time.

Thompson v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. · filed 2003-07-23(o)

If reassignment is appropriate, then “an employer ‘should reassign [an] individual to an equivalent position ... if the individual is qualified, and if the position is vacant within a reasonable amount of time.’ ” Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app. at 358). ... Because the position held by Mayes was not vacant within the relevant time frame, Thompson has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding this position.

Reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to a vacant position, but an employer need not reassign an employee to a job for which the employee is unqualified.

Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System and Forum Health · filed 2004-03-04(o)(2)(ii)

Although a “reasonable accommodation” may include reassignment to a vacant position, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii), an employer need not reassign a disabled employee to a position for which he is not qualified, nor is the employer required to waive legitimate, non-discriminatory employment policies or displace other employees’ rights in order to accommodate a disabled employee.

The regulation treats an employee as regarded as disabled without requiring a substantial limitation, and does not require an employer to reallocate essential job functions as an accommodation.

Belasco v. Warrensville Heights City School District · filed 2015-01-16(g)(1)(iii), (j)(2), and appendix § 1630.2(o)

An individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual is subjected to a prohibited, action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0(1) (emphasis added). “Whether an individual’s impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, is not relevant to coverage under paragraph (g)(l)(iii) (the ‘regarded as’ prong) of this section.” § 1630.2(j)(2). ... Further, “the ADA does not require employers to accommodate individuals by shifting an essential job function onto others.” ... see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (“An employer or other covered entity is not required to reallocate essential functions.”).

Section 1630.2(l)(1) identifies termination and denial of an employment privilege as examples of prohibited actions for regarded-as disability discrimination.

Koci v. Central City Optical Co. · filed 2014-11-14(l)(1)

Prohibited actions “include but are not limited to” termination or denial of any privilege of employment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).

Section 1630.2(l)(1)-(3) treats a person as having a substantially limiting impairment when others treat the person as substantially limited, even if the actual impairment is not substantially limiting or no impairment exists.

Heffernan v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance · filed 1999-02-19(l)(1)-(3)

Thus, “'a person is “regarded as having” an impairment that substantially limits the person’s major life activities when other people treat the person as having a substantially limiting impairment,’ regardless of whether the individual actually has an impairment.”

The regulation includes within “regarded as” disability persons whose impairment substantially limits major life activities because of the attitudes of others, and the court applied that principle to asymptomatic HIV infection.

Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A. · filed 1996-09-19(a)(2)

The EEOC defines the term "regarded as having [a disability]" to include persons who have "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(a)(2) (emphasis supplied). ... Runnebaum, though asymptomatic, has forecast sufficient evidence here to qualify under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), which protects those who are regarded as having a disability. ... This is enough to show at the summary judgment stage that the bank perceived Runnebaum as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(l)(3) treats a person as regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment when others treat that person as having one.

Webb v. Mercy Hospital · filed 1996-12-13(l)(3)

A person is "regarded as having" an impairment that substantially limits major life activities when others treat that person as having a substantially limiting impairment. Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3)).

Section 1630.2(k) covers a person with a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, while § 1630.2(l) covers a person treated by others as having such a limitation.

MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington · filed 2000-08-08(k), (l)

An individual has a record of a disability if he or she “has a history of ... a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... The potential clients of plaintiff in this case, all individuals with a record of narcotics addiction, are therefore individuals with disabilities who are protected under the ADA. ... An individual is “regarded as” having a disability if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation or “[h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).

The regulation requires that an employer treat an impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity to regard an employee as having a disability; inability to perform one particular job alone is insufficient.

Mathieu v. Moore Business Forms · filed 1998-06-12(1)

An employee "is regarded as having such an impairment" when he: ... (3) Has none of the impairments [listed by the regulations] but is treated by [an employer] as having a substantially limiting impairment. ... As noted previously, the defendant's belief that the plaintiff could not perform the duties of the off-line position, even if it also believed that the basis for his inability was stress or depression, does not establish that the defendant regarded the plaintiff as having a disability because the inability to perform one job is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.

The regarded-as definition does not require a plaintiff to prove an actual substantially limiting impairment; being treated as having such an impairment is sufficient, including where the perceived disability is future.

Winslow v. IDS Life Insurance · filed 1998-09-30(l)(1)-(3)

Both the ADA and. ... EEOC regulations establish that a plaintiff, such as Winslow, whose claim asserts only that she was regarded by a defendant as having a substantially limiting impairment, need not prove that she in fact suffered such impairment. As a result, although both parties present conflicting views as to whether Winslow’s dysthymia falls within the ADA definition of “impairment,” this Court need not reach the question and requires only that Plaintiff demonstrate that she was “regarded as having such an impairment” by IDS, as she so asserts.

Section 1630.2(l) covers an employee treated as having a substantially limiting impairment, including when a minor impairment is overestimated, limitations result from others’ attitudes, or no impairment exists but the employer treats the employee as substantially impaired; it does not apply when the employer acts solely because of the employee’s conduct.

Newberry v. East Texas State Uni · filed 1999-01-04(l)(1), (l)(2), and (l)(3)

Subsection (1) is inapposite. It protects employees from employers who believe a minor impairment to be more serious than it is. For example, if Newberry had a mild case of obsessive compulsive disorder that did not interfere with his work, but ETSU unnecessarily worried that the disorder would prevent him from working successfully, this subsection would apply. ... Subsection (2) is also irrelevant. There is no evidence that Newberry’s obsessive compulsiveness caused difficulties only because of others’ attitudes about the disorder. Newberry’s dismissal came about not because of others’ attitudes about the disorder, but because his behavior interfered with his job performance, and perhaps because the behavior displeased others. ... Subsection (3) might appear to apply literally but the Guidelines clearly explain its purpose with the following example: “This situation could occur, for example, if an employer discharged an employee in response to a rumor that the employee is infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Even though the rumor is totally unfounded and the individual has no impairment at all, the individual is considered an individual with a disability ....” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Here, Newberry was dismissed not because of rumors that he was obsessive compulsive, but because of his conduct.

The regulation treats an employee as having a regarded-as disability when the employee is not impaired but the covered employer regards the employee as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Hill v. Hamilton County Public Hospital · filed 1999-04-26(l)(3)

Hill correctly points out that there are three types of "perceived disabilities,” defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1)-(3), that are ac-lionable under the ADA. At issue here is the category in which the employee is not impaired, but is regarded by the covered employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(3).

The regarded-as prong covers an employer's mistaken belief that an employee has a substantially limiting impairment or that a non-limiting impairment is substantially limiting.

Peters v. City of Mauston · filed 2002-11-20(1)

Under the “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff may prove he is disabled by showing that either: 1) the employer mistakenly believes the employee has a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; or 2) the employer mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(Z)(l)-(3) recognizes three ways an employer may regard a person as having a disability: treating a non-substantially-limiting impairment as substantially limiting, having attitudes cause an impairment to be substantially limiting, or treating a person without a defined impairment as having one that substantially limits a major life activity.

Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Department of Social Services · filed 2002-11-26(Z)(l)

The EEOC, charged with administering the ADA, has set forth not two but three different ways for a plaintiff to establish than an employer has regarded him as having a disability under the ADA. Specifically, a person is regarded as having a disability if he: 1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity but the employer treats the impairment as substantially limiting; 2) has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or 3) has none of the impairments defined [by the EEOC regulations] but is treated by the employer as having one that substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(Z)(l)-(3).

The regulation covers a person whom an employer mistakenly believes has a substantially limiting impairment, or mistakenly believes an actual nonlimiting impairment is substantially limiting.

Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock · filed 2002-12-30(1)

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). ... Again, however, that isolated, anecdotal evidence is insufficient to sustain her burden of showing that DHC regarded her as substantially limited in her ability to work. ... Even viewing the evidence upon which plaintiff relies in the light most favorable to her, a reasonable, properly instructed trier of fact could not conclude that DHC regarded her as incapable of performing a wide range of jobs for which she was trained. ... In light of the sparse evidence of record upon which plaintiff relies, she has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that DHC regard her as disabled under section 12102(2)(C).

Section 1630.2(o) covers an individual who is treated as having a substantially limiting impairment even though she has no such impairment.

Grazioli v. Genuine Parts Co. · filed 2005-12-30(o)

A person is “regarded as” having a disability if she has: (1) a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by the covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) no such impairment but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.

The regulation’s regarded-as category requires the employer to treat the individual as having an impairment and base the adverse decision largely or entirely on that perception; knowledge of an impairment alone is insufficient.

Wellman v. DuPont Dow Elastomers L.L.C. · filed 2010-09-14(1)

As to the third category, the court must determine whether DDE treated plaintiff as having an impairment, and whether the decision to terminate her was based largely or entirely upon that perception. ... Merely having knowledge of the impairment, however, is insufficient to suggest that the employer considered or perceived the employee as disabled. ... Such facts suggest that DDE believed plaintiff was capable of working and did not perceive her as disabled.

Section 1630.2(l) treats an individual as regarded as having an impairment when a covered entity treats an actual or nonexistent impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity.

Dulaney v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2012-06-06(l)

According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations that were in effect at the time of Dulaney’s termination, to be “regarded as” having such an impairment means that an individual: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2007). Thus, an employer “runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.”

Section 1630.2(l) treats an individual as regarded as having an impairment when an employer treats an actual or nonexistent impairment as substantially limiting major life activities.

Washington v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2014-05-27(l)

According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations that were in effect at the time of Washington’s termination, to be “regarded as having such an impairment means that an individual: ... (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2007). Thus, an employer “runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.” D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).

The regulation defines “regarded as having such an impairment” broadly: a person qualifies when subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, regardless of whether it substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.

Cook v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-03-02(Z)(1)

[A]n individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(l) covers an individual whom a covered entity treats as having a substantially limiting impairment, even if the individual has no such impairment.

Birnbach v. Americares Foundation, Inc. · filed 2020-06-29(l)

“Rather, an individual is covered by the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of disability in the ADA and the RHA if he ‘has none of the impairments defined in [the definition of the term ‘impairment’] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.’”

Section 1630.2(l)(1) defines an individual as regarded as having an impairment when subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, regardless of substantial limitation.

Clawson v. The City of Albany Department of Fire and Emergency · filed 2023-03-09(l)(1)

Under the ADA, an individual is 'regarded as having such an impairment' if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity. Prohibited actions include but are not limited to refusal to hire, demotion, placement on involuntary leave, termination, exclusion for failure to meet a qualification standard, harassment, or denial of any other term, condition, or privilege of employment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). ... Even if he was regarded as "having a problem with alcohol," that does not sufficiently allege disability under the ADA, as it does not allege that this was more than "transitory or minor." As such, rescinding a promotion based on one public night of intoxication does not require a finding that an employer was on notice of a disability or regarded someone as having a disability.

Section 1630.2(g)(1) defines disability to include a substantially limiting impairment, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment; under subsection (g)(1)(iii), the regarded-as impairment cannot be both transitory and minor.

Barker v. Department of the Army · filed 2023-05-22(g)(1), (g)(1)(iii)

To prove disability discrimination under the ADA, the appellant must establish that he is an individual with a disability as that term is defined in the ADA and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations. ... He may prove that he has a disability by showing that he (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); Thome, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 24; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ... The administrative judge correctly found that an individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if he establishes that he has been subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment that is not both “transitory and minor.”

Section 1630.2(l)(1) covers a person regarded as having a physical or mental impairment; the court held that an employer’s belief that the person was healthy and able to work defeats that status.

Luca v. Social Security, Commissioner of · filed 2024-09-27(l)(1)

However, Plaintiff “lacks evidence that the SSA’s actions were based on a belief that he had a physical or mental impairment.” ... At the time the Commissioner denied or recharacterized Plaintiff’s requests for LWOP and removed him from federal service, “the SSA did not regard Plaintiff as impaired or unable to work.” ... The undisputed evidentiary record shows that Defendant converted Plaintiff’s LWOP to AWOL, and, ultimately, removed Plaintiff from federal service, not because he was perceived as being disabled, but for the very opposite reason: He was believed to have faked or grossly exaggerated his inability to work and the medical condition he identified as the reason.

Section 1630.2(l) treats a person as regarded as having an impairment when, without having the impairment, a covered entity treats the person as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Pietsch v. FMC Technologies, Inc. · filed 2024-10-15(l)

A person is “regarded as having an impairment if he ‘[h]as none of the impairments…but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.’” ... Pietsch fails to demonstrate that FMC treated him as having such an impairment. Indeed, Pietsch has only alleged that FMC treated him as an individual who could not receive the COVID-19 vaccine due to his mitral valve prolapse.

Section 1630.2(I)(1) treats an individual as regarded as having an impairment when the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, regardless of whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Mackey · filed 2026-02-23(I)(1)

An “individual is ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I)(1) (2025). ... Here, Mackey cannot show that he was regarded as impaired under the third element because Schino, the decision maker with respect to his discipline and termination, did not perceive Mackey to be impaired.

An impairment includes a physiological disorder or condition affecting a body system; an employer may regard an applicant as impaired by assuming a back condition disqualifies him.

Eeoc v. Bnsf Railway Company · filed 2018-09-12(h)(1)

By regulation, the EEOC has defined an impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body ... systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... We conclude that BNSF perceived Holt to have an impairment for the purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(i) treats working as a major life activity, while § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires an inability to work to extend beyond a single particular job to a class or broad range of jobs.

Bedwell v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. · filed 1996-07-24(i), (j)(3)(i)

Although the statute does not define "major life activities," the Eighth Circuit has adopted EEOC guidelines which interprets working as a major life activity. Id. at 1319 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). However, if a plaintiff points to an inability to work, she must show more than an "inability to perform a single, particular job." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Plaintiff must show that the impairment "significantly restrict[s] [her] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). [2] In this case, plaintiff does not establish a prima facie case because she is not "disabled," as defined under the ADA. Plaintiff admitted in deposition testimony that her shoulder injury (bursitis) only prevented her from doing one job, the job of catcher. (Plaintiff's Deposition, Part II, p. 43-44). The Court finds that this does not constitute an inability to perform "a class of jobs or broad range of jobs" as required by the Eighth Circuit.

The regulation’s regarded-as framework covers a person with no impairment who is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment, and working is a major life activity, although inability to perform one particular job is not itself a substantial limitation in working.

Sullivan v. River Valley School District, and Charles O. Williams, Superintendent, Individually and in His Of · filed 1999-11-29(1), (i)

The Act defines three ways that someone may be “regarded as” disabled, but since Sullivan stipulates that he has no actual disability of any kind, he could only qualify under the third: having no impairment but being treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. ... Under the Act, working qualifies as a “major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). However, the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

For the major life activity of working, being unable to perform one particular job is not a substantial limitation; the restriction must affect a class or broad range of jobs.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc. · filed 2001-02-08(j)(3)(i)

Indeed, the Court noted that the EEOC defines “substantially limited” in the major life activity of working as “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” ... Because the position of “OTR” is a single job for a single employer, EEOC’s proof does not support the claim that Hunt regarded claimants as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) distinguishes inability to perform a class of jobs from inability to perform a single particular job when determining whether working is substantially limited.

Mendez v. West · filed 2001-11-30(j)(3)(i)

Nevertheless this Circuit distinguishes an inability to perform "a class of jobs which provides the basis for a disability finding from an "inability to perform a single ... particular job" which does not render someone disabled.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats inability to perform a single, particular job as insufficient to substantially limit the major life activity of working; the impairment must restrict a class or broad range of jobs.

Doree Stein v. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, and Immigration and Naturalization Service · filed 2002-03-21(j)(3)(i)

When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “she was significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” ... Further, “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” ... In other words, “the impairment must substantially limit employment generally.” ... Stein’s inability to lift and carry heavy boxes of files to the extent necessary to perform her duties outside the office does not rise to the level of a restriction on her ability to work in a broad class of jobs. ... A plaintiffs inability to perform “one narrow job for one employer” is insufficient to establish a disability. ... While Stein’s impairment may preclude her from lifting and carrying heavy objects on outreach assignments, this is but one single aspect of her duties, and does not overcome her demonstrated ability to successfully perform the numerous other tasks required of her job.

For the major life activity of working, an impairment must substantially limit performance of a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes; inability to perform one particular job is not necessarily sufficient.

Milatz v. Frito-Lay, Inc. · filed 1997-01-15(i)

Subsection (A) requires an actual physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Milatz presents evidence related to impairment only in the major life activity category of work. Work constitutes a major life activity, but to qualify as ADA disabled, the impairment must significantly restrict the individual from performing “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” Bolton v Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1104 (1995). The inability to perform one particular job is not necessarily sufficient. Id. (citing Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting equivalent provision of the Rehabilitation Act)).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides that inability to perform one particular job alone is not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Adams v. Rochester General Hospital · filed 1997-08-15(j)(3)(i)

“The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

Section 1630.2(i) treats working as a major life activity, while § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) provides that inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial limitation on working.

State Dept. of Public Safety v. Sexton · filed 1998-06-12(i), (j)(3)(i)

Working is a "major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1994). However, "`the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.' 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)(1994)." Bullion v. JMBL, Inc., 657 So.2d at 837.

For the major life activity of working, an inability to perform only one particular job is not a substantial limitation; the relevant inquiry considers whether the impairment excludes the person from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, including comparable jobs in the geographic area.

Muller v. Costello · filed 1999-08-11(j)(3)(i), (j)(3)(ii)

The EEOC's regulations explain that, in evaluating a claimed impairment to the major life activity of working, "[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997). If the plaintiff establishes only "the inability to perform a single, particular job," he has failed to establish a substantial impairment to his major life activity of working. Id. ... The position of correctional officer constitutes a single, particular job, and a limitation on a single, particular job cannot constitute a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working. See Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1996). ... Muller presented no evidence that he was precluded from jobs other than correctional officer in his geographic area. His failure to do so, and his insistence that his class of jobs is limited to correctional officer, compels our holding that there was insufficient evidence before the jury for it to have concluded that Muller was substantially limited in his major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires a substantial limitation in working to affect a class or broad range of jobs, so inability to perform one particular job is insufficient.

Lane v. Harborside Healthcare · filed 2002-07-16(j)(3)(i)

“With respect to the major life activity of working . . . [the] term ‘substantially limits’ means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes . . . . The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). ... Lane has shown that Harborside regarded her as disabled as far as her performance on her evening shift is concerned, but even s o , the inability to perform a single, particular job does not suffice to qualify as a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working. Absent facts establishing that Harborside perceived Lane’s impairment as substantially impairing her ability to participate in a broad class of jobs, Lane has not made out a prima facie case that Harborside regarded her as disabled.

The regulation treats inability to perform a single, particular job as insufficient to establish a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

Whitson v. Union Boiler Co. · filed 2002-10-02(j)(3)(i)

Nevertheless, evidence that Whitson was unable to do a single, particular job is not sufficient evidence of a disability for purposes of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(i) identifies working as a major life activity under the ADA regulations.

Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc. · filed 2004-01-21(i)

The regulations implementing the ADA enumerate several functions that qualify as “major life activities,” included among which is the activity of “working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2003).

Section 1630.2(i) identifies learning as a major life activity for determining whether an impairment substantially limits a person under the ADA.

Knapp v. City of Columbus · filed 2006-07-06(i)

Under these regulations, ADHD qualifies as a “physical or mental impairment,” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A), and learning qualifies as a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (providing that major life activities include, but are not limited to, “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”).

An inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working; the limitation must cover a class or broad range of jobs.

Logan v. Marathon Petroleum Co. · filed 2006-09-06(j)(3)(i)

Unfortunately for Logan, “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Id.

Inability to perform one particular job does not, by itself, substantially limit the major life activity of working.

Andreoli v. Gates · filed 2007-04-06(j)(3)(I)

The medical evaluations by doctors who examined Andreoli do not provide any additional details as to Andreoli's limitations that would render her "disabled" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, they note her inability to return to work at the DSCP. However, "the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I).