29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Subsection (n)(3)(i) identifies the employer’s judgment about a function’s importance as evidence relevant to determining whether the function is essential.

Kniffen v. East Wenatchee Water District · filed 2025-06-27(n)(3)(i)

Evidence of an essential function of a job may exist in several places, including: the employer’s judgment that the function is essential; a written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants; the amount of time spent on the job function; and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(iv). ... And though the amount of time expended on valve turning activity is disputed (ECF No. 46 at 22, ECF No. 50 at 9, ¶ 41), the Court is satisfied that the act of doing so is an essential function of the job. Implicit in the requirements of an inspector is to do the actual inspection, something that could only be performed by an employee of the district, and fundamental to the role.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) lists reasons a job function may be essential, while § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies relevant, non-dispositive evidence for determining essential functions.

Sheehan v. Shippensburg University · filed 2025-07-07(n)(2), (n)(3)

To determine what is an essential function, the court turns to the relevant regulation, which provides: (2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). The regulation also provides several pieces of evidence the court may consider, none of which are dispositive. Deane v. Pocono Medical Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1998). These include: “(1) ‘[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential’; (2) ‘[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function’; and (3) ‘[t]he consequences of not requiring the [employee] to perform the function.’” Kiburz v. England, 361 F. App'x 326, 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). While Plaintiff is correct that the court is not bound solely by the job description and the employer’s judgment, these pieces of evidence remain relevant for consideration.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies a job function as essential when the position exists to perform it, insufficient other employees are available to perform it, or it requires specialized expertise.

Nicholi v. North Carolina Detective Agency, Inc. · filed 2025-08-13(n)(2)

A function is essential to a position “when ‘the reason the position exists is to perform that function,’ when there aren't enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 579 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)). Here, the complaint lacks allegations of the essential functions of plaintiff’s position or of his ability to perform them. Plaintiff alleges he stayed “awake and attentive” when using pen and paper at work. (Compl. (DE 15) ¶ 21). Such minimal performance cannot reasonably be considered “essential” to the security guard position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Because plaintiff does not plausibly allege that he is a qualified individual, he fails to state a claim of ADA discrimination.

Section 1630.2(n)(2) identifies the types of evidence courts consider when deciding whether a job function is essential.

Guerrero v. Constellation Home Care, LLC (NY) · filed 2025-09-04(n)(2)

In evaluating a job’s essential functions, courts must consider “the employer’s judgment, ... and the work experience of current employees in similar positions.” McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Courts must also give “considerable deference to an employer’s determination as to what functions are essential.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126. This is a “fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice,” and no one factor is dispositive. Id. ... Thus, based on the job description and Plaintiff’s work experience and the experiences of other employees, home care visits are essential functions of the position. Plaintiff’s dispute that driving was not essential function of the job does not alter the Court’s conclusion that making home care visits was essential function of the job.

Subsection (n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions and identifies factors relevant to determining whether a duty is essential.

Stapleton v. Prince Carpentry, Inc. · filed 2025-09-08(n)(1), (n)(3)

The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission define essential functions as the “fundamental job duties” of the position, but not “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); ... Although no factor is dispositive, relevant factors include an “employer’s judgment,” “written job descriptions,” consequences of not performing the function, and the work experience of employees in similar positions. ... However, when the underlying factors, taken together and viewed in the non-movant’s favor, indicate a “reasonable dispute” as to whether a duty is essential, that is a question for the trier of fact.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies factors courts consider in deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent, consequences, bargaining terms, and incumbents’ work experience.

Burke · filed 2025-09-19(n)

In evaluating whether a job function is “essential,” courts consider ... Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)). Courts “must give considerable deference to an employer’s judgment regarding what functions are essential for service in a particular position, but no one listed factor will be dispositive.” ... Here, the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Burke, compels the conclusion that the ability to lift, push, pull, and carry objects weighing up to 50 pounds was at all relevant times an essential job requirement for Con Edison Gas Troubleshooters.

In deciding whether a job function is essential, a court may consider the amount of time the employee spends performing it.

Reddish v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority · filed 2026-02-11(n)(3)(iii)

During this period, Reddish mostly performed administrative duties and only occasionally had to operate machinery or to lift heavy loads. In these unique circumstances, the Court is persuaded that a reasonable jury could find that operating heavy equipment and lifting heavy items—unlike assisting with paperwork—were not essential functions of her actual job. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii) (“Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to . . . [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function.”)

Section 1630.2(n) treats essential functions as fundamental duties actually required of the position, determined case by case, and permits regular attendance to be an essential function.

Colon · filed 2026-03-02(n)

The essential functions of a position are the “fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... Ordinarily, “[d]etermining whether a particular job duty is an essential function involves a factual inquiry to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Here, no reasonable jury could find or infer that Colon “c[ould] perform the essential functions” of his mechanical superintendent position on the Beirut project, including regular attendance, given the undisputed record evidence that he continually was absent and missed work on the project.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors to consider when determining whether a job duty is an essential function, including the job description, the employer’s judgment, time spent performing the duty, consequences of not requiring it, and past and current work experience.

Ford · filed 2026-03-27(n)(3)

To determine whether a particular duty is essential, courts consider “the employee’s job description, the employer’s opinion, the amount of time spent performing the function, the consequences for not requiring the individual to perform the duty, and past and current work experiences” (“Ammons factors”). ... see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (listing factors). ... Conducting a “case-specific inquiry” consistent with Kinney and considering the factors listed in Ammons, the Court finds it is essential for those in Ford’s position to go into the office at times.

The regulation defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the employment position.

Coles · filed 2026-03-27(n)(1)

“Although the term ‘essential functions’ is not defined by the ADA, regulations promulgated by the [EEOC] indicate that it encompasses ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position.’” McBride, 583 F.3d at 98 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). “In approaching this inquiry, ‘[a] court must give considerable deference to an employer’s judgment regarding what functions are essential for service in a particular position.’” Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1998)). Here, it is evident that Plaintiff cannot perform all of the essential functions of a Security Guard position if she is unable to stay awake and she does not dispute that staying awake is an essential function of this position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) requires courts assessing whether a job function is essential to consider the employer’s judgment, the job description, time spent performing the function, and the work experience of past and current employees in the position.

Neil · filed 2026-05-22(n)(3)

Courts must determine whether a function is essential by considering: (1) the employer’s judgment; (2) the job description; (3) the time spent performing the function; (4) the work experience of those who previously held the position; and (5) the work experience of those who currently hold the positions. ... While the Tenth Circuit instructs not to second guess employers’ judgment on job-related functions, the “employer’s judgment is not conclusive evidence.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for deciding whether a job duty is essential, including the employer’s judgment, job descriptions, and employees’ work experience.

Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance · filed 2012-09-26(n)(3)

Factors to be considered include the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the work experience of past incumbents of the job, and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining a job’s essential functions, including the employer’s judgment, the job description, and how the work is performed.

Matos v. Devos · filed 2018-08-13(n)(3)

In short, Matos's essential duties involved tasks requiring at least some physical presence in the office, and thus the Department properly concluded that full-time telework was not a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) makes the employer’s judgment, collective bargaining terms, and the consequences of omitting a function relevant to whether that function is essential; required protective footwear can be an essential job function.

Holmes v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc. · filed 2019-07-01(n)(3)

It is undisputed that at least as of 2013, General Dynamics viewed wearing protective footwear as an essential function of the Shelter Fabricator position. The Collective Bargaining Agreement, the outside auditor's assessment, and OSHA regulations all underscore the importance of safety shoes to protect employees' feet from falling heavy and sharp objects and other hazards. ... No reasonable accommodation existed that would have allowed Holmes to perform the Shelter Fabricator job safely, and if she could not perform the essential functions of the job safely, then she could not perform the essential functions of the job.

Whether a duty is an essential job function under § 1630.2(n) can present a triable factual question when the job description is ambiguous.

McCall v. Carbon Schuylkill Community Hospital, Inc. · filed 2022-08-23(n)

As an initial matter, because the parties contest whether being able to perform non-sedentary tasks constitutes an essential function of McCall’s job as a Skilled Nursing Account Representative and the relevant job description is ambiguous as to this point, there is a triable issue as to the essential functions of McCall’s position.

Essential functions are fundamental job duties, as distinguished from marginal functions.

Alvara v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2014-08-13(n)(1)

Regulations interpreting the Act, however, provide that “essential functions” means “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” as distinguished from “marginal ... functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(1).

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats a fundamental job duty as an essential function.

Zehnder v. Mayo Clinic · filed 2024-09-30(n)(1)

The Court finds that Defendant has established that the night shift is a “basic duty” of its radiology residents, so, it is an essential function.

Section 1630.2(n) concerns which job duties are essential; a factual dispute about an employee’s ability to perform those duties can preclude summary judgment.

Jones v. Henhouse Incorporated · filed 2025-01-21(n)

The Court finds that plaintiff has, at the very least, shown that a genuine dispute of fact exists as to whether she could perform the essential job duties of a hostess.

Essential job functions include duties an employee must perform during both slow and busy periods.

Johnston v. Morrison, Inc. · filed 1994-04-20(n)(1)

However, Ms. Johnston’s position as a food server required her to perform her duties during all times she was at her work station, whether the situation presented slow or busy periods.

An employer’s judgment may identify which job functions are essential.

Cheatwood v. Roanoke Industries · filed 1995-07-20(n)(3)(i)

Defendant has the right to determine the essential functions of jobs at its plant. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (“consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (an employer can determine which functions are essential).

Regular attendance can be an essential job function, and an employee who cannot meet a job’s attendance requirements is not qualified.

Cole v. Staff Temps · filed 1996-10-23(n)(1)

It is clear that Cole cannot meet one of the essential functions of her job. We agree with the Tyndall court that an employee, who cannot meet the attendance requirements of a job, cannot be considered a “qualified” individual protected by the ADA.

Whether a duty is an essential job function depends on evidence such as the job description, the work employees perform, and the consequences of leaving the duty undone.

Guneratne v. St. Mary's Hospital · filed 1996-11-01(n)(3)

These physical requirements are an essential function of the job because nurses must be prepared to immediately react in emergency situations, which Plaintiff herself suggests occur “possibly once a week or once every four or five days” on the unit where she worked.

Speed and accuracy may be essential job functions when the evidence shows the position requires them.

Hoffman v. Fidelity Brokerage Services, Inc. · filed 1997-01-29(n)

Defendant has come forward with sufficient, credible evidence to establish that speed and accuracy are essential functions of the CSR job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) considers time spent performing a job function and the consequences of omitting it when determining whether the function is essential.

Pikora v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 1997-03-31(n)(3)

The EEOC regulations mirror that section, and also provide for consideration of the amount of time spent on the job performing the function and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Viewing the facts in light of the above guidelines, it appears that the Plaintiff cannot establish that she is qualified for the position of Customer Service Representative. Plaintiff cannot perform the essential function of her job, that being telephone work, with or without accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) considers employer judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on a task, and the consequences of omitting it when deciding whether a job function is essential.

Frix v. Florida Tile Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-07-11(n)(3)

Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes (1) “the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential;” (2) written job descriptions prepared in a, timely manner; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the particular function; and (4) the consequences of not requiring the job holder to perform the function. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1996). In the present case, the evidence shows that lifting items weighing more than 25 pounds is an essential function of the storeroom coordinator position.

Factors for identifying an essential job function include the position’s purpose, the number of employees available to perform the function, and the specialized expertise it requires.

Allen v. Georgia Power Co. · filed 1997-07-15(n)(2)

Regulations promulgated under the ADA further identify three factors that can be considered pursuant to an inquiry regarding whether a particular task is an essential part of a job: (1) the reason the position exists is to perform the function; (2) there are limited number of employees available among whom the performance of the job function can be distributed; and (3) the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position was hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. ... Further, the above-listed tasks that require the physical movements are among the tasks that Defendant hires electricians to perform; some (if not all) of the functions are specialized and, thus, require the expertise and ability Plaintiff possessed when he was initially hired into the position; and, Defendant’s undergoing a massive downsizing ultimately would result in reduced numbers’ of electricians to perform these type of tasks, which Plaintiff was unable to perform.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) provides nonexhaustive factors for deciding whether a job function is essential; the determination depends on the facts of the particular job.

Coleman v. Keebler Co. · filed 1998-02-26(n)(3)

This list is not meant to be exhaustive, no one factor should be granted more weight than any other factor, and above all, “whether a particular function is essential is a factual determination that must be made on a case by ease basis.” Interpretive Guidance § 1630.2(n). Applying these factors to the record before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that the ability to lift twenty pounds is an essential function of the fry packer position.

A job function may be essential when too few employees are available to perform it; punctual attendance was essential for a school's only guidance counselor.

Salmon v. Dade County School Board · filed 1998-04-28(n)(2)(ii)

Likewise, a job function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed. ... As such, the Court must accept the defendant’s unrebutted claim that arriving promptly for work is a necessary part of Salmon’s position and that plaintiff was unable to meet this essential requirement.

A job function may be essential when few employees are available to share it.

Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc. · filed 1998-07-07(n)(2)(ii)

We believe that Frontier’s efforts to support a seven-day flight schedule with its limited staff fall squarely within the situation contemplated by the regulation. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that passenger assistance was an essential function of Moritz’s job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential; operating heavy machinery was an essential function of this chemical operator position.

Washington v. Occidental Chemical Corp. · filed 1998-10-06(n)(3)

Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function;(4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents on the job; and/or (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff is not qualified for the position from which she was terminated because she cannot perform the essential function of operating heavy machinery.

Section 1630.2(o) does not require an employer to reallocate an employee’s essential job functions to others as a reasonable accommodation.

McMackins v. Elk Grove Unified School District · filed 1998-11-03(o)

Thus, assigning to student aides the “physical labor required to operate the store” would change the nature and extent of their position and reallocate to them essential functions of plaintiffs position, a result not contemplated by the ADA.

A job function is essential when the position exists to perform that function.

Balls v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1998-12-04(n)(2)(i)

Even if judicial estoppel does not bar plaintiffs claim, she is unable to prove that she is a qualified individual, because it is undisputed that she is unable to type forty-five words per minute to relay messages of hearing-impaired customers for eight hours a day which is an essential part of the job. A job function is essential if, inter alia, “the reason the position exists is to perform that function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and excludes marginal duties.

Dorchy v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1999-02-25(n)

In addition, regulations for enforcing the ADA issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and contained within the Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”) advise that “[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). ... However, the essential functions of Mr. Dorchy’s job as a B Machinist are not limited to light duty work, as evidenced by WMATA’s job description for a B Machinist.

A job function may be essential when the position exists to perform it or when too few employees are available to distribute it.

Burch v. City of Nacogdoches · filed 1999-05-10(n)(2)

Although the Act itself does not define what those requirements are exactly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations allow functions to be defined as “essential” because, inter alia, “the reason the position exists is to perform that function; [and] ... because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2). Burch cannot, as mentioned above, perform the essential functions of a firefighter.

Job descriptions are evidence of a job’s essential functions, but they do not control which functions are essential.

Sanchez v. Western Auto of Puerto Rico · filed 1999-09-29(n)

Of course, a job description is only one means of determining what are a job’s essential functions. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1995). Job. descriptions are not controlling on this issue. See Laurin, 150 F.3d at 59, n. 5; see also; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1998). The controversy over which job description properly applied to Medina is sufficient here, though, to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Medina’s qualification for his job at Western Auto.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job duty is an essential function, including the employer’s judgment, job descriptions, time spent performing the duty, and the consequences of leaving it undone.

Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co. · filed 2000-01-27(n)(3)

Considering the types of evidence described in § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii) as applicable here, I conclude that reasonable jurors could only find that climbing is an essential element of the installer technician position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s assessment, a prior written job description, time spent performing the function, and the experience of workers in similar jobs.

Fritz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-03-29(n)(3)

The regulations state that evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to, the employer’s assessment of what functions are essential, written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing for the job, the amount of time spent on the job performing that function, and the work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). All the available evidence of the essential functions of the jewelry clerk job indicate that standing is an essential function.

A job function is essential if removing it would fundamentallyly alter the position.

Kiphart v. Saturn Corporation · filed 2001-05-31(n)

A job function is essential if its removal would “fundamentally alter” the position.

An investigator’s duties can be essential functions even when performed infrequently if they are fundamental to the job, including protecting people during physical confrontations.

Frazier v. Simmons · filed 2001-07-03(n)

An “essential function” is defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... Based on the evidence as a whole, we hold Mr. Frazier failed to put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact rebutting Mr. Simmons’ position that his job required him to perform multiple essential functions in different environments, including carrying a firearm, running, and engaging in violent activity.

Essential functions are a position’s fundamental duties, rather than its marginal functions.

Cripe v. City of San Jose · filed 2001-08-17(n)(1)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations interpreting the ADA explain that a job’s “essential functions” are its “fundamental” duties, not the “marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l).

Essential job functions are fundamental duties, not marginal tasks; conflicting evidence about those functions can preclude summary judgment on whether an employee is qualified.

Morris v. Roche · filed 2002-01-30(n)(1)

According to the regulations implementing Title I of the ADA, ... the essential functions of a job are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” but they do not include “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l) (2001). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this conflicting evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to what the essential functions of Plaintiffs job were.

The factors for deciding whether a job function is essential are instructive rather than exhaustive; disputed evidence about how an employer applies a requirement can leave the question for a jury.

Smith v. Quikrete Companies, Inc. · filed 2002-05-21(n)(3)

This list is instructive, rather than exhaustive. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted the evidence necessary to create a genuine question of fact whether tarping loads is an essential job function for Defendant’s delivery drivers.

Section 1630.2(n) calls for a fact-specific determination of whether a job function is essential; disputed evidence may require a jury to decide.

YOUNG v. JABIL, INC. · filed 2025-04-22(n)

Similarly, whether repetitive motions were an essential function of Operator’s assembling medical devices is a fact issue that must be decided by the jury.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and collective bargaining terms.

Trevino · filed 2026-01-23(n)(3)

In short, the law requires consideration of, among other things, the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and terms of a collective bargaining agreement to determine essential functions.

Section 1630.2(n) calls for a fact-specific assessment of a job’s essential functions, including whether the employer actually requires employees to perform them.

MILLAGA v. City of Sioux City · filed 2003-04-25(n)

This court agrees with the reasoning in Kapche to hold that determination of whether or not a claimant under the ADA can perform the essential functions of a particular job must be based upon an “individualized assessment” of his or her ability to perform the job safely, and cannot be based simply on a blanket exclusion.

An essential job function must be fundamental to the job; an employer’s preference for an 8:00 a.m. start time alone does not establish that it is essential.

Conneen v. Mbna America Bank, N.A · filed 2003-06-27(n)(1)

Though such examples may be justifiable from the employer’s point of view, even important to the professional atmosphere and decorum that is largely defined by the conduct of managers, that hardly elevates such preferences to fundamental functions. Absent more than appears on this record, we are not prepared to conclude that beginning work at 8:00 a.m. as opposed to 9:00 a.m. is an essential job function.

An essential job function is a fundamental duty of the position a person holds or desires; marginal duties are excluded.

Davidson v. America Online, Inc. · filed 2003-07-30(n)(1)

The term “essential function” is defined as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F. 3d 1120, 1130 (10 th Cir. 1999). This term does not include marginal functions of the position.

A written job description can establish an essential job function when the employee offers no affirmative evidence contradicting its requirements.

Collins v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 2004-03-30(n)(1)

Other than his eonclusory denial of the weight-lifting restriction, Collins has cited to no affirmative evidence (such as specific testimony from dockworkers or language in the collective bargaining agreement concerning weight-lifting requirements) that actually contradicts the specific weight-lifting requirements set forth in the written job description.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, excluding marginal duties; a history of delegating a duty can raise a factual dispute about whether it is essential.

Smith v. United States Postal · filed 2004-07-15(n)

Given the precedent of prior Tour I Supervisors delegating the accounting function to subordinate employees (including to Smith before she was promoted), there also is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the accounting duty was an essential function of the Tour I Supervisor position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) lists evidence for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment and employees’ actual work experience.

Hawkins v. George F. Cram Co. · filed 2005-10-28(n)(3)

The EEOC regulations further guide the court in evaluating an employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential for performance of a job. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Because the evidence raises genuine issues of fact regarding (1) what the ability to “multitask” actually requires, and (2) whether Cram actually considered the ability to multitask to a degree beyond Hawkins’ ability an essential function of a retained production position, the court cannot find that Hawkins is not a “qualified individual” as a matter of law.

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of a job; physical attendance may be essential when the job requires in-person interaction and supervision.

Becerra v. Earthlink, Inc. · filed 2006-01-23(n)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on this claim on the grounds that plaintiffs physical attendance in the Overland Park office was an essential function of her job and her request to work from home was unreasonable. As explained below, the court agrees with defendant, concludes that plaintiff is not a “qualified individual with a disability” and grants summary judgment in favor of defendant. ... “Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.”

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential job functions as fundamental duties and calls for a fact-specific assessment of whether a particular duty is essential.

Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA · filed 2006-03-20(n)

Whether a job duty is an “essential function” turns on whether it is “fundamental” to the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). ... Turner has presented evidence to support a reasonable jury in finding that rotating is not an essential function of the shaker table inspector position and, therefore, that she is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA.

Essential functions are a job’s fundamental duties and exclude marginal duties.

Sevcik v. Unlimited Construction Services, Inc. · filed 2006-11-07(n)(1)

“The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term ‘essential functions’ does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); ... The Court concludes Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job that he held with or without reasonable accommodations.

An essential job function may include scheduling flexibility, including a required rotating shift.

Rehrs v. IAMS Co. · filed 2007-05-15(n)(1)

However, the term essential function encompasses more than core job requirements; indeed, it also may include scheduling flexibility. ... Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Rehrs, we conclude shift rotation was a non-discriminatory essential function of Rehrs’s technician job at P & G and Rehrs’s restrictions to work only a straight shift rendered him unqualified to carry out all the essential functions of his P & G technician job.

A job function may be essential when the position exists to perform it, including a casual employee’s ability to take any available assignment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sharp Manufacturing Co. of America · filed 2008-02-01(n)(2)(i)

Thus, because the flexibility to take any available position, even a standing one, is an essential function of the job, the Court concludes that Vaughn was not “otherwise qualified” to be a casual.

Essential job functions are fundamental duties, not marginal functions of the position.

Jelsma v. City of Sioux Falls · filed 2010-09-29(n)(1)

With respect to the second prong, the essential functions of a job include the fundamental job duties, but not the marginal functions of the position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) makes the employer’s judgment an important but noncontrolling factor in deciding whether a job function is essential.

Miller v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2011-05-10(n)(3)

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Under this standard, the employer’s judgment is an important factor, but it is not controlling.

Section 1630.2(n) excludes marginal duties from essential job functions and identifies evidence relevant to deciding which duties are essential.

Abara v. Altec Industries, Inc. · filed 2011-12-22(n)

In determining which functions are essential, relevant evidence includes, but is not limited to, the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, and the past and current work experience of incumbents on the job. ... Therefore, since Plaintiffs produced evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case and to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue whether Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job he held, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs disability discrimination claims is denied.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence courts should consider when deciding which job functions are essential.

Hoppe v. Lewis University · filed 2012-08-31(n)(3)

Federal regulations instruct courts to consider the following categories of evidence when deciding an employee’s essential job functions: ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). The record contains no evidence of Hoppe’s essential job functions.

A rotating shift may be an essential job function when the evidence listed in § 1630.2(n)(3) supports that finding.

Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc. · filed 2012-09-04(n)(3)

A rotating shift can be an essential function of a position, Rehrs, 486 F.3d at 359, and we agree with the district court that it was an essential function of the Resource Coordinator position at Alliant.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and permits consideration of the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and employees’ experience.

Knutson v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc. · filed 2013-04-03(n)

“Essential functions” are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... No genuine issue of material fact exists that being DOT qualified to drive a delivery truck is an essential function of Knutson’s position.

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of a job; an employer’s judgment and written job description may help determine whether a duty is essential.

Murphy v. Samson Resources Company · filed 2013-05-08(n)

‘Essential functions’ are ‘the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.’” Id. at 1119 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). In determining whether a particular function is essential, courts may consider the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential and written job descriptions. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(3) (listing other factors). ... Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in finding that Murphy did not establish that she was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA.

Essential functions are a job’s fundamental duties, not marginal tasks; a function may be essential when the position exists to perform it.

Franklin v. City of Slidell · filed 2013-08-27(n)

“ ‘Essential functions’ are those duties that are fundamental to the job at issue”; the term does not include the marginal functions of the position. ... Thus, these are essential functions.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies factors for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and employees’ work experience.

Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County · filed 2014-03-20(n)

To determine whether a particular job function is essential, the court may look to the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, written job descriptions prepared before interviewing applicants for the job, and the work experience of past employees in the position or similar positions.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential job functions and identifies factors for deciding whether a particular duty is essential.

Samson v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2014-03-26(n)

In sum, viewing all the record evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Samson, as required, we conclude that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether test-driving FedEx trucks is an essential function of the Technician position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) makes past and current employees’ work relevant to whether a job duty is essential; evidence that comparable employees did not need to drive can create a factual dispute.

Toole v. Metal Services LLC · filed 2014-05-02(n)(3)

Thus, a reasonable person could infer that driving was not an essential function of the safety position.

A written job description is evidence that a duty is essential, but actual work practices may show that the duty is not essential.

Brown v. Smith · filed 2014-05-13(n)

Based on these considerations, balanced with consideration of Defendants’ assertion that driving is an essential function of the Street Supervisor position and the written description of the job, the Court finds that there is at least a question of material fact as to whether the ability to drive commercial vehicles is an essential function of the Street Supervisor position.

Whether a duty is an essential job function can be a factual question when assessing if an employee can perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Seeney v. Pennsylvania · filed 2014-07-10(n)

However, even if Defendants had moved for summary judgment on this basis, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether typing is an essential function of the Clerk Typist 2 position, and if it is an essential function, whether See-ney could perform this function with or without reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) permits courts to consider an employer’s judgment and job description when deciding whether a duty is an essential job function; here, the ability to work overtime was essential to the Corrections Lieutenant position.

Gibson v. Milwaukee County · filed 2015-03-05(n)(3)

Accordingly, I conclude that the evidence in the record reveals the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ability to work overtime was an essential function of the position of Corrections Lieutenant.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) provides factors for deciding whether a job function or qualification is essential; an employer’s judgment alone may be insufficient when the record does not connect the qualification to the job’s actual functions.

Cathey v. Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center · filed 2015-03-12(n)(3)

Although an employer’s judgment “as to which functions are essential” is usually clear, that is not the case here. The record reflects only that Baptist initially and arbitrarily set the “advanced high” standard and then lowered it after testing upon discovering that the selection was too aggressive for some of its employees. There is no evidence of any other consideration, including any relationship between the proficiency standard and the actual job functions.

Essential job functions are a position’s fundamental duties, determined case by case; a consistent shift schedule can be essential.

Spears v. Charlie Creel · filed 2015-04-15(n)

On the record presented, we conclude that Spears has not shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the ability to work shift hours and a consistent schedule was an essential function of an available position with the Sheriff.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence used to determine whether a job duty is essential; clinical, supervisory, and administrative duties were all essential to the Chief Psychologist position.

Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Center · filed 2015-06-04(n)(3)

The evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that each of the elements constituted essential functions of the job.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to whether a job function is essential, including the consequences of not performing it and the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

Oden v. SEPTA · filed 2015-10-05(n)(3)

We find many consequences of a cashier not being punctual including fares not registered, passengers cannot have their questions answered, handicapped passengers may not be able to reach the platform, and SEPTA’s operations would suffer. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of punctuality being an essential function. Additionally, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement place an emphasis on punctuality with its comprehensive “points policy” for tardiness. This factor also weighs in favor of punctuality being an essential function of the cashier position.

A job function may be essential when the position exists to perform that function.

Wheeler v. Jackson National Life Insurance · filed 2016-01-04(n)(2)

Moreover, a job function may be considered essential if the reason the position exists is to perform that particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for deciding whether a job duty is essential, including job descriptions, time spent performing the duty, and the consequences of not requiring it.

Agee v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. · filed 2016-03-30(n)(3)

In addition, other factors courts consider include: (1) written job descriptions prepared for interviewing applicants, (2) the amount of time spent performing the function, (3) the consequences of not requiring the ... employee to perform the function, and (4) past work experience of employees in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). ... Thus, given the unique requirements of an automobile manufacturer and the need to maintain production on various assembly lines, the ability to work overtime is an integral part of production team members’ positions.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) allows a jury to consider time spent performing a job function when deciding whether it is essential.

Brown v. Smith · filed 2016-06-28(n)(3)

The City concedes, as it must, that federal regulations unambiguously state that “[ejvidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to,” time spent performing the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Shell, 789 F.3d at 718. The City offers several reasons for ignoring these regulations, but none are persuasive.

Whether a job duty is essential depends on evidence including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the consequences of omitting the duty, and the experience of employees in similar jobs.

Wickware v. Johns Manville · filed 2017-01-17(n)(3)

Guided by the EEOC’s regulations, we have explicated factors that should be considered in determining whether a particular function is essential to a job—viz., (1) “the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential”; (2) “written job descriptions”; (3) “the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function”; and (4) “the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Shalala, 228 F.3d at 1144 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... Based on the record before us and relying on the same criteria as the district court, we are satisfied that being able to perform all operator positions was an essential function of the relief foreman position.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for deciding whether a job function is essential; those factors may show that regular attendance on a fixed schedule is not essential.

Bridgewater v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd. · filed 2017-10-10(n)(3)

None of the factors suggested by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3), to which the Ford court looked for guidance, favor a finding that regular attendance is an essential function in this case.

Evidence of how employees actually perform a job can create a factual dispute about whether a function is essential, despite the employer's assertion that it is.

Williams v. Abm Parking Servs. Inc. · filed 2017-10-31(n)(3)

Because a jury may conclude that the actual facts concerning operation of shuttle buses by shuttle bus supervisors rebut the defendants' assertion that shuttle bus driving is an essential duty of the shuttle bus supervisor position, a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the question whether shuttle bus driving is an "essential function" of the shuttle bus supervisor position.

An essential function is a fundamental job duty, assessed using evidence of what the position actually requires.

Lazer Spot, Inc. v. PHRC · filed 2018-02-02(n)

Accordingly, under these circumstances, we hold that participation in cross-training that involved driving an 18-wheeled tractor-trailer over public roads or being subject to temporary shuttle work assignments are not essential functions of Lazer Spot’s yard jockey position.

A job description does not conclusively establish which duties are essential; the employee's work experience and the employer's actual practices also matter.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2018-12-18(n)(3)

Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, I conclude that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the essential function of Reina's position was to collect carts from the parking lot and put them in the bay and that using the cart caddy or interacting with customers were not essential functions of his job.

The consequences of leaving a job function unperformed may be considered when deciding whether regular attendance is essential.

Jackson v. City of Birmingham · filed 2019-03-06(n)(3)(iv)

Mr. Jackson does not argue that regular and consistent attendance is not an essential function of the parking officer position, and Mr. Jackson has not offered evidence to create a question of fact with respect to the City's judgment that attendance at work is an essential function of the parking enforcement officer position.

A job’s essential functions are its fundamental duties, including its core duties.

Davenport v. Spencer · filed 2019-05-08(n)(1)

A position's "core duties" are the essential functions of a job, or the fundamental job duties of the position.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) distinguishes fundamental job duties from marginal functions; occasional field inspections and surveys may be marginal.

Kirkland v. Duke · filed 2019-12-23(n)(1)

But, the position description—and, more importantly, Britt’s testimony—show that field inspections and surveys were, at most, “marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Essential functions are a job’s fundamental duties rather than its marginal tasks; punctuality can be essential when timely preparation for surgery is required.

Cooper v. Dignity Health · filed 2020-02-07(n)(1)

The term “essential functions” means the “fundamental job duties” and not the “marginal functions of the position.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to consider factors including the employer’s judgment and the consequences of leaving a duty unperformed when deciding whether a job function is essential.

Weber v. Ry · filed 2021-02-24(n)(3)

To determine whether a function is essential, we look to several factors, such as the “employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential” and “the consequences of not requiring the ... incumbent to perform the function.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for deciding whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, and the consequences of not requiring it.

Thompson v. Microsoft · filed 2021-06-22(n)(3)

In determining whether a function is essential, we look to ... the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function.

Section 1630.2(n) identifies essential job functions by considering the employer’s job description and evidence of the duties the employee performed.

Zalezhnev v. Wonderworld Montessori Academy Corporation · filed 2021-10-05(n)

The district court reasonably concluded these job descriptions encompassed maintaining clean school grounds and operating the non-motorized gates at arrival and dismissal. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Moreover, WMA submitted Zalezhnev’s application for the security/maintenance position, his acknowledgement of the employee handbook, and his deposition admission that his duties included opening and closing the gates. As such, the district court did not err in finding that maintaining the grounds and opening the gates were essential functions of Zalezhnev’s position. See 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(n).

The factors for deciding whether a job function is essential include the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, and the consequences of not requiring the function.

Hicks v. Baylor University Medical Center Dallas · filed 2024-07-22(n)(3)

As “[t]he text of the ADA and its regulations require us to give greatest weight to the employer’s judgment factor,” the Court must prioritize Baylor’s judgment. ... Thus, the Court concludes nasal swabbing was an essential function of Hicks’ role.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties and identifies evidence for deciding whether a duty is essential, including the employer’s judgment and written job descriptions.

Fowlkes v. U.S. Dep't of Defense · filed 2025-12-08(n)

“In attempting the analysis, courts consider ‘the employer’s judgment,’ ‘written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,’ ‘the amount of time spent on the job performing the function,’ and ‘the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.’” Kellar, 157 F.4th at 877-78 (cleaned up) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). ... Communication—with both his Air Force colleagues and contractors—was an essential function of Fowlkes’s engineering job.

Essential functions are fundamental job duties; a reasonable accommodation may help an employee perform them but cannot eliminate them.

Redding v. Noem · filed 2026-03-03(n)(1)

Activities that are so “fundamental” to the job are nonnegotiable. 29 C.F.R. § ... 1630.2(n)(1). A reasonable accommodation can help an employee fulfill a core responsibility that she could not do otherwise, but it cannot eliminate the duty completely.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) requires an employer considering reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to consider a broad range of alternative jobs for which the employee satisfies legitimate prerequisites and can perform the essential functions, including jobs that would be a demotion.

Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc. · filed 1998-03-26(j)(3)(ii)(C)

The employer must first identify the full range of alternative positions for which the individual satisfies the employer’s legitimate, nondiseriminatory prerequisites, and then determine whether the employee’s own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her to perform the essential functions of any of those alternative positions, with or without reasonable accommodations. The employer’s duty to accommodate requires it to consider transferring the employee to any of these other jobs, including those that would represent a demotion. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (defining “broad range of jobs in various classes”); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o).

The regulation recognizes reassignment as a possible reasonable accommodation but does not require promotion, reassignment to an occupied position, or creation of a new position.

White v. York International Corporation · filed 1995-01-05(o)(2)(n)

EEOC guidelines provide that reassignment may be considered as a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(n). However, the ADA does not require an employer to promote a disabled employee as an accommodation, nor must an employer reassign the employee to an occupied position, nor must the employer create a new position to accommodate the disabled worker.

Section 1630.2(o) treats reasonable accommodation as including changes in the work environment or customary practices that enable equal employment opportunities, with reassignment generally considered when accommodation in the current position would pose undue hardship.

Pattison v. Meijer, Inc. · filed 1995-06-26(o)

“[A]n accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (app.). ... However, “[i]n general, reassignment should be considered only when accommodation within the individual’s current position would pose an undue hardship.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (app.); ... Because a first shift position was not vacant or to be vacant in a reasonable amount of time, Meijer was not required to reassign plaintiff to the first shift.

Section 1630.2(o)(ii) defines reasonable accommodation as changes to the work environment or the manner in which a position is performed that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the position’s essential functions.

Johnson v. City of Port Arthur · filed 1995-06-30(o)(ii)

A “reasonable accommodation” is defined by the ADA as “modification or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner of circumstances under which the position held is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii). Changing movant from a laborer to a “light-duty” worker is not a reasonable accommodation to assist in the performance of his job; it is a completely different job. It is a change in the essential functions of the employment. Although mov-ant has supported his argument with examples of persons who were injured and returned to work in light-duty positions, such an accommodation does not appear mandatory and the City asserted at the administrative level that there were no vacant positions open for movant’s reassignment. As a result, movant’s lawsuit does not have a substantial probability of success.

Section 1630.2 defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal duties and recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable-accommodation avenue employers must consider.

Davoll v. Webb · filed 1996-10-10(n)(l), (o)(2)(ii)

The EEOC regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds” and “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). ... I conclude the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement includes reassignment and imposes a duty on employers to consider that avenue.

Section 1630.2(o)(2) recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation, considered only after accommodation in the employee's current position would pose an undue hardship and subject to the requirement that the employee be qualified for the vacant position.

Cravens v. Blue Cross · filed 2000-06-07(o)(2)

Notably, the scope of this reassignment duty is limited by a number of constraints. For one, the very prospect of reassignment does not even arise unless "accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an undue hardship." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o). In this sense, reassignment is an accommodation of last resort.

Subsection (o) treats reassignment as a reasonable accommodation only when accommodation in the employee’s current position would impose undue hardship, with an equivalent position to be considered first.

Nighswander v. Henderson · filed 2001-10-05(o)

An employer should reassign an employee “ ‘only when accommodation within the individual’s current position would pose an undue hardship.’ ” ... If an employer finds reassignment necessary, the employer first should attempt to reassign an employee to an equivalent position in terms of pay, status, and benefits if the employee is qualified for the equivalent position and the position is vacant within a reasonable amount of time. ... An employer “should only reassign an individual to a lower graded position if the individual cannot be accommodated in an equivalent position.” ... These cases, read together, mean that an employer has, in the first instance, discretion to choose from among various reasonable accommodations. Reassignment, however, is reasonable only when continued accommodation in the employee’s current position would be an undue hardship for the employer. In circumstances where accommodation in the current position is an undue hardship, the employer first must, in any event, attempt to reassign the employee to an equivalent position.

Section 1630.2(o) treats reassignment as a possible reasonable accommodation but generally does not require an employer to create or promote an employee into a position; reassignment ordinarily concerns an equivalent vacant position for which the employee is qualified.

Zamudio v. Patla · filed 1997-02-20(o)

The law is clear that an employer is not obliged to create a new position in order to accommodate an employee. ... Neither is an employer obliged to offer a transfer to a position where there is no current vacancy nor any impending vacancy. ... The applicable regulations provide: ... Employers should reassign the individual to an equivalent position, in terms of pay, status, etc., if the individual is qualified, and if the position is vacant within a reasonable amount of time. ... It should also be noted that an employer is not required to promote an individual with a disability as an accommodation.

Section 1630.2(o) does not require an employer to reallocate essential job functions, create new jobs, or reassign a disabled employee to an occupied position, and reassignment is available to employees rather than applicants.

Puckett v. Porsche Cars of North America, Inc. · filed 1997-08-27(o)

The ADA does not require an employer to reallocate essential job functions, create new jobs, or reassign disabled employees to positions that are already occupied. ... Reassignment is only available to employees, not to applicants.

Section 1630.2(o) treats reassignment as a reasonable accommodation that must be considered when an employee cannot perform the present job even with reasonable accommodations.

Ransom v. State of Arizona Board of Regents · filed 1997-10-22(o)

Reassignment must be considered when an employee is unable to perform his or her present job, even with reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(o).

Section 1630.2(o) permits reassignment to a lower-graded position without maintaining the salary of the higher-graded position when no accommodation would allow the employee to remain in the current position and no vacant equivalent position is available, unless the employer maintains that higher salary for reassigned nondisabled employees.

Fail v. Community Hospital · filed 1997-11-24(o)

The instruction differs from 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1996) by the inclusion of the emphasized language. The instruction tendered by plaintiff and given by the court more accurately mirrors the language of § 1630.2(o): ... The instruction delivered by the court is a correct statement of the law and adequately . advised the jury regarding the hospital’s obligations with respect to reassignment under the ADA, including the issue of the rate of pay following reassignment.

The reasonable-accommodation provision treats reassignment to a vacant position as an available accommodation after accommodation in the current position cannot reasonably be made, and an appropriate reassignment must be offered rather than merely considered.

Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. · filed 1999-06-14(o)(2)(ii)

The context of the quoted language reveals that the word “considered” is not intended to denigrate a disabled employee’s right to have reassignment offered as a reasonable accommodation where appropriate.

Section 1630.2 recognizes that an employer may need to engage in an informal interactive process to develop a reasonable accommodation, which may include reassignment to a vacant position.

Liner v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Jefferson Parish · filed 2007-04-10(o)(3), (o)(2)(ii)

Once an employee requests an accommodation for a disability, ADA regulations state that “it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process” designed to craft a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). This court has held that “when an employer’s unwillingness to engage in a good faith interactive process leads to a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee, the employer violates the ADA.” Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d Cir. 1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)). However, because the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the employer and the employee, the employer is not liable under the ADA if the breakdown in the interactive process is traceable to the employee. Id. Consequently, the process must be viewed on a case-by-case basis. ... In sum, instead of working with Liner to identify a vacant position within WJMC that he might be able to transfer to, WJMC terminated Liner and told him it was his responsibility to find another job within WJMC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (stating that a reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to a vacant position).

Section 1630.2(o) defines a reasonable accommodation broadly, and changes such as sick leave or light duty can qualify when they enable an employee with a disability to work.

Pappas v. Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia · filed 2021-01-12(o)

First, the Court concludes that MPD granted each of the Plaintiffs an initial accommodation by placing them on either sick leave or on light duty, as these changes to Plaintiffs’ job responsibilities fit the definition of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. ... The ADA defines an accommodation as “any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1997).

Section 1630.2(o) recognizes that reasonable accommodation may include accrued paid leave or additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment.

Smith v. American Electric Power Service Corporation · filed 2021-04-14(o)

Finally, APCO provided Smith with a reasonable accommodation: unlimited paid leave while he recovered from shoulder surgery. See Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013) (Reasonable accommodation may comprise “the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)).

Section 1630.2(o)(4) does not require a covered entity to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual whose disability is established solely under the “regarded as” prong.

Neal v. East Carolina University · filed 2022-11-04(o)(4)

Further, she is proceeding solely under the “regarded as” prong of establishing a disability, which does not require sua sponte accommodations for a perceived impairment that has caused unprofessional conduct. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(4) (stating that covered entities are “not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong”).

Section 1630.2(o) does not require an employer to create a new position as a reasonable accommodation.

Monte v. City of Tampa · filed 2024-02-06(o)

Defendant was not required to accommodate Plaintiff by creating a position for him. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). But the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant did create this light duty position for Plaintiff.

Section 1630.2(o) no longer treats using leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

ROGERS v. CITY OF GREENSBORO ABC BOARD · filed 2024-07-24(o)

But that regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), no longer includes the provision cited in Wilson that using leave is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, and more recently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court opinion holding that requesting leave does not constitute an ADA accommodation.

Section 1630.2(m) asks whether an individual meets the position’s job-related requirements and can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, while § 1630.2(o) recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation and a last resort when the existing job cannot be accommodated.

Robbins · filed 2026-03-31(m), (o)

The Ninth Circuit established a two-step inquiry to determine qualification for a position: the court first considers whether the individual satisfies the “‘requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements’ of the position,” and then considers “whether the individual ‘can perform the essential functions of such position’ with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (first quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); then quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). ... While reassignment to a vacant position may be a form of reasonable accommodation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii), “[r]eassignment is a last resort to be utilized only if the employee cannot be reasonably accommodated in his or her existing job,” Ransom v. State of Arizona Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 900–01 (D. Ariz. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)).

Reassignment may be a reasonable accommodation when an employee cannot perform the current job with an accommodation, but the employee must show a vacant position for which she is qualified.

Pellack v. Thorek Hospital & Medical Center · filed 1998-07-10(o)(2)(ii)

Reassignment may be considered a reasonable accommodation where it is not possible to provide an accommodation that would enable an otherwise qualified individual to perform the functions of his or her own job. ... Plaintiff has not made this showing because she has not offered any evidence that, prior to her termination, she identified and applied for any vacant position for which she was qualified.

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) includes reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation.

Community Hospital v. Fail · filed 1998-11-30(o)(2)(ii)

In addition, we are persuaded by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines listing reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) includes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation, but does not require reassignment to a position for which the employee is unqualified.

Hedrick v. Western Rsrv · filed 2004-01-09(o)(2)(ii)

Although a “reasonable accommodation” may include reassignment to a vacant position, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii), an employer need not reassign a disabled employee to a position for which he is not qualified, nor is the employer required to waive legitimate, non-discriminatory employment policies or displace other employees’ rights in order to accommodate a disabled employee.

Section 1630.2(e)(1) treats an ADA employer during the transition period as a person with 25 or more employees on each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Jones v. Inter-County Imaging Centers · filed 1995-06-16(e)(1)

The ADA defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except that, from July 26, 1992 through July 25, 1994, an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and any agent of such person.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1). Because Jones was terminated in May of 1993, the applicable period is January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1993 and the applicable number of employees is 25 or more.

The regulation defines physical or mental impairment and major life activities, sets the substantial-limitation standard and factors for assessing it, and describes undue hardship as an accommodation that is excessively costly or disruptive or fundamentally alters the business.

Hendry v. GTE North, Inc. · filed 1995-08-17(h)(1), (i), (j)(1), (j)(2), (j)(3), (p)

The regulations define "physical or mental impairment" as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition" affecting one or more of the various body systems, including the cardiovascular system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). "Major life activities" are the basic activities that the average person can perform with little or no difficulty, e.g., "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "Substantially limits" is defined as either the inability to perform a major life activity, or a serious restriction on the ability to perform a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). In considering whether a person's impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the Court should consider: (1) its nature and severity, (2) how long it will last or is expected to last, and (3) its permanent or long-term impact, or expected impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... In addition, the following factors should be considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in working: (1) the type of job from which the individual has been disqualified because of impairment; (2) the number and types of jobs within that area from which the individual is disqualified; (3) the number and types of jobs using similar training, knowledge, skill, or abilities from which the individual is disqualified; and (4) the number of and types of other jobs in the area from which the individual is also disqualified. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). ... Here, Hendry's absences were unduly disruptive to GTE's operation. Thornburg Aff. ¶¶ 20-21; see, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) ("Undue hardship" refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.).

Section 1630.2 defines essential functions as the fundamental duties of the position and an employer as an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees.

Zeltman v. Infinigy Solutions, LLC · filed 2024-03-15(n)(1), (e)

It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the existence of some accommodation that would allow them to perform their essential job functions. See id. “Essential functions” broadly encompasses “the fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). ... It is not disputed by either party that Infinigy is subject to the ADA as an employer. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (defining an “employer” as an entity must be “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees”). However, the three remaining elements of prima facie discrimination are subject to genuine disputes of material fact.

Section 1630.2(m) defines a qualified individual by the ability to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, § 1630.2(n)(1) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions, and § 1630.2(n)(3) identifies factors for determining which duties are essential, including time spent and the consequences of not requiring performance.

Yonemoto v. McDonald · filed 2015-07-10(m), (n)(1), (n)(3)(iii), (n)(3)(iv)

The fact-finder should “consider, among other things, ‘the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are éssential,’ 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants, id.; ‘[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function,’ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii); ‘[t]he consequences of not requiring the [applicant or employee] to perform the function,’ id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv); and the work experience of current and former employees.”

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies employer judgment, written job descriptions, and collective-bargaining agreements as evidence of essential job functions, while § 1630.2(q) defines qualification standards as requirements an employer establishes for eligibility for a position.

McDaniel v. AlliedSignal, Inc. · filed 1995-08-24(n)(3)(i), (n)(3)(ii), (n)(3)(v), (q)

Notably, the ADA specifically requires consideration to be given to "the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i). Plaintiff does not dispute that AlliedSignal, in its capacity as a contractor for the DOE, has always considered a security clearance to be an essential function of all employment positions at the Kansas City Plant. ... The Handbook further states that "[i]f the government denies or revokes [an employee's] security clearance, [] employment will be terminated." Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii) (evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes "[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.") ... The Union agrees that, where Government security regulations are placed upon [AlliedSignal], such regulations will govern the acceptance or rejection of an employee for work coming under those regulations. The Union agrees that it will not file a grievance where the Company has removed from the payroll any employee who has not received a security clearance or whose security clearance has been revoked. This provision does not affect any rights or remedies available through Government procedures. Agreement at pp. 73-74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes "[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement.") ... According to EEOC regulations implementing the ADA, "qualification standards mean the personal and professional attributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). ... Because the Court finds a security clearance to be an essential function of Plaintiff's employment position, it seems to go without saying that a security clearance is both job-related and consistent with business necessity. Accordingly, the Court finds that the qualification standard requirement of a security clearance to maintain Plaintiff's employment does not violate this section of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(l)(3) treats a person as having a substantially limiting impairment when other people treat that person as having one.

Wooten v. Farmland Foods · filed 1995-06-28(l)(3)

A person is “regarded as having” an impairment that substantially limits the person’s major life activities when other people treat that person as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Section 1630.2(n) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal duties, and treats a function as essential when the position exists to perform it.

Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. · filed 1995-07-06(n)(1) and (n)(2)

The term “essential functions” is defined by the EEOC regulations as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds” and “does not include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l). A job function may be considered essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).

A pregnancy-related condition can qualify as an ADA disability when severe back pain is partly attributable to an aggravated prior back injury and the condition's duration cannot yet be determined.

Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1995-09-26(h)(1), (i), (j)(1)(ii), (h), (j)

The regulations define a “physical or mental impairment” as a physiological disorder or condition which affects one or more body systems, including the musculoskeletal system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). ... However, Ms. Patterson has alleged that her back pain was also attributable in part to the aggravation of a prior back injury, and thus the duration of her condition is impossible to ascertain on the meager record presently before the court. I therefore conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges a “disability” to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Xerox’s motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

Section 1630.2(j) addresses when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, while § 1630.2(h)(1) defines physical impairment to include physiological disorders affecting listed body systems, including the endocrine system.

Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc. · filed 1995-12-05(j), (h)(1)

While defendant disputes that plaintiffs condition substantially limits even one of his major life activities, the Court finds that, at the very least, plaintiff has raised a sufficiently genuine fact issue with respect to this point. ... Regulations which implement the ADA define a physical impairment as ... [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.... ... Accordingly, the Court presumes for purposes of evaluating defendant’s summary judgment motion that Turco could produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 1630.2 defines physical impairment, major life activity, substantial limitation in working, and being regarded as having an impairment for determining who is disabled under the ADA.

Redlich v. Albany Law School of Union University · filed 1995-10-03(h)(1)-(2); (h)(2)(i); (j)(3)(i); (g)(3)

The regulations define “physical impairment” broadly, as “(A) any physiological disorder or condition, ... or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems (list omitted) ... or (B) any mental or psychological disorder ...” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i); 45 C.F.R. § 605.3(j)(2)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l)-(2). ... Under the Department of Health and Human Services regulations, “major life activity” is defined as “functions such as earing for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii); 45 C.F.R. § 605.3(j)(2)(ii); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i). The relevant “major life activity” at issue in this case is “working.” The Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA define the term “substantially limits” with respect to working as “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). ... A disabled person may be defined as one who “is regarded as having a [physical or mental] impairment.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv); 45 C.F.R. § 605.3(j)(2)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3). The regulations define that phrase to mean having “a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by [the employer] as constituting such limitation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0(1). ... Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to raise a material factual issue as to whether he was regarded by the defendant as substantially limited in a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats a physiological disorder affecting the reproductive system as a physical impairment, and section 1630.2(i) encompasses reproduction as a major life activity.

Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges · filed 1995-10-18(h)(1) (i)

First, the EEOC instructs that “physical or mental impairment means: (1) any physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more of a number of the following body systems:” including reproductive. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Thus, in this case, the first inquiry is an easy one: Plaintiffs infertility is a physiological disorder of the reproductive system. ... The Court also finds that Congress intended reproduction to qualify as a major life activity. ... Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiffs allegation that her infertility is a physical impairment which substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction states a claim under the ADA; accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II is denied.

Subsection (q) defines a qualification standard as the personal and professional attributes established by a covered entity as requirements an individual must meet to be eligible for a position; the court applied that definition to hold that a campus police officer's no-direct-threat requirement need not be written in a handbook.

Metzenbaum v. John Carroll University · filed 1997-10-22(q)

The regulations define “qualification standard” as “the personal and professional attributes ... - established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired”. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). ... Plaintiff acknowledges these, provisions but contends that Defendant has not demonstrated that “campus police officer shall not be a direct threat” was a written qualification in the employee handbook. That campus police officers not pose a direct threat is an obvious qualification that need not be written down or published in a handbook to apply.

Section 1630.2 distinguishes a qualified individual who can perform a position's essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, from an applicant who meets an employer's separate qualification standards.

Bates v. UPS · filed 2007-12-27(m), (n)(1), (q)

Qualification for a position is a two-step inquiry. The court first examines whether the individual satisfies the “requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements” of the position. The court then considers whether the individual “can perform the essential functions of such position” with or without a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); ... “Essential functions” are not to be confused with “qualification standards,” which an employer may establish for a certain position. Whereas “essential functions” are basic “duties,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), “qualification standards” are “personal and professional attributes” that may include “physical, medical [and] safety” requirements. Id. § 1630.2(q). The difference is crucial.

A person may qualify under the ADA by satisfying the job's prerequisites and showing that they can perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; they need not satisfy every employer-established qualification standard, especially the challenged one.

Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2007-12-28(m), (n)(1), and (q)

The statute does not require that a person meet each of an employer's established "qualification standards," however, to show that he is "qualified."

Section 1630.2(q) defines qualification standards as skill, experience, education, physical, and other requirements a covered entity sets for eligibility for a desired or held position.

Frilando v. Metropolitan Transit Authority · filed 2020-04-22(q)

The English Language Requirement is a qualification standard. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (“Qualification standards . . . includ[e] the skill, experience, education, physical . . . and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired.”).

Subsection (q) treats an employer's medical and safety requirements as qualification standards that an individual must meet to be eligible for the position.

Frost v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2021-01-06(q)

Without medical approval from the City, he was not qualified for employment as a cadet in the Fire Academy.

Section 1630.2(q) permits an employer to establish necessary qualification standards, including safety standards, so the employer may require a garbage-truck driver to operate the vehicle with both hands.

Torres v. Rock River Disposal Services, Inc. · filed 2021-06-10(q)

But RRD is entitled to have qualification standards to ensure proper safety, and Torres already admitted that safety protocol requires driving with two hands. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(q), 1630.10(b); Torres Dep. 38:8–11. Thus, even if employing a helper to perform the physical elements of his job was a reasonable accommodation, he still would not be able to perform the essential functions of the residential driver position.

Section 1630.2 distinguishes employer qualification standards from essential job functions: an ADA plaintiff must show the ability to perform essential functions, but need not show that the plaintiff meets every challenged qualification standard.

Blankinship v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2024-12-20(q), (n)(1)

Qualification standards are “personal and professional attributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). “Essential functions,” in contrast, are the “fundamental job duties” of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). “Essential functions” and “qualification standards” are distinct. Bates, 511 F.3d at 990. The ADA requires an employee to prove that he can perform the essential functions of the job but does not require the employee to prove that he can meet each of the employer’s qualification standards. Id.

Section 1630.2(n)(1) treats essential functions as fundamental job duties, while § 1630.2(q) treats qualification standards as personal and professional attributes; an ADA plaintiff need not show compliance with an employer's qualification standards, and the employer bears the burden of showing that those standards reflect inability to perform essential functions.

Stern v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2025-04-28(n)(1), (q)

There, the Ninth Circuit explained essential functions of employment are different from employer-created qualification standards. See id. at 990. Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the employment position.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Whereas qualification standards are “personal and professional attributes” that could include “physical, medical, [and] safety requirements.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q)). An ADA plaintiff is not required to show they meet qualification standards set by an employer. Id. Doing so would make little sense because an ADA discrimination claim can be entirely based on a qualification standard being discriminatory. See id. An employer bears the burden of showing their qualification standards equate to an ADA plaintiff being unable to perform essential functions of a job. See id. at 991.

A medical requirement that an applicant must meet to be eligible for a position is a qualification standard.

Leverett v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1999-05-19(q)

The City’s hearing requirement clearly constitutes a qualification standard, as it is a medical requirement which must be satisfied to be a firefighter with the IFD.

The ADA employment regulations in 29 C.F.R. § 1630 do not apply to a Rehabilitation Act case that does not involve employment disability discrimination.

Pahulu v. University of Kansas · filed 1995-08-29(j)

The ease at bar does not involve employment disability discrimination; thus, the regulations found at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 are not applicable.

The regarded-as disability provision does not apply when a police department’s physical standards are rationally related to police duties rather than based on unsubstantiated fears.

Joyce v. Suffolk County · filed 1996-01-16(l)

In the Court’s view, the police department has every right to require that its new recruits be in optimal physical condition. Further, the standards set forth to effectuate that goal are in no way based on “unsubstantiated fears.”

Section 1630.2(o)(3) requires an employer, when necessary to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation, to initiate an informal interactive process with the qualified employee to identify the disability's precise limitations and potential accommodations, with both parties participating in good faith.

Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and Chancellor John Schroe · filed 1996-01-26(o)(3)

The employer has at least some responsibility in determining the necessary accommodation. The federal regulations implementing the ADA state: ... To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. ... But the regulations envision an interactive process that requires participation by both parties: ... [T]he employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats infertility as a physical impairment when it affects the reproductive system, and § 1630.2(i)'s illustrative list permits reproduction to qualify as a major life activity.

Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., Inc. · filed 1996-02-16(h)(1), (i)

A “physical or mental impairment” is “[a]ny physiological disorder ... or condition” that affects one or more of a number of listed “body systems.” Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA regulations”), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1995). Specifically listed as one of the covered “body systems” is the reproductive system. ... It defies common sense to say that infertility is not a physiological disorder or condition affecting the reproductive system. In fact, infertility is the ultimate impairment of the reproductive system. Moreover, it does not matter whether the infertility is explained or not. The ADA and regulations under it are simply devoid of any requirement that a physiological disorder or condition have a scientific name or known etiology. Therefore, infertility, whether explained or not, is an impairment under the ADA. ... The list includes, but is not limited to, “walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” ... In short, the court declines to limit “major life activities” to those activities that occur with frequency or are a necessary part of daily existence. To do so would be to ignore the EEOC’s interpretation of the term, courts’ directives to construe statutes like the ADA broadly, and the momentousness of reproduction. Accordingly, the court finds that reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(o)(3) suggests initiating an informal, interactive process in certain circumstances but does not require employers to use one.

Staub v. Boeing Co. · filed 1996-02-26(o)(3)

First, § 1630.2 does not require an informal process; it merely suggests it in certain circumstances.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats inability to perform a single particular job as insufficient by itself to substantially limit working, while §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) and (o)(2)(ii) address accommodations that enable essential functions, including reassignment to a vacant position.

Munoz v. H & M WHOLESALE, INC. · filed 1996-05-10(j)(3)(i), (o)(1)(ii), (o)(2)(ii)

“ ‘[Substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.’ ” ... An employee’s inability to perform one aspect of his job while retaining the ability to perform the work in general does not “constitute a substantial limitation of the activity of working.” ... The ADA defines reasonable accommodation as “ ‘modification or adjustments to work environment, or to the manner of circumstances under which the position held is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.’ ” ... Under the ADA, reassignment to a vacant position may be considered a reasonable accommodation.

Section 1630.2(c) identifies major life activities, while the court applied the ADA regulations to hold that an ordinary pregnancy with usual limitations is not a physical impairment or disability absent unusual circumstances.

Jessie v. Carter Health Care Center, Inc. · filed 1996-05-24(c)

“‘Major life activities’ in turn are defined by the regulations as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2© (1996). ... A condition such as pregnancy (and the usual accompanying limitations) is considered, for lack of a better word, a physiological “disorder” rather than some sort of physical impairment. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(h) at 395 (1994). ... That is, it is a temporary non-chronic condition of short duration which is not a disability under normal circumstances. ... The Court finds this interpretation and the opinions cited by Carter to be persuasive. ... No unusual circumstances exist with respect to Jessie’s pregnancy and thus such condition is not a “physical impairment” under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) excludes conditions such as pregnancy that are not the result of a physiological disorder from the definition of an impairment.

Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor · filed 1996-11-11(h)(1)

The Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) states that “conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are ... not impairments.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1995).

Section 1630.2 treats blindness as a disability under the ADA.

Sifre v. Department of Health · filed 1999-03-31

Plaintiff Román, however, is blind, which is a disability covered by the ADA.