28 U.S.C. § 1391

When an amended complaint adds a federal claim to a diversity action, § 1391(b) governs venue, allowing suit where all defendants reside or the claim arose.

Applegate v. Scott · filed 1984-03-26(b)

Here, plaintiff’s complaint, as amended, alleges a cause of action grounded not only in diversity but also in federal law. Accordingly, the propriety of venue must be determined with reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Venue is proper only where defendants reside (Pennsylvania) or where the cause of action arose (Pennsylvania).

Section 1391(b) supplements the venue provisions of RICO and the Sherman Act by permitting consideration of the district where the claim arose.

Chambers Development Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries · filed 1984-07-06(b)

Therefore, we may also consider whether this is “the judicial district in which the claim arose ... ”, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), in determining whether venue, and hence, jurisdiction, is proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391 provides an alternative basis for venue in civil RICO cases.

City of New York v. Cyco. Net, Inc. · filed 2005-01-27

This means Plaintiff may properly lay venue in accordance with either 18 U.S.C.1965 or 28 U.S.C. 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules did not support the chosen district for this RICO action; the court considered RICO’s separate venue provision.

Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C. · filed 2005-11-02

The general venue statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1391, does not support Plaintiffs choice of venue here. However, Plaintiff brought suit in this district pursuant to section 1965(a), RICO’s venue provision.

Under § 1391(e)(1), a federal agency and its secretary do not reside in a district merely because the agency maintains a regional office there.

Garcia v. Acosta · filed 2019-06-24(e)(1)

Although the Department maintains a regional office in Chicago, neither the Secretary of Labor nor the Department of Labor “resides” in the Northern District of Illinois; both are, instead, residents of the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(e)(1)(A) permits venue where a federal agency or official-capacity defendant resides.

Southern Poverty Law Center v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2019-05-10(e)(1)(A)

Each of the Defendants in this case is a federal agency, or an officer or employee thereof sued in his or her official capacity. It is undisputed that venue is available in this jurisdiction, where a number of these Defendants reside.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a plaintiff resides in an action against federal officers or employees that involves no real property.

California v. Trump · filed 2019-05-24(e)(1)

Because the Court finds that California has independent Article III standing, the Court finds venue is proper.

Section 1391(e)(1)(A) permits venue where a federal employee sued in an official capacity is domiciled, even if the employee works elsewhere.

Navajo Health Foundation-Sage Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Burwell · filed 2015-02-05(e)(1)(A)

Consequently, the Court holds that, because Dayish is domiciled in New Mexico, the District of New Mexico is a proper venue for this case under § 1391(e)(1)(A).

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue for claims against federal agencies and officials sued in their official capacities in a district where they reside.

Bond v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2011-12-06(e)(1)

This application of § 1391(e) is incorrect. Section 1391(e) states that venue is proper for claims against federal defendants (including officials sued in their official capacities) in judicial districts where: “(1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the a claim occurred . . . , or (3) the plaintiff resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (emphasis added).

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue for equitable claims against federal defendants where an official defendant resides, even if the government calls that defendant nominal.

Franz v. United States · filed 1984-07-06(e)(1)

In this proceeding, three official defendants, the United States, the Department of Justice, and the Attorney General reside in the District of Columbia. Their residence as a source of venue in this District is not precluded by the government’s assertion that the Department of Justice is only a nominal defendant in this action. That argument ignores the technical requirements of section 1391(e)(1) and glosses over the Department’s responsibility for administering the Witness Protection Program.

For an officer sued in an official capacity, venue is proper in a district where the officer performs a substantial portion of official duties, even if the officer performs more duties elsewhere.

Doe v. Casey · filed 1985-01-16(e)

The venue of a civil action involving federal question jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); the venue of an action against an officer of the United States sued in his official capacity is governed by § 1391(e). Both sections provide that venue is proper in the judicial district where the defendant resides. ... In determining the residence of a public official sued in his official capacity, the test of residence is where official duties are performed. When, as here, Director Casey performs a substantial portion of his duties in the District, although a larger proportion in Virginia, it is appropriate to conclude that the District of Columbia is a proper place for venue.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside.

Brant Point Corp. v. Poetzsch · filed 1987-09-30(a)

There is no question that this action might have been brought in the Western District of North Carolina since both defendants reside there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

For federal-question venue, a state official sued in his individual capacity does not reside in a district merely because he maintains a satellite office there when the suit has no connection to that district.

Braggs v. Lane · filed 1989-07-14(b)

True enough, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) — applicable to a federal-question lawsuit such as this one — limits filing to “the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” ... Upon reconsideration, it determines that Lane should not in fact be considered as residing in this district for purposes of this action for two reasons: ... Clearly this lawsuit lacks any adequate connection to the Northern District of Illinois under that analysis — even apart from the perhaps questionable application of the first two factors, the third is totally nonexistent.

Section 1391 permits venue in a judicial district where all defendants reside.

T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-12-30

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b), in that all the Defendants reside in this judicial district.

Section 1391(e) does not make a federal agency a resident of a district solely because it maintains a regional office there.

Davies Precision MacHining, Inc. v. Defense Logistics Agency · filed 1993-06-25(e)

With Congress providing such a convenient alternative venue, I find no reason to contort the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) to require that a federal agency be deemed to reside in a judicial district with which it has no other contact other than the fact that a regional office operates there.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a defendant’s district of residence only if all defendants reside in the same state.

Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. Mesa Operating Co. · filed 1996-06-21(a)(1)

Therefore, even if Mesa was a resident of the Northern District at the time the action commenced, venue would not be proper under section 1391(a)(1) because Hillin-Simon is not an Oklahoma resident and thus the second prong of that provision has not been satisfied.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Hunter v. Chiles · filed 1996-10-24(b)

This case can be brought in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Venue lies in the Southern District of Florida because all Defendants reside in Florida, Defendant Mitchell resides in the Southern District and the cause of action arose within the Southern District as to Plaintiff Hunter.

Section 1391(b)(1) requires all defendants to reside in the same state and at least one to reside in the forum district.

Dee-K Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. · filed 1997-12-23(b)(1)

That section requires that all defendants reside in-state, and that at least one defendant reside in the forum district.

When jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity, § 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Kunkler v. Palko Management Corp. · filed 1998-02-12(b)(1)

Therefore, since both defendants reside in New Jersey, as would satisfy the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, and since both defendants conduct substantial and continuous business affairs in New Jersey, as would satisfy the specific venue requirements of RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a), New Jersey is a district in which this case could have been brought.

Section 1391(a)(1) did not establish venue in the forum district where the defendants did not all reside there.

Tischio v. Bontex, Inc. · filed 1998-07-23(a)(1)

Venue is not proper in this District pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 1391(a) because all of the Defendants do not reside in this District.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. Partnership · filed 2001-03-22(a)(1)

Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as all defendants reside within the State of Virginia.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue based on the residence of a federal officer or agency defendant, but not on the residence of a joined non-federal defendant.

Rogers v. Civil Air Patrol · filed 2001-02-01(e)(1)

This court is persuaded by the logic of the Clarke opinion, and holds that the term “a defendant” in section 1391(e)(1) refers only to a federal officer or agency defendant in the case, and not to “any” defendant, including a non-federal one.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside.

Dermamed, Inc. v. Spa De Soleil, Inc. · filed 2001-06-14(b)

Moreover, this case may have been properly brought in California because that is where all Defendants reside.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only when all defendants reside in the same state.

Schultz v. Ary · filed 2001-11-15(b)(1)

Because Ary does not reside in Michigan, subsection (1) of 1391(b) does not make Michigan a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendants reside.

Millennium One Communications, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission · filed 2005-03-18(b)

Venue is proper because Defendants reside in the Austin Division of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(a) permits venue based on defendants’ residence when all defendants reside in the same state, or based on where a substantial part of the events occurred.

McNeil v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2010-06-15(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a). A review of the complaint shows that not all defendants reside in the same state, and that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" not in the District of Columbia, but in Seattle, Washington and surrounding areas.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in that district’s state.

Everlast World's Boxing Headquarters Corp. v. Ringside, Inc. · filed 2013-03-04(b)(1)

Because both RAL and Combat reside in Kansas, venue would be proper in the District of Kansas.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that district’s state.

Brown v. Pepe · filed 2014-09-08(b)(1)

Because all of the defendants named in Brown II reside in this district, venue in Massachusetts is now proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Jimenez v. R & D Masonry, Inc. · filed 2015-11-20(b)(1)

Plaintiffs certainly could have brought suit initially in Maryland, given that all Defendants are residents of that state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the same state).

Section 1391(e) permits venue where a federal officer sued in an official capacity performs a significant portion of official duties.

Daniels v. Shulkin · filed 2018-05-22(e)

Here, Defendant has been sued in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the VA, which is headquartered in the District of Columbia. Thus, Defendant performs a significant portion of his official duties in the District of Columbia. The Court therefore concludes that under § 1391(e), venue is proper in the District of Columbia for Mr. Daniels’s ADEA claim, as well as his VEVRAA, WPA, HIPAA and constitutional claims.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside when they all reside in the same state.

Torcup, Inc. v. Aztec Bolting Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-07-09(b)(1)

Here, Texas can exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants because High is a citizen of League City, Texas and ABS is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in League City, Texas. For these same reasons, venue is appropriate in the Southern District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where the defendants reside.

Computer Programs & Systems, Inc. v. Texas General Hospital · filed 2019-09-11(b)(1)

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because CPSI and Trubridge have their principal places of business in this judicial district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Monroe v. Gerbing · filed 2019-09-25(b)(1)

Because all other Defendants are also residents of New York, this alone makes the Southern District of New York a proper venue under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Miller v. Annucci · filed 2019-09-26(b)(1)

Because all Defendants are residents of New York, this makes both the Northern and Southern Districts proper venues under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Lev v. Colvin · filed 2019-12-23(b)(1)

It is not disputed that Defendant Annucci is in Albany, (Dkt. No. 25-2, at 30), thus venue in the Northern District of New York is proper under § 1391.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Integrity Life Insurance Company v. HOUSE · filed 2020-04-20(b)(1)

Venue in the Eastern District of Missouri would be proper because all of the named defendants reside in Missouri.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state where the district is located.

Adlaka v. State Farm Insurance Companies Fire Claims Division (35-5350-L96) · filed 2020-06-12(b)(1)

Therefore, all defendants do not reside in Indiana, and venue is not proper in this district under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a federal agency defendant resides, which the court held is the District of Columbia.

Fulkerson v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2020-07-07(e)(1)

The only defendants named in the proposed SAC are the same federal government agencies against whom plaintiff brought his initial complaint, and, consequently, to the extent plaintiff is relying on the residence of those defendants, venue is only proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only when all defendants reside in the state containing the district.

Curry v. Jasper · filed 2020-08-14(b)(1)

Accordingly, because not all defendants are residents of Alabama, § 1391(b)(1) is not a path to venue in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Tennessee Prisoners v. Parker · filed 2020-10-26(b)(1)

While venue is not improper here because Commissioner Tony Parker resides in this district, the other Defendants––Superintendent Taurean James and Cpl. Sellers––reside in ... Memphis, Tennessee, where they are employed at the Mark Luttrell Transitional Center.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Interlink Products International, Inc. v. Crowfoot · filed 2020-11-16(b)(1)

As discussed above, venue would be proper in the Eastern District of California pursuant to § 1391(b)(1) because that is where Defendants, sued in their official capacities, reside.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Turane v. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision · filed 2021-01-19(b)(1)

But because Plaintiff’s remaining claims are against individual DOCCS officials assigned to DOCCS offices in Albany County, which is in the Northern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 112(a), venue is also proper in the Northern District of New York under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Harris v. TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker · filed 2021-01-22(b)(1)

This case falls under the first Section 1391(b) category above, as all Defendants reside in this state. Venue in this district is not improper because Commissioner Tony Parker resides here, but all other Defendants appear to reside in Morgan County, Tennessee, where they are employed as MCCX officials.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state where the district is located.

Trebbles v. The State of Ohio · filed 2021-04-07(b)(1)

Thus, even assuming that defendant Enterprise Rental Cars resides in this District, venue is not proper under § 1391(b)(1) on that basis, because not all defendants are residents of New York State.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Hirsch v. Wade · filed 2021-07-16(b)(1)

Thus, venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), because James is located within the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Robinson v. Serra Chevrolet Buick GMC of Nashville · filed 2021-08-26(b)(1)

Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in the Middle District of Tennessee with respect to all Defendants.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Zen Group, Inc. v. State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration · filed 2021-09-28(b)(1)

Here, all the defendants are residents of Florida and at least one defendant is a resident of the Northern District of Florida. Thus, the first prong to satisfy a motion to transfer is met.

Section 1391(b)(1) requires all defendants to reside in the same state for venue to rest on a defendant’s residence in the district.

Susana v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) · filed 2021-11-09(b)(1)

Even though ICE and the United States can be considered to reside in this district, venue is nonetheless improper under section 1391(b)(1) because Plaintiffs do not allege that all Defendants reside in the State of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) looks to the defendants’ residence, not the plaintiffs’ residence, to determine venue.

KUTSENKOW v. FUSCARDO · filed 2021-12-10(b)(1)

However, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) requires that the Court look to the residency of the defendants, not the plaintiff(s).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where at least one defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state containing that district.

Doe v. University of Chicago · filed 2022-02-18(b)(1)

Plaintiff also fails to allege facts showing, for the purpose of establishing venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), that at least one of the defendants resides within this federal judicial district, and that all of the defendants reside within the State of New York. Thus, this Court is not a proper venue for any of Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides when the defendants reside in another state.

Lombard v. Baker (MAG+) · filed 2022-05-31(b)(1)

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants now reside in Alabama. Accordingly, venue is improper in this district under section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in that district’s state.

Atticus Corporation v. Tonja B. Carter, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nelle Harper Lee · filed 2022-08-19(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in the Southern District of Alabama. All Respondents are residents of the State of Alabama.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Lawtone-Bowles v. Liberty University · filed 2022-09-23(b)(1)

Accordingly, because all of the defendants appear to reside in Campbell County, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1).

For a federal defendant, residence under § 1391(e)(1) means the official residence where the defendant performs official duties.

Sigoloff v. Austin · filed 2023-02-21(e)(1)

The word “resides,” as used in § 1391(e), means the official residence of a federal defendant.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state containing that district.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Taronis Technologies, Inc. · filed 2023-06-22(b)(1)

Based on those facts, the SEC established that the Western District of Washington could not have provided the appropriate venue for bringing its claims, as only Wilson resides or has resided in the State of Washington at any time relevant to this action.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Warwick v. Schultz · filed 2023-06-27(b)(1)

Venue for Plaintiff’s ADEA and NYSHRL claims under Section 1391(b)(1) is therefore proper in both the Northern District of New York and the Western District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Sustainable Meats LLC v. Griffon Holdings LLC · filed 2023-08-17(b)(1)

Moreover, venue is proper in either the Northern District or the Southern District of Ohio under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1) because “a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all of the defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” In this instance Defendant Posada resides in the Southern District of Ohio while the rest of the Defendants reside in the Northern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only when all defendants reside in the same state.

Buckner v. The City of New York · filed 2023-08-30(b)(1)

Thus, because not all of the defendants reside within the State of New York, this court is not a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not establish venue in a district where the defendants are not shown to reside.

Flores v. Amber Vang · filed 2024-06-14(b)(1)

In any case, it is clear that this court is not a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1)(A).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the forum state.

Sullivan v. Xu · filed 2024-08-14(b)(1)

Because Plaintiff alleges that at least one of the defendants does not reside within the State of New York (Xu), let alone, within this judicial district,2 this court is not a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) bases venue on defendants’ residence; the plaintiff’s headquarters does not establish venue under that provision.

Shiplane Transport, Inc. v. HWY 31 Exchange Inc. · filed 2024-08-19(b)(1)

Plaintiff proposes laying venue in Illinois because it is headquartered there, id., but 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) focuses exclusively on Defendants’ residence.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for an official-capacity claim against a federal officer in a district where the officer performs official work, even if the officer’s principal office is elsewhere.

Rivera v. U.S. Department of Defense · filed 2024-08-21(e)

Venue for ADEA claims is not governed by a specific provision, but instead falls under the general venue statute for claims against officers of agencies acting in their official capacities, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... Mr. Rivera argues—correctly—that federal officers can have more than one residence and that venue is proper in the District of Columbia because Secretary Austin does official work here.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only when all defendants reside in the same state.

Jackson v. Federal Way Police Dept. · filed 2024-09-26(b)(1)

Given that Defendant San Diego Police Department, which is in California, is not located in the same state as the other Defendants, this lawsuit cannot be maintained in this District unless venue is improper elsewhere.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides only if all defendants reside in the state containing that district.

Barlow v. Africa Citizen Cled Dorvil, LLC · filed 2024-10-03(b)(1)

Because not all Defendants reside in New York, this district is not a proper venue under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Bravo v. Grover · filed 2024-10-04(b)(1)

Even if the Court assumes that substantial events occurred in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(2),2 because all Defendants reside in Nassau County, venue is also proper in the Eastern District under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state where the district is located.

Malhotra v. Kumar · filed 2024-12-05(b)(1)

Although he separately alleges these two Defendants reside in Naples (which is in this District), this would only establish venue “if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ... Because all Defendants do not reside in Florida, this basis for venue fails.

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue in a district where none of the defendants reside.

Smith v. Texas State of · filed 2024-12-12(b)(1)

First, § 1391(b)(1) doesn’t apply because none of the Defendants are residents of Oklahoma.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Buxbaum v. Travis · filed 2025-02-12(b)(1)

Venue for Plaintiff’s claims is therefore proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

VanLeer v. Detroit Police Department · filed 2025-05-12(b)(1)

When VanLeer filed the lawsuit, the defendants were all residents of Michigan and at least one defendant was a resident of this district. Thus, the Western District of Michigan is a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue in a district when the defendants reside in another state.

Apollo Holding Company, LLC v. Cliff Roe · filed 2025-05-22(b)(1)

Here, Defendants are residents of Michigan, so venue is not proper in this district under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(e)(1)(A) permits an official-capacity suit against federal officials in a district where a defendant resides.

J.G.G. v. Trump · filed 2025-06-04(e)(1)(A)

Plaintiffs have therefore named proper defendants and sued them in the district in which they reside.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state containing the district.

Coutain v. Keystone Property Management, Inc. · filed 2025-06-26(b)(1)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that all defendants are residents the same state, venue for her constitutional claims is not proper in this District, of any other district, under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendant state employees reside by virtue of their offices there.

Satkowiak v. Roos · filed 2025-07-29(b)(1)

At the outset, the Court acknowledges that it is a proper venue for this suit. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), any district in the state in which all defendants reside or a district in which “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” is an appropriate venue. All defendants named in the amended complaint are state employees whose offices are in Lansing, meaning they reside in this district for purposes of section 1391.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in the District of Oregon when all defendants reside in Oregon.

Old Republic Surety Company v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. · filed 2025-08-21(b)(1)

Venue is proper in the District of Oregon, as all Defendants reside in Oregon.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; a state resides in every judicial district within its borders.

Halousek v. State of California · filed 2025-09-15(b)(1)

The Court agrees with Judge Kim that this case should have been brought in the Eastern District of California, although for slightly different reasons. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”

Section 1391(b)(1) permits an ADEA claim in a district where the defendants reside.

Thompson · filed 2025-10-28(b)(1)

Thus, under Section 1391(b)(1), the United States District for the District of Minnesota, and not this court, is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under the ADEA.

Section 1391(b)(1) allows venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state where the district is located.

Chan v. Re/Max · filed 2025-12-02(b)(1)

That some defendants allegedly reside in Denver does not necessarily mean venue lies in the District of Colorado. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (laying venue in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” (emphasis added)).

Section 1391 permits venue where acts alleged to violate federal securities laws occurred.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Netelkos · filed 1984-08-03

Venue is found in this court based on the fact that various of the acts which are alleged to constitute violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 occurred and are occurring within the Southern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the acts underlying the alleged violations occurred.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. American Board of Trade, Inc. · filed 1984-09-05

Venue is found in this court based on the fact that various of the acts which are alleged to constitute violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act occurred and are occurring within the Southern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred.

Munoz v. Expedited Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-10-24(a)(2)

Venue is proper in this district because the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Garcia v. State of Arizona City of Phoenix · filed 1992-10-20(b)

Here, the defendants do not all reside in the same state. The complaint makes claims based on events that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona. Accordingly, venue was proper in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the dispute occurred.

James v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 1992-10-26(e)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as the dispute arises out of events occurring in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the alleged violations occurred.

United States v. Midwest Suspension and Brake · filed 1993-06-16(b)

Venue is proper in the Court pursuant to § 113(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because the site where the alleged violations occurred is within the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Friedman v. Revenue Management of New York, Inc. · filed 1993-10-01(b)(2)

The specific allegations of Counts 4 through 8 lead me to conclude that § 1391(b)(2) establishes the Northern District of Illinois as the proper venue for these claims.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred.

Showtime Game Brokers, Inc. v. Blockbuster Video, Inc. · filed 1993-11-02(a)

Furthermore, because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred within this State, venue in this action is proper in the Southern District of Indiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including events beyond the named officials’ actions.

Andrean v. Secretary of the United States Army · filed 1993-12-06(e)(2)

The court finds that the phrase “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” must have the same meaning in both (b) & (e) of § 1391 and that the court may consider all the events giving rise to claim, not just the actions of the officials named in the suit, in order to determine whether plaintiff has shown that a “substantial part” of the events giving rise to her claim occurred in Kansas.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. · filed 1994-02-23(a)(2)

The acts and occurrences giving rise to the claims alleged in this action took place in substantial part in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and venue is therefore proper in this Court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(2) and (3).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gundle Lining Construction Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 1994-03-02

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in the District of New Jersey because that is where a substantial part of the events and alleged omissions occurred.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Coultman v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1994-03-30(b)(2)

Because the Court concludes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the instant claim transpired in the Eastern District of Virginia, that district constitutes a proper place of venue for the trial of this action pursuant to Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even when venue is also proper in another district.

Lee W. Healy, AKA Mrs. Richard J. Healy v. Evelyn J. Phillips, Individually, and as and Beneficiary of Estate of Richard · filed 1993-10-18(a)(2)

The acts supporting these claims are alleged to have taken place in Los Angeles. Thus, venue is proper in Los Angeles as well as in Nevada, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), and the district court's order transferring venue was not clearly erroneous as a matter of law, see Washington Pub. Utils. Group, 843 F.2d at 325.

Section 1391(b)(2) focuses the events giving rise to a claim on the defendant’s actions rather than the plaintiff’s actions.

Gaines, Emhof, Metzler & Kriner v. Nisberg · filed 1994-02-24(b)(2)

The phrase “events or omissions giving rise to the claim” in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) suggests a focus on the actions of the defendant, not on those of the plaintiff. For this reason, plaintiffs reliance upon this section fails.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

McFarland v. Folsom · filed 1994-03-18(b)(2)

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (1993) (requiring an action to be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”). The entirety of the acts complained of against all defendants were performed by them in their official capacities in Montgomery, Alabama, which is located in the Middle District.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case when the chosen district has a substantial connection to the claim, even if another district has greater contacts.

Setco Enterprises, Corporation v. Denzil W. Robbins, Roberta A. Robbins, Setco Enterprises, Corporation v. Denzil W. Rob · filed 1994-03-30(a)(2)

Rather, we ask whether the district the plaintiff chose had a substantial connection to the claim, whether or not other forums had greater contacts. We agree with the district court that the Western District was a proper venue under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial connection between the district and the events giving rise to the claim; a tangential business relationship and the plaintiffs’ residence are insufficient.

Holmgren v. Allen · filed 1994-04-13(a)(2)

The business relationship between Auto Servi and Budget is at best only tangentially connected to this dispute. All of the relevant events giving rise to this claim occurred in Puerto Rico, including the automobile accident, the consummation of the rental agreement between plaintiffs and Auto Serví, and the defendants’ alleged negligence. The fact that the plaintiffs and their treating physicians reside in this judicial district is insufficient to create venue here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Accordingly, the proper venue for this action is the District of Puerto Rico.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

State Street Capital Corp. v. Dente · filed 1994-06-16(a)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas because that is where a substantial part of the events and alleged omissions occurred.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in more than one district when a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in each district.

Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance v. Brown · filed 1994-07-06(b)(2)

However, since the expansion of the venue provision by the 1990 amendments, it has become clear that more than one venue may be deemed proper so long as each satisfies the requirement that the “local” commissions or omissions be substantial. ... Twelve among the total of forty, though not a majority, is substantial.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Perry v. Kempton · filed 1994-09-12(a)(2)

Because we have found that a substantial part of the events occurred in Ohio, and that most of the money Plaintiff has a claim to was allegedly divided between the Defendants in Ohio, we find that venue is proper in the Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action when communications to or from the district have a sufficient connection to the claim.

Sacody Technologies, Inc. v. Avant, Inc. · filed 1994-09-14(a)(2)

The standard set forth in § 1391(a)(2) may be satisfied by a communication transmitted to or from the district in which the cause of action was filed, given a sufficient relationship between the communication and the cause of action. ... The Court finds that Sacody has alleged facts sufficient to ground venue in this District under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial connection between the district and the events or omissions giving rise to the claim.

Cottman Transm. Syst. v. Martino · filed 1994-09-20(b)(2)

However, the current statutory language still favors the defendant in a venue dispute by requiring that the events or omissions supporting a claim be "substantial."

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

National Utility Service, Inc. v. Queens Group, Inc. · filed 1994-04-22(a)(2)

The Court concludes that because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the instant claim transpired in the Southern District of Indiana, that district constitutes a proper place of venue for the trial of this action pursuant to Section 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including discussions essential to forming the contract at issue.

National Cathode Corp. v. Mexus Co. · filed 1994-06-20(a)(2)

In the instant case, this Court finds that since “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), occurred in New York in the form of the trade show discussions between N.C.C. president Evanisko and Transtek representatives Silverman and Lozoya, venue is established under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue for a trademark claim in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where allegedly infringing labels were affixed.

French Transit, Ltd. v. Modern Coupon System, Inc. · filed 1994-06-27(b)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), this action could have been brought in Arizona because Nature’s Crystals were processed and distributed from Arizona, indicating that the allegedly infringing labels were affixed there.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where subpoenas were served when that service is a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim, even if the decision to issue them occurred elsewhere.

Bent v. Berman · filed 1994-07-25(b)(2)

Although the decision to issue the subpoenas is clearly a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claim, it cannot be disputed that no claim would have arisen had these subpoenas never been served on plaintiffs. ... Defendants’ motion to dismiss or transfer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), is therefore denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Broadview Financial, Inc. v. Entech Management Services Corp. · filed 1994-08-02(b)(2)

These events, which occurred in Colorado, constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this case. Because venue of this action is proper in Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), I need not address defendants’ other arguments that venue is improper in Colorado under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, the SEC Act venue provision, or that venue should be transferred to the Western District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

Section 1391(b)(2) places venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; business contacts unrelated to those events do not establish venue.

Friedman v. Revenue Management of New York, Inc. · filed 1994-10-25(b)(2)

These facts, however, fail to establish that a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" took place in New York. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b)(2). ... Because all relevant corporate assets, offices, books, and records are located in Illinois, we believe that the proper venue is the Northern District of Illinois, where the substantial part of the events alleged occurred. As such, the district court properly dismissed Friedman's claims for improper venue.

Section 1391(b) does not establish venue where information is received if the substantial events giving rise to the claim occurred in another district.

Jarrett v. North Carolina · filed 1994-11-15(b)

The mere receipt in South Carolina of information sent by Defendants from North Carolina cannot establish either personal jurisdiction over Defendants, as stated above, or proper venue in this court. The subject file was maintained and updated in North Carolina, its disclosure was governed by North Carolina law, the decision to send a copy of it to the South Carolina attorney was made in North Carolina by North Carolina agents of an arm of North Carolina state government. The substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claim occurred in North Carolina, and thus, the Motion to Dismiss on those grounds is also proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Key Industries, Inc. v. O'Doski, Sellers & Clark, Inc. · filed 1994-12-09(a)(2)

Venue in Kansas is appropriate under § 1391(a)(2) because a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this judicial district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Vanguard Packaging, Inc. v. Midland Bank · filed 1994-12-29(a)(2)

And finally, venue in this district is proper because a “substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred” in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bashaw v. Belz Hotel Management Co., Inc. · filed 1995-01-10(a)(2)

Venue is proper in the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” within the District at The Peabody.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Kondrath v. Arum · filed 1995-03-27(b)(2)

Many of the pre-fight events occurred at least partly in New Jersey, the fight took place in New Jersey, and many of the post-fight events took place in New Jersey. The Court finds that these events form a substantial part of the events and omissions which gave rise to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district has more substantial contacts.

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Sims · filed 1994-12-12(a)(2)

Since the present action arises from the alleged breach of representations and warranties negotiated, finalized, and memorialized in Illinois, venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois notwithstanding the possibility that defendants’ activities may have been more substantial elsewhere.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action when a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the district.

Constitution Reinsurance Corp. v. Stonewall Insurance · filed 1995-01-03(a)(2)

The Court finds that venue in this District is proper under § 1391(a)(2). The ultimate issue in this case is whether Constitution is obligated to pay a claim that Stonewall has filed pursuant to the Reinsurance Contracts. The Reinsurance Contracts were negotiated through telephone calls and facsimile transmissions between New York and Texas; Constitution executed the Reinsurance Contracts in New York; and Constitution denied liability on Stonewalls claim pursuant to the Reinsurance Contracts in New York. A substantial part of the events giving rise to this action plainly occurred in New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, including work on an allegedly infringing mark.

Jaguar Cars, Ltd. v. National Football League · filed 1995-01-25(b)(2)

I find that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York. From their New York offices, the NFL and NFLP participated in the selection and design of the Jacksonville Jaguar mark.

Section 1391(a)(2) does not establish venue where a contract was made if the events significant to the claim occurred elsewhere.

Consolidated Insurance v. Vanderwoude · filed 1995-02-09(a)(2)

Thus, all of the events which are significant to Consolidated’s cause of action occurred in Illinois. While it is true that making the contract in Indiana was an event without which the present suit would not exist, that event does not constitute a “substantial part” of the events giving rise to Consolidated’s claim.

In a diversity action, Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district has more substantial contacts.

Vandeveld v. Christoph · filed 1995-02-27(a)(2)

The applicable provision for determining venue in this case is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), which provides that, in diversity actions, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). The present action arises from an alleged partnership agreement that was negotiated, consummated, and modified during the course of meetings taking place in Chicago. Accordingly, venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois notwithstanding the possibility that Mr. Christoph’s activities may have been more substantial elsewhere.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where the acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

House v. Corporate Services, Inc. · filed 1995-03-27(a)(2)

Venue is appropriate in the Middle District of Alabama as the acts giving rise to this claim transpired within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) places venue for a Lanham Act reverse passing off claim where consumers were confused by sales or advertising.

Woodke v. Dahm · filed 1995-01-17(b)(2)

Second, the rule for venue in a trademark infringement case based on where the “passing off’ occurred is equally applicable to a “reverse palming off’ or “reverse passing off’ claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). For both kinds of claims, the venue issues are the same: where were consumers confused by the defendant’s acts? Iowa is not that forum in this case, because no sales of the offending merchandise occurred here, and no advertisement of the offending product ever “entered” this forum. Thus, consumers in Iowa were not confused by the defendants’ conduct. Therefore, in this case, because none of the “reverse passing off’ occurred here, venue in this district is not proper.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the suit occurred.

Marange v. Fontenot · filed 1995-03-16(b)(2)

Because the events giving rise to this suit occurred in Orange County, Texas, a county within the geographical boundaries of the Eastern District of Texas, venue is proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in the district where the events giving rise to the litigation occurred.

Reynolds v. S & D Foods, Inc. · filed 1995-07-24(a)(2)

Due to the fact the events giving rise to this litigation occurred in Kansas, venue is proper in the District of Kansas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendants’ residence or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim; neither basis supports venue in a district that meets neither condition.

Deutsch v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1995-04-03(b)(1)-(2)

Because all of the Defendants do not reside in the same state, venue cannot lie in this district under § 1391(b)(1). Further, because a substantial part of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs claims did not take place in the District of Columbia, but rather New York and/or Pennsylvania, venue cannot he in this district under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(e)(2) does not make venue proper where plaintiffs corresponded with the defendant if the events giving rise to their claim occurred elsewhere.

Zelman v. United States · filed 1995-04-07(e)(2)

I reject the latter contention. The plaintiffs’ position is that errors and omissions took place in Maine because they corresponded with the Bureau of the Public Debt from their home in Hiram. However, it is clear that the contract at issue was made in New York (where the bonds were sold), the allegedly improper redemption of the bonds took place in New York, and the government made the decision to refuse payment to the plaintiffs at the headquarters of the Bureau of the Public Debt in West Virginia. No events or omissions giving rise to the complaint occurred in Maine.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Xpressions Footwear Corp. v. Peters · filed 1995-05-16(a)

The complaint alleges sufficient facts under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) to establish that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(a)(2) places venue for a malicious-prosecution claim where the underlying lawsuit was filed and handled when those events gave rise to the claim.

Engel v. CBS, INC. · filed 1995-05-18(a)(2)

The events giving rise to the claim for malicious prosecution involve the filing and handling of the New York lawsuit, a series of events occurring solely in New York. Thus, the Court finds that venue in California is not proper pursuant, to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Wedington v. Us Marshals · filed 1995-05-19(b)(2)

The Appellant alleges that the actions by the United States Marshals which caused his injuries occurred in Maryland, and venue is proper in the judicial district in which a substantial part of events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

McKnight v. Superamerica Group/Ashland Oil Co. · filed 1995-05-31(b)

Although Mr. McKnight no longer resides in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, venue is properly exercised under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the alleged events giving rise to his claim occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hot Stuff Food Systems, Inc. v. Griffin Petroleum, Inc. · filed 1995-07-10(b)(2)

Under § 1391(b)(2), venue is proper “in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim oecurred[.]” In this case, the Court finds that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the diversity claim of breach of the non-competition clause and to the federal question claim of unfair competition under the Lanham Trademark Act occurred in Arkansas.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in more than one district when a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in each district; advertising and direct-mail solicitation can establish venue in a trademark case.

Pilates, Inc. v. Pilates Institute, Inc. · filed 1995-07-10(b)

Almost all courts that have addressed the language of § 1391(b) have construed it to mean that venue may be proper in more than one district. ... Because plaintiff has alleged that defendant targeted New York through advertising, and through direct-mail solicitation, see supra, 1 find that plaintiff has satisfied the burden of demonstrating that venue is proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) and (b)(2) allow venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Securities Service Network, Inc., Steven L. Coffey, and Asset Planning Corporation v. Ronald E. Cromwell and Victorine L · filed 1995-08-01(a)(2), (b)(2)

The parties agree that venue is appropriate in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1391(a)(2) and (b)(2). According to the Cromwells, however, the relevant event was the filing of the Cromwell's Statement of Claim and Demand for Arbitration, which was mailed from Arizona to New York. Coffey contends that the relevant events are the facts underlying the Cromwells' investment decisions. As Coffey points out, the parties were first introduced in Knoxville, where they both resided at the time. In addition, all of investments were effected through the services of Tennessee corporations, with principal places of business in Knoxville. Moreover, any fraudulent concealment would have occurred in Knoxville. Thus, the district court was correct in determining that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Fash Obalco, Inc. v. M.K.M. Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-25(b)(2)

The Court finds that venue in this district is proper, under paragraph (b)(2) of § 1391, because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to this claim took place in Puerto Rico.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a debtor receives a collection notice when that receipt is a substantial part of the events giving rise to an FDCPA claim.

Paradise v. Robinson and Hoover · filed 1995-05-04(b)(2)

Because “receipt of a collection notice is a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,” Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir.1992), the district where a communication is received is a proper venue under subdivision (2) of section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Globe Glass & Mirror Co. v. Brown · filed 1995-06-19(b)(2)

In 1990, Congress amended the venue statute, replacing the language “the judicial district ... in which the claim arose” with “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... According to the affidavit of Mary Jo Prigge, a substantial part of USA-GLAS’s existing Louisiana business occurs in the Eastern District. ... Therefore, this suit is properly brought in this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where an alleged product failure and resulting injuries occurred because the accident is a substantial event giving rise to the claim.

Stokes v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1995-06-26(a)(2)

Because alleged product failure and resulting injuries serve as the basis for plaintiffs' claims, the court finds that the Piermont, New Hampshire, motor vehicle accident was the catalyst for this action and, as such, a substantial event sufficient to ... confer venue in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the bargaining at the center of the dispute is conducted.

GEN. COMMITTEE OF ADJ. OF GO-386 v. NRR · filed 1995-08-02(b)(2)

Furthermore, venue is proper in Washington, D.C. under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the main issue in this case concerns the current round of collective bargaining and the defendants' insistence that such talks be conducted in Washington, D.C. through their representative as in past years.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the action principally occurred.

Smith v. Drug, Chemical, Cosmetic, Plastics & Affiliated Industries Warehouse Employees Local 815 · filed 1996-08-19(b)

Venue for this action lies within the Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), as the alleged events in question transpired principally at Del Laboratories, Inc., located in Suffolk County, New York!

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred, even when all defendants reside in the same state.

Market Transition Facility of New Jersey v. Twena · filed 1996-10-07(a)(2)

As stated above, the plain language of § 1391(a) indicates that venue in diversity cases is proper, regardless of circumstances, in either a district within the state where all defendants reside or in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in the district where the accident giving rise to the suit occurred.

Schechter v. Tauck Tours, Inc. · filed 1998-08-24(a)(2)

Venue quite obviously could have been laid in Hawaii, as the accident giving rise to the suit occurred there.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Kahan v. United States · filed 1999-04-27(e)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) as the events from which this case arise occurred within this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the alleged negligent acts occurred.

Perez v. United States · filed 1999-08-11(b)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the acts of negligence alleged in the complaint took place at the Manhattan Veteran’s Administration Medical Center (“VAMC”), which is located in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant operates the theater complexes challenged in the lawsuit.

United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc. · filed 1999-08-31(b)

Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion fails because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in the Northern District of Ohio; Defendant operates four stadium-style theater complexes in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Waldon v. Borough of Upper Darby · filed 1999-12-09(b)

The Eastern District is a proper venue, because the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1999).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the disputed events occurred in a suit against federal officials.

The Wilderness Society v. Babbitt · filed 2000-05-23(e)

It is undisputed that this case could have been brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because a substantial part of the events in dispute took place in Alaska.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Dube v. Eagle Global Logistics · filed 2000-07-05(b)

There is no doubt that venue would be proper in Texas, as it is the defendant’s principal place of business and a substantial part of the occurrences giving rise to the claims occurred there.

Section 1391(a) supports venue in the district where the alleged unlawful acts occurred.

International Brotherhood v. St. Louis County · filed 2000-10-17(a)

All acts or practices alleged to be unlawful in the complaint were committed in the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of Missouri, and venue is proper here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the events underlying the lawsuit occurred.

Barton v. Young · filed 2001-04-10(b)

That requirement is met in this case since all the events that serve as the basis for Barton’s lawsuit occurred in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred; its third venue option applies only when the first two are unavailable.

Berry v. Salter · filed 2001-10-18(a)

The third choice of venue applies only if the first two cannot be met. ... Accordingly, venue is improper in the Middle District of Alabama, but is proper in the district court within which the accident occurred, which in this case is the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the action occurred.

Hoover v. New Paltz Central School District · filed 2003-03-28(b)

It appears from this review that the events giving rise to the underlying action at issue occurred predominantly in Hoover’s place of employment at New Paltz, and that all or most of the material events, documents, persons and potential witnesses related to this action are located in the Northern District of New York. ... The Court informed the parties that under these circumstances, venue for this case lies more properly in the Northern District of New York. ... ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this case to Northern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez · filed 2003-11-13(b)(2)

As the conduct of the criminal trial against the defendant is what gives rise to the claims here, and since that criminal proceeding and conviction occurred in this district, venue is proper.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Corry · filed 2004-07-08(a)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because the events giving rise to State Farm’s request for declaratory judgment occurred in Philadelphia, which is within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391 supports venue in the district where the events giving rise to the complaint occurred.

O'Dell v. Department of Public Welfare of Penn. · filed 2004-09-28

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the events which gave rise to this Complaint occurred in this judicial district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a judicial district where the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Security Title Guar. Corp. of Baltimore · filed 2004-09-30(b)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to plaintiffs claims allegedly occurred in this judicial district, namely Delaware County, Pennsylvania.