28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391’s general venue provisions remain available alongside special venue provisions unless a statute restricts their use.

Caribe Trailer Systems, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority · filed 1979-04-19

Although there has been some judicial uncertainty whether the general federal venue statute expands special venue provisions, it is now generally recognized that these provisions are available absent contrary statutory restrictions.

Section 1391 does not control venue in an ERISA action governed by ERISA’s special venue provision.

Boyer v. J. A. Majors Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan · filed 1979-12-10

The plaintiff’s reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (the general federal venue statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (change of venue for the convenience of the parties) is also misplaced, since it is ERISA’s special venue provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), which controls the issue as to whether venue is proper in this case.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to a specific venue provision governing actions for violations of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark · filed 1984-01-20

We thus conclude that in any action against the Secretary for failure to perform duties required by this Act, whether brought pursuant to the citizens’ suit provision’s grant of jurisdiction or under any other jurisdictional statute, the specific venue provision in 520(c)(1) prevails over the general venue rules of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity action in the district where all defendants reside or the cause of action arose, subject to more specific venue rules.

Rey v. City of Fredericktown, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation Jerry Umfleet, City Marshal of Fredericktown, an · filed 1984-03-16(b)

The general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), provides that civil actions not founded solely on diversity can only be brought in the district in which all the defendants reside, or the cause of action arose, except as otherwise provided by law. Under the language of this general provision, then, venue would have been proper in any division of the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to the Surface Mining Act’s specific venue provision in actions against the Secretary for failure to perform duties under that Act, regardless of the jurisdictional basis.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark · filed 1984-04-02

We thus conclude that in any action against the Secretary for failure to perform duties required by this Act, whether brought pursuant to the citizens' suit provision's grant of jurisdiction or under any other jurisdictional statute, the specific venue provision in 520(c)(1) prevails over the general venue rules of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391.

Section 1391(e)'s general venue rule does not displace the Tucker Act's specific venue rule when a claim is essentially for monetary damages against the United States, even if the complaint also seeks equitable relief.

Davila v. Weinberger · filed 1985-01-03(e)

Plaintiffs proffer that as the result of their seeking remedies other than monetary damages, the general venue provision allowing actions against the United States, its agencies or its officials to be brought in this district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), should prevail over the venue provision of the Tucker Act. ... Accordingly, the true nature of this action as a claim for monetary damages, with jurisdiction arising under the Tucker Act, cannot be disguised, and the venue provisions of that Act must'be found controlling.

Section 1391 governs venue for claims without an applicable special venue provision.

Trustees of the National Asbestos Workers Pension Fund & Medical Fund v. Lake Erie Insulation Co. · filed 1988-07-19

A claim not covered by special venue is governed by the general venue provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 which would require that this action be brought “only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” The special venue of ERISA, however, governs this action.

Section 1391(b) yields to a specific venue provision when another law provides one.

Steinberg & Lyman v. Takacs · filed 1988-07-25(b)

Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act has a venue provision that, pursuant to § 1391, governs this case.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions do not apply when Title VII’s specific venue provision controls.

Trujillo v. Total Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-01-30

I am persuaded that the more specific venue provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) control and, thus, exclude the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rule does not apply when a more specific statute, such as Title VII’s venue provision, governs the action.

Leroy H. JOHNSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAYLESS DRUG STORES NORTHWEST, INC., Dba Wonder World, Et Al., Defendants · filed 1991-12-06(b)

Section 1391, in contrast, is the general federal venue statute; its provisions apply in a civil action not founded solely on diversity of citizenship “except as otherwise provided by law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Here, under section 2000e-5(f)(3), the Northern District of California was not the appropriate venue for this action.

In Securities Exchange Act cases, the Act’s specific venue provision takes precedence over § 1391(b)’s general venue rule.

CIBC World Markets, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. · filed 2004-03-11(b)

The venue provision of primary importance in cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act, however, is not 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), but rather 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Section 1391(e)’s venue choices remain available for CERCLA citizen suits against federal officials because CERCLA’s special venue provision adds the District of Columbia without displacing them.

Sierra Club v. Johnson · filed 2008-07-23(e)

This order holds that Section 310(b)(2) supplements Section 1391(e) and thus allows citizen suits in the following venues: (i) where the defendant resides; (ii) where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (iii) where any plaintiff resides; or (iv) in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391 ordinarily permits venue against a corporation wherever its contacts support personal jurisdiction, but an exclusive venue provision in another federal law controls claims it covers.

Johnson v. General Dynamics · filed 2009-12-18

When a plaintiff sues a corporation in federal court, venue is ordinarily proper wherever the corporation has sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction, “except as otherwise provided by law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. In this case, the applicable federal law--USERRA--provides otherwise, expressly limiting venue to “any district in which the private employer . . . maintains a place of business.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(2). This exclusive venue provision trumps the general venue statute and therefore governs Johnson’s USERRA claim.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield when another federal statute provides an exclusive venue rule for a claim.

Johnson v. General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. · filed 2009-12-18

When a plaintiff sues a corporation in federal court, venue is ordinarily proper wherever the corporation has sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction, “except as otherwise provided by law.” ... This exclusive venue provision trumps the general venue statute and therefore governs Johnson’s USERRA claim.

Section 1391(b) assesses venue by the defendant’s residence, business activities, or personal jurisdiction rather than the plaintiff’s residence.

D & L Distribution, LLC v. Agxplore International, LLC · filed 2013-03-26(b)

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, proper venue is determined based upon where the defendant, not the plaintiff, resides, conducts business, or is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules yield to USERRA's specific venue provision for claims against private employers.

Washington v. Coastal International Security · filed 2014-01-10(b)

However, the USERRA has its own venue provision which “trumps the general venue statute.” ... That provision controls, but under either formulation, venue in this district is improper, while venue in the District of Maryland is proper.

Section 1391 governs venue generally, but a specific venue provision governs when one applies.

Nix El v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2017-02-10

Section 1391 is the general venue statute, and is distinct from the venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1402 that governs venue for tax refund suits against the United States.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules give way when a more specific venue provision governs the action.

Santore v. Swaminathan · filed 2018-03-01(b)

The venue provision of the Exchange Act, which governs here, see Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U. S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 n.2 (2013) (“Section 1391 governs ‘venue generally,’ that is, in cases where a more specific venue provision does not apply.”); ... (special venue provision of the Exchange Act supersedes 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)), provides that a civil action may be brought in any district where: (1) any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred; (2) the defendant is “found”; (3) the defendant is an “inhabitant”; or (4) the defendant transacts any business.

Section 1391(a) makes the general venue rules subject to exceptions provided by other laws, including Title VII's venue provision.

Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC · filed 2018-09-12(a)

But the parties ignore § 1391(a), which instructs that the general venue statute is still subject to "[e]xcept[ions] as otherwise provided by law."

Section 1391 applies when no special venue statute governs; patent infringement cases are governed by a special venue statute.

Green Source Holdings, LLC v. Ingevity Corporation · filed 2019-05-06

“Where no special venue statute is applicable, the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, applies.” ... Patent infringement cases fall within the category of cases governed by a special venue statute.

Section 1391 governs venue when no more specific venue provision applies; Exchange Act claims are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Avalon Holdings Corporation v. Gentile · filed 2019-09-24

Defendants ignore the specific venue statue, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, which governs securities actions. “Section 1391 governs ‘venue generally,’ that is, in cases where a more specific venue provision does not apply.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 55 n.2 (2013). However, in actions pursuant to the Exchange Act—including claims alleging violations of § 16(b)—venue is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Section 1391 does not govern venue when a specific statute supplies the applicable venue rule.

Water Quality Insurance Syndicate v. National Pollution Funds Center · filed 2020-01-27(a)

Because the OPA’s specific venue provision applies here, § 1391 does not control.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules give way when a more specific statute supplies the venue rule.

Aboloma, Osita v. Vembu, Rajan · filed 2020-02-25(b)

Wagner also contends that venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). But the Securities Exchange Act has its own venue provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, which trumps the general venue statute.

Section 1391(a)’s general venue rules give way to Title VII’s special venue provision for Title VII claims.

Douglas v. Sentel Corporation · filed 2020-05-20(a)

The general venue statute applies to all civil actions “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” ... Title VII contains a special venue provision that is distinct from the general venue statute.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule gives way to the Carmack Amendment's special venue provisions for claims against carriers.

CAULFIELD ASSOCIATES, INC. v. D&F TRANSFER, LLC · filed 2020-08-27(b)

As part of that scheme, the Carmack Amendment contains “special venue provision[s]” that displace the general federal venue provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue for Title VII and ADA claims because those claims have an exclusive venue provision.

WEAVER v. WALGREEN COMPANY · filed 2021-02-23(b)

This venue provision is considered to be “exclusive,” rendering the general venue statute inapplicable to Title VII and ADA cases.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII claims because Title VII has a specific venue provision.

Eleazu v. US Army Network Enterprise Center - Natick · filed 2021-09-21

The general venue statute, which would permit Plaintiff to bring his suit in South Carolina, simply does not apply to this cause of action.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to the specific venue provision governing ADAAA employment actions.

Anderson v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-09-29

Typically, venue is analyzed under the general venue statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391. But the ADAAA has its own venue provision, which it borrows from Title VII. ... Because that venue provision also applies to the ADAAA, the same goes for ADAAA actions.

Section 1391's general venue rules govern False Claims Act claims.

United States v. WARREN · filed 2022-07-13

The general venue statute contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 governs False Claims Act claims.

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules for ADEA, FMLA, and Section 1981 claims because those laws have no specific venue provisions.

Sung v. DeJoy · filed 2022-12-09

Claims under the ADEA, FMLA, and Section 1981 do not include specific venue provisions, and the general venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 therefore applies.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside in the same state and a defendant resides in the district, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Benson v. Lancaster County School District · filed 2023-05-15(b)

The undersigned denies Plaintiffs’ request for the reasons explained in Judge Lydon’s order in , 2023 WL 3017832, at *2–3 (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) allows a party to “bring a civil action in a judicial district (1) where any defendant resides if all defendants are residents of the state where the district is located or (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred” and denying request for change in venue because: (1) Plaintiffs “cannot show that all Defendants are residents of North Carolina” and (2) “[t]he events giving rise to these claims occurred within South Carolina”).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside and no event giving rise to the claim is alleged to have occurred.

Wade v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2023-05-31(b)

Venue for Plaintiff’s civil rights lawsuit is not proper in the Eastern District of Michigan because Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the acts, events, or omissions that form the basis of his lawsuit took place in this district. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that any Defendant resides in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; subsection (b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gravel v. Hearst Television, Inc. · filed 2023-05-31(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because the other Defendants are located in Vermont and the alleged events appear to have occurred in Vermont, where Plaintiff resides, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b) does not provide venue in this district for claims arising from the alleged collection efforts in Nassau County and New Jersey.

Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Baker Botts L.L.P. · filed 2023-06-05(b)

Third, the federal claim under the FDCPA is dismissed because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the Defendants he wishes to sue fall within the definition of “debt collector,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6), and in any event, no venue lies in this Court for events occurring in Nassau County and New Jersey, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For the same reason, venue is improper over any state law claims relating to the collection efforts.

Section 1391 governs venue for a statutory cause of action that has no special venue provision.

Benson v. Fort Mill Schools / York County District 4 · filed 2023-06-22(b)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs when a cause of action is created by statute without a special venue provision.

Section 1391(b) requires a basis connecting the chosen district to the defendants or the events giving rise to the action.

Emrit v. University of Miami School of Law · filed 2023-06-26(b)

Moreover, as explained in more detail by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff has not provided any allegations that would support a finding that venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) do not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Tajudeen v. John Christner Trucking, LLC · filed 2023-07-07(b)(1)-(2)

Since Johnston is a resident of Arizona and John Christner Trucking, LLC is a resident of Oklahoma and the parties agree that the accident took place in New Mexico, venue is improper in the Southern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, if the action could be brought elsewhere.

Emrit v. Jules · filed 2023-07-24(b)

A civil action may be brought only in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... To summarize, defendant does not live in this district, and nothing in the complaint happened here. ... In any event, venue here is improper.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Emrit v. Jules · filed 2023-07-24(b)

Here, none of the events alleged in the Complaint transpired in, nor had any relation to, Nebraska. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that either party has any connection to Nebraska. Plaintiff states that he is a “resident of the state[s] of Florida and Maryland,” and believes that the defendant lives in Florida. Filing No. 1 at 3. Thus, it is clear from the Complaint’s allegations that no party resides in the District of Nebraska and a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims did not occur in this district. Therefore, venue is not proper in this district and the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, and (b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Joseph v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center · filed 2023-07-25(b)(1), (b)(2)

Accordingly, venue lies in the Eastern District of New York, see § 1391(b)(1), (2), and in the interest of justice, this Court transfers this action to that court, see § 1406(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) permit venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Nielsen v. High Sierra Pools, Inc. · filed 2023-08-03(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue for Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim under Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) is therefore proper in the Western District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue for state-law claims where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred.

Riese v. LI Child and Family Development Services Inc. · filed 2023-08-09(b)(1), (b)(2)

However, the ... Eastern District of New York is clearly a proper venue for those claims under Section 1391(b)(1), and (2).

Section 1391(b) permits a civil action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(PC) Dao v. Vanhorn · filed 2023-08-10(b)

The remaining defendants are dismissed without prejudice to filing a separate lawsuit in the Northern District of California where venue is proper for acts that occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Cunningham v. Federal Brueau of Prisons · filed 2023-08-15(b)(2)

Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims are taking place in Brooklyn, which is located in the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 112(c), venue is proper in that district under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendant does not reside, none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Jones v. Black · filed 2023-08-11(b)

Ms. Jones has failed to establish that this court is the proper venue under any of the three options. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1)–(2) permits venue where the defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; allegations involving neither location do not establish venue in the district.

Etheredge v. State of Wisconsin · filed 2023-08-16(b)(1)–(2)

Finally, if the plaintiff has a viable federal claim about an adoption that took place thirty-five years ago, it does not belong in this district. Under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), a plaintiff may bring a civil lawsuit in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,” or in a “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1)–(2). The plaintiff lives somewhere in North Carolina and she alleges that the defendants reside Madison, which is in the Western District of Wisconsin. This court is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Section 1391 permits venue where an entity defendant resides through sufficient contacts with the district or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

CAMBER SPINE TECHNOLOGIES v. INTERMED RESOURCES TN, LLC · filed 2023-08-11(b)(1), (b)(2)

The Court also finds that venue in this District is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Section 1391 authorizes venue over a single defendant that is a domestic limited liability corporation, such as Defendant, where it “resides” which is defined, in a single district state, to include any judicial district in which “it is subject to personal jurisdiction.” In a multi-district state like Pennsylvania, “reside” is defined to include “any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.”

Section 1391 remains available for state CFPA enforcement actions because the CFPA’s home-state venue provision supplements it.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARINER FINANCE, LLC · filed 2024-01-12

Rather, the Court finds that the venue provision in 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) is supplemental to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and thus, the Plaintiffs are not confined by a territorial limitation to bring CFPA actions within their own States.

Section 1391 governs venue for ADEA claims, but Title VII’s specific venue rule controls a suit in which Title VII claims predominate.

Hairston v. Wormuth · filed 2024-04-25

And claims under the ADEA, which does not have its own venue provision, are subject to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Here, under either approach, the venue statute in Title VII is controlling, both because it is more specific and because it is clear from the face of the SAC that the plaintiff’s Title VII claims are primary to her ADEA claim.

Section 1391(a)'s general venue rules yield to Title VII's special venue provision for federal employment discrimination claims under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act.

Gamble v. DeJoy · filed 2024-08-09(a)

Subsection (a) states that this section is applicable “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... “The general venue statute provides that an action against the United States may be brought, inter alia, where the plaintiff resides. That statute, however, does not govern federal employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Instead, the special venue provision of Title VII, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), determines where such actions lie.”

Section 1391(a) yields to Title VII’s special venue provision for federal employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.

Gamble v. United States Postal Service (MAG2) · filed 2024-08-09(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1391 governs venue for all civil actions filed in federal courts. Subsection (a) states that this section is applicable “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... “The general venue statute provides that an action against the United States may be brought, inter alia, where the plaintiff resides. That statute, however, does not govern federal employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Instead, the special venue provision of Title VII, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), determines where such actions lie.”

Section 1391 generally governs venue in federal civil actions, but the Exchange Act’s specific venue provision governs Exchange Act cases.

PALOMINO MASTER LTD. v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG · filed 2025-01-31(a)(1)

In many cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 governs venue in United States District Courts. ... However, “[t]he venue provision of primary importance in cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act, [] is not 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), but rather 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.”

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield when a statute provides a specific venue rule.

Baughman v. Marathon Petroleum Logistics Services, LLC · filed 2025-02-13

“However, if a statute contains a specific venue provision, that statute governs and § 1391 is displaced.” ... Title VII is one such statute that contains a venue provision.

Section 1391 yields to a more specific venue provision, including Title VII’s venue rule.

Dantes · filed 2026-03-17(a)

However, where a party sues pursuant to a statute with a more specific venue provision, such as the one contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, that provision, rather than Section 1391, controls.

Section 1391(c)'s general corporate venue rule does not supplement Title VII's specific venue provisions.

Dubnick v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of California · filed 1973-03-01(c)

The district of “principal office”, on the other hand, was designed to facilitate the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406, ... not to open the door to the application of § 1391(c).

Section 1391 generally governs venue, but copyright infringement claims follow the Copyright Act’s special venue rule.

Luminence, LLC. v. Leach · filed 2020-06-26

In most actions, venue is governed by the general venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. However, as mentioned earlier, claims for copyright infringement are unique in that, in such claims, venue is governed by the special venue provisions of the Copyright Act.

Section 1391(e)'s general venue rules yield to the specific venue requirement for actions under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

Xia v. Kerry · filed 2015-11-16(e)

This requirement of § 1503 overrides the general venue provisions of federal law.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules yield to a special venue provision that governs the action.

Ponce de Leon Hospitality Corp. v. Avalon Logistics, Inc. · filed 2015-07-08(b)

Accordingly, the general venue provision codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is displaced by the specialized provision provided by the Carmack Amendment.

Section 1391(b) permits Congress to create additional venues by statute.

United States v. Real Property Located at 11205 McPherson Lane · filed 1991-01-15(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides specific locations for venue and adds that Congress may statutorily create additional venues. In this case, Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881(j), a venue provision. That provision places an additional venue in the district where the criminal prosecution related to the civil forfeiture action is pending. In this case, this court is in the district where the criminal prosecution is pending. Thus, this court is a proper venue and Claimant’s allegation fails.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule does not supplement a special venue statute that shows an intent to restrict venue.

Basic, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern · filed 1988-03-11(b)

In response, plaintiff asserts that venue in this district is proper under the general federal venue provision 28 U.S.C. § 1391 since Norfolk Southern “does business” in this district. This court disagrees. ... It is well settled that a special venue statute, expressly covering venue of a particular kind of action, will control over the general venue statutes, but provisions in the general statutes are often read as supplementing the special statute in the absence of contrary restrictive indications in the special statute. ... This court finds that such restrictive indications are present in the Staggers Rail Act as amended.

Section 1391(b)’s general federal question venue rule does not apply when a federal venue statute specific to the claim supersedes it.

Mercury Service, Inc. v. Allied Bank of Texas · filed 1987-08-14(b)

Furthermore, the general federal question venue rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) does not apply when it is superseded by a federal venue statute applicable to the specific claim at issue. Accordingly, venue is to be determined solely by 12 U.S.C. section 1975.

Section 1391(e)'s general venue rule yields to SMCRA's specific venue rule for actions concerning surface mining violations.

National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel · filed 1987-06-01(e)

It concluded that the specific venue provision of 30 U.S.C. § 1270(c)(1) prevails over the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Consequently, the venue provision of § 1270(c)(1) is applicable to this action.

Section 1391(e)'s general venue rule yields to Title VII's special venue rule when Title VII issues predominate in an action also brought under the Equal Pay Act.

Turbeville v. Casey · filed 1981-10-30(e)

Inasmuch as this case involves not merely the question of equal pay for equal work, but issues of hiring, promotions, specialized training, overseas assignments, management opportunities, career advancement, bias in evaluations of performance and allegedly sexist and discriminatory attitudes of supervisors as well, it is evident that this primarily is an action under Title VII. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F.Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1971), Judge Robinson ruled that a case brought under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act was essentially an action for equal pay for equal work, and, as such, found that section 1391 should take precedence over the Title VII venue provision. 321 F.Supp. at 1042. Consequently, in the instant case, since the Title VII issues predominate, the Title VII venue provision should govern.

Section 1391(b) makes general venue rules inapplicable when another law provides a different venue.

Manufacturers Buyers Corp. v. El Dorado Tire Co. · filed 1971-03-02(b)

Section 1391(b) of the Judicial Code provides that the general venue statute will not apply where a different law provides for another venue.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rule is subject to § 1392(a), which permits suit in a district where a defendant resides when defendants reside in different districts of the same state.

Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1973-06-07(b)

Concededly, § 1392(a) is an exception to § 1391(b) and by definition, therefore, differs from it.

Section 1391 does not govern venue for FTC subpoena enforcement actions when Section 9 of the FTC Act supplies venue.

Federal Trade Commission v. Cockrell · filed 1977-03-18

Respondents’ second argument is that the case should be dismissed for improper venue because 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute, and not section 9 of the FTC Act, should govern this case. The plain language of section 9, however, indicates that Congress intended section 9 to confer venue in enforcement actions such as this, and the courts have universally so interpreted section 9.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule yields to a statutory exception allowing suit in a district where one of several defendants residing in different districts of the same state resides.

Bolding v. Holshouser · filed 1978-04-26(b)

We reject the contention. It is true that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) states that non-diversity cases "may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law," but 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) makes special provision applicable to this case. It states that a civil action "not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of such districts." Since the instant case is a purported class suit against defendants residing in the several districts of North Carolina, venue lay, inter alia, in the Western District of North Carolina.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule yields to § 1392(a) when defendants reside in different districts of the same state.

Daniels v. Murphy · filed 1978-06-30(b)

As § 1392(a) is a specific venue provision for actions involving defendants located within several districts in a state, it controls in such a case over the general venue provisions of § 1391.

Section 1391 does not govern venue for tax refund actions brought by individual taxpayers.

Noonis v. United States · filed 1982-05-13

The venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) do not apply to tax refund actions brought by individual taxpayers.

Section 1391 does not govern venue for Title VII claims, which are governed by Title VII’s specific venue provisions.

Templeton v. Veterans Administration · filed 1982-06-09

Claims under Title VII are strictly governed by these venue provisions, rather than by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) supplements the Clayton Act’s special venue rule and permits an antitrust action where the claim arose.

Bamford v. Hobbs · filed 1983-02-18(b)

This court, will follow the majority position and hold that section 12 of the Clayton Act supplements, rather than supersedes, the provisions of the general venue statute. ... In addition, since all of the alleged illegal conduct on the part of defendants centered on Houston, it can be said that the claim arose here within the meaning of section 1391(b). Consequently, this court holds that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(c) does not provide additional venues for Title VII employment discrimination actions because Title VII’s venue provision is exclusive.

Kravec v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. · filed 1983-12-13(c)

This court is persuaded by the authorities cited above that the venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) were intended to be the exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination actions and ... that the more general provisions of § 1391 are not controlling in such cases.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules yield to the specific venue rule for statutory interpleader actions in § 1397.

Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Mares · filed 1993-06-22(b)

Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), the general venue provision, must yield to 28 U.S.C. § 1397, the venue provision specifically applicable to statutory interpleader actions.

Section 1391(e) does not govern venue when jurisdiction over the claims is governed by the Tucker Act.

Saraco v. Hallett · filed 1993-08-04(e)

Because the Court has addressed and rejected plaintiffs’ alternative jurisdiction argument and concluded that jurisdiction is governed by the Tucker Act, the federal question venue provision is inapplicable.

Section 1391 remains available as a general venue basis for motions under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Dombrowski v. Swiftships, Inc. · filed 1994-08-30

In this case, there is no clearly expressed intention that a court possessing jurisdiction under Section 1391 must surrender that power under Section 10 of the FAA.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not apply to NLRB subpoena enforcement actions because 29 U.S.C. § 161 provides a specific venue rule.

National Labor Relations Board v. Ronny Line · filed 1995-03-08

In this case, Congress created a specific venue requirement for NLRB enforcement actions in enacting 29 U.S.C. § 161. We therefore hold that the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are not applicable in NLRB subpoena enforcement actions.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not apply to NLRB subpoena enforcement actions because 29 U.S.C. § 161 provides a specific venue rule.

N.L.R.B. v. Line · filed 1995-03-13(a), (b)

We therefore hold that the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are not applicable in NLRB venue enforcement actions.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to the Securities Exchange Act’s more specific venue rule for a claim incident to a securities violation.

A+ Network, Inc. v. Shapiro · filed 1997-03-19

Under that reasoning, since this action is a remedial incident of a securities violation, and since the more specific venue statute generally controls the more general provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, ... then the facts upon which this Court should base its venue analysis are not where the legal fees were incurred, but rather where the underlying securities violations took place.

Section 1391's general venue provisions apply alongside the Clayton Act's worldwide service of process provision, even if they make its special venue rules unnecessary.

Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine · filed 1997-11-19

The Court rejects defendants’ argument that application of the general venue provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in conjunction with the worldwide service of process clause in § 22 renders superfluous the special venue provisions contained in § 22.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield when another law provides a different venue rule.

Wallace v. Mathias · filed 2012-05-17(b)

The key words are “except as otherwise provided by law” because, as explained above, the Packers and Stockyards Act provides for venue in the district in which the complainant resides — ■ in this case, Nebraska.

Section 1391(a)'s general venue rule does not apply to FTCA claims because the FTCA has its own venue provision.

Bangura v. United States · filed 2020-07-02(a)

Because the FTCA contains its own venue provision, the general venue provision found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which states that venue is proper in “a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” is not applicable here.

Section 1391(a)’s general venue rules apply unless another law provides a venue rule.

Ransom v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-02-07(a)

But 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides that the general venue rules apply unless “otherwise provided for by law.”

Section 1391(e) does not treat a privately owned corporation as a federal agency merely because it is federally regulated or sometimes acts as a fiscal agent, and § 1391(c) does not treat authorization for limited out-of-state activity as a license to do business there.

Masterson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1971-09-30(c), (e)

Corporations wholly owned by private persons may not be treated as federal agencies for venue purposes merely because they are subject to federal regulation or because they may, in occasional transactions, act as fiscal agents for the government. ... An implied authorization to engage only in limited activity outside the state is not a license to do business under the venue provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) does not make venue improper for a counterclaim merely because the counterclaimant lacks a principal place of business in the district.

Natcontainer Corporation v. Continental Can Co., Inc. · filed 1973-07-12(c)

Likewise, plaintiffs’ objection to the venue of Westvaco’s counterclaim against the two New Jersey plaintiffs on the ground that Westvaeo does not have a principal place of business in the State of New Yoi’k, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), is without merit.

Section 1391 governs where a suit may be initiated, not the venue of counterclaims.

UNITED STATES, ETC. v. Thermo Contracting Corp. · filed 1976-07-12

The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, prescribes the places where a suit may be “brought,” and that statute has been strictly construed to apply only to the initiation of suit rather than to counterclaims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; a proposed counterclaim may indicate an implicit basis for venue, with the grounds stated expressly in the amended pleading.

Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1996-04-08(a)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... The proposed amended answer also contains implicit bases for venue and personal jurisdiction. Defendants may file an amended answer that includes the proposed counterclaim within thirty days of the filing of this memorandum and order, including an explicit statement of the grounds on which venue depends.

Section 1391’s venue requirements apply to suits commenced by original process, not to counterclaims asserted later.

Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1997-03-17

But section 1391 of Title 28 only governs the venue where suits may be “brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Courts have construed this language literally holding that the statutory venue requirements apply only to a “civil suit commenced by original process” and not to subsequently asserted claims or counterclaims.

Section 1391 governs venue for rule interpleader; statutory interpleader is governed by § 1397.

Leader National Insurance v. Shaw · filed 1995-06-28

In cases of “rule” interpleader, venue is determined by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue provision. In cases of “statutory” interpleader, those actions under 28 U.S.C. 1335, venue is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1397, a special venue provision.

Section 1391(a) governs venue for Rule 22 interpleader actions and permits venue where a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

In Re Grogg · filed 2003-06-04(a)

An action brought under Rule 22 is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Assuming, based on its arguments, that HARTFORD contemplates the filing of a Rule 22 interpleader, contrary to HARTFORD’S assertions, the action could be brought either in the Northern District, because that is where McNEIL resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or in the Central District, because that is where LINDA resides.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for suits against the United States under Chapter 87 of Title 5.

Jones v. United States · filed 1976-02-24(b)

Hence the applicable venue statute for suits against the United States under Chapter 87 of Title 5 is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and this action was improperly filed in the wrong judicial district.

Under § 1391(b), a public officer’s residence for venue purposes is the officer’s official residence.

Cheeseman v. Carey · filed 1980-03-11(b)

The “residence” of a public officer under Section 1391 means his “official” not “actual” residence.

A state governmental entity may have more than one official residence for venue purposes when it maintains an office and conducts significant official business in a district.

Buffalo Teachers Federation, Inc. v. Helsby · filed 1976-12-23(b)

The threat of severe inconvenience or forum shopping is scarcely sufficient in cases against state officials to warrant a blanket rule that there may never be more than a single residence. ... It is uncontradicted that PERB maintains an official office in New York City and that a significant portion of PERB’s business is conducted in that office. This seems sufficient (without regard to the fact that two of the three defendants actually reside in this district) in the circumstances of this case to justify the laying of venue in this court.

Section 1391(b) treats a state official’s residence for venue purposes as the official residence.

Procario v. Ambach · filed 1979-03-13(b)

Residence of state officials for the purpose of venue should be deemed to be official residence. Since the official residence of all these defendants is Albany, venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) lies only in the Northern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where state officials maintain offices and conduct a significant part of their official business.

South Ogden CVS Store, Inc. v. Ambach · filed 1980-06-12(b)

The Court finds that, for the reasons stated in the Buffalo Teachers case, venue is appropriate in this district based on the official residence of the state defendants. As in Buffalo Teachers, it is undisputed here that defendants maintain offices in this district. Defendants have not shown that they do not conduct at least a significant part of their pharmacy-related business in this district; to distinguish Buffalo Teachers, they must make some such showing, particularly where, as here, the hearing leading to a finding of violation was conducted in this district.

Under § 1391(b), a state board’s supervision of county boards does not make every county its official residence for venue purposes.

Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin · filed 1988-03-29(b)

In this case, the court finds it equally unreasonable to assume that by the mere fact of the State Board’s supervisory role, it has an official residence in each of the one hundred counties in this state where county boards of elections are located.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a state official has a significant official presence and the office’s activities are closely related to the action.

Boston Drugs, Inc. v. Perales · filed 1990-10-10(b)

Because Perales maintains a significant official presence in this district, and because his office’s activities are highly related to the present actions, venue is proper in these cases.

Section 1391(b) treats a state official sued in an official capacity as residing where the official maintains an official office, which need not be the seat of state government; the official’s personal residence is irrelevant.

Taylor v. White · filed 1990-11-06(b)

While we are in agreement with the defendants’ argument that state officials who are sued in their official capacities should be deemed for venue purposes to reside at the place where they maintain their official offices, we do not agree that this may only be the seat of state government. They are correct, however, that where defendants White and Richards maintain personal residences is irrelevant.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where state official defendants reside.

St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. State of NY · filed 1991-09-23(b)

The state argues at length in its papers that venue is improper in this district, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and that the court should dismiss the action on this ground. As previously stated at the pre-trial conference, the court finds that venue is appropriate in the Southern District of New York (subject to a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a)) because the defendants reside in this judicial district.

For venue under § 1391(b)(1), a public official sued for acts performed in office resides in the district where the official performed those duties.

Berry v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1992-12-18(b)(1)

However, given the nature of the suit, defendants are correct in noting that for the purposes of venue McLaughlin’s residence should be considered to be the district where he performed his duties.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where one defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; a state official with a substantial official presence in the district resides there for venue purposes.

Westchester Advocates for Disabled Adults v. Pataki · filed 1996-06-21(b)(1)

Here, the State defendant Thomas A. Maul, OMRDD Commissioner, has a substantial official presence in this district and thus, in his official capacity, “resides” in the Eastern District. As § 1391(b)(1) requires only one resident defendant in the district, it is not necessary to inquire with respect to the others.

Under § 1391(b)(1), a public official sued individually for money damages resides at the official’s private residence for venue purposes.

Simon v. Ward · filed 2000-01-03(b)(1)

The only relevant residence in a claim for money damages against a individual defendant is that defendant’s private residence, and therefore the personal residences of the individual defendants in this case are the only residences relevant to this Court’s venue analysis. Defendants’ status as public officials has no effect the venue analysis in a suit against them in their individual capacities for money damages.

Section 1391(b)(1) treats state officials as residing in a district where they perform official duties.

Bay County Democratic Party v. Land · filed 2004-10-13(b)(1)

It is abundantly clear that the defendants perform official duties in this district and therefore “reside” here within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) treats public officials as residing where they serve for venue in a suit challenging their official acts.

Jackson 685964 v. Martino · filed 2022-01-24(b)

Defendants are public officials serving in Macomb County, and they “reside” in that county for purposes of venue over a suit challenging official acts.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an officer sued in an official capacity as residing where the agency performs its official duties.

Trout v. County of Madera · filed 2022-05-06(c)(2)

Because DHCS offices—including those of the agency’s director—are located in Sacramento County, within the Eastern District of California, that is where DHCS (and its officers sued in their official capacity) resides for purposes of § 1391(c)(2).

Under § 1391(c)(2), an officer sued in an official capacity resides where the agency maintains its offices.

Trout v. County of Madera · filed 2022-07-06(c)(2)

Because DHCS offices—including those of the agency’s director—are located in Sacramento County, within the Eastern District of California, that is where DHCS (and its officers sued in their official capacity) resides for purposes of § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b) treats a public official sued over official acts as residing where the official serves for venue purposes.

Clayton v. Fowlerville School District · filed 2022-09-29(b)

The general venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provide in pertinent part that a civil action may be brought in “(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” or “(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”. ... For purposes of venue in a lawsuit challenging official acts, defendant Roedel “resides” in Livingston County.

For venue under § 1391(b), public officials reside in the county where they serve.

Ouellete 766867 v. Michigan Department of Corrections Parole Board · filed 2024-05-30(b)

Public officials “reside” in the county where they serve.

Section 1391’s general venue options supplement the Clayton Act’s special venue provisions for antitrust cases.

First Pullen Commodity Services, Inc. v. a G. Becker-Kipnis & Co. · filed 1981-02-09

This Court, therefore, will follow the majority position espoused by many of the United States District Courts cited above and hold that 15 U.S.C. § 15, as further supplemented by 15 U.S.C. § 22, does not serve to abolish or supercede the available districts mentioned in the general venue provision of Section 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions remain available to antitrust plaintiffs alongside the antitrust venue statute.

Shires v. Magnavox Co. · filed 1977-03-07(b)

There is no merit to the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs may not also rely on the provisions of the general venue statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, et seq.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for an antitrust action in the district where the claim arose when the Clayton Act’s special venue provisions do not provide venue.

Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Products Co. · filed 1981-03-31(b)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, is also applicable to antitrust suits and may provide a basis for venue when the special provisions of the Clayton Act do not. ... Section 1391(b) provides that a civil action not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought in the judicial district in which the claim arose. ... We think that venue as to all the counterclaim-defendants is proper here.

Section 1391(b) provides a venue basis for antitrust actions alongside the Clayton Act’s special venue provisions; injury in the district alone does not establish venue.

Sportmart, Inc. v. Frisch · filed 1982-05-07(b)

Venue, the other threshold inquiry with which we are concerned at this early stage in these proceedings, may be established under the special venue provisions of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, or under the general federal venue provisions applicable to non-diversity cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c). It is clear that the venue provisions of the Clayton Act are not to be applied exclusively in antitrust cases; they merely supplement the general rule.

Section 1391(b) supplements the Clayton Act’s venue provision in antitrust cases.

King v. Johnson Wax Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-06-01(b)

Additionally, it now seems to be settled that § 12 of the Clayton Act is not exclusive, and therefore the general “federal question” venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), supplements § 12 in antitrust cases.

Section 1391(d) does not let an antitrust plaintiff use the Clayton Act’s worldwide service provision without satisfying the Clayton Act’s venue requirements.

In Re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation · filed 2000-03-27(d)

Therefore, the Court sees no merit in plaintiffs’ argument that although an antitrust plaintiff cannot use the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) when relying on the Clayton Act’s worldwide service of process provision, such a plaintiff could use the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) when relying on that same service provision.

Section 1391 cannot supply the venue prerequisite for nationwide service of process under section 12 of the Clayton Act.

Management Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-11-19

In contrast, the Second Circuit, and more recently, the D.C. Circuit, have concluded that a suit must satisfy the specific venue provisions of section 12 instead of satisfying those in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 before a court may turn to the question whether a defendant has met the “national contacts” test for personal jurisdiction. ... The Court finds the latter courts’ approach to be the more reasonable in light of the plain meaning of the statute, and therefore adopts it for purposes of discerning the proper venue analysis in this case.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (c) do not supplement the Clayton Act’s venue rule for domestic corporate antitrust defendants when personal jurisdiction rests solely on the Act’s nationwide service provision.

Cumberland Truck Equipment Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp. · filed 2005-11-14(b)(1), (c)

Requiring Plaintiffs to establish venue for domestic corporate Defendants exclusively under Section 12 preserves the Third Circuit’s alien-domestic distinction while reflecting a coherent interpretation of antitrust precedent.

Section 1391 provides a general venue route for antitrust actions when the forum state’s long-arm statute supplies personal jurisdiction.

ZERO TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. THE CLOROX COMPANY · filed 2024-01-30

In one instance, an antitrust plaintiff may rely on traditional principles of personal jurisdiction and venue, demonstrating that the forum state’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction and that venue is proper under the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b)'s venue requirements need not be independently satisfied for an ancillary proceeding brought by a federal receiver in the principal action.

Tcherepnin v. Franz · filed 1977-11-14(b)

Thus, the statutory venue limitations will not be applied to the ancillary proceedings to the receiver’s principal action just as the venue limitations are not applied to third-party practice under Fed.R. Civ.P. 14.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue requirements do not apply to a proceeding ancillary to a receivership when personal jurisdiction is proper.

Robb Evans & Associates, LLC, as Court Appointed Receiver in the In re Sanctuary Belize Litigation v. Diaz-Cueto · filed 2022-08-09(b)

But, as the Receiver points out, this case “need not satisfy the section 1391(b)[’s] general venue requirements . . . because this proceeding is ancillary to the appointment of a receiver and personal jurisdiction is proper.” ... There is no basis to dismiss this case based on improper venue.

Section 1391(f)(3)’s doing-business venue requirement is not satisfied merely by a finding that a foreign state used property for commercial activity in the district.

Crystallex International Corp. v. PDV Holding Inc. · filed 2019-12-12(f)(3)

Contrary to Saint-Gobain’s contention, however, that finding does not equate to a finding that Venezuela (through PDVSA) is “doing business” in Delaware, as that term is understood in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(3).

Section 1391(f)(4) designates the District Court for the District of Columbia as a forum for actions brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary · filed 2011-09-01(f)(4)

This Court is a designated forum for all actions brought under the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4), and is familiar with the issues of law presented by such a case.

Section 1391(f)(3) permits an action against a foreign state's agency or instrumentality in a district where it is doing business.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp. · filed 2002-04-03(f)(3)

This Court finds that the business activity described by Exxon is sufficient to meet the “doing business” requirement under § 1391(f).

Section 1391(f)(4) permits an action against a foreign state to be brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea · filed 1981-01-12(f)(4)

Venue is proper in this Court under the express authority granted to the District Court for the District of Columbia by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) (1976).

Section 1391(f) does not support venue after the foreign sovereign defendant is dismissed.

Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland · filed 1982-02-10(f)

It is necessary to dismiss this case as to the Republic of Ireland. As a result, venue will not lie here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1976).

Section 1391(f)(4) permits a civil action against a foreign state to be brought in the District of Columbia but does not require it to be brought there.

White v. Republic of Nauru · filed 1983-01-19(f)(4)

Next, the defendant asserts that if any court has jurisdiction over the defendant, venue rests in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C., citing 28 USC §1391(f)(4). ... The word "may" is discretionary, not mandatory. ... In short, the defendant has not provided any authority to demonstrate that this court is not the proper court.

Section 1391(f)(1) permits venue in an action against a foreign state where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic · filed 1984-01-16(f)(1)

It should also be apparent from the foregoing that venue is properly laid in the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1). The negotiation of the original loan, the negotiations after the first default, the execution of the 1937 agreement and the payment (or non-payment) of the notes, taken together, make up a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [plaintiffs’] claim”, and all took place in this District.

Section 1391(f)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia · filed 1985-08-26(f)(1)

Although venue would be proper in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4), it is also proper in this district. Section 1391(f)(1) provides that venue exists in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated. In this case, the accounts receivable, totalling nearly $2 million, that are at issue in Case One are present in this district.

Section 1391(f)(4) permits venue in the District of Columbia for an action against a foreign state.

Von Dardel Ex Rel. Wallenberg v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics · filed 1985-10-15(f)(4)

Venue is appropriate in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia because the defendant is a foreign state, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4).

Section 1391(f)(1) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim against a foreign state to occur in the district for venue to be proper there.

Tifa Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana · filed 1988-05-13(f)(1)

Because a substantial part of the acts or omissions which give rise to this action did not occur in New Jersey, venue of this action is not proper in New Jersey under § 1391(f)(1) of the FSIA.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where the plaintiffs reside and their claims arose in a suit against the United States.

Akiona v. United States · filed 1990-01-22(e)

As the plaintiffs reside in the State of Hawaii and the claims arose in this state, venue is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(f) permits venue in a suit against a foreign state where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ampac Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras · filed 1992-08-05(f)

Venue is properly laid in this District. From the foregoing review of the Complaint, it is apparent that Defendants’ contacts with the United States occurred predominantly in Miami, including some negotiation of the alleged contract that give rise to this action. Plaintiff’s principal place of business is in Miami. Under § 1391(f), the subsection to the venue statute added by the FSIA of 1976, these factors are enough to lay venue in the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391(f)(1) permits an action against a foreign state in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated or the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sotheby's, Inc. v. Garcia · filed 1992-09-30(f)(1)

Certainly, New York is a proper forum for maintenance of the interpleader action since the Paintings are presently located in New York; the Paintings were delivered to Sotheby’s in New York; the Philippines contacted Sotheby’s concerning the Paintings via its counsel in New York; and Mrs. Garcia visited Sotheby’s in New York demanding the return of the Paintings.

Section 1391(f)(4) permits an action against a foreign state or its agency or instrumentality to be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2000-12-20(f)(4)

Venue appropriately lies in this district court because the federal venue statute provides that actions against a foreign state and a state’s agent or instrumentality may be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a suit against the United States in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or where the plaintiff resides.

Burger v. United States · filed 2001-03-08(e)

Section 1391(e) of title 28 permits suits to be brought against the United States in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or ... [where] the plaintiff resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2), (3) (2000). Venue is therefore appropriate in any district where one of those two requirements is met.

Section 1391(f)(1) permits venue against a foreign state in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where substantial contract performance was to occur.

Tonoga, Ltd. v. Ministry of Public Works & Housing of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia · filed 2001-03-13(f)(1)

The statute governing venue in cases arising under the FSIA against a “foreign state” provides that venue is proper “in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1). ... As already discussed, the Court concludes that a substantial portion of the alleged guarantee was to be performed in this district. Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue is proper here and denies the Sovereign Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue or transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(f)(3) permits venue where a foreign state’s agency or instrumentality engages in commercial activity in the district, because that activity constitutes doing business there.

Altmann v. Republic of Austria · filed 2001-05-09(f)(3)

Unlike the other provisions of the FSIA that use the term “commercial activity,” the FSIA’s venue provision uses the term “doing business.” The statutory scheme of the FSIA suggests that these terms, if not interchangeable, are at least substantially similar in meaning. The Court can find no authority that suggests that a foreign agency or instrumentality that engages in “commercial activity” within a district is not also “doing business” within a district.

Section 1391(f)(4) permits venue in the District of Columbia for an action against a foreign state, including an agency or instrumentality of that state.

Century International Arms, Ltd. v. Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Corp. 'Rosvoorouzhenie' · filed 2001-10-22(f)(4)

Defendant qualifies under the statute as a "foreign state or political subdivision thereof,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4), because "[a] ‘foreign state’ ... includes ... an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), and it is undisputed that Rosvoo-rouzhenie is an agency or instrumentality of Russia.

Section 1391(f)(3) permits an action against a foreign-state agency or instrumentality in a district where it does business.

Chukwu v. Air France · filed 2002-09-11(f)(3)

Further, because plaintiffs flight was destined for San Francisco, and at least part of plaintiffs claims derive from defendant’s activity in San Francisco, this court finds that venue is proper under § 1391(f)(3) in the Northern District of California, as well.

Section 1391(f)(3) permits venue where a sued foreign state's agency or instrumentality does business, even when the foreign state is also a defendant.

Maria v. Altmann, an Individual v. Republic of Austria, a Foreign State and the Austrian Gallery, an Agency of the Repub · filed 2002-12-12(f)(3)

Sections (f)(3) and (f)(4) are alternative venue provisions, separated by the word “or.” Where, as here, both the foreign state and its instrumentality are sued in the same suit, both venue provisions are potentially available. Because the publications and advertisements of the Austrian Gallery that form the basis for jurisdiction under the FSIA have been distributed in the Central District of California, we hold that the Austrian Gallery, an agency or instrumentality of Austria, is “doing business” in the district and that venue is therefore proper in the Central District under § 1391(f)(3).

Section 1391(f)(3) permits venue against a foreign state agency where it is licensed to do business or is doing business; a code sharing relationship did not establish that CSA did business in Minnesota.

Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc. · filed 2004-08-24(f)(3)

The Court agrees. Shirobokova has not pointed to any applicable caselaw that addresses code sharing or other business relationships under these circumstances. The Court concludes that CSA is only doing business in New York, and not in Minnesota.

Section 1391(f) permits venue in the District of Columbia for an action against a foreign state without making that district the exclusive venue.

Telcordia Tech Inc, in the Matter of the Arbitration of Certain Controversies Between v. Telkom Sa Ltd · filed 2006-08-14(f)

At the time Telcordia brought the petition, the Government of South Africa was the majority owner of Telkom. Consequently, venue is permitted in, but not limited to, the District of Columbia pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), which states that: ... (4) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.

Section 1391(f)(3) permits venue where an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is doing business.

Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain · filed 2006-08-30(f)(3)

Despite Defendants’ arguments to the contrary, venue in this District is proper pursuant to this section since Defendants are “doing business” in this District and the finding that Defendants are engaged in “a commercial activity” in the United States is sufficient to satisfy the FSIA’s venue provision.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against the United States or a federal agency to be brought where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property at issue is located, even if federal officials reside elsewhere.

Rosales v. United States · filed 2007-03-19(e)

The events in question took place in that district, the alleged Native American cultural items that are at the heart of this controversy are located in that district, the property in question is located in that district, and Plaintiffs reside in that district. Thus, there is no doubt that Plaintiffs could have originally filed this case in the Southern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (“A civil action in which a defendant is ... an agency of the United States, or the United States, may ... be brought in any judicial district in which ... a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or [in which] the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.”).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against the United States or its agencies where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Otter v. Salazar · filed 2010-06-21(e)

Instead, because the general venue provision states that venue in a suit against the United States or its agencies is proper where "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e), venue is clearly proper in the District ofIdaho.

Section 1391(f)(4) permits venue in the District of Columbia for a suit against a foreign state.

Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq · filed 2010-06-29(f)(4)

ORDERED that this case be, and the same hereby is, TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4).

Section 1391(f)(4) permits civil actions against foreign states to be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2010-10-20(f)(4)

This Court is clearly a proper venue for claims brought against Iran, Syria, and other foreign-state defendants under the FSIA, as the general venue statute specifically provides that civil actions against foreign states “may be brought ... in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.” § 1391(f)(4).

Section 1391(f)(1) does not establish venue where property is located when the claims do not seek title, possession, or vindication of an interest in that property.

Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Government of Canada · filed 2011-05-31(f)(1)

However, Plaintiffs’ claims against Canada allege violations of treaty, statute, and contract, see Compl. [Dkt. # 1] Counts I-VT; the claims do not seek to adjudicate title, obtain possession of a particular piece of property, or vindicate interests in real property in a manner that would make the Eastern District of Michigan a proper venue for suit against Canada under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1).

Section 1391(f)(4) permits an action against a foreign state in the District of Columbia; if the other venue grounds do not apply, that district is the sole proper venue.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic · filed 2012-09-11(f)(4)

Subsections (1) through (3) are inapplicable in the present case; all relevant events, properties, and business entities are abroad. Thus, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the sole proper venue for this case.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against the United States where the plaintiff resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Budik v. United States · filed 2013-03-07(e)

Indeed, given the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), the Court finds that the District of Columbia is the appropriate venue for the plaintiff’s lawsuit concerning her Walter Reed records.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue for a suit against the United States where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or where the plaintiff resides.

Major W.D. Foster v. United States · filed 2013-07-03(e)(1)

To determine the proper venue for the transfer of this action, the Court looks to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), permitting “suits to be brought against the United States in any judicial district where ‘a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or . . . [where] the plaintiff resides.’” Burger v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 10, 11 (2001).