28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from conduct outside the conduct supporting original federal-question jurisdiction.

Europa Auto Imports, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge No. 1448 · filed 2023-07-20(a)

Because the Court is without original federal question jurisdiction over any conduct after April 30, 2022, the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims which are based a strike that began on June 16, 2022.

Section 1367 does not govern state-law claims aggregated to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction; those claims are within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Banga v. Lustig · filed 2025-07-17

In this case, the district court had original, not supplemental, jurisdiction over Banga’s timely § 123110 claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim only if it is sufficiently related to a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction to form part of the same case or controversy.

Hair · filed 2026-02-12(a)

A district court has broad discretion to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims that are “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff’s malpractice claim fails this initial test of relatedness to the federal claim.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, a dismissal of related state law claims under subsection (c)(3) based on the dismissal of all federal claims must also be reversed.

Payne v. City of Olive Branch · filed 2005-04-29(c)(3)

The district court dismissed Payne’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) because it had dismissed all of Payne’s federal claims. Since we reverse the dismissal of Payne’s federal claims with respect to Fulwood, we also reverse the dismissal of Payne’s state law claims against Fulwood.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, the district court must reconsider its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over associated state-law claims.

Robert Eliserio, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. United Steelworkers of America Local 310 Steve Vonk, Appellees/cross-Appell · filed 2005-02-24(c)(3)

After granting summary judgment on the federal law claims, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because we reverse and remand the federal law claims, the district court must reconsider its supplemental jurisdiction over the associated state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) calls for reconsidering a decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims involving a defendant who remains a party to a claim after remand.

Rosen v. County of Suffolk · filed 2005-01-21(c)(3)

In the event that any of the defendants named in any of the state law claims over which the District Court declined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to assert supplemental jurisdiction is a party to any claim remaining before the District Court following this remand, the Court should reconsider its election to decline jurisdiction over claims involving such party.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, related state law claims dismissed under § 1367(c)(3) should be remanded for reconsideration.

Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital · filed 2003-09-29(c)(3)

After dismissing all of Marshall’s federal claims on summary judgment, the district court dismissed the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As we have reinstated certain federal claims against the Hobbs Defendants, we remand the related state law claims to the district court for reconsideration.

When an appellate court reinstates a federal claim, the district court must revisit its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.

McCullah v. Mark Gadert and the City of Springfield, Illinois · filed 2003-09-22(a)

Second, although the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McCullah’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), our reinstatement of his Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Gadert under § 1983 will necessarily require the district court to revisit the issue of supplemental jurisdiction on remand.

When a federal claim is reinstated, state law claims dismissed solely because that federal claim had been dismissed should also be reinstated.

John J. Kenney, Jr. v. Roland Parson Contracting Corporation · filed 1994-07-15(c)(3)

In addition, because the district court dismissed Kenney’s state law claims only because it had dismissed the federal claim upon which federal jurisdiction depended, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), his state law claims should also be reinstated.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge claim when another claim supplies original federal jurisdiction.

Graef v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines · filed 1994-08-04(a)

In this case, the predicate is 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (authorizing the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within the court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III). Consequently, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(e) does not compel remand of the retaliatory discharge claim.

A dismissal of supplemental state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3) is vacated when the dismissal of the federal claims is reversed.

Tabas v. Tabas · filed 1995-05-02(c)(3)

Because we find that the district court erred in dismissing Counts I and II, we will instruct the district court to vacate the dismissal of plaintiffs' supplemental state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to revisit its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when reversal of a federal-claim dismissal changes the basis for that decision.

Inland Empire Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. Dear · filed 1996-02-21(c)(3)

The district court exercised its discretion to dismiss the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1), (3). Because its decision to dismiss the federal law claims was among the reasons for this exercise of discretion, the district court may revisit the issue, on remand, of whether to exercise its discretion to exercise jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits reinstatement of a supplemental state law claim when the federal claim is reinstated.

Davis v. Witt · filed 1996-04-10(c)(3)

Having reinstated Davis's federal claim, we also reinstate Davis's supplemental state law claim against Martin. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1994).

Section 1367(c)(3) calls for reconsidering dismissal of supplemental state-law claims when a federal claim is reinstated on appeal.

White v. White · filed 1997-06-19(c)(3)

Given our disposition of White's excessive force claim, we vacate the district court's dismissal of White's pendant state assault and battery claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

A state law claim dismissed under § 1367(c) may be reinstated when the federal claim is revived on appeal.

R.M. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Association Renee M. Smith · filed 1998-03-16(c)

In light of this conclusion, we ... will remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and direct the district court to reinstate her state law contract claim, over which the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) does not warrant dismissal of state law claims when the federal claim whose dismissal prompted that decision is reinstated on appeal.

Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus · filed 1999-12-01(c)(3)

When the district court dismissed Bollard’s claim under Title VII, it dismissed those claims under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Because we hold that Bollard has stated a claim under Title VII, the dismissal of his state law claims is no longer warranted.

A district court may reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when an accompanying federal claim is restored on appeal.

Bittner v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-09-14(c)(3)

Because we are vacating the district court’s dismissal of Bittner’s claim against Morrison, the district court may reconsider Bittner’s state law claim on remand.

Reinstatement of federal claims warrants vacating a dismissal of related state law claims under § 1367(c)(3).

Societe Des Hotels Meridien v. Lasalle Hotel Operating Partnership · filed 2004-08-17(c)(3)

Once the District Court dismissed Meridien's federal claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meridien's state unfair competition claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) See Meridien II, 2003 WL 1090281 at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3565 at *6 Since we reinstate the Lanham Act claims, we vacate the dismissal of Meridien's state law claims.

State and common-law claims dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) are reinstated when the related federal claims are revived on appeal.

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. · filed 2007-09-04(c)(2)

Because the District Court summarily dismissed Claims 9 through 13 — Broadcom’s state and common-law claims — for lack of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), we will order the reinstatement of those claims.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, a decision declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims because all federal claims were dismissed is vacated.

Loeffler v. Staten Island University Hospital · filed 2009-10-06(c)(3)

Because we vacate the dismissal of Robert’s and Josephine’s federal claims, we also vacate that part of the order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Robert’s and Josephine’s common law negligence claims.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, a dismissal of a supplemental state law claim under § 1367(c)(3) should be vacated so the district court can decide how to handle that claim on remand.

Davis v. White · filed 2015-07-28(c)(3)

When we reinstate the court’s original federal jurisdiction by reversing the grant of summary judgment and remanding for further proceedings on the federal excessive force claims, our proper disposition is to vacate the dismissal of the state law counterclaim under § 1367(c)(3) and “leave the question of how to handle the state claim to the District Court on remand.” Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 976 (8th Cir. 2002).

When federal claims within the district court’s original jurisdiction are revived on appeal, an order declining supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim under § 1367(c)(3) is vacated and remanded.

Rittenhouse Entertainment, Inc v. City of Wilkes-Barre · filed 2019-08-26(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Five, a tortious interference claim under state law. Because we are vacating and remanding claims over which the District Court has original jurisdiction, we will also vacate the court’s order as to supplemental jurisdiction and remand.

Section 1367 does not give a district court supplemental jurisdiction over a Tucker Act claim against the United States without an independent waiver of sovereign immunity permitting that claim to be heard in district court.

Saunders v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2020-10-30(a)

But, as the Fifth Circuit held in Wilkerson, a district court does not have jurisdiction under § 1367 to hear a Tucker Act claim because, “there is no waiver [of sovereign immunity] except to have the claims heard in the Court of Claims.” 67 F.3d at 119.

Section 1367 does not give district courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims properly brought in the Claims Court.

Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation · filed 1993-05-28(a)

As outlined above, jurisdiction does not exist under section 666, as this is not a dispute over the “use of water,” or section 1367, as the supplemental jurisdiction statute cannot be used to gain jurisdiction over claims properly asserted in the Claims Court.

Section 1367 does not override the Tucker Act's exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States exceeding $10,000.

Dia Navigation Company, Ltd v. Pomeroy · filed 1994-06-28

Dia asserts that the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction is overridden by the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We reject this argument in light of the Tucker Act's explicit jurisdictional bar.

Section 1367 does not override the Tucker Act’s exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States exceeding $10,000.

Dia Navigation Company, Limited v. Pomeroy · filed 1994-09-13

Dia asserts that the Claims Court's exclusive jurisdiction is overridden by the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367. We reject this argument in light of the Tucker Act's explicit jurisdictional bar.

Section 1367 does not override the Tucker Act’s exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States exceeding $10,000.

Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy · filed 1994-09-13

Dia asserts that the Claims Court’s exclusive jurisdiction is overridden by the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We reject this argument in light of the Tucker Act’s explicit jurisdictional bar.

Section 1367 does not override the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims.

Tucson Airport Authority v. General Dynamics Corp. · filed 1996-04-05

Federal courts have consistently held that the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims is not overridden by supplemental jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, this Court lacks supplement jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim asserted in Count VII.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant when that would defeat complete diversity.

Ware v. Jolly Roger Rides, Inc. · filed 1994-07-11(b)

But it is also clear that § 1367 does not change the complete diversity requirement in place since Strawbridge.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse defendant named in the original complaint when the action rests solely on diversity jurisdiction.

Dieter v. MFS Telecom, Inc. · filed 1994-12-15(b)

The Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because of incomplete diversity, and dismissed the case. This logic is sound and in keeping with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) and (b). ... The Garza case from Kentucky is not controlling and adopts an interpretation with which this Court disagrees. Namely, that because the party is not added pursuant to one of the rules enumerated in § 1367(b), its presence is permissible.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction to overcome the complete diversity requirement when original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity.

Parker v. Crete Carrier Corp. · filed 1996-02-09

This Court cannot use supplemental jurisdiction to override the requirement of complete diversity when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated only upon diversity.

Section 1367(b) does not preserve supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity action through a defendant’s impleader of a party whose realignment according to the parties’ actual interests would destroy diversity.

Polanco v. H.B. Fuller Co. · filed 1996-09-23(b)

Plaintiff asserts, however, that if Fuller-U.S. asserts a claim against Fuller-Guatemala, then 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) does not apply. Because the subsidiary would not then be adverse to plaintiff, she concludes, diversity will be preserved. The Court disagrees. ... Thus, were Fuller-Guatemala impleaded by Fuller-U.S., this Court would be required to realign the parties consistent with their primary interests; as the primary interests of both Fuller entities are adverse to that of plaintiff, Guatemalan citizens would be placed on both sides of the lawsuit, destroying diversity.

When original jurisdiction rests on diversity, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims that would destroy complete diversity.

In Re Air Crash Disaster of Aviateca Flight 901 · filed 1997-08-29(b)

The Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Espejel’s and Grimaldo’s claims because the Court’s jurisdiction over the remaining claims is based on diversity, and Espejel and Grimaldo would destroy diversity.

Section 1367(a) does not supply diversity jurisdiction over an action with a nondiverse defendant, even when the claims against that defendant arise from the same case or controversy.

Finley v. Higbee Co. · filed 1997-11-04(a)

That statute, by its terms, does not authorize a district court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over an action to which a non-diverse defendant has been named.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim against a nondiverse defendant in a diversity case, and retaining jurisdiction over a settlement with that defendant does not cure the diversity defect.

Herrick Co. v. SCS Communications, Inc. · filed 2001-05-23(b)

We conclude, therefore, that the district court could not properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction either over Herrick’s initial lawsuit against Skad-den or over the narrower subject matter of the settlement involving Skadden.

Section 1367(b) bars using supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity case to evade the requirement of complete diversity.

The Herrick Company, Inc. v. Scs Communications, Inc. · filed 2001-05-23(b)

Finally, this conclusion is in keeping with the firm rule, articulated in Kroger and affirmed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), that assertions of ancillary jurisdiction may not be used to avoid the requirement of complete diversity expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1367 cannot cure a lack of complete diversity by supplying supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant.

Jungil Lee v. ANC Car Rental Corp. · filed 2007-01-29

Contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ contention, the lack of diversity under § 1332(a) cannot be cured by the district court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over their claims against Jeon under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction when joinder of a nondiverse party defeats complete diversity and leaves no claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc. · filed 2007-08-31(a)

It follows that a defect of the latter sort eliminates every claim in the action, including any jurisdictionally proper action that might otherwise have anchored original jurisdiction, and removes the civil action from the purview of § 1367 altogether.

Section 1367(b) does not permit a district court to cure a lack of complete diversity by exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Hoffman v. Connecticut · filed 2009-09-18(b)

Moreover, a district court may not cure a lack of complete diversity by exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 cannot supply supplemental jurisdiction when a nondiverse party destroys complete diversity and leaves no claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation · filed 2011-01-18(a)

The presence of a nondiverse party, in other words, deprives the district court of jurisdiction over any of the claims; it follows that there is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction may attach.

Section 1367(a) supplies no supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity action when a nondiverse party defeats original jurisdiction over every claim.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2011-01-18(a)

The presence of a nondiverse party, in other words, deprives the district court of jurisdiction over any of the claims; it follows that there is nothing to which supplemental jurisdiction may attach.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant when its joinder destroys original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.

Wenzel v. Sand Canyon Corp. · filed 2012-01-05(a)

Incomplete diversity destroyed the Court’s original jurisdiction over the entire action and so the Court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Wenzels’ claims against Commerce.

Section 1367 does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to a joined plaintiff whose inclusion defeats complete diversity in a diversity action.

Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System v. Morgan Stanley & Co. · filed 2014-10-31(b)

We follow this rationale and hold that PSERS’s dismissal was proper, because inclusion of its claim destroyed complete diversity and would have otherwise “catalyze[d] loss of [federal] jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(b) cannot preserve supplemental jurisdiction over a claim against a nondiverse defendant whose presence defeats original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.

Cuviello v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2015-01-12(b)

Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, see Opp. at 5-6, the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) specifically, provides no basis for the Court to maintain Taylor as a defendant.

Section 1367(b) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against Rule 20 defendants when complete diversity is lacking.

Gray Ex Rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises-Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2004-11-10(b)

Because multiple defendants, like those in this case, are allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, complete diversity must exist, and § 1367(b) does not authorize the ex- ercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) requires a court to determine on its own whether a claim falls within the scope of supplemental jurisdiction.

Robert Myers and Steven R. Myers v. County of Lake, Indiana · filed 1994-07-22(a)

This division between the requisites of judicial competence in § 1367(a) and the criteria for the exercise of discretion in § 1367(c) also marks, we believe, the division between matters the court must examine on its own and those that depend on an assertion of error by the litigants. A court must satisfy itself that a claim falls within the category laid out in § 1367(a), for otherwise there is no federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) does not require a district court to consider on its own whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction, and an appellate court need not review unchallenged retention on its own.

Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-06-12(c)

Thus, while a district court must be sure that it has federal jurisdiction under § 1367(a), once it is satisfied that the power to resolve state law claims exists, the court is not required to make a § 1367(c) analysis unless asked to do so by a party. For the same reason, we are not required to step in sua sponte on appeal to undo an unchallenged exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

A district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim after dismissing the federal claims is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Moss v. Technicolor Inc. · filed 2002-10-09(c)

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state fraud claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Section 1367(c) does not require a district court to consider on its own initiative whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Mihailescu v. Maryville Nursing Home · filed 2009-07-22(c)

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider sua sponte whether it should have retained supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over Mihailescu’s claims arising under state law.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a court may sua sponte decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor doing so.

Manda v. Albin · filed 2019-11-25(c)(3)

Here, after carefully considering the relevant factors (economy, convenience, fairness, and ... comity), the Court finds that they weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. ... The Court may sua sponte render this determination. ... Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state ... law claims and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) requires a court to continue assessing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

JOHNSTON v. TITAN LOGISTICS & RESOURCES, LLC · filed 2020-10-29(c)(3)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by this amendment because the Court has a continuing obligation to assess its own jurisdiction under 28 U.SC. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim by a coplaintiff who does not independently meet the diversity amount in controversy, when another claim supplies original jurisdiction and subsection (b) does not exclude the claim.

Lindsay v. Kvortek · filed 1994-09-12(a), (b)

Although this area of the law is far from clear, the Court should apply § 1367 as written and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II of the Amended Complaint.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a closely related claim in a non-class diversity action even if that claim does not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement, provided subsection (b) does not exclude it.

Booty v. Shoney's, Inc. · filed 1995-01-11(a)

This court finds that in a non-class action context, if the requirements of § 1367(a) are met and the exceptions found in § 1367(b) do not apply, then the district court does have jurisdiction over the supplemental claim even though the jurisdictional amount is not met.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related Warranty Act and state-law claims when a state-law claim independently supports diversity jurisdiction, even if the additional state-law claim does not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Azimi v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1996-08-15(a)

However, if Mr. Azimi can establish diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), with respect to one of his state law counts, the court can assert supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over the Warranty Act counts, ... and over the remaining state law count, even if it does not meet the amount-in-controversy.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim below the diversity amount when another claim exceeds that amount and both form part of the same case or controversy.

Palmer v. Griffin · filed 2003-04-01(a)

The court could plainly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Palmer’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because Navarre’s claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit for diversity purposes, and Palmer’s claim was “so related to claims in the action within [the court’s jurisdiction] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c) does not govern a diversity court’s retention of a single plaintiff’s remaining claim when the plaintiff’s aggregated claims initially met the amount in controversy requirement.

Carter v. Tennant Company · filed 2004-09-13(c)

We hold today that it is not. The Second Circuit’s Wolde-Meskel opinion explains thoroughly why aggregated claims of a single plaintiff do not fit the supplemental jurisdiction model.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims of additional plaintiffs who do not meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement when at least one plaintiff does.

SJ Properties Suites v. Specialty Finance Group, LLC · filed 2010-08-25

Therefore, in the event that two of the named plaintiffs in this action do not meet the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over those two plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim below the diversity amount-in-controversy threshold when another plaintiff’s claim satisfies the threshold and the claims form part of the same case or controversy.

Intersport, Inc. v. T-Town Tickets LLC · filed 2012-09-12(a)

Although the Complaint alleges that Intersport suffered damages of only $10,000.00, the court is satisfied Intersport and Double Eagle’s claims “form part of the same case or controversy,” and, therefore, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Intersport’s claims pursuant to Section 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a claim arising from the same transaction as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction, even if that claim alone falls below the diversity amount-in-controversy threshold.

SHERIFF v. GARDNER · filed 2021-12-23(a)

Even assuming that was correct, on the facts as pled, the Court alternatively finds it is appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claim stated against KRE to the extent the claim clearly arises from the same real estate transaction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over one plaintiff’s claims when another plaintiff’s claims arising from the same case meet the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Bernard v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-08

However, if Defendants show by a preponderance of the evidence that either Kaylon or Reva’s claims likely exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the other Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim below the diversity amount threshold when another plaintiff’s claim meets that threshold and both arise from the same case or controversy.

Johnson v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2025-06-16(a)

Mr. Keith’s claim stems from the “same case or controversy” as Ms. Johnson’s claims, so the Court may exercise jurisdiction over his claims if the Court may exercise jurisdiction over Ms. Johnson’s claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an MMWA claim below that Act’s amount-in-controversy threshold when it shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim independently within federal jurisdiction.

Pierre v. Planet Automotive, Inc. · filed 2016-06-21(a)

Because, the MMWA does not expressly contradict the supplemental jurisdiction statute, and because the two statutes are not irreconcilable, the Court concludes that the MMWA’s amount-in-controversy requirement does not prohibit the Court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs MMWA claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims that do not satisfy that Act’s amount-in-controversy requirement when diversity jurisdiction exists over the underlying claims.

HURLEY v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2020-04-02(a)

The Court agrees with defendant that, under Samuel-Bassett, plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to satisfy the MMWA’s amount-in-controversy requirement and thus concludes that it does not have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction under that statute. However, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ MMWA claims, and it does so.

A district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) is discretionary, and the resulting remand order is reviewable.

Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage · filed 1995-07-11(c)(3)

The district court's remand order is reviewable. Although remand orders under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(c), (d), are not generally reviewable, the district court did not remand pursuant to these sections. The district court had federal question jurisdiction over the claim it found preempted by ERISA and had supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). The district court made a discretionary decision under Sec. 1367(c)(3) not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. "A remand based on a district court's perceived discretion is not" treated as a remand under Sec. 1447(c). Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1480 (10th Cir.1993). Therefore, this court has authority to review the remand order.

A district court’s decision to remand remaining claims under § 1367(c)(3) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while an underlying legal issue is reviewed de novo.

In Re in Re · filed 1999-09-16(c)(3)

Turning to the merits of the parties' contentions, we review the District Court's decision to remand under § 1367(c)(3) for abuse of discretion; however, to the extent that the underlying issue giving rise to that remand decision, in this case the extent of preemption, is one of law, our review is de novo.

Section 1367(c) confers discretionary remand authority that an appellate court should not raise sua sponte as a jurisdictional matter when the district court did not invoke it.

Gonzalez v. Citgo Petro Corp · filed 2002-08-23(c)

Moreover, it is not appropriate for us to raise § 1367(c) sua sponte as a “jurisdictional” matter, since in this case, our purpose would be solely to analyze the propriety of the district court’s exercise of a discretionary power to remand conferred by that provision.

A discretionary remand under § 1367(c)(3) is reviewable on appeal.

Green v. America Online (Aol) John Does 1 & 2 · filed 2003-01-16(c)(3)

However, in this case the District Court did not expressly remand pursuant to § 1447(c); remand appears to have been discretionary and thus reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

A discretionary remand after declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is reviewable by ordinary appeal under § 1291.

California Department of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp. · filed 2008-07-21(c)

We conclude that Moses H. Cone should guide our review of remands to state court, and, on the authority of Quackenbush, we overrule circuit precedents that instruct otherwise.

A district court’s discretionary remand after declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is reviewable by appeal under § 1291 and is not barred from review by § 1447(d).

California Department of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp. · filed 2008-07-22(c)

In light of clear precedent, then, we hold that review of a district court’s decision to decline an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is not barred by § 1447(d). ... Applying Moses H. Cone to this case, we find that we have jurisdiction under § 1291 to review the remand order.

Section 1367(c) permits discretionary remand of a supplemental claim; that remand is reviewable and may be reconsidered by the district court.

Thomas v. LTV Corp. · filed 1994-12-12(c)

As opposed to section 1447(d) remand orders, discretionary remand orders are reviewable either by the district court or on appeal.

A discretionary remand under § 1367(c) is reviewable by the district court or on appeal.

Thomas v. Ltv Corporation · filed 1994-12-13(c)

This claim was initially remanded as a matter of discretion under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), which states in relevant part: ... Discretionary remand orders under this provision are neither based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction nor a defect in the removal procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). ... As opposed to section 1447(d) remand orders, discretionary remand orders are reviewable either by the district court or on appeal.

Section 1367 does not displace § 1332’s rules for aggregating plaintiffs’ claims to meet the amount in controversy requirement in a non-class diversity action.

Henkel v. ITT Bowest Corp. · filed 1994-12-19(b)

In short, the court concludes that the adoption of § 1367 does not overrule § 1332’s rules of aggregation in a non-class action case.

Section 1367 gives a district court discretion to retain or dismiss remaining state law claims when dismissal of an aggregated diversity claim reduces the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold, if the case satisfied that threshold when filed.

Shanaghan v. John D. Cahill Cahill & Associates, Incorporated · filed 1995-06-28(c)(3)

There is no way to distinguish a reduction of the amount in controversy from the disappearance of a federal claim as contemplated under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over related claims even when they do not independently satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.

Lewis v. Richardson · filed 1995-11-08(a)

Section 1367(a) unambiguously authorizes federal court jurisdiction over supplemental claims "so related" to claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, even where the supplemental claims do not independently meet the amount in controversy reguirement set forth in § 1332.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim in a non-class action even when that claim does not independently meet the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Fairchild v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1995-11-30

Although the present litigation does not involve a class action, this Court determines that the In re Abbott Labs, holding applies in non-class action cases as well. Therefore, the Court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over William Fairchild’s claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 although his claim does not exceed $50,000.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a closely related claim by a plaintiff who satisfies diversity of citizenship but falls below the amount-in-controversy minimum.

Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., and Comfort Control, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc. · filed 1996-02-20(a)

If § 1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional amount but not the diversity requirement, it also allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the jurisdictional amount.

Section 1367 allows a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related breach-of-contract claim even when that claim falls below the diversity amount-in-controversy threshold.

Tacket v. General Motors Corporation, Delco Remy Division · filed 1996-08-15(a)

The district court also shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Tacket’s $3,000 breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related co-plaintiffs’ claims that do not independently meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement when other plaintiffs’ claims do.

Gandolfo v. U-Haul International, Inc. · filed 1996-12-19(a)

The claims of Suzanne Gandolfo and Marianne Peterson meet the amount in controversy requirement. Thus, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the other plaintiffs is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over the claims of Ingrid Chen, Michael Gandolfo, and Chris Hansen, because these claims form part of the same case or controversy as the claims of Suzanne Gandolfo and Marianne Peterson.

Section 1367(b) supports declining jurisdiction over a remaining contract claim if the amount sought is less than $50,000.

Hunt v. Wyle Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1997-02-24(b)

If the amount is less than $50,000, the Court will decline jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

Section 1367(a) permits a court with original jurisdiction over one plaintiff’s claim to hear related claims of other plaintiffs arising from common facts, even if those claims do not independently meet the amount in controversy requirement.

Acosta v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 1997-10-03(a)

When a District Court properly has original jurisdiction over a matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) allows the court in its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims involved in the case arising from common facts. ... Thus, if one of the Plaintiff’s claims exceeds $75,000 the Court could properly exercise jurisdiction over all other claims.

Section 1367 preserves the rule that separate plaintiffs’ claims cannot be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction.

Meritcare Inc v. St Paul Mercury Ins · filed 1999-01-25(b)

Our review of the text, legislative history, and origins of Section 1367 leads us to hold that it preserves the prohibition against aggregation outlined in Zahn v. International Paper Co. and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., and thus maintains the traditional rules governing diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. S 1332.

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over claims of individual plaintiffs who fail to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.

Agre v. Rain & Hail LLC · filed 2002-04-15(a)

Defendants next argue that even if some individual claimants seek less than $75,000, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the less-than-$75,000 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This argument also fails.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related claim by an additional plaintiff when one named plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement.

In Re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation · filed 2002-04-24(a)

In the Seventh Circuit, as long as one named plaintiff satisfies the jurisdictional amount, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over other plaintiffs with related claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of plaintiffs who do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement when one named plaintiff does meet it.

Corbin v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc. · filed 2002-04-24

In the Seventh Circuit, as long as one named plaintiff 'satisfies the jurisdictional amount, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over other plaintiffs with related claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims by additional diverse plaintiffs that do not meet the amount in controversy requirement when at least one claim independently satisfies that requirement.

Carey v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. · filed 2002-06-28(a)

In section 1367(a) the Congress has abolished any jurisdictional amount over state law claims in diversity cases, but only where at least one claim does meet the amount in controversy requirement of section 1332, thus vesting the court with traditional subject matter jurisdiction under section 1332 before supplemental jurisdiction may even be considered.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over other named plaintiffs’ claims when one named plaintiff meets the diversity amount-in-controversy threshold, even if the others do not.

Hawkins, Glenn A. v. Aid Assoc Lutherans · filed 2003-08-05(a)

Moreover, the ruling was contrary to this circuit’s precedent, which holds that when one named plaintiff meets the minimum amount-in-controversy thresh- old, a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the remaining plaintiffs’ claims, even if their individual claims do not exceed that amount.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims by other diverse plaintiffs who do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement when at least one named plaintiff does and the other jurisdictional requirements are met.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. · filed 2005-06-23(a)

We hold that, where the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants that fail the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement, even when a claim against another defendant satisfies it.

State Farm Mut. Auto. v. Greater Chiropractic Cen. · filed 2005-06-30(b)

Even if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met for a claim against one defendant, the district courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to claims against different defendants, when such claims do not meet the requisite amount in controversy.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs who do not meet the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement when at least one named plaintiff meets it.

Cancino v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. · filed 2005-09-26

As an initial matter, the United States Supreme Court recently held that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs who fail to satisfy minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as at least one named plaintiff satisfies that requirement. ... Therefore, this Court must decide whether the Defendant has proved by the preponderance of the evidence that one of the named Plaintiffs has satisfied that requirement. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that the Defendant has met its burden in that regard.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related plaintiffs’ claims below the diversity amount when another plaintiff meets that amount and the claims arise from the same case or controversy.

Engstrom v. Mayfield · filed 2005-12-15(a)

We therefore hold that because William and Mary Engstrom satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a), and because the claims of Harold Engstrom, Pacheco, Hall, Ross, Robert and Ruth Mozzi, and Richard Bialko undeniably arise out of the same case or controversy over which the district court has original jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the above named plaintiffs is proper.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related plaintiffs’ claims below the diversity amount in controversy when at least one plaintiff satisfies that requirement.

Engstrom v. Mayfield · filed 2006-08-24(a)

We therefore hold that because William and Mary Engstrom satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332(a), and because the claims of Harold Engstrom, Pacheco, Hall, Ross, Robert and Ruth Mozzi, and Richard Bialko undeniably arise out of the same case or controversy over which the district court has original jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the above named plaintiffs is proper.

Section 1367 does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff allege more than $75,000 in controversy as to each defendant in a diversity case.

State Farm Mutual, Automobile Insurance v. V'Chesed · filed 2008-02-26

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the rule remains that a plaintiff must allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as to each defendant.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law breach of contract claim accompanying a federal RICO claim without satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.

Bloodstock Research Information Services, Inc. v. Edbain.Com, LLC · filed 2009-04-07

Johnson argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Johnson misunderstands this Court’s jurisdiction over such claims. Bloodstock’s RICO claims are properly before the Court under its federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The breach of contract claim is also properly before the Court under its supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The amount in controversy is an issue under diversity jurisdiction, which is not the basis for jurisdiction here.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ claims below the diversity amount only when at least one named plaintiff has a claim satisfying that amount.

Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc. · filed 2010-07-19(a)

There exists no basis, therefore, for exerting supplemental jurisdiction over Cappuccitti’s claims under Allapattah.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim that falls below the diversity amount in controversy threshold when another plaintiff’s claim meets that threshold and both claims form part of the same case or controversy.

White v. Loomis Armored US, Inc. · filed 2010-07-28(a)

Under section 1367(a), the district court has jurisdiction over pendent claims that are “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The complaint plainly demonstrates that Flanders’s and White’s claims, although separate, are so related. They arose from the same incident, and the defendant took the same adverse action against them.

Section 1367(a) imposes no minimum amount in controversy for a state law claim supplemental to a federal claim.

Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC · filed 2012-08-06(a)

And since no minimum amount in controversy is specified as a condition of a federal court’s having jurisdiction to decide a state law claim supplemental to a federal claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the modesty of the plaintiffs’ stake in this appeal is ir- relevant.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff’s claim below the diversity amount in controversy when another plaintiff meets that amount, the other diversity requirements are satisfied, and the claims are part of the same case or controversy.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. · filed 2016-04-19(a)

The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that § 1367(a) permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as other elements of diversity jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement. ... Lucky Star’s contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction -over SCP’s supplemental claim is therefore patently meritless.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of additional plaintiffs in a diversity suit when one plaintiff independently satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

Berg v. San Juan Marriott Hotel & Stellaris Casino · filed 2016-07-06(a)

Furthermore, since Torres’s claim meets the threshold amount required to establish this court’s original jurisdiction, this court also has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the nearly identical claims of the other two plaintiffs.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims by parties diverse from the defendant even when their individual claims fall below the diversity amount in controversy.

CNH Industrial America LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas · filed 2018-02-15(a)

True, no dealer claim meets the $75,000 threshold, but given the diversity of citizenship, the dealers would qualify as pendent parties entitled to invoke supplemental jurisdiction of the court.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff whose claim falls below the diversity amount in controversy when another plaintiff’s claim meets that threshold.

Mid-South Tax Credit Partners I v. Junkin · filed 2019-09-10(a)

Because the court is satisfied that Mid-South’s claims exceed the amount in controversy requirement, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over AJY under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining defendant whose claim does not exceed $75,000 when diversity jurisdiction exists over another defendant.

Prewett Enterprises, Inc. v. Cedar River Railroad Co. · filed 2019-11-25(a)

That being the case, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over at least one of the remaining defendants and so may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the remaining defendant even in the absence of a claim against that defendant in excess of $75,000.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs’ claims arising from the same case or controversy even if they do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, provided one plaintiff satisfies that requirement and the other elements of diversity jurisdiction are present.

Mayers v. Razor USA LLC · filed 2019-12-03(a)

The allegation of multiple surgeries and the nature of the injuries sustained appears sufficient to establish that the amount in controversy requirement is met at to C.M. As such, the Court also has jurisdiction over C.M.’s parents’ claims as well. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., wherein the United States Supreme Court held that, in cases such as this, where at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, the additional plaintiffs’ claims are part of the same case or controversy as those of the plaintiff who alleges a sufficient amount in controversy, and the other elements of diversity jurisdiction are present, the court may exercise 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction over the additional plaintiffs’ claims even though their claims do not meet the amount in controversy requirement.

Each plaintiff must independently satisfy the diversity amount-in-controversy requirement unless that plaintiff’s claims fall within the grant of supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(a).

Bailey v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. · filed 2019-12-16(a)

Each plaintiff must establish that his or her own claims meet the jurisdictional threshold unless those claims fall within the grant of supplemental jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554–55, 559 (2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If the plaintiffs file an amended complaint, they must state, in clearer terms, the amount in controversy for each plaintiff and explain whether they are relying on supplemental jurisdiction for any of the claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of plaintiffs who do not individually meet the diversity amount in controversy when at least one plaintiff does.

Davalos, Individually and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Cathrine Solano v. Allstate Fire and Casualty In · filed 2021-02-25

But the argument ignores supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 once the amount in controversy is exceeded for one plaintiff.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims fall below the diversity amount in controversy when at least one plaintiff satisfies that amount.

BURGESS, JR. v. BENNETT · filed 2021-03-19(a)

However, this infirmity does not impact the jurisdictional analysis; although these particular plaintiffs’ claims may not reach the amount in controversy, so long as one plaintiff in this case satisfies the jurisdictional amount, this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related plaintiff’s claim that does not meet the diversity amount in controversy threshold when another plaintiff’s claim does.

Cunningham v. Norris · filed 2021-07-16(a)

Johnny Cunningham’s loss of consortium claim against defendants is wholly dependent on the merits of his wife’s claim against defendants, and the claims of Brenda and Johnny Cunningham are part of the same case or controversy. Therefore, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Johnny Cunningham’s claim against defendants, even if defendants have not shown that the amount in controversy for this claim exceeds $75,000.

Section 1367 allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims of additional plaintiffs who do not independently meet the diversity amount in controversy when another plaintiff does.

ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY (EUROPE) LTD. v. REILLY · filed 2021-10-08(a)

Barbican and Endurance are already Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and Defendant does not contend that keeping either entity in this litigation destroys diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff whose claim falls below the diversity amount threshold if at least one named plaintiff meets that threshold, the other diversity requirements are met, and the claims are part of the same case or controversy.

Matthews v. Allen · filed 2022-07-12(a)

However, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in diversity may exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over additional plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, as long as the other elements of diversity jurisdiction are present, at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, and the additional plaintiffs’ claims are part of the same case or controversy as those of the plaintiff(s) who allege a sufficient amount in controversy. Johnson, 2018 WL 4512190, at *6, citing 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005). Accordingly, Defendants have to establish that at least one of the Plaintiff’s damages satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a second plaintiff’s claim arising from the same case or controversy when the first plaintiff’s claim satisfies the diversity amount in controversy requirement, regardless of the second claim’s monetary value.

McKenzie v. Auction.com, Inc. · filed 2022-12-08(a)

Because Martha McKenzie’s claim meets the $ 75,000 threshold, it is subject to the court’s diversity jurisdiction. As a result, the court is authorized to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dan McKenzie’s claim--which is part of the “same case or controversy”--regardless of its monetary value. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) supplies supplemental jurisdiction over joined wage claims even when each additional plaintiff’s amount in controversy is below the diversity threshold.

Glynn v. Martin Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-03-22(a)

However, the amount in controversy is irrelevant here where the court has jurisdiction over the wage claims under supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 supplies supplemental jurisdiction over other claims when at least one claim satisfies the diversity amount in controversy requirement.

Beck, M.D. v. Bronstein, M.D. · filed 2023-09-08

Because Defendants have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and, by clear and convincing evidence, that MSO was fraudulently joined, the Court finds that it has diversity jurisdiction over at least one claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as to all other claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over other plaintiffs’ claims when at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Rivera v. Valyria LLC · filed 2023-11-22

For consolidated cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs where at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional codefendants in a diversity action when those claims do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Ezell v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London · filed 2023-11-22(b)

The Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ezell’s claims against the other six syndicates merely because the jurisdictional threshold might be met as to the one syndicate, BRT 2987.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction over related claims, and a state statute cannot take that jurisdiction away from a federal court.

Scott v. School District No. 6 · filed 1993-03-04(a)

Section 1367 has no provision allowing a state to take away a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis · filed 1995-02-01(c)

A ruling on the supplemental issues of state law is made unnecessary by the above rulings. Alternatively, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the State law claims made in Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XII.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over unsettled state-law claims when the related federal claims depend on resolution of those state-law issues.

North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Alcatel · filed 1995-02-02(c)

All five claims involve matters that have yet to be decided by a North Carolina court. As well, it is clear from the above discussion that these claims are totally dependant on the coverage claims in that if it is determined that plaintiff is not liable for coverage of the GICs, the ERISA claims will never ripen. For these reasons, the court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the issues raised in claims one through five.

Section 1367(a) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claim presents a triable issue, leaving the decision whether to hear the state law claims to the court’s discretion.

Wayne Construction, Inc. v. Monti Dean Lenard, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant v. Mayhan Construction, Inc., John a Mayha · filed 1995-05-19(a)

Because we now hold that Lenard has presented a triable issue of fact over his seaman status, the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). We therefore reverse the dismissal of the state law claims and remand so that the district court may exercise discretion whether to entertain them.

Section 1367(b) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant added to a diversity case.

Stephen C. Scaccianoce and Kellie L. Scaccianoce v. Hixon Manufacturing & Supply Company and Commonwealth Edison Company · filed 1995-07-21(b)

Supplementary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not apply to parties added in diversity cases in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law defamation and false light claims.

Hunter v. County of Cook · filed 1995-10-06(a)

Third, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the defamation and false light claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a).

Section 1367 gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims accompanying a federal civil rights claim after removal.

Peterson v. Rasmussen · filed 1996-07-26(a)

Moreover, the fact that Mr. Peterson asserted violations of state law did not require the remand of those claims to the state court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate them.

Section 1367(a) gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims when the federal claims remain before it.

Figueira v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc. · filed 1996-11-01(a)

Finally, because defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII and FMLA claims is denied, this court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and there is no valid reason to dismiss under § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) prevents a plaintiff in a diversity case from using another party’s joinder or intervention to assert claims against a nondiverse party.

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Southwestern Public Service Co. · filed 1997-01-07(b)

We note, however, that Thunder Basin could not utilize TUCO’s joinder or intervention as an avenue to escape the limitations of the district court’s diversity jurisdiction and assert its own claims against TUCO.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state human rights claim when the related federal claims remain in the case.

Azzaro v. Allegheny · filed 1997-04-11(a)

The district court ... should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.

Section 1367(a) supports exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an accompanying state-law claim when the federal claims are reinstated.

Azzaro v. County of Allegheny Tom Foerster, an Individual and Chairman, Allegheny County Commissioners and Wa · filed 1997-04-11(a)

In light of our ruling on Azzaro's Title VII and § 1983 claims, we will also reverse the district court's dismissal of her Pennsylvania Human Relations Act claim. The district court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when a federal claim survives dismissal.

Pollock v. City of Ocean City · filed 1997-06-13(a)

Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims survive defendants’ motion to dismiss as the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to counterclaims placed within the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction by federal labor law unless they have independent jurisdictional support.

Evergreen Media Corp. v. RADIO & TV BROADCAST ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 1220 · filed 1997-10-15(a)

While we ordinarily have supplemental jurisdiction over claims transactionally related to a claim over which we have original jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction does not operate where a federal statute expressly provides otherwise. ... Here, the Supreme Court has interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) as granting the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice allegations, ... and this holding acts to deprive this Court of supplemental jurisdiction over those parts of the Union’s counterclaim which lack independent jurisdictional support.

Section 1367 permits a court retaining federal claims from an incident to hear a related state-law property-damage claim when judicial economy favors hearing them together.

Reyes v. Sazan · filed 1997-10-27

As this Court will retain jurisdiction over the Martinezes’ claims regarding the same incident, it would violate any theoiy of judicial economy to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to litigate Reyes’ claim for damages to his truck under state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim.

Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp. · filed 1997-11-25(c)(3)

Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim, we also hold that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain state-law claims against an individual defendant after dismissing the federal claims against that defendant.

Ganzy v. Allen Christian School · filed 1998-03-02(a)

Jurisdiction to adjudicate the state causes of action against her continues, and these claims were not dismissed.

Section 1367’s authorization of pendent party jurisdiction is effective only if Article III permits pendent party jurisdiction.

Elsaas v. County of Placer · filed 1999-02-09(a)

Thus, congressional approval of pendent party jurisdiction, as manifested in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is effective only if pendent party jurisdiction is permitted under Article III.

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class claims when the federal statute supplying original jurisdiction expressly bars a class action with fewer than 100 named plaintiffs.

Hatfield v. Oak Hill Banks · filed 2000-10-04(a)

Section 1367, however, denies this Court subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ class claims because it offers supplemental jurisdiction only when not “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c)(3) does not authorize remand of claims that themselves fall within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

Battle v. Bruce · filed 2002-06-04(c)(3)

Accordingly, the district court erred when it remanded the Remaining Claims to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) based upon its mistaken belief that it had otherwise dis- missed all claims over which it had "original jurisdiction."

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand state claims that present an unsettled issue of state law, even when judicial economy favors keeping the case.

Bennett v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2002-11-07(c)(1)

The first reason expressed by Congress is compelling in the present case. The state courts of South Carolina have found several exceptions to a rule which previously was air-tight, and have never to this Court’s knowledge been presented squarely with an argument such as that presented here. ... The Court considers this result to outweigh any “judicial economy” which may be promoted by keeping the case in federal court, and concludes that remand is the most appropriate action to take.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand state-law claims that raise novel questions of state law.

Jeung v. McKrow · filed 2003-04-09(c)

Finally, the Court finds that the plaintiffs state law claims are not so devoid of merit as to warrant dismissal, but because some of them raise novel questions under state law, the Court will, in its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand them to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over claims presenting a novel issue of state law.

Cea v. Ulster County · filed 2004-03-12(c)(1)

Since neither party has adequately briefed this issue and, to date, the case law has not definitively addressed the issue, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims based upon violations of the New York State Constitution on the ground that these claims present a novel issue of state law which the courts of the State of New York should address in the first instance.

Section 1367(b) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction to join a foreign defendant when that joinder would defeat diversity jurisdiction.

Extra Equipamentos v. Case Corporation · filed 2004-03-15(b)

And the federal courts’ supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used to leap this jurisdictional hurdle. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity action only when exercising it would conflict with § 1332; intervention by a nondiverse, nonindispensable defendant does not trigger the bar.

Mattel, Inc. v. Carter Bryant, an Individual Mga Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2006-05-02(b)

Mattel’s argument overlooks the final clause of § 1367(b): the prohibition applies only “when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.” This final clause makes the diversity statute, § 1332, decisive. If that statute is not offended, the prohibition of § 1367(b) does not apply.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that raise a complex issue of state law.

Partelow v. Massachusetts · filed 2006-06-23(c)(1)

Because the question of whether Plaintiff fulfilled the presentment requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 5 raises a “complex issue of State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), the court chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

A district court that remands a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot later assert supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) over the same claim.

Burr & Forman v. Blair · filed 2006-11-27(a)

In remanding the case, however, the court effectively ruled that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367 to entertain the claim.

Section 1367(a) cannot supply supplemental jurisdiction over customs entries when doing so would bypass the requirement to pay liquidated duties before invoking the Court of International Trade’s original jurisdiction.

International Custom Products, Inc. v. United States · filed 2008-05-20(a)

Section 1367(a) grants district courts supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used as a basis to grant an injunction over these entries.

Section 1367 supports supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims accompanying an independent, live federal copyright counterclaim.

Mostly Memories Inc v. For Your Ease Only · filed 2008-05-27

Because For Your Ease’s copyright infringement counterclaim presented an independent and live federal controversy, jurisdiction was proper under §§ 1331 and 1338 (along with § 1367 for the supplemental state-law claims), and thus the counterclaim defendants’ state of residency or domicile is irrelevant.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that raises a novel question of state law.

Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. · filed 2010-08-11(c)(1)

Assuming that I could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over West Bend’s claim pursuant to Section 1367(a), however, I would decline to do so because such claim “raises a novel or complex issue of State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Specifically, West Bend asks me to resolve whether its general commercial liability policy provides coverage for claims under the TCPA. As far as I can tell, no Wisconsin court has addressed this issue, and thus West Bend’s claim involves a novel question of state law. I therefore conclude that this claim should be addressed in the pending state-court litigation rather than here.

Section 1367 requires an independent basis for original jurisdiction before supplemental jurisdiction can apply and does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity.

Rae v. United States (In Re Rae) · filed 2010-08-25(a)

There must be an independent basis for this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance before supplemental jurisdiction can be invoked over other claims. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States, and the United States cannot be sued without its consent.

Section 1367(c)(1) generally does not allow a court to remand a state-law claim for novelty or complexity when the claim independently qualifies for diversity jurisdiction.

Clark v. Matthews Intern. Corp. · filed 2011-05-02(c)(1)

In that opinion, we declined, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Clark's MHRA claim because it "raises a novel or complex issue of State law." Clark, 628 F.3d at 472 (citing § 1367(c)(1)). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that, as a general rule, the novelty or complexity of a state-law issue is not an appropriate basis upon which to remand a case when diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists. ... Although there may be exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258, 1261 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982), we do not believe an exception applies in this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a claim raises a complex issue of state law.

GLC Ltd. v. Smith (In re GLC Ltd.) · filed 2012-07-13(c)

“[District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... if ... the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Ultimately, the third-party complaint is about the rights created under the divorce decree. This presents a complex issue under Georgia law. ... Therefore, even if it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court declines to do so.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim barred by state law.

Thorpe v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc. · filed 2013-02-22

Contrary to Plaintiffs contention that the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over state law claims that are barred by state law.

Section 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction does not supersede a state notice-of-claim requirement for state law claims.

Moses v. Westchester County Department of Corrections · filed 2013-06-12(a)

This Court’s supplemental jurisdiction does not supersede New York’s notice of claim requirement.

Section 1367 does not allow supplemental jurisdiction over a cross-claim that fails the Contract Disputes Act’s specific jurisdictional prerequisites.

Contango Operators, Inc. v. United States · filed 2013-08-15

But Rule 13(g) and § 1367 do not provide an end-run around the specific jurisdictional prerequisites in the CDA.