28 U.S.C. § 1331

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over state-law claims against a federally created corporation wholly owned by the United States because those claims arise under federal law.

Monsanto Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1978-03-27(a)

TVA, however, is a federally created corporation and the precedents going back over a hundred and fifty years establish that any claim, even one created by state law, against a federally created corporation arises under federal law.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction over suits involving corporations created by Congress while the United States holds a majority ownership interest.

Harvey v. National Railroad Passenger · filed 1987-09-24

It is apparent that § 1349 is not an affirmative grant of federal jurisdiction, but rather a restriction on jurisdiction that would otherwise be proper under § 1331. ... Defendants have cited no authority, statutory or otherwise, inconsistent with the conclusion reached herein that Congress created Amtrak and Conrail as private corporations under state law, but subject to federal question jurisdiction as long as the federal government held majority ownership.

Section 1331 does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Jiang v. Fang · filed 2020-11-23

Plaintiffs erroneously assert that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

After elimination of the Warsaw Convention claim that supplied § 1331 treaty jurisdiction, a district court may remand the remaining state-law claims.

In Re Eastern Airlines, Inc. · filed 1986-02-03

Many of the suits filed in this case were removed pursuant to the federal courts’ treaty jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Absent an allegation of physical injury, the Complaints in this case do not state a cause of action under the Warsaw Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention claim which was the basis for treaty jurisdiction is eliminated from the case, this Court has discretion to remand the remaining state claims.

A bare citation to § 1331 and an unspecified reference to pendent state claims do not establish jurisdiction over particular state-law causes of action.

Garcia v. Wyckoff · filed 1985-07-15

A casual reference to the existence of pendent state causes of action is insufficient to establish jurisdiction over specific causes of action.

Section 1331 cannot sustain jurisdiction after the putative federal causes of action are dismissed and only pendent state-law claims remain.

Griffin v. O'Neal, Jones & Feldman, Inc. · filed 1985-03-14

These were the causes of actions on which federal jurisdiction was based; those claims remaining are state claims and were pendent to those dismissed.

Section 1331 does not foreclose ancillary jurisdiction over an independent discovery action related to substantial federal claims, although a court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction.

Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. v. Burlington Northern Railroad · filed 1984-05-31

The court finds nothing in CERCLA, RCRA or the court’s grant of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which either expressly or impliedly indicates Congressional intent that this court not extend jurisdiction over Reilly Tar’s discovery action against Burlington Northern.

Section 1331's jurisdictional grant is broad enough to support pendent state-law claims against a city when they share the facts underlying a substantial direct Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Kedra v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1978-06-29

The state law claims arise out of the same facts as those forming the basis for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, and the scope of § 1331’s jurisdictional grant is not so limited as to exclude this type of claim against the City. I therefore have power to hear these pendent claims against the City of Philadelphia.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over federal securities claims supports pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts.

Davidson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. · filed 1979-10-24

The court does not reach the question whether there is diversity jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiffs have asserted federal claims against defendant “Dean Witter” and against Frank Hayford. There is no dispute that these claims correctly rest on federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition to these federal claims, plaintiffs have asserted three state law claims against defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. As to this defendant there is established federal question jurisdiction, and the “pendent” claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as those on which the federal claims are asserted.

Section 1331(a) supplies original jurisdiction over constitutional claims to which related negligence claims against individual federal employees may be pendent.

Shepard v. Stidham · filed 1980-12-08(a)

To resolve the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the tort claim against the individual defendants, the Court will treat plaintiff’s negligence claims against Stidham, Jones, Fleagle and Stigall as pendent to plaintiff’s constitutional claims against those same individuals. The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s constitutional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a) and 1346(b).

Section 1331’s scope is not restricted by Section 1983 or Section 1343 and does not negate pendent-party jurisdiction over a consenting state for a related state-law claim.

Irwin v. Calhoun · filed 1981-09-16

Second, we find that Congress has not negated pendent jurisdiction over the Commonwealth in the statutes supporting plaintiff Irwin’s federal claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... There is no similar or parallel reference to § 1983 in § 1331.

Section 1331 covers only claims arising under federal law and does not authorize pendent-party jurisdiction over a separate state-law claim by a new plaintiff merely because it shares facts with another plaintiff’s federal claim.

Leopold v. Birkett · filed 1981-10-13

The claim of Sylvie Leopold is based on New York law. Had it been asserted in a separate action the court could not hear it. By the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 this court has jurisdiction only over “civil actions . . . [arising] under the Constitution” or federal laws. ... Here Sylvie Leopold has no legal interest in her husband’s federal claim. Both spouses can obtain all the relief they seek in a state court. The court will therefore grant the motion to dismiss.

Section 1331 pendent jurisdiction reaches a related state-law claim against a third-party defendant already subject to independent federal jurisdiction when the Gibbs factors are met and Congress has not foreclosed it.

Potter v. Rain Brook Feed Co., Inc. · filed 1982-01-13

That relationship is altogether altered, however, when the otherwise pendent party .is brought into the “case,” whether by impleader or otherwise, pursuant to an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Even though no independent jurisdiction exists directly between the plaintiff and the impleaded party, the third party defendant’s relationship to the “case” is jurisdictionally solidified, precluding the need to stretch the pendent power to the point of joining a completely new, nonfederal party. In this situation, joinder of claims, and not joinder of parties, is the object and effect of the doctrine. ... Having found that neither constitutional nor statutory considerations prevent the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state claim, the increase in convenience, judicial economy and fairness to the litigants which would result from resolving plaintiff’s claims in one judicial proceeding leads this court to conclude that it should exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s entire action.

Section 1331's broad jurisdictional grant does not implicitly negate pendent jurisdiction over related state-law claims in a case properly presenting independent federal claims.

Amoco Oil Co. v. Local 99, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1982-03-29

Thus, despite the defendants’ arguments, the Court concludes that neither § 187(b) nor the “broad grants of jurisdiction” in §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(1) implicitly negate the existence of pendent jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1331 does not itself negate pendent-party jurisdiction over a related state-law claim against a state official when Congress has not excluded that joinder.

Wells v. Schweiker · filed 1982-04-14

The jurisdictional statute relied upon by Mrs. Wells, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, offers little clue concerning Congress’ attitude regarding joinder of the state defendant. ... Congress here apparently has not expressly or impliedly negated the use of pendent party jurisdiction to include the Secretary in this lawsuit.

Section 1331 must be read subject to pendent-party limits inferable from LMRA Section 303(b) and does not supply jurisdiction over state claims against individual union members when no federal claim is alleged against them.

Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy · filed 1983-06-01

Bonanno has alleged neither diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, nor “arising under” jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In any event, we assume that the Supreme Court intends us to read § 1331 in light of the pendent party limitations inferable from § 303(b), for otherwise ... would seem meaningless.

Section 1331, read with the federal banking statute, permits pendent-party jurisdiction over a related state banking-law claim when Congress did not expressly or impliedly negate that jurisdiction.

Independent Bankers Ass'n of New York State Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. · filed 1983-12-02

Although a district court does have the inherent constitutional power under Article III to hear a pendant party claim, it remains to be decided whether the federal statute ... in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, expressly or by implication negates the existence of jurisdiction over Wegman’s on the state law claim. ... In summary, I hold that this Court has both the constitutional and statutory power to exercise pendant party jurisdiction over Wegman’s on the plaintiffs’ state banking law claim.

Section 1331 jurisdiction based on federal challenges permits a court to adjudicate related state-law claims even when it resolves the case on state-law grounds and does not grant summary judgment on a federal ground.

Air Cal, Inc. v. City of San Francisco · filed 1986-06-06

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since plaintiffs challenge the validity of the ordinance under the United States Constitution and various laws and regulations of the United States. Although the court does not grant summary judgment on one of those federal grounds, the court nevertheless has jurisdiction and can adjudicate the state law claims.

Section 1331 does not preclude pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same operative facts as a substantial federal constitutional claim.

Sambrick v. Borough of Norristown · filed 1986-07-18

The pendent claims against the Borough arose from the same operative facts as those forming the basis of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which grants this court jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, does not preclude this court from hearing the pendent claims against the Borough. ... Accordingly, I have the constitutional power to hear the pendent claims against the Borough.

A substantial Section 1983 claim supported by Section 1331 may support pendent-party jurisdiction over a related state-law claim against a private individual when Congress has not negated that jurisdiction and discretionary factors favor one forum.

Santella v. Grishaber · filed 1987-10-15

All in all, the relevant considerations weigh heavily in favor of exercising pendent party jurisdiction, and this Court will do so.

Section 1331 does not independently provide jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim that asserts no federal question; jurisdiction depends instead on whether the counterclaim is compulsory and ancillary.

Painter v. Harvey · filed 1987-11-05

Accordingly, there is no diversity of citizenship, nor does Harvey assert a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. Thus, whether this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction has been invoked by Harvey’s counterclaim turns upon whether it is compulsory: whether it arose “out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a Title VII claim but not independent jurisdiction over state-law claims against a nondiverse pendent party.

Saulsberry v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1987-11-20

Jurisdiction is in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because of the claim under Title VII against ARCO Chemical Company. Defendant Melvin Henderson is a pendent party to this action. The court has no independent jurisdiction over the state law claims against Henderson under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides an independent jurisdictional basis for impleaded claims arising under the Interstate Commerce Act, even when those claims are not maritime.

Harcrest International, Ltd. v. M/V Zim Keelung · filed 1988-01-28

However, in the action before this Court, there is an independent federal jurisdictional basis for the claims against Searail (and, therefore, Intermodal). The claims against Searail are brought under the Interstate Commerce Act. This Court has jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

When Sections 1331 and 1343 provide the only jurisdictional basis and all federal claims are dismissed, related state-law tort claims must also be dismissed absent an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.

Gleason v. McBride · filed 1988-04-22

The remaining counts in the Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint allege state law intentional torts. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Since all of the federal claims have been dismissed, the pendent state law claims must be dismissed since no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction over them is alleged.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal Section 1983 claims that supplied the federal question have been resolved against the plaintiff.

Taylor v. City of Nederland, Tex. · filed 1988-05-16

The plaintiff erroneously seeks after final judgment to amend his original pleadings to bring in more claims and causes of action. However, with the summary judgment against the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, no federal question jurisdiction exists for the court to hear these largely state law claims.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over an ADEA claim does not extend pendent-party jurisdiction to a distinct state tort claim against a nondiverse coemployee merely because both claims arise from common facts.

Shultz v. Superior Tube Co. · filed 1988-06-30

Were this Court to permit the use of pendent party jurisdiction to include defendant Ernest Smith, the ultimate result would be an expansion of federal court jurisdiction to hear any and all claims asserted by a plaintiff simply because they arose from a common nucleus of operative facts that gave rise to the ADEA claim. The attempted inclusion of a tortious interference claim against a non-diverse co-employee in an ADEA case, therefore, constitutes an unacceptable “attempt to manufacture federal jurisdiction where it is otherwise foreclosed by the relevant statutes.”

A district court may retain pendent jurisdiction over a common-law claim after the federal claims that originally supported Section 1331 jurisdiction have been eliminated.

Lojuk v. Bruce Johnson, M.D. · filed 1988-08-02

As a result of those cases, plaintiff Walter Lo-juk’s claim has been limited to the common law tort of battery, but as the Government has urged (Br. 2-3), we are retaining pendent jurisdiction originally predicated under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Dismissal of Section 1331 federal claims does not eliminate pendent jurisdiction over related state claims when the original federal claims were substantial rather than frivolous and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines · filed 1988-08-29

Defendants contend that with the dismissal of plaintiffs’ federal discrimination claims, plaintiffs may no longer assert federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... The court finds that although plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 were not meritorious, they were also not “absolutely devoid of merit or obviously frivolous.” ... Thus, plaintiffs’ federal claims were sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction. ... Retention of plaintiffs’ state law claims clearly promotes the values of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.

When all Section 1331 federal anchor claims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pendent state-law claims should also be dismissed absent another federal jurisdictional source.

Aviles v. United States · filed 1988-10-06

Because the court must dismiss all of plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims, the only claims that remain are those for infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and invasion of privacy. These claims arise under state — not federal — law. Therefore, a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction other than 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is necessary. ... None exists. Although pendent jurisdiction previously supported these state law claims, the court has since dismissed plaintiff’s federal anchor claims for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the court believes that it would be inappropriate to retain jurisdiction over the nonfed-eral claims.

Permissive intervention requires an independent jurisdictional basis, and Section 1331 supplies none when the proposed intervenor limits its position to state-law claims.

International Paper Co. v. Inhabitants of Jay · filed 1989-02-16

The Court rejects 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1343 as viable independent bases of jurisdiction for permissive intervention by Maine in this action. ... On its face, Maine’s motion to intervene limits itself to IP’s claims that the ordinance violates state law. Thus limited, Maine’s motion to intervene does not state a federal cause of action that would warrant an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not confer pendent-party jurisdiction over state-law claims against parties whose liability has no independent federal basis.

Hall American Center Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Dick · filed 1989-12-19

Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) permit such pendent-party jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over substantial federal claims permits pendent jurisdiction over state claims sharing a common nucleus of operative fact, but a court may decline the state claims after the federal claims are resolved when comity and state-policy concerns predominate.

Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. City of Columbus, Ohio · filed 1990-04-03

In this ease, plaintiffs’ federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are substantial federal claims that arise from a common nucleus of operative fact with plaintiffs’ state claims. ... (2) even if it does, the overwhelming public policy considerations involved in resolving the state claims convince this Court that it should not exercise its discretion to entertain jurisdiction but to leave those matters to the state courts which are infinitely better equipped to decide them.

Section 1331 ancillary jurisdiction may cover a separately filed state eviction action that functionally serves as a counterclaim to an existing federal case and shares its common nucleus of operative fact when state procedure required a separate complaint.

Mantey, Mon Ami, Lonz Wineries, Inc. v. Buckantz · filed 1990-05-24

The dispute is over whether the eviction action under state law was properly pendent to the federal claims in the Buckantz Case, so as to give the court jurisdiction under Sec. 1331. We hold that jurisdiction was proper. ... We hold that the Ohio procedural rule cannot defeat federal jurisdiction in this case. Functionally, the Eviction Case is a counterclaim that would have been asserted in the Buckantz Case but for the procedural bar. ... For reasons of both fairness and efficiency, we hold that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the Eviction Case.

Section 1331’s grant over civil actions arising under federal law does not automatically extend jurisdiction to pendent or ancillary state-law claims or additional parties.

Federal Deposit Insurance Ex Rel. FSLIC Resolution Fund v. Israel · filed 1990-07-03

The words “civil actions” or “civil suits” have been read to mean specific claims and not just the general theme of the suit.

Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over federal-law claims and permits related state claims sharing a common nucleus of operative fact to proceed pendent to them.

Sampson v. Invest America, Inc. · filed 1990-12-12

This Court has jurisdiction over the federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331. In its discretion, this Court accepts the state claims asserted by the Sampsons because the, “state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”

Section 1331 does not affirmatively grant pendent-party jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a party not subject to the federal claim.

Ortega v. Schramm · filed 1991-01-28

Because a state law claim cannot arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States, section 1331 provides no affirmative grant of pendent party jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not independently confer federal-question jurisdiction over claims grounded entirely in state law, even when they are related to federal securities claims against other parties.

Cowen & Co. v. Merriam · filed 1991-01-29

The Court does not have federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) over Counts 1-3 and 6 because they are grounded in state law.

Section 1331 does not independently support a remaining state-law claim against a nonfederal party after the federal claims against that party are dismissed, and pre-Section 1367 pendent-party jurisdiction is unavailable.

Johnson v. Reserve Life Insurance · filed 1991-02-06

Jurisdiction in this action was premised 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1441 and 29 U.S.C. section 1132. ... Having found that all but one aspect of that claim is preempted and having dismissed the preempted claims, there is no independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over the non-preempted negligence claim against Foy. ... As the present action was commenced prior to new 28 U.S.C. section 1367, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining aspect of plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant Foy, and that claim must be remanded to the state court from which this case was removed.

Section 1331 supplies no independent jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a nondiverse additional party when the claim presents no federal question.

Loebers v. Bay Tankers · filed 1991-03-06

As no federal question is involved, jurisdiction does not lie under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331; as the citizenship of the parties is not diverse, jurisdiction does not lie under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332; as the claim against Violet is grounded on state law, the district court has jurisdiction over the claim against Violet only if pendent-party jurisdiction is available in admiralty cases.

Section 1331 does not independently confer jurisdiction over a state-law claim against a nondiverse additional party when no federal question is involved.

Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc. · filed 1991-03-06

As no federal question is involved, jurisdiction does not lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; as the citizenship of the parties is not diverse, jurisdiction does not lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; as the claim against Violet is grounded on state law, the district court has jurisdiction over the claim against Violet only if pendent-party jurisdiction is available in admiralty cases.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a nonfrivolous federal securities claim supports pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same common nucleus of operative facts even when the federal claim fails after trial.

Shlomchik v. Richmond 103 Equities Co. · filed 1991-05-15

Simply because this court determined in its prior decision that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proving the element of scien-ter or fraudulent intent in the exchange of properties, it does not follow that the securities claim in his complaint was “unsubstantial” for purposes of pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... Shlomchik’s securities law claims were not “constitutionally insubstantial” in the sense that they were frivolous or beyond controversy in light of prior decisions ... Further, plaintiffs causes of action are all predicated on a common nucleus of operative facts and intertwining occurrences, and should have been tried in a single judicial proceeding ... Here, the court concludes that although it has the discretion to dismiss this case, plainly it would not be an abuse of discretion to exercise pendent jurisdiction ... Consequently, finding there is pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims, the court adheres to its prior overruling of defendants’ motion for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

After the sole Section 1331 claim is resolved, a court may decline pendent jurisdiction and remand remaining state-law claims, particularly when they present novel state issues and no extraordinary circumstances favor retention.

Seal v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1991-06-19

Because the sole question of federal law i.e. plaintiff’s civil rights claim at Count VI is resolved, no question of federal law remains in this action. In deciding whether or not to exercise pendant jurisdiction, we are satisfied that none of the remaining claims either involve or are closely tied to questions touching upon federal policy. ... In our view, these claims embrace unclear and unique issues of law of a particular interest to Pennsylvania which are better left to the attention of the Commonwealth’s appellate courts. ... We have considered the posture of this case with an eye toward identifying any extraordinary circumstances which would make it appropriate for the Court to retain jurisdiction. No such circumstances have been found. Therefore, the plaintiff’s state law claims will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania for disposition.

Section 1331 jurisdiction over a pleaded TILA claim does not itself authorize adjudication of an unpleaded state-law issue; that issue must enter through pendent jurisdiction, which the court may leave for state adjudication.

Scott v. Long Island Savings Bank, FSB · filed 1991-06-21

It asserted subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) by virtue of relief sought under TILA. ... Had the complaint sought, in addition, to set aside that portion of the mortgage covering Jonathan’s one-third share by reason of the absence of Jonathan’s consent, this would have raised a claim under New York law which would not have come within the ... federal court’s jurisdiction except by exercise of pendent jurisdiction, ancillary to the TILA claim. ... These considerations lead us to vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it resolves a claim that was not pleaded, leaving the issue of LISB’s reliance upon Shari’s representation of custody to be determined by the state court in LISB’s action to foreclose its mortgage.

After dismissal of a substantial Section 1331 RICO claim, exceptional fairness and judicial-economy considerations may justify retaining an already tried pendent contract claim while relinquishing unresolved state-law claims.

Blue Line Coal Co., Inc. v. Equibank · filed 1991-07-03

The amended complaint sets forth violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, together with pendent state law counts for breach of contract, interference with prospective contractual relations, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. Jurisdiction is RICO and federal question. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ... Generally, if all the federal claims involved in a lawsuit are dismissed, a court should refrain from exercising pendent jurisdiction in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances.” ... Here, the amended complaint states substantial federal claims. ... considerations of fairness to plaintiffs and judicial economy favor retaining pendent jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. ... On the other hand, state law defenses are raised to count III (“intentional interference with performance of contracts by third persons”), count IV (“intentional interference with prospective contractual relations”), and count V (“fraud and breach of fiduciary duty”). As to these counts, pendent jurisdiction will be relinquished.

Section 1331 no longer supplies federal-question jurisdiction when all claims arising under federal statutes have been dismissed.

Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp. · filed 1991-10-25

Having dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims arising under federal statutes, this Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

For actions outside § 1367, § 1331 does not affirmatively grant pendent party jurisdiction over state-law claims against additional defendants.

Meyers v. Trinity Medical Center · filed 1993-01-14

We agree with the district court that neither the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contains an affirmative grant of pendent party jurisdiction as required by Finley.

Section 1331 does not support ancillary jurisdiction over a proceeding too remote from an earlier federal default judgment.

Lewis v. Sandor · filed 2021-05-04

Likewise, the district court did not err when it determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1367(a). The 2008 default judgment is far too removed from the current proceeding to have provided the district court with ancillary jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not support pendent party plaintiff jurisdiction over unrelated state-law claims brought by plaintiffs whose own federal claims have been dismissed.

Brereton v. Communications Satellite Corp. · filed 1990-04-17

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, will not overextend Congress’ grant of limited jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by resting an assertion of jurisdiction over the proposed “state-law” DCHRA claims upon the too-thin reed of pendent party plaintiff jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a state law claim against an additional party when that claim does not arise under federal law.

Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc. · filed 1992-11-05

Acme’s claim against Wausau does not “arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” Accordingly, this Court may not rely on plaintiff’s Complaint to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over Wausau.

Section 1331 does not extend pendent jurisdiction to a non-diverse defendant on a purely state law claim.

Shields v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1981-12-03

More specifically, it does not operate to establish subject matter jurisdiction over a non-diverse party on a purely state law claim.

Section 1331(a) permits pendent jurisdiction over a closely related state law claim against private parties in a suit reviewing federal administrative action.

North Dakota v. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1980-08-06(a)

In light of the 1976 amendment and Congress’s implicit recognition of the importance of judicial review of administrative action, we find that Congress did not intend to exclude parties like the appellee banks from federal court in judicial review actions brought under section 1331(a).

The Administrative Procedure Act's waiver of sovereign immunity applies to Section 1331 actions seeking nonmonetary relief against federal agencies or their officials.

Warin v. Director, Department of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms · filed 1982-03-19(a)

Francis Warin now appeals the District Court’s grant of the government’s motion to dismiss his claims because of sovereign immunity. We find that the amended 5 U.S.C. § 702 operates as a waiver of the sovereign immunity defense available under Section 1331. We, therefore, reverse. We align ourselves with the Circuits that have concluded that 5 U.S.C. § 702 waives the sovereign immunity defense in actions for non-monetary relief under Section 1331.

Section 1331 gives jurisdiction over federal-law claims against state officers administering a federal program, and Section 405(h) limits the grant only for the federal defendants it specifies.

Kuehner v. Schweiker · filed 1983-09-19

Reading the complaint as charging that state officers, acting under color of federal law, deprived the class members of property interests to which the Social Security Act entitled them, either in violation of the due process clause or in violation of the Social Security Act, states a claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... Section 405(h) refers only to actions against “the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof.” It cannot be construed as a limitation of state court jurisdiction over suits against state officers, or as a limitation of the general jurisdictional grant in section 1331 except as specified.

Section 1331's well-pleaded-complaint limitations do not govern an action in which the United States is the plaintiff and jurisdiction instead rests on Section 1345.

Federal Home Loan Bank Board v. R.Y. Empie · filed 1985-11-26

We agree with the district court and the Bank Board that this line of cases concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 is inapplicable to suits in which the United States brings the action and is the real party in interest.

Section 1331's well-pleaded-complaint limitations do not govern an action in which the United States is the plaintiff and jurisdiction instead rests on Section 1345.

Federal Home Loan Bank Board v. Empie · filed 1985-11-26

We agree with the district court and the Bank Board that this line of cases concerning the well-pleaded complaint rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is inapplicable to suits in which the United States brings the action and is the real party in interest.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over a state official administering a federally authorized Clean Water Act permit program when federal claims challenge his authority under that program.

Friends of the Crystal River v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1992-06-23

However, he is subject to the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and section 404 of the CWA because he is the Director of the MDNR which administers the state authorized permit program under the CWA.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is not barred by § 405(h) when a Medicare or Medicaid provider seeks a hearing that comports with due process rather than review of a final benefits decision.

Schwartzberg v. Califano · filed 1978-06-23

Accordingly, I find there is jurisdiction to entertain this complaint.

Section 405(h), as extended to Medicare claims, bars Section 1331 jurisdiction when the Medicare Act supplies an applicable administrative and judicial review process that the plaintiff failed to pursue.

John Muir Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Califano · filed 1978-09-22

In sum, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 to hear plaintiff’s suit because of the bar of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), particularly in light of the fact that plaintiff’s alleged constitutional right to a hearing arose only because plaintiff was dilatory in filing a Request for a Hearing with the PRRB, an administrative option that was available to plaintiff and that would ultimately have permitted plaintiff to seek judicial review of the administrative decision pursuant to the judicial review section of the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(l).

Section 1331 generally does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare reimbursement action because § 405(h) precludes federal-question review, absent a colorable constitutional claim.

Kechijian v. Califano · filed 1978-10-12

This Court therefore concludes that § 1331 generally cannot provide jurisdiction in a Medicare reimbursement action. However, this Court is mindful of the exception to this proposition, whereby federal question jurisdiction might be available if a colorable constitutional claim is shown.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction to review a federal official's discretionary approval of state Medicaid regulations when the questions arise directly under Medicaid and Congress has not precluded review.

Hempstead General Hospital v. Whalen · filed 1979-08-03

Although Congress has not expressly provided for judicial review of such a decision, neither did it preclude review of such questions which arise directly under the Medicaid statute. ... Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ... then the court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action.

The statutory bar on Section 1331 review of Medicare provider terminations does not bar a distinct federal-question challenge to a proposed Medicaid disallowance.

Woodstock/Kenosha Health Center v. Schweiker · filed 1983-07-19

The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear challenges to Medicaid decisions was never directly addressed. ... We therefore conclude that the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Medicaid claims in the instant case.

The statutory bar on Section 1331 review of Medicare provider terminations does not bar a distinct federal-question challenge to a proposed Medicaid disallowance.

Woodstock/Kenosha Health Center v. Schweiker · filed 1983-08-05

The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear challenges to Medicaid decisions was never directly addressed. The section of Americana Healthcare dealing with federal question jurisdiction relies entirely on precedent and statutes dealing with the Medicare program. ... We therefore conclude that the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Medicaid claims in the instant case.

Section 1331 jurisdiction is unavailable for claims arising under Medicare because § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act, makes § 405(g) the sole avenue for judicial review.

Medic-Vac Ambulance, Inc. v. Schweiker · filed 1984-09-07

Plaintiff asserts four bases of jurisdiction over this action. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is specifically excluded by the terms of 42 U.S.C. 405(h).

Section 405(h) does not foreclose Section 1331 review of collateral constitutional claims merely because relief may incidentally increase Medicare payments.

Good Samaritan Medical Center v. Heckler · filed 1984-09-20

Although the Supreme Court stated that “arising under” was to be construed broadly, this Court does not construe the decision to foreclose all direct district court review merely because an incidental effect of a favorable decision may be increased benefits to plaintiffs.

Section 405(h) prevents Section 1331 from serving as the jurisdictional basis for reviewing a Medicare decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Sheepshead Nursing Home v. Heckler · filed 1984-10-17

Sheepshead is mistaken, however, in attempting to rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a basis of jurisdiction over the federal defendant (the Secretary of HHS).

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare procedural challenge that is inextricably intertwined with a claim for Part B benefits when the Medicare statute bars judicial review.

Starnes v. Schweiker · filed 1984-11-13

It follows that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1361, and that the district court must dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Medicaid provider’s reimbursement claim arises under federal law for Section 1331 purposes when the provider’s right to reimbursement derives from the Medicaid statutory scheme.

Medicare&medicaid Gu 35,373 Eugene Hollander v. Stanley Brezenoff, Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of · filed 1986-04-10

It is precisely because appellant’s right to seek reimbursement for the cost of services provided is derived from this statutory scheme that appellant can maintain this action in federal court as a claim arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a Medicaid compliance action because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) does not bar jurisdiction over a claim brought under the Medicaid program.

Lexington Management Co. v. Missouri Department of Social Services · filed 1986-07-18

The Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346. The federal government’s argument that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) ... prohibits the Court from exercising federal question, jurisdiction over this case is unfounded for three independent reasons. First, plaintiff Lexington brought this action to enforce compliance with a provision of the. Medicaid program — specifically, § 1396i(c)(2) — and not under the Medicare program. Thus, § 405(h) is wholly inapplicable to this case.

Section 1331 permits review of a statutory challenge to the validity of a Medicare or Medicaid regulation even when Section 405(h) bars review of an underlying benefits claim not authorized by Medicare's specific review provisions.

New York State Department of Social Services v. Bowen · filed 1987-06-10

Accordingly, this Court finds jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim that 42 C.F.R. § 433.146(c) violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25).

Section 1331 permits review of the methods used to make Medicare Part B decisions, as distinct from review of benefit determinations governed by Medicare’s specific review statute.

Griffith v. Bowen · filed 1988-02-01

The court specifically ruled that § 1395ff — the section governing judicial review of benefit determinations — does not bar federal question jurisdiction for challenges to the Secretary’s procedures where such challenges to method arise, as in the instant case, out of a determination in connection with a past claim for benefits. ... For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ claims lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a Section 1983 claim that a state Medicaid agency failed to comply with the federal Medicaid Act.

Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Department of Social Services · filed 1989-07-11

The district court correctly held jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since plaintiffs were challenging Colorado’s compliance with the Medicaid Act in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... We are in accord with the district court on the jurisdictional basis, and, furthermore, hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), the federal mandamus statute, is not a jurisdictional basis in this case.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a Medicare provider claim whose core seeks additional reimbursement under the Act.

National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Bowen · filed 1989-08-15

Because the core of the plaintiffs’ claims seek additional reimbursement under the Act, this court is precluded from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in this case under section 1331.

Section 1331 permits a direct federal damages action under the Medicaid Boren Amendment even when Section 1983 does not provide retrospective relief.

Folden v. Washington State Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1990-04-05

On the same date, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for retrospective relief under the Supreme Court’s holding in ... Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, ... but ruled that the plaintiffs nevertheless had a federal cause of action for damages against the defendants directly under the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), and that this Court could entertain such a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 cannot be used to evade Section 405(g)’s prescribed route for judicial review of Medicaid determinations, and ordinary administrative-exhaustion requirements apply even if Section 405(h) does not foreclose Section 1331 expressly.

Medicare&Medicaid Gu v. Sullivan · filed 1991-03-13

The incorporation of section 405(g) can only be understood as a determination to make section 405(g) the route for judicial review of Medicaid determinations, since if it were only a route every provider would avoid it, as Health Equity has tried to do by basing its suit not on section 405(g) but on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute. Even if this end run could succeed to the extent that section 1331 might (though we think not) be thought, in the absence of section 405(h), to provide an alternative basis to section 405(g) for federal court jurisdiction, it would not follow that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable.

Invoking Section 1331 does not eliminate the administrative-exhaustion requirement for judicial review of a Medicaid contract termination, even if Section 1331 could otherwise supply an alternative jurisdictional basis.

Health Equity Resources, Urbana, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1991-03-13

Even if this end run could succeed to the extent that section 1331 might (though we think not) be thought, in the absence of section 405(h), to provide an alternative basis to section 405(g) for federal court jurisdiction, it would not follow that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a Medicare provider reimbursement claim when the Medicare Act supplies a judicial review route for that type of claim, even if the provider cannot meet its amount-in-controversy requirement.

Westchester Management Corp. v. United States Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1991-11-05

We determine that subject-matter jurisdiction may not be based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare claim that challenges the application of valid rules or regulations without challenging their validity.

Abbey v. Sullivan · filed 1992-02-07

Since plaintiffs’ claim does not support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case only if plaintiffs have met the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), incorporated into the Medicare Act through 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(l).

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare reimbursement claim barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) after the provider failed to timely pursue its PRRB appeal.

Albert Einstein Medical Center v. Sullivan · filed 1992-11-24

To exercise federal question jurisdiction over Einstein’s claims would be to ignore the express instructions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) that such jurisdiction not be exercised.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a Medicare Part A reimbursement claim arising under the Medicare Act when the Act provides a route for judicial review.

St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala · filed 1994-08-05

And in the absence of that presumption, we read 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act and as interpreted in Salfi and Ringer, to mean that SFMC may not assert its claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over post-1986 Medicare Part B claims for increased benefits; judicial review proceeds under the Medicare Act through 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Martin v. Shalala · filed 1995-07-31

We hold that the plaintiffs’ only source of federal court jurisdiction is the Medicare Act, not the federal question statute 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare statute because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) channels those claims through the statutory review process.

Good Samaritan Hospital Regional Medical Center v. Shalala · filed 1995-08-03

Therefore, because plaintiffs’ claims arise under the Medicare statute, we must look beyond § 1331 to establish our jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over Medicare claims arising under the Medicare Act; judicial review must proceed through the Act’s administrative review scheme.

Manakee Professional Medical Transfer Service, Inc. v. Shalala · filed 1995-12-12

Section 1395Ü of the Medicare Act incorporates 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) of the Social Security Act, in which it is explicitly stated that § 405(g), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is the sole avenue for judicial review for claims “arising under” the Act.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction for judicial review of Medicare claims arising under the Act; claimants must use the review process under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Manakee Professional Medical Transfer Service, Inc. v. Shalala · filed 1995-12-12

Section 1395ii of the Medicare Act incorporates 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(h) of the Social Security Act, in which it is explicitly stated that Sec. 405(g), to the exclusion of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, is the sole avenue for judicial review for claims "arising under" the Act.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare reimbursement claim when the Medicare Act confines judicial review to 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f).

Saint Vincent Health Center v. Shalala · filed 1995-12-22

The sole means of review of the PRRB’s decision is pursuant to § 1395oo(f). This Court has no jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1361.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over state-law Medicaid reimbursement claims merely because federal law requires the state to pursue liable third parties.

COM. OF MASSACHUSETTS v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1996-05-20

In sum, the claims alleged in the complaint do not “arise under” the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the ease was not removable on that ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare Act when 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) channels those claims through Medicare’s judicial review process.

Michigan Ass'n of Homes & Services for the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala · filed 1996-05-20

Because Plaintiffs claims arise under the Medicare Act, § 405(h) deprives this court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.

Section 1331 does not allow Medicare Part B claimants to bypass the presentment and exhaustion requirements for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

American Academy of Dermatology v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1997-08-07

In this case, as in Ringer, plaintiffs may not circumvent the requirements of § 405(g) by invoking the court's general federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over Medicare Act claims that must proceed through the Act’s administrative review process, even when the claims are framed as procedural.

Ancillary Affiliated Health Services, Inc. v. Shalala · filed 1998-01-15

Simply because a claim may be classified as procedural, rather than substantive, does not grant this court federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over Medicare claims when the Medicare review scheme affords judicial review and § 405(h) channels claims through that scheme.

Bartlett Memorial Medical Center, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 2001-10-22

Because Plaintiffs were not foreclosed all judicial review by the Medicare statutory scheme, the Michigan Academy exception to § 405(h) does not apply, and Plaintiffs may not proceed with this suit under a theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction.

Section 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction when a party challenges the United States' recovery of settlement proceeds under the Medicare Secondary Payer statute.

Hoste v. Shanty Creek Management, Inc. · filed 2002-07-17

Federal question jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 where a party challenges the United States' attempt to recover settlement proceeds as repayment for Medicare costs under the Medicare Secondary Payer statute. ... It is likewise present here, where plaintiff has sought and procured a state court order which would purportedly bar the United States from seeking any recovery of settlement proceeds which he obtains from Shanty Creek.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a Medicare rule challenge when agency procedures provide no avenue for review of that challenge.

Bartlett Memorial v. Thompson · filed 2003-08-22

In this case, however, Plaintiffs challenged Ruling 97-2 at the earliest opportunity, and the PRRB declared it had no jurisdiction over the challenge, leaving Plaintiffs no remaining avenues through which to pursue their claims before the agency. Thus, Plaintiffs effectively received “no review at all” on their challenge to Ruling 97-2 and should be permitted to bring their challenge before this court. Because of this unique situation, we conclude that we may exercise federal question jurisdiction over this case under Michigan Academy.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction over Medicare Act claims when agency review is available and the claimant fails to present and exhaust those claims administratively.

Bp Care, Inc. v. Tommy Thompson, Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services Department of Health a · filed 2005-02-15

The district court did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear any of BP Care’s claims. This is because each of BP Care’s claims arises under the Medicare Act, and BP Care failed to present the claims, and exhaust its remedies in an HHS administrative proceeding, as required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii and 405(h).

Section 1331 may provide jurisdiction over a Medicare claim when applying 42 U.S.C. § 405 would leave no judicial review at all; requiring presentment does not meet that condition when review remains available.

Situ v. Leavitt · filed 2007-01-12

Jurisdiction may be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 where application of § 405 “would mean no review at all,” ... but Plaintiffs have failed to persuade this Court that requiring presentment would result in the lack of judicial review.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over an action challenging a Medicaid or Medicare determination.

Forum Healthcare Group, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services · filed 2007-07-11

In any event, an action challenging a Medicaid or Medicare determination may not be brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a Medicare claim when judicial review remains available after the administrative claims appeal process.

Bailey v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance · filed 2008-02-08

However, the potential availability of judicial review after exhaustion of the administrative claims appeal process bars this Court’s jurisdiction under section 1331.

Section 1331 does not supply jurisdiction over a Medicare claim channeled through the Medicare Act when the claimant can obtain administrative and later judicial review.

TRIAD AT JEFFERSONVILLE I, LLC v. Leavitt · filed 2008-06-02

Triad’s choice to instead immediately file this lawsuit does not create a proper basis to exercise general federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it cannot exercise general federal question jurisdiction over Triad’s claims.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare reimbursement dispute when the Medicare review process allows judicial review after final agency action.

Jordan Hospital v. Leavitt · filed 2008-08-15

But Jordan Hospital has not demonstrated that absent federal question jurisdiction it would have no avenue for review of the Administrator’s alleged unauthorized remand to CMS. To the contrary, as discussed above, the Secretary has conceded that Jordan Hospital will be able to raise all issues from the administrative process in an appeal following final agency action. Thus, this exception is inapplicable, and Jordan Hospital cannot rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare claim when administrative review can lead to judicial review of that claim.

National Hospice & Palliative Care Organization, Inc. v. Weems · filed 2008-11-24

Rather, the claimants must show that, absent judicial review pursuant to § 1331, their claims would never be subject to judicial review at all. ... The exception therefore does not apply, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over National Hospice’s claims.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare Part A reimbursement claim when the hospital could seek administrative review and then judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f).

Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Thompson · filed 2009-03-25

It is settled law in this Circuit, however, that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “could not be more plainly off limits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which explicitly withholds § 1331 jurisdiction for ‘any claim’ arising under [the Medicare Act].” Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d at 812. ... The Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1331 does not provide direct jurisdiction over Medicare payment claims arising under the Medicare Act when 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) channels review through the Medicare review scheme.

Auburn Regional Medical Center v. Sebelius · filed 2010-03-11

Accordingly, pursuant to § 1395Ü and § 405(h), the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiffs’ claims for relief directly under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not give district courts jurisdiction to review Medicare payment claims arising under the Medicare Act when 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii and 405(h) bar direct review.

Auburn Regional Medical Center v. Leavitt · filed 2010-03-11

Accordingly, pursuant to § 1395ii and § 405(h), the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' claims for relief directly under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to Medicare benefits claims subject to the Medicare Act’s exclusive administrative review process.

Moller v. CMS-Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services · filed 2013-08-02

Furthermore, according to Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and Supreme Court precedent, § 405(h) even bars the exercise of federal question jurisdiction in cases such as this, where a plaintiffs challenge is based on the Constitution.

Section 1331 does not confer original jurisdiction over Medicare beneficiaries’ claims when the Medicare Act supplies both standing and the substantive basis for the claims and § 405(h) requires administrative channeling.

Haro v. Sebelius · filed 2013-09-04

Because the secondary payer provisions of the Medicare Act provide the standing and the substantive basis for the beneficiaries’ claim, § 405(h) precludes original jurisdiction under § 1331.

Section 1331 does not permit review of a Medicare intermediary’s reopening decision barred by § 405(h), but permits constitutional challenges to the reopening regulations when applying that bar would foreclose judicial review and no specific evidence shows an intent to foreclose such review.

St. Francis Hospital v. Sebelius · filed 2014-07-23

... this Court finds that judicial review under section 1331 of Plaintiffs claim challenging the intermediary’s decision to reopen the 225 claims is barred by section 405(h). ... Were the Court to apply the jurisdictional bar of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) to Plaintiffs claim challenging the constitutionality of 42 C.F.R. § 405.980(a)(5) and 42 C.F.R. § 405.926(Z), Plaintiffs claim would be placed beyond judicial review. ... Accordingly, the Court will exercise federal question jurisdiction so as to provide Plaintiff with a forum for judicial review of its challenges to the validity of 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.980(a)(5) and 405.926(i).

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over an unexhausted due process claim arising under the Medicare Act when administrative review is available.

Taransky v. Secretary of the United States Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2014-07-29

The Medicare Act prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when a claim “arises under” the statute—a concept that has been read broadly by the Supreme Court. ... That is the case here. Taransky’s constitutional claim is rooted in, and derived from, the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare Act, which must proceed through the Act’s administrative and judicial review scheme.

Woodruff v. Humana Pharmacy Inc. · filed 2014-08-29

Thus, either: (1) Woodruffs claim arises under the Medicare Act (as Humana contends), and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because § 1331 is abrogated and this is not a suit against the Secretary for review of a final administrative decision; or (2) the claim does not arise under the Medicare Act (as Woodruff argues), and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because there is no basis such as diversity for bringing her state-law claim in federal court.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over Medicare claims when claimants failed to use an available administrative and judicial review route.

American Hospital Association v. Sebelius · filed 2014-09-17

That Plaintiffs did not raise these claims at the appropriate time through Medicare Act channels does not make § 1331 available to do so now.

Section 1331 permits jurisdiction over an unexhausted Medicare claim when it is collateral to the agency decision and full relief cannot be obtained after the agency process.

Infinity Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Azar · filed 2018-10-12

Accordingly, like the claims in Family Rehab, they are collateral. ... Thus, as in Family Rehab, Plaintiff has thus far made a showing that full relief cannot be obtained through a post-deprivation hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff has established that the Court has § 1331 federal question jurisdiction under the collateral-claims exception over Plaintiff's claims in Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six.

Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over a Medicare claim when agency review is delayed but judicial review remains available.

Supreme Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Azar · filed 2019-04-23

Likewise, here, Supreme did not allege that channeling will render judicial review completely unavailable. Therefore, § 1331 does not confer jurisdiction.

Section 1331 jurisdiction cannot be established through the collateral-claim doctrine for claims arising under the Medicare Act.

Senior Life York, Inc. v. Azar · filed 2019-11-25

Mathews is not a means for establishing Section 1331 jurisdiction.

The Medicare statute’s exclusive judicial review scheme displaces general federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 for claims arising under Medicare.

Robert Odell, Jr. v. Hhs · filed 2021-04-27

The judicial-review provision in the Medicare statute incorporates that of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. That statute, in turn, provides an exclusive mechanism for review of the agency’s decisions, expressly displacing the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over Medicare claims arising under the Medicare Act; judicial review must proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Larry V. Bishins v. U.S. Secretary Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-07-24

Accordingly, § 405(g) is the exclusive source of subject-matter ju- risdiction over claims “arising under” the Medicare Act.

Section 1331 permits federal-question jurisdiction over a challenge to Medicare rulemaking procedures, but Section 205(h) bars its use for reimbursement claims before available administrative review.

Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano · filed 1978-09-18(a)

We are mindful that Section 205(h) is “sweeping and direct” in its preclusion of federal-question jurisdiction. ... We think, however, that when suit is brought simply to vindicate an interest in procedural regularity, Section 205(h) is not summoned into play.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare Part A provider's reimbursement claim when the Medicare Act provides an avenue for judicial review, even if the provider cannot meet its requirements.

St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala · filed 1994-08-09

Since a provider seeking Part A payments has these avenues of review available under the Medicare Act, the presumption that Congress did not intend to foreclose judicial review, which was central to the decision in Michigan Academy, is inapplicable. And in the absence of that presumption, we read 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act and as interpreted in Salfi and Ringer, to mean that SFMC may not assert its claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over a Medicare Part B claim arising under the Medicare Act when the claimant must first exhaust the administrative remedy required by § 405(g).

Cardiac Monitoring Services, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Arkansas · filed 1992-08-06

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s claim “arises under” the Act. ... Section 405(g) is more restrictive than § 1331 because it requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy before seeking judicial review. ... Having given the competing cases careful consideration, the Court finds that the better rule is that articulated in Kidney Patients, i.e., Part B claims are also subject to the exhaustion requirement of § 405(g). Thus, the Court need not delve into the distinction between “method” and “amount” challenges. Plaintiff is required to exhaust its administrative remedy.

Section 1331(a) does not provide jurisdiction to review a Medicare reimbursement challenge barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

Alabama Hospital Association v. Califano · filed 1979-02-26(a)

On the basis of Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), this court concluded that the incorporation of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) into the Medicare Act through 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii, eliminated subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) to review the validity of HEW's reimbursement procedures. That decision controls this case.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over Medicare claims when 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) channels judicial review through § 405(g).

Neurological Associates-H. Hooshmand, M.D., P.A. v. Bowen · filed 1987-03-17

Plaintiffs do not possess jurisdictional access to this Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 or 1346. 42 U.S.C. Section 405(h).

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a Medicare Part A provider reimbursement claim that must first proceed through the Medicare Act’s administrative review process, even when framed as a due process claim.

Total Care, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1991-01-08

Given the unambiguous language of the statute and the clear Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit interpretations of the statute, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s jurisdiction claim under § 1331 is meritless.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over claims arising under the Medicare Act when judicial review is governed exclusively by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Michigan Department of Social Services v. Shalala · filed 1994-06-30

Under the circumstances, there is no general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; DSS must comply with the judicial review requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction and federal law governs after the Secretary of HUD is substituted as the sole defendant in a removed action.

Gibson v. Secretary of U. S. Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1978-08-01

It is the view of the Court that its jurisdiction now rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdictional provision and that it is appropriate to apply federal law.

Section 1331(a) supplies jurisdiction over a claim to enforce the FBI's federal statutory duty concerning the reliability of criminal-identification records.

McKnight v. Webster · filed 1980-10-23(a)

I have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) over a claim to enforce this duty.

Section 1331(a) gives a district court jurisdiction over a private claimant’s claim to a non-Treasury escrow fund controlled by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Southern Sog, Inc. v. James S. Roland, Area Director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 1981-04-04(a)

The district court clearly erred in dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Southern Sog’s claim to the $10,000 escrow fund controlled by HUD.

Section 1331 confers jurisdiction over claims that federal defendants violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment.

Smith v. Lehman · filed 1982-02-19

However, because plaintiff has alleged that defendants' actions (1) were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) deprived him of his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, the Federal Question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does confer jurisdiction in this case.

An action requiring interpretation of a federal statute and its implementing regulations presents a federal question sufficient for § 1331 jurisdiction to review agency action.

International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local F-100 v. United States Department of Navy, Naval Education & Training Center · filed 1982-04-02

The instant action, which involves interpretation of a federal statute and its implementing regulations, presents this Court with a federal question sufficient to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over a challenge alleging that a federal agency failed to comply with federal procurement regulations.

Washington Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. United States Department of the Navy · filed 1984-09-21

Thus, jurisdiction is ... proper in accordance with 28 U.S.C. section 1331.

Section 1331 supplies subject-matter jurisdiction over a cognizable federal claim challenging federal housing-agency action.

Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp · filed 1989-07-17

The federal defendants have moved this Court to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Rule 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the federal defendants moved for summary judgment. The PHA defendants joined these motions. Because I find that this Court does have jurisdiction over the subject matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, and that plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim, the motion to dismiss is denied. I will therefore consider only defendants’ alternative motion for summary judgment.

Section 1331 supplies jurisdiction over a local sewer district's action to enforce Clean Water Act requirements against a federal facility.

Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago v. United States Department of the Navy · filed 1989-09-21

The question of federal law arises from § 313(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), which mandates that federal facilities comply with all requirements of federal, state and local law regarding the control and abatement of water pollution, ... and which also subjects federal facilities to the same enforcement procedures, including process and sanctions, to which private entities are subject. The MSD has properly invoked this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 gives federal district courts jurisdiction to review BIA actions under the APA, subject to statutes that preclude judicial review.

Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Bureau of Indian Affairs · filed 2006-11-17

Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review, pursuant to the APA, BIA actions. ... Consequently, the plaintiffs jurisdictional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is subject to preclusion of review statutes.

Section 1331 does not provide federal-question jurisdiction over a local housing authority solely because HUD appointed one of its employees to oversee the authority.

Greene v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2011-05-11

For purposes of Greene’s motion, neither PHA nor Richman were acting as a federal agency or official over which this Court would have subject matter jurisdiction simply by virtue of Richman’s position at HUD.

Section 1331’s substantial federal question requirement does not limit jurisdiction over suits removed by federal agencies under § 1442(a)(1).

Poblete v. U.S. Marshals Service · filed 2017-05-22

As a result, the strictures of § 1331 are inapplicable, and the lack of a substantial federal question on the face of Poblete’s pleading is of no jurisdictional significance.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction merely because a plaintiff sues a federal agency or challenges another agency’s decision.

Williams v. Secretary · filed 2025-11-14

Williams appears to state that this case presents a federal question because she is suing a federal agency to challenge the unfavorable decision of another federal agency. However, neither ... of these bases is sufficient to create a federal question.

Section 1331 requires a basis in federal law; naming a federal agency as a defendant alone does not establish federal-question jurisdiction.

Mueller · filed 2026-03-16

Although Mueller lists the Social Security Administration as defendant, that reference alone does not confer federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to determine which state has authority over an interstate child-custody dispute.

Templeton v. Witham · filed 1984-10-05

This court has jurisdiction under that law to determine whether Oregon or California has power over the custody of Debra Kay Templeton.

Section 1331(a) does not provide original jurisdiction over a dispute that is fundamentally a domestic-relations matter and presents no federal question despite allegations of sex discrimination.

Wilkins v. Rogers · filed 1978-08-02(a)

And, such disputes do not present a federal question, notwithstanding allegations of sexual discrimination. ... Therefore, original jurisdiction over Wilkins' claims does not lie.

Section 1331 does not provide jurisdiction over domestic or family disputes when the complaint presents no federal constitutional question.

Gordon v. Crouchley · filed 1982-12-22

In the absence of a federal question, this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over matters involving domestic/familial/parental disputes.

A federal statutory claim falls within Section 1331, and the domestic-relations exception does not bar that federal-question jurisdiction when no state forum can provide effective relief.

Ruffalo, Ruffalo v. Civiletti · filed 1983-06-08

Here, however, we are confronted with a case based on federal-question jurisdiction; Donna has asserted a claim "arising under the ... laws ... of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331; see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). ... It is unclear whether the domestic-relations exception applies to cases brought under the federal-question statute. ... We need not decide this question, however, because the exception would not apply in this case in any event.

Section 1331 subject-matter jurisdiction may exist over constitutional claims arising from ongoing child-custody proceedings even when the federal court must abstain in favor of the state proceedings.

Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Carros · filed 1983-12-20

Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Pending before the court are the motions of defendants to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that, while subject matter jurisdiction is extant, abstention is required because ... plaintiff can and should raise the unresolved questions in the state court litigation so that resolution may be had within the context of ongoing custody proceedings.

Section 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction over substantial constitutional and federal statutory challenges to a state’s child-support procedures; the domestic-relations exception does not bar such systemic claims merely because individual support orders are involved.

Agg v. Flanagan · filed 1988-08-25

Since they present substantial federal questions, jurisdiction in the District Court was therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 or Sec. 1343. ... The claim that the state's method of determining and enforcing child support is unconstitutional and contrary to federal law is not identical to a claim that a particular support order is too high. The domestic relations exception concerns the second claim; the federal courts must properly exercise jurisdiction over the first.

The domestic-relations exception does not bar Section 1331 jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to state-court procedures when resolving the challenge does not require the federal court to become enmeshed in domestic factual disputes.

Ingram v. Hayes · filed 1988-11-29

Under either a liberal or restrictive application of the domestic relations exception, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the declaratory relief claim. Even the courts that liberally apply the domestic relations exception to federal question jurisdiction only allow abstention when the federal court would necessarily become enmeshed in the domestic factual disputes. ... Because Ingram’s claim merely requires the district court to consider the constitutionality of the Alabama court’s procedures, resolution of this issue does not require the court to delve into the parties’ domestic affairs.

The domestic-relations exception to diversity jurisdiction does not bar Section 1331 cases arising under the Constitution or federal law.

John J. McLaughlin, Marilyn McLaughlin v. Pernsley · filed 1989-05-30

But this action was not brought under the diversity statute. It was commenced under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982). ... “[A]s a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the McLaughlins' complaint.

The domestic-relations exception to diversity jurisdiction does not bar Section 1331 cases arising under the Constitution or federal law.

McLaughlin v. Pernsley · filed 1989-05-30

But this action was not brought under the diversity statute. It was commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). ... “[A]s a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” ... Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the McLaughlins’ complaint.

Section 1331 confers jurisdiction only when a federal statute or the Constitution supplies a substantive right, and it does not authorize a collateral federal attack on a state child-support order under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.

Scheidegg v. Department of the Air Force of the United States · filed 1989-06-30

These sections do not provide a substantive basis of the court’s jurisdiction, but confer jurisdiction where a substantive right exists under a federal statute or the Constitution. ... Such relief would interfere with the state court writ of garnishment and thus the Civil Relief Act does not provide a basis for this federal court to hear the claim.

Section 1331 permits federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state procedures separating parents and children when adjudication does not require a custody decree.

Thomas v. New York City · filed 1993-02-05

Thus, the adjudication of whether the state’s procedure used to separate a parent from a child complies with the constitutional due process requirements is squarely within this Court’s federal question jurisdiction and does not entail any investigation by the federal court into the fitness of the parent to care for the child or the issuance of any decree that the parent must necessarily be reunited with the child; such an adjudication will entail at most a description of what process a state must follow in making determinations to deprive a parent of parental rights and custody of his or her child and in making determinations regarding visitation between them.

Section 1331 does not confer federal-question jurisdiction over an action concerning purely domestic issues.

Burns v. Burns · filed 1995-02-10

The district court's original jurisdiction extends to "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. In order for a district court to have original jurisdiction, there must be a federal question presented. 1 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1993). Burns' action concerns purely domestic issues and jurisdiction does not lie with federal district courts.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is not subject to the domestic relations exception applicable to diversity jurisdiction.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1996-09-05

First, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the domestic relations exception applies to federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ... However, the present case arises under the CSRA, a federal criminal law, and thus this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1331 supplies federal-question jurisdiction over a Child Support Recovery Act prosecution, and the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction does not bar it.

United States v. Bailey · filed 1997-06-12

The instant action is based not on diversity but on an express grant of jurisdictional authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because this case clearly arises under this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception presents no bar.

Section 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is not barred by the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.

United States v. Bailey · filed 1997-08-21

The instant action is based not on diversity but on an express grant of jurisdictional authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because this case clearly arises under this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception presents no bar.

Section 1331 permits a general constitutional challenge to state adoption laws that does not require a child custody determination, even if the domestic relations exception applies to federal question cases.

Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco) · filed 2000-08-28

Because Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to the Utah statutes does not require the federal district court to make a custody determination, that claim does not fall within the domestic relations exception even if the exception applies to proceedings involving an exercise of federal question jurisdiction.