20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (d)(3) treats an opinion that a claimant is disabled as addressing an issue reserved to the Commissioner and deserving no weight.

Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-01(d)(1), (d)(3)

With respect to Dr. Harmon’s statement, plaintiff argues only that the ALJ erred by giving the statement partial weight but “failing to acknowledge [Dr. Harmon’s] comment asking, ‘Why has SSA repeatedly concluded that [plaintiff] is not significantly disabled?’” Dkt. 13 at 8 (quoting AR 2968). The ALJ did not err by failing to address this question. To the extent Dr. Harmon’s question was intended to express an opinion that plaintiff should be found disabled, the question was an opinion on an issue “reserved to the Commissioner” deserving no weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (d)(3) permit an ALJ to discount a source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled because disability is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Lewis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-15(d)(1), (d)(3)

As for the ALJ’s first reason, it was proper for the ALJ to discount Ms. Stenerson’s statements regarding her opinion that plaintiff is disabled; that is a determination “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability because that issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

Dillard v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2024-03-27(d)(1)

Moreover, a “statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the SSA] will determine” that the claimant is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). That is because opinions about whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (RFC), and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Any such statement from a treating physician may be relevant to the ALJ’s findings but is not determinative, because it is the ALJ who must find the claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled.

CARRUTH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-03-28(d)(1)

The ALJ correctly noted, however, that the determination of disability for purposes of benefits is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); see also Pintal v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The ultimate legal determination of disability is reserved for the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the SSA will find the claimant disabled.

Ewing v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2024-03-29(d)(1)

Moreover, a “statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the SSA] will determine” that the claimant is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) leaves the ultimate disability and residual-functional-capacity determinations to the ALJ rather than treating or examining physicians or state agency consultants.

Green v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-05-20(e)(1)

The ALJ—not Ms. G.’s treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—makes the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c). ... The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and he did not err by adopting Dr. Chapman’s proposed lifting restrictions in lieu of the state agency consultants’ stated exertional limitations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) makes independent evaluation of the record the ALJ’s duty when formulating residual functional capacity and does not require reliance on a medical opinion.

Crouch v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-06-24(d)(2)

Crouch contends that Moon v. Colvin. 763 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014), stands for the proposition that an ALJ must rely on a medical opinion. Crouch is mistaken. While Moon held that an ALJ cannot interpret medical records such as MRI’s, it did not require that an ALJ rely on a medical opinion to craft an RFC. It is clear, in fact, that it is solely the ALJ’s responsibility, and not that of any medical personnel, to formulate an RFC. ... based on the entire record, which includes objective medical evidence and the testimony at the hearing. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2) (independent evaluation of the record is ALJ’s express duty).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not give it controlling weight.

MCGUIRE v. O'MALLEY · filed 2024-08-12(d)(1)

Whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability is an administrative finding, not a medical opinion. That administrative finding is “reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. § 404.1527(d). And because the Commissioner has delegated his authority to make the finding at the hearing level to an ALJ, the finding is effectively reserved to the ALJ. Id. § 404.1546(c); see also S.S.R. 96-5p (July 2, 1996) (giving such opinions controlling weight would "confer upon the treating source the authority to make" disability determinations). Accordingly, Dr. Mundy’s and Dr. Fuchs’ opinions in that regard were not entitled to be afforded any weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(3) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to the source of an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Haines v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-15(d)(2)-(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not accept a medical source’s statement on that issue.

Wheatley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2024-08-30(d)(1)

But, “[a] medical source’s opinion that a [plaintiff] is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is not dispositive of a disability claim because the determination is reserved to the [ALJ] acting on behalf of the Commissioner.” Walker v. Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 2021); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Therefore, the ALJ was not required to take this statement into account and did not err by declining to do so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)–(3) reserves the determination of disability to the Commissioner.

Drinen v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-09(d)(1)–(3)

Finally, the ALJ was justified in rejecting NP Manning’s opinion insofar as it stated that Plaintiff was disabled and unable to work. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(3), the determination of disability is reserved for the Commissioner. The Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to NP Manning’s opinion due to its conclusory nature and its inconsistency with the record as a whole.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(3) treats a medical provider’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion requiring separate analysis.

Jud v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-17(d)(1)-(3)

“Opinions on some issues ... are not medical opinions,” such as medical providers’ conclusions that you are “disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’” which are “issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1-3). ... Because that is not a “medical opinion” that requires independent analysis under the regulations, the Court finds the ALJ did not err by failing to analyze Dr. Huff’s comments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled is not controlling.

Abdulahi v. O'Malley · filed 2024-09-27(d)(1)

ALJ Hodgson had no duty to blindly follow the medical expert’s testimony. The ALJ writing the decision has the full authority to label a claimant as disabled or not and determine the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a bare conclusion that a claimant is unable to work as reserved to the Commissioner, but not a medical source’s functional assessment of the claimant’s likelihood of sustaining full-time work.

Tharp v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-10-17(d)

Statements that an individual is “unable to work” are statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner rather than medical opinions and given no “special significance” in the disability analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). ... However, “an assessment” of a claimant’s “likelihood of being able to sustain full time employment given the many medical and mental impairments [they] face[]” does not fall into the category of statements on an individual’s ability to work reserved to the Commissioner. ... Dr. Meagher’s opinion was such a statement. It was not a conclusory assertion that Plaintiff would be unable to maintain employment, but, rather, an assessment based on his four-page description of her symptoms and medical history and the way in which those symptoms have affected her activities, social history, and other functional abilities. See AR 587–90. As such, the ALJ erred by failing to address it.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to an opinion source on reserved issues.

Browning v. Social Security Administration · filed 2024-11-22(d)(2), (d)(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves to the Commissioner the determination of how a claimant’s condition affects her capacity to work.

Brooke Tolan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2024-12-06(d)(2)

And the effect of Tolan’s condition on her capacity to work is a determination expressly reserved for the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Social Security Ruling 96-5P, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves conclusions about whether a claimant is disabled or able to work to the Commissioner rather than medical personnel.

Correa-Vargas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-12-18(e)

Moreover, any conclusions as to whether Plaintiff is “disabled” or able to work are legal conclusions and administrative decisions that are to be made by the Commissioner, not by medical personnel. ... Therefore, the ALJ properly considered the medical opinions of Dr. Egozcue and Dr. Rojas in conducting her step two determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves to the Commissioner the final responsibility for deciding whether a claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment.

Bechard v. Colvin · filed 2025-01-03(d)(2)

But while an ALJ must consider medical evidence, such as the opinion of a medical expert, ... “the final responsibility for deciding” whether a claimant’s impairment meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *3–4 (Mar. 27, 2017) (“When an adjudicator at the hearings level obtains [medical expert] testimony or written responses to interrogatories about whether an individual’s impairment(s) medically equals a listing, the adjudicator cannot rely on an [expert’s] conclusory statement that an individual’s impairment(s) medically equals a listed impairment(s).”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Bishop v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-02-06(d)(2)

... The RFC determination sets out an individual’s work-related abilities despite his or her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is unable to work as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

Schwartz v. O'Malley · filed 2025-02-18(d)

To the extent Hodges stated that Plaintiff was unable to work, her letter addressed an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner and is not a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of disability to the Commissioner, so an opinion from a medical source that a claimant is disabled need not receive significant weight.

RAVIKOVICH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2025-03-04(d)

Moreover, the ALJ properly noted that Dr. Mahmood’s opinion of disability is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. R. 29; see also Louis v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 808 F. App’x 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Whether or not Louis can perform occupational duties is a legal determination reserved for the Commissioner.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)); Zonak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 290 F. App’x 493, 497 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ was not obligated to give significant weight to Dr. Kumar’s opinion as to Zonak’s ability to work because the opinion related to the ultimate issue of disability—an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and bars special significance based on the source of an opinion on reserved issues.

Munger v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2025-03-07(d)(2)-(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the question whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner.

SEALS v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2025-03-26(d)(1)

However, such statements did not purport to opine as to Plaintiff’s specific functional limitations, and the ALJ, therefore, correctly declined to provide written analyses about these statements because they opined on questions of disability, which are reserved solely for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires consideration of a medical source’s opinion but reserves final responsibility for deciding certain issues to the Commissioner.

Johnson v. Dudek · filed 2025-03-26(d)(2)

The ALJ was not required to address every single piece of evidence or adopt every opinion that Dr. Cole offered. While a medical source’s opinion is relevant and must be considered, “the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves conclusions about whether a claimant is disabled and related legal conclusions to the Commissioner, not medical personnel.

Felix-Santiago v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-21(e)

However, conclusions as to whether a claimant is “disabled” and related legal conclusions are administrative decisions that are to be made by the Commissioner, not by medical personnel.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual functional capacity determinations to the Commissioner as administrative, rather than medical, findings.

Winters v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-07-14(d)

The regulations explicitly ... provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Stitt v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-09-16(d)(2)

The Social Security regulation explains that, although opinions from medical sources can be used when determining issues such as residual functional capacity, the final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s RFC “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). ... For example, the ALJ directly referenced Ms. Higginbotham’s opinion about Stitt’s inability to return to work due to his need to alternate sitting and standing, when he wrote: “The portion of Dr. Khalafi and Ms. Higginbotham’s opinions noting that the claimant is disabled and unable to return to work, are not persuasive because those issues are reserved to the Commissioner.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion.

(SS) Warren v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-28(d)(2)

Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ requires some type of guidance from a healthcare professional, the RFC determination is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a ... medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Beauchamp v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-10-08(d)(2)

Moreover, the “final responsibility” for determining a claimant’s RFC “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) permits an ALJ to give little weight to a medical opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Higgins · filed 2025-10-15(d)

The ALJ also properly found that, to the extent the disabled parking placard is construed as a medical opinion, it was entitled to little weight as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(d), 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) and (d)(3) make the Commissioner the final arbiter of issues reserved to the Commissioner and require no special significance for the source of an opinion on such an issue.

Eales · filed 2025-10-16(d)(2), (d)(3)

Further, to the extent the Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have adopted her treating sources’ findings that she was essentially disabled, the Regulations expressly provide that the Commissioner is the final arbiter on such issues, and is under no obligation to give any special significance to the source for issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) makes residual functional capacity an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical finding.

Engel · filed 2025-10-27(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives no special significance to a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled because the ultimate disability determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Hagger · filed 2026-01-20(d)(3)

The ALJ correctly noted that ultimate finding of disability is reserved to him as a representative of the Commissioner. Tr. 48; See Thompson v. O'Malley, No. 6:24-CV-00010, 2025 WL 1270303, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:24-CV-00010, 2025 WL 1266955 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2025) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) and Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003) ( “Among the opinions by treating doctors that have no special significance are determinations that an applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ [as] [t]hese determinations are legal conclusions that the regulation describes as ‘reserved to the Commissioner.’”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(3) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to the source of an opinion on a reserved issue.

Cline · filed 2026-01-21(d)(2)-(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the ultimate determination of disability to the Commissioner, but a treating source’s conclusory disability opinion may still be considered for consistency with that source’s later opinions.

Tweedy · filed 2026-01-27(d)

The ALJ appropriately found that PA-C Stiles’ conclusion of disability on this form is not persuasive by itself, as the finding of disability is reserved for the Commissioner. However, considering that PA-C Stiles treated Plaintiff for the entirety of the relevant period and reviewed the reports and imaging obtained from referrals to specialists, PA-C Stiles’ opinion in April 2022 that Plaintiff was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, even if it is conclusory, is useful to consider the consistency of PA-C Stiles’ subsequent opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the ultimate determination of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical provider’s opinion that a claimant is disabled does not decide that issue.

NORTON · filed 2026-03-06(d)

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff relies on her providers’ opinions that she is disabled, that is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See Louis v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 808 F. App’x 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Whether or not Louis can perform occupational duties is a legal determination reserved for the Commissioner.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)); cf. Zonak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 290 F. App’x 493, 497 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ was not obligated to give significant weight to Dr. Kumar’s opinion as to Zonak’s ability to work because the opinion related to the ultimate issue of disability—an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work addresses an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Phillips v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2008-04-28(e)(1)

However, the ALJ properly noted that “[t]his is an issue reserve to the Commissioner ... and therefore, no weight is accorded to the assessment of inability to work by Dr. ... Greenwald and Dr. McKenna.” (A-21); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1) (statement by a medical source that an individual is “disabled” or “unable to work” is an administrative finding on an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not entitled to weight because that determination is reserved for the Commissioner.

Blair v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2011-07-14(e)(1)

To the extent that Dr. Kilgallin opined that plaintiff is “disabled” or “unable to work,” his opinion is not entitled to weight because that is an issue reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The ALJ makes the ultimate disability and residual functional capacity determinations.

Kacee Chandler v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2011-12-07(e)(1)

The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 reserves the decision whether an impairment meets or equals a Listing to the Commissioner; an ALJ need give no further explanation for rejecting a conclusory medical opinion on equivalence that supplies no supporting medical findings or reasons.

Avery v. Astrue · filed 2009-02-19(e)(2)

Thus, the ALJ clearly rejected Dr. Francis’s conclusory opinion on equivalency, an issue reserved to the Commissioner. As Dr. Francis did not testify as to the medical findings or reason behind his equivalency opinion, nothing more was required of the ALJ.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the decision whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement on that issue may receive less weight.

Green v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-09-30(d)

The only additional evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's alleged inability to work during the asserted closed period is two notes by Dr. Williams on (R. 322, 437), indicating that Plaintiff was unable to work, evidence the ALJ properly afforded less weight, as such issues are reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (statements that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner, but an ALJ must consider a treating provider’s view that a claimant’s impairments prevent work.

Mata v. Saul · filed 2021-03-02(e)(1)

Given such authority, the ALJ could not simply dismiss Dr. Bush-Joseph’s and Smith’s findings that the severity of Paul’s leg and knee impairments renders him unable to work.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A treating source’s statement that a claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity addresses a disability determination reserved to the Commissioner.

Urbanczyk v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-18(d)

Insofar as Dr. Szymanski writes that Plaintiff is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, such statement is not a medical opinion but a conclusory opinion on a matter that is reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) allows an ALJ to discount a medical source’s conclusion that a claimant cannot work because the disability determination is reserved for the Commissioner.

Goad v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-22(d)(1)

The ALJ properly declined to afford weight to the portion of Dr. Cohen’s statements that plaintiff's limitations in socializing and/or interacting and depression prevented plaintiff from holding full time employment and that plaintiff required financial assistance until she was able to work full time independently, id. at 462, on the basis that this analysis constituted “conclusory statements on an issue reserved for the Commissioner taking into account medical and vocational factors within the rubric of Social Security rules.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Treating source opinions on whether an impairment meets a Listing are not entitled to significant weight because that decision is reserved for the Commissioner.

Valder v. Barnhart · filed 2006-01-25(e)(2)-(3)

First, the law does not require that the ALJ accept Dr. Perillo’s opinion on whether the requirements for Listing 11.14 were met. That is an issue reserved for the Commissioner to decide. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, treating source opinions on issues reserved for determination by the Commissioner are not entitled to any significant weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A treating source’s statement that a claimant is totally disabled is not a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight under the treating physician’s rule.

Earl-Buck v. Barnhart · filed 2006-02-13(a)(2)

Because the opinions of Drs. Land-fried and Kelly that plaintiff was “totally disabled” are not “medical opinions” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), the ALJ was not required to accord them any significant weight under the treating physician’s rule. Nor was the ALJ required to state reasons on the record for not doing so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled, and an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner receives no special significance because of its source.

Nicholson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2009-02-27(e)(1), (e)(3)

Moreover, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1), the Commissioner is responsible for making the determination whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(3), 416.927(e)(3), no special significance will be given to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) leaves the ultimate disability determination to the ALJ, who may rely on a state agency consultant’s opinion.

Kacee Chandler v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2012-01-05(e)(1)

Contrary to the District Court’s view, the ALJ was entitled to rely on Dr. Popat’s opinion. The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 reserves the final RFC determination to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to another source’s opinion on that issue.

Trauterman v. Colvin · filed 2014-02-19(e)(2), (e)(3)

As set forth above, however, the final responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC is reserved to the Commissioner, who will not give any special significance to the source of another opinion on this issue. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2), (e)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) does not make a medical source’s statement that a claimant cannot work decisive of disability, but it does not justify ignoring the statement.

MCTAGGART v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2020-04-30(d)(1)

This provision does refer to medical source opinions that a claimant is unable to work, but all it says is that such a statement, in and of itself, is not sufficient to mandate a determination that a claimant is disabled. ... The Court concludes that this regulatory provision does not justify the ALJ’s failure to discuss the statement in question.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the decision whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner.

Norris v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-05(d)(1)

Consistent with applicable law, the ALJ recognized that Dr. Campbell’s opinions are not medical opinions, but are, instead, opinions on the issue of disability which is reserved to the Commissioner (Id.). See §§404.1527(d)(1), 404.1546(c), 416.927(d)(1), 416.946(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of whether a claimant can work to the Commissioner.

Wacha v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-19(d)

Ms. Deganis’s statement is on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to apply its factors when evaluating medical opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Hill v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-13(d)

In evaluating medical opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ must apply the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The Commissioner has final responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Swanson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-16(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) excludes conclusory statements about a claimant’s ability to work from medical opinions that an ALJ must evaluate and weigh.

Berz, Randall v. Berryhill, Nancy · filed 2020-05-07(a)(2)

Conclusory statements about a claimant’s ability to work -- as opposed to opinions about the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments -- are not medical opinions and, therefore, the ALJ need not accept or evaluate and discount each such statement.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate determination of whether a claimant can work to the Commissioner, but does not allow an ALJ to reject an objective medical assessment of the claimant's ability to sustain full-time employment on that basis alone.

Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-18(d)(1)

The ALJ correctly explains that the determination of whether a claimant can work is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But what Dr. Brown provided was “an assessment based on objective medical evidence of [the claimant's] likelihood of being able to sustain full-time employment.” See Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). Dr. Brown completed a mental status exam, and his statement about plaintiff not being able to work competitively “at this time” was based on his assessment of plaintiff’s “current mood and anxiety symptoms.” AR 566. The ALJ, therefore, could not discount Dr. Brown’s opinion for this reason.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) provides that a medical source’s conclusion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work concerns an issue reserved to the Commissioner and need not control the disability determination.

Mihalics v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-31(e)(1)

To the extent that all of Dr. Namassivaya’s “opinions,” and portions of Dr. Pietrantoni’s, consisted of conclusory statements that plaintiff should be “out of work” for a certain period or was “unable to work,” the ALJ correctly declined to consider them, because they opined on the ultimate issue of disability, which is reserved for the Commissioner. See e.g., Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (the ultimate issue of disability is set aside for the Commissioner, and conclusory opinions on that issue, even when rendered by a treating physician, are appropriately ignored by an ALJ). See also 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(e)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable medical source's judgment about an impairment's nature and severity, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, remaining abilities, and restrictions, while § 404.1527(d)(1) treats opinions on disability as issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Luevano v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-18(a)(1), (d)(1)

“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [his] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite impairment(s), and [his] physical or mental restrictions.” ... Dr. Rattan’s opinion that Luevano “would have significant difficulty maintaining consistent employment from a mental health standpoint” ... is an opinion on disability, which is an issue within the Commissioner’s sole province.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled or able to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a medical-source statement on that issue does not establish disability.

McAuley v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-05-20(d)(1)

A statement by a medical source that plaintiff is “unable to work” does not mean she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to medical opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, including residual functional capacity and vocational factors.

Clark v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-05-27(d), (d)(2)

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), the determination of whether an individual is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, and no special significance will be given to an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner. Section (d)(2) provides that although the Commissioner will consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as the RFC and the application of vocational factors, the final responsibility for deciding those issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, who is responsible for translating the evidence into work-related functions.

Hernandez v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-27(d)(2)

The ALJ has the sole authority to review medical and other record evidence and translate the evidence into work related functions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (the “residual functional capacity” is an issue “reserved to the Commissioner”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that an opinion on whether a claimant is unable to work is not a medical opinion entitled to special significance, but the ALJ must still evaluate the medical source opinion under the applicable factors.

Hernandez v. Saul · filed 2020-05-28(d)

A statement by a medical source that a claimant is “unable to work” is not a medical opinion and is not due “any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Nevertheless, the ALJ is required to consider medical source opinions about any issue, including issues reserved to the Commissioner, by evaluating the opinion in light of the evidence in the record and applying the applicable factors.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Reed v. Social Security · filed 2020-05-31(d)(1)

Besides, as to Dr. Mufarreh’s opinion that Reed was unable to work, an opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is an administrative determination reserved for the Commissioner, not some other source. See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Subsection [(d)(1)] further elaborates that no ‘special significance’ will be given to the opinions of disability, even if they come from a treating physician.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. In so doing, we review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source’s statement that you are disabled. A statement by a medical source that you are “disabled” or “unable to work” does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding issues such as a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, although the ALJ must consider medical-source opinions.

Hastings v. Saul · filed 2020-06-01(d)(2)

“the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a medical provider's opinion on that issue is not entitled to controlling weight.

Vick v. Saul · filed 2020-06-01(d)(1)

Furthermore, Allen’s finding that Vick was permanently disabled is a determination reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security. (Tr. 22.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d). Therefore, Allen’s opinion was not entitled to more than little weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and § 404.1527(c)(2) permits an ALJ to give a treating-source opinion less weight when it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

Frink v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-01(d)(1), (c)(2)

Therefore, plaintiff’s focus on worker’s compensation classification of “permanent, partial, moderate to marked” is misplaced. In this instance, the ALJ appropriately and clearly did not rely on that portion of Dr. Fiorini’s report but rather the examination findings and statements by the plaintiff at that time. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1); Pintagro v. Colvin, 1:15-CV-00478(MAT), 2017 WL 6616377, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2017) (“An opinion that a claimant is totally or partially ‘disabled’ or is under a ‘disability’, even from an acceptable medical source such as a treating physician, is not entitled to any particular weight”); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (a decision by another governmental entity that a claimant is blind is “based on its rules” and not binding on the ALJ). ... The inconsistency between these opinions and the plaintiff’s statements about his abilities was also an adequate reason for the ALJ not to afford greater weight to these conclusory statements regardless of the treating relationship. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); see also Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than as a medical opinion.

Hughes v. BERRYHILL · filed 2020-06-12(d)

Plaintiff’s final contention that remand is warranted because the ALJ did not address Dr. Amini’s statement that he was precluded from competitive, full-time work activity on a sustained basis (R. at 1156) also fails, as a medical source’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not a medical opinion but an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical-source statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not require the ALJ to determine that the claimant meets the definition of disability.

Trenidad v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-16(d)(1)

Defendant is accurate that a statement from a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” does not require the ALJ to determine the claimant meets the definition of disability. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity and vocational factors to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to medical-source opinions on those issues.

Evans v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-06-17(d)(2)

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), the determination of whether an individual is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, and no special significance will be given to an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner. Section (d)(2) provides that although the Commissioner will consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as the RFC and the application of vocational factors, the final responsibility for deciding those issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a source's statement on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled or unemployable, as not a medical opinion entitled to weight as one.

Baker v. Saul · filed 2020-06-17(d)

Moreover, the ALJ was not required to give any weight to Dr. Bowen’s statements that he supported Plaintiff’s disability claim and that Plaintiff was unemployable due to a combination of seizures and seizure medication side effects,10 as those were not medical opinions but instead opinions on an ultimate issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Hernandez v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 761 F. App’x 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Fernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-29(e)

The determination of whether a claimant is able to work is reserved for the Commissioner, and statements “by a medical source that [a claimant] is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” “are not medical opinions.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a physician’s statement that a claimant is disabled as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion entitled to special weight.

Colony-Herrera v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-06-29(d)

A physician’s opinion that one is “disabled,” however, is not a medical opinion but instead an opinion on an issue reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine that the claimant is disabled because that issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

Baker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-06(d)(1)

The ALJ appropriately found Dr. Kita’s cursory February 2013 opinion that plaintiff was “unable to work at this time” infringed on a determination reserved for the Commissioner. (AR 1258.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); SSR 96-5p. Plaintiff contends an ALJ must still consider opinions regarding issues reserved to the Commissioner. However, Dr. Kita did not provide any medical explanation underlying her conclusory opinion for the ALJ to consider. Similarly, Dr. Kita’s April 2017 opinion plaintiff was “unable to return to work due to progression of her disease” lacked any medical explanation. (AR 1031.2) The ALJ did not err by discounting these conclusory opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats medical-source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner as receiving no deference.

Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-09(d)

Although it is well established that medical-source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are due no deference, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (d); 416.927 (d), an ALJ must explain why a treating-physician opinion, even one as cursory as this, is not being credited.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) says the Commissioner does not give special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner, including whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability.

Bower v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-16(d)(3)

Because Dr. Poole goes on to discuss what Petitioner can and cannot do in a workplace setting, the import of his references to Petitioner’s alleged disabling pain is lessened (if it can even be fully understood). ... All this is to say that, at bottom, the ALJ clearly disagreed with Dr. Poole’s possible conclusion that Petitioner is disabled and cannot work at all. Such a determination is indisputably the province of the ALJ. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3) (“We will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner [(whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability)].”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 permits medical sources to provide opinions about impairment severity and residual functional capacity, but reserves the final decision on those issues to the Commissioner.

Politte v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-17(d)(2)

An RFC assessment is not a medical opinion, and indeed, determining the RFC is within the exclusive province of the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“We use medical sources, including your treating source, to provide evidence, including opinions, on the nature and severity of your impairment(s). Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . ., the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner”)

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner, so they are not entitled to controlling weight or special significance but must still be considered.

Reese v. Saul (CONSENT) · filed 2020-07-29(d)

Opinions on some issues, such as whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work “are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d); 416.927(d); Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1986). Opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not entitled to controlling weight or special significance. SSR 96-5p. However, “[s]uch opinions on these issues must not be disregarded” and the “decision must explain the consideration given to the treating source’s opinion(s).” Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 591288, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2008).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work do not determine disability, and § 404.1527(d)(3) provides that opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner receive no special significance.

RAY v. SAUL · filed 2020-07-29(d)(1), (d)(3)

First, doctor’s statements that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” do not qualify as medical opinions because they are dispositive of the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Thus, the 2015 appraisal of Plaintiff as “disabled and unable to work” was not a medical opinion. Likewise, on the 2018 questionnaire, Dr. Zaragoza checked a box next to the word “No” for the question of whether Plaintiff was capable of performing sedentary work. [Filing No. 13-10, at ECF p. 48.] These opinions constituted opinions on issues reserved to the SSA. The SSA “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source opinion that a claimant is disabled from working as a legal conclusion reserved to the Commissioner, rather than an opinion entitled to particular weight.

Beery v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2020-07-30(d)(1)

A medical source opinion that the claimant is disabled from working is a legal conclusion on an issue that is reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats an opinion that a claimant is unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, requiring the ALJ to evaluate its evidentiary support without giving it controlling weight or special significance.

Sutherland v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-07-31(e)

A treating source’s opinion that a claimant is unable to work is not a “medical opinion” as defined by the regulations, but is an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Where the record contains such an opinion, the ALJ must evaluate all the evidence to determine the extent it is supported by the record, but an opinion that a claimant is unable to work is never entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) excludes an opinion that a claimant is disabled from the definition of a medical opinion but requires the ALJ to consider supporting medical findings and other evidence.

Sells v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-08-07(d)

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), an opinion that you are disabled is not considered a medical opinion under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). However, the ALJ must nonetheless consider the opinion along with “all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source’s statement that you are disabled.” Id. Therefore, the ALJ was still required to provide legally sufficient reasons to reject the remaining parts of Dr. Morris’ medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) treats opinions on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner, so they are not medical opinions entitled to special significance or great weight.

Young v. Saul · filed 2020-08-10(d)(3)

An ALJ need not defer to a treating physician’s conclusion that a claimant is disabled because such an opinion has no “special significance” and is not considered a “medical opinion” entitled to great weight within the meaning of the regulations.