20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d) provides that an opinion on whether a claimant can work is reserved to the Commissioner.

Garcia v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2012-11-19(d)

The ALJ also did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Buckenberger’s opinion that Garcia “cannot work full time” because such a conclusion is reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion by the judgments it reflects about an impairment and its effects, while subsection (d) excludes conclusory opinions on issues such as whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work because those issues are reserved to the Commissioner.

Brad Dunlap, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2012-12-27(a)(2), (d)

On appeal, Dunlap contends that the administrative law judge’s decision ignored or, at least, failed to give proper weight to the medical opinions of his treating physician. In response, the Commissioner argues – correctly, we conclude – that the May 2007 statement by Dr. Redmon does not constitute a medical opinion, citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), which defines a medical opinion as one “that reflects[s] judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” Indeed, the regulations specifically exclude from consideration opinions on certain issues, such as conclusory statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Thus, the administrative law judge correctly ruled that the conclusion expressed by Dr. Redmon in his single-sentence note of May 2007 was one properly reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves conclusions about whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner rather than treating physicians.

Stokes v. Astrue · filed 2008-04-18(e)

The doctor’s subsequent legal conclusion that this “chronic low back” rendered Ms. Stokes totally disabled is a determination reserved for the Commissioner. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 defines medical opinions as judgments about the nature and severity of an impairment and excludes opinions about a claimant’s ability to work because that issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

Sawyer v. Colvin · filed 2013-03-07(a)(2), (d)(1)

Excluded from this definition are opinions about a claimant’s ability to work, a question that the regulation reserves for the Commissioner alone.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) assigns the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner, rather than the treating physician.

Claymore v. Astrue · filed 2013-06-04(d)(1)

It is the Commissioner who is “responsible for making the determination or decision about whether [the claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner and not entitled to special significance, but the ALJ must still consider the opinion and explain the consideration given to it.

Coppola v. SSA · filed 2014-02-21(d)

The Commissioner is correct that a medical opinion that a claimant is "'disabled' or 'unable to work'", even if it is from a treating source like Dr. Lemmond, is considered an opinion on an issue "reserved to the Commissioner" and is not entitled to "special significance." ... That does not mean, however, that an ALJ need not take notice of such an opinion. To the contrary, the ALJ "must always carefully consider medical source opinions about any issue, including opinions about issues that are reserved to the Commissioner." ... Such opinions "must never be ignored," and if the record contains a treating source's opinion on an issue reserved to the commissioner, the ALJ's decision "must explain the consideration given to the treating source's opinion(s)."

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 excludes opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner from the treating-physician rule's controlling-weight treatment.

Harris v. Colvin · filed 2014-04-04(d), (e)(1)

The ALJ gave controlling weight to the opinion of Harris’s treating physicians, but appropriately departed from the physician’s opinion where it concerned an issue reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), (e)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d), (e)(1); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir.1999).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner.

Donnelly v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2014-07-11(e)

Ultimately, as indicated above, the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate determination of whether an individual is disabled to the Commissioner.

Acevedo v. Colvin · filed 2014-05-19(d)(1)

The ultimate determination as to whether or not an individual is disabled is a determination left to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) does not require an ALJ to defer to a physician on the ultimate determination of disability.

Kibble v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2014-09-02(d)(3)

To the extent that Dr. Wood’s report contained opinions on Claimant’s disability status, the ALJ was not required to defer to a physician on the ultimate determination of disability, McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not adopt a medical source's opinion on that ultimate issue.

Levesque v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2014-09-11(d)

And whether Levesque is “disabled,” as his surgeon suggested, is a matter reserved to the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d)(1), so the ALJ was not required to adopt that opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled is not binding on the Commissioner.

Marr v. Colvin · filed 2014-09-12(d)(1)

The suggestion that no treating or examining source has found plaintiff to be disabled (Tr. 26) is really a nonsequitur, since any such statement would not be binding on the Commissioner in any event.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats a medical source statement on whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, requiring consideration but not giving it any particular weight.

Hanken v. Colvin · filed 2014-09-18(e)

The determination that a claimant is disabled vel non is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and although a medical source statement on that issue must be considered, it is entitled to no particular weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats an opinion on whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Davison v. Colvin · filed 2014-12-22(d)(1)

The psychiatrist’s opinion that Mr. Davison is disabled is not a “medical opinion” but, instead, an opinion on the ultimate issue of disability which is a matter reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Such opinions, even when offered by a treating source, are never entitled to controlling weight or given special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a physician’s statement that an individual is incapacitated or disabled is not dispositive in determining disability.

Hacia v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2015-02-02(d)

Notably, a physician’s statement that an individual is incapacitated or disabled is not dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions that a claimant is disabled or on residual functional capacity as administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner, so they are not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Duncan v. Colvin · filed 2015-04-02(d)

The ALJ also correctly observed that certain opinions by medical providers, including opinions that a claimant is disabled or opinions concerning residual functional capacity, are not medical opinions but, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Such opinions, even when offered by a treating source, are never entitled to controlling weight or given special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats an opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than as a medical opinion entitled to deference.

Markland v. Colvin · filed 2015-08-31(d)(1)

A physician’s opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is entitled to no deference “because it invades the province of the Commissioner to make the ultimate disability determination.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a physician's conclusion that a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion.

Sarkiss v. Colvin · filed 2015-11-20(d)(1)

Moreover, Dr. Janjua’s finding that Sarkiss was disabled is not a medical opinion but instead is an opinion on a question reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats an opinion on whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Washington v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2015-12-01(d)(1)

As we have previously explained, in disability determinations “we are concerned . . . with the doctors’ evaluations of [the claimant’s] condition and the medical consequences thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his condition.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (recognizing that an opinion on whether a claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion and reserving to Commissioner the “responsib[ility] for making the determination or decision about whether [the claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability”). Because the opinion that Mr. Washington is disabled creates no “reasonable possibility” of a different administrative result, it is immaterial.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled as a legal determination for the Social Security Administration, not as a medical opinion.

Clough v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2016-01-06(d)(1)

However, this diagnosis does not change our outcome because whether a claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion but rather a legal determination to be made by the SSA. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats the ultimate determination of disability as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion the ALJ must adopt.

Gallo v. Colvin · filed 2016-05-13(e)

Moreover, the magistrate judge intimated, without finding as such, that the administrative law judge erred for not having relied on the doctors’ determination of disability. The magistrate judge wrote that “[ajlthough at least three medical opinions existed in Plaintiffs file at the time of the hearing, all indicating that she was disabled, the ALJ called an additional medical expert [].” ... However, it is well settled in this circuit that “[t]he ultimate decision concerning the disability of a claimant is reserved for the Commissioner.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a physician’s conclusion that a claimant is fully disabled concerns an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not entitled to special significance.

Williams v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2016-05-23(d)

First, to the extent that Dr. Grauer purported to declare Williams “fully disabled,” this was not a medical opinion entitled to special significance, but rather a conclusory legal judgment “on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant can engage in gainful employment as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Simard v. SSA · filed 2016-10-21(d)(1)

Dr. Benton’s opinion that claimant is “unable to engage in gainful employment at this time” is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner.

Brown v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-30(d)

This decision was within the ALJ’s discretion because the RFC determination is one of the issues expressly reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner as not medical opinions and gives them no special significance.

Cooper v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-30(d)(1), (d)(3)

The Court notes, however, that Dr. Trudeau’s opinions in his Consultation Report that (1) it seemed reasonable for Plaintiff to apply for disability and (2) that Plaintiff qualifies for a physical disability are not “medical opinions” and are instead opinions on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). As such, those opinions are not given any special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3); Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 289 (7th Cir. 2002).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) defines a medical opinion as an acceptable-source statement reflecting judgments about impairments and resulting abilities or restrictions; section 404.1527(d) excludes opinions on dispositive issues reserved to the Commissioner from that definition and special weight, while still requiring consideration.

McLain v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2017-01-20(a)(2), (d)

For a statement to be characterized as a “medical opinion,” it must be from a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable source and “reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairments(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). A doctor’s opinion on a dispositive issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether the claimant is disabled or unable to work, is excluded from the definition of a medical opinion and is not given special weight, even if it is offered by a treating source, but the ALJ should still consider the opinion. Id. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of whether an individual is disabled to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to medical opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner; subsection (d)(2) likewise reserves final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity and vocational-factor issues to the Commissioner.

Pate v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2017-01-31(d)

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), the determination of whether an individual is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, and no special significance will be given to an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner. Section (d)(2) provides that although the Commissioner will consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as the RFC and the application of vocational factors, the final responsibility for deciding those issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical-source opinion on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work, an issue reserved to the Commissioner, is not entitled to controlling weight.

Henry v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2017-02-08(d)(1)

Dr. Tallio’s statement that Henry is “unable to maintain gainful employment” is not entitled to controlling weight because it addresses an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats statements that a claimant is unable to work as opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, and § 404.1527(d)(1) gives them no special significance.

Gillen v SSA · filed 2017-02-28(d), (d)(1)

First, a medical-source statement that a claimant is unable to work is not a medical opinion but, rather, is an opinion on an issue reserved to the Acting Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) & 416.927(d). Such an opinion is entitled to no special significance. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) & 416.927(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner, so those opinions are not medical opinions entitled to special significance.

Moore v. Colvin · filed 2017-03-08(d)

The Commissioner’s' regulations explain that medical source opinions that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are not medical opinions and are not given special significance because opinions as to whether or not a claimant is disabled are reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to assign less than controlling weight to the opinions of Dr. Brownstein, Dr. Hosny, and Dr. Tam.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that an opinion on whether a claimant is unable to work is an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and is entitled to no weight.

Coheley v. Social Security Administration · filed 2017-09-07(d)

Moreover, Dr. Wilson’s opinion that Claimant was “unable to work” is entitled to no weight because that is an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) says that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not itself determine whether the claimant is disabled.

Jahnsen v. Berryhill · filed 2017-07-13(d)(1)

“[a] statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [defendant] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, including dispositive disability determinations, as administrative findings rather than medical opinions entitled to controlling weight.

Valentin v. Berryhill · filed 2017-10-10(d)

Furthermore, the opinion that Valentin “is essentially and realistically unemployable” is an issue left exclusively to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in giving Mr. Dreiling’s opinion little weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) treats an opinion that a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so the ALJ need not give it special significance.

Cook v. Berryhill · filed 2017-11-22(d)(3)

Moreover, to the extent that Ms. McMahan opined that Claimant was disabled, such a determination is reserved to the Commissioner, and the ALJ had no duty to give it any special significance. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats an opinion on whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so the ALJ need not accept such an opinion.

Topoulos v. Colvin · filed 2018-03-16(d)

Furthermore, the ALJ was not required to accept that opinion, given that it is an opinion on disability, an issue for the Commissioner to decide. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2) treats a disability determination as an administrative finding reserved to the ALJ, so a medical source's opinion that a claimant is completely disabled is not dispositive.

Gammill v. Berryhill · filed 2018-07-25(e)(2)

Further, although Dr. Thomas opined that Plaintiff was completely disabled, Dr. Thomas’ statement is not dispositive because a disability determination is an administrative finding left to the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2) and 416.927(e)(2); Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2005) (a medical source opinion that Plaintiff is disabled or unable to work is an issue reserved for the ALJ).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, including whether a claimant is disabled, as administrative findings rather than medical opinions.

Trepanier v. Comm'r of Social Security Admin. · filed 2018-11-13(d)(1)

This rule does not apply, however, to administrative findings, which are “reserved to the Commissioner.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). As section 404.1527(d)(1) of the regulations provides, “[o]pinions on some issues . . . are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.” The regulation explains that the Commissioner is responsible for making a determination about whether a claimant “meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). See Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34471 (July 2, 1996) (“[S]ome issues are not medical issues regarding the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s) but are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case. The following are examples of such issues: . . . Whether an individual is ‘disabled’ under the Act.”). A bald statement that a claimant is “disabled” represents an administrative finding, not a medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (d)(3) treat a claimant’s ability to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner and do not give controlling weight to a medical source’s opinion on that issue.

Kestel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2018-11-29(d)(1), (d)(3)

Moreover, we note that final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s ability to work is an issue reserved to the commissioner, and thus Dr. Ward’s opinion regarding Kestel’s perceived inability to work is not entitled to any controlling weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Sections 404.1527(c) and (d) direct the ALJ to weigh medical opinions using factors such as supportability and consistency while treating residual-functional-capacity conclusions as issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Howard v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2019-03-08(c), (d)

In determining the appropriate weight to give a medical opinion, the ALJ considers -- among other things -- these factors: (1) the examining relationship, (2) the treatment relationship, (3) whether the opinion is well-supported, and (4) whether the opinion is consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). ... Moreover, to the extent that Dr. Teschner and Dr. Wilson sought to define Claimant’s functional limitations, those opinions are entitled to no weight because Claimant’s RFC is a legal conclusion reserved for the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is unable to work, do not merit special significance.

Manuel v. Berryhill · filed 2019-05-15(d)

As the ALJ correctly noted, most of the treating physician’s opinions consist of general statements that Manuel is unable to work, which are issues reserved to the Commissioner that do not merit “any special significance.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions about whether a claimant can work, the claimant’s RFC, and vocational factors as administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner, so the ALJ must evaluate them with the other evidence and retain the ultimate disability determination.

JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2019-06-21(d)

Opinions on issues such as whether the claimant is unable to work, the claimant’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors, “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of the case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); see Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1986). Although a claimant may provide a statement containing a treating physician’s opinion of his remaining capabilities, the ALJ must evaluate such a statement in light of the other evidence presented and the ALJ must make the ultimate determination of disability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as administrative determinations reserved to the Commissioner, so they are not medical opinions entitled to controlling weight.

REED-SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2019-06-20(d)(1)

Therefore, a treating professional’s opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not a “medical opinion” and is not entitled controlling weight because whether the claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act is an administrative opinion reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so it is not a medical opinion entitled to special significance, although the Commissioner must consider it.

Brooks-Harris v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2019-07-16(a)(1), (d)

For disability claims filed prior to March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 establishes the process for evaluation of medical opinions in disability cases. Not all opinions qualify as “medical opinions.” Only opinions that are “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s impairment(s)], including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical and mental restrictions” are considered medical opinions. Id. at § 404.1527(a)(1). An “acceptable medical source” refers to a several types of medical and mental health professionals, including physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). However, where a medical source offers an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as the assertion that a claimant is disabled or “unable to work,” it does not qualify as a “medical opinion” for purposes of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) and is not to be assigned any special significance when reviewed. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d). ... The Court finds the “Discontinue RETURN TO WORK” is an opinion regarding an issue reserved to the Commissioner, i.e. whether a claimant is disabled or capable of performing work, as Brooks-Harris concedes. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the regulations contemplate that such an opinion will be considered by the Commissioner, the Court find’s the ALJ’s decision not to explicitly address or discuss the phrase was, at worst, harmless error.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that the claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability.

Wennet v. Saul · filed 2019-06-27(d)(1)

“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(3) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to the source of an opinion on that issue.

Nance v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-07-18(d)(1)-(3)

As a general matter, the ALJ properly granted little weight to Dr. Sims’s opinions that Nance is disabled and cannot perform her occupational duties because those are legal determinations reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Thus, the ALJ did not err by giving them little weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (“We will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner. . . .”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) permits an ALJ to reject a treating physician’s conclusory statement about a claimant’s ability to work because that determination is reserved to the ALJ.

Balbas v. Saul · filed 2019-07-30(d)(1)

Further, even if Arcelia B.’s treating physicians had placed work limitations on her, when evaluating medical evidence, the ALJ does not have to accept conclusory statements made by a treating physician about a patient’s ability to work because the determination of a claimant’s ability to work is reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a finding of disability or inability to work as an issue reserved for the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Greenlaw v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-07-31(d)

This is correct. A finding of disability or inability to work is not a medical opinion and is reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Where there are no functional limitations, there is nothing to weigh.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner as non-medical opinions, and § 404.1527(d)(3) means they are not entitled to any weight.

Jacobs v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-08-15(d), (d)(3)

As an initial matter, and as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Wilson’s opinion that Jacobs is not capable of working is not a medical opinion, but is instead a legal issue reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Coheley v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 707 Fed. Appx. 656, 659 (11th Cir. 2017); Hutchison v. Astrue, 408 Fed. Appx. 324, 327 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that an opinion regarding whether a claimant “could hold a job is a vocational opinion, not a medical one” and is a “question reserved to the ALJ”); see also R. at. As such, that opinion is not entitled to any weight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3), and the ALJ did not err by discounting it.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the ALJ rather than a medical opinion.

(SS)Manzano v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-19(d)(2)

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but is an issue to be decided by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.920(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) means that an ALJ need not give controlling or special significance to a doctor’s opinion that a claimant is disabled because disability determinations are reserved to the Commissioner.

Jaber v. SSA, Commissioner of · filed 2019-08-22(d)(1)

Fundamentally, this objection is unfounded because it is well established, as ALJ Tobin acknowledged in her Opinion, that an ALJ need not give “controlling weight” or even “special significance” to a doctor’s conclusion that a plaintiff is disabled from all work “ [b]ecause these are administrative findings that may determine whether an individual is disabled, [and] they are reserved to the Commissioner.” Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 727 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner, so a medical source's opinion that the claimant is disabled does not require a favorable disability determination.

Meade v. Saul · filed 2019-08-23(d)

Indeed, only the Commissioner has the authority to determine “whether the claimant ultimately meets the statutory definition of disabled.” Brown v. Comm’r, 873 F.3d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)). An examining source’s opinion that the claimant is disabled does not obligate the ALJ to “make a favorable disability determination.” Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats the determination of whether a claimant is disabled as an administrative issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Miller v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-23(d)(1)

The ALJ was correct that a finding of disability is an administrative matter reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats the determination of residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Walpole v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-26(e)

The determination of RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the Commissioner’s RFC finding.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves disability determinations to the Commissioner and gives no special significance to medical-source opinions on reserved issues; subsection (d)(2) reserves final responsibility for RFC and vocational-factor determinations to the Commissioner.

Pritchett v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-08-28(d)(2)

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), the determination of whether an individual is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner, and no special significance will be given to an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner. Section (d)(2) provides that although the Commissioner will consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as the RFC and the application of vocational factors, the final responsibility for deciding those issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ evaluating medical opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner to apply the listed regulatory factors and clearly state the legal rules applied and the weight assigned to the evidence.

Howell v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-30(d)

In evaluating medical opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ must apply the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). The ALJ must clearly state the legal rules that he applies and the weight that he accords the evidence considered.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as comments on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than medical opinions entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Kyser v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-30(e)

Even if a treating source determined that Plaintiff was “disabled” and unable to work, such an opinion would not be conclusive of Plaintiff's disability status because statements from a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are not medical opinions, but rather comments on a determination reserved to the Commissioner and therefore, not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves determinations about whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner, so an ALJ may give a doctor's statements on those issues no weight.

Bailey v. Berryhill · filed 2019-09-04(d)

The ALJ explained that the issues of whether Plaintiff is disabled and unable to work are reserved to the Commissioner and, thus, the ALJ gave these statements no weight. ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); ... “Statements by medical sources that a patient is disabled, unable to work, or meets the listing requirements are not medical issues, but are administrative findings reserved for the Commissioner.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats classification of a claimant's residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Stacy Lee Melican, Claimant v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant · filed 2019-09-09(d)(2)

Even if Welch’s sedentary designation could be considered a medical opinion, classification of an RFC as “sedentary” is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) says that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability; the final responsibility is reserved to the Commissioner, and the source gets no special significance on reserved issues.

Stonerock v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-10(e)(1)-(3)

The pertinent regulation says that “a statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). That’s not the same thing as saying that such a statement is improper and therefore to be ignored, as is further made clear when the regulation goes on to state that “the final responsibility for deciding” residual functional capacity (ability to work—and so whether the applicant is disabled) “is reserved to the Commissioner.” § 404.1527(e)(2) (emphasis added). And “we will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” § 404.1527(e)(3) (emphasis added).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) treats the ultimate determination of whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Mojica v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-11(e)(1)

Although in April 2014, Dr. Mejia checked off a box indicating that Bonilla Mojica was “temporarily unemployable,” the ALJ gave this opinion “no weight,” because “a statement from a medical source that a person is disabled or unable to work is not binding on me. The final responsibility for deciding the ability to work is reserved to the Commissioner.” R. 46. The ALJ did not err as to this evaluation. See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[S]ome kinds of findings — including the ultimate finding of whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work — are ‘reserved to the Commissioner.’”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) permits an ALJ to give no special significance to an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, but a provider's statements about vocational factors do not negate the provider's detailed opinions about functional limitations.

Saluskin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-13(d)

The ALJ need not give any special significance to an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as an opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). But Dr. Andersen’s opinion included detailed opinions about plaintiff’s functional limitations, including difficulties with concentration, memory, fund of knowledge, need for supervision and instruction, judgment, stress tolerance, ability to engage in appropriate behavior in a workplace and more. Tr. 230. The fact that she also included statements on vocational factors does not negate her entire opinion. This was not a valid reason to reject her opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) means that an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner cannot receive special significance, but it must still be evaluated against the full record and weighed under the applicable factors.

Coca v. Social Security Administration · filed 2019-09-13(d)

While the ALJ correctly noted that an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner is not entitled to any special significance, he erred by then rejecting that opinion outright without first (1) demonstrating that he evaluated all the evidence in the case record to determine the extent to which that opinion was supported by the record as a whole, and (2) applying the applicable factors for weighing the opinions of medical sources on issues reserved to the Commissioner, principally the consistency of Dr. Cardenas’s opinions with the record as a whole.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that opinions about whether a claimant is disabled concern an issue reserved to the Commissioner and receive no special significance based on their source.

Reyna v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-16(d)(1), (d)(3)

However, opinions that Plaintiff would be a good candidate for social security disability benefits involves vocational considerations and are issues reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). ... It is the Commissioner’s responsibility to determine whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. Cottrell v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-702-FPG, 2016 WL 4523187, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016) (citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (“We will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats whether a claimant is disabled or able to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s opinion on that issue may be given little weight.

Lyde v. Saul · filed 2019-09-18(d)

The ALJ gave good reasons for assigning “little weight” to Dr. Schaffner’s opinion. (R. 31–32.) First, Dr. Schaffner’s opinion that Plaintiff would not be able to work full time is a determination of disability reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a treating-source opinion on that issue receives no special significance and inconsistent functional limitations need not be adopted.

TUTTLE v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER · filed 2019-09-20(d)

An ALJ need not accept the opinion of a treating source that a claimant’s impairments are “disabling” or adopt functional limitations that are supportably deemed inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (whether a claimant is disabled is an issue reserved to the commissioner with respect to which even the opinion of a treating source is given no special significance); Campagna v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-cv-00521-JDL, 2017 WL 5037463, at *4 (D. Me. Nov. 3, 2017) (rec. dec., aff’d Jan. 2, 2018) (“inconsistency with other substantial evidence of record” constitutes a good reason for affording a treating source opinion little or no weight).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the ultimate determination of disability to the Commissioner, so a treating doctor's statement that a claimant is disabled is not binding on the ALJ.

Patterson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-20(d)

Second, Dr. Nation’s opinion was conclusory and on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. The ultimate finding of whether Plaintiff was disabled and cannot work is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). “That means that the Social Security Administration considers the data that physicians provide but draws its own conclusions as to whether those data indicate disability. A treating physician's statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.” ... Therefore, the ALJ did not err in affording the determinations of Dr. Nation’s statement little weight, because a doctor’s opinion regarding the disability of a plaintiff is not binding on the ALJ.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats a medical opinion that a claimant cannot work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a dispositive opinion on disability.

Horn v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-23(e)

Further, to the extent Dr. Parikh believed Plaintiff could not work at any job, that statement goes to the ultimate determination of disability, which is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) and SSR 96–5p. The ALJ did not disregard the basis for Dr. Parikh’s opinion, but carefully reviewed all of the evidence supporting the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as opinions on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not medical opinions entitled to deference.

Gray v. SSA · filed 2019-09-25(d)

Here, Dr. Gupta’s opinion that Gray was disabled, (Tr. 956), is not a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Additionally, the Court finds that Dr. Gupta’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work more than four hours per day, (Tr. 956), is, similarly, not a medical opinion as it is merely another way of restating that Gray was disabled and unable to work. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App’x 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Dr. Wright’s statement that Turner was not ‘currently capable of a full-time 8-hour workload’ was simply an alternate way of restating his opinion that Turner was ‘unable to work.’ It was thus an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner and was not entitled to any deference.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source's opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant meets the statutory definition of disability.

Hatch-Heitzman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-26(d)(1)

A medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” does not require the ALJ to determine the claimant meets the definition of disability. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d)(1); 416.927(d)(1). It was reasonable for the ALJ to reject this portion of Dr. Gilmore’s opinion on this basis.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) treats opinions about whether a claimant can find or keep a job as addressing an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so such opinions are not entitled to special deference.

Bentley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-09-26(d)(3)

Dr. Oblena’s opinion that Bentley would have difficulty finding and keeping a job pertains to an issue reserved for the Commissioner, thus the ALJ properly discounted it on that basis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3); see SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not entitled to any special weight of deference).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 provides that an ALJ will not give special significance to the source of an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled.

Pearson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-09-26

SSA regulations state that the ALJ “will not give any special ... significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner” such as whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider an opinion addressing an issue reserved for the Commissioner, although the opinion may be given little weight when it is too vague to assess function-by-function capacity.

Hodges v. Saul · filed 2019-10-11(d)(1), (2)

An ALJ must still consider the opinion. Id.; see also Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). But the court does not read the ALJ’s decision as discounting Dr. Gorelick’s opinion simply because it was offered on an opinion reserved for the Commissioner. Rather, the ALJ said she was giving Dr. Gorelick’s opinion only “slight weight” because “it is too vague to assist in development of a function-by-function residual capacity.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not mean the claimant will be determined disabled.

Zell v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-10-22(d)(1)

The forms contain no substantive explanations from treating sources of the conclusory information listed, some of which addresses matters reserved to the Commissioner. ... see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); 416.927(d)(1) (same); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Moreover, some kinds of findings—including the ultimate finding of whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work—are reserved to the Commissioner.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The forms thus do not constitute new and material evidence that could affect the outcome of the Commissioner’s final determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled, because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Czerwiec v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-10-22(d)(1)

In this factual context, the opinion that plaintiff was “unemployable” was factually inconsistent with mild depression as well as legally reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); 416.927(d)(1) (same); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Moreover, some kinds of findings—including the ultimate finding of whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work—are reserved to the Commissioner.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled, because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Wisniewski v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-10-30(d)(1)

Nor did the ALJ err in observing the letters from Dr. Giedt did not contain functional limitations. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A treating physician’s evaluation of a patient’s ability to work may be useful or suggestive of useful information, but a treating physician ordinarily does not consult a [VE] or have the expertise of one. An impairment is a purely medical condition. . . . The law reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner. Rejection of the treating physician’s opinion on ability to perform any remunerative work does not by itself trigger a duty to contact the physician for more explanation.”) (quoted and cited sources omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats statements about the nature and severity of an impairment as medical opinions, while reserving opinions on whether a claimant is disabled or able to work to the Commissioner.

Embry v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2019-11-01(a)(1), (d)

While Dr. Menzel’s belief Embry is unable to work and should be considered for disability are issues reserved to the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) (identifying opinions on issues reserved to Commissioner), 416.927(d) (same), her statements regarding Embry’s apraxia and lack of insight and judgment, including her prognosis regarding these deficits, reflect a judgment about the nature and severity of Embry’s impairment and, as such, constitute a medical opinion, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1) (defining “medical opinion”), 416.927(a)(1) (same).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (d)(3) treat statements on whether a claimant is disabled as administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner, so they are not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Ramsey v. Saul · filed 2019-11-12(d)(1), (d)(3)

A statement from a medical provider that Plaintiff is “unable to work” is not considered to be a medical opinion; rather, it is an administrative finding that would be dispositive of a case, and is therefore an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) and (3); SSR 96-5p, available at 1996 WL 374183 at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1)-(3) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not decide disability, the final responsibility remains with the Commissioner, and the source receives no special significance for that opinion.

Westfall v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-11-20(e)(1)-(3)

The pertinent regulation says that “a statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that you are disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). ... And “we will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3). ... Thus, the fact that Dr. Menendez provided his opinion about Plaintiff’s inability to work does not properly serve as a ground for placing little weight on Dr. Menendez’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) says that an opinion that a claimant is disabled is not itself a medical opinion but still must be considered with the medical findings and other evidence supporting it.

Anderson v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2019-12-26(d)

Although an opinion that a plaintiff is disabled is not a medical opinion under the Social Security Act, the ALJ still must consider the opinion along with “all the other medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source’s statement that [plaintiff] is disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives no special significance to a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is unable to work because the ultimate issue of ability to work is reserved to the Commissioner.

Bautista v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2019-12-30(d)(3)

Moreover, the ALJ properly gave little weight to PMHNP Rutland’s letter because “the issue of whether the claimant is able to work is one reserved to the Commissioner.” Tr. 22. As such, a statement by a medical source that a claimant is “unable to work” will not be given “any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3); 416.927(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats opinions about whether a claimant is disabled as administrative issues reserved to the Commissioner, rather than medical opinions that determine disability.

Rodriquez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-07(d)

“Opinions on some issues, such as [an opinion as to disability], are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats determinations of whether a claimant is disabled or meets a listing as issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Bartram v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-08(d)

Second, Dr. Perachio did not provide an opinion regarding whether Plaintiff was “disabled” or “not disabled” or whether he met a listing. Therefore, she did not address an issue reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that whether a claimant is disabled is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Hasberry v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-01-08(d)(1)

The point is irrelevant because the issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats an RFC determination as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner.

Bassett v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-10(d)(2)

The “final responsibility” for decision issues such as an individual’s RFC “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires the ALJ to consider medical-source opinions about functioning but reserves the final RFC determination to the Commissioner, who must assess it from the record as a whole.

Ido v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-07(d)(2)

The ALJ extensively discussed Dr. Sherban’s treatment notes and properly gave “little weight” to his opinion on the administrative issue of disability. Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”); Breinin v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-01166 (LEK TWD), 2015 WL 7749318, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7738047 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015) (“It is the ALJ’s job to determine a claimant’s RFC, and not to simply agree with a physician’s opinion.”). An ALJ considers medical opinions as to a claimant’s level of functioning, but he must ultimately reach an RFC assessment based on the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) Additionally, as the ALJ explained, Dr. Sherban’s opinions were not supported by the objective evidence documenting largely mild neck and shoulder findings and no notable lumbar impairments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 distinguishes medical opinions—judgments about impairment severity and functional limits—from conclusory statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work, which are issues reserved to the Commissioner and need not receive treating-physician-rule consideration.

McNaughton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-14(a)(1), (d)

Moreover, and significantly, those conclusory assessments addressed an issue reserved solely for the Commissioner and the ALJ was not required to discuss them pursuant to the treating physician rule. ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (stating that “statement[s] by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” are not “medical opinions” as defined by the regulations, but are instead “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner”). ... The regulations define “medical opinions” as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [a claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [a claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1), 416.927(a)(1). ... Here, the records cited by McNaughton are more accurately described as treatment notes than medical opinions. ... Therefore, the records do not qualify as medical opinions, and the ALJ did not err in failing to discuss Waghmarae’s notes cited by McNaughton.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 excludes opinions that conclude a claimant is disabled or unable to work, or assess the claimant’s RFC, from the definition of medical opinions because those issues are reserved to the Commissioner.

Armstrong v. Berryhill · filed 2020-01-21(d)

To be clear, opinions that (1) conclude that a claimant is disabled or unable to work due to impairments or (2) assess a claimant’s RFC “are not medical opinions” under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner.

Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-22(e)(1)

As an initial matter, this determination is reserved exclusively to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats disability determinations as issues reserved to the Commissioner and bars giving special significance to a medical source’s opinion on such an issue.

Brown v. Berryhill · filed 2020-01-24(d)

Determinations as to whether a plaintiff is disabled “are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). ... Therefore, the ALJ did not err by failing to give special significance to Dr. Henry’s conclusion that plaintiff could not work. Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats statements about whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, rather than medical opinions entitled to special significance.

Liseo v. Berryhill · filed 2020-01-27(d)

Determinations as to whether a plaintiff is disabled “are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). “A statement by a medical source that [a plaintiff is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine that [the plaintiff is] disabled.” Id. The ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” Id. The ALJ therefore did not err in rejecting Rehabilitation Services’ determination that plaintiff was disabled.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a treating physician’s opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is unable to work or the claimant’s residual functional capacity, is not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-27(d)

A treating physician’s opinion on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is unable to work or their residual functional capacity, is not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats statements that a claimant is disabled or cannot work as issues reserved to the Commissioner and gives them no special significance.

Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-12-16(d)

As stated in the regulations, a physician’s statement that an individual is or is not disabled or that he can or cannot work is a statement on an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not entitled to any special significance. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that the claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability.

(SS) Paxton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-11(d)(1)

Additionally, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Fine’s July 2016 opinion that Plaintiff was permanently disabled. AR 64, 387. Dr. Fine’s opinion of permanent disability, including Plaintiff's inability to work, is an issue reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability.... A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats statements about a claimant’s ability to work as opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, not medical opinions entitled to controlling weight.

Davidson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-06(d)(2)

Statements about ability to work are opinions on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not medical opinions, and cannot be accorded controlling weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so the ALJ need not rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion when formulating the RFC.

Payne v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-18(d)(2)

To the extent that plaintiff’s is arguing that the ALJ erred by crafting his own RFC rather than relying on a medical opinion, his point is rejected. The ALJ “must consider the entire record, but the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician's opinion or choose between the opinions. . . .” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). The determination of RFC is an administrative finding that is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats the determination of disability as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

Stovall-Arbertha v. The Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-18(d)

Although Plaintiff argues that her doctors’ opinions establish her disability, ECF 17 at 2, 8, the ultimate issue of disability is a determination reserved to the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (explaining that the determination of disability is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, and not a medical opinion).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ evaluating medical opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner to apply the listed factors.

Frey v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2020-02-19(d)

In evaluating medical opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ must apply the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability; it addresses an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight.

Stover v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-25(d)(1)

The ALJ properly gave little weight to this conclusory opinion because it was non-specific and addressed an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 423 F. Supp. 2d 77 (WDNY 2006) (“A treating source’s statement that a plaintiff is ‘disabled,’ however, is not considered a ‘medical opinion’ under the treating physician's rule, and is not entitled to controlling weight because it represents an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.”); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(1) ("A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that you are. disabled.”) Moreover, even if the ALJ had credited Dr. Rachala’s statements in the parking permit application, those statements would have been insufficient to render a finding of disability under the Act.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats the determination of a claimant's residual functional capacity as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner.

Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-27(d)(2)

To the extent that plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ erred by crafting his own RFC rather than relying on a medical opinion, her point is rejected. The ALJ “must consider the entire record, but the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician's opinion or choose between the opinions. . . .” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). The determination of RFC is an administrative finding that is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) permits an ALJ to decline controlling weight for a treating physician's opinion on the ultimate issue of disability because that opinion is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner.

Barraza v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2020-02-24(d)

For example, an ALJ may decline to give controlling weight where the treating physician has simply proffered opinions on the ultimate issue of disability—i.e., whether or not a claimant can work—because such opinions are not medical opinions, but rather are administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the legal determination of disability to the Social Security Administration, so a medical opinion that a claimant cannot work is not itself a legal finding of disability.

Padilla v. Berryhill · filed 2020-02-28(d)

A medical opinion indicating disability or an inability to work is not equivalent to a legal finding of disability. ... Only Defendant (the Social Security Administration) has the power to make such a disability determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a statement that a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so it does not require the ALJ to give that statement weight or special significance.

LINN v. BERRYHILL · filed 2020-02-28(d)(1)

To be clear, the ultimate decision of disability as it relates to social security claims is reserved solely for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, 416.927. Thus, the ALJ was not required to give this opinion any weight or special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats an RFC assessment as a decision reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion and does not require a physician’s opinion.

Washington v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-03-06(d)(2)

The RFC assessment is not a medical opinion, it is a decision on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); see also Langley, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 1252–58. The Commissioner will consider medical evidence on the subject, but the rules do not say that the Commissioner must obtain a physician’s opinion to make an RFC assessment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant can work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a medical source's opinion on that issue is not entitled to special significance.

(SS) Green v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-13(d)(1)

Whether a claimant can work competitively is an issue reserved specifically to the Commissioner, and a physician’s opinion on this issue is not entitled to special significance. ... Therefore, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Bryan’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work full-time.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” as not a medical opinion and reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner.

Apodaca v. Saul · filed 2020-03-16(d)(1)

A medical source opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not a medical opinion and the ALJ is not required to determine that the claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(1). The determination of disability is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. S.S.R. 96-5p. Therefore, the ALJ reasonably gave that portion of Dr. Kopp’s opinion little weight. Tr. 439.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, which the ALJ may reject.

Adamczyk, Sr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-17(d)(1)

I agree that ALJ Baird was entitled to reject the conclusory statements found throughout the medical records concerning plaintiff’s degree of disability (i.e. “moderate”, “marked”, “total”, along with various percentages) made in the context of plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. See Taylor v. Barnhart, 83 Fed. Appx. 347 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Dr. Desai’s opinion that Taylor was ‘temporarily totally disabled’ is not entitled to any weight, since the ultimate issue of disability is reserved for the Commissioner.”); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1527 (statement by a medical source that a plaintiff is “disabled” or “unable to work” are examples of “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner”). Accordingly, ALJ Baird was entitled to reject Dr. Capicotto’s opinions concerning plaintiff’s degree or percentage of disability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats an opinion that a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, gives it no special significance based on its source, but still requires the ALJ to explain the consideration given to it.

Hughes v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-17(d), (d)(3)

Indeed, under the Regulations, opinions that an individual is disabled are not medical opinions “but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Accordingly, the Social Security Administration does “not give any special significance to the source of an opinion reserved to the Commissioner …” even when that source is a treating physician. Id. § 404.1527(d)(3); ... But that does not mean an ALJ can ignore the opinion; “While controlling weight will not be provided to a treating physician's opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ still must ‘explain the consideration given to the treating source's opinion(s).’” ... In the present case, ALJ Sanders adequately explained the consideration given to Dr. Akhter’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine whether the claimant is disabled, which is an issue for the Commissioner.

(SS) Hudson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-20(d)(1)

Second, Dr. Lieberman’s statement that plaintiff qualified for the subsequent injury fund, to the extent that it is relevant at all, is a statement on the ultimate issue of disability which is not binding on the Commissioner. AR 22, 404; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“a statement by a medical source that you are “disabled” or “unable to work” does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”)

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner.

Mallard v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-23(d)(1)

As the ALJ correctly explained, “the issue of disability or inability to work is reserved to the Commissioner.” Tr. 20; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) treats a statement that a claimant is unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight or special significance.

Mackey v. Saul · filed 2020-03-24(d)(1) and (3)

Moreover, the ALJ is correct that a statement from a medical provider that Plaintiff is “unable to work” is not considered to be a medical opinion; rather, it is an administrative finding that would be dispositive of a case, and is therefore an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) and (3); SSR 96-5p, available at 1996 WL 374183 at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance.”). Thus, the ALJ did not err to the extent he disregarded Dr. Colby’s opinion specifically as to Plaintiff's capacity to maintain employment; however, this is not a specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to reject the specific functional limitations opined by Dr. Colby in his medical opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a statement that a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Quintana v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-24(d)

First, Dr. Pérez’s statement of “disability” does not constitute a medical opinion because the issue of disability is a finding reserved solely to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Sneed-Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-25(d)(1)

First, regarding Dr. Poitier’s opinions that Plaintiff is now permanently and totally disabled and is unable to work, the Court finds that this opinion is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(1) (finding that medical source opinions reserved to the Commissioner include opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work.). Therefore, The ALJ properly afforded no weight to Dr. Poitier’s May 6, 2015 and September 17, 2016 opinions that Plaintiff is permanently disabled and unable to work.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats issues reserved to the Commissioner, such as residual functional capacity, as generally not entitled to special significance in evaluating medical opinions.

Akner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-25(d)

Commissioner also reserves the power to decide certain issues, such as a claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the ALJ will consider opinions of treating physicians “on the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s),” opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are generally not entitled to special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Bass, 499 F.3d at 511.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical opinion entitled to special significance.

Hingey v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-27(d)

“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” is “an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner,” is “not [a] medical opinion[],” and is not due “any special significance” regardless of the source of the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability, which is reserved to the Commissioner.

Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-30(e)(1)

The ALJ properly rejected the cryptic statements on the FMLA certification form. There is no evidence as to who prepared the FMLA form. Furthermore, even if Dr. Mahany had prepared the certification, the ALJ would not be bound by the doctor’s conclusion that plaintiff was unable to work up to a “lifetime”. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) (“[a] statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that you are disabled’). Such statements, by even a treating physician, constitute a legal conclusion that is not binding on the Commissioner. Crisp v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 790 F.2d. 450, 452 (6th Cir. 1986). The determination of disability is the prerogative of the Commissioner, not the treating physician. See Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) excludes opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work from medical opinions and gives them no special weight because disability is reserved to the Commissioner.

JONES v. SAUL · filed 2020-04-06(d)(1), (3)

A treating physician’s opinions that a claimant is unable to work and is necessarily disabled would not be entitled to any special weight or deference, however. The regulations expressly exclude such a disability opinion from the definition of a medical opinion because it is an issue reserved to the Commissioner and a medical source is not given “any special significance” with respect to issues reserved to the Commissioner, such as disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats opinions on whether a claimant is disabled as administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner rather than medical opinions subject to the treating physician rule.

Monter v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-04-08(d)(1)

As section 404.1527(d)(1) of the regulations provides, “[o]pinions on some issues ... are not medical opinions ... but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.” The regulation explains that the Commissioner is responsible for making a determination about whether a claimant “meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). See Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34471 (July 2, 1996) (“[S]ome issues are not medical issues regarding the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s) but are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case. The following are examples of such issues: ... Whether an individual is ‘disabled’ under the Act.”). A bald statement that a claimant is “disabled” represents an administrative finding, not a medical opinion. Because Dr. Barnes’s statements were administrative findings and not medical opinions, the ALJ was not obligated to assess the statements under the treating physician rule.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a residual functional capacity determination as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than as a medical opinion.

(SS)Stetson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-04-15(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining residual functional capacity).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled, including the claimant’s ultimate ability to work, as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Esterline v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-04-20(d)(1)

The ALJ committed no error, though, in rejecting Dr. Ernst’s opinion that plaintiff “would not be able to hold gainful employment.” AR 846. The ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Ernst had no established expertise with vocational factors or social security disability regulations, and plaintiff’s ultimate ability to work is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical source's opinion on whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner and gives it no special significance.

Marler v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-05-04(d)

However, even were it to be construed as an opinion, first, as explained by the Magistrate Judge, a finding of disability is reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Dr. Kooistra provides no other additional information within those notes regarding functional limitations related to such a finding, nor is there any clarifying information to support this observation or opinion, to the extent that is what Dr. Kooistra meant to opine. Even were this Court to construe this an opinion that the ALJ should have weighed, the regulations direct an ALJ not to afford any “special significance” to an issue reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) provides that medical-source opinions on issues such as residual functional capacity are considered, but the final responsibility for deciding those issues rests with the Commissioner.

Benzo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-05-08(d)(2)

An ALJ considers medical opinions as to a claimant’s level of functioning, but he or she must ultimately reach an RFC assessment based on the record as awhole. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as. . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not rely entirely on any particular physician’s opinion.

Alimorong v. Saul · filed 2020-05-11(d)

But the determination of a claimant’s RFC is a matter for the ALJ alone to decide. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (the final responsibility for determining your RFC is reserved to the commissioner); Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, including whether a claimant is disabled, are not entitled to controlling weight as medical opinions.

ZACHARY v. SAUL · filed 2020-01-29(d)

The ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. McGrath’s opinions that Plaintiff qualified as disabled. As recognized by the ALJ, Dr. McGrath’s disability opinions concern dispositive matters reserved to the Commissioner and, as a result, did not warrant controlling weight, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) provides that a physician’s statement that a claimant is unable to work, is disabled, or has a particular residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion entitled to special significance.

George v. Berryhill · filed 2020-01-31(e)(1)

The determination whether a claimant is able to work is a legal conclusion reserved to the Commissioner. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) (A physician’s statement that a claimant is not able to work, is disabled, or has a particular RFC, is not entitled to any special significance, because it is not a medical opinion.).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than as a medical opinion.

King v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2020-01-31(d)(1)

Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the ultimate determination of whether a claimant is disabled and unable to work to the Commissioner, so statements reaching that determination are not binding.

Vitko v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-01-31(d)

The ultimate finding of whether a plaintiff is disabled and cannot work is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Case law is clear that statements which invade the Commissioner’s role to determine whether plaintiff is disabled are not determinative or binding.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats opinions on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner and gives them no special significance based on the source.

Chatman v. Saul · filed 2020-02-05(d)(1), (d)(3)

That such a statement might come from a treating source is immaterial, as the Commissioner “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner…” Id. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not require the ALJ to find the claimant disabled.

Dziuk v. Barnhart · filed 2003-05-01(e)(1)

However, the ALJ need not give controlling weight to a treating physician’s general conclusion that a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so it is not a medical opinion entitled to weight or special significance.

Zyla v. SSA · filed 2009-04-06(e)(1), (e)(3)

The term “medical opinions” refers to “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). But, the category of “medical opinions” does not include a medical source’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). Rather, such a statement addresses an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and the ALJ need “not give any special significance” to i t . See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3). ... Here, the statement by D r . Cooney on which claimant relies is not a medical opinion; it is a statement about an issue reserved to the Commissioner. Thus, the ALJ was not obligated to give it any weight, or explain the reasons for giving it the weight he did.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A medical source statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not by itself require the agency to find the claimant disabled.

Hartline v. Astrue · filed 2009-03-31(e)(1)

According to Social Security Agency regulations, “[a] statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (e) provides that a medical-source statement that a person is disabled or unable to work is not conclusive and receives no special significance.

Joly v. Astrue · filed 2009-12-15(e)

A nurse practitioner is an “other source” whose opinion must be considered by the ALJ, SSR 06-03p, but a statement by a medical source that a person is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not conclusive and is entitled to no special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e), § 416.927(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) says that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not itself establish disability, because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-03(d)(1)

NP Lakin also opined that Plaintiff is “unable to work due to her symptoms and functional impairment.” AR 41. But whether Plaintiff is unable to work is an issue left solely to the Commissioner. ... see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”). NP Lakin’s conclusory opinion does not undermine the substantial evidence cited by the ALJ in support of his RFC determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) permits the Commissioner to disregard a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Lieu v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-09-19(d)(1)

Finally, the ALJ correctly disregarded Mr. Paul’s statement regarding Plaintiff’s fitness for work, sedentary or otherwise. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) permits medical evidence to be discounted when it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence.

Jones v. Barnhart · filed 2003-07-02(c)

Medical evidence may be discounted if it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to review all evidence relevant to a claim and make findings about what the evidence shows.

Butler v. Astrue · filed 2011-01-31(c)

An ALJ is required to “review all of the evidence relevant to [a] claim” and “make findings about what the evidence shows.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(b) requires the ALJ to consider all medical opinion evidence.

Tommasetti v. Astrue · filed 2008-07-17(b)

The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions using factors including the source’s specialization, the supporting data, and consistency with the record.

King v. Barnhart · filed 2004-06-01(d)(3), (d)(4), and (d)(5)

Having evaluated the evidence, the court holds that substantial evidence does not support the decision denying disability benefits. Improper legal standards were applied. 1) The ALJ failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Dr. Goff, stating he was not a treating psychologist. The ALJ ignored the fact that Dr. Goff is a highly qualified specialist (one of the reasons for deference giving in the Commissioner’s regulations). He also ignored the carefully complete testing Dr. Goff did, and the complete lack of contradiction of those test results in the record. 2) The ALJ failed to follow the standards for evaluating opinion evidence set in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider an opinion's supportability and consistency with the record, including when evaluating opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, although those opinions receive no special significance.

Lackey v. Barnhart · filed 2005-04-05(d) and (e)

Nevertheless, the ALJ must “evaluate all evidence in the case record that may have a bearing on the determination or decision of disability, including opinions from medical sources about issues reserved to the Commissioner.” SSR 96-5p, at *3. Thus, while § 404.1527(e) and SSR 96-5p constrain the evaluative process under § 404.1527(d), the ALJ must still assess “the extent to which the opinion is supported by the record” and, in doing so, “must apply the applicable factors” from § 404.1527(d). SSR 96-5p, at *3 (emphasis added). In particular, when assessing the probative value of an opinion under§ 404.1527(e), it remains “appropriate to consider the supportability of the opinion [ see § 404.1527(d)(3)] and its consistency with the record as a whole [ see § 404.1527(d)(4)].” SSR 96-5p, at *3.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to assess medical opinions using factors such as the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and specialization, while requiring only a minimally articulated good reason for the weight assigned to a treating source’s opinion.

Hinkston v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-03-06(c)

Pursuant to Agency regulations, a medical opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is from a treating source and is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” ... In determining the weight of medical source opinions not entitled to controlling weight, an ALJ will evaluate the following factors: the length, nature, and extent of treatment relationship; evidence in support of the opinion; consistency with the record as a whole; and the physician’s specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2010). ... The ALJ’s written decision, however, need not discuss or explain the reasoning regarding each of the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Instead, effectively, the ALJ need only minimally articulate a good reason(s) for the weight given to a treating source’s opinion. Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) directs an ALJ weighing a medical opinion to consider the examining relationship, the nature, extent, and length of the treating relationship, supporting explanations, consistency with the record as a whole, the source's specialization, and other relevant factors.

JOHNSON v. SAUL · filed 2022-04-13(c)(1)-(6)

The applicable Social Security regulations3 direct an ALJ to consider a number of factors in deciding what weight to accord a medical opinion. These factors include: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the nature and extent, and length of a treating relationship; (3) the supporting explanations provided for the opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the records as a whole; (5) the medical source’s specialization; and (6) any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a treating physician’s opinion is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or inconsistent with substantial evidence, it is not entitled to controlling weight but must still be weighed using the factors in § 404.1527(c).

Williams v. Saul · filed 2022-05-20(c)

If the treating physician’s opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, it is not entitled to controlling weight. ... In that event, the ALJ must consider the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) to determine what weight to accord the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider every medical opinion with the rest of the relevant evidence and to evaluate and explain its weight using the regulatory factors.

Mabry v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-19(b), (c)

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, such as Amina’s, the ALJ evaluates medical opinion evidence under the framework provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927. Under that framework, the ALJ is required to consider every medical opinion submitted, regardless of its source, “together with the rest of the relevant evidence” in the case record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b), (c), 416.927(b), (c). ... The ALJ also failed to properly “consider all of the [regulatory] factors in deciding the weight” he assigned to the opinions of Dr. Pradhan and Dr. Brauer. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (factors an ALJ will consider in weighing opinion evidence). That failure warrants remand as well.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to explain the weight given to medical opinions, but a treating physician’s opinion does not bind the ALJ on functional capacity and the ultimate disability and RFC determinations remain the ALJ’s responsibility.

CHUNG v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2024-03-28(d)(1)-(2), (e)(1), (f)(2)(ii)

The Court finds that the ALJ properly articulated his evaluation of the medical opinions under the pertinent regulations, and sufficiently explained “the weight given to physician opinions and the degree to which a claimant’s testimony is credited.” Chandler v. Commissioner of Social Security, 667 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii)); see also Candace D. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 23-01151, 2024 WL 913218, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2024) (“[A] treating source’s opinion will be given controlling weight only if the opinion ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’ A treating source’s conclusory medical opinions, however, will not be given controlling weight.” (quoting Houston v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1984))). ... Ultimately, “[a]lthough treating and examining physician opinions often deserve more weight than the opinions of doctors who review records . . . ‘[t]he law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.’” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2)) (quoting Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011)). ... Further, “[t]he ALJ — not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants — must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The regulation gives controlling weight to a treating physician's supported medical opinions, but not opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work, and leaves the final RFC determination to the Commissioner.

Ellis v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security Administration. · filed 2005-01-03(d)(2), (e)(1), and (e)(2)

Generally, an ALJ is obliged to give controlling weight to a treating physician's medical opinions that are supported by the record. See Randolph v. Barnhart, 386 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). A medical source opinion that an applicant is "disabled" or "unable to work," however, involves an issue reserved for the Commissioner and therefore is not the type of "medical opinion" to which the Commissioner gives controlling weight. See Stormo, 377 F.3d at 806 ("[T]reating physicians' opinions are not medical opinions that should be credited when they simply state that a claimant can not be gainfully employed, because they are merely opinions on the application of the statute, a task assigned solely to the discretion of the Commissioner." (internal marks omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). Further, although medical source opinions are considered in assessing RFC, the final determination of RFC is left to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2). Thus, to the extent that the ALJ discredited Dr. Johnson's conclusion that Ellis could not work, he rightly did so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives controlling weight to a well-supported treating physician’s medical opinion when it is consistent with other substantial evidence, but a source’s statement that a claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion entitled to controlling weight because disability is reserved to the Commissioner.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-04-03(d)(2), (e)

It is well-settled that the opinion of a treating physician is given controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. ... A treating source’s statement that a plaintiff “is disabled,” however, is not considered a “medical opinion” under the treating physician’s rule, and is not entitled to controlling weight because it represents an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e); 416.927(e) (“A statement by a medical source that you are disabled or unable to work does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical evidence and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not given special significance.

Thompson v. Astrue · filed 2011-08-10(d)(2), (d)(4), (e), (e)(3)

Under the “treating physician rule,” a treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical evidence and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). However, “if a physician’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.” ... Thus, Dr. Hughes’ letter more closely resembled an opinion on a matter reserved to the Commissioner than a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e) (“Opinions on some issues . . . are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.”). Such opinions are not afforded any special significance.