20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(c)(2) presumptively gives treating-source opinions greater weight and gives controlling weight only to opinions that are well-supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence; an ALJ must give good reasons for denying controlling weight.

Lehouillier v. Colvin · filed 2015-12-21(c)(2)

Under agency regulations, more weight is presumptively given to opinions from treating sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. This is so because treating physicians are most familiar with the claimant’s conditions and circumstances and thus best able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of the claimant’s medical issues. Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). At the same time, however, a treating physician’s statements are sometimes less credible because “many physicians . . . will often bend over backward to assist a patient in obtaining benefits.” Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006). For this reason, a treating source’s opinion is given controlling weight only when it is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. See id.; White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2005). ALJs are required to give “good reasons” for any decision not to award controlling weight to a treating source. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010). ... Still, the ALJ’s principal reason for not giving controlling weight to Dr. Floren’s “final report” is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ explained that Floren’s report from January 2012 contradicts his earlier assessments of Lehouillier’s condition and was given only to satisfy Lehouillier’s repeated demands for an opinion bolstering her claim for Social Security benefits.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician's medical opinion substantial or considerable weight unless good cause justifies giving it less weight.

Duvall v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2015-12-29(c)(2)

An ALJ must give the medical opinions of a treating physician, such as Dr. Sadek, “substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) requires controlling weight for a well-supported, consistent treating-source opinion; otherwise the ALJ must weigh it using the listed treatment, support, consistency, and specialty factors and give good reasons for the assigned weight.

Edwards v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2016-01-19(c)(2)-(6)

The agency’s regulations require that a treating source’s medical opinion concerning the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments be given “controlling weight” as long as it “[1] is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [2] is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record[.]” 20. C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). If a treating source’s opinion is not found controlling, the ALJ must determine the weight that it should be given based on a number of factors, including the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the “area of specialty and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant evidence.” ... As a procedural requirement, the ALJ must also provide “good reasons” for discounting the weight to be given to a treating source’s opinion. ... Review of the record as a whole reveals that the ALJ addressed the relevant evidence and provided adequate reasons for discounting the treating source opinions relied upon by Edwards in assessing her residual functional capacity for work-related activities.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires the Commissioner to weigh all medical opinions using factors including the examining and treatment relationships, supportability, and consistency, and to require supporting explanations for a non-examining physician's opinion.

Binnarr v. Colvin · filed 2016-01-21(c)

The ALJ is required to weigh the respective opinions of all of the expert witnesses in light of their examining relationship, treatment relationship, nature and extent of treatment relationship, supportability of the opinions in the medical record, and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). There is no indication that the ALJ weighed the competing testimony of Dr. Glaser and Dr. Saito in light of the standards set forth in the Treating Physician Rule. In particular, there is not the slightest suggestion in the ALJ’s decision that any weight was accorded to the opinions of Dr. Glaser because of his long-term treating and examining relationship and the special knowledge and insights he had acquired from his treatment of Plaintiff. The regulations further require that if weight is to be given to the opinions of a non-examining physician it must be based on the ‘supporting explanations.’ § 404.1527(c)(3). In this case, Dr. Saito provided no explanation of the basis of her opinions that Plaintiff could sit, stand and walk for six hours.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires deference to a treating physician’s opinion when it is well-supported and consistent with the record, but permits discounting it when unsupported and requires good reasons for the weight assigned.

Hudon v. SSA · filed 2016-01-26(d)(2)

The ALJ weighs the medical opinions “based on the nature of the medical source’s relationship with the claimant, the consistency of the opinion with the other record evidence, the medical source’s specialty, and other factors that may be brought to the ALJ’s attention.” Grant v. Colvin, 2015 DNH 59, 7 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)). The ALJ generally gives more weight to the opinion of a source who examined the claimant, and may give controlling weight to the claimant’s treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ should defer to a treating physician’s opinion insofar as it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [his] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The ALJ may, however, discount an opinion that is not so supported. See, e.g., Carrion v. Colvin, 2014 DNH 174, 6-8 (upholding ALJ’s decision to reject treating physician’s opinions as unsupported when claimant failed cite supporting record evidence). When the ALJ does so, he must “give good reasons . . . for the weight [he] give[s] to [the] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.

Knox v. Colvin · filed 2016-01-29(c)(2)

“A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Gieseke v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2014); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... Here, the opinions in question were inconsistent with the medical evidence and with the opinions of numerous treating and consulting physicians during the period in question: ... Based on this conflicting medical evidence, like the district court we conclude that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of Dr. Ahmad and Dr. Brown.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to always give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician's evaluation.

Nowling v. Colvin · filed 2016-02-22(d)(2)

The ALJ's superficial references to the GAF score and Nowling's "improvement" fail to satisfy the regulations' "require[ment] that the ALJ 'always give good reasons' for the weight afforded to a treating physician's evaluation." Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider specified factors, including the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors.

Harris v. Colvin · filed 2016-02-25(d)(2)

Where, as here, an ALJ declines to accord controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ “must consider various ‘factors’ to determine how much weight to give to the opinion[,]” id. (quoting '20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)), such as “(i) the frequency of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ii) the evidence in support of the treating physician’s opinion; (iii) the consistency of the opinion with the record a? a whole; (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Security Administration’s attention that tend to support or contradict the opinion.’ ” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to apply the regulatory factors and explain the weight assigned with specific, legitimate reasons.

Lopez v. Colvin · filed 2016-02-29(c)(2)

Second, if the treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must “make clear how much weight the opinion is being given (including whether it is being rejected outright) and give good reasons, tied to the factors specified in [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927] . . . for the weight assigned.” Id. ... The ALJ failed to ... apply the regulatory factors to Dr. Krause’s opinions, as required under the second step of the test and ... articulate a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting or discounting these opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. Thus, the ALJ did not “engag[e] in the proper legal analysis” and we must reverse.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating source's medical opinion substantial or considerable weight unless good cause exists.

Medina v. Social Security Administration · filed 2016-01-06(c)(2)

The ALJ is required to give the medical opinions of treating sources substantial or considerable weight absent good cause.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires controlling weight for a well-supported treating-source opinion that is not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires good reasons when the ALJ declines to give it controlling weight.

Brandi Gale Differ v SSA · filed 2016-03-11(d)(2)

The medical opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight when that opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. When an ALJ decides not to give controlling weight to the treating source’s opinion, he must give “good reasons” for the weight ascribed to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives a treating source's opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.

Michel v. Colvin · filed 2016-03-23(d)(2)

Relevant to the present case, the ALJ affords a treating source's opinion "controlling weight" if that opinion "'is well-supported by medically-acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the applicant's] record.'" Id. at 848–49 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). ... When a treating physician's opinion is in conflict with other substantial medical evidence, then the ALJ may afford less weight to that physician's opinion. Id. (citing Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2000)). ... Accordingly, we find that the ALJ considered Dr. Viner's opinions at great length and provided sufficient bases for the "little weight" afforded to those opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives greater weight to a treating source who has seen the claimant frequently, while opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not medical opinions and receive no weight.

Jutta Spies v. Colvin · filed 2016-05-05(c)(2)(i), (d)(1)

Regardless, the ALJ here discussed all of Dr. Webster’s opinions, and he provided good reasons for discounting them. See Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that ALJ must give good reason for rejecting treating physician’s opinion that is supported by medical evidence and “not inconsistent” with substantial evidence in record). First, Spies typically saw Dr. Webster just once a year. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (explaining that SSA gives greater weight to treating source who has seen claimant on frequent basis); Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)). ... And, finally, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Webster’s opinions were speculative and conclusory on issues that are reserved for the Commissioner. In the November 2013 “to whom it may concern” letter, Dr. Webster asserted that Spies could not work. But that opinion is not a medical opinion, and thus it was entitled to no weight, even coming from a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); Loveless, 810 F.3d at 507; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medical evidence and not inconsistent with the record; finding that the opinion is not well-supported alone merely removes controlling-weight status.

Salaz v. Colvin · filed 2016-05-31(c)(2), (d)(2)

The ALJ gave minimal weight to the treating physicians’ opinions on the basis that they were not well-supported by evidence in the record. However, finding that a treating physician’s opinions are not “well-supported” by medical evidence merely relieves the ALJ from having to give the physician’s opinions “controlling weight.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), (d)(2); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give good reasons for declining to give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, and permits discounting it for good cause when it is unsupported or inconsistent with the record.

Kent v. Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2016-06-07(c)(2)

In weighing medical opinions, the ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion “substantial or considerable weight” unless the ALJ articulates good cause for not doing so. Winschel v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (providing that the ALJ will give “good reasons” for not giving controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion). “Good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Marchese’s opinion amount to good cause and are supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to consider the regulatory factors and articulate good reasons for the weight assigned when a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight.

Camille v. Colvin · filed 2016-06-15(c)(2)

If a treating physician’s opinion is not afforded controlling weight, the ALJ must consider certain factors to determine how much weight to give it, and should articulate “good reasons” for the weight given. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) generally requires more weight to be given to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to the opinion of a source who has not.

Aurand v. Colvin · filed 2016-07-05(c)(1)

“Generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating-source opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.

Manning v. Colvin · filed 2016-04-19(c)(2)

The opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) requires an ALJ to give a well-supported, consistent treating-source opinion controlling weight or otherwise consider specified factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned.

Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2016-08-05(c)(2)–(6)

An ALJ must accord a treating source’s opinion controlling weight only if it is well-supported by objective clinical findings and consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); see also Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 652 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc). If an ALJ declines to bestow controlling-weight status on the opinion, he must still consider the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship along with the opinion’s supportability and consistency, the physician’s specialization, and any other pertinent factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)–(6), 416.927(c)(2)–(6). In the end, an ALJ must “give good reasons in [its] notice of determination or decision for the weight [it gives the claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating source’s opinion, and § 404.1527(c)(6) permits consideration of the source’s understanding of SSA disability programs and evidentiary requirements.

Quinn v. Colvin · filed 2016-08-10(c)(2), (c)(6)

An ALJ “will always give good reasons in [his or her] notice of determination or decision for the weight [he or she gives the plaintiffs] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... The consideration of a source’s “understanding of [the SSA’s] disability programs and their evidentiary requirements” is proper in according weight given to medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). ... Thus, it was appropriate for the ALJ to afford substantial, but not controlling, weight to Dr. Shields’ opinion regarding disability because Dr. Shields’ opinion was in relation to Workers’ Compensation, a separate, state agency. (Tr. 329).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to meaningfully explain the weight assigned to medical opinions by considering the regulatory factors, and it does not permit greater scrutiny of treating-source opinions.

Marks v. Colvin · filed 2016-08-19(c)

The ALJ makes no effort to specifically scrutinize the opinions of the record-reviewers and points to nothing in the record to support their warranting “great weight.” The ALJ’s conclusory assessment of the record-reviewers’ opinions thus erroneously fails to give a meaningful explanation of any of the required 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) factors, and evidences application of “greater scrutiny” to the opinions given by treating sources, a practice deemed error by the Sixth Circuit.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to determine the appropriate weight for a treating-source opinion by considering factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization.

O'Malley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2016-09-27(c)

Even if a treater’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires controlling weight for a treating source's opinion when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case.

Morder v. Colvin · filed 2016-10-24(c)(2)

Under applicable regulations and the law of the Third Circuit, a treating medical source’s opinions are generally entitled to controlling weight, or at least substantial weight. See, e.g., Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001)(citing 20 CFR § 404.1527(c)(2); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)). Oftentimes referred to as the “treating physician rule”, this principle is codified at 20 CFR 404.1527(c)(2), and is widely accepted in the Third Circuit. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1993); See also Dorf v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1986). The regulations also address the weight to be given a treating source’s opinion: “If we find that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case, we will give it controlling weight.” 20 CFR § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) requires an ALJ to give great or controlling weight to evidence from an acceptable medical source who has a long-term treatment relationship with the claimant.

Reynard v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-02(d)

Dr. Lippman, Mr. Reynard’s primary care physician, is both a long-term treatment provider and an “acceptable medical source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1); 416.913(a)(1). As such, evidence from his records should be given great weight or controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d); 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 generally requires an ALJ to evaluate treating-source opinions using factors such as the treatment relationship, supportability, and consistency, and to give good reasons for the weight assigned when controlling weight is not given.

Arrington v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-03(c)(2)-(6)

“Where controlling weight is not given to a treating source opinion, the ALJ considers an array of factors to determine what weight to grant the opinionf.]” Bourinot, 96 F.Supp.3d at 176-76. Those factors include “the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion can be supported by relevant evidence, and the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole.” Id. at 176. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). However, the regulations do not require the ALJ to list these factors or “to expressly state how each factor was considered,” as long as the ALJ “provide[s] ‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a treating source opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires a treating source’s opinion to receive controlling weight only when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and consistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.

Gobis v. SSA · filed 2016-08-12(c)(2)

To be entitled to controlling weight, a treating source’s opinions must be “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [cannot be] inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) does not prevent an ALJ from giving more weight to a non-acceptable medical source's opinion than to a treating medical source's opinion.

Anderson v. Colvin · filed 2016-11-30(d)(2)

Giving more weight to the opinion of a non-acceptable medical source over a treating medical source does not violate the treating source rules under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) permits an ALJ to consider factors including the treatment relationship, support for the opinion, consistency with the record, specialization, and other supporting or contradictory factors when assigning weight to a treating physician’s opinion.

Rael v. Berryhill · filed 2017-02-03(c)

The ALJ appropriately considered each of these factors in discounting Rusin’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating-source opinion, and § 404.1527(c)(4) directs greater weight to opinions consistent with the record as a whole.

Tricarico v. Colvin · filed 2017-03-03(c)(2), (c)(4)

This Circuit has held that a Commissioner’s determination of liability is subject to remand where the ALJ fails “to provide ‘good reasons’ for the weight she gives to the treating source’s opinion.” See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32–33; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... Although a treating physician’s assessment is typically given more weight than other examiners’ assessments, internal inconsistencies, and the conflicting opinions of other examining physicians, where supported by evidence in the record, can constitute substantial evidence to support not according the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, as well as good reasons to attribute only limited weight to that opinion. See Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 314–15 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give good reasons in the notice of determination or decision for the weight assigned to a treating source’s opinion.

Kaddo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2017-02-28(c)(2)

When assessing the opinion of a treating source, an ALJ must "give good reasons in [the] notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives a treating physician's well-supported, consistent opinion controlling weight and requires the ALJ to give good reasons for the weight assigned.

Wigfall v. Berryhill · filed 2017-03-22(d)(2)

The opinions' and findings of the plaintiffs treating physician are entitled to “controlling weight” if that opinion is ‘“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.’ ” ... Whether the ALJ grants a treating physician’s opinion substantial or little weight, the ALJ must “always give good reasons” for the particular weight given to a treating physician’s evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). ... The ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Huffman’s opinion and his findings regarding the severity of Wigfall’s mental impairments are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) makes the length, frequency, nature, and extent of a treating relationship relevant to weighing a treating physician's opinion, generally favoring greater weight over a non-examining physician's opinion.

Knorr v. Berryhill · filed 2017-06-02(c)(2)(i)-(ii)

Plaintiff saw Dr. Carlson approximately once a month between August 2010 and May 2014, and he performed two spinal fusion surgeries on her back. See AR 608-711, 835-58, 941-66 (treatment notes); AR 762 (first surgery in August 2010); AR 732 (second surgery in April 2012). Under Social Security regulations, the length and extent of this treating relationship mean that his opinion is generally entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)—(ii); Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Because Dr. Carlson’s 2014 opinion was contradicted by the opinions of two non-examining State agency physicians, who assigned a less restrictive RFC, see AR 53-63, 64-78, the ALJ was required to provide “ ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting Dr. Carlson’s opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) gives greater weight to treating-source opinions, requires controlling weight for a well-supported and consistent treating-source opinion, and requires the ALJ to weigh a non-controlling opinion using specified factors and give good reasons for discounting it.

Lonek v. SSA · filed 2017-06-12(c)(2)-(6)

Generally speaking, the Social Security Administration, and by an extension, an ALJ, should give more weight to medical opinions from a claimant’s treating physician(s) than to the opinions of medical sources who have merely examined a claimant, and should give the least amount weight to the opinions of sources who have neither treated nor examined a claimant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Because the ALJ did not give controlling weight to Dr. Kunz’s opinion, he was obligated to determine the amount of weight to give that opinion by considering: (1) the length of Lonek’s treatment relationship with Dr. Kunz and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of Dr. Kunz’s opinion; (4) the consistency of that opinion with the record as a whole; (5) Dr. Kunz’s medical specialization; and (6) any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). ... By identifying deficiencies in the areas of supportability and consistency, the ALJ fulfilled his obligation, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), to provide good reasons for his decision to give little weight to Kunz’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an adjudicator to weigh a treating-source medical opinion under regulatory factors, including the length and frequency of the treatment relationship and the treatment provided.

Scott v. Berryhill · filed 2017-07-10(c)(2)(i), (c)(2)(ii)

But even “if the ALJ does not assign controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, it is still entitled to deference and subject to weighing under the relevant factors [listed in] 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.” Id. ... Nevertheless, the length of the sessions and the treatment relationship were legitimate factors for the ALJ’s consideration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will give to the source’s medical opinion.”); id. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii) (“We will look at the treatment the source has provided . . .”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 gives treating-source opinions more weight and requires controlling weight when the opinion is well supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence; if controlling weight is denied, the adjudicator must explain the deference and factors considered.

Sinclair v. Berryhill · filed 2017-07-21(c)(2), (c)(1)-(6)

Under the Agency’s regulations, the opinions of treating sources merit more weight because the authoring physicians “are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [an individual’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Where the opinion pertains to the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairment(s) and is “well-supported by ... acceptable ... diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with ... other substantial evidence in [the] record, it [is entitled to] controlling weight.” Id. ... If, however, the hearing officer does not grant controlling weight to the treating physician’s assessment, she must identify to what extent the opinion warrants deference, as well as the factors she considered in reaching that decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(l)-(6). ... Therefore, the hearing officer erred by assigning little weight to Dr. Funa’s opinion without an adequate explanation for doing so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) does not require controlling weight for a treating physician’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.

Brunson v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2017-07-31(c)(2)

The federal regulation addressing the weight of the treating source’s medical opinion is now codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), and it continues to provide that a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight when it is “inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in” the case record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally gives treating-source opinions more weight, requires controlling weight when they are well-supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires good reasons for the assigned weight.

Jackson v. Berryhill · filed 2017-08-02(c)(2)

By regulation, opinions from treating physicians should “generally” be given “more weight” by ALJs because these sources are “likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations. . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ALJs are instructed to give “controlling weight” to such opinions where they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Id. In addition, ALJs are directed to “give good reasons” for the weight they give to a treating source’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion submitted by a treating physician.

Duffy v. Colvin · filed 2017-08-07(d)(2)

Duffy is correct that regulations require an ALJ to give more weight to a medical opinion submitted by a treating physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). However, as the ALJ noted in his opinion, this record contains no treating or examining- physician medical opinion as to Duffy’s physical functional abilities and limitations. R. 21. ... Given the lack of any treating physician medical opinion that translate Duffy’s limited neck range of motion into functional limitations, it was not error for the ALJ to rely to the opinions of the non-examining and non-treating sources upon finding that they were consistent with the medical record as a whole.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 directs an ALJ to generally give more weight to treating-source opinions, consider specified factors when declining controlling weight, and provide specific, supportable reasons for the weight assigned.

Baron v. Social Security · filed 2017-08-21(c)(2)-(6)

Where, as here, an ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, see id., he must determine how much weight to give that opinion by considering a variety of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the supportability of the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, the medical specialization of the treating source, and any other relevant factors, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) & 416.927(c)(2)-(6). ... Finally, after weighing a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ must give good reasons for the amount of weight he affords it. ... To meet the “good reasons” requirement, the ALJ’s reasons must be both specific, see Kenerson v. Astrue, No. 10–cv–161–SM, 2011 WL 1981609, at *4 (D.N.H. May 20, 2011) (citation omitted), and supportable, see Soto–Cedeño v. Astrue, 380 Fed. Appx. 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). ... The ALJ discounted Dr. Niegisch’s opinion because of the limited scope of his treatment of Baron, the lack of support for his opinion in his treatment records, and the inconsistency between his opinion and other evidence in the record. In so doing, he “offer[ed] a rationale that could be accepted by a reasonable mind.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) does not require an ALJ to accept a treating physician’s report at face value when the report conflicts with the physician’s treatment notes and a state-agency consultant’s assessment is more persuasive.

Galette v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2017-09-13(c)(2)

In this case, the ALJ gave the report little weight because she concluded that it conflicted with Dr. Kasmani’s actual treatment notes, the most recent of which before the report stated that Galette was “stable on current [medication] management” (R. 741; ECF No. 8-11 at 56), and none of which mentioned panic attacks that are referenced in the report. The ALJ also explained that she found more persuasive the assessment of a State agency psychological consultant who concluded that Galette had only moderate psychological limitations. (R.72-76; ECF No. 8-3 at 10-14.) Galette has not argued that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to Dr. Kasmani’s report, and we cannot say that she was required to accept it at face value under these circumstances. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported and consistent with the record; if the ALJ declines controlling weight, the ALJ must give specific, supportable reasons for the weight assigned.

Liberi v. Social Security · filed 2017-09-15(c)(2)

Under the applicable regulations, the opinions of a treating source such as Dr. Cohen are entitled to controlling weight if they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). ... Finally, an ALJ must give “good reasons in [his] decision for the weight [he] give[s] [a claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). ... To meet the “good reasons” requirement, the ALJ’s reasons must be both specific, see Kenerson v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-161-SM, 2011 WL 1981609, at *4 (D.N.H. May 20, 2011) (citation omitted), and supportable, see Soto–Cedeño v. Astrue, 380 Fed. Appx. 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion substantial or considerable weight unless good cause supports giving it less weight.

Horowitz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2017-06-05(c)(2)

The ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion “substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires controlling weight for a well-supported, consistent treating-source opinion; otherwise, the ALJ must weigh it under specified factors and explain the assigned weight with good reasons.

McCormick v. SSA · filed 2017-09-22(c)(2)-(6)

Under the applicable regulations, the opinions of treating sources such as Drs. Harrington and McClintock are entitled to controlling weight if they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). ... When an ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, he must still determine how much weight to give that opinion by considering the following factors: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of the opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) the specialization of the source offering the opinion; and (6) any other relevant factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) & 416.927(c)(2)-(6). ... Finally, an ALJ must give “good reasons in [his] decision for the weight [he] give[s] [a claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). ... The ALJ was obligated to give good reasons for the weight he gave those opinions, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2), and by giving no reasons at all, he necessarily fell short of meeting the “good reasons” requirement.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally favors treating-source opinions and permits an ALJ to give one less weight when it is unsupported or inconsistent with the record, provided the reasons are clearly articulated.

Hargress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2017-11-06(c)(2)

The ALJ considers many factors when weighing medical evidence, including whether an opinion is well-supported and consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). A treating physician’s medical opinion must be given “substantial or considerable weight” unless “good cause” is shown to give it less weight. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). “With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, but he must clearly articulate [the] reasons for doing so.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Good cause exists when “the (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Odjegba’s opinion about Hargress’s physical capacities. The ALJ’s stated reason for discounting Dr. Odjegba’s opinion—that it was inconsistent with his own medical records and the record as a whole—was adequate and amounts to good cause. See id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires the ALJ to consider the examining and treating relationships, supportability, consistency, specialization, and other relevant factors when deciding the weight of a medical opinion, and § 404.1527(c)(2) requires controlling weight for a well-supported treating-source opinion that is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

Laird v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2017-11-09(c), (c)(2)

The SSA regulations set forth how the ALJ weighs medical opinions. The regulations provide that “unless [the ALJ] give[s] a treating source’s opinion controlling weight ... [the ALJ] consider[s] all of the following factors in deciding the weight [to] give to any medical opinion”: (1) examining relationship; (2) treating relationship; (3) supportability of the opinion; (4) consistency; (5) specialization; and, (6) “any factors [the applicant] or others bring[s] to [the ALJ’s] attention.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The regulations provide that if the ALJ finds “that a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [the applicant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the applicant’s] record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling weight.” Id. at § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis added). Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating physician's opinion more weight than other opinions, requires controlling weight when it is supported by proper medical testing and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires good reasons for the weight assigned.

Baker v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2017-11-09(c)(2)

When determining the RFC, a treating physician's opinion is given more weight than other sources in a disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). When a treating physician's opinion is supported by proper medical testing, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ must give the opinion controlling weight. Id. “However, [a]n ALJ may discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.” Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). Ultimately, the ALJ must “give good reasons” to explain the weight given the treating physician's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) generally gives greater weight to opinions from treating sources because they can provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of the claimant's impairment.

Simmons v. Colvin · filed 2017-11-09(d)(2)

Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally favors treating physicians’ opinions, but allows an ALJ to discount one when it lacks clinical or other support or conflicts with the remaining record.

Eisenbise v. Berryhill · filed 2017-12-05(c)(2)

Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is given more weight than other sources in a disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However, a treating physician’s opinion may be disregarded if it is unsupported by clinical or other data or is contrary to the weight of the remaining evidence in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)-(2) generally requires an ALJ to give treating-source medical opinions substantial or considerable weight absent good cause, and to clearly articulate reasons for discounting them.

Hull v. Berryhill · filed 2017-12-12(d)(1)-(2)

“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). Absent “good cause,” an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians “substantial or considerable weight.” ... see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2). Good cause exists “when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” ... With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion, but he “must clearly articulate [the] reasons” for doing so. ... Here, the ALJ did not disregard Dr. Bose’s opinion, rather he gave it great weight, and considered it in conjunction with the additional evidence in the record, including Plaintiff’s own testimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight to consider the listed factors when determining the weight of that opinion and other medical opinions in the record.

Bogley v. Berryhill · filed 2017-12-13(c)(2)-(6)

When the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ must consider a nonexclusive list of factors to determine what weight to give the opinion of the treating source and all other medical opinions in the record. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (2016) (listing factors).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion, give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion about the nature and severity of an impairment when it is consistent with substantial evidence, and give good reasons for the weight assigned when controlling weight is not given.

Scully v. Berryhill · filed 2017-10-12(c)

SSA regulations require that the ALJ "evaluate every medical opinion [the ALJ] receive[s]," that he or she give "controlling weight" to a treating source's opinion as to the "nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s)" if consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, and that he or she "give good reasons in [his or her] ... decision for the weight" given to a treating source not granted controlling weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) permits controlling weight for a well-supported, consistent treating-source opinion and requires good reasons supported by substantial evidence when assigning its weight; § 404.1527(a)(2) distinguishes examining physicians from treating physicians.

Lariviere v. Colvin · filed 2017-12-15(c)(2), (c), (a)(2)

In making an RFC determination, a treating source’s opinion that is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” may be given controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), ... The ALJ must give “good reasons” for the weight assigned to a treating source’s medical opinion, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), although “the regulations do not require an ALJ to expressly state how each factor was considered,” ... Those “good reasons” must be supported by substantial evidence. ... While Dr. Horton examined Lariviere, he did so only for the purposes of his benefits application and therefore is not considered a “treating physician” under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion when it is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires good reasons for declining controlling weight.

Biestek v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. · filed 2018-01-29(c)(2)

An ALJ is required to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, so long as that opinion is supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). But if the ALJ concludes that a treating source’s medical opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, she must weigh the opinion in light of several factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (listing factors). The ALJ need not perform an exhaustive, step-by-step analysis of each factor; she need only provide “good reasons” for both her decision not to afford the physician’s opinion controlling weight and for her ultimate weighing of the opinion. Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App’x 802, 804–05 (6th Cir. 2011); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally gives treating-physician opinions greater weight because treating sources can provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of the claimant’s impairments.

Thomas v. Berryhill · filed 2018-02-05(c)(2)

The record supports a conclusion that Thomas exaggerated her pre-application relationship with Dr. Hollis and thus his ability to provide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of her impairments—the primary reason that the social-security regulations accord treating physicians deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A well-supported treating-source opinion that is not inconsistent with substantial evidence receives controlling weight; if it does not receive controlling weight, it must be evaluated using the regulatory factors.

Knight v. Berryhill · filed 2018-02-28(d)(2)

“A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” ... “If the treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight under 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2), it must be weighed considering the factors in 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(6).” ... “Dr. Weisensee’s opinions are entitled to controlling weight.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The cited provisions identify examining and treatment relationships, specialization, diagnostic testing, and consistency with the record as factors favoring greater weight for a doctor’s opinion.

Yancey v. Colvin · filed 2018-03-12(c)(2)(i), (ii)

The agency's regulations shed light on how the ALJ should approach the question of the weight to be given to a doctor's opinion. “They state that more weight should be given to the opinions of doctors who have (1) examined a claimant, (2) treated a claimant frequently and for an extended period of time, (3) specialized in treating the claimant's condition, (4) performed appropriate diagnostic tests on the claimant, (5) offered opinions that are consistent with objective medical evidence and the record as a whole.” Roddy, 705 F.3d at 637 citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)G@), (ii). ... Here, after analyzing the medical findings, treatment records, and medical source statements of Mr, Yancey’s treating physician, Dr. Lee, the ALJ afforded “limited” weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion “because it [was] not supported by his treatment records” (R. 25). In so doing, the ALJ did not mention that Dr. Lee is a psychiatrist; did not discuss the frequency, or lack thereof, of Mr. Yancey’s treatment by Dr. Lee (who saw Mr. Yancey 10 times during the 27-monthperiod from October 2012 to January 2015); and he did not discuss whether Dr. Lee performed the appropriate diagnostic tests on Mr. Yancey. The ALJ also failed to consider the consistency of Dr. Lee’s opinion with the opinions of other treating, examining and reviewing medical sources.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating source’s opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; otherwise, the ALJ weighs it using the regulatory factors.

Nichols v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner · filed 2018-03-13(c)(2)

A “treating source’s” opinion is entitled to “controlling weight” if that opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with . . . other substantial evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Foley v. Astrue, No. 09-10864, 2010 WL 2507773, *8 (D. Mass. June 17, 2010). Even if a treating source’s opinion does not satisfy these requirements, it may be “entitled to deference,” see SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)), “insofar as it is ‘well-supported.’” Hudon v. Colvin, 2016 DNH 019, at *2 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). To determine how much weight a treating source’s opinion should receive, the ALJ must consider the “length of the treatment relationship,” the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship,” the opinion’s supportability and consistency with the record as a whole, the treating source’s area of specialization, if any, and any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires controlling weight for a treating physician’s opinion when it is well-supported and not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and requires consideration of regulatory factors if controlling weight is denied.

Fidler v. Berryhill · filed 2018-05-24(c)(2)

An ALJ is required to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(c)(2); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ must give good reasons for the weight that she assigns a treating physician’s opinion. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1101 (7th Cir. 2013); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2013). If an ALJ chooses not to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, “the regulations require the ALJ to consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician’s specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion.” Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider the regulation’s listed factors when deciding what weight to assign.

Weber v. Berryhill · filed 2018-05-30(d)(2)–(6)

Fourth, although the ALJ is entitled to not accord controlling weight to Dr. Vick’s opinions, she still must address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to determine what weight to give the opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally gives greater weight to a treating source’s opinion because that source can provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of the claimant’s medical impairment.

Weldon Knape, III v. Berryhill · filed 2018-06-04(c)(2)

The ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of the treating physician, who developed a “detailed, longitudinal picture” of Knape’s complicated medical history, and giving greater weight to the opinion of an examining psychologist, who described the claimant’s mental condition as it appeared to her that day. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to evaluate the opinion using the regulation’s listed factors, including the treatment relationship, examination frequency, support, consistency, and specialization.

Keippel v. Berryhill · filed 2018-06-25(d)(2)–(6)

Fourth, although the ALJ is entitled to not accord controlling weight to Dr. Walsh’s opinions, she still must address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to determine what weight to give the opinions. ... Here, the ALJ failed to minimally address several of the enumerated factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 for either the 2013 report or the 2016 report. Specifically, the ALJ did not discuss the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, or whether Dr. Walsh had a relevant specialty. ... The ALJ did not do so here, preventing this Court from assessing the reasonableness of the ALJ’s decision in light of the factors indicated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a well-supported treating physician’s opinion controlling weight unless it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, while § 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the RFC determination to the Commissioner rather than requiring acceptance of a physician’s opinion.

Winn v. Commissioner, Social Security · filed 2018-07-06(c)(2), (d)(2)

A treating physician’s opinion will be given controlling weight “if, and only if, it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.’” Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2011); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... The ALJ was not required to accept any physician’s opinion regarding this element of Winn’s RFC. “Even though the RFC assessment draws from medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619-20 (8th Cir. 2007); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the decisionmaker must explain the weight assigned using the factors in § 404.1527(c), including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Greggs v. Berryhill · filed 2018-07-13(c)

If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must still determine how much weight to give it. ... To do this, the ALJ must, by regulation, consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which medical evidence supports the opinion; (4) the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the entire record; and (5) whether the physician was a specialist in the relevant area. ... The ALJ should address these factors so the Court can properly review whether the ALJ followed the correct methodology in weighing the medical opinion evidence. ... Remand is also appropriate because, in determining the amount of weight to give Dr. Sangster’s opinion, the ALJ failed to address or otherwise consider many of the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ... Ultimately, the ALJ failed to adequately justify his decision to give the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Sangster, “little weight,” and remand is appropriate. To be clear, the Court is not finding that, on remand, the Commissioner must give controlling weight to Dr. Sangster’s January 2014 opinion, or any other opinion of Dr. Sangster. Rather, if the Commissioner determines that Dr. Sangster’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, she must support this determination with good reasons supported by substantial evidence. And if Dr. Sangster’s opinion is given less than controlling weight, the Commissioner must sufficiently explain the rationale underlying the amount of weight given to this Opinion, in accordance with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ weighing a noncontrolling treating-physician opinion to consider the treatment relationship, supporting explanation, consistency with other evidence, and the physician's specialty.

Lambert v. Berryhill · filed 2018-07-19(c)

Relatedly, the ALJ weighed Dr. Paul’s opinions without considering the regulatory factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). ALJs must evaluate a treating physician’s noncontrolling opinion by considering the treatment relationship’s length, nature, and extent; the opinion’s supporting explanation and consistency with other evidence; and any specialty of the physician. ... Yet the ALJ did not explain his view of these factors in assigning little weight to Dr. Paul’s opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ deciding the weight of a treating physician’s opinion to consider factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, specialization, and other validating or contradicting factors.

Hearan v. Colvin · filed 2018-07-09(d)(2)-(6)

In making that determination, the regulations require the ALJ to consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the nature and duration of the examining relationship: (2) the length and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which medical evidence supports the opinion; (4) the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the entire record; (5) the physician’s specialization if applicable, and (6) other factors which validate or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion when it is supported by medical findings and consistent with substantial evidence in the record.

Weisberg v. Berryhill · filed 2018-07-24(c)(2)

The ALJ “should give controlling weight to the treating physician’s opinion as long as it is supported by medical findings and consistent with substantial evidence in the record. See, Kaminski v. Berryhill, No. 17-3314, 2018 WL 3341811, at *2 (7th Cir. July 9, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) requires an adjudicator weighing a treating physician’s opinion to consider its supportability, consistency with the record, treatment relationship, specialization, and other relevant factors; a well-supported and consistent opinion receives controlling weight.

Armstrong v. Berryhill · filed 2018-07-25(c)(2)-(6)

Treating physicians’ opinions are entitled to controlling weight if they are well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and are consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Kelly v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998). ... If the ALJ determines that the claimant’s treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, he must evaluate the following factors to determine what weight to give the opinion: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the quantity of evidence in support of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) whether the doctor is a specialist; (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6). ... The ALJ appropriately found that Dong’s opinion was not consistent with the medical record as a whole, and therefore, appropriately discounted his limitation findings. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c)(4). As such, this Court finds no error in the weight the ALJ assigned Dong’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to give a well-supported treating physician's opinion controlling weight when it is not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and otherwise to weigh it using specified factors.

Eddy v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-14(c)

An ALJ must give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion if the opinion is both "well-supported" and "not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ must also "offer good reasons for discounting" the opinion of a treating physician. Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); Scott, 647 F.3d at 739. And even if a treater's opinion is not given controlling weight, an ALJ must still determine what value the assessment does merit. Scott, 647 F.3d at 740; Campbell, 627 F.3d at 308. The regulations require the ALJ to consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; (2) the frequency of examination; (3) the physician's specialty; (4) the types of tests performed; and (5) the consistency and support for the physician's opinion. See Id. The ALJ here squarely addressed these factors when according only “partial weight” to Dr. Walsh’s opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally gives treating physicians’ opinions greater weight, permits discounting unsupported or inconsistent opinions, and requires good reasons for the weight assigned.

Wessling v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-15(c)(2)

Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is given more weight than other sources in a disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treating physician’s opinion may be disregarded if it is unsupported by clinical or other data, or is contrary to the weight of the remaining evidence in the record. ... The ALJ must “give good reasons” to explain the weight given the treating physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Anderson, 696 F.3d at 793. ... The Court reviewed the record, and finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Ulusarac’s opinion. The Court also finds the ALJ provided good reasons explaining the weight she afforded Ulusarac’s opinion. ... The Court finds the ALJ properly weighed Ulusarac’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to weigh a treating-source opinion using the regulatory factors and explain the weight assigned, even when the opinion is not given controlling weight.

Fogarty v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-21(c)

Finally, even assuming that the ALJ provided “good reasons” for not affording Dr. Najera’s opinion controlling weight, she was still required to address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to determine what weight to give the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors and explain the weight assigned to a treating source's opinion when it is given less than controlling weight.

Kotara v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-21(c)

Further, even if the ALJ provided “good reasons” for discounting Dr. Goodman’s opinion, he was still required to address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) to determine what weight to give the opinions. ... If Dr. Goodman’s opinion is given less than controlling weight, the Commissioner must sufficiently explain the rationale underlying the amount of weight given to his opinion, in accordance with the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, specialization, and other relevant factors in determining the opinion’s weight.

Vue v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-24(c)(2)-(6)

If the ALJ determines that the treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, he must evaluate the following factors to determine the weight to give the opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the quantity of evidence in support of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) whether the doctor is a specialist; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to give a well-supported, record-consistent treating-source opinion controlling weight and otherwise evaluate it under specified factors while giving good reasons for the weight assigned.

Lemieux v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-30(c)

The opinions of treating physicians “are ordinarily accorded deference in Social Security disability proceedings.” Richards v. Hewlett–Packard Corp., 592 F.3d 232, 240 n. 9 (1st Cir. 2010). This is because treating physicians are best situated to offer “a detailed, longitudinal picture . . . and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treating source opinion that is well-supported by objective evidence and not inconsistent with the record is accorded “controlling weight.” Id. “If not ‘controlling,’ the treating opinion must still be evaluated against six criteria in order to fulfill the mandate that the ALJ ‘always give good reasons’ when determining the weight a treating opinion deserves.” Santana v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-13232-IT, 2016 WL 7428223, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2016); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (identifying relevant criteria as the length and frequency of the treatment relationship; the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the amount of evidence offered in support of the treating relationship's opinion; the treating opinion's consistency with the overall record; the treating source's specialization; and other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions using non-exhaustive factors such as the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization, and permits discounting treating-source opinions that are inconsistent with the medical record.

Kelley v. Colvin · filed 2018-09-10(c)

However, this list of factors is “non-exhaustive and presents the quintessential balancing test.” ... The ALJ was allowed to discount the treating physicians’ opinions to the extent that they were inconsistent with other parts of her medical records.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to address the listed factors when deciding what weight to give a treating physician’s opinion that is not given controlling weight.

Pierce-Virgen v. Berryhill · filed 2018-08-22(d)(2)–(6)

Further, although the ALJ was not required to give Dr. Strugala’s opinion controlling weight, he still was required to address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 to determine what weight to give the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) does not bind an ALJ to a medical source's opinion on the ultimate question of whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work.

Carter v. Barnhart · filed 2003-02-21(e)

The ALJ, however, is not bound by physician opinions on ultimate issues, See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) ("We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability____ A statement by a medical source that you are 'disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); ... and there was nothing to suggest that either doctor understood the legal requirements for sedentary work contained in the Social Security Regulation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the ALJ to apply subsection (d)'s factors to treating physicians' medical opinions, but not to their legal conclusions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work, which are reserved to the Commissioner.

Frank v. Barnhart · filed 2003-03-26(d), (e)

The ALJ must consider the six factors in subsection (d) only with respect to the medical opinions of treating physicians. Subsection (d) is entitled “How we weigh medical opinions” and explicitly applies only to “medical opinions.” Subsection (e) of the regulation expressly explains that some opinions by physicians are not medical opinions, and as such have no “special significance” in the ALJ’s determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) & (e)(3). Among the opinions by treating doctors that have no special significance are determinations that an applicant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). These determinations are legal conclusions that the regulation describes as “reserved to the Commissioner.” The factors set out at subsection (d) apply only to medical opinions, not opinions “reserved to the Commissioner.” Assuming arguendo that the ALJ did not consider the six factors in subsection (d), he was not required to do so with respect to Dr. Zeringue’s opinion that Frank could not work. The doctor’s opinion was not a medical opinion within the meaning of the regulation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) provides that a treating physician’s opinion is not dispositive in determining whether a claimant is disabled.

Boyce v. Comm Social Security · filed 2003-03-28(e)(1)

However, a treating physician’s opinion is not dispositive in determining a claimant’s disability. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(e)(1); § 416.927(e)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) does not require an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion on whether a claimant is disabled because that ultimate issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

Fleming v. Barnhart · filed 2003-09-05(e)

Finally, the Commissioner correctly asserts that the ALJ was not required to accord Dr. Weiss’s opinions of June 25 and July 2, 2001 that plaintiff could not work controlling weight, as the ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Additionally, a treating physician’s opinion need not be accorded controlling weight if it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record, and Dr. Weiss’s later opinion was inconsistent with his previous notation, albeit also on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, that plaintiff could do sedentary work.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves disability and residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner or ALJ, so a medical source's opinion on those issues is not dispositive.

Tate v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-03-29(d)

To the extent Tate asserts the ALJ did not rely upon a formal functional assessment by a treating or examining physician, relevant authority clearly establishes the responsibility for conducting an RFC analysis rests with the ALJ, not with any medical provider. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (stating that RFC and disability determinations constitute “issues reserved to the Commissioner”); Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 482 F. App’x 483, 486 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)) (“A claimant’s residual functional capacity is a matter reserved for the ALJ’s determination, and while a physician’s opinion on the matter will be considered, it is not dispositive.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

Fazzino v. Saul · filed 2022-03-31(d)(1)

As noted in ALJ Molleur’s decision, LCSW McJunkins and Dr. Mejia’s statement mainly “indicates that the claimant is expected to be unable to work for a period of 6 months,” Tr. at 26. This is a “[a] statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘unable to work,’” which is not a “medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (“Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case, i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.”); id. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as whether your impairment(s) meets or equals the requirements of any impairment(s) . . . your residential functional capacity . . . or the application of vocational factors, the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner.

Cruz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-04-18(d)(1)

As the ALJ noted, findings that a claimant is disabled or unable to work are reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); see McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2011).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves the ultimate determination of disability to the Commissioner rather than allowing a physician's opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work to control.

Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-04-19(e)

A claimant, however, is not entitled to disability benefits simply because a physician finds that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” Under the Social Security regulations, the Commissioner is charged with determining the ultimate issue of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate determination of whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner, so a medical source's statement that the claimant is disabled may be given little weight.

Doll v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-05-12(d)(1)

The ALJ properly found Dr. Alikhan’s statement regarding disability was entitled to little weight because a determination of disability is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because it is an administrative finding dispositive of the case.

Gruber v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-16(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a medical source's opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled, receives no special significance.

Benton v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-06-09(d)

The Court recognizes that a physician’s statement regarding issues reserved for the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled, is not entitled to special deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (special significance is not given to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner). However, Dr. Sheleg did far more than simply state that Plaintiff was disabled, and those opinions were entitled to the weight due an opinion of a treating physician. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. This was not a proper reason to discount the opinion of a treating physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) assigns responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than to a medical source.

Hess v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-27(d)

The ALJ—not a medical source—has the duty to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 404.1527(d), 416.946(c), 416.927(d)(2); Ramsey v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 830 F. App’x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2020) (the ALJ committed no error by determining the scope of the Plaintiffs RFC because that responsibility belongs to the ALJ).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical source.

Kostelny v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-28(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled as non-dispositive because disability determinations are reserved to the Commissioner, and requires the ALJ to consider and weigh state-agency consultants’ opinions like those of other medical sources without treating-physician deference.

Wines v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-07(c), (d), (e)

The Commissioner, not a claimant’s physician, is responsible for determining whether the claimant is statutorily disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). A medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled is not dispositive of a disability claim because the determination is reserved to an ALJ acting on behalf of the Commissioner. Id.; Walker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 987 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 2021). ... State agency medical or psychological consultants are considered experts in social security disability evaluation, and the ALJ must consider and assign weight to their opinions in the same manner as other medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), (e). However, these one-time examiners are not considered “treating physicians,” and thus, their opinions are not entitled to deference. ... The weight to be given to a non-examining physician’s opinion depends on, among other things, the extent to which it is consistent with other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). ... Here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Wines was not disabled from December 21, 2015. The consultative examiner’s report was consistent with Wines’s medical records that showed she exhibited symptoms of depression and anxiety, but fair concentration and grossly intact memory, such that she possessed an RFC to perform jobs that existed in the national economy in significant numbers.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves conclusions about whether a person is disabled to the ALJ, but does not prohibit observations based on objective medical evidence about the claimant's likelihood of sustaining full-time employment.

Kiran v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-07-14(d)(1)

Conclusions about whether a person is disabled are reserved to the ALJ under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But this Court has recognized that § 404.1527(d)(1)’s prohibition does not apply to observations, like the one here, that are “based on objective medical evidence . . . of [a claimant’s] likelihood of being able to sustain full time employment” given the claimant’s severe impairments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) means that an ALJ need not accept a medical opinion that a claimant is completely disabled because the ultimate disability determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Mucka v. Saul · filed 2022-07-27(d)

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored a medical opinion that he “is completely disabled with no work capacity” (ECF No. 22-1, at 6), but the ALJ is not required to accept such an opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Grisel A. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-00719 (TOF), 2021 WL 4350565, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2021) (“The Commissioner is not obliged to give any special significance to the source of such an opinion,” because under the regulations, “[t]he final question of disability is expressly reserved to the Commissioner.”) (ellipsis, quotation marks and citation omitted).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to determine the proper weight of a medical opinion by applying the regulatory factors, including when the source opines that the claimant cannot work; a statement that the claimant is disabled or unable to work is not itself controlling.

Mendenhall v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-08-01(d)(1)

The Court also notes that although an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to an opinion that the claimant could not work, see, e. g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”), she is required to determine the proper weight to give that opinion by applying the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, specifically in relation to functional limitations. ... Here, the ALJ should have assessed this opinion by applying the appropriate factors.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) provides that a medical-source opinion on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work concerns an issue reserved to the Commissioner and receives no special significance.

Singleton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-04(d)(3)

As an initial matter, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. Lear’s opinion that plaintiff was “not likely to sustain employment” “even in a part-time sedentary position” (Tr. 55, citing Tr. 481) amounts to an issue reserved to the Commissioner based on Social Security rules and regulations. Whether a person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, i.e., unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and a medical source’s opinion that her patient is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not “giv[en] any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). See Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007) (opinion by medical source on issues reserved to Commissioner is never entitled to controlling weight or special significance); see also Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the ALJ reasonably found that Ms. Lear’s opinion that plaintiff would be unable to sustain employment is not persuasive.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Rich v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-29(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ is responsible for assessing the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, Policy Interpretation Rulings Titles II and XVI: Medical Source Opinions on Issues Reserved to the Commissioner, available at 1996 WL 374183 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant's RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant's RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical ... professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) provides that a medical source’s opinion on whether a claimant is disabled or unable to work is an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not given special significance.

Roush v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-15(d)(3)

Whether a person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, i.e., unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and a medical source’s opinion that her patient is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not “giv[en] any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate determination that a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement on that issue does not control the ALJ’s disability determination.

Clark v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-08-30(d)(1)

Opinions that a plaintiff is disabled are reserved to the Commissioner “because they are dispositive of a case[.]” § 404.1527(d)(1). In other words, “[a] statement by a medical source that [a plaintiff is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine that you are disabled.” Id.; see also Romeo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 686 F. App’x 731, 733 (11th Cir. 2017) (Affirming ALJ’s decision to discount physicians’ opinions in part because “[a] medical opinion that a claimant is disabled constitutes an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not controlling.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)). Dr. Lawry’s January 2020 conclusion that Plaintiff “cannot maintain gainful employment” and “social security disability benefits should be awarded” constitutes a conclusion reserved to the Commissioner. R. 844–45. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to disregard this opinion was proper under the law. § 404.1527(d)(1); Romeo, 686 F. App’x at 733.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) says that an adjudicator need not give special significance to a medical-source opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as a conclusory statement that a claimant is disabled.

Mertin v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2022-08-30(d)(3)

An ALJ need not give special significance to an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as a conclusory statement that a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3); see Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). As such, the ALJ did not err in rejecting either of Dr. Lawrence’s 2018 opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) treats a medical source's opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as addressing an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so the opinion is not given special significance.

Gamble v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-01(d)(3)

... Whether a person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, i.e., unable to engage in substantial gainful activity, is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, and a medical source’s opinion that his patient is “disabled” or “unable to work” is not “giv[en] any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of whether a claimant is disabled to the Commissioner, but an explained functional assessment is not automatically a conclusory disability opinion.

Conner v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-13(d)

Defendant is correct that whether or not a claimant is disabled is an issue reserved for the ALJ and not due any special significance. ECF No. 19 at 17; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). However, Ms. Garcia’s statement that Plaintiff had not “stabilized long enough to allow for the additional stressors that employment would present” is not a conclusory statement that she is disabled. See Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3rd 1153, 1160 (9th Circuit. 2012) (a physician’s statement that the client would be “unlikely” to work full time was not a conclusory statement like those described in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d)). Further, she explained and supported her opinion. Ms. Garcia’s full statement provides information about Plaintiff’s functioning and mental limitations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as a legal conclusion reserved to the Commissioner and not binding on the Commissioner.

Rienstra v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-14(d)(1)

In addition to failing to present a function-by-function assessment, DNP Gibson’s opinion that plaintiff would be unable to work full time is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1) and 416.927(d)(1) (“[a] statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled”). Such a statements constitute a legal conclusion that is not binding on the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of residual functional capacity to the Commissioner as an administrative finding.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-15(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability, because opinions about disability, residual functional capacity, and vocational factors are reserved to the Commissioner.

Coley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-09-19(d)(1)

Furthermore, a “statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the SSA] will determine” that the claimant is “disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). That is because opinions about whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (RFC), and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats whether a claimant is disabled as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, so a medical source's opinion on that issue does not control the disability determination.

Hawk v. SSA · filed 2022-09-21(d)(1)

Finally, Richardson’s opinion that Hawk is disabled is a decision reserved to the Commissioner and, therefore, the ALJ did not err in rejecting it. Beery v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. App’x 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than to a treating physician.

Ohneck v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-09-26(d)

The applicable regulations and caselaw make clear that a claimant’s RFC is an issue “reserved to the Commissioner,” and not any physician.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 recognizes that the ALJ has final responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity and must consider, but need not adopt, a physician's opinions about the claimant's limitations.

Lebron v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-26

First, the ALJ had the “final responsibility” to decide Plaintiff’s RFC—not Dr. Bazacos. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Under the law, the ALJ needed to consider Dr. Bazacos’ persuasive opinions on Plaintiff’s marked limitations and nothing more. Physicians don’t decide a claimant’s RFC.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, rather than an examining physician.

Leslie v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2022-09-27(d)(2)

Likewise, while we agree with Leslie that an ALJ may not take on the role of doctor, the “final responsibility for deciding” the residual functional capacity is “reserved to the Commissioner,” not an examining physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (giving the ALJ responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity); Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing how an ALJ necessarily must resolve conflicting medical evidence).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a medical source's statement that a claimant is unable to work is not controlling, but the ALJ must still consider the medical findings and other evidence supporting it.

Sanborn v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-22(d)

First, although a statement by a medical source that a claimant is “unable to work” is not controlling on the Commissioner, the ALJ was required to consider all the medical findings and other evidence supporting Dr. MacLennan’s statement that Plaintiff would have difficulty functioning at work due to difficulty with sustained concentration, pace, and persistence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of a claimant's residual functional capacity to the Commissioner as an administrative finding dispositive of the case.

Baines v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-07(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats residual functional capacity as an administrative issue reserved to the Commissioner and provides that an ALJ gives no special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Grossman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-09(d)(2), (d)(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and provides that an administrative law judge will not give special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Bennett v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2022-12-15(d)(2), (d)(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) classifies a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Hanson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-01-09(d)(2)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, a determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion and need not mirror any medical opinion, rather it is a legal decision reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2); See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats an opinion on a claimant's residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS)Torrecillas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-01-31(d)(2)

To the extent she argues the ALJ has impermissibly substituted her own opinion for a doctor’s professional interpretation of the record, Plaintiff’s contention is also unavailing. As previously noted, the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (d) treats opinions on the ultimate issue of disability as outside the definition of medical opinions and gives them no special significance because that issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

Cuellar v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-02-17(d)

The Court does not find error in the ALJ’s determination that ARNP Combs’s opinion about listing-level criteria lacks value and is not persuasive. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (noting that the ultimate issue of disability is reserved for the Commissioner, and opinions on that issue are not considered medical opinions nor are they given any special significance).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats statements that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner rather than medical opinions entitled to controlling weight.

(SS) Mangrum v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-17(d)

A physician’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is not entitled to controlling weight because statements “by a medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” “are not medical opinions” under the Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). An ALJ “is precluded from giving any special significance to the source; e.g., giving a treating source’s opinion controlling weight” when it is on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as the ultimate issue of disability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats statements about issues reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is disabled or able to work, as not medical opinions and gives their source no special significance.

Matthews v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-17(d)

Opinions on issues reserved to the Commission “are not medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Examples of issues reserved to the Commissioner include, “[a] statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work.’” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). The Commissioner will “not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner,” which would include Dr. Lamm’s findings on the issues of employability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). Thus, the ALJ properly afforded no weight to Dr. Lamm’s opinions on the issues of employability, namely that Plaintiff would have extreme difficulty in resuming work as a housekeeper and she would be unemployable.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats medical source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner as administrative findings rather than medical opinions.

Ogden v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-02-21(d)

The ALJ is correct that medical source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not medical opinions “because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the ultimate determination of disability and ability to work to the Commissioner, so a physician’s contrary conclusion does not control the decision.

Stover v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-01(d)

Dr. Carter didn’t offer any opinions about Ms. Stover’s actual functional limitations, so the ALJ didn’t err in giving little weight to Dr. Carter’s conclusory opinion that Ms. Stover is “permanently disabled” and “no longer able to work” because adjudicatory determination is reserved for the Commissioner, not a physician. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) provides that a medical source’s statement on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is unable to work, is not a medical opinion entitled to any special significance.

Morton v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-03(d)

A statement by a medical source that a claimant is “unable to work” is not a medical opinion and is not due “any special significance.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Nevertheless, the ALJ is required to consider medical source opinions about any issue, including issues reserved to the Commissioner, by evaluating the opinion in light of the evidence in the record and applying the applicable factors. SSR 96-5p at *2-3. The ALJ considered Dr. Heap’s opinion that Plaintiff has a “chronic disabling condition” and reasonably found the opinion was entitled to little weight. Tr. 940.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as issues reserved to the Commissioner, unlike an assessment of the likelihood of sustaining employment.

Torres-Quinones v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-09(d)(1)

Opinions that the claimant is disabled or unable to work are issues reserved for the Commissioner’s determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c)(3), 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1). Plaintiff cites Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2012), for the proposition that a physician’s statement that a claimant’s ability to work was “unlikely” was not a conclusion reserved to the Commissioner. Dkt. 8, at 8 (citing Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159–60). This case is distinguishable from Hill. In Hill, the Ninth Circuit found that the doctor’s statement that the claimant “would be ‘unlikely’ to work full time was not a conclusory statement like those described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), but instead an assessment . . . of [the claimant’s] likelihood of being able to sustain full time employment” in light of their impairments. Hill, 698 F.3d at 1160 (emphasis in original). Here, Dr. Digman did not opine on the likelihood of Plaintiff’s ability to sustain employment; rather, the doctor asserted in absolute terms that Plaintiff “is quite debilitated by her symptoms” and “is unable to work.” AR 1504. Therefore, the ALJ properly found Dr. Digman’s opinion to be conclusory and on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) gives no special significance to a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work because that determination is reserved to the Commissioner.

Lyannas, Jr. v. Social Security Administration · filed 2023-03-31(d)(1)-(3)

This “unable to work” descriptor falls squarely into the category of opinions § 404.1527(d) is meant to address. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(3). That regulation specifically provides that the Administration “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner,” such as “a statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work.’” Id. This type of statement merits no special significance because it is a dispositive administrative decision. § 404.1527(d), (3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the ultimate disability determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ is not bound by a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled.

Brown v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-04-11(d)(1)

Whether a claimant is “disabled”—within the context of social security benefits—is an ultimate issue that is reserved to the determination of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Thus, an ALJ is not bound by a medical source’s opinion as to whether a claimant is “disabled.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination, not a medical opinion, and reserves that determination to the Commissioner.

(SS) Gegan v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-05-08(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not incorporate every finding from a medical source merely because the ALJ finds the source's opinion persuasive.

MADONNA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-05-16(d)(2)

As the Third Circuit explained in Wilkinson, “no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the source’s opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight,” because “the controlling regulations are clear that the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner.” 558 F. App’x at 256 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(2)); see also Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Surveying the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ’s duties.”). Thus, I conclude that the ALJ’s failure to specifically mention rejecting NP Hammon’s lifting and carrying restrictions does not constitute error.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled does not determine whether the claimant is disabled.

Bonato v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-05-30(d)(1)

The ALJ also correctly gave no significant weight to Dr. DeWald’s statement that Kevin was disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision on whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . . A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”); see Kevin B., 2020 WL 248131, at *11.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves to the Commissioner opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work, so even a treating physician’s opinion on that issue receives no weight.

Zalusky v. Saul · filed 2023-06-08(d)(1)

To begin, this opinion was provided by Dr. Hnilica (Claimant’s surgeon) and not by Dr. Smith9 but this detail does not matter because the ALJ was required to reject it. As the ALJ noted, opinions as to whether a claimant is “disabled” or is “unable to work” are reserved to the Commissioner pursuant to the applicable regulation. (R. 113, 114); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual functional capacity determinations to the Commissioner because they are dispositive administrative findings.

Watts v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-06-12(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves to the Commissioner the question whether a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant meets a listing does not by itself require remand.

Larese v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-07(d)(2)

The Government responds that an opinion on an issue that is dispositive of a case—such as whether a claimant meets the severity of any impairment in the regulatory listings, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1—is not a medical opinion because it is an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). ... Granted, as the Government argues, a statement on a form stating that Larese meets Listing 12.05A doesn’t require remand because whether a claimant meets or equals a listing is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves to the Commissioner the determination whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability.

Pickett v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-07-19(d)(1)

Finally, Pickett argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Khalsa’s opinion that Pickett was “disabled” and “unable to work” because these determinations are administrative findings reserved for the ALJ. (Pl. Br. at 17 n.6.) The ALJ did so properly because while “[physicians] may render opinions on the ultimate issue of disability,” see Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998), it is the ALJs who “are responsible for making the determination or decision about whether [a claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1)–(3) reserves determinations that a claimant is disabled or unable to work to the Commissioner and gives medical-source opinions on those issues no special significance.

Dondero v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-17(d)(1)–(3)

As an initial matter, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Magness’s July 16, 2013 statement that Plaintiff was unable to work, as this is a dispositive issue reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(3), (noting that statements by a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner and will not be given any special significance); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (“[T]reating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance.”); Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 518 F. App’x 875, 877 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Commissioner, not a claimant’s physician, is responsible for determining whether a claimant is statutorily disabled.”) (citations omitted); Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 401 F. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A doctor’s opinion on a dispositive issue reserved for the Commissioner, such as whether the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work,’ is not considered a medical opinion and is not given any special significance, even if offered by a treating source[.]”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves the disability determination to the agency, so a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not establish disability.

Warren v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2023-06-27(d)(1)

However, the ALJ was not required to consider this statement, as it constitutes a conclusion reserved to the agency. ... “A statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the agency] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) reserve disability and ability-to-work determinations to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s opinion that a claimant cannot work receives no special significance.

CRAWN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-07-25(d)(1), (3)

In any event, despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the ALJ properly found that Dr. Daknis’ opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work was not entitled to any special significance, R. 69, because that is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) provides that a treating source’s opinion on whether a claimant can work is a dispositive finding reserved to the ALJ, not a medical opinion, and is entitled to no special significance.

Wilson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2023-09-08(d)(1), (d)(3)

An opinion as to whether a claimant is able to work is not a medical opinion, even if offered by a treating source, but rather a dispositive finding for the ALJ to make. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 401 F. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010). It is entitled to no special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) and (3); Kelly, 401 F. App’x at 407.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a controlling medical opinion.

Mackey v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-19(d)(1)

The ALJ is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability, not a physician. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5 (July 2, 1996). A medical source statement that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” does not require the ALJ to determine the claimant meets the definition of disability. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1). This is a specific, legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves conclusions about disability or inability to work to the Commissioner, but such a conclusion in a medical opinion does not undermine the remainder of that opinion.

(SS) Haggerty v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-27(d)

Finally, the ALJ notes that “as with all opinions rendered as to the claimant’s “disability” or inability to work, this issue is clearly reserved for the Commissioner.” AR 38 (citing 20 CFR 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d)). However, this point does little to further defendant’s argument as it is a given in all cases and is not especially helpful in resolving the issue at hand. Moreover, simply checking a box regarding a conclusion of disability does not undermine the remainder of the opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) gives no special significance to a treating source’s opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether the claimant can work.

De Gomez v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-28(d)(3)

But this is a vocational opinion on an ultimate issue, not a medical opinion. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “this determination is for the Social Security Administration to make, not a physician.” McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the ALJ’s rejection of medical opinion that claimant “could not work at all”). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). “A treating physician’s evaluation of a patient’s ability to work may be useful or suggestive of useful information, but a treating physician ordinarily does not consult a vocational expert or have the expertise of one.” McLeod, 640 F.3d at 884. Dr. Nazeri’s opinion that plaintiff cannot maintain a full-time or part-time job provided no basis for this conclusion and did not include any specific functional limitations. As such, the ALJ was not required to adopt or give any special weight to Dr. Nazeri’s disability opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) provides that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work does not determine disability because that ultimate legal issue is reserved to the Commissioner.

De La Rosa v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-28(d)(1)

Finally, the ALJ properly declined to afford Dr. Shusterman’s statement that Gomez was “totally disabled” any persuasive value. Id. at 62; see id. at 248, 250, 252, 254. Disability is the ultimate legal issue “expressly reserved to the Commissioner.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133–34 (2d Cir. 1999); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(3) requires an ALJ to give no special significance to a medical source’s opinion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work because those issues are reserved to the Commissioner.

Arias v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-09-29(d)(3)

An opinion from a medical source is not necessarily a “medical opinion.” Rather, some opinions from a medical source are “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). One such issue reserved to the Commissioner is whether a claimant is “unable to work.” Id. (listing “statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” as an example of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner); Sager v. Colvin, 622 Fed. Appx. 629 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that opinion on whether claimant is unable to work is not a “‘medical opinion’ but rather a question reserved to the ALJ.”). SSA regulations require that when an opinion from a medical source speaks to an issue reserved the ALJ, the ALJ must “not give any special significance” to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). That is exactly what the ALJ did here. All four of Dr. Higgins’ opinions speak to whether Arias is disabled and whether she is unable to work. Thus, all four opinions are on issues reserved to the ALJ. The ALJ did not err in affording each of these four opinions “no special significance.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) reserves dispositive disability determinations to the Commissioner, so an ALJ may discount a medical source’s opinion that a claimant cannot work or will be absent too often to work.

Henderson v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-29(d)(1)

The ALJ was entitled to discount Dr. Childers’ opinion because a finding of “inability to work” or how often a claimant would be able to work is a dispositive issue of the case reserved for the Commissioner.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) and (3) reserve to the Commissioner the conclusion whether a claimant can work and permit an ALJ to give no weight to a treating physician’s contrary conclusion.

Deitrick v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-29(d)(1), (3)

Although Dr. Jiunta made clinical findings in his treatment notes, his statement that Deitrick could not work was, as the ALJ observed, a conclusion. Moreover, the statement that a claimant cannot work is a conclusion that is reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (3); ... Thus, the ALJ did not err in giving no weight to Dr. Jiunta’s statement that Deitrick could not work.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a physician’s statement that a claimant is disabled as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical opinion subject to treating-source evaluation.

Hultz v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-10-03(c), (d)

This evaluation of Dr. Singh’s statements was proper. As SSA regulations make clear, opinions that a claimant is disabled “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Accordingly, Dr. Singh’s evaluation did not constitute a “medical opinion” and the ALJ was therefore not required to analyze the evaluation under the process for considering the medical opinions of treating sources outlined in these regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) reserves determinations about whether a claimant is unable to work or disabled to the Commissioner, so a medical source’s opinion on those issues receives no special significance.

Tichy v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-10-17(e)

Whether Plaintiff is unable to work, and disabled is a determination reserved to the Commissioner. Thus, ARNP Dekeyser’s opinion Plaintiff is unable to work is not entitled to special significance.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an opinion on an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion that determines disability.

Coleman v. SSA · filed 2023-11-06(d)

Of course, as ALJ Bowling correctly recognized, “the conclusion of disability . . . is an issue reserved exclusively for the Commissioner.” [Tr. 23]; see also Allen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Social Security regulations state that ‘[o]pinions on some issues . . . are not medical opinions . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (emphasis added): ... ALJ Bowling, therefore, appropriately rejected Dr. Breeding’s findings to the extent they opined on the ultimate issue of disability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) does not permit an ALJ to treat a medical source’s nonconclusory statement that a claimant’s impairments would possibly preclude employment as an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Vague v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-12-04(d)(1)

The regulations state that a medical source’s statement that a claimant is ‘“disabled” or “unable to work”’ is not a medical opinion but rather an issue reserved to the Commissioner, thus no special significance is given to such statements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). However, Dr. Szczebak’s opinion expressed that Plaintiff’s impairments would “possibly” preclude employment. AR 1625 (emphasis added). The statement was not conclusory as “disabled” or “unable to work,” therefore in rejecting Dr. Szczebak’s first opinion, the ALJ erred.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats a medical source’s statement that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical opinion the ALJ must weigh.

Cano v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-12-13(d)(1)

Additionally, the ALJ does not need to weigh conclusions couched as medical opinions. “A statement by a medical source that [a claimant] is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” is not a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). These are “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e. that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” Id. § 404.1527(d). ... The Court first notes that Dr. Mehta’s statement that Plaintiff would be unable to hold a job is a conclusion reserved for the SSA, couched as a medical opinion, and thus the ALJ did not need to consider it.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner as an administrative finding dispositive of the case.

Lopez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-05(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) does not treat a medical source's evidence-based assessment of a claimant's ability to sustain work as a conclusory opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Palmer v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-09(d)(1)

However, “assessment[s], based on objective medical evidence, of [a claimant’s] likelihood of being able to sustain full time employment given the many medical and mental impairments [that a claimant] faces” are not “conclusory statement[s] like those described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the statements of Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Asaadi were assessments based on their experiences treating Plaintiff. AR 1406, 1696. Both formed their opinions based on the medical evidence available to them from treating Plaintiff and described the basis for those opinions with reference to Plaintiff’s impairments and their experiences treating Plaintiff. See id. Thus, the ALJ’s determination that these statements were on issues reserved to the Commissioner was in error.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats a medical source’s ultimate conclusion that a claimant is disabled or unable to work as a non-medical opinion reserved to the Commissioner, but does not permit rejection of the source’s work-related limitations merely because the source also addressed that ultimate issue.

(SS) Casillas De Magana v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-29(e)

A physician’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability is not entitled to controlling weight, because statements “by a medical source that [a claimant] is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’” “are not medical opinions” under the Regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Rather, an ALJ “is precluded from giving any special significance to the source; e.g., giving a treating source’s opinion controlling weight” when it is on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as the ultimate issue of disability. Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3 (July 2, 1996); see McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[t]he law reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner”); Martinez v. Astrue, 261 Fed. Appx. 33, 35 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he opinion that [a claimant] is unable to work is not a medical opinion, but is an opinion about an issue reserved to the Commissioner. It is therefore not accorded the weight of a medical opinion”). The ALJ was entitled to reject the conclusion of Dr. Vanderhyde that Defendant “Remain off-work.” However, an ALJ may not reject work-related limitations simply on the grounds that a source also addressed the ultimate issue.