17 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 groups photographs and maps within pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and defines a compilation as an original work formed by selecting, coordinating, or arranging preexisting materials.

Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC · filed 2015-08-08

This determination is supported by the text of the Copyright Act, which groups both “photographs” and “maps” into the broader category of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act separately defines a “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id.

Section 101 treats a live broadcast as fixed when a fixation is made simultaneously with its transmission; successive feeds of the same live game do not constitute separate works.

National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc. · filed 1986-06-04

To hold that this transmission process nevertheless represents the performance of separate works would gut the plain purpose of the “fixation” definition, as well as distort the concept of a “work prepared over a period of time.”

Section 101 treats a live broadcast fixed during transmission as one work even when commercials and station breaks are added after the initial feed.

National Football League v. Mcbee & Bruno's, Inc. · filed 1986-07-01

To hold that this transmission process nevertheless represents the performance of separate works would gut the plain purpose of the "fixation" definition, as well as distort the concept of a "work prepared over a period of time."

For a commissioned work to qualify as a work made for hire under § 101(2), the writing need not use the phrases “specially commissioned or ordered,” “the work shall be considered a work made for hire,” or “each work,” nor must it be titled a “work for hire contract.”

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2001-10-15(2)

The Copyright Act does not require that written contracts memorializing a work for hire arrangement contain the words “specially commissioned or ordered,” just as it does not mandate that the phrase “the work shall be considered a work made for hire” appear. Similarly, there is no requirement that the contract state that “each work” composed will be considered a work for hire, or that the agreement be titled a “work for hire contract” rather than something else.

Section 101 treats a work as made for hire when it is prepared by an employee within the scope of employment, and employee status does not require a formal or regular employment relationship.

Nadel & Sons Toy Corp. v. William Shaland Corp. · filed 1987-03-07(1)

It is established that a formal or regular relationship of employment is not a necessary condition for employee status within the meaning of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire as a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment, and an employee is a person acting under the employer’s direction and supervision.

M & a Associates, Inc. v. Vcx, Inc. · filed 1987-04-08

An “employee,” for purposes of the work made for hire doctrine, is any person who acts under an employer’s direction and supervision.

Section 101(1)'s work-made-for-hire rule turns on whether the creator was an employee; the court held that employee status presented a genuine issue of material fact.

Howard v. Sterchi · filed 1989-03-30(1)

However, the court determines by implication that the there is a genuine question of material fact regarding whether Matthews was an employee of Sterchi under § 101(1). Neither party has argued this specific issue, although its resolution is critical to the proper application of the “work made for hire” doctrine. If the plaintiffs prove that Matthews was an employee, the renderings might have become “work made for hire,” and the property of the plaintiffs through Sterchi’s alleged agency relationship with Howard.

Section 101(2) limits an independent contractor’s commissioned work to work-for-hire status only if it falls within one of nine specified categories and the parties sign a written agreement saying it is a work made for hire.

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid · filed 1988-05-31(2)

Satisfied that the literal interpretation is the one that best suits the 1976 Act, we hold that a copyrightable work of an independent contractor cannot be a work made for hire under the current Act unless that work falls within one of the specific categories enumerated in § 101(2) ... and ... “the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” 17 U.S. C. § 101(2).

Section 101 defines a work made for hire as a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment, including work created by a corporate employee regardless of how or where the employee is paid or works.

Simplified Information Systems, Inc. v. Cannon (In Re Simplified Information Systems, Inc.) · filed 1988-05-11

Under the Copyright Act, one may be an employee without regard to the method of payment, i.e., salary, piecework, royalty, or gratis, ... Furthermore, the “work made for hire” doctrine is not avoidable merely by performing the work in a separate location, or on non-work time.

Section 101(1) defines a work made for hire as one prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.

Johannsen v. Brown · filed 1992-06-24(1)

A work made for hire is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).

Section 101(1)'s work-made-for-hire exception did not transfer ownership to the employer because the software's creator remained the rightful owner.

Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer · filed 1992-11-04(1)

Avtec has failed to overcome the presumption that Peiffer, as the Orbit Program’s creator, is its rightful owner for copyright purposes.

A work is made for hire under § 101(1) when an employee prepares it within the scope of employment, with employee status determined under common-law agency principles, especially the hiring party’s control over the work.

Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Centers, Inc. · filed 1995-01-04(1)

In order for the INI Orlando Floor Plan to be considered a work for hire, however, Martin must have prepared the plan within the scope of his employment pursuant to Section 101(1). ... The term “employee” is defined in accordance with the general common law of agency. ... Paramount to this definition is whether the hiring party has the right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the INI Orlando Floor Plan is a work for hire within the meaning of Section 101(1).

For a commissioned work to qualify as a work made for hire under § 101(2), the hiring party need not possess or exercise artistic control over the product.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas · filed 1995-05-05(2)

We agree with these commentators that the hiring party need not possess or exercise artistic control over the product for a work to be “specially ordered or commissioned” within the meaning of § 101(2).

Section 101 requires a signed written agreement for the commissioned-work route when independent contractors create photographs outside the employee route.

Natkin v. Winfrey · filed 2000-08-30

Thus, Harpo must produce a written work made for hire agreement signed by both sides to successfully claim exclusive ownership of the copyrights to these photographs.

Section 101's work-made-for-hire definition covers employee works and specified commissioned works only when the parties expressly agree in a signed writing.

LZT/Filliung Partnership, LLP v. Cody/Braun & Associates, Inc. · filed 2000-10-12

A work made for hire is (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) a type of work that fits in one of the nine specified categories of specially ordered work or commissioned work, if the parties expressly agree in writing that the work is to be a work made for hire.

Section 101's employee work-made-for-hire route does not give ownership to a claimant whose software was created by independent contractors rather than employees.

Jou v. Accurate Research, Inc. · filed 2003-08-22

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish ownership of the software as works made for hire.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire to include a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.

JustMed, Inc. v. Byce · filed 2010-04-05

As it is relevant here, a “work made for hire” is “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Weighing the common law factors in light of the circumstances and JustMed’s business, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that Byce was an employee and that the source code was a work made for hire.

Section 101 treats a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire, with employee status determined under common-law agency principles, including borrowed-servant factors.

U.S. Vinyl Manufacturing Corp. v. Colour & Design, Inc. · filed 2013-09-26

The Copyright Act further defines “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In that case, the Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an individual was an “employee” for the purposes of the “work made for hire” doctrine of § 101 of the Copyright Act should be based on “principles of general common law of agency.” ... As discussed below, applying the borrowed servant doctrine to the case at hand, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Defendant, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Defendant was Cartensen’s employer. ... The Court therefore finds that a genuine dispute remains concerning whether Plaintiff or Defendant owns the SATO pattern.

Section 101 treats a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire, with scope assessed using common-law agency principles.

Issaenko v. University of Minnesota · filed 2014-09-30

A work made for hire is further defined, in relevant part, under the Act as “a work prepared by an-employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Although the Copyright Act does not define either ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment,’ these terms must be ‘understood in light of the general common law of agency.’” ... Citing this guidance, numerous courts have adopted the three-part test under the Second Restatement of Agency “for determining when a work is made by an employee ‘within the scope’ of employment.” ... Under this three-part test, in determining whether a work was prepared within the scope of employment, courts consider whether the work “is of the kind [the employee] is employed to perform,” “occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits,” and “is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”

Section 101 treats a work as made for hire when it is prepared by an employee within the scope of employment, with employee status determined under common-law agency principles.

Smith v. Mikki More, LLC · filed 2014-10-09

When a work is “made for hire,” the employer is considered the author of the work and owns the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). In the absence of a written instrument in which the parties “expressly agree ... that the work shall be considered a work made for hire,” a work is only “made for hire” if it is “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. To determine whether a hired party is an “employee” within the meaning of Section 101, courts look to the “the general common law of agency” and so “consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.” ... Defendants’ first argument fails because no reasonable jury could find that Smith was an employee rather than an independent contractor. Smith was a skilled graphic designer with fifteen years experience who created the Copyrighted Graphics on his own computer, in his own home, on his own schedule. Braun had no right to control the manner or means of this work. ... Smith was not given employee benefits, nor was he treated as an employee for tax purposes. ... Smith was, in many respects, the paradigmatic independent contractor.

Section 101 creates two mutually exclusive routes to work-for-hire status: employee work within the scope of employment, or qualifying commissioned work with a signed writing.

Horror Inc. v. Miller · filed 2018-09-28(1)-(2)

Thus, the framework set up by the definition in section 101 establishes "two mutually exclusive means" through which a work for hire might arise.

Section 101 treats a work as made for hire when an employee prepares it within the scope of employment.

LeSEA Inc v. LeSEA Broadcasting Corporation · filed 2023-08-22

For present purposes, the Traveler Photo was a work for hire if it was “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” 17 U.S.C. §101. ... In all events, there is no question that Lester was a LeSEA employee at the time he took the trip to China with his grandfather. ... Because I conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Lester took the Traveler Photo in his personal capacity rather than within the scope of his employment with LeSEA, the copyright, as a matter of law, belongs to LeSEA, and summary judgment will be granted to LeSEA on Count X of Lester’s counterclaims.

Section 101(1)'s work-made-for-hire definition covers an employee's work prepared within the scope of employment; works outside that scope do not qualify as works made for hire.

Aquarian Foundation, Inc. v. Lowndes · filed 2025-02-03(1)

For many of the same reasons, the disputed works covered by the 1976 Copyright Act also do not qualify as works for hire.

Section 101 treats a useful article's design as a pictorial or graphic work only when its pictorial or graphic features can be identified separately from and exist independently of its utilitarian aspects.

Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. · filed 1986-10-08

Defendant also argues that the audiovisual displays of “Print Shop” are ineligible for copyright protection because they do not fall within the definition of “pictorial” or “graphic” works in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977), which states in pertinent part: ... [T]he design of a useful article * * * shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. ... In the present case, it is clear that the structure, sequence, and layout of the audiovisual displays in “Print Shop” were dictated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations, and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones. ... Thus, the Court cannot accept defendant’s argument that the audiovisual displays of “Print Shop” fall outside the scope of “pictorial” or “graphic” works as set forth in § 101.

Section 101 treats an item as a useful article when its purpose is utilitarian and permits copyright protection only for pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that are separable from and independently exist apart from the article’s utilitarian aspects.

Whimsicality, Inc. v. Battat · filed 1998-11-23

The costumes at issue (including the costumes that Whimsicality wants to add) are “useful articles” as that term is defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101, and as that term is understood for copyright purposes. ... A “useful article” may be copyrightable, but only to the extent that the article “incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101; ... On the record before me, Whimsicality’s costumes do not meet this standard, and no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise.

Section 101 permits copyright protection for pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of a useful article when they can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article’s utilitarian aspects.

DELLAMORTE, LLC v. THE MICHAELS COMPANIES, INC. · filed 2022-01-27

A useful article is one that has “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information,” and may not receive copyright protection. ... However, “useful articles that ‘incorporate[] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article’ may be eligible for protection of those features alone.” ... A feature of a useful article is copyrightable if: (1) the feature can be “perceived as a two- or three- dimensional work of art separate from the useful article” and (2) the feature qualifies “as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful article.” ... Applying this reasoning to the Vampire Bat Mug, the Court perceives the bat sculpture, the waxing moon, and arch handle as a work separate from the useful article, the mug. ... Accordingly, only the cylindrical structure is a useful article, and is thus an unprotected element.

Section 101 treats a feature as non-utilitarian only when its sole function is to portray its own appearance or convey information; a feature that helps make another part of a work visible remains utilitarian.

GRONDIN v. FANATICS, INC. · filed 2023-05-24

But Mr. Grondin’s argument also fails on the merits. An article or feature of a work is not utilitarian where its function is “merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C § 101. That statutory text means what it says: that a feature is not utilitarian if its only function is to portray ifs own appearance or to convey information. ... If the sole function of Mr. Grondin’s air bubble was to portray its own appearance, like the novelty nose masks in Masquerade, then it would not be utilitarian under the statutory definition. But it is clear from Mr. Grondin’s pleadings that the air bubble’s function is not to portray its own appearance, but rather to help portray the water inside the puck.

Section 101 excludes useful articles from copyright protection unless their pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features can be identified separately from and exist independently of their utilitarian aspects.

Bolier & Co. v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc. · filed 2014-09-19

In addition to the originality requirement, the Copyright Act does not protect works that are useful articles defined as “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. To receive protection: [T]he design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

For renewal copyrights in works governed by the 1909 Act, § 101's definition of “children” does not control eligibility under § 304(a); who qualifies is determined by state law.

Stone v. Williams · filed 1992-07-13

We do not think § 101 commands a uniform federal definition of "children" for purposes of copyright renewals under § 304(a). ... We therefore hold that Stone is entitled to a share of copyright renewals under § 24 of the 1909 Act and under § 304(a) of the 1976 Act, despite having been adopted-out, since "children" for purposes of both sections is defined by state law.

Section 101 defines a person’s children as immediate offspring, whether legitimate or not, and legally adopted children, without a dependency requirement.

Saroyan v. William Saroyan Foundation · filed 1987-12-18

That Congress intended a broad and unqualified meaning to the term “children” is further indicated by the definition provided elsewhere in the Copyright Act: “A person’s children are that person’s immediate offspring, whether legitimate or not, and any children legally adopted by that person.”

Section 101 treats a directory as a copyright-protectable compilation of facts, even though the individual facts are not protected.

Konor Enterprises, Inc. v. Eagle Publications, Inc. · filed 1989-06-20

Directories can receive copyright protection as a “compilation,” as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Although facts contained in a telephone directory are not protected by the copyright laws, the directory itself is protected as a unique compilation of those facts.

Section 101 recognizes computer software as copyrightable subject matter, including program components that qualify as expression rather than ideas.

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-10-03

Computer software is subject to copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. A computer program is made up of several different components, including the source and object code, 2 the structure, sequence and/or organization of the program, the user interface, 3 and the function, or purpose, of the program. Whether a particular component of a program is protected by a copyright depends on whether it qualifies as an "expression" of an idea, rather than the idea itself.

Section 101 covers computer software as copyright-protectable subject matter.

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-10-03

Computer software is subject to copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 excludes purely functional, utilitarian, or mechanical aspects of a sculptural work from copyright protection, while original nonfunctional expression may be protected.

Lucky Break Wishbone Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co. · filed 2010-04-07

Purely functional, utilitarian, or mechanical aspects of a sculptural work may not receive copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101; ... They went beyond mere copying and did not serve a functional purpose; they were therefore sufficient to constitute original expression. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded on summary judgment that Lucky Break had a valid copyright in the Lucky Break wishbone.

Section 101 includes annotations among works eligible for copyright protection.

Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. · filed 2017-03-23

The Copyright Act itself specifically lists “annotations” in the works entitled to copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Here, Defendant argues that these annotations to the O.C.G.A. are not copyrightable, but the Court disagrees. The Court acknowledges that this is an unusual case because most official codes are not annotated and most annotated codes are not official. The annotations here are nonetheless entitled to copyright protection.

Section 101 excludes technical drawings from the statutory definition of a “work of visual art,” but a technical drawing may nevertheless be eligible for copyright protection.

Interior Electric Incorporated Nevada v. T.W.C. Construction, Inc. · filed 2020-02-12

Although Interior Electric references the defined term “work of visual art[]”—which does not include technical drawings—in its complaint, I find that Interior Electric nevertheless states a plausible claim that the template is a technical drawing eligible for copyright protection because of its description of the template.

Section 101 treats an original selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materials as protectable expression when the resulting work as a whole is an original work of authorship.

Morford v. Cattelan · filed 2022-07-06

While Morford is afforded no protection for the idea of a duct-taped banana or the individual components of his work, Morford may be able to claim some degree of copyright protection in the “selection, coordination, [and] arrangement” of these otherwise unprotectable elements. See Off Lease, 825 F. App’x at 726 (discussing copyrighted works “formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials . . . that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)). In particular, Morford can claim some copyright protection in the combination of his choices in color, positioning, and angling.

Section 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act permits an award of prejudgment interest, which ordinarily should be awarded to compensate a prevailing copyright owner.

Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. · filed 1989-09-27(b)

Indeed, the wording of the relevant patent statute was similar to that of Sec. 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act. ... We therefore hold that prejudgment interest is an available remedy under the 1909 Act.

Section 101 requires a work embodied in computer memory to persist for more than a transitory duration before it qualifies as a copy.

Cdk Global LLC v. Brnovich · filed 2021-10-25

But embodiment alone does not result in the creation of a copy; the embodiment must also persist for a period of more than transitory duration.

Section 101 defines a copy as a material object in which a work is fixed, requiring a sufficiently permanent or stable embodiment; a transient internet transmission alone is not a copy.

Imapizza, LLC v. At Pizza Limited · filed 2020-07-17

The Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed” and considers a work “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. We agree with the district court that this definition of copy does not include “ephemeral transmission of a picture across the internet.” Instead, the copy becomes “fixed” when the picture is reproduced for a viewer.

Section 101 defines “copies” and “fixed” broadly enough that a proposal can embody a computer program in a sufficiently permanent form to be perceived.

National Medical Advisory Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Medical Cost Reduction Systems, Inc., a… · filed 1989-09-29

Reading together the definitions of "copies" and "fixed" under 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101, 4 the proposal qualifies as a material object in which the work was embodied in a sufficiently permanent form to allow it to be perceived. See Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir.1979). The district court's finding that the proposal prepared by use of the MCC/UR program was a copy is not clearly erroneous.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent to permit reproduction.

James J. Andrien, in No. 90-5622 v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce Manahawkin Newspapers · filed 1991-04-03

The Copyright Act defines a work as "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when "its embodiment in a copy ... by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent ... to permit it to be ... reproduced." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. ... The critical phrase is "by or under the authority of the author." That statutory language and the Supreme Court's guidance produce a definition of an author as the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into an expression that is embodied in a copy by himself or herself, or who authorizes another to embody the expression in a copy.

Section 101's fixation concept requires a created work; a future work cannot yet be fixed.

Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc. · filed 1991-09-04

Since a “future” work, by definition, has not yet been created, it cannot be ... as that term is defined under 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's copy and fixation definitions allow intermediate copies to support copyright infringement without substantial similarity to the final product.

Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. · filed 1992-04-03

The court rejects Accolade’s argument that SEL must establish substantial similarity between Accolades’ final product and plaintiff’s and that intermediate copies do not provide a basis for copyright infringement. The language of the Copyright Act itself indicates no such limitation.

Section 101 treats a computer program loaded into RAM as a copy when the RAM representation is stable enough to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration; here, minutes or longer sufficed.

Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. Mai Systems Corp. · filed 1994-02-03

Rather, the Act requires only that the representation created in RAM be a “material object” that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In sum, where, as here, a copyrighted program is loaded into RAM and maintained there for minutes or longer, the RAM representation of the program is sufficiently “fixed” to constitute a “copy” under the Act.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when it is recorded by or under the authority of the author, and the court held that consented videotaping satisfies that definition.

Ahn v. Midway Manufacturing Co. · filed 1997-05-28

To be fixed in a tangible form, the work must be recorded by or under the authority of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Because plaintiffs’ consented to the videotaping, the definition of ‘fixed’ is satisfied.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when it is recorded by or under the author’s authority; an actor’s active participation and consent satisfies that requirement.

Fleet v. CBS, INC. · filed 1996-11-26

A work is fixed in a tangible of expression for purposes of the Act, only if recorded “by or under the authority of the author.” (17 U.S.C. § 101.) Here, appellants’ performances in the film were recorded with their active participation and consent.

Under § 101, a work is fixed when embodied in a copy sufficiently permanently or stably to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration, and a computer's RAM copy can satisfy that standard when an Internet user can perceive it with a computer.

Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distributors and Northwest Nexus, Inc. · filed 1997-11-13

“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Yet, a “copy” under the Act need not be potentially perceptible with the naked eye. ... In the instant case, the copy created by Northwest’s computer can be perceived with the aid of a machine or device, namely, the Internet user’s computer. ... Accordingly, the court rejects Northwest’s argument that its computer did not “copy” plaintiffs files when they were requested by Internet users.

Section 101 treats software as copied when it is fixed in a computer, including by installation or loading into memory for use.

Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-06-02

The language of the Copyright Act, case law, and common sense support the proposition that the installation of software onto a computer results in "copying" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. s 101 (defining "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device"); 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright s 8.08[A][1], at 8-113 (1997) ("Nimmer") (the Act's language "makes clear that the input of a work into a computer results in the making of a copy"); cf. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) ("the act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program").

Section 101 treats a work as fixed in the arrangement embedded in a material object and perceived by a machine without an uninvited user manipulation or rearrangement of the data.

Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., Hyperlaw, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee v. West Publishing Co. West Publishing Cor · filed 1998-11-03

But the relevant statutory wording refers to material objects in which “a work” readable by technology “is fixed,” not to another work or works that can be created, unbidden, by using technology to alter the fixed embedding of the work, by rearrangement or otherwise. The natural reading of the statute is that the arrangement of the work is the one that can be perceived by a machine without an uninvited manipulation of the data.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration; repeatable software output from identical input satisfies that requirement.

Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin · filed 2001-03-30

A work, in turn, is “fixed” when “its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Here, Spielberg created the Software which, in response to an end-user’s input of a particular term, sifts through the Database, reorganizes it according to its algorithm, and then creates a matrix that displays that search term. Although the matrixes do not appear either in the Software or the Database, they are “fixed” insofar as the output is repeatable whenever the input is identical. That is to say, each time an end-user inputs the phrase “Yitzhak Rabin,” the Software will produce the same matrix.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when it is embodied in a copy sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Costar Group, Incorporated v. Loopnet, Incorporated · filed 2004-06-21

And the term "copies" refers to "material objects ... in which a work is fixed. " 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("Definitions") (emphasis added). A work is "fixed" in a medium when it is embodied in a copy "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. " Id. (emphasis added).

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when it is embodied in a copy sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc. · filed 2004-06-21

In concluding that an ISP has not itself fixed a copy in its system of more than transitory duration when it provides an Internet hosting service to its subscribers, we do not hold that a computer owner who downloads copyrighted software onto a computer cannot infringe the software’s copyright.

Section 101 treats a literary work as fixed when an idea is first transferred into a written form containing original expression.

TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Productions, Inc. · filed 2004-11-24

Literary works are fixed in a medium when they are for the first time transferred from ideas to fixed and written form containing an original expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Toney v. L'OreaL Usa, Inc., the Wella Corporation, and Wella Personal Care of North America, Inc. · filed 2005-06-21

The Act’s definitional section explains that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression “when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Applying the facts of this case to the requirements for preemption, we find that Toney’s identity is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when it is recorded by or under the authority of its author.

Leto v. RCA Corp. · filed 2004-10-25

To be “fixed” in tangible form, a work must be recorded “by or under the authority of the author,” here Zacchini.

Section 101 requires a work to be embodied in a copy by or under the authority of the author to be fixed.

Leto v. RCA Corp. · filed 2004-10-26

To be “fixed” in tangible form, a work must be recorded “by or under the authority of the author,” here Zacchini.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration; a person's identity or persona is not fixed merely because an image of that person is fixed in a photograph.

Toney, June v. L'Oreal USA Inc · filed 2005-05-06

A person’s likeness—her persona—is not authored and it is not fixed.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment is stable enough to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration, and includes photographs within pictorial works.

Toney, June v. L'Oreal USA Inc · filed 2004-09-21

The Act’s definitional section, § 101, explains that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression “when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Section 101 also states that pictoral works include photographs. Id. Therefore, the photographs of Toney’s likeness are the subject matter of copyright.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Stanford v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2006-05-01

A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.

Section 101 requires fixation in a sufficiently permanent or stable medium, so a perishable bowl of food is not fixed for copyright purposes.

Kim Seng Co. v. J & a IMPORTERS, INC. · filed 2011-08-30

Like a garden, which is “inherently changeable,” a bowl of perishable food will, by its terms, ultimately perish. Indeed, if the fact that the Wildflower Works garden reviving itself each year was not sufficient to establish its fixed nature, a bowl of food which, once it spoils is gone forever, cannot be considered “fixed” for the purposes of § 101.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Ray v. ESPN, Inc. · filed 2015-04-22

A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. ... The filming of Ray's wrestling performances clearly generated an "original work[] of authorship," id. at § 102(a), that was "'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression" and could be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated," id. at § 101. The films, therefore, are within the subject matter of copyright law.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent and stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Krawiec v. Manly · filed 2016-01-22

“Significantly for this case, “a work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . , by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent and stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” Id. § 101. ... Plaintiffs here have not alleged that their “original ideas for dance productions” have been commemorated or memorialized in any way or exist in any tangible medium of expression, including through film or videographic means.”

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for more than a transitory duration, and the court held that photographs satisfy this standard.

Maloney v. T3media, Inc. · filed 2017-04-05

There is also no doubt that a photograph is “sufficiently permanent” to permit it to be perceived “for more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a copy as a material object in which a work is fixed, and fixation requires an embodiment sufficiently permanent or stable to last more than a transitory duration.

Imapizza, LLC v. at Pizza Limited · filed 2018-09-24

A “copy” is a “material object[] . . . in which a work is fixed,” and a “work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when embodied in a copy, by or under the author's authority, with sufficient permanence to permit perception, reproduction, or communication for more than a transitory duration.

Mourabit v. Klein · filed 2020-06-08

Under the Copyright Act, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . , by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Here, the Makeup Artistry—i.e., the work that Mourabit asserts is the subject of his state law claims—was plainly fixed in Klein’s Photograph. When Klein photographed Lewis during the Photo Shoot, he physically embodied Mourabit’s Makeup Artistry in the Photograph, thereby allowing the work to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101; ... Although Klein, not Mourabit, took the Photograph, that fact is of no import here because a work of authorship may be fixed “by or under the authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Mourabit plainly consented to the photographing of his work by Klein: after all, creating such a Photograph was the goal of the Photo Shoot. Thus, the fixation of his Makeup Artistry in the Photograph occurred under Mourabit’s authority.

Section 101 treats a work as a “copy” when it is fixed in a material object from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated; embedding content hosted on a third-party server does not create such a copy.

Chosen Figure LLC v. Kevin Frazier Productions, Inc. · filed 2023-07-19

“‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Embedded content remains stored on the third-party servers, such as Instagram, and does not create an infringing copy. ... By publishing the Story as part of its Article, KFP “fixed” the Photograph in a “tangible means of expression” and infringed upon Chosen Figure’s exclusive right to public display. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).

Section 101 requires a work to be fixed—sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than transitory duration—for copyright protection.

Munro v. United States Copyright Office · filed 2024-03-18

Moreover, the Board could not even determine whether the curled fiber was fixed in its position, a requirement for copyright protection. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Fixation in tangible form is not merely a statutory condition to copyright. It is also a constitutional necessity.”) (citation omitted); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work as “fixed” when it is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”). Thus, far from abusing its discretion, the Board in fact provided both factual and legal bases for discounting the arrangement of the optic fiber as reflecting sufficient creativity.

Section 101’s definitions of copies and fixation cover a scanned image stored in computer memory long enough to be perceived or manipulated.

Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc. · filed 1999-07-12

This Court finds that Defendant’s scanning of the 1998 Image and input of this precursor image into its computer, in preparation for further graphic manipulation and insertion into its own works, constitutes an act of copyright infringement as a matter of law.

Section 101 defines a copy as the material object in which a work is fixed. Which video game component is the copy depends on the facts; here, the ROMs were the copies of the audiovisual works.

United States v. Goss · filed 1989-10-17

This answer misconceives the statutory definition of “copies”: “work” and “copy” are not synonymous terms; rather, a copy is the material object in which a work is fixed. ... All of the evidence adduced at trial showed that the ROMs were the copies. A jury could not reasonably have found otherwise.

Section 101 requires a copy to be fixed in a tangible form; computer files and printouts made during reverse engineering can meet that requirement.

Sega Enterprises Ltd., a Japanese Corporation v. Accolade, Inc., a California Corporation · filed 1993-01-06

In order to constitute a “copy” for purposes of the Act, the allegedly infringing work must be fixed in some tangible form, “from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The computer file generated by the disassembly program, the printouts of the disassembled code, and the computer files containing Accolade’s modifications of the code that were generated during the reverse engineering process all satisfy that requirement.

Section 101’s definition of a copy includes a temporary copy made in a computer’s RAM when a person browses a website.

Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc. · filed 1999-12-06

When a person browses a website, and by so doing displays the Handbook, a copy of the Handbook is made in the computer’s random access memory (RAM), to permit viewing of the material. And in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who browsed infringes the copyright.

Section 101 requires a work to be fixed in a tangible medium by or under the authority of its author.

Garcia v. Google, Inc. · filed 2015-05-18

For better or for worse, Youssef and his crew “fixed” Garcia’s performance in the tangible medium, whether in physical film or in digital form. However one might characterize Garcia’s performance, she played no role in fixation. On top of this, Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s ultimate rendition or. how she was portrayed in Innocence of Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the film or her cameo in it was fixed “by or under [her] authority.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used to bring about a result, covering the program instructions but not the data produced by executing them.

Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enterprise, Inc. · filed 2014-08-06

17 U.S.C. § 101 provides that, “A ‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” This Congressional definition indicates that protection for computer programs includes program instructions, or the software code that tells the microprocessor what to do, but not program data which is stored somewhere in memory and often changes as the program instructions are being executed by the microprocessor. The program data is the result sought by execution of the program instructions. Thus, the statements that manipulate the data would fall within the statutory definition, while the data that result from those calculations would not. ... Here the “job files” and other documents produced by the program are “data” not covered by the program’s copyright.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc. v. Dowell · filed 2013-01-23

A computer program, for purposes of the federal Copyright Act, is defined as a “set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Computer Mgmt Asst v. Robert F deCastro · filed 2000-09-18

The Copyright Act defines a computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Computer Management Assistance Company v. Robert F. Decastro, Inc. Information Management Consultants & Associates, Inc. · filed 2000-07-25

The Copyright Act defines a computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about certain results.

Cognotec Services Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. · filed 1994-08-17

A computer program is “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about certain results.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats software as a computer program when it consists of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result.

Synergistic Technologies, Inc. v. IDB Mobile Communications, Inc. · filed 1994-12-15

Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... At the same time, a key element of the Statement of Work is the provision and delivery of computer software “to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”— namely, the ability of IDB’s earth stations to facilitate satellite communications. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, the Court finds that the software provided to IDB pursuant to the Statement of Work constitutes a computer “program” for purposes of § 117 of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Levy v. Commissioner · filed 1992-08-19

A computer program has been defined since the copyright statute was amended in 1980 in 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 , as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." ... The record shows that petitioner owned an asset that included a source code which fit the definition of a program under the copyright law.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. · filed 1991-08-09

A computer program, as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, “is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.”

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Cable/Home Communication Corporation v. Network Productions, Inc. · filed 1990-06-04

The Copyright Act extends protection to computer programs. ... A "computer program" is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.

Section 101’s definition of a computer program can encompass literal and nonliteral elements of a user interface when they are integrated into the program’s means of communicating instructions to produce a result.

Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International · filed 1990-06-28

It is not, though, the screen display itself, in this narrow sense, that is a copyrightable “computer program” — that is, “a set of statements or instructions ... to bring about a certain result,” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The screen display, understood in this narrow sense, is useless for this purpose unless it is integrated with other parts of the computer program so as to become indirectly part of the means by which the user communicates instructions through the total program to bring about the desired result.

Section 101's computer-program definition does not require the instructions to be a complete set before they can be part of a program.

Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1991-08-01

Although the statutory definition defines a program as “a set ... of instructions,” nothing in this definition compels the conclusion that the program label attaches to the instructions only as a complete set.

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems Inc. · filed 1992-04-21

A “computer program” which is “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result” is a copyrightable work.

Section 101's literary-works category includes computer programs expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.

Atari Games Corp. And Tengen, Inc. v. Nintendo of America Inc. And Nintendo Co., Ltd. · filed 1992-11-17

As works “expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,” computer programs fall within the terms of the 1976 Act.

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result, and protection for data structures depends on their being part of the whole program rather than independently producing a result.

Baystate Technologies, Inc. v. Bentley System, Inc. · filed 1996-12-06

For copyright purposes, a “computer program” is defined as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 Accordingly, the computer program comprising CAD-KEY is copyright protected (if the appropriate procedures are followed) but because the data structures at issue in this case do not bring about any result on their own, they are copyright protected, if at all, only as a part of the whole computer program.

Section 101 defines a computer program broadly as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result, encompassing source code created with Professional File.

Quinn v. City of Detroit · filed 1998-09-29

Pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act, a “computer program” is defined as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. This very broad definition encompasses Quinn’s creation because he authored a set of statements or instructions, admittedly using the syntax and symbols dictated by Professional File, ordering these statements or instructions in such a way as to produce certain outcomes.

Section 101 defines literary works to include works expressed in words, numbers, or verbal or numerical symbols, and defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result.

SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp. · filed 2005-09-09

The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” including “literary works.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(1). “Literary works” are “works ... expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.” Id. § 101. By amendment in 1980, Congress explicitly provided copyright protection to computer programs. 180 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2005); 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”). Literal elements of computer programs, such as source and object codes, are entitled to copyright protection.

Section 101 places computer programs within the category of literary works.

Thoroughbred Software International, Inc. v. Dice Corp. · filed 2006-07-21

Computer programs fall within the definition of literary works.

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson · filed 2006-08-30

The Copyright Act defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result; the court applied that broad understanding to include a database schema embodied in the registered program.

DSMC, INC. v. Convera Corp. · filed 2007-03-27

A computer program is “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Based on this broad understanding of the nonliteral elements of computer programs, the Court finds that the database schema was “embodied in” the computer program registered with the Copyright Office.

Section 101 defines a computer program and the Copyright Act protects both source and object code.

Quantlab Technologies Ltd.(BVI) v. Godlevsky · filed 2010-06-23

The Copyright Act extends protection to both forms of “computer code.”

Section 101 places computer programs within the copyright regime, giving them the Act’s exclusive rights while subjecting those rights to ordinary copyright limitations such as fair use.

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. · filed 2021-07-08

By defining computer programs in §101, Congress chose to place this subject matter within the copyright regime. Like other protected works, that means that the owners of computer programs enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, including the right to “reproduce [a] copyrighted work” or to “prepare derivative works.” 17 U. S. C. §106. But that also means that exclusive rights in computer programs are limited like any other works.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

IBM Corporation v. Micro Focus (US), Inc. · filed 2023-06-08

“It is well-established that computer programs are protected by copyright law as literary works. ... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”).”

Section 101 treats each computer-program version containing new, copyrightable authorship as a separate work.

Engineering and Software System Solutions, Inc. v. Cusatis · filed 2024-03-29

Although each version of a computer program that contains new, copyrightable authorship is considered a separate work, 17 U.S.C. § 101, versions representing “only a few minor changes or revisions to a preexisting work or making changes or revisions of a rote nature that are predetermined by the functional considerations of the hardware” may be covered by the same registration. ... As a result, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the “version” of the code Dr. Cusatis had access to from 2018 to 2019 remains protected by the Plaintiff’s 2022 registration.

Section 101 places computer programs within the copyright regime, so their exclusive rights remain subject to ordinary copyright limitations such as fair use.

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. · filed 2021-04-05

We do not understand Congress, however, to have shielded computer programs from the ordinary application of copyright’s limiting doctrines in this way. By defining computer programs in §101, Congress chose to place this subject matter within the copyright regime. Like other protected works, that means that the owners of computer programs enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, including the right to “reproduce [a] copyrighted work” or to “prepare derivative works.” 17 U. S. C. §106. But that also means that exclusive rights in computer programs are limited like any other works.

Section 101 defines a computer program to include instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer, placing computer programs within the Copyright Act and subjecting their exclusive rights to the Act's ordinary limitations.

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. · filed 2021-05-03

We do not understand Congress, however, to have shielded computer programs from the ordinary application of copyright’s limiting doctrines in this way. By defining computer programs in §101, Congress chose to place this subject matter within the copyright regime. Like other protected works, that means that the owners of computer programs enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, including the right to “reproduce [a] copyrighted work” or to “prepare derivative works.” 17 U. S. C. §106. But that also means that exclusive rights in computer programs are limited like any other works.

A computer program’s selection and arrangement of formulas, constants, and variables can contain enough creative expression to qualify for copyright protection.

Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. · filed 2003-02-27

Lexmark’s unique creative computer programming language and its selection and arrangement of appropriate approximation techniques, including the selection, arrangement, and particular expression of formulas, constants, and variables that comprise the Toner Loading Programs contain the requisite amount of creativity for the Toner Loading Programs to qualify for copyright protection.

Section 101’s useful-article limitations do not apply to computer programs, which are literary works.

EF Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America · filed 1985-12-13

Accordingly, the limitations placed on the copyrightability of useful articles by section 101 of the Act are simply not applicable here.

Section 101’s definition of a computer program includes software embedded in a ROM chip and software that communicates with a computer’s operating system.

Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc. · filed 1990-06-04

The Copyright Act extends protection to computer programs. ... We find persuasive and applicable in this case the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Franklin, analyzing not only the copyrightability of a program embedded on a ROM (Read Only Memory) or semi-conductor chip inserted into the circuitry of a computer, but also the copyright protection for a program communicating with the operating system of a computer as opposed to the user.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc. · filed 2014-05-09

Indeed, the statutory definition of “computer program” acknowledges that they function “to bring about a certain result.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result”).

Section 101's definition of transfer of copyright ownership excludes nonexclusive licenses, so a nonexclusive license for a particular purpose need not be in writing.

Johnson v. Jones · filed 1995-04-20

Consequently, in so far as the copyright laws are concerned, nonexclusive licenses to use copyrighted material for a particular purpose need not be in writing.

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so an oral nonexclusive license need not be in writing.

Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck · filed 1997-04-18

This is true because 17 U.S.C. § 101 excludes the assignment of nonexclusive licenses from the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership."

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so such licenses may be granted orally or implied by conduct.

Jacob Maxwell, Incorporated v. Veeck · filed 1997-05-13

This is true because 17 U.S.C. § 101 excludes the assignment of nonexclusive licenses from the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership."

Section 101 defines a nonexclusive license as permission to use a copyrighted work in a specified manner and does not require such a license to be in writing.

Saxelbye Architects v. First Citizens Bank · filed 1997-11-03

A "nonexclusive license" is the permission to use a copyrighted work in a particular specified manner, and, by statutory definition, "nonexclusive licenses" need not be in writing. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a nonexclusive license as something other than a transfer of copyright ownership.

Johnson v. Jones · filed 1998-07-21

It is also well-settled that a nonexclusive license is not a transfer of ownership, and is not, therefore, subject to the writing requirement of § 204. Effects, 908 F.2d at 558; 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's definition of a transfer of copyright ownership includes hypothecation, which covers security interests in the copyright.

Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In Re Cybernetic Services, Inc.) · filed 1999-09-29

The inclusion of “hypothecation” within the scope of what constitutes “transfer of copyright ownership” evidences an intent to include security interests.

Section 101 excludes an article from the “useful article” category when its only utilitarian function is portraying the article’s appearance, so separability analysis is unnecessary.

Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., and Everett Novak, an Individual · filed 1990-08-27

That nose masks are meant to be worn by humans to evoke laughter does not distinguish them from clearly copyrightable works of art like paintings. When worn by a human being, a nose mask may evoke chuckles and guffaws from onlookers. When hung on a wall, a painting may evoke a myriad of human emotions, but we would not say that the painting is not copyrightable because its artistic elements could not be separated from the emotional effect its creator hoped it would have on persons viewing it. The utilitarian nature of an animal nose mask or a painting of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ inheres solely in its appearance, regardless of the fact that the nose mask’s appearance is intended to evoke mirth and the painting’s appearance a feeling of religious reverence. Thus, Masquerade’s nose masks are not “useful articles” for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 101, and are copyrightable as sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).

Section 101 defines performing a work as reciting, rendering, playing, dancing, or acting it directly or by a device or process, and defines transmitting as communicating a performance by a device or process so that sounds or images are received beyond the place sent.

Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews · filed 1990-09-13

To “perform a work” under copyright law means to “recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly of by means of any device or process-” 17 U.S.C. § 101. By playing music over a radio, defendants clearly “performed” the compositions “by means of [a] device” according to the plain language of this definition. To perform a work “publicly” means: ... Thus, because the defendants’ “performance” took place in their restaurant when it was open to the public, the performance was a “public performance” for the purposes of copyright law. The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that the defendants performed the protected works publicly. ... The copyright law defines “to transmit” as meaning “to communicate [a performance] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In the context of § 110(5), the courts have interpreted “to further transmit” to mean any dispersal of sound from a point of reception through a restaurant or other establishment. ... Thus, the Court concludes that defendants “further transmitted” radio broadcasts to the public.

Section 101 defines transmitting a performance as communicating it by a device or process so images or sounds are received beyond the place sent.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., D/B/A Claire's Boutiques, and D/B/A Arcadia · filed 1991-12-11

To “transmit” is “to communicate [a performance] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines “perform” to include playing a work and “publicly” to include performing it at an open public place or where a substantial number of outsiders gather, but playing a game in a tournament is not a “performance” under those definitions.

Allen v. Academic Games League of America, Inc. · filed 1996-07-12

“Perform” and “publicly” are defined in the Copyright Act as, respectively, “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or progress ...” and “to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered....” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In applying these statutory definitions to the playing of Allen’s games in a tournament setting, we conclude that the playing of a game is not a “performance” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 defines performing an audiovisual work as showing its images in sequence or making its accompanying sounds audible.

Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2000-07-26

The right to “perform” an audiovisual work means the right “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”

Section 101 defines “perform” broadly to include playing a work directly or through a device or process.

Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc. · filed 2012-01-12

Both the tracks played from the compact disc player and the compositions played by the live band were “performed” as that term is used in the Copyright Act. “To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines “perform” to include reciting, rendering, playing, dancing, or acting a work directly or through a device or process.

Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc. · filed 2012-02-16

Both the tracks played from the compact disc player and the compositions played by the live band were “performed” as that term is used in the Copyright Act. “To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats playing or communicating a work by a device or process as performing it, and treats transmission or communication to a public place or to the public as performing or displaying it publicly.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Jeep Sales & Service Co. · filed 1990-10-18

The term “perform” is defined in the Copyright Act as “to recite, render, play, dance or act ... either directly or by means of any device or process.... ” 17 U.S.C. § 101. To perform or display a work “publicly” within the definition of the Act means ... (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of any normal circle of a family and its social acquaintance is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Section 101 defines performing a work to include acting through a device or process, and defines performing publicly to include transmitting or communicating a performance to the public by such means, even when recipients are in separate places or receive it at different times.

National Cable Television Ass'n v. Broadcast Music, Inc. · filed 1991-08-16

To “perform” a work under the Act means “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act states that to perform “publicly” means to perform “at a place open to the public” or to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”

Section 101 treats displaying a work at a place open to the public by means of any device or process as a public performance.

EMI Mills Music, Inc. v. Empress Hotel, Inc. · filed 2006-09-20

the same occurs when the work is displayed “at a place open to the public... by means of any device or process....

Section 101 defines performing or displaying a work publicly to include performing it at a place open to the public or where a substantial number of outsiders are gathered.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Georgia Rib Co. · filed 2014-05-21

Abedi’s testimony that the music was played in the background of and exclusively for a private party in a back room, even if true, fails to show that GRC was not a “place open to the public” on the night in question.

Section 101 treats a secure test as unpublished; administering it alone does not publish it.

College Entrance Examination Board v. Cuomo · filed 1992-03-23

Thus, the mere fact that GMAC administers, the test, without more, is not enough to convert it into a published work for purposes of the Act.

Section 101 treats a useful article’s design as a pictorial or graphic work when its artistic features can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article’s utilitarian aspects; physical or conceptual separability satisfies this requirement.

Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc. · filed 2015-04-29

Separability for the purpose of assessing copyright eligibility of a useful article’s design means that the design is “either physically severable from the utilitarian article or conceptually severable.” ... The Glazed Maple design at issue here meets both tests: it is both physically and conceptually severable from the Time Crafted Maple flooring to which Mannington applied it. ... Because the design is both physically and conceptually severable from the flooring to which Mannington applied it, the district court erred when it determined the design was an uncopyrightable useful article.

Section 101 defines a useful article as having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the article's appearance or convey information.

Zahourek Systems v. Balanced Body University · filed 2020-07-21

A useful article is defined as “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under this definition, an item is not a “useful article” if its usefulness derives solely from its appearance. ... Like a toy airplane or nose mask, the Maniken has utility only because it portrays the appearance of something (the human body). ... So a material factual issue exists on whether the Maniken fits the statutory definition of a useful article.

Section 101 treats a work as created when it is first fixed in a copy, with each fixed portion or version constituting the work as of that time.

Rodrigue v. Rodrigue · filed 1999-02-12

A work is “created” when it is “fixed in a copy ... for the first time ... [W]here a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a computer program broadly enough to include statements used indirectly in a computer to bring about a result.

Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-04-28

Under the copyright laws, a “computer program” is “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Court finds that the SQL Data Structures here are a set of statements to be used indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. Accordingly, the SQL Data Structures are proper subject matter for copyright protection.

Section 101 treats a work of sounds or images being transmitted as “fixed” for Title 17 purposes when a fixation is made simultaneously with the transmission.

United States v. Moghadam · filed 1999-05-19

This result is based upon the last sentence of the definition of “fixed” in 17 U.S.C. § 101. That last sentence provides: “A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.” This definition creates a legal fiction that the simultaneous fixation occurs before the transmission and the unauthorized recording.

Section 101's definition of a work of visual art can cover an otherwise qualifying intermediate sculpture that is part of a larger project, and a clay sculpture used to create a larger bronze sculpture is not excluded merely because it is a model when it is recognized as a work of art in its own right.

Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc. · filed 2001-04-19

The statutory definition of “a work of visual art”, however, does not exclude an otherwise qualifying work simply because it is part of a larger project. ... Thus, regardless of its status as an impermanent or intermediate stage in the creation of the 35' bronze, the 35' clay sculpture falls under VARA’s protection if it meets the statutory definition of “a work of visual art.”

Section 101 defines “work of visual art” to include a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture only when it exists in a single copy or in a signed and consecutively numbered limited edition of 200 or fewer.

Maharishi Hardy Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. · filed 2003-12-08

Additionally, that statute is available only to “author[s] of a work of visual art.” ... The dragon images at issue here plainly do not qualify as “work[s] of visual art” under the statute. ... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art,” in relevant part as “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author ... ”).

Section 101 excludes advertising and promotional materials from the definition of a “work of visual art,” so VARA rights do not apply to reproductions of art on those materials.

Nogueras v. Home Depot · filed 2004-08-11(A)(ii)

In contrast to the above, however, the rights of attribution and integrity do not apply to reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other uses of the otherwise protected work when used in connection with those works specifically excluded from the definition of “works of visual art” under 17 U.S.C. Section 101. ... Based on the foregoing, it is clear that VARA does not afford a right of action to plaintiff for the unauthorized reproduction of his work upon the “posters” or “shoppers” i.e. “advertising or promotional material” that were printed or published by defendants in their stores.

Section 101 excludes models and technical drawings from the definition of “works of visual art,” placing them outside the category of works protected by VARA.

National Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle · filed 2005-02-11

Although this argument is plausible based on the Copyright Act’s definition of works of visual art, it fails when considered in light of the Act’s exclusions from that definition. In particular, the Act excludes both “models” and “technical drawings” from the definition of works • of visual art. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Thus, this court concludes that Scharle’s drawings are excluded from the definition of works of visual art.

Section 101’s definition of a “work of visual art” excludes Bretford’s table, so the table is not protected under § 106A.

Bretford Mfg Inc v. Smith System Mfg Co · filed 2005-08-08

Bretford’s table is not a “work of visual art” under §106A (and the definition in 17 U.S.C. §101).

Section 101's definition of a “work of visual art” does not cover Bretford’s table.

Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Corporation · filed 2005-08-08

Bretford’s table is not a “work of visual art” under § 106A (and the definition in 17 U.S.C. § 101).

Section 101 limits a work of visual art to specified artistic works, including qualifying limited-edition photographic images, and excludes technical drawings such as architectural plans.

Landrau v. Betancourt · filed 2007-05-21

A work of visual art is defined as a painting, drawing, print, sculpture or photographic images in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer and which are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. ... VARA excludes from coverage technical drawings, such as architectural plans. ... Accordingly, because the project does not fall under the definition of a work of visual art, any VARA claims against Solis-Betancourt must be dismissed.

Section 101 excludes advertising and promotional material from the definition of a protected work of visual art.

Rivera v. Mendez & Co. · filed 2011-08-05

Therefore, even though the reproductions of Plaintiffs works may in fact be unauthorized, the infringing uses alleged by Plaintiff do not garner the protections of either VARA or PRIPA, as these works were originally created to advertise and promote the various HJF’s.

Section 101 defines a work of visual art to include a painting existing in a single copy or a qualifying limited edition, subject to statutory exceptions.

Trombetta v. Novocin · filed 2019-10-02

The Act defines a “work of visual art” as “a painting ... existing in a single copy” or “in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author,” subject to several exceptions not relevant here. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Trombetta’s allegations that Defendants have attributed her name as the artist who painted the painting at issue are plausible. She has attached to her Complaint an advertisement, seemingly authored by Estate, which proclaims that she is the author of the single painting at issue and which includes a copy of her biography from her personal website. The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that Trombetta has not alleged that the painting existed in a single copy, because she asserts that her name was falsely attributed to a single painting.

Section 101 excludes technical drawings and architectural works embodied in buildings from the definition of a “work of visual art.”

Designworks Homes, Inc. v. Columbia House of Brokers Realty, Inc. · filed 2019-11-06

In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the drawings on which the structure at 1713 Kenilworth is based are technical drawings. Under the plain language of § 101, technical drawings are among the works of authorship not included in the definition of “a work of visual art.” Because technical drawings are specifically excluded from this category, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment to the extent Designworks alleges violation of VARA with reference to the underlying drawings for 1713 Kenilworth. ... Because “an architectural work embodied in a building does not fall within the definition of a work of visual art,” Designworks cannot establish a VARA violation based on the Design as incorporated into the residence located at 1713 Kenilworth.

Section 101 defines a “work of visual art” to exclude books and requires paintings or drawings to exist in a single copy or in a signed, consecutively numbered limited edition of 200 or fewer.

Purohit v. Legend Pictures, LLC · filed 2020-03-24

Section 106A only applies to “works of visual art.” “A work of visual art” is “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “A work of visual art does not include any . . . book.” Id. Plaintiff’s copyrighted work is a book, which is explicitly exempt from being “a work of visual art.”

Section 101(1) limits a protected work of visual art to a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture existing in a single copy or in a signed, consecutively numbered edition of 200 copies or fewer.

Santaella v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 2020-04-03(1)

But VARA’s protections extend only to a “work of visual art,” a term that the statute defines to mean “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy [or] in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). The complaint does not allege that the Design exists only as “a single copy” or “in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”

Section 101 excludes applied art and promotional materials from the definition of a protected work of visual art under VARA, with applied art turning on whether the work retains a real utilitarian function.

Lew v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2021-12-22

However, “applied art” is excluded from VARA protection under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing that a “work of visual art does not include” any poster, map globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . .”). ... Under the Cheffins test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the La Contessa, a mobile replica of a 16th-century Spanish galleon, was applied art because it was built on top of an operational school bus. ... In applying the Cheffins test to this case, factual issues remain as to whether the underlying canvases used for each of Plaintiff’s works initially served a utilitarian function and if so, whether they continued to serve a largely practical function after the works were complete. ... For these reasons, the court declines to find that Plaintiff’s works constitute “applied art.” ... The VARA statute excludes “any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, packaging material or container” from protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In contrast to the facts in Kleinman, Plaintiff alleges that he was asked to “showcase” his “original art at the exhibit.” ... Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that his artwork was a component of the exhibit. As such, the court finds that the “promotional materials” exclusion does not warrant dismissal.

Section 101 excludes applied art, merchandising items, and promotional materials from the definition of a work of visual art; applied art turns on whether the object continues to serve a real utilitarian function, while artwork that is merely part of an exhibit is not thereby promotional material.

Lew v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2022-01-06

However, “applied art” is excluded from VARA protection under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing that a “work of visual art does not include” any poster, map globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . .”). ... In applying the Cheffins test to this case, factual issues remain as to whether the underlying canvases used for each of Plaintiff’s works initially served a utilitarian function and if so, whether they continued to serve a largely practical function after the works were complete. ... For these reasons, the court declines to find that Plaintiff’s works constitute “applied art.” ... The VARA statute excludes “any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, packaging material or container” from protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In contrast to the facts in Kleinman, Plaintiff alleges that he was asked to “showcase” his “original art at the exhibit.” (FAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiff does not allege that he was asked to create works symbolic of the museum or that reflected the museum’s image or culture. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that his artwork was a component of the exhibit. As such, the court finds that the “promotional materials” exclusion does not warrant dismissal.

Section 101 excludes motion pictures and other audiovisual works from its definition of a “work of visual art.”

Promedev LLC v. Wilson · filed 2024-04-11

Although Section 106A provides a limited exception to the registration requirement for “work[s] of visual art,” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a), the Copyright Act explicitly excludes “motion picture[s] or other audiovisual work[s]” from the definition of a “work of visual art,” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a “work of visual art” to include a sculpture existing in a single copy, and an allegation that a sculpture exists in a single copy suffices under that definition.

Goszczynska · filed 2025-09-30

Even if this argument were not waived, it rests on a misreading of 17 U.S.C. § 101, which defines a “work of visual art” as “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy.” Plaintiff’s allegation that Gleam is a “sculpture” that exists “in a single copy only,” Am. Compl. ¶ 34, therefore suffices.

Section 101’s definition of a work of visual art does not cover an entire park merely because an artist’s sculptures and stone elements form part of it.

Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2003-10-24

The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that the Park as a whole is a work of visual art.

Section 101 excludes an image created specifically for use on merchandise from the definition of a work of visual art.

Beard v. Helman · filed 2022-03-31

The Court concludes that the Image does not qualify as a work of visual art pursuant to Section 101.

Section 101's definition of “copyright owner” does not exclude state or local governments, so a county may own a copyright under the Copyright Act.

County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate Solutions · filed 2001-07-25

Nor is there an indication in the statute that copyright ownership is limited to private persons. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("'Copyright owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right."); id. § 102 (noting simply that copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship..."). ... Thus, Suffolk County may own a copyright under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 does not limit copyright ownership to private persons, so a county may own copyright in its tax maps.

County of Suffolk v. First American Real Estate Solutions · filed 2001-07-25

Thus, Suffolk County may own a copyright under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 excludes promotional displays from the definition of a “work of visual art” protected by VARA.

Pollara v. Seymour · filed 2002-05-30

Therefore, it is also held that the mural was a promotional display within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101, and not a “work of visual art” for purposes of VARA.

Section 101 excludes advertising and promotional materials from the definition of a work of visual art protected by VARA, regardless of whether the promotion is commercial or artistic.

Pollara v. Joseph J. Seymour and Thomas E. Casey, John Does · filed 2003-09-19

Congress chose to exclude from the scope of VARA all advertising and promotional materials, regardless of whether the thing being promoted or advertised was a commercial product or (as here) a particular advocacy group’s lobbying efforts, and regardless of whether the work being used to promote or advertise might otherwise be called a painting, drawing, or sculpture.

Section 101 defines a sound recording as a work resulting from fixation of musical, spoken, or other sounds, excluding sounds accompanying a motion picture or audiovisual work.

Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2011-08-30

A “sound recording” is a “work[ ] that result[s] ... fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects ... in which they are embodied.”

Section 101 defines a sound recording as a work resulting from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.

Tufamerica, Inc. v. Diamond · filed 2013-09-10

sound recordings are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.