17 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(2) permits a work-for-hire agreement signed after creation if the writing confirms the parties’ understanding when the work was created and satisfies the signed-writing requirement.

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc. · filed 2001-06-28(2)

Moreover, because the Court finds that the Second Circuit’s rule appropriately allows for a flexible, case-by-case inquiry into the existence of a work-for-hire agreement, the Court adopts it, and holds that the three overriding questions in the matter are: (1) whether the language of the Ergonome-Gruber agreement was sufficient to meet the writing requirement of § 101(2); (2) if so, whether Ergonome and Gruber understood at the time the photographs were created that the works were made for hire; and (3) whether the Ergonome-Gruber agreement was signed by both parties or by their authorized agents.

Section 101 requires a signed writing expressing the parties’ intent for a specially ordered or commissioned contribution to a collective work to qualify as a work made for hire.

Numbers Licensing, LLC v. Bvisual USA, Inc. · filed 2009-07-15(2)

A signed writing expressing the intent to have a work-made-for-hire is a prerequisite to establishing a collective work. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). ... The Court finds that the second work-made-for-hire exception is inapplicable. Neither party produced a signed, written agreement expressing an intent to place initial ownership rights with bVisual. The work-made-for-hire exception therefore lacks the necessary writing component.

Section 101 treats a commissioned work as made for hire only when the parties sign a written agreement specifying that status and defines a compilation as an original selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materials.

Want Ad Digest, Inc. v. Display Advertising, Inc. · filed 2009-09-03

Under the current statute, a classified advertisement may be considered a “work for hire” which absolutely vests all copyrights in the person placing the advertisement, only if: ... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). ... In the present instance, Want Ad is clearly not an employee of those placing ads in the Want Ad Digest, rendering subsection (1) irrelevant. ... Further, subsection (2) is inapplicable because there is no written statement between the parties that indicates the classified advertisements are to be considered works made for hire. Thus, the classified advertisements appearing in the Want Ad Digest are not works made for hire, and Want Ad’s claim of infringement as to these advertisements is not defeated by defendants invocation of the “work for hire” doctrine under Brattleboro.

Section 101 defines work made for hire and excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so those licenses need not satisfy section 204(a)'s writing requirement.

Xtomic, LLC v. Active Release Techniques, LLC · filed 2018-09-13

Section 101 of the Act defines "transfer of copyright ownership" to include exclusive licenses, but expressly excludes nonexclusive licenses. See id. § 101; Effects Assoc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, even though section 204(a) invalidates any transfer of copyright ownership not in writing, section 101 explicitly removes a nonexclusive license from the section 204(a) writing requirement. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).

Section 101 defines a phonorecord as a material object in which sounds are fixed, recognizes edited sound recordings as compilations, and limits protection for sculptural works to their artistic form rather than mechanical or utilitarian aspects.

Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. · filed 1983-12-13

Any “material objects in which sounds ... are fixed” is a “phonorecord” under 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The sound recording was recorded at an actual hockey game but was then extensively edited down to a short segment that qualifies as a “compilation” pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The hockey players and game board are not barred from holding copyright by the requirement that “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” works “shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned____” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit perception, reproduction, or communication for more than transitory duration.

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. · filed 1983-04-25

Section 101 now provides “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”

Section 101 treats a transmitted work as fixed when it is recorded simultaneously with transmission, but that fixation does not bar an independent simultaneous live telecast.

Production Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. · filed 1985-11-29

Even if the parade itself is not copyrightable, its telecast might be entitled to copyright protection if it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Section 101 provides that a “work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Further, the Court holds that the telecast of the parade is a work of authorship fixed simultaneously with its transmission only for purposes of copyright protection from videotaping, tape-delays, or secondary transmissions. This protection does not extend to prevent another simultaneous live telecast by another television or radio station. ... Therefore, WLS’ live telecast is not sufficiently “fixed” to prevent WGN’s simultaneous live telecast of the parade.

Section 101 defines a sound recording as a fixation of musical, spoken, or other sounds, excluding sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.

Jarvis v. a & M RECORDS · filed 1993-04-27

works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords in which they are embodied.

Section 101 defines literary works broadly to include material expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.

Lowry’s Reports v. Legg Mason, Inc. · filed 2003-05-29

“Literary works” encompass not only the plays of Shakespeare, but anything “expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”

Section 101 defines literary works broadly as works expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols, regardless of the material object in which they are embodied.

Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2005-07-19

Congress defines literary works as “works ... expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols ... regardless of the nature of the material objects.”

Section 101 treats a literary work as copyrightable regardless of the type of material object in which it is embodied.

A Slice of Pie Productions, LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entertainment · filed 2005-09-21

literary works are subject to copyright “regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonoree-ords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.”

Section 101 defines a copy by fixation in a material object, requires a derivative work to include original authorship, and excludes advertising material from the definition of a work of visual art protected by VARA.

Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc. · filed 2010-07-12

A “copy” is defined as a tangible form or “material object” in which a work is “fixed by any method now known or later developed,” and from which that work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 28 U.S.C. § 101. ... Based on the applicable law and the undisputed facts, Teter has not established that GOI infringed § 106(2) by creating derivative works because the copy images are not an “original work of authorship” that constitute a derivative work under § 101, nor has Teter established that GOI unlawfully distributed copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership under § 106(3). ... GOI’s electronic images are used for advertising purposes and fall comfortably within the works that are excluded from liability under the VARA. The VARA does not protect “any merchandising items or advertising” presumably because the intent in such items is to successfully promote the artist, which requires preserving integrity in how the artist’s work is portrayed. ... Because GOI’s digital images are not within the definition of a “work of visual art” under the VARA, there is no basis for Teter’s cause of action and summary judgment is GRANTED.

Section 101 expressly applies the federal copyright law to Puerto Rico.

Pancorbo v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 1984-06-04

La nueva ley federal, como la anterior, se aplica expresamente a Puerto Rico. 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 (1976).

Section 101 defines a copyrightable compilation to include a collection of data whose selection, coordination, or arrangement makes the work as a whole original.

Dennis W. Eckes and James Beckett, III v. Card Prices Update and Suffolk Collectables · filed 1984-06-08

The Act defines a compilation as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or' arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. § 101. ... Nevertheless, our cases do not hold that subjective selection and arrangement of information does not merit protection. ... We have no doubt that appellants exercised selection, creativity and judgment in choosing among the 18,000 or so different baseball cards in order to determine which were the 5,000 premium cards. Accordingly, we believe that the Guide merits protection under the copyright laws.

Section 101 extends copyright protection to a compilation when its selection, coordination, and arrangement show the minimal creativity required for originality.

Metropolitan Regional Information Systems, Inc. v. American Home Realty Network, Inc. · filed 2012-08-24

The Court finds that the MRIS Database exhibits the requisite originality for copyright protection.

Section 101 defines a compilation as a work made by selecting, coordinating, or arranging preexisting materials so that the work as a whole is an original authorship.

Tomaydo-Tomahhdo LLC v. Vozary · filed 2015-10-20

A compilation is a “work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... As a matter of law, Tomaydo has not shown that any aspect of their recipe book is original and would therefore enjoy copyright protection.

Section 101 defines a compilation as preexisting material selected, coordinated, or arranged into an original work of authorship.

Vaad L'Hafotzas Sichos, Inc. v. Krinsky · filed 2015-09-30

Both compilations and derivative works start with preexisting material. In a compilation, the preexisting material is “selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a compilation as collected preexisting materials or data selected, coordinated, or arranged so that the resulting work as a whole is original.

Experian Information Solutions v. Nationwide Marketing Services · filed 2018-06-27

factual compilations are entitled to some protection as long as there is creativity in the selection, arrangement, or coordination of the facts.

Section 101 treats a transmission as a public performance when it communicates the work to the public, whether directly or indirectly and regardless of whether the transmitter originates, concludes, or merely carries the signal.

Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc. · filed 1984-08-23

The court agrees that under the broad definitions found in § 101 of the Act, a transmission is a public performance whether made directly or indirectly to the public and whether the transmitter originates, concludes or simply carries the signal.

Section 101 treats a performance as public when it occurs at a place open to the public; private viewing booths within a public video store do not change that result.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc. · filed 1984-11-23

“To perform a work means ... in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Clearly, playing a video cassette results in a sequential showing of a motion picture’s images and in making the sounds accompanying it audible. Thus, Maxwell’s activities constitute a performance under section 101. ... Section 101 also states that to perform a work “publicly” means “[t]o perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” ... We find it unnecessary to examine the second part of the statutory definition because we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Maxwell’s was open to the public. ... The relevant “place” within the meaning of section 101 is each of Maxwell’s two stores, not each individual booth within each store. Simply because the cassettes can be viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that Maxwell’s is unquestionably open to the public.

Section 101 treats a performance at a place open to the public as a public performance, even when customers view the work in private rooms, and the customers’ performances at the Nickelodeon were therefore public performances.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc. · filed 1985-06-28

The major dispute between the parties is whether the videocassettes are performed “publicly.” The copyright statute defines this phrase: ... To perform ... a work “publicly” means ... (1) To perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or ... (2) To transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. ... The Nickelodeon is open to the public just as Maxwell's was open to the public. The cassettes are performed at the Nickelodeon by Nickelodeon customers and the cassettes are therefore publicly performed.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when it is fixed simultaneously with its transmission and defines a public performance or display as one made to a substantial number of people outside the normal circle of family or friends.

National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's · filed 1985-10-02

A work consisting of sounds, images or both that are being transmitted is fixed if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission, 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... A "public performance" is the performance or display of a work to a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of family or friends. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work's performance or display to a substantial number of people outside a normal family-or-friends circle, or its transmission by device to the public for reception in separate places, as a public performance.

Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc. · filed 1986-10-23

“public performance” as the performance or display of a work to a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of family or friends. A public performance also occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to the public for reception in separate places.

Section 101 treats a performance at a place where a substantial number of people outside a normal family and social circle may gather as a public performance, including at a private club.

Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams · filed 1986-12-22

Although the establishment is classified as a private club under the laws of the state of Kansas, it is a “place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances” may gather.

Section 101's definition of performing a work publicly applies when a proprietor has sufficient control over a nightclub's public performance of copyrighted music.

Sweet Summer Night Music v. Aiken · filed 1987-02-09

The affidavits and other evidence establish that the defendant was the proprietor of the night club and had sufficient control over it so that he can properly be charged with “performing the work publicly,” as the term is used in 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) and as defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines “perform” broadly to include rendering or playing a work directly or by any device or process, treats a performance as public when it occurs at a place open to the public, and defines transmitting as communicating a performance so images or sounds are received beyond where they are sent.

International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk · filed 1987-07-01

The Act broadly defines “perform” to include the rendition or playing of a work “either directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. To perform “publicly” means to perform at a place open to the public. ... As defined in the Act, “to ‘transmit’ a performance ... is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats transmitting a work or a performance to the public by broadcast as a public performance, requiring separate authorization even when the underlying recording or live performance was authorized.

Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp. · filed 1987-06-18

broadcasting is an additional performance which requires separate permission.

Section 101 defines a public performance to include transmitting or communicating a work to the public by any device or process, including indirectly through an intermediary.

David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. · filed 1988-10-18

Under the definitions of “perform,” “display,” “publicly,” and “transmit” in section 101, the concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial rendition or showing, ... but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public.

Section 101 defines performance of an audiovisual work to include showing its images in sequence, and defines public performance to include performing at a place open to the public.

Red Baron--Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corporation · filed 1989-09-05

We begin with the proposition that the Double Dragon video game is an "audiovisual work" as defined by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. ... We therefore conclude that the operation of a video game constitutes a performance as that term is defined in Sec. 101. ... Under the Act, as we have noted, to perform a work " 'publicly' means," among other things, "to perform ... it at a place open to the public." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. ... Thus our conclusion is that Red Baron caused the public performance of Double Dragon.

Section 101 treats showing the images of a motion picture or audiovisual work by a device as performing it, and treats showing it in a place open to the public as performing it publicly.

Video Views, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Studio 21, Ltd., and Joseph Sclafani, Defendants-Appellees-Cros · filed 1991-04-16

The remaining question is whether the works had been “performed publicly” by Studio 21 within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Once again, we begin with the language of the Copyright Act, namely § 101 of the Act, which generally provides that to “perform” a copyrighted work is ... to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible. ... That section of the Act further provides that to perform a copyrighted work “publicly” means to ... (1) to perform it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or ... (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or different times. ... There is no question that the films would be “performed” if displayed in one of Studio 21’s video arcade booths. ... the proper inquiry is directed to the nature of the place in which the private video booths are located, and whether it is a place where the public is openly invited. This is compatible with our view that the Copyright Act contemplates a broad interpretation of the concept of “public performance.”

Section 101(2) treats a cable network's transmission to local cable companies that retransmit to subscribers as a public performance by the network, separate from the live performance.

Coleman v. ESPN, Inc. · filed 1991-05-08(2)

Transmissions by a cable network or service to local cable companies who in turn transmit to individual cable subscribers constitute “public performances” by the network under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) separate from the live public performances which fall under § 101(1).

Section 101 defines a public performance to include transmitting or otherwise communicating a work to the public by any device or process, and defines transmitting as communicating sounds beyond their place of origin.

U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc. · filed 1991-05-16

With regard to whether Defendants in this case “further transmitted” the subject songs to the public, the Court finds that clearly they did. Again, the copyright law defines “to transmit” as meaning “to communicate [a performance] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “In the context of § 110(5), the courts have interpreted ‘to further transmit’ to mean any dispersal of sound through a restaurant or other establishment.”

Section 101 defines a motion-picture performance as showing its images or making its accompanying sounds audible, and treats a transmission to members of the public as public even when they receive it in separate places or at different times.

On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries · filed 1991-11-14

The Act defines the performance of a motion picture as the “show[ing] of its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A movie video is thus performed only when it is visible and audible. In On Command’s system, this viewing and hearing occurs only in an individual guest room. That can be the only relevant place of performance for public place analysis. Since hotel guest rooms are indisputably not public places for copyright purposes, On Command’s system results in no public performances under the public place clause. ... A performance may still be public under the transmit clause “whether the members of the public ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Thus, whether the number of hotel guests viewing an On Command transmission is one or one hundred, and whether these guests view the transmission simultaneously or sequentially, the transmission is still a public performance since it goes to members of the public.

Section 101's use of "play" in defining "perform" does not encompass playing a board game in a tournament.

No. 94-56593 · filed 1996-07-12

"Perform" and "publicly" are defined in the Copyright Act as, respectively, "to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or progress ..." and "to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered...." 17 U.S.C. § 101. In applying these statutory definitions to the playing of Allen's games in a tournament setting, we conclude that the playing of a game is not a "performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 requires both embodiment in a medium and more-than-transitory duration for a work to be fixed, and determines whether a transmission is public by examining who is capable of receiving that particular transmission.

Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. · filed 2008-08-04

We believe that this language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements: the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment requirement”), and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more than transitory duration” (the “duration requirement”). ... Unless both requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work whose data is buffered. ... The implication from this same language, however, is that it is relevant, in determining whether a transmission is made to the public, to discern who is “capable of receiving” the performance being transmitted. ... Although the transmit clause is not a model of clarity, we believe that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it refers to the performance created by the act of transmission.

Section 101's definition of "publicly" does not treat a transmission of a unique ringtone to a single subscriber as a transmission to the public.

In Re Cellco Partnership · filed 2009-10-14

Based on undisputed facts, however, Verizon has shown that its transmission of a ringtone to a cellular telephone customer does not constitute a performance of a musical work "publicly," as that term is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Because only one subscriber is capable of receiving this transmission or performance, the transmission is not made to the public and is not covered by the Transmission Clause, at least when considered by itself.

Under § 101's Transmission Clause, a transmission of a performance is not made “to the public” when only one subscriber is capable of receiving the unique copy, considered by itself.

United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors, & Publishers · filed 2009-10-14

Based on undisputed facts, however, Verizon has shown that its transmission of a ringtone to a cellular telephone customer does not constitute a performance of a musical work “publicly,” as that term is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In analyzing whether the transmission to a cellular telephone qualifies as a transmission of the work to the public, the focus is on the transmission itself and its potential recipients, and not on the potential audience of the underlying work or ringtone that rests on Verizon’s file servers. ... Because only one subscriber is capable of receiving this transmission or performance, the transmission is not made to the public and is not covered by the Transmission Clause, at least when considered by itself.

Section 101 treats a performance as public when it is transmitted to the public, even if recipients receive it in separate places or at different times.

Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-08-01

Moreover, it does not matter that Defendants’ customers are viewing the transmissions at different times and in different places. Section 101 of the Copyright Act explicitly states that a performance can still be public under the transmit clause “whether the members of the public ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Therefore, Defendants “publicly perform” Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Works within the meaning of the transmit clause.

Section 101’s transmit clause directs courts to determine public performance by examining who is capable of receiving the particular transmission, not merely whether the work is available to many subscribers.

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. · filed 2012-07-11

This meant that, in determining whether there has ... been a public performance, courts are to look to the transmission being made as the performance at issue, rather than simply to whether the public receives the underlying work.

Section 101's Transmit Clause does not treat user-specific transmissions of unique copies as public performances when each transmission has a potential audience of one.

WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. · filed 2013-04-01

We conclude that Aereo’s transmissions of unique copies of broadcast television programs created at its users’ requests and transmitted while the programs are still airing on broadcast television are not “public performances” of the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works under ... Cablevision.

Section 101 broadly defines a public performance to include transmitting a performance to members of the public through any device or process, including when they receive it in separate places and at different times.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Filmon X, LLC · filed 2013-09-05

By making available Plaintiffs’ copyrighted performances to any member of the public who accesses the FilmOn X service, FilmOn X performs the copyrighted work publicly as defined by the Transmit Clause: Film On X “transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. “A ‘device,’ ‘machine,’ or ‘process’ is one now known [i.e., in 1976] or later developed;” “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process.” Id. (emphases added). These two definitions are facially broad and encompass FilmOn X’s convoluted process for relaying television signals. The Transmit Clause, which applies whether “members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” also plainly captures FilmOn X’s DVR-like capabilities. Id. FilmOn X transmits (i.e., communicates from mini-antenna through servers over the Internet to a user) the performance (i.e., an original over-the-air broadcast of a work copyrighted by one of the Plaintiffs) to members of the public (i.e., any person who accesses the FilmOn X service through its website or application) who receive the performance in separate places and at different times (i.e. at home at their computers or on their mobile devices). FilmOn X violates §§ 101 and 106(4) of the 1976 Act, meaning that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their copyright infringement claim.

Section 101 defines “transmit” as communicating a work by a device or process so images or sounds are received beyond the place sent; recordings made and retained inside a subscriber’s home are not transmissions.

Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC · filed 2015-01-20

As discussed above regarding DISH Anywhere, transmission means “to communicate [a work] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. PTAT is a system for automatically recording programming as it is being received by a subscriber’s STB, inside the subscriber’s home. Those recordings are not distributed, delivered, or transmitted to any other location or person using PTAT alone.

Section 101's Transmit Clause treats transmissions of performances to the public via any device or process as public performances even when recipients are in different places or receive them at different times, so it covers FilmOn X's time-delayed DVR retransmissions.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Filmon X, LLC · filed 2015-12-02

While it is true that the Supreme Court in Aereo III did not consider Aereo’s time-delayed retransmission service, its reasoning confirms this Court’s conclusion that the Transmit Clause encompasses FilmOn X’s DVR-like functionality. ... FilmOn X’s transmissions are made to the public regardless of the time delay.

Section 101 defines public performance to include transmitting a performance or display to the public by any device or process, regardless of whether recipients receive it at the same or different times; streaming the episodes to U.S. viewers therefore infringed the public-performance right.

Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A. · filed 2016-12-02

SEI’s public performance right includes the exclusive right to transmit TVP Polonia shows to viewers in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, “[t]o ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process, or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible. To ‘transmit’ a performance is to communicate [a work] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent. To perform a work ‘publicly’ is to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to . . . the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times [the ‘Transmit Clause’].” Fox Broad. Co., 160 F. Supp. 3d at 1158 (internal citations omitted). ... Both Michael Barnett and Christian Jensen were able to stream and view TVP Polonia episodes by accessing TVP’s website, www.tvp.pl in the U.S. Thus SEI’s public performance right was infringed.

Section 101's transmit clause treats a performance as public when it is communicated to the public by a device or process through a commercial public relationship, regardless of where viewing occurs.

Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc. · filed 2016-12-12

A transmission is made “to the public” if “the relationship between .., the transmitter of the performance, and the audience ... is a commercial, ‘public’ relationship regardless of where the viewing takes place.”

Section 101 treats a performance as public when it occurs at a place open to the public; the court found allegations about public karaoke rooms sufficient at the pleading stage.

Lee v. Karaoke City · filed 2020-08-31

It further alleges that the singing rooms are located inside “place[s] open to the public” under the statute, and are available for use by anyone willing to pay to rent them.

Section 101 defines a public performance to include performing a work at a place open to the public or where a substantial number of people outside a normal family and social circle are gathered.

Elohim EPF USA, Inc. v. 162 D & Y Corp. · filed 2022-06-09

“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite . . . either directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In relevant part, “[t]o perform a work ‘publicly’ means (1) to perform . . . it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. . . .” Id. ... If the establishment is predominantly in character a public space, despite the presence of small private areas, then the performance of a copyrighted work is public. If the gathering of invitees within the rented space routinely included “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances,” then performance of a copyrighted work would also be a public performance.

Section 101 defines public performance to include transmitting or communicating a performance to the public by any device or process, and defines a copy as a material object in which a work is fixed and from which it can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Galindo · filed 2022-11-18

While the law indicates that there are two ways to “perform a work publicly,” Plaintiffs proceed under the second definition, that is, “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in the separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Streaming a copyrighted work over the Internet qualifies as public performance. ... As the law indicates that streaming falls under the purview of public performance, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that Horsten and Galindo publicly performed the Copyrighted Works without authorization. ... Under the DMCA, a copy is defined as a “material object[] . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. To qualify as a copy under the Copyright Act, the “allegedly infringing work must be fixed in some tangible form, from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).

Section 101 treats playing or reciting a work through a device as a performance, and a karaoke-room performance can be public when the venue is open to the public.

Lee v. Flower Karaoke · filed 2023-01-17

Performance means “to recite . . . etther directly or by means of any device or process.” ... (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). ... The playing of a song in a privately rented karaoke room can constitute a public performance as long as it 1s located within an establishment that is open to the public.

Section 101’s Transmit Clause treats “transmission” as the actions of the sender and/or ultimate recipient of a copyrighted performance or display, not the mere operation of a channel through which the transmission occurs.

Concord Music Group, Inc. v. X Corp · filed 2024-03-05

The plaintiffs base their claims on the type of use described in 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), which grants the holder of rights in a “literary, musical, dramatic, [or] choreographic work[]” the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” Id. While what X/Twitter does may not appear, on its face, to seem much like “performance,” the plaintiffs rely on the Copyright Act’s so-called “Transmit Clause,” which defines “public performance” to include “transmit[ting] or otherwise communicat[ing] a performance or display of the work to . . . the public, by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... That purpose is consistent with the conclusion that “transmission” refers to the actions of the sender and/or ultimate recipient of a copyright-protected work—not those of the operators of the channels through which that transmission was accomplished. Claims against such a third party continue to be appropriate for consideration in connection with theories of secondary liability, not direct infringement. The court, accordingly, will dismiss Count I.

Section 101 defines a public performance to include performing a work at a place open to the public or where a substantial number of people outside a normal family and social circle are gathered.

Broadcast Music, Inc v. Little City Cider Company, LLC · filed 2025-07-08

The Copyright Act defines the act of performing or displaying a work “publicly” to include “perform[ing] or display[ing] it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Courts have broadly concluded that a copyrighted work has been publicly performed when it is played in a business establishment open to the public.” Elohim EPF USA, Inc. v. 162 D & Y Corp., 707 F. Supp. 3d 372, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). ... The Complaint and Schedule also allege that, in connection with the operation of the Cider Establishment, Defendants publicly performed or caused to be publicly performed each of the five compositions on October 5, 2024 at Little City Cider Company without the copyright owner’s permission. These allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient to establish the second element of copyright infringement.

Section 101 defines public performance to include transmitting a work to viewers in separate places or at different times.

Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A. · filed 2016-12-12

SEI’s public performance right includes the exclusive right to transmit TVP Polonia shows to viewers in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101’s definition of public performance does not treat making a work available for download or downloading it as a performance.

Umg Recordings, Inc. v. Grande Commc'ns Networks, LLC · filed 2019-03-15

Making a copyrighted work available for downloading, or actual downloading of a copyrighted work, is not itself a performance.

Section 101’s definition of public performance raises factual questions that may prevent dismissal of a claim involving karaoke rooms.

LEE v. ROKU KARAOKE · filed 2019-06-19

These definitions are rife with factual questions inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. The complaint’s allegations, assumed at this stage to be true, are far from being inadequate as a matter of law.

Section 101 defines public performance to include transmitting a work to the public; a work is transmitted when its images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.

Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer · filed 2026-04-09

“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . [among other things] to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101. If the images or sounds comprising a work “are received beyond the place from which they are sent,” then the work was transmitted. Id. ... We agree with the district court that the defendants’ use of encoders constitutes direct copyright infringement.

Section 101’s definition of performing a work publicly does not cover a carrier’s transmission to cable systems that, in turn, distribute the work to subscribers.

WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc. · filed 1981-09-30

The cable television systems to which UVI transmits, although numerous (more than 1400), are not the “public” and UVI’s transmissions to these systems are not transmissions to the public.

Section 101’s definition of public performance covers showing copyrighted programming to hotel patrons.

Entertainment & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Community Hotel, Inc. · filed 1985-02-15

17 U.S.C. § 101 defines “public performance” as the performance or display of a work to a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of family or friends. ... Defendant, by means of its earth station, has for over two years intercepted the transmissions of HBO’s and ESPN’s copyrighted programming and has publicly performed and displayed such intercepted copyrighted motion pictures and other programming by showing it to patrons of its hotel.

Section 101 treats transmitting a work to the public for reception in separate places as a public performance, including when a hotel shows copyrighted programming to its patrons.

Entertainment & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Community Hotel, Inc. · filed 1986-05-16

17 U.S.C. § 101 defines “public performance” as the performance or display of a work to a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of family or friends. A public performance also occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to the public for reception in separate places. ... Defendant, by means of its earth station, has for over two years intercepted the transmissions of HBO’s and ESPN’s copyrighted programming and has publicly performed and displayed such intercepted copyrighted motion pictures and other programming by showing it to patrons of its hotel.

Section 101 treats transmitting a copyrighted work to the public by radio broadcast as a performance.

Guedes v. Martinez · filed 2001-02-12

The transmission of a copyrighted work to the public by means of a radio broadcast constitutes a “performance.”

Section 101’s definition of performance requires a transmission capable of simultaneous perception; downloading a music file alone does not perform the song.

United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers · filed 2007-04-25

Neither does a performance occur in the situation at issue herein, for it is not the availability of prompt replay but the simultaneously perceptible nature of a transmission that renders it a performance under the Act.

Section 101’s public performance definition does not require two members of the public to receive a copyrighted work from the same transmission.

Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Barrydriller Content Systems, PLC · filed 2012-12-27

The statute provides an exclusive right to transmit a performance publicly, but does not by its express terms require that two members of the public receive the performance from the same transmission.

Section 101’s definition of public performance covers a service that acts like a cable system by enhancing viewers’ ability to receive copyrighted programming.

Dish Network LLC. v. Jadoo TV, Inc. · filed 2023-06-13

The Court held that the Transmit Clause “makes clear that an entity that acts like a CATV system itself performs, even if when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals.” Id. at 442. ... Here, Jadoo acts much like Aereo. It performed the Works because it is “an entity that acts like a CATV system” by “enhance[ing] viewers’ ability to receive” programming.

Section 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act permits recovery of ascertainable indirect profits attributable to infringement.

Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. · filed 1985-09-23(b)

The 1909 Act provided that a copyright proprietor is entitled to “all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement____” 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). The language of the statute is broad enough to permit recovery of indirect as well as direct profits.

Section 101(b) requires an infringer to prove each cost it claims when calculating profits; general overhead may be allocated if the infringer shows that the infringement increased it.

Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc. · filed 1976-09-27(b)

Had defendant made some showing of increase in its administrative expenses and general overhead resulting from its manufacture of the infringing books, allocation rather than precision would be acceptable. But there is no evidence of any increase in those areas and consequently, defendant has failed “to prove every element of cost which [it] claims . . . ” 17 U.S.C. § 101(b).

Section 101(b) allows an infringer to deduct overhead from profits only when it proves the overhead actually assisted in producing, distributing, or selling the infringing goods.

Kamar International, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co. · filed 1984-12-04(b)

These goals, we believe, can best be achieved by allowing a deduction for overhead only when the infringer can demonstrate it was of actual assistance in the production, distribution or sale of the infringing product.

Under former § 101(b), the copyright owner proves the infringer’s sales, and the infringer must prove any costs it seeks to deduct.

Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., Barry M. Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc · filed 1986-08-29(b)

Plaintiff carried its burden; defendant did not. Since the statutory scheme calls for subtracting defendant’s proof from that of the plaintiff, and since defendant’s proof was found to be zero, the figure proven by plaintiff winds up establishing the profits from the Hustler issues in question.

Section 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act allows recovery of the greater of the copyright owner's actual damages or the infringer's profits.

Frank Music Corporation v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. · filed 1985-09-23(b)

In this circuit, we have construed section 101(b) of the 1909 Act as allowing recovery of the greater of the plaintiff's damage or the defendant's profits.

Under the 1909 Copyright Act, § 101(b) gives the trial judge discretion to award statutory damages in lieu of or in addition to actual damages to deter infringement.

F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago · filed 1985-01-31(b)

Accordingly, the trial judge has discretion to award statutory damages in lieu of or in addition to actual damages for the purpose of deterring future infringement.

Section 101 treats diagrams, models, and technical drawings as copyrightable works in their expressive form, but not in their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.

Honeywell International, Inc. v. Western Support Group, Inc. · filed 2013-04-04

Second, with regard to the diagrams in the 131-9A Manual, “diagrams, models, and technical drawings” enjoy copyright protection for their “form[,j but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(5).

Section 101 includes technical drawings, diagrams, and models within the statute’s category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.

Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc. et seq. · filed 1984-08-24

Although the act makes no explicit reference to architectural drawings, we note that it encompasses “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” which include “. . . technical drawings, diagrams, and models.”

Section 101 includes technical drawings, diagrams, and models within pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works protected by copyright, covering architectural drawings.

Robert R. Jones Associates, Inc. v. Nino Homes, Michele Lochirco, Diebele-Ginter · filed 1988-11-07

the statute does afford protection to “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” ... which are defined as including “technical drawings, diagrams, and models.”

Section 101 protects an original derivative work when its new material provides a distinguishable variation from the preexisting material.

Richmond Homes Management, Inc. v. Raintree, Inc. · filed 1994-09-07

In line with the aforementioned principles, a derivative work will be deemed sufficiently original if it has a “ ‘faint trace of originality’ and if it provides a ‘distinguishable variation’ ” from the original material.

Section 101 defines an architectural work to include a building’s design embodied in a tangible medium, but a store constructed inside an existing mall is not itself a building.

Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co. · filed 1998-07-21

The Copyright Act defines an architectural work as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The Court has difficulty concluding that constructing an empty room in a large shopping mall into a candle shop with a colonial motif transforms that room into a “building” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. ... The Court believes that protection extends to free standing structures, like Yankee’s “stand alone” flagship candle store in South Deerfield, not individual units comprising a larger structure. ... The Court concludes that although Yankee may have intended its Holyoke store to offer a structure habitable by employees and shoppers alike, its proper characterization lies as a structure other than a building, or a structure in a building, not as a “building” in and of itself.

Section 101 includes architectural plans and drawings as embodiments of an architectural work, so construction of the building is not required for copyright to subsist.

Hunt v. Irwin Pasternack Michael Everitt Bradley Bishop · filed 1999-09-28

we hold that construction of the actual building was not required.

Section 101’s definitions cover architectural plans and technical drawings.

Lindberg v. Kitsap County · filed 1997-11-26

The documents pertinent to this case are covered in the definitions section of the Copyright Act under 17 U.S.C. § 101 as follows: ... An “architectural work” is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.

Section 101's definition of “transmit” encompasses sending a received radio broadcast by wiring from a room without speakers to a separate room with speakers.

Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1988-05-13

Second, the radio broadcasts received by defendants were “further transmitted” to the public because the broadcasts were initially received in a room or area without speakers and were sent to a separate room with speakers via some 40 feet of wiring.

Section 101’s definition of “transmit” covers communicating a performance from a receiving location to public areas through a commercial sound system.

Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co. · filed 1985-09-24

The undisputed evidence of the physical layout and the equipment later described in this opinion make it clear that a commercial sound system was used to transmit the music into public areas from the office where it is received. This is sufficient to satisfy the definition of “transmit” in 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines “transmit” broadly to cover communicating a performance or display by any device or process that lets images or sounds be received beyond where they are sent.

Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc. · filed 1985-12-17

The Copyright Act defines a primary transmission as a "transmission made to the public * * * [that is] further transmitted by the secondary transmission service * * *." Id. Sec. 111(f). The resulting question then becomes whether the WTBS microwave signal is a "transmission made to the public." While the term "transmission" is not itself defined in the Copyright Act, the term "transmit" is defined. Id. Sec. 101. And, with respect to this definition, Congress has expressly stated that 39 [t]he definition of "transmit"--to communicate a performance or display "by any device or process whereby images or sound[s] are received beyond the place from which they are sent"--is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless communications media, including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a "transmission," and if the transmission reaches the public in any form, [that transmission constitutes a public performance or display] within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106. 40 H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5678 (quoting 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101) (emphasis added). Further, Congress specifically anticipated the transmission of other than over the air signals when it defined the term "cable system" (the very entity subject to the compulsory licensing provisions) as a "facility * * * that * * * receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by * * * television broadcast stations * * * and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs * * * to subscribing members of the public * * *." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 111(f) (emphasis added). 41 These and other congressional statements, see, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5676-78, convince us that the WTBS microwave signal, like its UHF signal, constitutes a "transmission made to the public," 17 U.S.C. Sec. 111(f), as intended by Congress.

Section 101’s definition of “transmit” covers a microwave television signal even when the signal is not broadcast over the air.

Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc. · filed 1985-11-13

While the term “transmission” is not itself defined in the Copyright Act, the term “transmit” is defined. Id. § 101. ... These and other congressional statements, ... convince us that the WTBS microwave signal, like its UHF signal, constitutes a “transmission made to the public,” 17 U.S.C. § 111(f), as intended by Congress.

Section 101 treats a compilation's arrangement of materials, considered “taken as a whole,” as potentially copyrightable even when its individual elements are not.

West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc. · filed 1985-10-03

But as is seen above, this is not just a series of numbers each rising by one over its predecessor, it is the basis of the West arrangement—the key to the self-index by which West’s arrangement is accessed. This is, the Court finds, what is meant by the words “taken as a whole” in the copyright definition of “compilations”. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's definitions of compilations and derivative works support treating the selection, arrangement, sequencing, and ordering of materials as potentially protectible expression rather than merely an unprotectible idea.

Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. · filed 1986-08-04

Although the Code does not use the terms “sequence,” “order” or “structure,” it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative works, and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, ... that the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership broadly to include an exclusive license or other conveyance of copyright rights even when limited in time or place.

Bandai America Incorporated v. Bally Midway Mfg. Co. · filed 1985-10-10

A transfer of copyright ownership is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license. ... Namco's recapture rights, if they exist, merely limit the time of Midway's license. Moreover, both the legal and the beneficial owners of copyrights have standing to sue infringers.

Section 101 defines a copyright owner, for any exclusive right in a copyright, as the owner of that particular right, supporting separate ownership of divisible copyright rights.

Rokos v. Peck · filed 1986-06-19

In any event, the 1976 act expressly contemplates a divisible copyright by providing: “ ‘Copyright owner,’ with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.” (17 U.S.C. § 101.) This definition underlies section 201(d)(2) which states that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106 [the provision enumerating protected rights], may be transferred . . . and owned separately.” In line with the definition quoted immediately above, this subsection then provides that “[t]he owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.”

Section 101 defines “transfer of copyright ownership” to include an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or its exclusive rights.

Raffoler, Ltd. v. Peabody & Wright, Ltd. · filed 1987-10-08

Having obtained ownership of the copyrighted materials through a corporate merger which took place prior to the initial registration of the copyrights, Raffoler did not actually effect a “transfer of copyright” within the meaning of the statute. “Transfer of copyright ownership” is defined by statute as “[A]n assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Plaintiffs corporate merger falls into none of these categories.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership broadly but excludes a nonexclusive license, so a nonexclusive license is outside the writing requirement for transfers under § 204.

Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen · filed 1990-07-20

Section 101 defines transfers of ownership broadly, but expressly removes from the scope of section 204 a "nonexclusive license."

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership, so the exclusive licensee owns the conveyed rights and cannot infringe those rights merely by breaching the license.

United States Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc. · filed 1991-06-18

An exclusive license granted by the copyright owner constitutes a transfer of ownership of the copyright rights conveyed in the license. See id. Sec. 101 ("A 'transfer of copyright ownership' is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance ... of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect...."); ... Hence, an exclusive licensee of any of the rights comprised in the copyright, though it is capable of breaching the contractual obligations imposed on it by the license, cannot be liable for infringing the copyright rights conveyed to it.

Section 101 treats exclusive licenses as transfers of copyright ownership but excludes nonexclusive licenses.

Ladas v. Potpourri Press, Inc. · filed 1994-03-16

Transfers of copyright ownership include exclusive licenses, but not nonexclusive licenses.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so a nonexclusive license is not subject to § 204(a)'s writing requirement.

I.A.E., Incorporated and Rama Talluri v. Shaver · filed 1996-01-17

The "transfer of copyright ownership" is defined, in the Copyright Act, as an exclusive license or some other instrument of conveyance. The definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. 6 Therefore, even though section 204(a) of the Copyright Act invalidates any transfer of copyright ownership that is not in writing, section 101 explicitly removes a nonexclusive license from the section 204(a) writing requirement.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an assignment or other conveyance of a copyright or exclusive rights, but an agreement concerning only royalties is not such a transfer.

Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean · filed 1996-04-11

A “transfer of copyright ownership” is defined by the Copyright Act as “an assignment, ..., or any other conveyance, ... of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... However, an agreement concerning royalties does not constitute a “transfer of copyright ownership” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc. · filed 1996-05-30

The Copyright Act defines "transfer of copyright ownership" as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp.1995). Thus, if Bateman's purported license was exclusive, the lack of writing is fatal to his claim that there was an oral license. If it was nonexclusive, however, it is not a transfer of ownership for the purposes of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license, even one limited in time and place, as a transfer of copyright.

Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co. · filed 1996-05-14

Such an exclusive license, though limited in time and place of effect, constitutes a transfer of copyright to Feiner, as defined in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's definition of “transfer of copyright ownership” does not include an assignment of a right to receive royalties that transfers no interest in a copyright or in any exclusive right comprised in a copyright.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Perry L. Hirsch and Marc R. Staenberg v. United States · filed 1997-01-15

The Act defines “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright....” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The assignments on their face did not transfer any interest in a copyright or in any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership but does not treat a nonexclusive license as one.

In Re Patient Education Media, Inc. · filed 1997-06-30

A “transfer of copyright ownership” includes the grant of an exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to exclude nonexclusive licenses, so a nonexclusive license does not transfer copyright ownership.

Walthal v. Rusk · filed 1999-03-26

A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an "assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Transfers of ownership must be in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). Nonexclusive licenses are excluded from the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership." Therefore, nonexclusive licenses such as the one we are considering here may be granted orally, but they do not transfer ownership of the copyright.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license.

Radio Television Espanola S.A. v. New World Entertainment, Ltd. · filed 1999-07-16

The copyright laws define a "transfer of copyright ownership” as an “assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright ... but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Television Española claims that it was granted an exclusive license and does not claim that it has a nonexclusive license; thus, the transaction forming the basis of this lawsuit falls within the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership.”

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license.

Gardner v. Nike, Inc. · filed 2000-07-31

First, section 101 of the Act provides that a “ ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under that definition, an exclusive license is equated with an assignment.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership broadly enough to include a mortgage, which the court construed to encompass an Article 9 security interest.

In Re World Auxiliary Power Company in Re World, Aerotechnology Corporation in Re Air Refrigeration Systems… · filed 2002-09-11

The Copyright Act's use of the word "mortgage" as one definition of a "transfer" 26 is properly read to include security interests under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Section 101's transfer-of-ownership definition includes a mortgage and therefore encompasses security interests under Article 9.

Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.) · filed 2002-09-11

is properly read to include security interests under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so the license need not be written and may be granted orally.

Landsted Homes, Inc. v. Sherman · filed 2002-12-10

Because no transfer of copyright ownership occurs with a nonexclusive license, no writing is required and permission may be granted orally.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the Copyright Act's definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Atkins, Leslie v. Fischer, Benson · filed 2003-06-20

However, section 101 of the Act excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of ‘‘transfer of copyright ownership.’’ 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license of an exclusive copyright right as a transfer of copyright ownership, allowing the exclusive licensee to transfer that right.

Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc. · filed 2006-07-07

A natural reading of the Act’s language leads to the conclusion that exclusive licensees, as copyright owners of their exclusive rights, are free under the Act to transfer those rights to third parties.

Section 101 treats an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or other conveyance of a copyright or exclusive right as a transfer of ownership, but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Mason v. Jamie Music Publishing Co. · filed 2009-09-16

The Copyright Act defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance ... of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright ... but not including a nonexclusive license.” ... The Court finds that Defendants’ extrinsic evidence does not constitute a written assignment of Mason’s copyright ownership, either by itself or when considered in conjunction with the Songwriter’s Agreement.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership; a nonexclusive license does not transfer ownership or the right to sue for infringement.

Cohen v. United States · filed 2011-04-14

Any oral agreement between Dr. Cohen and HRD Press or Amazon in which Dr. Cohen allowed either company to display his works on the Internet is irrelevant because an oral agreement is a non-exclusive license, and a nonexclusive license does not transfer copyright ownership or the right to sue for infringements of such rights. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see RT Computer Graphics, 44 Fed.Cl. at 754; see also Essex Music, 743 F.Supp. at 242.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership.

Ramirez v. Freddie Records, Inc., et · filed 2012-11-02

An exclusive license is a transfer of copyright ownership, 17 U.S.C. § 101, and must be memorialized in a signed writing, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an exclusive license, so transferring an exclusive license is subject to the Copyright Act’s writing requirement.

Craigslist Inc. v. 3taps Inc. · filed 2013-04-30

Transferring an exclusive license requires a writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (“A transfer of copyright ownership ... is not valid unless ... in writing.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership” to include an “exclusive license”).

Section 101 treats an exclusive license or other clear, written conveyance of an exclusive right as a transfer of copyright ownership, but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons · filed 2014-01-27

Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, a transfer of copyright ownership not only needs to be in writing, but it also must be clear and unambiguous-.

Section 101 treats both an assignment and an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership, unlike an assignment of a non-exclusive license.

Righthaven Llc v. Hoehn · filed 2013-05-09

The Copyright Act does not distinguish between transferring a copyright via an assignment or an exclusive license.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so it cannot transfer ownership of an exclusive copyright right.

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo · filed 2014-02-21

Section 101 of the Copyright Act makes clear that transfer of ownership of an exclusive right cannot be accomplished by a nonexclusive license.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license of a copyright or an exclusive right as a transfer of ownership, but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Monterey Bay Homes, LLC v. Chambers · filed 2014-03-31

The license is, therefore, exclusive, indicating a transfer of ownership of those rights under § 101.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license or assignment of a copyright interest as a transfer of copyright ownership, while excluding a nonexclusive license.

Corbello v. Valli · filed 2015-02-10

Thus, in granting this exclusive right to create, whether classified as an exclusive license or an assignment, the 1999 Agreement constitutes a transfer of ownership of DeVito’s derivative-work right in the Work to Valli and Gaudio.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership, but excludes a nonexclusive license from that definition.

Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC · filed 2015-03-27

the conveyance of an exclusive license is a transfer of copyright ownership.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transaction capable of transferring copyright ownership.

Simmons v. Stanberry · filed 2016-01-15

The Act includes exclusive licenses among the list of transactions that can effect a “transfer of copyright ownership,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, and exclusive licensees stand in the shoes of creators for enforcement purposes, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).

Section 101 treats an assignment or exclusive license of an exclusive copyright right as a transfer of copyright ownership.

BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc. · filed 2015-12-01

Section 101 defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, ... exclusive license, or any other conveyance ... of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats an assignment or exclusive license as a transfer of a copyright interest, but a nonexclusive license is not a transfer of copyright ownership.

DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hill Global Education Holdings, LLC · filed 2017-09-12

“[E]ither an assignment (which transfers legal title to the transferee) or an exclusive license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the transferee) qualifies as a ‘transfer’ of a right in a copyright for the purposes of the Act.” Minden, 795 F.3d at 1003; accord 17 U.S.C. § 101. By contrast, a mere “nonexclusive license” does not constitute a “transfer of copyright ownership” and therefore cannot confer standing to assert an infringement claim. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Office for Planning and Architecture, Inc. v. City of Harrisburg · filed 2020-11-24

A granting of a nonexclusive license is not the equivalent of a transfer of ownership. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so the license need not be in writing and may be granted orally or implied from conduct.

McElroy v. Courtney Ajinca Events LLC · filed 2021-01-12

Although the Copyright Act requires all exclusive transfers of copyright to be in writing, 17 U.S.C. § 204(a), “non-exclusive licenses are exempt from this writing requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 101, and may be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.”

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an exclusive license but exclude a nonexclusive license.

American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO v. Rural Media Group, Inc. · filed 2021-03-05

“A ‘transfer of copyright ownership,” for the purposes of the DMCA, “is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C.§ 101. Accordingly, while “transfer” captures more than merely outright, total transfers of a party’s complete rights in a work, it does not reach situations where, for example, the recipient has merely become a nonexclusive licensee, with the original owner retaining the right to license the work to others. The defendants do not dispute, at least for the present purposes, that the exclusive licenses at issue in this case were transfers of ownership, as that term is used under the DMCA.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include exclusive licenses but exclude nonexclusive licenses, so a nonexclusive license is not subject to § 204(a)'s writing requirement.

Martin v. Pure Spectrum CBD, LLC · filed 2022-01-03

The Copyright Act “defines ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ to include exclusive licenses, but expressly excludes nonexclusive licenses.” Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). Therefore, although Section 204(a) generally operates to invalidate transfers of copyright ownership not in writing, “Section 101 explicitly removes a nonexclusive license from” that requirement. Id. (citing I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Section 101 treats an exclusive license of any exclusive copyright right as a transfer of copyright ownership, while a nonexclusive license does not transfer ownership.

Creative Photographers, Inc. v. Julie Torres Art, LLC · filed 2023-03-13

A “transfer of copyright ownership” occurs when a copyright owner conveys an exclusive license “of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,” but a transfer of ownership does not occur when that owner conveys only a nonexclusive license. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Because a nonexclusive license does not convey an ownership interest, a nonexclusive licensee does not have standing to sue for copyright infringement.

Section 101 treats an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance as a transfer of copyright ownership.

Juice Creative Group, LLC v. UncommonGood, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25

Copyright ownership can be transferred by “assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance.” U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Breeden Media LLC v. The Daily Wire, LLC · filed 2024-12-27

The rationale underlying this rule is that the grant of a non-exclusive license is not a “transfer of copyright ownership.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 1998).

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an assignment or other conveyance of a copyright or exclusive rights, but not a nonexclusive license.

Juice Creative Group, LLC v. UncommonGood, Inc. · filed 2025-08-25

A “transfer of copyright ownership is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The Transfer Agreement was a written, executed assignment of the copyright ownership of the Website Deliverables.

An unrestricted, exclusive grant of rights to exploit a motion picture effects a sale of its copyright for copyright law purposes.

Law v. Commissioner · filed 1986-05-22

Such an unrestricted and exclusive grant of rights effected a sale of the motion picture film and copyright for tax purposes (Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, supra; Carnegie Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 642 (1973); Fields v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950), affd. 189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951)) and copyright law purposes (17 U.S.C. secs. 101, 201(d)(1), 204(a) (1982)).

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from transfers of copyright ownership; a nonexclusive licensee cannot convey rights it does not own without the copyright owner’s permission.

Lambert v. Emerald Publishing Limited · filed 2025-09-10

This means that transferees may, absent contractual restrictions, reconvey their rights, but those who lack title—including, for example, non-exclusive licensees—may not do so, unless they have the copyright owner’s permission. 3 David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.02[B][4][a] (2025); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership” to include “an . . . exclusive license” but not “a nonexclusive license”).

Section 101’s definition of a transfer of copyright ownership includes a judicial lien on a copyright, even if the lien does not give the creditor immediate control.

National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In Re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.) · filed 1990-06-28

Thus, while the creation of a lien on a copyright may not give a creditor an immediate right to control the copyright, it amounts to a sufficient transfer of rights to come within the broad definition of transfer under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 includes exclusive licenses in its definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, but that definition does not give an exclusive licensee an unrestricted right to assign the license.

Michael Gardner and Bien Licensing Agency, Inc. v. Nike, Inc. · filed 2002-01-31

This explicit language limits the rights afforded to an owner of exclusive rights. Based on basic principles of statutory construction, the specific language of § 201(d)(2) is given precedence over the more general language of § 101 and § 201(d)(1).

Section 101 treats an exclusive license of distribution rights as a transfer of copyright ownership.

Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. v. Franchise Pictures LLC (In Re Franchise Pictures LLC) · filed 2008-01-25

Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., the exclusive license of distribution rights in perpetuity in virtually all media in the Territory effected a transfer or a completed assignment of the distribution rights to Morgan Creek.

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from transfers of copyright ownership, so a co-owner’s nonexclusive license does not give the licensee standing to sue for infringement.

Sybersound Records, Inc. v. Uav Corporation · filed 2008-02-26

Although the 1976 Copyright Act permits exclusive rights to be chopped up and owned separately, to be effective, the assignment or other type of alienation permitted by 17 U.S.C. §§101 and 201(d)(2) must be exclusive.

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership as a conveyance of rights; a judgment that merely memorializes an earlier agreement does not itself transfer those rights.

Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. · filed 2008-03-26

On that point, the 1976 Act is helpful as it defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101; ... The consent judgment at issue did not effectuate any transfer of rights from Sie-gel and Shuster to Detective Comics.

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Thornton v. J Jargon Co. · filed 2008-07-08

Although the Copyright Act provides that the transfer of an exclusive license to a work must be in writing, the statute exempts nonexclusive licenses from the writing requirement. See 17 U.S.C. 204; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining transfer of copyright ownership to exclude a nonexclusive license).

Section 101 treats an assignment of copyright or an exclusive copyright right as a transfer of ownership, but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Elsevier B v. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. · filed 2011-03-07

Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” to be an “assignment ... of a copyright or any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). ... In this case, the authors’ retention of a non-exclusive license did not disrupt the transfer of all of the copyrights in the Articles to Elsevier. Therefore, Elsevier properly registered the Articles by registering the Journal.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership but excludes a nonexclusive license.

Corbello v. DeVito · filed 2011-10-27

The Court finds that the Valli/Gaudio License was not a “transfer of copyright ownership” under 17 U.S.C. § 101 but was a selectively exclusive license, i.e., it was exclusive as against DeVito, but nonexclusive as against Plaintiff.

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership.

Fathers & Daughters Nev., LLC v. Zhang · filed 2018-01-17

An exclusive license serves to transfer "ownership" of a copyright during the term of the license.

Section 101 excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Mapp v. UMG Recordings, Inc. · filed 2018-02-16

The grant of a non-exclusive license does not render Defendant a "co-owner" within the meaning of copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("transfer of copyright ownership" does not include nonexclusive license).

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership over the rights licensed.

Great Bowery v. Best Little Sites · filed 2023-05-02

If a copyright owner by definition has an exclusive right over all Section 106 subsets,145 and granting an exclusive license means for purposes of the statute transferring copyright ownership,146 then a party has a full set of exclusive rights when that party receives an exclusive license.

Section 101 includes photographs within the definition of pictorial works, and photographs meeting the Act’s originality requirement fall within the subject matter of copyright.

Maloney v. T3Media, Inc. · filed 2015-03-06

The Act lists photographs in its definition of “pictorial works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The images to which Plaintiffs refer are photographs, and photographs that meet the Act’s originality requirement fall within the subject matter of copyright.

Section 101 excludes the mechanical and utilitarian aspects of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works from copyright protection, while protecting their artistic form.

Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Vicki Sheen, Bill Sheen, Ladawn Bragg, and Flake Wells, Doing Business as Carousel · filed 1996-03-05

Our judgment that the wooden doll is a non-copyrightable idea is reinforced by the Copyright Act’s focus on artistic innovation and its refusal to offer protection to utilitarian qualities. The Copyright Act’s definition of protectable pictorial, graphic and sculptural works sets out this distinction: “Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, not only is the idea of a wooden doll not copyrightable, but any basic and utilitarian aspects of the dolls, such as the shape of a human body and standard paper doll poses which are both friendly and inviting and also utilitarian in their ease of manufacture and adaptability to' the attachment of various wardrobes, cannot be copyrighted.

Section 101 treats photographs as pictorial works and defines a work as created when it is first fixed in a copy.

Elbe v. Adkins · filed 1991-10-30

A pictorial work includes a photograph. 17 U.S.C. § 101. An interest in the photographs arises when the work is created, which the Code defines as the time when the work “is fixed in a copy ... for the first time.”

Section 101’s category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works covers the sculptural toy designs at issue for purposes of § 102(a)(5).

Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc. · filed 1985-12-17

pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” covered by § 102(a)(5) of the Act.

Section 101 includes two-dimensional graphic works, including an original design whose distinctive arrangement and layout qualifies as a protected graphic work.

Reader's Digest Association, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., Reader's Digest Association, Inc. v. Conservative Digest · filed 1987-06-30

The statute itself provides some indication of the meaning of “works of authorship.” The statute lists seven broad categories of works of authorship, one of which is “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). This category is defined to “include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, and models.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The district court did not err in finding that the design of Reader’s Digest’s cover qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act as an “original work of authorship.” None of the parties has disputed the originality of the design; all agree that it is an independent creation. The question thus turns on whether the design is a “work of authorship” within the meaning of the statute. We conclude that it is such a work. None of the individual elements of the Reader’s Digest cover — ordinary lines, typefaces, and colors — qualifies for copyright protection. But the distinctive arrangement and layout of those elements is entitled to protection as a graphic work.

Section 101 treats maps as pictorial and graphic works of authorship, so their creative depiction may be protected apart from the underlying geographic facts.

Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc. · filed 1992-07-27

Mason’s maps also possess sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection as pictorial and graphic works of authorship.

Section 101 categorizes maps as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works rather than merely factual compilations.

Hodge E. Mason and Hodge Mason Maps, Inc. v. Montgomery Data, Inc. · filed 1992-07-28

The Copyright Act, however, categorizes maps not as factual compilations but as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” — a category that includes photographs and architectural plans.

Section 101 defines pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to include diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.

Richdale Development Co. v. McNeil Co. · filed 1993-12-10

Section 102(a) of the copyright act extends copyright protection to “(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” which works are in turn defined by that act’s § 101, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(1), October 31, 1988, effective March 1, 1989, which provides: “ ‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include . .. diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”

Section 101 classifies maps as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, even though their subject matter may be factual compilations.

Wilson v. Brennan · filed 2009-08-18

While most courts have treated maps solely as compilations of facts, the Copyright Act categorizes them instead as “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.”

Section 101 includes photographs within the category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works covered by copyright.

Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross · filed 2015-09-25

Act’s definitional section plainly states that this phrase ... includes photographs.

Section 101 defines graphic works and treats a design with a utilitarian use as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work when its pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article's utilitarian aspects.

Members 1st Federal Credit Union v. 206 Design, LLC · filed 2023-03-24

Graphic works are “works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. When a work has mechanical or utilitarian use, its design “shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Id. In this case, the logo itself is a work of graphic art, and its utilitarian use as a logo exists independently of its design features. Thus, the court finds that the Branding Element is a graphic work. As a graphic work, the Branding Element is protectable under the Copyright Act. Therefore, the first prong is satisfied.

Section 101's pictorial- and graphic-works category includes typeface glyphs for purposes of determining the subject matter of copyright.

Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC v. Brand Design Company, Inc. · filed 2023-12-28

The Court is satisfied that typeface glyphs constitute a work of pictorial or graphic art within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. sections 101 and 102.

Section 101 includes maps among pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, a category that covers a tentative subdivision map.

Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes And Gardner, Inc. · filed 1987-06-23

The Tentative Map itself falls within the category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.

Section 101’s definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works covers the Pikl’d Pig sculpture.

Dean v. Burrows · filed 1989-02-09

That the Pikl’d Pig is of itself copyrightable is clear. 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 (pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works defined); 17 U.S.C. sec. 102(a)(5).