17 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 makes terms such as “including” and “such as” illustrative rather than limiting, so the Copyright Act’s listed categories are nonexclusive.

Motion Medical Technologies, L.L.C. v. Thermotek, Inc. · filed 2017-11-14

This argument also founders because § 102(a)’s list is ‘'illustrative and not limitive.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 makes illustrative terms nonlimiting, so the omission of sports events from the list of protected works does not by itself foreclose copyright protection.

National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-08-02

Although this omission does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of extending copyright protection to an NBA game, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“The terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative and not limitative.”), it is probative of the absence of congressional intent to afford copyright protection to such well known events as NBA games, ... (1929)).

Section 101 defines a work as “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time.

Sobol v. UMG Recordings, Inc. · filed 2020-03-31

Sound recordings are created for purposes of the Copyright Act on the date they are ‘fixed,’ or recorded. ... “Publication” refers to the distribution or transfer of ownership, not to the creation of a work. ... Nor does “release” indicate when the work was “created.” Ely’s termination notice is thus insufficient.

Section 101's fixation requirement is satisfied when a work is embodied for more than a transitory duration, and even a short period can suffice.

Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P. · filed 2018-02-12

For copyright protection, therefore, fixation for even a short period will suffice.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration; makeup designs lasting more than several minutes satisfy that standard.

Mourabit v. Klein · filed 2019-07-02

However, a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” ... Applying those principles to the facts at hand, the Court finds that makeup designs are capable of being communicated “for a period of more than transitory duration” because they exist for more than several minutes.

Section 101 does not treat the infringed images here as a compilation; each image is a separate work.

VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Group, Inc. · filed 2021-03-10

Based on these observations, the court now clarifies its prior holding. The court concludes as a matter of law that the infringed images at issue do not constitute a “compilation” under 17 U.S.C. § 101. Rather, each infringed image is a “work” for which a separate award of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) is appropriate.

Section 101's United States-work definition turns on where and when an online work was first published, including whether it was simultaneously available in the United States.

Cong v. Zhao · filed 2024-06-21

A work published online in a foreign nation may or may not qualify as a United States work, depending on whether it was available simultaneously in the United States.

Section 101's definition of “architectural work” does not require the work to be original for § 120(a)'s public-photography exception to apply.

Mercedes Benz USA LLC v. Bombardier · filed 2019-09-11

First, defendants contend that Mercedes must allege that the buildings at issue are “original” and “protected by copyright.” This argument lacks merit. Section 120(a) does not contain any requirement of protectability. “Originality” is not included within the definition of “architectural work” as used in section 120(a). See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The only requirement of originality is found within section 102(a), which defines the scope of copyrightable matter as “original works of authorship” but this section does not limit section 120(a)’s right to photograph publicly visible buildings.

Section 101's definition of “architectural work” does not impose an originality requirement when the work is considered under § 120(a).

Mercedes Benz USA LLC v. Soto · filed 2019-09-11

First, defendants contend that Mercedes must allege that the buildings at issue are “original” and “protected by copyright.” This argument lacks merit. Section 120(a) does not contain any requirement of protectability. “Originality” is not included within the definition of “architectural work” as used in section 120(a). See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The only requirement of originality is found within section 102(a), which defines the scope of copyrightable matter as “original works of authorship” but this section does not limit section 120(a)’s right to photograph publicly visible buildings.

Section 101 does not define “authorize”; in copyright law, authorization means permission and may arise through a written, verbal, or implied license.

Bitmanagement Software Gmbh v. United States · filed 2019-09-24

The term “authorize” is not defined in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The common understanding of this term is that “authorization” is synonymous with “permission.” Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “authorize” as: “(1) To give legal authority; to empower; or (2) To formally approve; to sanction.” Authorize, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In the copyright context, “authorization” typically comes in the form of a written “license,” but that need not always be the case.

Section 101 requires a copyrightable work to be the product of human authorship, so a recording created automatically without human creative input is not copyrightable.

Stebbins v. Polano · filed 2022-07-11

To be copyrightable, the work must be original to the author, which means that it must “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citation omitted). The work also must be the product of human authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2 (3d ed. 2021) (“works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author” are not copyrightable.) Plaintiff cannot establish either element here.

Section 101 requires fixation by or under the authority of an author, and a copyrightable work must therefore originate with a human capable of intellectual, creative, or artistic labor.

Thaler v. Perlmutter · filed 2023-08-18

The “fixing” of the work in the tangible medium must be done “by or under the authority of the author.” Id. § 101. In order to be eligible for copyright, then, a work must have an “author.” ... By its plain text, the 1976 Act thus requires a copyrightable work to have an originator with the capacity for intellectual, creative, or artistic labor. Must that originator be a human being to claim copyright protection? The answer is yes.

Section 101 treats a joint work as one created by authors intending their contributions to merge and defines computer programs and machines as tools used by human authors, not as authors themselves.

Thaler v. Perlmutter · filed 2025-03-18

Sixth, authors have intentions. A joint work is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Machines lack minds and do not intend anything. Seventh, and by comparison, every time the Copyright Act discusses machines, the context indicates that machines are tools, not authors. For example, the Copyright Act defines a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly” to “bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The word “machine” is given the same definition as the words “device” and “process,” id., and those terms are consistently used in the statute as mechanisms that assist authors, rather than as authors themselves.

Section 101 treats each version of a work as a separate work for copyright purposes.

Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari · filed 2024-06-21

Thereafter, under the Copyright Act, “each version [of the work] constitutes a separate work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In light of this standard and the plain text of the Agreement, the District Court correctly interpreted this relatively straightforward Agreement. ... The Updated Software, accordingly, is covered by this provision as a subsequent version of the Initial Software that plainly stands alone as “a separate work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a “treaty party” as a country or intergovernmental organization other than the United States that is party to an international agreement, including the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention.

Diaz v. Edi Korta, LLC · filed 2024-07-15

A “treaty party” is statutorily defined as “a country or intergovernmental organization other than the United States that is a party to an international agreement.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “An ‘international agreement’ is . . . the Universal Copyright Convention [and] . . . the Berne Convention[,]” among others. Id.

Section 101 defines performing a work to include reciting, rendering, playing, dancing, or acting it, whether directly or through a device or process.

Herbilicious Music v. Screenbuzz Entertainment LLC · filed 2025-05-23

For purposes of the Copyright Act, “[t]o ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 contemplates that literary works such as software may be embodied in disks.

JET SYSTEMS, LLC v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2025-11-19

The fact that Defendant retained the CD containing the ALF software cannot qualitatively change the nature of the software conversion claim because Congress clearly contemplated that protected works such as software could be embodied in CDs. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (noting that “literary works” may be embodied in “disks”).

Section 101 defines displaying a work as showing a copy directly or through a device or process; applying that definition, the court treated user-driven search-result thumbnails as akin to Google search images rather than an infringing display.

King Spider LLC v. Panda (Hong Kong) Technology Co., Ltd. · filed 2025-01-14

“To display a work, under the Act, is to ‘show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process.’ ... The Court finds that the images displayed on Pandabuy’s website are akin to images being collated by a Google search. Any lists listings displayed to Pandabuy consumers result entirely from algorithmic and user driven behavior. ... Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden in demonstrating Plaintiff Denim Tears is not likely to succeed on its copyright claim.

Section 101’s reference to annotations covers only original works of authorship; annotations created by judges or legislators in their official capacity are ineligible for copyright protection.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. · filed 2020-04-28

But that provision refers only to “annotations . . . which . . . represent an original work of authorship.” 17 U. S. C. §101 (emphasis added). The whole point of the government edicts doctrine is that judges and legislators cannot serve as authors when they produce works in their official capacity.

Section 101’s reference to copyrightable annotations does not make annotations created by judges or legislators in their official capacities eligible for copyright protection.

Georgia v. Public Resource.Org, Inc. · filed 2020-04-27

In the same way that judicial materials are ineligible for protection even though they plainly qualify as “[l]iterary works . . . expressed in words,” ibid., legislative materials are ineligible for protection even if they happen to fit the description of otherwise copyrightable “annotations.”

Section 101(a) permits a preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of copyright infringement without a detailed showing of likely irreparable damage.

Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. · filed 1966-06-25(a)

When a prima facie showing of copyright infringement has been made, plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction without the detailed showing of likelihood of irreparable damage which is ordinarily required for preliminary injunctive relief.

Section 101 permits authors with a protected interest to sue for infringement when they join the copyright proprietor after the proprietor refuses a demand to sue.

Manning v. Miller Music Corporation · filed 1959-06-10

17 U.S.C. § 101 provides that one who infringes the copyright in any protected work shall be liable to “pay to the copyright proprietor” damages. ... It is this fiduciary relationship, imposing equitable obligations upon the publisher beyond those ordinarily imposed by law upon those dealing fully at arms’ length, which gives the plaintiffs standing to sue here. ... Since the plaintiffs have joined the owner of the copyright as a party defendant and have alleged refusal on his part to sue after due demand, I hold that plaintiffs have standing under the Copyright Law to maintain this suit.

Maps and factual compilations protect original ways of selecting or presenting facts, but not the facts themselves.

Albert Sparaco, Jr. v. Lawler · filed 2002-08-29

Although a mapmaker is not protected from copying of the factual information conveyed in the map, she is protected from the copying of any originality in the manner of expression employed in communicating the factual information.

For a work prepared over time, the portion fixed at a particular time is the work as of that time.

I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Systems, Inc. · filed 2004-02-23

If, as plaintiff claims, its website qualifies as a “work ... prepared over a period of time,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, the same statutory definition directs that the portion of the work fixed in March of 2002 was the work as of that time.

Section 101 protects an original combination of elements in an architectural work, even when individual elements are not protectable on their own.

T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc. · filed 2006-08-18

Timberpeg bases its claims here on a combination of elements, which, taken together, are protectable under the definition of an architectural work in 17 U.S.C. § 101.