17 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(b) lets the trial court choose, in its discretion, between proven profits and damages and a statutory-damages estimate within the statutory limits.

F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc. · filed 1952-12-22(b)

We think that the statute empowers the trial court in its sound exercise of judicial discretion to determine whether on all the facts a recovery upon proven profits and damages or one estimated within the statutory limits is more just.

Section 101(b) authorizes recovery of the copyright proprietor’s damages caused by infringement and the infringer’s profits; damages for repeated showings cannot exceed the work’s total value.

Pickford Corporation v. De Luxe Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1958-12-15(b)

Defendant Motion Pictures for Television thus infringed plaintiff’s copyright, and is liable for the damages sufiered by plaintiff for such infringement within the two-year statute, i. e., June 24, 1952, and to the profits of Motion Pictures for Television under 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). ... It makes little difference in the assessment of “such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement” [17 U.S.C. 101(b)] whether each showing was a separate infringement or not. The total value of the picture did not exceed $3,000, and hence the sum of the parts (separate showings) cannot exceed the whole. The damages to the plaintiff under the statute cannot, therefore, from the evidence, exceed $3,000.

Section 101(b) limits copyright damages to losses caused by the infringement and requires a damages determination supported by evidence of that loss.

County of Ventura v. O. v. Blackburn · filed 1966-06-14(b)

We entertain the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed in finding that the damage suffered by the plaintiff, due to the infringement by the defendant, was the value of said copyright unencumbered by the agreement. It appears to us that in fixing damages due to infringement in the amount of the market value of the unencumbered copyright, the District Court failed to take into consideration the extent to which the fair market value of the copyright was necessarily affected by the rights granted to the County under the agreement.

Section 101(b) permits a court to award just damages when actual damages or lost profits are difficult to determine.

National Council of Young Israel, Inc. v. Feit Co., Inc. · filed 1972-09-13(b)

Moreover, since there are “uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright,” ... invocation of the Court’s discretion under 17 U.S.C., section 101(b) appears to be an appropriate sanction to discourage infringement and secure enforcement of the copyright policy. Since there were four separate illustrations that were copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted material, the Court awards total damages in the sum of $1,000.

Section 101(b) permits the court to award statutory damages in lieu of an accounting when actual damages are difficult to prove.

Advisers, Incorporated v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc. · filed 1958-04-28(b)

Because of the difficulty of proving the actual damages to the plaintiff, this Court has discretionary power in lieu of an accounting to grant relief to plaintiff by allowing statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) under which plaintiff is awarded statutory damages amounting to $2,500.

Section 101 permits the court to award damages in lieu of actual damages, but the award must remain within the statute's limits.

Wihtol v. Crow · filed 1962-11-27

The discretion to award damages for copyright infringement is that of the trial court, not of this Court. In lieu of actual damages, the damages allowed may be such “as to the court shall appear to be just,” but must be within statutory limits (17 U.S.C. § 101).

Section 101 permits the trial court to award damages in lieu of actual damages as justice requires, subject to statutory limits.

Wihtol v. Crow · filed 1963-01-05

The discretion to award damages for copyright infringement is that of the trial court, not of this Court. In lieu of actual damages, the damages allowed may be such "as to the court shall appear to be just," but must be within statutory limits (17 U.S.C. § 101).

Section 101 permits a court, in its discretion, to award statutory damages when the amount of damages or profits is uncertain and to award a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.

Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corporation · filed 1963-02-27

The plaintiff was unable to prove any actual damages and the testimony as to the amount of profits was in conflict. The Court may, in its discretion, award statutory damages to the plaintiff when there is uncertainty as to the amount of damages or profits. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts (1952), 344 U.S. 288, 73 S.Ct. 222, 97 L.Ed. 276, 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the plaintiff as part of her costs. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101(b) requires statutory damages within the stated limits when actual damages and profits have not been proved, while § 101(a) authorizes but does not require an injunction when future infringement is unlikely.

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., a California Corporation Doing Business as Reed's Music St · filed 1966-09-29(b), (a)

Where such damages and profits have not been proved the statutory limits must be applied and the trial court’s only discretion lies in determining the amount (between a minimum of $250 and a maximum of $5,000) per infringement to be awarded. ... We conclude that under the facts of this case the district court committed no error in finding that appellee was not likely to infringe again, and did not abuse his discretion in refusing to award an injunction.

Section 101(b) permits the court to award damages it deems just in lieu of actual damages and profits, within the court’s discretion.

Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corporation and Henry G. Michael · filed 1974-03-12(b)

In assessing damages the District Court awarded $25,000, in lieu of actual damages and profits. This is consistent with Section 101(b) of the Copyright Law, and is within the Court’s discretion.

Section 101(b), as it existed before 1976, authorized a copyright plaintiff to seek statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.

McA, Inc. v. Wilson · filed 1981-07-30(b)

Plaintiff offered no evidence of actual damages, seeking instead the "in lieu of actual damages" award authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 101(b), as it existed prior to 1976. ... We think this is a case in which the "time" test should have been applied and that Let My People Come's continuous run at the Village Gate should have been treated as one continuing infringement. ... The $32,500.00 award of statutory damages is reduced to $250.00.

When sought alongside an injunction, § 101(b) damages in lieu of actual damages and profits are equitable relief for which the defendant has no right to a jury trial.

Chappell & Co., Inc. v. Palermo Cafe Co., Inc., Palermo Cafe Co., Inc. v. Chappell & Co., Inc. · filed 1957-10-31(b)

However, we do not rest our decision on that ground, inasmuch as we regard the present complaint under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b) as being in its entirety a claim invoking the equity jurisdiction of the district court, so that defendant had no right to demand a jury trial in any aspect of the claim.

Section 101(b) provides statutory damages for copyright infringement.

Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co. · filed 1962-04-30(b)

The plaintiff is awarded statutory damages of $1,500. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b).

Section 101(b) treats each monthly broadcast of a copyrighted composition as a separate infringement when calculating statutory damages.

Baccaro v. Pisa · filed 1966-03-21(b)

It may be readily concluded that each playing of a copyrighted composition was a separate taking of plaintiff’s property for purposes of § 101(b).

Section 101(b) permits a court to award statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits, with a minimum award of $250.

Morser v. Bengor Products Co. · filed 1968-05-01(b)

Plaintiff asks for $5,000 in damages, the maximum permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). In view of the inexpensive product involved, this seems wholly unreasonable. We think that the minimum statutory allowance of $250 justly compensates the plaintiff and discourages further infringement by the defendants.

Section 101(b) permits a court to award statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits.

Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1977-11-17(b)

The case is remanded for an accounting, after which the district court may, in its discretion, award statutory "in lieu" damages.

Former § 101(b) permits statutory damages despite an infringer’s claim of innocence when the copyrighted works bear notice.

Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp. · filed 1978-07-11(b)

Upon a review of the authorities cited by defendant, the Court concludes that the better rule in the present case is to allow statutory damages.

Section 101(b) permits statutory damages in addition to an infringer’s profits when actual damages cannot be precisely calculated.

Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc. · filed 1978-09-21(b)

We therefore hold that the district court did not err in awarding to plaintiff the profits realized from the infringement, plus the statutory “in lieu” damages.

Under the 1909 Copyright Act, § 101(b) requires at least $250 in statutory damages for each infringement found.

Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks · filed 1983-03-10(b)

Further, the court’s discretion in awarding “just” statutory damages is limited to adhering to the statutory minimum of $250.00 for each infringement found.

Section 101(b) permits statutory damages above the maximum for infringement after actual notice, even without willful intent, to discourage wrongful conduct.

Kamar International v. Russ Berrie & Company, Inc. · filed 1987-10-01(b)

The district court may exceed the statutory maximum, even when there is no malicious or “willful” intent to infringe, in order to discourage wrongful conduct.

Section 101 provides injunction and damages as remedies for copyright infringement.

American Visuals Corporation v. Frederick A. Holland and Sam Schwartz · filed 1958-12-12

Thus the record fully supports Judge Murphy’s findings that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction and damages under 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101(a), (b), and (d) authorize injunctive relief, damages and profits, and delivery of infringing copies and devices for destruction in a copyright infringement case.

Dorchester Music Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co. · filed 1959-02-20(a), (b), (d)

4) Plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the defendants, and each of them, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and licensees and against all persons, firms, corporations and associations in concert with them, whether acting directly or indirectly, permanently enjoining and restraining them, and each of them, from using, reproducing, recording, performing, printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, vending and otherwise infringing plaintiff’s copyright in its musical composition “Rendezvous” and from selling, disposing of, or otherwise turning to account any and all existing infringing copies, articles, records and devices. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(a) and 112. ... 5) Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants, and each of them, the damages and profits to which it is entitled by law (17 U.S.C. § 101(b)), together with full costs of these suits (17 U.S.C. § 116), and as part of said costs, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be assessed by this Court for the services of said attorneys in these consolidated cases and in all proceedings relating thereto. 17 U.S.C. § 116. ... 6) Plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the defendants requiring the defendants, and each of them, to deliver up, on oath, for destruction all infringing copies, articles, records and devices now in their possession or under their control, or under the possession or control of their agents, or employees, as well as all plates, molds, matrices or other means of making such infringing copies, articles, records and devices of plaintiff’s copyrighted song “Rendezvous”. 17 U.S.C. § 101(d).

Section 101(a) permits injunctive relief against unauthorized publication, copying, or vending, while § 101(b) preserves a copyright proprietor’s right to sue for damages despite a conditional security assignment.

Pantone, Inc. v. A. I. Friedman, Inc. · filed 1968-12-17(a) (b)

Since plaintiff’s copyright gave it the exclusive right to “publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work”, 17 U.S.C. § 1(a), it is entitled to injunctive relief against such unauthorized publication, copying or vending on the part of others. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a); see Platt & Munk, Inc. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963). ... Thus the plaintiff continues as the real party in interest and is entitled, as both the equitable owner and copyright proprietor, to maintain this suit for infringement. Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y.1959). The purpose of recordation of the assignment pursuant to Title 17, U.S.C. § 30 was to put subsequent purchasers or mortgagees on notice, New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star, 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y.1915). It did not destroy plaintiff’s status as “the copyright proprietor” entitled to sue for damages, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b), and its right as a “party aggrieved” to seek injunctive relief, 17 U.S.C. § 112.

Section 101(a) authorizes federal courts to issue copyright injunctions, but preliminary relief still requires the traditional equitable showing.

Meeropol v. Nizer · filed 1973-07-18(a)

It is true that §§ 101 and 112 of- the Copyright Act, for example, talk specifically about the power of a federal court to issue injunctions in copyright cases. It does not follow from this fact, however, that the court can grant such relief on the comparatively meager showing as advocated by plaintiffs.

The then-applicable § 101(b) authorized injunctive relief and specified statutory damages for copyright infringement, while § 101(d) supported destruction of infringing copies under the infringer’s control.

Telex Corp. v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1973-11-09(b), (d)

The court concludes that each of the twelve Telex manuals constitutes an infringement of IBM's copyright in one or more IBM manuals. As a result of Telex’s infringement, IBM is entitled to an injunction against continuing infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1947). IBM is also entitled to statutory damages under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b), in the amount of $250 for each infringement and $1 for each additional infringing copy. ... In addition IBM is entitled to the destruction of all copies of the infringing Telex manuals insofar as still under the control of Tel...ex, 17 U.S.C. § 101(d), and reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.

Section 101 supports judgment as a matter of law when admissions establish the allegations necessary to state a copyright-infringement cause of action.

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Log Cabin Club Ass'n · filed 1973-09-13

judgment as a matter of law due to the admission of the allegations necessary to state a cause of action under 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101(a) authorizes a permanent injunction against continued infringement, including further performance of an infringing work while preserving independent noninfringing use.

Breffort v. I Had a Ball Company · filed 1967-07-24(a)

That record, coupled with the jury’s verdict, convinces the Court that in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 a permanent injunction should issue restraining the defendants Chodorov and Kipness from further infringing plaintiffs’ copyright in “Impasse,” including a restraint against further performance of ... Had a Ball,” at least as long as it remains substantially in its present form, which infringes plaintiffs’ copyrighted work.

Section 101(e) treats a licensed mechanical reproduction as unauthorized manufacture, and therefore infringement, when the reproducer fails to pay the statutory royalty; its complete-defense provision consequently bars actions for unpaid royalties.

Norbay Music, Inc. v. King Records, Inc. · filed 1961-05-25(e)

Section 101(e) clearly treats the term “infringement” as embracing “unauthorized manufacture” occurring after the copyright proprietor has licensed mechanical reproduction. Since a once-recorded composition is available to all third parties “upon the payment” of a two-cent royalty, manufacture at this point can be “unauthorized” only in that the third party fails ■ to make the required payments. Thus § 101(e), in treating “unauthorized manufacture” as infringement, treats nonpayment of the statutory royalty as an act of infringement. We conclude, therefore, that the “complete defense” provision, in barring actions for infringement, applies to all actions for unpaid statutory royalties, however they may be named.

Section 101(e) treats preparing tapes in the United States for foreign manufacture of phonograph records as part of the infringing manufacture, making the preparer liable for the resulting infringement.

Famous Music Corporation v. Seeco Records, Inc. · filed 1961-11-22(e)

The preparation of the tapes (which are sent to persons abroad to be used by said persons to manufacture phonograph records), which contain renditions of plaintiffs’ compositions, is a violation of Section 101(e). ... Accordingly, this court holds that the act of defendant in preparing the tape was a part of the manufacture and, consequently, an infringement for which it should respond under Section 101(e).

Section 101(e) treats unauthorized manufacture or sale of a record or tape as infringement unless the similar-use exception in section 1(e) applies.

United States v. Heilman · filed 1980-02-08(e)

In sum, a person who makes or sells a record or tape of a copyrighted musical composition without authorization infringes unless the “similar use” exception of Section 1(e) applies.

Section 101 defines a copy broadly enough to include a computer program fixed in a ROM or other electronic device, even when the work can be perceived only with the aid of a machine.

Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc. · filed 1982-08-24

By this broad language, Congress opted for an expansive interpretation of the terms “fixation” and “copy” which encompass technological advances such as those represented by the electronic devices in this ease.

Section 101 defines a copy as a material object in which a work is fixed and from which it can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated, including with a machine; changing a computer-data format does not avoid infringement.

Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc. · filed 1984-07-25

The way that information must be formatted in order to be of use by a particular computer or program should not prevent a finding of infringement.

Section 101 defines a derivative work broadly to include a work based on preexisting works and original modifications taken as a whole.

SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1985-03-06

The definition includes “editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship....”

Section 101 treats software loaded into a computer's RAM as a copy when the RAM representation can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.

MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. · filed 1993-04-07

However, since we find that the copy created in the RAM can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” we hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 treats a videotape as a copy when a work is fixed in a material object from which it can be perceived, and its public-performance definition covers transmissions by any device or process.

Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television International, Ltd. · filed 1996-07-22

By making a videotape of the fiber link transmission, Visnews reproduced the copyrighted work in a copy, thereby violating section 106. Copies “are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” ... The videotape is a material object. Visnews mechanically fixed the riot footage to it. By placing the videotape in a VCR, a viewer can perceive the footage. ... A performance is public if it occurs “at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” ... This argument flies in the face of section 101’s plain language that transmittal may be “by means of any device or process.”

Section 101 defines a compilation as an original work formed by selecting, coordinating, or arranging preexisting materials, and a collective work as a whole made from separate and independent contributions.

MCA Television Limited v. Feltner · filed 1996-07-26

Along the same lines, we reject Feltner's argument that each episode was part of a "collective work." ... The Copyright Act defines "compilation" as a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective works. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). A "collective work" is "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." Id. ... Thus, the district court properly awarded damages for each television episode, rather than for each series, broadcast as a separate "work."

Section 101 protects a building design embodied in any tangible medium, including its overall form and arrangement and composition of spaces and elements, even when a rough model could not be constructed; individual standard elements may remain unprotected.

Shine v. Childs · filed 2005-08-10

Shine ’99, although certainly a rough model, is more than a concept or an idea; it is a distinctive design for a building. As explained above, whether a tower actually could be constructed from this model is irrelevant. Defendants argue that the shape and form of Shine ’99 are so rudimentary and standard that protecting it would be akin to protecting a particular geometric shape, such as “an ellipse, a pyramid, or an egg.” (Def. Br. at 28) However, the AWCPA protects “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression ... [including] the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design....” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Individual arguably “standard” elements of Shine ’99, such as its twist or its setbacks, might not be worthy of protection, but the arrangement and composition of the various elements in the model do at least arguably constitute the “design of a building” under the AWC-PA.

Section 101 treats a work stored in a computer’s memory as a fixed copy and treats displaying it as showing that copy on a computer screen or communicating it to another computer.

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon. Inc · filed 2007-05-15

In sum, based on the plain language of the statute, a person displays a photographic image by using a computer to fill a computer screen with a copy of the photographic image fixed in the computer’s memory.

Section 101 defines performing a work in terms of perceptible acts, so downloading a musical file without simultaneously playing it is not a performance, and the definition of “publicly” does not change that meaning.

United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers · filed 2010-09-28

The downloads at issue in this appeal are not musical performances that are contemporaneously perceived by the listener. They are simply transfers of electronic files containing digital copies from an on-line server to a local hard drive. The downloaded songs are not performed in any perceptible manner during the transfers; the user must take some further action to play the songs after they are downloaded. Because the electronic download itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the musical work encoded in the digital transmission, we hold that such a download is not a performance of that work, as defined by § 101. ... The definition of “publicly” simply defines the circumstances under which a performance will be considered public; it does not define the meaning of “performance.”

Section 101 requires a work to be embodied in a copy or phonorecord with sufficient permanence or stability to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

Kelley v. Chicago Park District · filed 2011-02-15

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression “when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Although the planting material is tangible and can be perceived for more than a transitory duration, it is not stable or permanent enough to be called “fixed.” ... The essence of a garden is its vitality, not its fixedness. ... Because Kelley’s garden is neither “authored” nor “fixed” in the senses required for basic copyright, it cannot qualify for moral-rights protection under VARA.

Section 101 treats an assignment, exclusive license, or other conveyance as a transfer of a copyright right, even when the transfer is limited in time or place.

Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. · filed 2015-07-29

It specifies that the owner can transfer a right, or a share of such a right, via “an assignment, . . . exclusive license, or any other conveyance, . . . whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect.” Id. § 101. That is, either an assignment (which transfers legal title to the transferee) or an exclusive license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the transferee) qualifies as a “transfer” of a right in a copyright for the purposes of the Act.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as the design of a building embodied in a tangible medium, including its overall form and arrangement or composition of spaces and elements, but excluding individual standard features.

Davidson v. United States · filed 2017-07-18

The statutory definition of “architectural work” is “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression . . . . The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... It is undisputed that the statue is not, independently, a building within this regulatory definition. The Las Vegas Lady Liberty is a free standing work of sculpture; it is not part of the facade of the hotel’s superstructure nor is it connected to the building in any physical sense. It also does not serve any functional purpose with regard to the building.

Section 101 treats showing audiovisual images to members of the public through a device or process—including a user-requested online transmission—as performing and transmitting the work.

Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A. · filed 2018-03-02

To “perform” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” Id. § 101. To do so publicly means, as relevant, to “transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” Id.; see also id. (“To ‘transmit’ a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”). Nowhere does the Act state that a work so shown is performed only if a third-party end user plays no role in the showing. Here, because TV Polska “show[ed]” the fifty-one copyrighted episodes “to the public” through its video-on-demand system—“a[] device or process” that rendered “members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . in separate places and . . . at different times,” id.—it has violated Spanski’s undisputed public performance right.

Section 101's definition of “visual art” excludes motion pictures and posters from works eligible for VARA's moral-rights protection.

Mahon v. Mainsail LLC · filed 2020-08-07

Here, Mahon seeks to assert author rights under VARA, BCIA, and the Berne Convention. For the reasons stated above, VARA does not protect Mahon’s works: none of the Film, the screenplay, the posters, or the trailer constitute “visual art” eligible for protection under the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “visual art” to exclude motion pictures and posters).

Section 101 defines a sound recording as a work resulting from fixation of a series of sounds, distinguishing the recording from the underlying musical composition.

Richardson v. Kharbouch · filed 2024-01-04

The Copyright Act defines sound recordings as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In other words, the sound recording is the actual physical recording of a particular performance of a musical work.

Section 101 defines publication as distribution of copies or phonorecords to the public by sale, transfer, rental, lease, or lending, and an unauthorized distribution by someone who stole the work does not constitute publication under the court’s application of the Copyright Act.

JH v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A · filed 2025-04-29

While the Copyright Act does not define “published,” it defines “publication” as “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute provides further guidance: “The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.” Id. However, as previously noted, the Register of Copyrights has counseled that, “[a]lthough it is not expressly stated in the statutory definition, the legislative history indicates that publication occurs only when copies or phonorecords are distributed by or with the authority of the copyright owner,” Compendium of the U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 1902 (3d ed.). Here, JH alleges that factories stole her works and sold them without her authority. Accordingly, under the Register’s guidance, JH did not publish her works.

Section 101 defines a copy as a material object in which a work is fixed and from which it can be perceived or reproduced.

Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm't W., Inc. · filed 2018-05-29

The act of downloading and storing the pages and code of a website qualifies as making a "copy" under the Copyright Act because the pages and code becomes fixed on a hard drive, from which they can later be perceived and reproduced with the aid of a computer.

Section 101(e) imposes liability for unauthorized phonograph-record sales on a business that has the right and ability to supervise the seller and a direct financial interest in the sales, even without actual knowledge of infringement.

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H. L. Green Company, Inc., and Third Party Jalen Amusement Company, Inc., and Third Pa · filed 1963-04-15(e)

Section 101(e) of the Copyright Act makes unlawful the “unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale” of phonograph records. Because of the open-ended terminology of the section, and the related section 1(e), courts have had to trace, case by ease, a pattern of business relationships which would render one person liable for the infringing conduct of another. ... When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials — even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired, see De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, Hearst Magazines v. De Acosta 325 U.S. 862, 65 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed. 1983 (1945) — the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.

Section 101(b) permits cumulative recovery of proven damages and the infringer’s profits, and lets the court award just damages in lieu of actual damages and profits when proof is difficult, even if infringer profits are shown.

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc., and Henry Glass & Co. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc. · filed 1964-03-05(b)

Since the statute is clear that lack of proof of damages and profits does not preclude the recovery of a larger amount where warranted, we hold that it was error for the Trial Court not to consider as within its discretion the propriety of a statutory award, if any, for damages suffered even though incapable of exact proof in addition to the actual profits shown to have been made by the infringer.

Section 101(b) permits a court to award damages it deems just instead of actual damages and profits.

Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co. · filed 1970-12-23(b)

The Court may, in lieu of actual damages and profits, award to Plaintiff such damages as to the Court shall appear to be just. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). After receipt of Plaintiff’s notice of infringement in March, 1969, the Defendant did cause to be destroyed certain labels which its Hong Kong agent had not yet shipped. Further, it later commenced using another type of label. Consequently, having heard the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars is a just amount to be awarded to Plaintiff as its damages.

Section 101(b) permits recovery of both the copyright owner’s damages and the infringer’s profits.

Matilda Alouf, Also Known as Matty Joy, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of House of Joy v. Expansion Products, I · filed 1969-11-05(b)

that § 101(b) means what it says in allowing recovery both of the owner’s damages and of the infringer’s profits, despite a contrary statement in the legislative history ... plaintiff still did not have enough to carry the day.

Section 101(b) permits a cumulative award of the copyright proprietor’s damages and the infringer’s profits.

Thomas Wilson & Company, Inc. v. Irving J. Dorfman Company, Inc. · filed 1970-10-16(b)

Thus, the statute twice refers to a cumulative award of the proprietor’s damages ... and ... the infringer’s profits.

Section 101 permits the court, in its discretion, to elect copyright-infringement damages instead of the infringer’s profits.

Runge v. Joyce Lee and Joyce Eve Lee Cosmetics, Inc., a Corporation · filed 1971-03-26

Such an election is properly within the court’s discretion.

Section 101(b) permits recovery of actual damages and infringer’s profits, but does not allow duplicative recovery and limits profits to those attributable to the infringing material.

Fedtro, Inc. v. Kravex Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1970-01-26(b)

Of course, in any event if the defendant’s unit profit on the infringement aspect of each transaction in which it engaged is a certain amount and the plaintiff’s profit on the same sale, if it had made such sale, would have been a greater unit amount, plaintiff would not be entitled to both recoveries but only to the greater of the two recoveries, notwithstanding the language of Section 101(b), and the settled rule that the first two clauses of Section 101(b) are cumulative. Damages from infringement can take many forms but when the damages from infringement take the form of claiming the entire profit on the defendant’s sale, on the lost-sale-to-plaintiff theory, the amount so claimed is inclusive of both damages and profits under the cumulative language of Section 101(b). ... Granting that under Section 101(b) plaintiff need only show sales and defendants must “prove every element of cost which he claims” what is the sale which the plaintiff must show? It is the sale of the copyright material that the plaintiff is, as it were, prima facie entitled to stand on, and it is the costs of that sale of the copyright material which the defendant has the burden of establishing.

Section 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright Act permits a copyright plaintiff to recover both actual damages and the infringer's profits from the infringement.

Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. · filed 1981-07-23(b)

The language of section 101(b) unambiguously provides for the recovery of both actual damages and profits. ... We therefore hold a plaintiff may recover both damages sustained by him and profits earned by the infringers as a result of unlawful infringement.

Section 101(b) permits a court to award damages in lieu of actual damages and infringer profits when neither is proven.

Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc. · filed 1972-01-14(b)

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not proved that he has suffered actual damages as the result of the publication of the infringing work. Furthermore, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that defendants have gained no profits as the result of the publication and sale of “To the Top of the World.” Therefore, it is clearly within the discretion of the court to revert to the “in lieu” provision under the statute.

Section 101(b) allows a copyright plaintiff to seek an accounting of infringement profits or statutory in lieu damages.

Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald'S Corp. · filed 1977-10-12(b)

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in awarding damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101(b). ... We find, however, that the district court was in error in awarding damages. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Section 101(e) permits the court to award additional damages when a manufacturer fails to give the required notice of intent to use a copyrighted musical composition.

Leo Feist, Inc. v. Apollo Records, N. Y. Corp. · filed 1969-03-27(e)

Plaintiffs are entitled to damages in the amount of an additional $548.29 for violation of the notice provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 101(e), thus requiring a royalty of $1,096.58 total.

Section 101(e) permits additional damages when a record manufacturer fails to give the required notice of its intended use of a copyrighted composition under the compulsory license.

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington Records, Inc. · filed 1959-04-03(e)

Thus the evidence amply supports the finding that there was failure of notice. This finding is important, first because it is the statutory predicate for an award of punitive damages, and second because it sheds light on defendants’ subsequent conduct, characterized by plaintiffs as trade “piracy.”

Section 101(e) reaches parties who knowingly participate in or further the unauthorized sale of phonograph records, making them jointly and severally liable with the principal infringer.

Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc. · filed 1966-07-18(e)

one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor is applicable in suits arising under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 defines “display” to include showing a copy of a work via television.

Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1978-02-10

Defendant’s use of TV Guide constitutes a “display” within the ambit of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 includes states within the class of persons liable for copyright infringement and subject to damages.

Mills Music, Inc. v. State of Arizona and Arizona Coliseum and Exposition Center Board, a Body Politic Under and by Virt · filed 1979-02-26(b)

Although neither the parties nor the Court has located any cases determining whether a state is included in the definition of “any person [who] shall infringe,” we believe that the reasonable construction of this provision includes states within the defined class.

Section 101 defines “display” as showing a copy of a work.

Burwood Products Co. v. Marsel Mirror & Glass Products, Inc. · filed 1979-04-16

“Display” is defined as “to show a copy” of the work.

Section 101 permits an infringing copy to be fixed in a medium different from the protected work, and the copy need not be sold for profit for statutory damages to be available.

Walker v. University Books, Inc. · filed 1979-09-06

That an infringing copy may be produced in a medium different than that of the protected work is not, in itself, a bar to recovery, nor does the fact that the blueprints themselves were never sold for profit eliminate the possibility of an award of statutory damages for infringement under the Act.

Section 101 treats a musical arrangement, dramatization, or other recast, transformed, or adapted form of a copyrighted work as a derivative work.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc. · filed 1979-10-12

This automatically establishes that Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to prepare derivative ... works ... based on the copyrighted work, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); and that Plaintiffs are entitled to prevent any unauthorized “ . . . musical arrangement, dramatization ... or any other form in which the work may be recast, transformed or adapted”, 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Under § 101, a work-for-hire determination first uses general common-law agency principles to distinguish employees from independent contractors, while the commissioned-works route is limited to enumerated categories covered by a signed written agreement.

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid · filed 1989-06-05(1) and (2)

determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor. After making this determination, the court can apply the appropriate subsection of § 101.

Section 101 defines a compilation as an original work formed by selecting, coordinating, or arranging preexisting materials, and defines a collective work as a collection of separate and independent contributions assembled into a collective whole.

Heyman v. Salle · filed 1989-07-11

Those compilations which consist of contributions which themselves constitute “works” capable of copyright are called collective works.

Section 101 treats a broadcast as fixed when the first copy of the transmission is made, allowing copyright protection to attach at that point.

Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc. · filed 1989-07-13

copyright protection attaches to the broadcast feature only when the first copy of the transmission is made.

Section 101 treats an article with an intrinsic utilitarian function as a useful article and permits copyright protection only for artistic features separable from its utilitarian aspects.

Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co., Inc. · filed 1989-09-11

Since the purpose of the soft sculptures is to enable the wearer to masquerade, the artistic elements of each article are not conceptually separable from each article’s utilitarian aspects.

Section 101 treats the owner of any exclusive copyright right as a copyright owner.

SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures Corp. · filed 1989-09-13

A “copyright owner” is defined, under the Copyright Act, as the owner of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.

Section 101 treats a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors and requires a contributor to translate an idea into fixed, tangible expression; merely describing the desired functions or appearance is insufficient for joint authorship.

S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc. · filed 1989-09-13

A person who merely describes to an author what the commissioned work should do or look like is not a joint author for purposes of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 treats an audiovisual work as the full series of related images displayed, so registration analysis should consider the work as a whole rather than only its individual components.

Atari Games Corporation v. Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights · filed 1989-10-31

the Register’s focus, even if initially concentrated on discrete parts, ... should be on the audiovisual work as a whole, ... the total sequence of images displayed as the game is played.

Section 101 defines a compilation as an original selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materials or data and permits uncopyrightable elements, but a work consisting entirely of one uncopyrightable blank form is not copyrightable as a compilation.

Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc. · filed 1990-01-12

Here, however, the superbill consists in its entirety of one uncopyrightable blank form and hence cannot be copyrightable as a compilation.

Section 101 treats an article as a useful article when it has an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond merely conveying its appearance or information; a flag or banner qualifies because it can function as a flag without its decorative design.

Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags & Crafts, Inc. · filed 1990-02-16

In this Court’s view, a flag or banner does qualify as a useful article in and of itself, as it may function as a flag even in the absence of any design.

Section 101's definition of a derivative work does not cover a work based on an uncopyrighted, non-public-domain design.

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Rosstex Fabrics, Inc. · filed 1990-03-15

the copyright in issue is not a derivative work with the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103. Accordingly, defendants’ second argument is unconvincing.

Section 101 treats a work created by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire, while an independent contractor's work qualifies only if it falls within an enumerated category; paintings are excluded.

Marshburn v. United States · filed 1990-06-29

Paintings are not included in this list. Therefore, a painter who completes a painting as an independent contractor will own the copyright of the painting.

Section 101 treats a creative contribution by a nonemployee as owned by its creator unless a written agreement transfers ownership, and excludes a nonexclusive license from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership.

Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen · filed 1990-07-20

where a non-employee contributes to a book or movie, as Effects did here, the exclusive rights of copyright ownership vest in the creator of the contribution, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary.

Section 101 defines publication to include distributing copies or offering them to a group for further distribution, and defines public display to include communicating a work to the public by a device or process.

Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n · filed 1990-08-08

Clearly, defendants communicated by means of a mailing, a form of public display.

Section 101 defines useful articles by intrinsic utilitarian function and limits copyright treatment of their designs to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features separately identifiable from and independently existing apart from the utilitarian aspects.

H20 Swimwear, Ltd. v. Lomas · filed 1990-08-16

Since the aesthetic qualities of clothing, including swimwear, can rarely be separable from their utilitarian function, garments are generally not accorded copyright protection.

Section 101 defines public performance to include transmitting or communicating a performance to the public, so a cable programming service can publicly perform music by providing programming to cable operators.

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Services · filed 1990-08-29

Plaintiffs submit that the second definition encompasses defendant’s provision of programming services to cable system operators. The Court agrees.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1990-09-06

a “computer program” as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”

Section 101 defines a derivative work as an original work based on preexisting material, and the copyright covers only the author's original additions.

Folio Impressions, Inc. v. California · filed 1990-10-04

Since Sadjan created the rose blossom portion of design pattern RG28.1, his addition of this particular original contribution to the preexisting documentary background was an expression of an idea which qualifies Pattern # 1365 as a “derivative work.”

Section 101 treats a work formed by selecting, coordinating, or arranging preexisting materials or data into an original whole as a compilation.

J.R. O'Dwyer Co. v. Media Marketing International, Inc. · filed 1991-01-25

O’Dwyer’s directory plainly is a compilation as defined by Section 101.

Section 101 defines a derivative work as a work based on preexisting works that, through recasting, transformation, adaptation, or original modifications, becomes an original work of authorship.

C Tek Software, Inc. v. New York State Business Venture Partnership · filed 1991-03-01

IIS’ changes are not “trivial” in the copyright sense; they required more than token independent effort or judgment.

Section 101 treats a person as an author when the person translates an idea into an expression embodied in a copy by the person or under the person's authority, subject to the limits on rote transcription.

Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce · filed 1991-03-01

When one authorizes embodiment, that process must be rote or mechanical transcription that does not require intellectual modification or highly technical enhancement.

Section 101 does not protect a collection of facts whose selection, coordination, and arrangement utterly lack originality.

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. · filed 1991-03-27

a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks originality.

Section 101(2) limits commissioned works made for hire by independent contractors to nine enumerated categories and requires a signed written agreement.

M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. · filed 1990-06-25(2)

we look to the language of § 101(2) to determine if the advertising flyer was a work for hire.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire through employee-scope work or certain commissioned work accompanied by a signed writing; the drawings therefore were not works made for hire where the architect was an independent contractor and the agreement was oral.

Bryce & Palazzola Architects & Associates, Inc. v. A.M.E. Group, Inc. · filed 1994-04-26

Therefore, the court finds that the drawings were not a work made for hire as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101. Because the drawings fail to meet that statutory definition, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) is inapplicable.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building design embodied in a tangible medium, including plans or drawings, covering overall form and spatial arrangement but excluding individual standard features.

Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Maloney · filed 1995-07-03

The Copyright Act defines an architectural work as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 makes a factual compilation copyrightable only to the extent that its selection, coordination, or arrangement is original; a mechanical selection of facts does not qualify.

Mid America Title Co. v. Kirk · filed 1995-07-18

In essence, Mid America’s selection of the facts that were allegedly copied from Title Commitment No. 125266 was too rote and mechanical a task to constitute an original element of the work.

Section 101 treats a motion picture as a derivative work of a screenplay when it is based on and recasts the preexisting screenplay.

Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp. · filed 1995-09-08

Thus, the Motion Picture would be a “derivative work” of the Screenplay.

Section 101's publication definition requires the copyright owner's consent to making the work available to the general public.

Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. · filed 1995-09-22

There is no evidence of any consensual release of any of these works to the public.

Section 101 treats clothing as a useful article with an intrinsic utilitarian function, while separable artwork on the clothing may remain protectable.

Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. · filed 1995-11-13

As “ ‘useful article[s]’ ... having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, clothes are not copyrightable.

Section 101 excludes a work made for hire from VARA's definition of a work of visual art and defines such a work to include one prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. · filed 1995-12-01(1), (2)(B)

These factors, properly considered and weighed with the employee benefits granted plaintiffs and the tax treatment accorded them, are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the artists were employees, and the sculpture is therefore a work made for hire as a matter of law.

Section 101 permits copyright protection for a compilation when the author's choices reflect sufficient creativity and judgment.

Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Technology, Inc. · filed 1995-12-06

Accordingly, the choices made by Compaq reflect the requisite degree of creativity and judgment necessary to protect its compilation.

Section 101 protects a compilation when the selection, arrangement, and coordination of preexisting materials make the whole original, even if individual elements are not protected.

Skinder-Strauss Associates v. Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. · filed 1995-12-27

Thus, a compilation, such as a legal directory, may be subject to copyright although the facts presented therein are not.

Section 101 treats animal mannequins designed merely to portray an animal's appearance as outside the useful-article category and therefore protectable as sculptural works.

Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Company, Inc. · filed 1996-01-29

The mannequin forms “by definition are not useful articles.”

Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership to include an exclusive license but exclude a nonexclusive license.

Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc. · filed 1996-03-22

Thus, if Bateman's purported license was exclusive, the lack of writing is fatal to his claim that there was an oral license.

Section 101 excludes sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work from the definition of sound recordings and treats the soundtrack as protected under the motion-picture copyright.

Maljack Productions, Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp. · filed 1996-04-17

The Act defines sound recordings, however, as “not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 excludes nonexclusive licenses from the definition of a transfer of copyright ownership, so §204(a)'s writing requirement does not apply to them.

I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver · filed 1996-01-17

Therefore, even though section 204(a) of the Copyright Act invalidates any transfer of copyright ownership that is not in writing, section 101 explicitly removes a nonexclusive license from the section 204(a) writing requirement.

Section 101 requires a derivative work based on a preexisting work to substantially borrow from the existing work, not merely be based on it.

M.H. Segan Ltd. Partnership v. Hasbro, Inc. · filed 1996-05-02

A derivative work must “borrow[ ] substantially from existing works.”

Section 101's compilation definition requires preexisting material or data; the court held the computer program could not strictly qualify as a compilation because it did not consist solely of such material.

Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-05-14

Strictly speaking, though, the plaintiff’s program cannot be viewed as a compilation because SCM does not consist solely of “preexisting material or data.”

Section 101 treats an exclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership even when the exclusive rights conveyed are narrow, so the transfer must be in writing.

PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1996-05-16

Thus, even if the rights to be conveyed were narrow, since an exclusive license was contemplated, a writing was required.

Section 101 treats physically removing pages from a copyrighted book and adapting the artwork into framed wall art as recasting and transforming the preexisting work into an infringing derivative work.

Greenwich Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc. · filed 1996-05-20

Defendants’ infringement is particularly evident in the context of the copyrighted book, which defendants have clearly “recast” and “transformed” by physically removing the pages and adapting them into works of art to hang on the wall.

Section 101 treats a school serving multiple teachers and students as a group of persons for purposes of publication and public performance.

Bagdadi v. Nazar · filed 1996-05-29

Therefore, we conclude that the school constituted a “group of persons.”

Section 101's joint-work definition requires intent toward joint authorship in addition to intent that independently copyrightable contributions merge into a unitary whole.

Clogston v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons · filed 1996-07-09

The Court concludes that the AAOS’s proposed methodology correctly apprehends joint authorship.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building's design embodied in a tangible medium and covers the overall form and arrangement of spaces and elements rather than individual standard features.

Qualey v. Caring Center of Slidell · filed 1996-08-16

The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.

Section 101(2) permits a signed agreement to establish a commissioned work as made for hire even if the agreement does not use the exact phrase work made for hire, when it clearly gives the commissioning party ownership.

Armento v. Laser Image, Inc. · filed 1996-10-16(2)

This Court concludes that, for the purposes of qualifying the work under the for-hire doctrine, that omission is not fatal.

Section 101's compilation protection allows others to build on the ideas or facts set forth in a compilation.

Publications International, Limited v. Meredith Corporation · filed 1996-07-08

It therefore promotes the progress of science and art by allowing others to build upon ideas or information (i.e., facts) set forth in a compilation.

Section 101 treats the audiovisual works created by Elias/Savion as satisfying the definition of an audiovisual work.

Raquel v. Education Management Corp. · filed 1996-11-25

Conversely, the “Audiovisual Works” created by Elias/Savion represents a property right which fully satisfies the definitions of an audiovisual work.

Section 101 treats a work consisting of sounds or images being transmitted as fixed when a fixation is made simultaneously with the transmission.

National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 1997-01-30

A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

Section 101's collective-work definition requires separate and independent works to be assembled into a collective whole.

Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc. · filed 1997-02-06

Because this evidence supports the conclusion that the episodes were not “assembled into a collective whole,” it was not error for the district court to reject Feltner’s contention that each series was a “compilation” under § 504(c).

Section 101 protects a useful article's artistic features only when they can be identified separately from and exist independently of its utilitarian aspects.

Milligan v. Worldwide Tupperware, Inc. · filed 1997-03-05

Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.

Section 101 defines a derivative work as a work based on one or more preexisting works.

Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp. · filed 1997-05-21

A derivative work is a work based on one or more preexisting works.

Section 101 permits compilation copyrights even when a broadcast includes works separately copyrighted by others.

Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood · filed 1997-06-06

This is entirely without significance, as the Act specifically provides for such “compilation” copyrights.

Section 101 treats showing a copyrighted work's image by television broadcast as a display.

Los Angeles News Service v. CONUS COM. CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP · filed 1997-07-09

The Copyright Act of 1976 made clear that the “display” of a copyrighted work includes the showing of its image by television broadcast.

Section 101 requires a derivative work to include an original contribution, so a modification lacking originality is not an infringing derivative work.

Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc. · filed 1997-07-29

Applying the proper standard to the ease at bar, the Court finds that the necessary element of originality is absent from the items manufactured for La Infantil from the Precious Moments fabric.

Section 101's definition of copies is technology-neutral and supports treating works perceived from a computer terminal as copies.

Tasini v. New York Times Co. · filed 1997-08-13

Thus, the right to reproduce a work, which necessarily encompasses the right to create copies of that work, presupposes that such copies might be “perceived” from a computer terminal.

Section 101's visual-art exclusion does not make a sculpture advertising merely because it appears in an advertising brochure.

Martin v. City of Indianapolis · filed 1997-10-03

Further, the inclusion of the sculpture in the advertising brochure did not transform the sculpture itself into advertising, any more than a photograph of the State Capitol included in an advertising medium would turn the State Capitol into mere advertising.

Section 101(2)'s audiovisual-work category requires a visual component, so purely audio works do not qualify under it.

Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc. · filed 1997-12-03(2)

The plain language of this definition indicates that an audiovisual work must have a visual component.

Section 101 protects a useful article's design only when its artistic features can be separated from its utilitarian aspects.

Severin Montres, Ltd. v. Yidah Watch Co. · filed 1997-12-29

Therefore, to be the proper subject matter of a copyright, the design of the watch must be separable from the utilitarian aspects of the watch.

Section 101 permits copyright protection for a factual compilation while leaving the underlying facts unprotected.

TransWestern Publishing Co. v. Multimedia Marketing Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-01-08

A factual compilation is copyrightable but the facts themselves are not.

Section 101 treats a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire.

Graham v. James · filed 1998-05-18

We affirm the district court’s determination that the C version was not a work for hire, and that consequently James owns the copyright.

Section 101 defines a joint work by the authors' intention to merge their contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

DeBitetto v. Alpha Books · filed 1998-05-20

A book is a joint work if the authors intended, at the time of creation, to merge their respective contributions into “inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”

Section 101's limited-publication concept can present a fact question when software is distributed to a restricted class for a restricted purpose.

Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc. · filed 1998-08-17

Although Rolm urges the Court to determine, as a matter of law, that the distribution of its software constituted no more than a “limited publication,” based on the record before it, the Court finds that this question is more appropriately resolved by a jury.

Section 101 requires derivative works and compilations to display sufficient originality as a whole to qualify for copyright protection.

Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. v. West Publishing Co. · filed 1998-11-03

Copyright protection is unavailable for both derivative works and compilations alike unless, when analyzed as a whole, they display sufficient originality so as to amount to an “original work of authorship.”

Section 101 provides that displaying a work alone does not constitute publication.

Bridge Publications, Inc. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc. · filed 1998-11-04

[D]isplay of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

Section 101 treats a work as joint when the putative authors intend to merge their contributions into a unitary whole.

Systems XIX, Inc. v. Parker · filed 1998-11-09

For a joint work to exist, the putative authors must have intended to merge their respective contributions into a unitary whole.