11 U.S.C. § 523

A creditor who fails to prove that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury cannot except the resulting debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6).

Pablo v. Leader · filed 2023-11-27(a)(6)

This Court concludes that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that Leader caused Estillado’s death by willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a wage debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures employees; unlawful underpayment alone does not establish malice.

Jiao v. Wu · filed 2024-01-03(a)(6)

Assuming Fan lacked the ability to pay lawful wages, employing workers for over a year without the ability to pay lawful wages is evidence of willfulness. ... Putting threats of violence aside, the Court finds that Fan acted with malice because, taken as a whole, the evidence establishes that Fan’s acts are contrary to commonly accepted duties of an employer and injurious to employees.

The creditors' claims against one defendant did not qualify under § 523(a)(6) because they did not prove his conduct was willful.

Jiao v. Zou · filed 2024-01-03(a)(6)

Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs’ claims result from Zou’s willful conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts unpaid wage claims from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes willful and malicious injury to employees.

Jiao v. Fan · filed 2024-01-03(a)(6)

For the reasons set forth below, judgment is granted in favor of plaintiffs to the extent that each plaintiff’s claims against Zhaorui Fan will be declared nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally and willfully injures another by converting their property; recklessness alone is insufficient.

Guse v. Carter · filed 2024-02-08(a)(6)

But, the Supreme Court held in Geiger that recklessness alone does not fall under § 523(a)(6). Plaintiff needed to prove that Defendant intentionally and willfully converted Plaintiff’s funds. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED and Plaintiff is awarded a nondischargeable judgment in the amount of $132,600.00, which is the amount disbursed after the Admission Email is dated.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for breach of a noncompete agreement nondischargeable when the debtor intended the injury and acted in conscious disregard of contractual duties.

Polylok, Inc. v. Hornback · filed 2024-02-21(a)(6)

Based upon the Findings of Fact of the District Court, it is clear to this Court that Debtor’s actions in breaching the Covenant Not to Compete with Polylok constituted “willful” and “malicious” injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt arising from deliberate conduct that is substantially certain to cause harm.

Johnston v. House · filed 2024-02-26(a)(6)

To render a debt non-dischargeable under the (a)(6) exception, the creditor must show that the debt arose from the debtor’s deliberate action which was substantially certain to produce harm.”

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a contract debt from discharge merely because the debtor knowingly breached the contract; the injury must be willful and malicious.

The Clubhouse Group, LLC v. Catapano · filed 2024-02-27(a)(6)

A knowing breach of contract does not satisfy the malicious element of § 523(a)(6) absent some aggravating circumstance evidencing conduct so reprehensible as to warrant denial of the fresh start to which the honest but unfortunate debtor would normally be entitled under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a prior statutory theft verdict can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Robert D. Russo, of the Estate of Thomas v. Thornton · filed 2024-02-28(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) requires a plaintiff to establish that the debt was (1) for an injury, which injury was (2) willful and (3) malicious. ... Accordingly, under preclusion principles, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the Count Three section 523(a)(6) cause of action.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a defamation debt from discharge based on reckless disregard for the truth; the creditor must show the debtor knew or was substantially certain the statements were false.

Kanaga v. Landon · filed 2024-01-30(a)(6)

But a reckless disregard of the truth does not satisfy the standard for willful injury under § 523(a)(6). Kanaga has not established that Defendant knew or was substantially certain that the statements in the Defamatory Post were false, and therefore has not shown Defendant made the false statements willfully under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury or believed it was substantially certain to result; a strict liability wage judgment alone does not establish that intent.

Simoes v. Nicholas Sivieri, III · filed 2024-03-05(a)(6)

To show that Sivieri caused injury more than negligently or recklessly, Simões and Pereira needed to show that Sivieri was aware, before their business arrangement ended, that he was misclassifying them as independent contractors and that he at least knew about injurious consequences under wage law that would be substantially certain to result (namely, the deprivation of a right to overtime pay to which employees may be entitled).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge only when the debtor willfully and maliciously causes the injury; intentionally taking an action that causes injury is insufficient.

Rist v. Rist · filed 2024-03-13(a)(6)

In any event, intentionally filing the partition action does not by itself constitute willfulness under § 523(a)(6). Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that Frank intended to injure Tim and his company.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a claim for willful and malicious injury when a debtor knowingly keeps another’s funds and injury to that person’s property interest is substantially certain.

Barrett v. Storm · filed 2024-03-27(a)(6)

Again, from these facts, the Court can infer that Defendant knew that the funds did not belong to BinaNat or Defendant and, therefore, it was a substantial certainty that failure to remit the funds to Plaintiff would injure Plaintiff’s property interest.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s knowing breach of contract or conversion causes injury that the debtor intended or knew was substantially certain.

Adair v. Stutsman Construction, LLC · filed 2024-03-28(a)(6)

Because all the factors under § 523(a)(6) are satisfied, the Court affirms the bankruptcy court’s determination that Adair’s actions were willful and malicious; therefore, the Judgment debt is nondischargeable for breach of contract as well as for conversion.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except attorney fees awarded in an order-of-protection proceeding from discharge without proof of injury and willful and malicious conduct.

Gaither v. Judge · filed 2024-04-02(a)(6)

Mr. Gaither’s argument that the fees owed to him by the Debtor here are nondischargeable as a matter of law and without any proof of injury or willful and malicious conduct does not have merit and will not be sustained.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a genuine dispute about the debtor’s intent prevents summary judgment on that exception.

Gray v. Zahn · filed 2024-04-02(a)(6)

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Zahn acted with willful and malicious intent when causing injury to Gray’s purported property interest in the road.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it arises from a willful and malicious injury.

Triumphant Gold Limited v. Matloff · filed 2024-04-11(a)(6)

After conducting a de novo review of the Bankruptcy Judge’s Memorandum Opinion, the Parties’ briefs, and the record in this case, the Court concludes that Appellees’ discharge under § 523 was legally proper because the evidence at trial showed that amounts due did not arise from a “willful and malicious injury” inflicted through Appellee’s alleged breach of contract, § 523(a)(6), and that the guaranty was not based on Appellee’s alleged “false representation” of his intent to repay. § 523(a)(2)(A).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures another person.

Polack v. Dever · filed 2024-04-11(a)(6)

That evidence established that Debtor’s conduct met the legal standards of both “willful” and “malicious” conduct pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) may except a contractual debt from discharge when the breach causes an intentional or substantially certain injury.

Kampfhenkel v. Sereboff · filed 2024-04-22(a)(6)

Thus, a contractual breach may form the basis of a cause of action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts damages for an intentional, tortious eviction from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes willful and malicious injury.

Mula v. Kumar · filed 2024-04-26(a)(6)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant’s conduct was willful and malicious, and that the resulting damages constitute a nondischargable claim under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge of a debt for a tortious injury that the debtor caused willfully and maliciously.

In Re: Kirk Brown v. Chamouille · filed 2024-05-13(a)(6)

An individual debtor may not discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). To satisfy this standard, the debtor’s conduct must have been “tortious,” and the injury must have been “willful,” and “malicious.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor knowingly retains another’s funds and thereby causes a willful and malicious injury.

Davis v. May · filed 2024-05-13(a)(6)

Therefore, the $75,000 debt owed to Plaintiff by the Defendant is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except an injury debt from discharge when the debtor neither intended the injury nor acted with substantial certainty that it would occur.

Chainy v. Smith · filed 2024-05-16(a)(6)

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate there exist genuine issues of material fact that Defendant had either the objective or subjective intent to cause willful and malicious injury through the wrongful death of Mr. Chainy by co-signing a car loan for her son.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge merely because a debtor knowingly breaches a contract or recklessly disregards a creditor’s economic interests.

Barklage v. Childers · filed 2024-05-31(a)(6)

As currently pleaded, the Creditor’s allegations do not amount to more than a breach of contract. Neither a knowing breach of contract nor a reckless disregard of a creditor’s economic interests constitutes willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge based solely on a debtor’s vicarious liability for another person’s willful and malicious injury.

Kuns Northcoast Security Center LLC v. Sharp · filed 2024-06-03(a)(6)

The language of § 523(a)(6) undercuts application of the vicarious liability principles of Bartenwerfer to claims seeking an exception to discharge for willful and malicious injury to a plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor intended the injury before a debt is excepted from discharge.

Vojislav Sesum · filed 2024-06-13(a)(6)

The evidence from Trial does not prove that the Defendant had an intent to harm the Plaintiff; rather, the facts seem to show an intent to be promoted and make more money. ... Accordingly, the Court does not find that the Defendant’s behavior was willful. ... For these reasons, Squarepoint’s debt which is based upon the Arbitration Award does not fall within the exception to discharge of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an objectively substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm; alleged tortious interference alone does not establish a willful and malicious injury.

J.A.S. Farms, Inc. v. Toribio · filed 2024-06-21(a)(6)

The Court finds that Defendant’s alleged tortious “interference” with Plaintiff’s contract is not, by itself, a sufficient “injury” for purposes of the § 523(a)(6) analysis. Instead, this Court must determine whether Plaintiff has shown that Defendant’s alleged tortious interference with its contracts entailed either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) permits a court to establish maliciousness through issue preclusion before deciding willfulness at trial.

In Re Narinder Sangha · filed 2024-07-11(a)(6)

Here, the Bankruptcy Court did precisely what the BAP contemplated in Plyam and what it directed another bankruptcy court to do in Arden: it applied collateral estoppel to the “maliciousness” prong based on the Default Judgment and then held a trial to determine whether the “willfulness” prong was met. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in finding malice before willfulness.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge when the debtor acted willfully and maliciously.

Heilbron v. Plaza · filed 2024-09-12(a)(6)

Upon consideration of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court properly concluded – applying the correct legal standards – that Appellee had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant acted willfully and maliciously and that, pursuant to Section 523(a)(6), the Default Judgment therefore is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) bars discharge when injury was intended or substantially certain to occur and the debtor acted in conscious disregard of duties or without just cause or excuse; the debtor need not know injury was likely.

Heyerholm, Rita v. Johnson, Ryan · filed 2024-09-19(a)(6)

Conduct is willful under First Weber if the injury is intended or if injury is substantially certain, regardless of whether the debtor is aware of the risk. And conduct is malicious under First Weber if the debtor acted in conscious disregard of his duties or if the conduct was “without just cause or excuse.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury from discharge only when the debtor acted willfully and maliciously, with subjective intent to cause harm.

Darnell · filed 2024-09-30(a)(6)

The Court likewise agrees with the bankruptcy court that there was otherwise no evidence in the record to establish that Darnell willfully—with a subjective intent to harm Souliotis—and maliciously injured Souliotis to render Darnell’s debt to him non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sanction for frivolous, bad faith litigation from discharge as a debt for willful and malicious injury.

El Dorado County v. Harrington · filed 2024-11-19(a)(6)

Settled Ninth Circuit law holds that a state court sanctions award for litigation conduct that is frivolous and in bad faith satisfies the § 523(a)(6) requirement of conduct that is willful and malicious and without excuse. ... Hence, § 523(a)(6) provides an adequate, independent reason for the result excepting the § 1038 award from discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a sexual harassment judgment from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the creditor.

Knochel · filed 2024-12-03(a)(6)

In sum, Dr. Knochel willfully injured Ms. Ronan because, as shown by a preponderance of the evidence, he subjectively desired to harass and intimidate her and because the harassment she endured was substantially certain to result from his undisputedly intentional conduct. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err when it held, independent of issue preclusion, that the State Court Judgment is exempt from discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a malicious prosecution debt from discharge when prior jury findings establish willful and malicious injury under its subjective and objective tests.

Veritas Vincit, LLC v. Brown · filed 2024-12-09(a)(6)

This Court finds that the jury’s findings and the Final Judgment entered by Chief Judge Gilstrap are sufficient under collateral estoppel principles to meet the subjective and objective tests under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a judgment establishes that the debtor caused willful and malicious injury.

Hahn v. Marks · filed 2024-12-13(a)(6)

In sum, the entry of a damages judgment based on Plaintiff’s satisfaction of the elements of New York City Administrative Code § 10-180 and Civil Rights Law § 52-b are sufficient to establish that the judgment is for “willful and malicious injury” and thus is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires more than a contract breach or an unpaid consent judgment to establish willful and malicious injury.

Simmons Bank v. Kibby · filed 2024-12-16(a)(6)

However, breaching a contract, breaching a mediation agreement, and failing to pay a consent judgment do not rise to the level of willful or malicious intent without more.

Section 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6) can except a money award for fraud, larceny, and willful and malicious injury from discharge.

Harris v. Curley · filed 2024-12-20(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6)

There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, that the Money Award is a debt for fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), larceny under § 523(a)(4), and willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) does not require a creditor to prove a separate intentional tort to establish that a debt is for willful and malicious injury.

Arnold v. Birchell · filed 2024-12-23(a)(6)

Thus, the state of mind of the debtor under Section 523(a)(6) is the same as the state of mind needed to prove an intentional tort, but there is nothing in the statute or the case law requiring a creditor prove a separate intentional tort under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires tortious conduct to except a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge.

In re: Michele Lynn McKee · filed 2025-01-02(a)(6)

Finally, O’Kane has not alleged tortious conduct by McKee, a required element of a § 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure or knowledge that injury is substantially certain; a finding of deliberate indifference alone does not establish willfulness.

Goldman v. Becker · filed 2025-01-22(a)(6)

Because willfulness under § 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure, and the jury’s findings show only intent to act while knowing of a substantial risk—essentially recklessness—the jury verdict is insufficient to prove that Becker had “subjective knowledge” that her actions were “substantially certain” to injure Carter.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment debt from discharge when the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury, including through defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Bikkina v. Mahadevan · filed 2025-02-21(a)(6)

Accordingly, since Mahadevan was willful and malicious in inflicting emotional distress on Bikkina and was also willful and malicious in defaming Bikkina, Mahadevan’s judgement debt owed to Bikkina as set forth in the California Judgement in the amount of $776,000 is excepted from discharge as a debt for a willful and malicious injury to another entity or to the property of another entity pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for intentional conversion from discharge when the conversion constitutes willful and malicious injury.

Cosmographic Software, LLC v. Franklin · filed 2025-02-24(a)(6)

Because judgment was entered on the intentional tort of conversion in the Michigan Lawsuit and the facts supporting that judgment are entitled to preclusion in this Court, the judgment debt is non-dischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when lawful self-defense causes no violation of another’s legal rights.

Horton v. O'Keefe · filed 2025-03-04(a)(6)

Because the evidence shows that O’Keefe struck Horton in self-defense under Wisconsin civil law, Horton failed to prove that O’Keefe caused him an injury within the meaning of §523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) permits a creditor to establish maliciousness by proving either conscious disregard of a duty or lack of just cause or excuse.

Heyerholm v. Johnson · filed 2025-03-04(a)(6)

A creditor doesn’t need to prove both conscious disregard and lack of just cause or excuse. Either is sufficient.

Section 523(a)(6)’s willful and malicious injury requirement is not established by issue preclusion unless the prior court examined the debtor’s subjective intent to cause harm.

Kruglyak v. Baer · filed 2025-03-12(a)(6)

For § 523(a)(6)’s “willful and malicious” requirement to have been actually litigated, the court must have examined the debtor’s “subjective intent” to do harm.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for injury to another’s property from discharge when the debtor’s acts were substantially certain to cause the injury and lacked just cause.

Ansin v. Ansin · filed 2025-03-14(a)(6)

There was substantial certainty that Mr. Ansin would be deprived of his property by her acts. Finally, the State Court held that she had no just cause for her actions. ... A separate judgment of nondischargeability in favor of Mr. Ansin and against Ms. Ansin in the amount of $195,955.49 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) shall be entered as required by Rule 7058 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a willful and malicious injury debt from an ordinary Chapter 13 discharge; it applies if the debtor receives a hardship discharge.

Jill C. Sarcia · filed 2025-03-14(a)(6)

Unlike Bankruptcy Code §§ 523(2) and (4), a debt is not excepted from discharge in a Chapter 13 case pursuant to § 523(6) unless the debtor receives a hardship discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury, including damages attributable to that injury.

Scribner v. Linski · filed 2025-03-21(a)(6)

Nevertheless, the undisputed evidence put forth before this Court at trial and through briefs submitted, including the Complaints and the Superior Court judgment, the elements of the counts for which damages were awarded together sufficiently support this Court’s conclusion that Linski’s misuse of Scribner’s credit cards, while serving as his caretaker, was both willful and malicious within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, this Court independently concludes that the claim pertaining to Linski’s unauthorized use of the credit cards is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) did not except the fee award from discharge on the record before the court.

Katherine White, individually and as Trustee of th v. Baier · filed 2025-03-26(a)(6)

Thus, the Court cannot except the Fee Award from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) based on the record before it.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt for injury the debtor willfully and maliciously caused, including an intentional conversion of another’s property.

Tarlton v. Thurber · filed 2025-03-27(a)(6)

Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that the debt owed by Defendant because he participated in and directed the conversion of Plaintiff’s earnings is a debt for willful and malicious injury within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a finding of malice under a more stringent standard can establish malice under this subsection.

Darnell v. Wasinger · filed 2025-03-27(a)(6)

Thus, the jury’s finding of malice under a higher malice standard is sufficient to establish malice under the lower § 523(a)(6) standard.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for deliberate vandalism from discharge when the debtor’s injury to another’s property was both willful and malicious.

Thornton v. Ludwikowski · filed 2025-03-28(a)(6)

Accordingly, given the binding effect of the state court judgment, and the failure of the Defendant-Debtor to assert the existence of any material factual dispute that could be resolved by trial, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, excepting the debt from discharge due to Defendant-Debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury for the resulting debt to be excepted from discharge.

Gomez v. Fisher · filed 2025-04-04(a)(6)

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s debt is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6). Plaintiffs did not establish that Defendant’s actions were willful, that they were malicious or that they caused injury to Plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(6) applies only when an actionable injury gives rise to a debt through compensable liability.

Holloway v. Harris · filed 2025-04-07(a)(6)

It applies only when an actionable tort gives rise to a compensable liability.

Section 523(a)(6) requires separate consideration of willful and malicious intent, and a court may decide malicious intent first.

Sangha v. Schrader · filed 2025-04-15(a)(6)

The bankruptcy court did not err by deciding “malicious” intent before “willful” intent on remand. A court must analyze the requirements of “malicious” intent and “willful” intent separately.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a judgment debt from discharge when issues necessarily decided in a prior state court judgment establish willful and malicious injury.

Hampton Harold Price and Patricia Ann Price · filed 2025-05-01(a)(6)

The issues that must be proven to except the judgment debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6) are the same issues that were determined by the state court.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an injury that is neither does not qualify.

David R. Dingess · filed 2025-05-14(a)(6)

Therefore, Melody’s claim does not fall within the exceptions to discharge under either Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6) or § 1328(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts for a debtor’s willful and malicious injury to another person or that person’s property.

Olsen v. Dingess · filed 2025-05-14(a)(6)

Therefore, Melody’s claim does not fall within the exceptions to discharge under either Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6) or § 1328(a)(4).

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt for willful and malicious injury nondischargeable; a prior judgment can establish those elements through collateral estoppel.

Impact Images, Inc. v. Wolfe · filed 2025-05-21(a)(6)

The multiple findings by the jury match the Sixth Circuit's requirements for nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The defendant knew that he was taking or using the plaintiff's trade secrets (willful), and he knew that doing so would injure the plaintiff (injury). The defendant also did not have a just cause or excuse in misappropriating trade secrets, merely intending to convert them for economic benefit (malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a litigation-sanctions debt from discharge when preclusive findings establish that the debtor caused willful and malicious injury.

Goldstein v. Khullar · filed 2025-05-27(a)(6)

With respect to Count III, though, the Court can determine on summary judgment that – based on the collateral estoppel effect of the state court’s February 22, 2023 order and February 19, 2024 final judgment – the entire debt arising thereunder is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause the injury underlying the debt; intent to commit a different wrong does not suffice.

Mey v. Phillips · filed 2025-06-12(a)(6)

Ms. Mey has not met her burden of proving that anyone – the Debtors or their alter ego companies – intended to injure her by the acts of robocalling that provide the basis for the Judgment debt. Any injury that may be inferred from the Judgment debt was incidental and thus outside the scope of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause the injury underlying the debt; intent to commit a separate fraud does not suffice.

Mey v. Thompson · filed 2025-06-12(a)(6)

Unintended injuries stemming from an intentional act are outside the scope of § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can except from discharge fees and costs awarded for a debtor’s willful and malicious discovery fraud, even when their amount remains to be determined.

GPB Debt Holdings II, LLC v. Burroughs · filed 2025-06-18(a)(6)

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that collateral estoppel applies to the debtor’s liability under § 523(a)(6) for discovery fraud.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of an intentional injury, and a creditor cannot obtain judgment on the pleadings when the debtor’s intent remains unresolved.

L. Bryan Carr Co. LPA v. Coger · filed 2025-07-07(a)(6)

The record’s lack of evidence regarding Defendant-Debtor’s intent at various points in time prevents a grant of judgment on the pleadings under §523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) can except a conversion debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct is substantially certain to injure the creditor.

Nutrien AG Solutions, Inc. formerly know as Crop P v. Benny F. Hall, Sr. Individually and Doing Business · filed 2025-07-17(a)(6)

Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court deems Mrs. Hall’s debt for conversion in the amount of $556,367.69 to be non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury; an intentional act that results in injury is insufficient.

Carbaidwala v. Gerleman · filed 2025-07-25(a)(6)

It is legally insufficient for purposes of § 523(a)(6) for Plaintiff to demonstrate that Defendant took intentional actions which resulted in an injury to Plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a debt arising from an injury that the debtor intended to cause.

Lessard Design, Inc. v. Paul · filed 2025-07-31(a)(6)

Thus, even if the Complaint sufficiently pled a willful and malicious act, it fails to allege any debt arising from an injury, and certainly fails to allege willful intent to cause an injury.

Section 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause the confinement underlying a false-imprisonment debt, but not intent that the confinement be unlawful.

Watson v. Bradsher · filed 2025-08-04(a)(6)

Watson erroneously assumes that false imprisonment is only “willful” if he intended both the confinement and its unlawfulness. But the statute requires only that the debtor “willful[ly]” cause the “injury.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Bradsher’s and Ali’s confinement was the “injury,” and the bankruptcy court found that Watson intended to cause it.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willfulness and maliciousness; a factual dispute over the debtor’s subjective intent to injure prevents summary judgment on that claim.

Seida, Jr. v. Baldwin · filed 2025-08-04(a)(6)

The court finds that there is a question of material fact regarding whether defendant had a subjective motive to inflict injury (as opposed to merely pursuing legal rights he believed—rightly or wrongly—that he possessed).

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury or conduct substantially certain to cause injury; an intentional act alone is insufficient.

Century Recovery, LLC as assignee of Progress Sola v. Long · filed 2025-08-05(a)(6)

Because the legal standards are not identical, this Court cannot apply collateral estoppel to find that the judgment is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for defamation from discharge when a prior judgment establishes that the debtor caused willful and malicious injury.

St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. v. Bundy · filed 2025-08-05(a)(6)

The Idaho Default Judgment fully established that Mr. Bundy injured Plaintiffs in a willful and malicious manner through his defamation of them. However, all other claims asserted in the Idaho Lawsuit do not meet the standard for recognition under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for willful and malicious injury from discharge when injury was objectively substantially certain or the debtor subjectively intended harm.

White v. Marshall · filed 2025-08-13(a)(6)

The 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) exception for willful and malicious injury by a debtor requires either: (1) objective substantial certainty of injury; or (2) subjective motive to cause harm.

Section 523(a)(6) requires an intent to cause injury; a wrongful death claim alleging negligence or recklessness is dischargeable.

Johnson v. Trewartha · filed 2025-08-14(a)(6)

However, the Court determines that the claim as presented / asserted in the State Court Complaint does not meet the Geiger standard for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). Therefore, the claim presently asserted by Administrator in the State Court Complaint has been discharged, effective as of May 28, 2025, the date Debtor was granted a bankruptcy discharge.

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof that the debtor acted willfully and maliciously, intending injury or believing injury was substantially certain to result.

Popovich v. Turner · filed 2025-09-04(a)(6)

To exclude the state court judgment debt from Defendant’s discharge under § 523(a)(6), Plaintiff would have to establish that (1) Defendant engaged in conduct that was (2) willful and (3) malicious, with (4) the actual intent to cause injury or with a belief that the injury was substantially certain to result from her conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) does not make a contractual debt nondischargeable merely because the debtor breached the contract.

THE BANCORP BANK, N.A. v. Perkins · filed 2025-09-09(a)(6)

Bancorp contends that Ms. Perkins willfully breached the terms of Stock Pledge Agreement when she conveyed her stock in Vault Rooms to Cool Life. The mere existence of such a breach, however, is not enough for a § 523(a)(6) claim.

Section 523(a)(6) can except an appellate attorney-fee award from discharge when prior findings of frivolous litigation establish willful and malicious injury.

Burkhart v. Burkhart · filed 2025-09-24(a)(6)

The Bankruptcy Court correctly concluded that the findings and conclusions of State Court and the Colorado Court of Appeals in the 2020 Lawsuit satisfied § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes any debt arising from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury nondischargeable.

Czymmek v. Fenstermaker · filed 2025-09-29(a)(6)

Above, the Court has concluded that Fenstermaker willfully and maliciously injured Czymmek. As indicated, “any debt” that flows from such injury is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a claim may proceed when the allegations plausibly show both elements and an injury.

Nideffer v. Svensson · filed 2025-09-30(a)(6)

There are sufficient factual allegations to raise a plausible claim that the Defendant’s actions were willful, malicious and they injured the Plaintiff. The Debtor’s request to dismiss this cause of action is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a claim may proceed when the allegations plausibly show such injury.

Hammond v. Svensson · filed 2025-09-30(a)(6)

There are sufficient factual allegations to raise a plausible claim that the Defendant’s actions were willful, malicious and they injured the Plaintiffs. The request to dismiss this cause of action is denied.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; a claim may proceed when the alleged facts plausibly show deliberate conduct that injured the creditor.

Sarrubbo v. Svensson · filed 2025-09-30(a)(6)

There are sufficient factual allegations to raise a plausible claim that the Defendant’s actions were willful in that they were deliberate and malicious in that they injured the Plaintiffs.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury from discharge; an unsuccessful venture does not qualify when the debtors intended it to succeed.

Giarratano v. Ramirez · filed 2025-10-02(a)(6)

Further, again because their intention was for the deal to go well and not to fail,57 I found that the debtors have not willfully and maliciously injured the Plaintiff, eliminating his objection to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) requires proof of both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Fruman v. Lunn · filed 2025-10-02(a)(6)

To prevail, the creditor must prove that the act resulted in both “willful” and “malicious” injury.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intentionally causes an injury without just cause or excuse.

Slowinski v. Garriga · filed 2025-10-07(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy discharge “does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ... Here, Garriga’s conduct giving rise to the State Court Judgment resulted in a willful and malicious injury to Slowinski and the Hudson Property.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct causes both willful and malicious injury to another entity or its property.

Seeley International PTY Ltd. v. Maisotsenko · filed 2025-10-08(a)(6)

The Court finds that the Order Awarding Damages in the District Court Action contains specific findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to establish that the damages award is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) makes claims based on willful and malicious infringement nondischargeable when the debtor continues infringing after clear notice and with knowledge of the injury.

Donnelly · filed 2025-10-09(a)(6)

Because Anand continued to offer for sale KAWS- branded items after receiving unambiguous notice that he was infringing plaintiffs’ trademarks and copyrights, and did so with knowledge that he was causing injury to plaintiffs, the Court held that plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that their claims in the Infringement Action are based upon Anand’s willful and malicious acts of infringement. Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs’ claims in the Infringement Action are nondischargeable bankruptcy debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct was objectively substantially certain to cause injury.

French · filed 2025-10-16(a)(6)

Accordingly, there was an objective substantial certainty that French would pay for services that were not rendered, and her payment of $3,987.45 constitutes a debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) allows a claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured another.

Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant · filed 2025-11-18(a)(6)

Thus, Plaintiff has successfully stated a claim that Defendants’ actions constitute a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) and the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a defamation debt from discharge when the debtor knowingly makes false statements while knowing they will harm the creditor.

Mahadevan v. Bikkina · filed 2025-11-24(a)(6)

Applied to this case, Bikkina must show that Mahadevan knew that his statements were false, but spread them anyway, knowing they would harm Bikkina.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when it results from a debtor’s willful and malicious injury.

Grimes v. Landy · filed 2025-12-15(a)(6)

The Court finds that Grimes has sufficiently demonstrated that Judge Orlando’s findings satisfy the requirements of Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code and render the Award nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) treats an injury as willful when the debtor acts knowing the injury is substantially certain to result.

Mollohan · filed 2025-12-30(a)(6)

Judge Stanley’s findings as to willfulness and bad faith correspond with the requirements of section 523(a)(6). The determination that Mollohan knowingly infringed upon appellee’s mark satisfies the requirement that he was substantially certain that the injury – trademark infringement – would result.

Section 523(a)(6) permits summary judgment on a willful and malicious injury claim only when the facts leave no room to find that the debtor did not willfully and maliciously harm the plaintiff.

Darjean · filed 2026-01-27(a)(6)

Summary judgment on a § 523(a)(6) claim is only appropriate when the facts and circumstances surrounding a debtor's actions leave no room for a trier of fact to conclude that the debtor willfully and maliciously harmed the plaintiff.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor deliberately or intentionally causes injury or is substantially certain injury will result.

Cessna · filed 2026-02-18(a)(6)

The court is not persuaded that Defendant deliberately or intentionally injured Plaintiff or that Defendant was substantially certain Plaintiff would be injured by his conduct.

Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge all damages traceable to an injury caused by the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct.

Deehl · filed 2026-03-10(a)(6)

Because all of the damages underlying the Circuit Court judgment are traceable to Defendant’s willful and malicious conduct, the entire judgment is nondischargeable.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both a willful injury and a malicious injury for a debt to be nondischargeable.

Bender · filed 2026-03-18(a)(6)

As the text of the statute makes plain, nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(6) requires both a “willful injury” and a “malicious injury.”

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the creditor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor caused a willful and malicious injury.

Olson · filed 2026-03-19(a)(6)

Plaintiff has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence there was any willful or malicious injury caused by Defendant. As such, the Court will not except any debt owed to Plaintiff from Defendant’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when a debtor’s unauthorized sale of secured collateral is substantially certain to injure the creditor.

Okorie · filed 2026-03-30(a)(6)

Under this standard, Okorie’s sale of Trustmark’s collateral without consent or remittance of payment was substantially certain to result in injury to Trustmark.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury; a Georgia appropriation of likeness claim satisfies those elements, but a judgment on multiple claims must identify damages attributable to that claim for issue preclusion to establish nondischargeability.

Rev.io, LLC v. Carliemar White · filed 2026-03-31(a)(6)

Given the requirements under Georgia law that an appropriation of likeness must be for commercial benefit instead of serving some public interest, the Court agrees with the dissenting opinion in Karlin, and finds that an appropriation of likeness inherently includes a finding that the debtor’s actions were “wrongful and without just cause.” Accordingly, the Court finds that an appropriation of likeness claim shares an identity of issues with willful and malicious injury.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a contract debt from discharge when the debtor intended the injury or knew the breach was substantially certain to cause it.

Pennington · filed 2026-04-02(a)(6)

Therefore, the Court finds that McKee has pled a plausible claim for relief under § 523(a)(6) regarding his allegations that Blackstone either intended to cause harm or was substantially certain that it would cause harm to McKee through a breach of the Agreement.

Section 523(a)(6) requires a creditor alleging injury to loan collateral to plead particular facts about the timing of transfers or the collateral’s condition when the loan was made.

Franklin Financial Corp. v. Sessions · filed 2026-04-09(a)(6)

These facts need to be pled, however, with more particularity to support a claim under Section 523(a)(6), especially in terms of the timing of the challenged transfers or operability of the Collateral in connection with the making of the Loan.

Section 523(a)(6) requires both willful and malicious injury to except a debt from discharge.

Kopanski · filed 2026-05-12(a)(6)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable for Kopanski, this Court cannot find as a matter of law that Kopanski’s spending constitutes a malicious injury that makes her debt to Rumizen non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor willfully and maliciously injures the creditor.

Phillips · filed 2026-06-02(a)(6)

Because this conduct meets both the “willful” and “malicious” elements, the State Court Judgment is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for civil theft from discharge because civil theft necessarily involves willful and malicious injury to the owner's property interest.

Tanner · filed 2026-06-03(a)(6)

A defendant liable for civil theft necessarily meets the requirements of willful and malicious injury to the property interest of a plaintiff for the purposes of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt for civil theft from discharge because civil theft necessarily involves willful and malicious injury to another’s property.

Amster-Olszewski · filed 2026-06-08(a)(6)

A defendant liable for civil theft necessarily meets the requirements of willful and malicious injury to the property interest of a plaintiff for the purposes of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge for a wrongful act done intentionally that necessarily causes harm and is without just cause or excuse.

Legal Econometrics, Inc. v. Chama Land & Cattle Co. (In Re Legal Econometrics, Inc.) · filed 1994-07-26(a)(6)

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit breaks down the cause of action for § 523(a)(6) into two elements: (1) a wrongful act intentionally done (ie., willful); and (2) which necessarily causes harm and is without just cause or excuse (ie., malicious).

Section 523(a)(6) does not except a debt from discharge when the debtor did not willfully and maliciously injure another’s property.

In re First National Acceptance Co. · filed 2000-02-03(a)(6)

These facts dispel any notion that Wojtalik acted with “intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” First National or that he committed “willful and malicious injury” to the Clifford property.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a judgment from discharge even when the creditor fails to prove Title VII sexual harassment, but the creditor must prove willful and malicious injury.

Voss v. Tompkins (In Re Tompkins) · filed 2003-02-12(a)(6)

Notwithstanding the Court’s finding herein, the failure of Voss to prove sexual harassment under Title VII does not summarily preclude the Voss Judgment from being determined to be nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6). However, absent a finding of sexual harassment under Title VII that some Courts have found necessarily makes the conduct and resulting damage fall within the discharge exception, Voss must demonstrate that the Debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious as required by the Geiger standard, which covers acts done with actual intent to cause both injury and the consequences of an act, not simply the act itself.

Section 523(a)(6) may except a contract debt from discharge when the debtor intended or was substantially certain to injure the creditor; knowingly violating a judgment can also qualify.

Williams v. IBEW Local 520 · filed 2003-07-07(a)(6)

Because there is no indication that Williams intended or was substantially certain to injure the Union when he initially violated the CBA, we hold that the first debt of $155,855.39 does not arise from a willful and malicious injury; Section 523(a)(6) does not except this debt from discharge. We hold, furthermore, the second debt of $106,911.43 arises from the willful and malicious injury Williams inflicted by refusing to obey the Agreed Judgment and is excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(6).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a debt from discharge when the debtor intended to cause injury or acted with substantial certainty that harm would result.

Parsons v. Parks (In Re Parks) · filed 2003-12-19(a)(6)

The test, then, is whether the debtor acted with " substan- tial certainty [that] harm [would result] or a subjective motive to cause harm." In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998).

Section 523(a)(6) excepts a malicious prosecution debt from discharge when the debtor’s conduct was willful and malicious and the tort is established.

Peterson v. Underwood · filed 2008-11-26(a)(6)

However, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (OCIS 2008) states that a bank-ruptey discharge does not discharge debts arising from a "willful and malicious injury" by the debtor. "Because both intentional conduct and malice must be shown to prevail in a malicious prosecution lawsuit, a debt arising out of malicious prosecution is nondis-chargeable" under the statute. ... Nevertheless, when the facts are insufficient to establish the tort of malicious prosecution, a dismissal based on a bankruptcy discharge is warranted.

Section 523(a)(6) can except a debt for injury to a creditor’s collateral from discharge when the debtor acted with a substantial certainty of harm or a motive to cause harm; spending the proceeds on ordinary business expenses does not itself resolve that inquiry.

Triumphant Gold v. Matloff · filed 2025-10-08(a)(6)

Instead, the relevant inquiry is “whether there exists ‘either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm’ on the part of the debtor.”

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over creditor-requested dischargeability determinations under subsections (a)(2), (4), and (6), while state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over subsection (a)(5).

Kuzminski v. Peterman (In Re Peterman) · filed 1980-08-25(c)

While subsection 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of debts listed in subsections 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) when a creditor requests such a determination, it does not give the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over the debts listed in the other subsections of 523(a), including subsection 523(a)(5).

Section 523(c) requires the bankruptcy court to decide whether a debt alleged to arise from fraud or defalcation is nondischargeable.

Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. D'Andrea (In Re D'Andrea) · filed 1980-12-12(c)

The grounds for denial of discharge which have been raised by the Plaintiff must be heard by the bankruptcy court assigned to entertain such a proceeding. They cannot be determined by the state court which might be chosen by the Plaintiff to hear the merits of its action for damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1978).

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to except a debt under subsection (a)(2), (4), or (6) from discharge to request a bankruptcy court determination; otherwise, the debt is discharged.

Gutierrez v. Schweiker · filed 1981-06-02(c)

Sections (a)(2), (4), and (6) are the exceptions to discharge pertaining to false statements, defalcation or larceny misappropriation, and willful and malicious injury which this court believes are the types of claims that had to be raised to justify an exception to discharge for an overpayment found to be accepted not without fault. Defendant failed to initiate these proceedings in the bankruptcy court for an exception to discharge. Therefore, the overpayment was discharged.

Section 523(a)(5) dischargeability claims may be decided in state court because they are not among the matters reserved to federal court by § 523(c).

In Re Maynard · filed 1983-05-19(a)(5)

While certain dischargeability matters, those designated in § 523(c) are for practical purposes for the exclusive disposition by the Federal Court, claims involving § 523(a)(5), that provision with which we are here dealing, is not one of those.

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of debts involving fraud or willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).

In Re Petronello · filed 1983-10-17(c)

This Court under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) has exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of whether or not a debtor may be discharged where that debt involved fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2); fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4); or willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction to decide dischargeability under Section 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).

Aldrich v. Imbrogno (In Re Aldrich) · filed 1983-10-26(c)

Such claims may not be pursued in the state court as a result of the exclusive jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy courts by the bankruptcy code. The bankruptcy court erred insofar as it denied Aldrich’s motion for a preliminary injunction in this area based on 11 U.S.C. Section 523(c).

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court authority to decide dischargeability when fraud, trust duties, or intentional torts are alleged.

United States v. Carey (In Re Carey) · filed 1983-12-28(c)

Unfortunately for SSA, the bankruptcy court, and not SSA was conferred the power by Congress to rule on the dischargeability of debts where there is alleged fraudulent conduct, trust duties or intentional torts.

State courts and bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether a debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(5), and a state court’s decision can have res judicata effect.

In Re Crowder · filed 1984-01-09(a)(5)

Until and unless this court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of a debt owed by one spouse to another under § 523(a)(5), such a determination made by a State court constitutes res judicata under the present Code.

Section 523(a)(5) allows a bankruptcy court to decide whether an obligation for alimony, maintenance, or support is dischargeable, but does not authorize it to change the underlying divorce decree or agreement.

Hund v. Miller (In Re Miller) · filed 1984-01-23(a)(5)

A Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction in these matters is limited to deciding whether an obligation in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, in connection with a divorce decree or agreement between the parties, is dischargeable. Upon a proper showing, such a decision can be vacated or modified. A Bankruptcy Court lacks jurisdiction, however, to modify or vacate the underlying divorce decree or agreement.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to have a debt declared nondischargeable to obtain that determination in bankruptcy court.

Redenbaugh v. Gahle (In Re Redenbaugh) · filed 1984-02-01(c)

Gahle is attempting to collect his debt by way of the state court criminal proceedings, when the only place he can have the debt found to be non-dischargeable and therefore collectible, is in the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. Section 523(c) (1979).

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6), while other questions about the effect of a discharge may be decided by a state court.

In Re Snedaker · filed 1984-04-20(c)

I am satisfied that except for the determination of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6), which are not pertinent here, this court has merely concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction to determine the effect of a bankruptcy discharge.

Bankruptcy and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether a student loan debt under § 523(a)(8) is dischargeable.

Jones v. I.T.T. Technical Institute (In Re Jones) · filed 1984-04-30(a)(8)

Plaintiffs’ debt, a student loan, falls under the provisions of § 523(a)(8) of the Code and, thus, is not under the sections of § 523(a) which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court.

Section 523(a)(5) allows state courts and bankruptcy courts to determine whether a divorce obligation is nondischargeable support.

Beckmann v. Beckmann · filed 1984-07-06(a)(5)

The law is clear that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine issues raised under 11 U.S. C.A. § 523(a)(5).

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether claims relating to fraud are dischargeable.

In Re Curtis · filed 1984-06-11(c)

The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of all claims relating to fraud under Section 523(c).

Section 523(c) does not bar a state court from deciding whether student loans are dischargeable when the debt falls outside the categories covered by that subsection.

State v. Perkins · filed 1985-07-03(c)

This is not a case where the debt arose in the context of fraud or false pretenses, fiduciary *486fraud or willful and malicious injury to property (see, 11 USC § 523 [c], formerly Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17 [c] [2], 11 USC § 35 [c] [2]). Therefore, Special Term had jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of defendant’s student loans (see, State of New York Higher Educ. Seros. Corp. v Quell, 104 AD2d 11, 13-14; see also, Chevron Oil Co. v Dobie, 40 NY2d 712, 715).

Section 523 gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability.

Frank v. Daley · filed 1985-11-13

Under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability.

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a debt for willful and malicious injury is nondischargeable.

In Re Yaffe · filed 1986-01-02(c)

Although under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), (b) and (c) this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a debt is non-dis-chargeable on the ground that it is a debt “for willful and malicious injury,” the issues relevant to that determination seem to be rather closely related to issues which might arise in the Superior Court case.

State courts share jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to decide whether debts covered by § 523(a)(3) are dischargeable.

In Re Gray · filed 1986-05-14(a)(3)

The parties agree — as indeed they must — that the obligations in question fall within the encinc-ture of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). In respect to debts of that genre, bankruptcy courts do not possess exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, their jurisdiction is concurrent with the state courts. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

Bankruptcy courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide dischargeability under § 523(a)(3).

In Re Dabbs · filed 1987-03-23(a)(3)

The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to determine dischargeability issues arising from 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) is not exclusive.

Section 523(c) requires creditors to seek a bankruptcy court determination of whether a debt obtained by fraud is dischargeable.

Scott v. Bank of Coushatta · filed 1987-04-20(c)

Since the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, creditors must apply to the bankruptcy court to adjudicate dischargeability of debts for money obtained by fraud and the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine such dischargeability. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive authority to determine dischargeability for the debts it covers.

Pesak v. Weitzel (In Re Weitzel) · filed 1987-03-24(c)

This argument runs contra to the developing judicial interpretation of the exclusive nature of the Bankruptcy Court's power to determine the dischargeability of debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

A state court may decide dischargeability under § 523(a)(5) if it applies the federal standard for determining alimony.

Polley v. Spangler (In Re Polley) · filed 1987-06-04(a)(5)

It is clear that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the dischargeability of debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), providing that a federal standard concerning a determination of alimony is used in reaching a decision.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts to decide whether a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(9).

American Family Mutual Insurance v. Anderson (In Re Anderson) · filed 1987-06-05(a)(9)

It should be noted that the bankruptcy court does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question of nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(9) — the state court has concurrent jurisdiction to decide that issue.

Section 523(c) gives bankruptcy courts exclusive authority to decide whether debts under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) are dischargeable.

In Re Borbridge · filed 1988-01-19(c)

Such a result follows from the statutory provision requiring that bankruptcy courts determine questions of dischargeability under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).

Section 523(a)(1) allows a state court to determine whether a tax debt is dischargeable when the bankruptcy court has made no prior determination.

Galbreath v. Illinois Department of Revenue (In Re Galbreath) · filed 1988-03-11(a)(1)

The state court had authority to enter final judgment in the Department’s enforcement action by reason of its concurrent jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(1), and this Court will neither set that judgment aside nor consider the correctness of the state court’s determination.

Section 523(c) requires a creditor seeking to except a fraud debt from discharge to pursue a bankruptcy court determination before proceeding against the discharged debtor in state court, unless the bankruptcy court permits the state court action.

McCray v. Adams · filed 1988-04-06(c)

In order to seek redress against Skolsky, appellant should have pursued the remedy available to him in federal court, or should have asked permission of the bankruptcy court to relinquish jurisdiction so that he could proceed in state court on the fraud claims which may have led to the foreclosure action.

Section 523 reserves fraud-based exceptions to discharge for the bankruptcy court, but does not give that court exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a debt existed when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

John Deere Co. v. Epstein · filed 1988-05-18(c)

Unlike the exception from discharge for a debt based on fraud, a determination that a debt is discharged on the ground that it did not exist when the bankruptcy petition was filed is not one over which the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction. See 11 U.S.C. § 523. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issue.

Section 523(a)(6) makes a debt nondischargeable based on federal standards for willful and malicious injury; state law cannot make a debt nondischargeable on its own.

State Farm Insurance v. McConnehea (In Re McConnehea) · filed 1988-09-09(a)(6)

We hold that state law is powerless to create a non-dischargeable debt under the bankruptcy laws of the United States of America as a matter of law. Whether a debt is non-dischargeable depends, as a matter of law, solely on federal law which provides that if, as a matter of fact, the debt was incurred willfully, intentionally and maliciously, it is non-discharge-able.

Section 523(c) leaves state courts with concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether an alimony or support obligation is dischargeable.

Gatch v. McCracken (In Re McCracken) · filed 1988-12-21(c)

The Domestic Relations Court of Ohio has concurrent jurisdiction with this court as to dischargeability matters of this nature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). Relief from the stay is necessary in order to make it clear that any such adjudication can proceed in the Domestic Relations Court of Clermont County, Ohio.

Section 523 permits a state court to determine whether a debt was discharged when no exception under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) is asserted.

Gonzales v. AM Community Credit Union · filed 1989-05-10

AMC has not suggested, in its answer to the complaint or in its briefs to this court, that federal court jurisdiction is exclusive because Gonzales' debt is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). Indeed, AMC admits that Gonzales' debt was discharged. Therefore, under the federal statute, the trial court has jurisdiction to determine whether Gonzales remains personally liable to AMC for the debt.

Section 523(a)(3) allows state courts as well as bankruptcy courts to decide whether an omitted debt is excepted from discharge.

Bowen v. Franks (In Re Bowen) · filed 1989-08-10(a)(3)

Unlike dischargeability questions under §§ 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) over which the bankruptcy court is granted exclusive jurisdiction, dischargeability questions under § 523(a)(3) are the type over which the bankruptcy court has concurrent, but not exclusive, jurisdiction.

Section 523(a)(5) allows state courts and bankruptcy courts to determine whether a debt for alimony, maintenance, or support is nondischargeable.

In Re the Marriage of Sailsbury · filed 1989-09-15(a)(5)

We conclude that the trial court has concurrent jurisdiction to consider whether the Beneficial loan debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), as alimony, maintenance, or support.

Section 523 permits a state court to decide whether an unscheduled debt is excepted from discharge because bankruptcy courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over that question.

Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle · filed 1990-05-03(c)

In contrast to the types of debts described above, the determination of dischargeability under this section is “of the type over which the bankruptcy court has concurrent but not exclusive jurisdiction.”

State courts may determine whether a debt is dischargeable under § 523(a)(3).

In Re Moon · filed 1990-06-05(a)(3)

State courts have jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(3).

Section 523(c) requires a complaint to determine whether a debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2).

Wood v. Jasperson (In Re Jasperson) · filed 1990-07-12(c)

Therefore, a complaint is the proper form of pleading under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).

Section 523(a)(5) allows a state court to determine in a contempt proceeding whether a debt is nondischargeable support.

Pearl v. Pearl · filed 1990-08-16(a)(5)

Thus, it is clear from the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the applicable case law that the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support so as to be nondischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a) (5) is properly raised in a state court of competent jurisdiction by a contempt motion for a debtor's failure to pay the debt.

Section 523(c) gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).

Snyder v. Devitt (In Re Devitt) · filed 1991-03-27(c)

This is obvious, not only to prevent a duplication of effort and a multiplicity of suits, but more importantly because the bankruptcy court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of debts under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(2), (4) and (6), pursuant to Section 523(c).

Section 523(a)(5) gives state domestic relations courts and bankruptcy courts concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether a domestic debt is nondischargeable support.

In Re the Marriage of Barber · filed 1991-04-25(a)(5)

While a bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant relief from the automatic stay, there is concurrent jurisdiction in a bankruptcy court and a state domestic relations court to determine the dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988) of domestic debts alleged to be in the nature of support.

Section 523(a)(5) allows state courts and bankruptcy courts to decide whether a divorce obligation is nondischargeable support or maintenance.

In Re Smith · filed 1991-04-01(a)(5)

Clearly, a State Court of competent jurisdiction has concurrent jurisdiction with the Bankruptcy Court in determining the nature of an obligation created by a divorce decree and the dischargeability of that debt in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).