11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits postpetition acts to create or perfect a lien against estate property, including applying for and obtaining title to a mobile home.

American State Bank v. Swearingen (In Re Swearingen) · filed 1983-02-09(a)(4)

These events occurred after the March 18, 1982 filing of the petition. Not only were these acts proscribed by § 362(a)(4), but § 549(a)(2)(B) provides that the trustee may avoid post petition transfers of property, such as attempted lien perfections.

Section 362(a)(2) bars enforcement of a judgment against the debtor or estate property, but does not bar execution on a third-party supersedeas bond that is not property of the debtor’s estate.

Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1983-02-10(a)(2)

It is clear that the automatic stay bars Mrs. Moran from enforcing her judgment against the debtor or against the property of the debtor’s estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2). ... This Court holds that the bond is not property of JM, and thus the ruling on the appeal by the Sixth Circuit, and this Court’s order of November 30, 1982 are both valid.

Section 362(a) prevents a secured creditor from disposing of repossessed collateral while its rights are adequately protected, extending the debtor’s opportunity to redeem it.

In Re Montgomery · filed 1983-04-25(a)

As long as the secured creditor’s rights with respect to the collateral are being adequately protected the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) will prohibit the secured creditor from “disposing” of the collateral and thus extend the time for the Debtors’ redemption rights.

Section 362 stays enforcement of a judgment lien during a Chapter 13 case until completion or termination, unless the court orders otherwise.

Castle v. Parrish (In Re Parrish) · filed 1983-05-02

Although the judgment lien is not affected by the order of confirmation, any action to enforce the lien has been stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 pending completion or termination of the Chapter 13 case, unless otherwise ordered.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) bar postpetition perfection of security interests when the exception in § 362(b)(3) does not apply.

In Re Astrocade, Inc. · filed 1983-06-02(a)(4), (a)(5), (b)(3)

If Astro-cade’s chief executive office were always located in Columbus, however, the Bank’s and Nitron’s attempt to perfect their interests in Ohio on March 14, 1983 and February 25, 1983 must fail, since they are precluded from such action by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) and (5), and the exception in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) is not applicable.

Section 362(b)(3) does not exempt a municipal tax lien foreclosure notice from the automatic stay when the notice serves to collect or enforce the lien rather than perfect it.

Wallingford's Fruit House v. Inhabitants of Auburn (In Re Wallingford's Fruit House) · filed 1983-06-06(b)(3)

Thus, that notice was not necessary either to perfect or preserve the City’s tax lien status, but was intended to collect or enforce the lien on property of the debtor. The Court concludes that it was sent in clear violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits a creditor from completing a sale of repossessed collateral after the bankruptcy filing to enforce its lien when the collateral is property of the estate.

Willis v. Parks Chevrolet, Inc. (In Re Willis) · filed 1983-10-07(a)(4)

The acceptance of the purchase price, the delivery of the car, and the counterclaim filed in this action for a deficiency were all part of the process begun by the repossession of the car designed to enforce the creditor’s lien after the Debtor's default. The Court holds that the actions of the defendant constituted a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of an inchoate lien when applicable law makes the perfection effective against interests acquired before perfection under section 546(b).

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hamlin (In Re Hamlin) · filed 1983-12-01(b)(3)

Thus, by virtue of section 362(b)(3) and section 546(b), Sears, Roebuck was not stayed from perfecting its inchoate lien subsequent to the debtors’ commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362(a)(4) bars the creation or enforcement of liens against estate property after a bankruptcy petition is filed, including liens for postpetition real estate taxes.

Perpetual American Bank, FSB v. District of Columbia (In Re Carlisle Court, Inc.) · filed 1983-12-30(a)(4)

Because the subject property, as property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 of the Code, is in “custo-dia legis”, the right to even “create”, as well as “enforce” any such lien is clearly interdicted by the filing of a petition. The express language of the automatic stay prevents this and such prohibition remains as long as the stay is in effect.

Section 362(b)(3) permits perfection of a mechanics lien under § 546(b), but does not exempt foreclosure proceedings from the automatic stay.

Victoria Grain Co. of Manneapolis v. Janesville Elevator Construction, Inc. (In Re Victoria Grain Co.) · filed 1984-02-02(b)(3)

Since I have concluded that § 546(b) does apply to the perfection of mechanics liens, it follows that the exception to the automatic stay found in § 362(b)(3) applies. Thus, the automatic stay did not prohibit the filing of the mechanics lien statement by Janesville. ... However, clearly the commencement of foreclosure proceedings is something other than perfection of a lien. Foreclosure proceedings are prohibited by any number of the provisions of § 362(a) including those found in § 362(a)(1), (3), (4), and (6). The exception provided in § 362(b)(3) is only for acts to perfect an interest in property. Thus, it is clear that the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings violated § 362(a).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection only when the trustee’s rights are subject to that perfection under § 546; a postpetition filing without a state-law basis for earlier perfection violates the automatic stay and is unenforceable.

Walker v. West Kentucky Production Credit Ass'n (In Re Rogers) · filed 1984-03-14(b)(3)

Postpetition perfection is permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) only to the extent that a trustee’s rights and powers are subject to perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 546. ... Since KRS 355.9-312(2) is void of any intent for Hancock to be deemed perfected at a time prior to the bankruptcy filing even though the act of filing occurred postpetition, this Court finds that the postpetition filing by Hancock violated the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and is unenforceable for purposes of this proceeding.

Section 362(a)(4) and (a)(5) prevent a secured creditor from taking action after the petition to terminate the debtor’s ownership interest in repossessed collateral.

Tektronix Employees Federal Credit Union v. Titel (In Re Titel) · filed 1984-02-24(a)(4), (a)(5)

The plaintiff has not alleged that any of these contingencies occurred before the petition was filed, and the automatic stay currently precludes the plaintiff from taking any action to terminate the debtor’s ownership interest in the car. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(4) and 362(a)(5) (1982).

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) make a postpetition recording of a security interest in estate property ineffective when it violates the automatic stay.

In re Air Vermont Inc. · filed 1984-05-02(a)(4), (a)(5)

This recordation occurred seven days after the filing of the petition for relief, and as a violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) & (5), is clearly ineffective.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits postpetition recording of a covenant that creates an interest in estate property to secure performance of an obligation.

Levin v. Kelton Realty, Inc. (In Re Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc.) · filed 1984-06-14(a)(4)

Since the covenant afforded Kelton an interest in the estate’s property, and since the recordation of that interest served to secure the performance of that obligation, we hold that said recordation violated § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition action to perfect a statutory lien when state law makes the perfection effective against interests acquired before the bankruptcy filing.

Stern v. Munroe (In Re Stern) · filed 1984-06-15(b)(3)

Thus, notwithstanding the automatic stay, post-petition action to perfect a statutory lien is permissible as long as, under state law, perfection relates back to a pre-filing date.

Section 362(a)(4) makes a postpetition filing of a notice of federal tax lien in violation of the automatic stay void.

Computer Management, Inc. v. Trust Co. (In Re Computer Management, Inc.) · filed 1984-06-28(a)(4)

Therefore, because such filing was in violation of the automatic stay, it is void.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition creation of a personal property tax lien from the automatic stay when state law gives the lien no retroactive effect.

Quigley v. General Electric Co. (In Re Electric City, Inc.) · filed 1984-10-11(b)(3)

The lien claimed by King County can have no retroactive effect because state law simply makes no provision for such retroactivity and indeed precludes it. Therefore, post-petition perfection is not an issue. Under these circumstances, consideration of § 546(b), as permitted by 362(b)(3) is not relevant. The lien claimed by the county is asserted in violation of § 362(a)(4) and is not enforceable.

Section 362(a) does not bar repossession completed before the bankruptcy filing, but it prevents the creditor from taking further action against the repossessed collateral after filing.

Williams v. Guaranty Agricultural Credit Corp. (In Re Williams) · filed 1984-10-26(a)(4), (a)(5)

Since the actual act of repossession occurred prior to filing, there was no violation of the automatic stay provisions found in 11 USC § 362(a). However, since there was no disposition of the farm machinery and equipment prior to filing by the Debtors, the automatic stay has prohibited the Defendant from taking any further action as to this collateral. See 11 USC § 362(a)(4) and (5).

Section 362 bars a postpetition notice perfecting a prepetition attorneys’ lien against third parties when perfection is not retroactive under § 546(b), and the notice is void.

Bender & Treece, P.C. v. Storage Technology Corp. (In Re Storage Technology Corp.) · filed 1985-01-08(a)(5), (b)(3)

Filing a notice of attorneys’ lien was an act intended “to ... perfect or enforce against property of the Debtor [a] lien ... which secure[s] a claim that arose before the commencement of the case”, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5). Perfection of an attorneys’ lien as to third parties is not retroactive so as to trigger § 546(b) and exempt the “act” of filing from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(3). Thus, the notice is void and the lien is neither enforceable nor perfected against third parties.

Section 362(a)(4) makes an attempt to perfect a lien against estate property ineffective after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Vineyard v. McKenzie · filed 1985-02-11(a)(4)

Filing the petition rendered nugatory Borg-Warner’s attempt to perfect its lien. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982) (automatically staying “any act to ... perfect ... any lien against property of the estate”).

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition lien perfection from the automatic stay when the perfection is effective against the trustee under § 546(b).

In Re Ridley · filed 1985-03-19(b)(3)

Since the court has already found that the notation of the creditor’s lien on the vehicle certificate of title frustrated any attempt to avoid such perfection under § 546(b), this action was exempted from the provisions of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(b)(3) (West 1979).

Filing a Chapter 11 petition automatically stays a proposed sale of a debtor’s vessel to enforce a maritime lien.

In Re Louisiana Ship Management, Inc. · filed 1985-05-14(a)(5)

Filing of the petition under Chapter 11 automatically stayed the proposed sale to enforce the maritime lien. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5).

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits postpetition acts that create a possessory lien against estate property, including accepting property for storage when storage creates the lien.

Serbus v. First National Bank of Elbow Lake (In Re Serbus) · filed 1985-07-09(a)(4)

Clarence Lennes’ actions also violated the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, any act “to create ... any lien against property of the estate” is a violation of the automatic stay. ... In this case, Lennes’ acceptance of the grain for storage was an act creating a possessory lien.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a creditor from perfecting a lien against estate property after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

United States Ex Rel. Farmers Home Administration v. MSC, Inc. (In Re MSC, Inc.) · filed 1985-07-11(a)(4)

[t]he filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code ‘operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of — ... (4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate ... ’ § 362(a)(4). ... Accordingly, the plaintiff may not now perfect its lien by filing the financing statement.

Section 362(b)(3) permits qualifying acts to perfect a mechanic’s lien, but does not except a suit to enforce the lien from the automatic stay.

H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain (In Re Bain) · filed 1985-08-23(b)(3)

Clearly, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) prevents the filing of a suit to enforce any lien against property of the estate and this prohibition is not affected by the exception of § 362(b)(3) which permits certain acts to perfect.

Section 362(a)(5) permits assignment of an existing tax lien because the transfer itself neither creates nor enforces the lien.

Harrington v. Knuckey · filed 1985-09-30(a)(5)

That assignment was merely a transfer of the evidence of the lien that already existed on the property and was not in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor from obtaining and placing an execution on its judgment after a bankruptcy case begins.

In Re Gus Hormovitis & George Karahalios · filed 1985-12-20(a)

The Court is left with no alternative but to find and determine that Code violated the § 362 automatic stay by securing the issuance of the execution on its Final Judgment Order and placing same with the Lake County Sheriff.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a lien from attaching to the trustee’s interest in estate property after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Zimmerman v. CDM Properties, Inc. (In Re Cobb & Lawless Kitchens, Inc.) · filed 1986-01-16(a)(4)

Thus, while CDM’s default under the complaint before us served to vest the trustee with title to the fund, this act occurred postpetition and therefore, under § 362(a)(4), the IRS lien could not then attach to the trustee’s interest in the property.

Section 362(a) does not bar a creditor’s repossession of a vehicle when the creditor regained possession before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Rader v. White Chevrolet, Inc. (In re Rader) · filed 1986-04-14(a)

Defendant bank repossessed a vehicle on March 25, 1985 after the debtors had filed the Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on March 21, 1985, for which action the Court found the bank in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and (h). In the instant case the repossession was accomplished before the Chapter 13 bankruptcy was filed in Dayton, Ohio.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts postpetition lien perfection from the automatic stay only when the creditor’s underlying interest was created before the bankruptcy petition.

North Side Lumber Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (In Re North Side Lumber Co.) · filed 1986-04-24(b)(3)

It is through a comparison of these two subsections that the court finds that in order for acts to perfect a lien to be excepted from the automatic stay, a creditor’s underlying interest must be created prior to the petition.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits a creditor from filing a state-court suit to enforce a perfected mechanics’ lien against property of the bankruptcy estate.

H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain (In Re Bain) · filed 1986-04-29(a)(4)

Since the filing of a bill of complaint in the state court constitutes an attempt to enforce a perfected mechanics’ lien, and not a step in the perfection process, Bowling plainly violated the automatic stay of Section 362 in the present case. Section 362 treats enforcement of liens much differently than their perfection. Specifically, Section 362(a)(4) prohibits the filing of suit to enforce any lien against property of the debtor’s estate.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a PACA claimant to file a notice preserving a trust claim without relief from the automatic stay, which does not toll or excuse the notice deadline.

St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. DeBruyn Produce Co. (In Re Prange Foods, Corp.) · filed 1986-05-08(b)(3)

The automatic stay does not toll the thirty day period for filing, nor does it excuse a PACA claimant from filing within that period. A PACA claimant, however, need not obtain a lift of stay before filing his PACA notice.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts a qualifying postpetition act to perfect a property interest from the automatic stay when the trustee’s rights are subject to perfection under § 546(b).

Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,239 in Re G. Dwayne Casbeer, Debtor. G. Dwayne Casbeer v. State Federal Savings & Loan Association o · filed 1986-07-14(b)(3)

An exception to § 362(a)(4) exists, though, for acts taken “to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under” 11 U.S.C. § 546(b). ... This being so, we conclude that Casbeer cannot satisfy § 544 on its face and that, even if he were able to do so, the post-petition motions that State Savings filed provided sufficient notice to allow it to perfect its interest in the rents from each property, effective on the date the motion to lift the stay and prevent Casbeer from using rents from that property was filed.

Section 362(a) prevents a lienholder from filing a state court foreclosure action while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Matter of Provincetown-Boston Airline, Inc. · filed 1986-10-30(a)

The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), prevented Sekman from filing a summary procedure in state court and, in fact, compelled Sekman to bring all actions in this Court.

Section 362(a) does not stay lien enforcement against funds held by a third party when the action is neither against the debtor nor to obtain estate property.

In Re Monroe Well Service, Inc. · filed 1986-12-03(a)(1), (a)(3)

The starting point in this case, and a proposition with which all parties agree, is that the enforcement actions of the lien creditors are not restrained by the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362. The enforcement of the lien creditors’ rights to monies in the possession of the First Purchasers is neither an action against the debtor nor an action to obtain possession of property of the estate.

Section 362(a) protects property owned by a Chapter 11 debtor from foreclosure, and a foreclosure sale in violation of the stay is void.

In Re Gibson · filed 1986-12-17(a)

The consequence of this is that Gibson’s filing under Chapter 11 on December 9, 1985, triggered the protection of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) over the motel property. We therefore hold that NBD’s motion to strike assets should be denied and determine that the foreclosure sale of December 9, 1985 is void as having been in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) bars proceedings on prepetition claims, and § 362(a)(3) bars interference with possession of estate property, including vessels arrested abroad.

United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In Re McLean Industries, Inc.) · filed 1986-12-29(a)(1), (a)(3)

It is undisputed here that in causing the issuance of the Hong Kong and Singapore warrants, the defendant took steps to proceed on a pre-petition claim in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and disturbed the debtor’s possession of its property in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(1), (4), and (6) bar a creditor from continuing foreign vessel arrest proceedings to collect a prepetition debt through substitution of an assignee, and acts taken in violation of the stay are void.

United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In Re McLean Industries, Inc.) · filed 1987-03-12(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(6)

Thus, instead of taking steps to discontinue those arrest proceedings as the contempt decree required, GAC Marine took the active steps of ensuring their continuation. GAC Marine thus violated 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (a)(4) and (a)(6) anew. Its actions in violation of those sections were void.

Section 362 stays a lessor and a secured creditor from asserting their respective rights over property in a bankruptcy estate.

Pasco Enterprises v. United States · filed 1987-09-30(a)(3)

Bankruptcy Code § 362 imposed a stay against both plaintiff and defendant in asserting their rights respectively as lessor and creditor.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar a creditor’s suit over fraudulent transfers that never became estate property when the trustee failed to exercise the avoidance right in time.

Dixon v. Bennett · filed 1987-10-14

Appellant is not barred by the automatic stay provision because the fraudulent transfers never became property of the estate and the trustee failed to exercise his right to avoid those transfers in a timely manner.

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of an interest in rents and profits when state law makes perfection relate back to a prepetition date.

Matter of Rief · filed 1988-02-29(b)(3)

Accordingly, an act to perfect such an interest is permissible notwithstanding the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(b)(3) where state law allows perfection to relate back to a pre-fil-ing date.

Section 362(a)(4) stays a creditor from docketing a money judgment after a bankruptcy filing when docketing would create a lien against estate property.

Green Hill Corporation v. Charles C. Kim Duak F. Kim Bank of Seoul/new York Agency · filed 1988-03-30(a)(4)

Green Hill did not act within that period, and after the Kims' filing, Green Hill was automatically stayed from "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a pre-existing property interest but does not permit creation of a new lien.

In Re Klefstad · filed 1988-07-22(b)(3)

While these two sections allow creditors to perfect liens after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, they do not allow the creation of liens.

A notice of lien filed against a debtor’s property in violation of § 362 is null and void.

In Re Lenz · filed 1988-09-02

FURTHER ORDERED that the notice of lien filed by Ken-Caryl Ranch Master Association, Inc. against the Debtors’ property on October 19, 1987, at Reception No. 87129035 in the Clerk and Recorder’s Office in Jefferson County, Colorado, is null and void as being filed in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(5) stays efforts to perfect or enforce a lien securing a prepetition claim against the debtor’s property.

In Re the Marriage of Berkland · filed 1988-09-15(a)(5)

Unfortunately for Treece, the petitioner’s bankruptcy filing on November 26, 1984, prevented Treece from taking any action intended to “perfect or enforce against property of the debtor [a] lien ... which secure[s] a claim that arose before the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1982).

Section 362 stays a lienholder from suing to enforce its lien against a debtor’s property unless the stay is modified.

Steinberg v. National Survey Service Inc. (In Re Chemisphere Partners) · filed 1988-09-16

However, it is clear that National was and remains barred by the automatic stay from suing to enforce its lien absent modification of that stay.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a creditor from perfecting an unperfected lien against property of the estate after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Allegheny International, Inc. · filed 1988-10-26(a)(4)

Whatever lien First Chicago and U.S. Trust have is unperfected, and cannot be perfected because of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) and (a)(5) bar enforcement of a prepetition security interest in estate property during Chapter 11; cashing an estate-owned certificate of deposit in violation of the stay is void.

Taxel v. California State Board of Equalization (In Re Sluggo's Chicago Style, Inc.) · filed 1988-12-09(a)(4), (a)(5)

The action of the state in enforcing any portion of its security interest by cashing in the certificate was in violation of the automatic stay. An action taken in violation of the stay is void.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except continuation or reinstatement of a fraudulent conveyance suit from the automatic stay when obtaining judgment would not perfect an interest with an effective date relating back to a lis pendens filing.

In re Rodemeyer · filed 1989-01-25(b)(3)

If obtaining judgment would not relate back, neither would reinstatement of the state court action. The court, therefore, concludes that the automatic stay is applicable to the continuation or reinstatement of the fraudulent conveyance suit by Bank and is not excepted from the stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(3) and 546(b).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition lien perfection when applicable law makes that perfection effective against a bona fide purchaser who acquired rights before the bankruptcy filing.

McLean v. City of Philadelphia, Dept. of Revenue (In Re McLean) · filed 1989-03-20(b)(3)

The effect of this subsection, along with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), is to allow a creditor to perfect its lien post-petition, and prevent the trustee from avoiding the unperfected lien, if applicable non-bankruptcy law ... permits a subsequent perfection which would relate back to the bankruptcy filing, viz., bind a bona fide purchaser who takes just prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) stay acts to perfect or enforce an assignment-of-rents lien against estate property after a bankruptcy petition is filed; the creditor must first obtain relief from the stay.

In Re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership · filed 1989-03-20(a)(4)-(5)

Regardless of whether A.R.S. Section 33-702 is a “perfection” statute or an “enforcement” statute, it is subject to 11 U.S. C. Section 362(a)(4) and (5), which stays any act to “create, perfect, or enforce” a lien against property of an estate in bankruptcy upon the filing of a petition under 11 U.S.C. Sections 301-303.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a creditor from using a postpetition state court proceeding and retroactive docket change to create or perfect a lien against estate property.

Brodsky v. Independent Cement Corp. (In Re Marine Pollution Service, Inc.) · filed 1989-03-28(a)(4)

The Article 78 Proceeding and the execution of the Stipulation Order directing the nunc pro tunc docket date change from June 9, 1987 to April 24, 1987 were acts taken by Independent to create and perfect a “non-avoidable” lien in lieu of its avoidable lien. Such acts can only be considered a violation of § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a)(5) stays a levy against a debtor’s exempt property to enforce a lien securing a prepetition claim.

In Re Miller · filed 1989-03-30(a)(5)

An attempt to levy on the Trustee is an attempt by the Service to enforce against property of Debtors a lien which secures a prepetition claim. Thus, the Service’s levy is a clear and overt violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a creditor from seeking to enforce a lien claim in bankruptcy court, but stays steps to enforce the lien in a non-bankruptcy forum.

Brandt v. R & D Trucking Co., Inc. (In Re Lissner Corp.) · filed 1989-04-04(a)(4)

The automatic stay does not preclude a creditor from seeking to enforce its claims in bankruptcy court; what is stayed is the taking of any steps by a creditor to enforce a lien in a non-bankruptcy forum.

Section 362(b)(3) exempts acts to perfect a lien from the automatic stay, but foreclosure to enforce an already perfected lien remains stayed under section 362(a)(4).

In Re Hunters Run Limited Partnership, Debtor. Miner Corporation, and John Hand, Dba/sunny Day Cement Company v. Hunters · filed 1989-05-26(b)(3)

Commencement of foreclosure proceedings under RCW 60.04.100 is not an element of “perfection” exempted from section 362’s stay by section 546(b); rather, it is “enforcement” which remains stayed by section 362.

Section 362 does not make a mortgagee’s continued possession of property a stay violation while the mortgagee is entitled to retain possession pending the debtor’s required adequate protection payments.

Panas v. Polonia Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Panas) · filed 1989-06-07

Since the Mortgagee will be entitled to possession of the premises until the conditions set forth are met, its retention -of the premises was not heretofore violative of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) permits an act to perfect a lien covered by § 546(b) despite the automatic stay, even when the same act also creates the lien.

In Re Microfab, Inc. · filed 1989-08-18(b)(3)

Therefore, an act to perfect a lien that comes within the § 362(b)(3) exception is excepted from the automatic stay even if it simultaneously creates a lien.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a tax lien from arising after the bankruptcy petition is filed but does not disturb a tax lien that already existed.

Equibank, N.A. And the Farmers' Home Administration v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation · filed 1989-08-22(a)(4)

By its terms, the automatic stay would not affect the secured status of a tax that had already attained lien status, but it prevents the creation of a lien post-petition.

Section 362(a) prohibits postpetition acts to obtain possession of estate property or perfect a lien against it, and such acts are voidable.

Drewes v. United States (In Re Bukowski) · filed 1990-01-29(a)

Any postpetition act to obtain possession of or to perfect a lien against property of the estate constitutes a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and as such is voidable.

Section 362 bars postpetition perfection of an interest in rents unless applicable law makes the later perfection effective against intervening interests from an earlier date.

In Re Westchase I Associates, L.P. · filed 1990-02-21(b)(3)

While some courts have interpreted § 546(b) as allowing post-petition perfection of an interest in rents and profits, this court concludes that the better rule of law is that post-petition perfection is prohibited by § 362 unless applicable law allows the rights put in place by perfection to relate back to an earlier date, effecting priority over intervening parties.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a contractor to perfect a prepetition Vermont statutory lien after bankruptcy by obtaining a timely state court prejudgment writ of attachment.

Town of Colchester v. Hinesburg Sand & Gravel, Inc. (In Re APC Construction, Inc.) · filed 1990-03-13(b)(3)

In Vermont, a contractor or subcontractor creditor is permitted to achieve post-petition perfection by obtaining a timely State Court pre-judgment writ of attachment. ... Section 546 allows a statutory lien to be perfected, § 362(b)(3) prevents the automatic stay from falling around the lien’s perfection.

Section 362(a)(4) bars a creditor from perfecting a security interest by taking possession of rental payments after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Funding Systems Asset Management Corp. v. Chemical Business Credit Corp. (In Re Funding Systems Asset Management Corp.) · filed 1990-03-12(a)(4)

Similarly, any purported perfection resulting from Chemical’s possession of the rental payments during the post petition period would be in violation of the automatic stay provision at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a) stays subcontractors’ mechanic’s lien enforcement actions when the general contractor files for bankruptcy, even if the contractor does not own the liened property.

Middleton & Dugger Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Richardson Builders, Inc. (In Re Richardson Builders, Inc.) · filed 1990-11-30(a)

For the foregoing reasons this court finds that when a general contractor files a bankruptcy petition, section 362(a) stays the filing and prosecution of mechanic’s lien enforcement actions by subcontractors.

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to take appropriate action after a bankruptcy filing to perfect a security interest in rents when § 546(b) allows that perfection.

Delta Plaza Partners v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance (In Re Delta Plaza Partners) · filed 1991-05-02(b)(3)

11 U.S.C. § 546(b) and § 362(b)(3) allow Minnesota Mutual to perfect its security interest in the debtor’s rents by taking appropriate action, even subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy case.

The automatic stay does not bar a creditor from consenting to a trustee’s sale of estate property under § 363.

United States v. Nelson (In Re Nelson) · filed 1991-07-26(a)

Consenting to a trustee sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363 does not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) stays enforcement of liens after a new bankruptcy filing even when the secured debts would be nondischargeable, until the stay is modified or vacated.

In Re Earl · filed 1992-01-10(a)(4), (5)

Even if the dismissal of this case were with prejudice, and if the debts scheduled in the present case could not be discharged in a subsequent case, this would not render the Debtor ineligible to file a new case pursuant to § 109(g), and the automatic stay in the new case would still prevent the creditors of the debtor from proceeding to enforce and realize upon their liens secured by such nondis-chargeable debt, until the stay was modified or vacated.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts acts to perfect an interest in property from the automatic stay to the extent the trustee’s avoidance powers are subject to § 546(b).

Matter of TH New Orleans Ltd. Partnership · filed 1992-03-23(b)(3)

Under 362(b)(3), however, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not operate as a stay of any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s avoidance powers are subject to 11 U.S.C. § 546(b).

Section 362(b)(3) permits a creditor to perfect an interest in property despite the automatic stay when the trustee’s rights are subject to that perfection under § 546(b).

In Re Griggs · filed 1992-05-18(b)(3)

We find additional support for our holding in this case in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1988), which creates an exception to the automatic stay. Section 362(b)(3) provides that the automatic stay does not operate against "any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title ..." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1988).

Section 362 prevents a secured creditor from taking postpetition steps to enforce a security interest in rents when those steps were incomplete before bankruptcy.

In Re Vienna Park Properties · filed 1992-09-29(a)

The necessary steps for enforcement of the security interest under Virginia law were not satisfied prior to bankruptcy. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code prevents the Banks from taking such steps after Vienna Park filed the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362. Thus the Banks are not entitled to collect the rents.

The automatic stay does not excuse a lien claimant from giving timely § 546(b) notice to perfect an inchoate prepetition mechanics’ lien.

Stoebner v. Horizon Fabricators, Inc. · filed 1993-04-23(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, the court rejects Klemp’s claim that its failure to serve Chasco is justified on the basis of the bankruptcy stay.

Section 362(a) stays enforcement of a security interest in rents when the creditor had not taken possession or obtained a receiver before the bankruptcy petition.

Creekstone Apartments Associates, L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In Re Creekstone Apartments Associates, L.P.) · filed 1993-12-27(a)

The RTC's failure to take possession of the property or appoint a receiver to sequester rents prior to the petition date stays the enforcement of the RTC’s security interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) prevent statutory liens for unpaid pension contributions and unfunded pension benefit liabilities from arising after the bankruptcy petition.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In Re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.) · filed 1994-11-18(a)(4), (5)

The bankruptcy court was correct, as the Reorganized Debtors and the United Steelworkers urge, in holding that tax priority arises only as to those unfunded benefit liabilities to which a lien is imposed, and that the automatic stay precluded the creation of the statutory lien.

Section 362(a) subjects a postpetition transfer of stock held in escrow to the automatic stay even if the debtor breached the pledge agreement before filing.

In Re Yeary · filed 1995-05-16(a)

Even if the Yearys' anticipatorily breached the agreement, the escrow agent did not transfer the stocks, and any future transfer is subject to the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a).

Section 362 prevents prepetition judgment and tax liens from attaching to an inheritance that becomes estate property after the petition, and the stay continues while the sale proceeds remain in the estate.

Krippendorf v. Campbell (In re Campbell) · filed 1995-06-08(a)(4), (c)(1)

No lien could attach to that property of the estate because of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). ... Under section 362(c)(1), the stay continues in force.

Section 362 does not bar a prepetition writ of attachment that became effective upon service before the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Oliver · filed 1995-07-07

Since Washington Federal’s prepetition writ of attachment upon debtor’s bank account was effective upon service and was not a violation of the automatic stay, debtor’s motion to show cause is unwarranted.

Section 362’s automatic stay permits a creditor to seek an extension of a state court levy solely to preserve an existing lien, without enlarging the lien or threatening estate property, and requires no prior bankruptcy court approval for that motion.

W.D. Curran & Associates, Inc. v. Cheng-Shum Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1995-12-05

As we explained above, by its second Motion to Extend, appellant intended to do no more than prevent a lien from lapsing. Indeed, as in the cases outlined above, appellant was not attempting to enlarge the lien or threaten the property of the estate which would otherwise be available to general creditors. Rather, appellant desired to maintain the status quo. Appellant’s action, therefore, was not violative of the automatic stay and did not require prior bankruptcy court approval.

Section 362(a)(4)-(5) prohibits taking a lien in property of the bankruptcy estate while the automatic stay is in effect.

National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. McMullan (In Re McMullan) · filed 1996-04-18(a)(4)-(5)

In addition, the taking of the lien in property of the estate would be an act against property of the estate prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)-(5) (1994).

Section 362(a)(3) stays a state court appointed partition trustee from selling property in which the bankruptcy estate has an interest unless relief from the stay is granted.

In re Scipio · filed 1996-11-26(a)(3)

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) stays any act to obtain possession or control over property of the estate. This stay currently prohibits the state court appointed trustee in the partition ease from moving forward to liquidate the interests of both the debtor (i.e. the estate) and Sanders. As no relief from stay has been sought by Sanders, the partition case remains stayed at this time.

Section 362(a) stays admiralty proceedings to enforce a maritime lien against a debtor’s vessel while the bankruptcy case is pending.

O'Hara Corp. v. F/V NORTH STAR · filed 1997-07-24(a)

Therefore, I hold that the broad language of the automatic stay provision prevents this court from going ahead with the admiralty issues during the pendency of the Bankruptcy ease.

Section 362(a)(5) stays enforcement of a prepetition lien against a debtor’s property after Chapter 13 confirmation, until case closing, dismissal, or discharge under § 362(c)(2)(C).

In Re Henline · filed 1999-12-21(a)(5)

But, as reflected above, the stay applies against the enforcement of a lien on a debtor’s property under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5), and the stay continues under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C) until the earlier of case closing, dismissal or discharge.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from employing a prepetition writ of attachment during the postpetition, predischarge period to collect a prepetition judgment.

In Re Schneiderman · filed 2000-10-17(a)(1)

During that postpetition-predischarge period, the automatic stay barred enforcement of Chase’s judgment (§ 362(a)(2)) and barred any employment of a writ of attachment (§ 362(a)(1)).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a prepetition property interest when generally applicable law gives the perfected interest priority over rights acquired before perfection; that law need not expressly provide for retroactive perfection.

WI Dept Workforce v. Bank One N.A.-WI · filed 2003-09-22(b)(3)

Accordingly, we hold that a priming statute need not contain language ex- pressly providing for retroactive perfection in order to trigger the exception provided in 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) to the automatic stay of postpetition efforts to perfect a property interest. The Wisconsin statute therefore fits within the automatic stay exception, and the Depart- ment’s lien does not violate the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) and (4) prohibit a lienholder from taking possession of estate property to enforce its lien through a debtor’s surrender election unless the property becomes exempt or abandoned or the lienholder obtains relief from the stay.

In Re Kasper · filed 2004-04-27(a)(3), (a)(4)

Until the property becomes exempt or abandoned, or the lienholder obtains an order under § 362(d) granting relief from the automatic stay, a turnover to the lien-holder would place the lienholder in the posture of violating the automatic stay as it would be obtaining possession of and exercising control over property of the estate, and taking steps to enforce its lien.

Section 362(a)(4) and (5) is not violated when an assignee of a previously perfected mortgage takes no action to create, perfect, or enforce the lien against estate or debtor property.

Patton v. State Street Bank (In Re Patton) · filed 2004-09-16(a)(4) and (a)(5)

As the defendant took no action to create, perfect, or enforce its perfected lien against property of the estate or property of the debtor, the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant violated the automatic stay is unwarranted.

Section 362 prohibits reallocating a debtor’s LLC membership interest to enforce a lien, even when the debtor previously authorized the lienholder to exercise ownership rights.

Braunstein v. Panagiotou (In Re McCabe) · filed 2006-06-27(a)(4)

Furthermore, the February, 2003, communication of McCabe, in which he empowered Panagiotou to exercise McCabe’s ownership rights, does not abrogate Pana-giotou’s violation of the stay. That authorization was dependent upon a lien in favor of Panagiotou. Thus, to the extent that Panagiotou has relied upon McCabe’s letter to justify amending the GEDCO LLC agreement, he has violated the automatic stay provision prohibiting acts to enforce a lien.

Section 362(a)(3) bars repossession of an estate vehicle before court authorization, and a local rule cannot permit creditors to bypass the stay when the debtor's insurance lapses.

Suggs v. Regency Financial Corp. (In Re Suggs) · filed 2007-11-05(a)(3)

It is clear from the record that a stay violation did occur, and the violation was at no time addressed by the bankruptcy court. The violation occurred when Regency repossessed the vehicle before obtaining a court order authorizing it to do so. ... We agree with the debtor that Local Rule 4070-l.D. enlarges creditors’ rights beyond the scope permitted by § 362 and Federal Rule 4001(a).

Section 362 stays enforcement of judicial liens against funds held in a state court registry, renders postpetition enforcement actions void, and requires relief from the stay before collection may proceed.

In Re Tinkess · filed 2008-09-26(a), (d)

ANIC holds judicial liens against the levied portion of the PFDs, but its collection efforts were stayed once the debtors filed their petitions. ... Any post-petition actions taken by ANIC or the state court with regard to the enforcement of ANIC’s liens against the PFDs are therefore void. ... If ANIC wishes to pursue collection of the PFDs in state court before this bankruptcy case is closed, it must first obtain relief from stay from this court.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents a creditor whose claim against the debtor is established by an alter-ego determination from creating, perfecting, or enforcing a lien against estate property.

Greaves v. Office of the Delaware Attorney General (In Re Two Springs Membership Club) · filed 2009-04-09(a)(4)

Although this Court’s finding of alter ego between Debtor and Revcon Nevada establishes that Coast has a valid claim against Debtor, that claim remains unsecured. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), the automatic stay prevents Coast from "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(3) does not require a mortgage holder to release a disputed lien while a borrower’s rescission claim awaits adjudication.

Giza v. Amcap Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Giza) · filed 2010-04-15(a)(3)

Defendants’ attempt to preserve the status quo and the disputed lien pendente lite, and in this case until consummation of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, without more, is not a violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(b)(24) excepts from the automatic stay any transfer that is not avoidable under § 549.

Morton v. Kievit (In Re Vallecito Gas, LLC) · filed 2010-11-17(b)(24)

Therefore, the Court concludes that a transfer that is not avoidable under § 549 is excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(24).

Section 362(a)(5) stays acts to enforce a prepetition lien against a chapter 9 debtor’s property through a receivership, even if a governmental unit is involved.

In Re Jefferson County, Ala. · filed 2012-01-06(a)(5)

Despite § 362(b)(4) and even if a governmental unit were involved, the § 362(a)(5) stay still proscribes the activities of the Indenture Trustee and those acting on its behest. Absent some other exclusion or further order of this Court, § 362(a)(5) stops actions in the receivership case and by the Receiver constituting creation, perfection or enforcement of a lien against property of the County.

Section 362(a)(4) prohibits a creditor from causing post-petition docketing of an order extending an expired judgment lien against estate property.

Pereira v. 397 Realty LLC (In re Heavey) · filed 2016-04-01(a)(4)

In light of the fact that there was no lien on the Property on the date of the Defendant’s counsel’s inquiry as the lien had expired pursuant to CPLR § 5203(a), this act clearly sought to “create, perfect, or enforce” a lien against property of the estate, and therefore, it was a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay bars a plaintiff from pursuing claims against a corporate defendant.

Wichard v. Bear Mill Manufacturing Co. · filed 1991-01-22

Similarly, the IAS court properly determined that the automatic stay provision of 11 USC § 362 is a bar to plaintiff’s pursuit of his claims against the corporate defendant.

Section 362(a)(1) permits a stay-violation claim when a creditor files a state-court action against the debtor after an involuntary bankruptcy petition, even if the creditor takes no further action against the debtor.

Glinka v. Dartmouth Banking Co. (In Re Kelton Motors Inc.) · filed 1990-09-26(a)(1)

There is no doubt in this Court’s mind that Trustee’s allegation that USAC filed a State Court lawsuit against Kelton after it and the other Defendants had filed an involuntary petition against Kelton is, without more, enough to survive Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim of a violation of § 362 upon which relief may be granted.

The automatic stay protects an estate contract from attempted termination under a conditional for-cause clause unless the other party obtains relief from the stay.

In Re Carroll · filed 1990-05-23(a)(3)

As property of the estate, the agreement was protected by the automatic stay to the extent of the rights provided for in the agreement. The "for cause" language in paragraph 7.01 only gives Tri-Growth a conditional right to terminate. Thus, Tri-Growth should have sought relief from the stay before attempting to terminate the agreement.

Section 362(a)(3) protects an estate contract from unilateral termination; a counterparty must obtain relief from the stay before terminating it, even when the contract permits termination for cause.

Carroll v. Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. (In re Carroll) · filed 1990-05-23(a)(3)

An executory contract that is property of the estate can only be terminated after a grant of relief from the stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent an order requiring surrender of nonresidential premises once the lease is deemed rejected under § 365(d)(4).

In Re U.S. Fax, Inc. · filed 1990-04-25(a)(3)

... the automatic stay provisions do not preclude ordering surrender under section 365(d)(4). That court reasoned that when a nonresidential lease is “deemed rejected,” the debtor’s leasehold is “no longer property of the estate.” ... I find this reasoning persuasive.

Section 362’s automatic stay continues to apply to a foreclosure proceeding removed to bankruptcy court, and a debtor’s motion to open the foreclosure judgment can serve as a request for relief from the stay.

R.C.R. Services, Inc. v. Sciortino (In Re Sciortino) · filed 1990-05-24

While the stay applies to the instant proceeding in this court, no separate pleading requesting relief from the stay is required to obtain relief from it. Rather, the Debtor’s motion to open the judgment may be considered as the logic equivalent of a request for relief from the stay to prosecute this motion.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a corporation from terminating a debtor’s employment as its president.

Crown Oil & Wax Co. of Delaware v. Gilece (In Re Gilece) · filed 1980-01-11

Second, we conclude that the automatic stay of § 362 does not preclude the termination of the debtor’s employment by Crown.

Section 362 bars a premium financier from canceling a debtor’s insurance policies after bankruptcy to obtain unearned premiums.

Bragg's Electric Construction Co. v. Rebsamen Companies (In Re Bragg's Electric Construction Co.) · filed 1980-10-17

The payments to the financiers are not premium payments, which could be administrative expenses, but rather are payments on a debt which is unsecured by any lien on “property” of the debtors. Only by undertaking that which § 362 forbids can Rebsamen and PFS realize anything cognizable as a “property” interest in which a security interest could lie.

Section 362(a)(3) stays both judicial and nonjudicial attempts by a landlord to regain premises when the debtor held even a scintilla of equitable interest in them at filing.

Omni International, Ltd. v. Mimi's of Atlanta, Inc. (In Re Mimi's of Atlanta, Inc.) · filed 1980-08-13(a)(3)

Since the debtors have continually maintained possession of the premises and have never had an opportunity to refute the landlord’s unilateral termination of the lease until the instant stay litigation was commenced, the court hereby finds that each of the debtors had a scintilla of equitable interest in the landlord’s premises as of the date the petitions were filed, thereby making the stay imposed by § 362(a)(3) applicable to all attempts by the landlord to gain possession of the premises, whether the attempts require judicial supervision or not.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor but does not bar an action brought by the debtor from proceeding in state court.

Ideal Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. M. R. Harrison Construction Corp. (In Re Ideal Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, I · filed 1980-09-22(a)(1)

While § 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of any legal proceeding against the debtor, I find no legal impediment to bar an action brought by the debtor from proceeding in State court.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay GNMA’s termination of a bankrupt mortgage issuer’s status or its transfer of the issuer’s servicing obligations under the National Housing Act.

Matter of Whitcomb & Keller Mortg. Co., Inc. · filed 1980-12-12(a)(3)

Although the automatic stay provision does not apply to GNMA’s actions, this Court has ample other powers pursuant to Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to stay actions not covered by the automatic stay provision.

Section 362 automatically stays further enforcement of a writ of garnishment when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

University of Alabama Hospitals v. Warren (In Re Warren) · filed 1980-11-14

The filing of a petition in the Bankruptcy Court with respect to the defendant acts as an automatic stay upon further enforcement of the writ of garnishment. 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362 stays claims asserted against a debtor, including counterclaims, but does not stay claims asserted by the debtor.

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. (In Re Northern Pipeline Construction Co.) · filed 1980-11-17

The stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and Rule 401 of the Bankruptcy Rules reach claims asserted against but not claims asserted by the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) does not cover a divorce petition outside its limits on prebankruptcy proceedings and claims.

Cunningham v. Cunningham (In Re Cunningham) · filed 1981-01-29(a)(1)

The provisions of § 362(a)(1) are limited, though, to actions that could have been commenced before the bankruptcy case was filed or to claims that arose before the case. ... The divorce petition is clearly not within the meaning of §§ 362(a)(1) and 101(4).

Section 362(a)(3) permits a lessor to give a debtor notice of a lease default, but a postpetition notice attempting to terminate the lease and obtain possession is a nullity.

Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. v. Sixteen to One Mining Corp. (In Re Sixteen to One Mining Corp.) · filed 1981-02-12(a)(3)

Secondly, the automatic stay of Section 362 prevents any act to obtain possession of the property of the estate. [11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)] Does this include the giving of notices of default? The answer is that so long as there is no attempt to obtain possession a notice may be given to alert a debtor lessee of breach of the terms of a lease. A landlord is entitled to put a lessee on notice of where and when the lessee is failing in performance. Otherwise there may be no knowledge of the default which the landlord expects to be cured in the event of assumption of the lease. The giving of a notice in January 1980 that there was a default and describing it is only valid for what it is — notice. The landlord cannot obtain possession without an order of the Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), or by abandonment, rejection of the lease or stipulation. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) and (d)(2). The notice in April 1980 from the landlord attempting to terminate the lease and thereby obtain possession is a nullity.

Section 362 stays certain proceedings against a debtor, but does not prevent a court-directed order transferring and consolidating cases involving that debtor; the receiving court must comply with the stay.

Horn v. Rincker · filed 1981-02-20

Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (Supp. II 1978)) provides that a petition filed under sections 301, 302, or 303 operates as a stay of certain proceedings pending against a debtor. The order which we have entered is directed to the courts wherein these cases are pending and not against the debtor White Farm Equipment Company. The circuit court of Shelby County, however, must make appropriate provisions for complying with section 362 of the Bankruptcy Act when these cases are consolidated in that court.

Section 362 stays an attempt to evict a debtor from premises the debtor occupies when filing, even if a state court has already entered a judgment for possession.

Gibbs v. Housing Authority of New Haven (In Re Gibbs) · filed 1981-03-05(a)(3)

In summary, the court holds that an existing occupancy of premises by a debtor upon the filing of a petition for relief is subject to the automatic stay provisions regardless of the existence of a state court judgment for possession of the premises; that any attempt by another court to deal with this occupancy without a relief from stay ordered by the bankruptcy court is a nullity and subject to collateral attack; that a public housing authority is not exercising a regulatory power when it seeks to enforce lease provisions; and that the statutory exceptions to the automatic stay cannot be employed to defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over property of the estate.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay in a Chapter 11 case protects the debtor and does not extend to a codebtor merely because the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Royal Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Maritima Salvadorena, S.A. · filed 1981-03-31(a)

In this court’s opinion, Congress’ decision to specifically provide for stays against co-debtors under the New Code’s Chapter 13 provisions and Congress’ apparent decision to not provide for similar relief under Chapter 11 lends further support to this court’s conclusion that the automatic stay provisions in § 362(a) operated in favor of the bankrupt Armasal only and not in favor of a co-debtor such as Uiterwyk.

Section 362 automatically stays eviction of a Chapter 13 debtor with an operative residential lease for unpaid pre-petition rent, including issuance of a state court eviction warrant, unless the bankruptcy court grants relief from the stay under subsection (d).

Butler v. Bellwest Management Corp. (In Re Butler) · filed 1981-06-04(a)

I hold, therefore, that if a wage-earner has a valid operative lease with a landlord of residential premises at the time of filing under Chapter 13, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 apply to prevent the issuance on account of unpaid pre-petition rent of a state court warrant of eviction. So long as the stay remains in effect, there may be no eviction for unpaid pre-petition rent, without leave of the Bankruptcy Court obtained pursuant to § 362(d).

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a tax agency’s subpoena directed to the debtor’s accountants for records relating to the debtor.

Meehan v. Pennsylvania (In Re Barsky) · filed 1981-06-04(a)(1)

The issuance of subpoenas on the accountants does not, in our view, bring § 362(a)(1) into play.

Section 362 bars enforcement of a state court judgment against the debtor after the bankruptcy petition is filed, even if the hearing occurred nearly simultaneously with the filing.

Cate Enterprises, Inc. v. Schwab (In Re Schwab) · filed 1981-06-18

Thus, since the automatic stay clearly applies to prohibit enforcement of any judgment, the court finds it unnecessary to determine the validity of the state court judgment, particularly since there has been no evidence submitted by Cate to support its request and the court is not prepared to enforce the judgment, in any event.

Section 362(a)(1)'s stay of proceedings against a debtor does not extend to a codefendant merely because it is sued with the debtor.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Yates Motor Co. · filed 1981-07-09(a)(1)

We see no reason to extend the language to include codefendants of the debtor.

Section 362(a)(3) stays a landlord’s postpetition action to oust a debtor tenant and even a postpetition default letter; the landlord must obtain relief from the stay before proceeding.

Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Hub of Military Circle, Inc. (In Re Hub of Military Circle, Inc · filed 1981-08-13(a)(3)

The issue was not raised by the defendant — debtor, but it was a clear violation of the automatic stay for Equitable to commence any action following the entry of an order for relief on April 3, 1981. The letter of default sent by the landlord on April 28th was a technical violation of the stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Relief from the stay was essential.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(6) do not stay a lawsuit against a Chapter 13 debtor on a claim arising after the bankruptcy case began.

Weymouth v. York (In Re York) · filed 1981-08-26(a)(1), (a)(6)

Neither this subsection nor subsection 362(a)(6) stays the commencement of a judicial proceeding against a Chapter 13 debtor based on a claim which arose after the commencement of a case.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not protect individual comakers from personal liability when they are not themselves debtors in bankruptcy.

Hunter Savings Ass'n v. Georgetown of Kettering Ltd. (In Re Georgetown of Kettering, Ltd.) · filed 1981-09-02

Frederic E. Gagel, H. Garrett Frey, and Steven F. Williams, deceased, as individuals and comakers jointly and severally liable on the promissory notes secured by the real estate mortgage in foreclosure, are not personally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the automatic stay imposed by statute is not effective as to their personal liabilities.

Section 362(d)(1) permits relief from the stay for cause to allow domestic relations proceedings affecting third parties to continue in the court with prior jurisdiction.

Schulze v. Schulze · filed 1981-10-22(d)(1)

Actions only remotely related to the bankruptcy case and which involve the rights of third parties not before the bankruptcy court should be permitted to proceed in the court with prior jurisdiction “for cause, including lack of adequate protection...” See 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(1).

Section 362(a) abates a pending civil action against the debtor without dismissing it.

In Re 1438 Meridian Place, N. W., Inc. · filed 1981-11-12(a)

While the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) have resulted in an abatement of the pending D. C. Superior Court case, there is clearly no dismissal of that action, and it is clear from the facts of record that the tenants in this case are also creditors by reason of their individual claims.

Section 362 stays a surety’s attempt to cancel bonds needed for the debtor’s reorganization when the cancellation is a proceeding against the debtor.

In Re ROAM, Inc. · filed 1981-12-03

By 11 U.S.C. § 362 the filing of a proceeding in Title 11 stays any proceeding against the debtor. An attempt to cancel a bond is a proceeding.

Section 362 stays an attempt to cancel a debtor’s continuing surety bonds because the cancellation is a proceeding against the debtor.

R.O.A.M., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (In re R.O.A.M., Inc.) · filed 1981-12-03

By 11 U.S.C. § 362 the filing of a proceeding in Title 11 stays any proceeding against the debtor. An attempt to cancel a bond is a proceeding.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against the debtor or its property, but does not protect nonbankrupt guarantors.

Van Balen v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1981-12-09

The automatic stay of that section does not protect the guarantors of a loan made to the debtor or other persons or parties who have not filed proceedings in bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) makes a financing statement filed after the bankruptcy petition ineffective under the automatic stay.

Hodges v. Anderson (George B. Kerr, Inc.) · filed 1981-12-14(a)

The filing of the financing statement after the filing of the petition is ineffective because of the automatic stay imposed by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(5) does not continue the automatic stay for assets that a corporate or partnership debtor voluntarily abandons to a lienholder; the lienholder may enforce its lien against those assets.

D'annies Restaurant, Inc. v. Northwestern National Bank of Mankato (In re D'annies Restaurant, Inc.) · filed 1981-12-14(a)(5)

For these reasons, this Court holds that “property of the debtor”, as used in § 362(a)(5), does not include the assets of a corporate or partnership debtor voluntarily abandoned to a lienholder in accordance with § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the lienholder may enforce its lien upon such assets free from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not make a judgment void when the asserted stay violation consists solely of a court entering that judgment.

Willard v. Willard (In Re Willard) · filed 1981-12-17(a)

Thus, while a bankruptcy court might find a party in contempt for commencing or continuing an action, the court would not have the jurisdiction to void a judgment where the judgment results solely from a court entering a judgment and the judgment is challenged on automatic stay grounds.

Section 362 requires a party who knows of a bankruptcy to obtain a determination that an obligation is excepted from the automatic stay before seeking a state-court contempt order to enforce it.

Stamper v. Stamper (In Re Stamper) · filed 1982-01-18(a), (b)(2)

In conclusion, therefore, this court finds that defendant, Mary A. Stamper, is in contempt of the bankruptcy court jurisdiction for seeking the contempt of court order in the state court, including imminent incarceration of the debtor, Dorman Henry Stamper, despite knowledge of the bankruptcy court case and before a determination that the obligation is as exception to the Section 362 automatic stay and to the Section 523(a)(5) provisions, both questions of federal law.

Section 362(a) stays the continuation of a judicial proceeding against the debtor, including one pending in federal district court.

United States v. Critical Fork Coal Corp. (In Re Critical Fork Coal Corp.) · filed 1982-01-20(a)

In any event, the continuation of a judicial proceeding against the debtor is expressly prohibited by the automatic stay in § 362(a) of the Code. The stay provision is “applicable to all entities,” presumably including a federal district court in which an action is pending.

Section 362(a) does not toll the expiration of a loan commitment that ends by its terms without further creditor action.

In Re New Town Mall · filed 1982-01-29(a)

For the following reasons, this Bankruptcy Court holds the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not toll the expiration of a loan commitment.

Section 362(a)(1) covers a proceeding on a claim that arose before bankruptcy even when the plaintiff confines its complaint to the debtor’s conduct after filing.

Nike, Inc. v. National Shoes, Inc. (In Re National Shoes, Inc.) · filed 1982-03-09(a)(1)

Bifurcating its claim does not change the fact that its claim is one which arose before the commencement of the Defendant’s Chapter 11 ease and that this proceeding could have been commenced before the commencement of the Defendant’s Chapter 11 case within the meaning and intent of Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(3) stays cancellation of a contract for deed affecting property in which the debtor has an equitable interest; a cancellation attempted after the vendor learns of that interest is void.

Lanesboro State Bank v. Hennessey · filed 1982-03-26(a)(3)

Once the debtor’s interest came to light, the Hennesseys were required to proceed in accordance with the bankruptcy act. Their attempt to give notice of cancellation was void because of the automatic stay, and the state court was precluded from entering judgment.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend to an eviction action against a separate nondebtor tenant when the debtor was neither the original tenant nor an assignee of the lease.

Bresler Malls, Inc. v. F.A.M.I. Service Systems, Inc. (In Re F.A.M.I. Service Systems, Inc.) · filed 1982-04-06

The issue presented for consideration here is whether the debtor and the subleas-ee are the same entity so that the debtor’s automatic stay would extend to the eviction and related actions now pending in State Court. The Court finds that the two entities are not the same and thus the automatic stay on actions involving the debtor has no effect on the pending State Court action between Bresler and C.C.L.

Section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not stay an interpleader action to determine whether disputed property belongs to a debtor’s estate when the action neither seeks to recover a prepetition claim against the debtor nor to obtain estate property.

Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. West Texas Marketing Corp. · filed 1982-05-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

Section 362(a)(1) applies by its terms only to, inter alia, proceedings to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the Chapter 11 case. This action does not involve a claim against ECI which arose prior to ECI’s filing its Chapter 11 petition, because no dispute then existed over title to the oil in Shell’s possession. Section 362(a)(3) applies by its terms only to acts to obtain possession of property of the debtor’s estate. This interpleader action does not seek to obtain property from the debtor’s estate, but rather to determine whether the oil is in fact property of the estate.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar an appeal brought by the debtor from proceeding in state court.

Accredited Associates, Inc. v. Shottenfeld · filed 1982-06-15(a)(1)

Since this appeal was brought by appellant debtor, this court is not barred from proceeding to a final resolution of this matter.

Section 362(a)(1)-(2) automatically stays creditors from proceeding against a debtor in pending lawsuits after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Brady · filed 1982-06-16(a)(1)-(2)

However, it appears to the Court that the debtor’s creditors were notified of the proceedings and under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l)-(2) the creditors would be automatically stayed from proceeding against the debtor.

Section 362’s automatic stay prohibits issuing and recording a sheriff’s deed to obtain a debtor’s property after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Bernard (In Re Bernard) · filed 1982-06-28(a)(1), (a)(5)

We agree with the debtor’s contentions that the automatic stay provisions of the Code prohibit a person from taking any actions to obtain possession of the property of the debtor or to enforce a lien against such property ... and that the stay did prohibit the action taken in this case by the Sheriff and the VA in issuing and recording the deed to the debt- or’s property in September, 1980.

Section 362 does not deprive a federal district court of jurisdiction to enforce its orders when a sham bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith to evade them.

Meyerson v. Werner · filed 1982-07-14

We do not believe, however, that § 362 was intended to deprive a federal district court of jurisdiction to deal with circumstances such as these.

Section 362(a) stays actions against the debtor or the debtor’s estate, but does not toll the time for a debtor to assert its own claim against another party’s property.

T. C. I. Ltd. v. Sears Bank & Trust Co. (In Re T. C. I. Ltd.) · filed 1982-07-21(a)

Since the plain meaning of Section 362(a) as well as its Legislative History unambiguously restrict its scope to actions against a debtor or the debtor’s estate, this court holds that Section 362(a) does not stay the period of time in which T.C.I. can assert its claim for a mechanic’s lien under Illinois Law.

Section 362 does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to enjoin a sham bankruptcy filing made in bad faith to evade its prior orders.

Monroe R. MEYERSON, Sidney Milgrim and Central Rigging and Contracting Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees v.… · filed 1982-07-23

We recognized that ordinarily the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays an ongoing suit or the enforcement of a previously obtained judgment. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. We do not believe, however, that § 362 was intended to deprive a federal district court of jurisdiction to deal with circumstances such as these. In view of this long and extraordinary history of misconduct, which clearly demonstrated that Cook filed the sham Chapter XI petition in a bad faith, vexatious and contemptuous effort to violate the district court's prior orders, the court was entitled to exercise its inherent power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 to enjoin such an attempt to defeat the court's orders by resorting to frivolous litigation elsewhere.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit an employer from terminating an employee because the employee filed for bankruptcy.

Amidon v. Avco Financial Services Trust (In Re Amidon) · filed 1982-08-18(a)

First, while § 362(a) stays all kinds of proceedings, acts against property, and acts to collect a debt, it does not prohibit an employer from terminating an employee, even for the simple reason that she filed for bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) may stay proceedings against a debtor’s co-defendants when the allegations share the same factual and legal basis and are inextricably interwoven.

Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson · filed 1982-08-24(a)

However, we see nothing in section 362(a) which acts to stay Calder Bros.’ action against Star Palace, Signs, and Crowley. Section 362(a) may, in certain circumstances, stay judicial proceedings against not only the debtor in bankruptcy but also co-defendants when the allegations against them arise from the same factual and legal basis and are inextricably interwoven.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from evicting a debtor after a bankruptcy filing when the debtor’s possessory and leasehold interests in the apartment are property of the estate.

Lowry v. Mc Neil Corp. (In Re Lowry) · filed 1982-09-16(a)(3)

The eviction of the Debtors from their apartment is an act to take possession of property of the estate, that is, to take possession of the Debtors’ possessory and leasehold interest in the apartment, prohibited by § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) prohibits cancellation of a debtor’s executory contract as an act to obtain possession of estate property.

In Re Coast Trading Co., Inc. · filed 1982-10-20(a)

An executory contract of the debtor is property of the estate. Therefore, cancellation of such a contract is prohibited under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate.”

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar a utility from discontinuing service on account of another resident’s debt when the utility has no claim against the debtor.

Matthews v. Philadelphia Gas Works (In Re Matthews) · filed 1982-11-19(a)(6)

Although the debtor urges this Court to find that PGW has violated the automatic stay, no such violation is present. The stay only prevents creditors from enforcing pre-petition claims. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). In the case at bar, PGW has no claim against the debtor. The only claim which they assert is against Ms. Brown. The Court, therefore, finds that PGW has not violated the stay.

Section 362 stays an attempt to cancel a debtor’s existing bond after a bankruptcy petition is filed, so the attempted cancellation has no effect.

In Re Advent Corp. · filed 1982-11-29

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the filing of a petition under Title 11 stays any proceeding against the debtor. An attempt to cancel a bond is a proceeding.

Section 362 does not protect a leasehold interest that was effectively terminated under applicable state law before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Babco, Inc. v. Markusic (In Re Babco, Inc.) · filed 1982-12-09

If a leasehold interest of a debtor in possession in a Chapter XI bankruptcy, in this case Babeo, is effectively terminated under the applicable state law prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, then the debtor in possession acquires no interest in the lease, and the leasehold interest is not a part of the bankrupt’s estate for purposes of § 541 or § 362.

Section 362(a)(8) automatically bars a debtor from commencing a Tax Court proceeding after filing a bankruptcy petition, and a Tax Court petition filed during the stay is invalid from filing and cannot later be reinstated.

Ever Clean Servs. v. Commissioner · filed 1982-12-20(a)(8)

Thus, without any requirement of action by the Bankruptcy Court, the filing of the petition under Title 11 on March 21, 1980, automatically precluded the petitioner from commencing an action in this Court. ... We instead consider the petition as invalid from the moment of filing, and not thereafter susceptible to resurrection.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the commencement of arbitration proceedings against the debtor.

Cott Corp. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund (In Re Cott Corp.) · filed 1982-12-21(a)(1)

Although not mentioning withdrawal liability from pension plans, the legislative history to § 362 does indicate that the commencement of any arbitration proceedings against the debtor would be stayed: ... All proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings.

Section 362(a) makes a complaint filed against a debtor after its bankruptcy petition a nullity even if the plaintiff was unaware of the filing.

CONSUMERS DISTRIBUTING CO. LTD. v. Tele-Save Merchandising Co. · filed 1982-12-30(a)

Even though plaintiff was unaware of the filing of the bankruptcy petition when it filed its complaint in the state court, the filing of the complaint against Tele-Save was unlawful and must be deemed a nullity.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor from suing a Chapter 11 debtor in state court to enforce a debt that arose before the bankruptcy petition, even when state joinder rules would otherwise require the debtor to be joined.

First Nat. Bank of Shreveport v. Crawford · filed 1983-01-17(a)(1)

To hold otherwise and to require the Bank to sue the Howes in state court would subject the Bank to contempt for violating the stay order to which it acknowledges that it is subject.

Section 362 does not stay a debtor from prosecuting its own counterclaim.

Regal Construction Co. v. Meade Concrete Pipe Co. (In Re Regal Construction Co.) · filed 1983-02-18

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 did not preclude Regal from proceeding on its counterclaim in the District of Columbia.