11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(a)(3) stays a trustee’s sale that would deprive a debtor of possession of a valid leasehold interest in estate property.

Babco, Inc. v. Markusic (In Re Babco, Inc.) · filed 1983-03-22(a)(3)

The interest constituted property of Babco’s estate, which was subject to the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. The stay provision prohibits any action to obtain possession of the leasehold interest of plaintiff. The trustee’s attempted sale was impermissible because Babco’s right to possession would be abrogated following the sale.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a prepetition declaratory judgment action against the debtor over insurance coverage.

Commercial Union Insurance v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.) · filed 1983-04-21(a)(1)

To hold that CU’s Massachusetts declaratory judgment action falls outside the scope of § 362(a) would be to disregard the plain wording of the statute. Judge Lifland correctly concluded that the stay applied to the action.

Section 362(a) requires a court to defer ruling as to defendants that have filed petitions for reorganization in bankruptcy court.

Reil v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1983-05-12(a)

... it is hereby ordered and decreed that said motion is granted in favor of movant and against all other parties, except those defendants which have filed petitions for reorganization in Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. §362(a). Our ruling as to these bankrupt defendants is deferred, without prejudice to the right of movant to praecipe this court for further consideration when timely and appropriate in accordance with said bankruptcy proceedings, and/or pursuant to further order of this court.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an action commenced by the debtor.

In Re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. · filed 1983-08-23(a)(1)

This action was commenced by Revere and as such is not affected by the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays the continuation of actions involving a debtor when a bankruptcy case is filed, including arbitration proceedings.

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc. (In Re Braniff Airways, Inc.) · filed 1983-08-29

The automatic stay provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibit the continuance of actions involving the debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy case. The legislative history of § 362 specifically mentions that arbitration proceedings are stayed.

Section 362(a) bars acts to recover leased premises or cancel a franchise, but does not stop a previously noticed franchise termination from taking effect by its own terms.

Shell Oil Co. v. Anne Cara Oil Co. (In Re Anne Cara Oil Co.) · filed 1983-09-01(a)

This would include any actions by Shell to obtain possession of the leasehold premises or to attempt to cancel the franchise relationship. The stay remains in effect as long as the property in question remains part of the estate. Here, Shell did not perform any of the acts forbidden by § 362(a) before the franchise relationship terminated by the terms of the January 12 letter.

Section 362(a) does not prevent a debtor from bringing an action to challenge a prepetition judgment.

In Re A-1 24 Hour Towing, Inc. · filed 1983-09-19(a)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) does not prevent the debtor from pursuing such an action.

Section 362 stays a divorce property division action while the property at issue remains in the bankruptcy estate, until the property becomes available for division or the bankruptcy case closes.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 1983-09-21(a)

We therefore hold that under the circumstances of the instant case, the order of the state district court is ineffective to divide the property of the appellant and respondent. The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 541 and 11 U.S.C. § 362 operate to stay the respondent’s action in the trial court until such time that property is made available for division because it is excluded from the bankruptcy estate by the federal court or because the bankruptcy case is closed.

Section 362 stays state court proceedings to open or strike a foreclosure judgment after the debtors file for bankruptcy.

Virginia National Bank Mortgage Corp. v. Ruzowicz · filed 1983-09-22

The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates an automatic stay of all proceedings against the debtor. ... We must again emphasize that we feel this matter could not be acted on because of the pending bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a proceeding against a debtor even when she is sued in her capacity as personal representative of another person’s estate.

Metro Mill & Casework, Inc. v. Fiedler (In Re Fiedler) · filed 1983-11-14(a)(1)

A suit against Mrs. Fiedler, in whatever “capacity” is a proceeding against the Debtor as referred to in § 362(a)(1). Therefore, I hold that § 362(a)(1) applies to stay the mechanic’s lien litigation against Mrs. Fiedler as personal representative of the estate of Earl Fiedler.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stop a contract from expiring by its terms when the required notice was given before the bankruptcy filing and no further act is needed to end the contract.

Lauderdale Motorcar Corp. v. Rolls-Royce Motors Inc. (In Re Lauderdale Motorcar Corp.) · filed 1983-11-30(a)(3)

As of the Filing Date, the Debtor’s property in the Dealer Agreement was limited to contractual rights existing through and until September 30. No further “act” was required for the Dealer Agreement to expire on that date, and no action was taken by ROLLS-ROYCE after the Filing Date that would constitute in any way a violation of Section 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a debtor’s postpetition petition to open a judgment when that petition arises from a proceeding originally brought against the debtor.

Brady v. Tobias Knoblauch Private Bank (In Re Brady) · filed 1983-11-30(a)(1)

Likewise, in the instant case, the debtor’s state court petition can be viewed as an appeal arising out of a proceeding which was originally brought against the debtor, i.e., the entry of judgment by the bank against the debtor on the note. Since the debtor’s state court petition was dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on November 17,1981, some nine months after the debtor filed her petition under chapter 13 of the Code, we conclude that the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County was prevented from entering judgment on the debtor’s petition by operation of section 362 of the Code.

Section 362(a)(1) initially stays a prepetition proceeding against a debtor even when the debtor is sued in a representative capacity as a trustee.

Colin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In Re Colin) · filed 1983-12-19(a)(1)

While it may be true that a “probate proceeding in which the debtor is the executor or administrator of another’s estate ... [or] proceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary” generally would not justify the continued application of the stay, House Report at 343-44, it is equally true that to such proceedings the stay, in the first instance, applies.

Section 362 stays an action that requires joining the debtor as a defendant, even when the plaintiff seeks no direct relief from the debtor.

Garbe Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester · filed 1983-12-01

Section 362, however, broadly and plainly prohibits the commencement of any type of proceeding against the debtor (11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (Supp. 1979)), and this action, under the statute, could not have been commenced without joining the debtor as a party defendant. Plaintiff was unquestionably subject to the automatic stay and correctly delayed filing suit until it was lifted.

Section 362 stays an action and pending motion against a Chapter 13 debtor, while the action and motion may continue against a nondebtor co-defendant.

Hyster Credit Corp. v. O'NEILL · filed 1983-12-21

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, this action and plaintiffs Motion to Strike are now stayed as to defendant O'Neill. The action and the present motion continue as to defendant Rittenhouse.

A court may consider lifting a § 362(a) automatic stay on its own motion when the circumstances warrant it.

Furness v. Lilienfield · filed 1983-12-22(a)

In the light of the circumstances of this case, the Emergency Rule, and the precedent, this Court determines that it has the power to consider, sua sponte, lifting the automatic stay imposed by ... upon Furness v. Lilienfield, and will do so.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a creditor’s suit arising from a prepetition lease even when some alleged damages occurred after the bankruptcy filing.

Matter of O'Danny Boy, Inc. · filed 1983-12-27(a)(1)

The involvement of the § 362 stay stems not only from the contractual arrangement that placed the Debtor in occupancy of the premises but, also, from the attempted dominion over estate property without leave of court by blocking the gate to prohibit removal of the trucks and other equipment of the estate for use in the operation of the Debtor’s business. The nexus, therefore, sounds both in contract and in tort, encompassing all elements of the state court lawsuit. The only element that might by any analysis be considered as “postpetition” pertains only to the question of monetary damages properly allowable to either the lessor or the lessee. The lease as nexus arose prior to filing.

Section 362(a) bars a debtor from reimbursing its president for prepetition expenses after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Centerre Bank National Ass'n v. Continental Marine Corp. (In Re Continental Marine Corp.) · filed 1984-01-05(a)

However, Drennan’s admitted repayment, to himself, of the pre-petition expenses, does violate the stays of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and is absolutely contrary to all principles of bankruptcy administration.

Section 362(d)(1) does not allow relief from the automatic stay solely because a loan agreement treats the debtor’s bankruptcy filing as a default.

Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. John Gillis Perry, Jr., in Re John Gillis Perry, Jr., Debtor · filed 1984-03-16(d)(1)

This Court's enforcement of a default-upon-filing clause would clearly intrude upon that policy since any such default would deprive the debtor of the advantages of the Code's liquidation procedures; this result follows from the working of section 362(d)(1). Thus, a debtor could not file under Chapter 7 to invoke the automatic stay without assuring its demise due to his default under the contract. Accordingly, we align ourselves with the District Court and other Federal courts that have held default-upon-filing clauses unenforceable as a matter of law.

Section 362’s automatic stay benefits only the bankrupt party; codefendants cannot invoke it merely because that party filed for bankruptcy.

Climax Molybdenum Co. v. M/V SEATRAIN ANTWERP · filed 1984-03-23

The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 operate only for the benefit of the bankrupt party.

Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay when property is no longer property of the estate and the debtor has received a discharge.

In Re Cureton · filed 1984-04-04(c)

11 U.S.C. § 362(c) provides for termination of the automatic stay when the property is no longer property of the estate and after the discharge is granted or denied. The debtor chose to exempt a portion of the property in-question and the trustee abandoned the remaining portion. The property was therefore no longer property of the estate. Furthermore, the discharge was duly entered on April 2, 1984. By the express terms of § 362(c), the automatic stay expired.

Section 362(a) does not stay acts concerning property in which the debtor had no interest when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

United Penn Bank v. Dudley (In Re Dudley) · filed 1984-04-20(a)

We conclude, therefore, that the automatic stay never applied to Dudley’s property and did not prohibit the Bank from serving Dudley with the Writ of Possession to gain possession of the house.

The automatic stay protects a debtor’s limited equitable interest in possessing premises under a terminated lease, but that protection does not revive the lease.

Chart House, Inc. v. Maxwell (In Re Maxwell) · filed 1984-05-02

As a debtor in possession, under a terminated lease which left it with only a tenancy at sufferance, Maxwell held this limited equitable interest which was protected by the automatic stay. ... The use of the automatic stay to protect the limited interest of the tenant in possession has absolutely no bearing on the continued viability of the lease.

Section 362(a) does not stay a debtor’s rejection of a lease merely because another debtor holds a secured interest in that lease.

In Re Hawaii Dimensions, Inc. · filed 1984-06-01(a)

The provisions of § 362(a) are specific in detailing the actions stayed by a bankruptcy filing; these sections do not include the rejection of a lease in which another debtor (Commercial) holds a secured interest.

Section 362 bars a creditor from enforcing an option against a debtor in possession during bankruptcy when the creditor has shown no cause for relief from the automatic stay.

Berge v. Value Enterprises, Ltd. (In re Berge) · filed 1984-06-25(a)

Since VEL has failed to demonstrate any cause for relief from the stay, any further attempt by VEL to enforce the option would violate 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a judgment creditor’s effort to recover from a state recovery fund when payment would give the fund a reimbursement claim against the debtor, even if the creditor disclaims further recovery from the debtor.

Barlow v. Phillips (In Re Phillips) · filed 1984-06-27(a)(1)

Barlow and Hubbard have stipulated that no further claim would be asserted against the debtor. This, however, does not mean the claim is one that is not against the debtor. Relief from stay is still necessary in order to make a recovery from the Fund. Once payment is made, the Real Estate Commission will have a right of reimbursement from the debtor. 1973 C.R.S. § 12-61-305. This adversely affects the debtor’s interests.

Section 362 stays a debtor’s appeal from a judgment on a counterclaim against the debtor, even when the debtor filed the original action; the substance of the action controls over party labels.

Kessel v. Peterson · filed 1984-06-28(a)

This is clearly an action against the debtor at the initial proceeding and is consequently stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. With all due respect to the bankruptcy court, we believe the court mistakenly concluded that the action was not one against the debtor simply because Kessel was labeled “plaintiff” in the initial proceeding. Kessel was essentially a defendant in the counterclaim, on which Petersons prevailed. When the debtor is a defendant, the fact that the debtor wants to appeal is irrelevant. The action is stayed unless the bankruptcy court grants relief.

Section 362(a)(2) stays enforcement of a prepetition eviction judgment against a debtor's equitable possessory interest, and the stay may continue while the debtor pursues state court relief and pays current rent.

In Re Onio's Italian Restaurant Corp. · filed 1984-09-21(a)(2)

Section 362(a)(2) of the Code stays enforcement of pre-petition judgments against property of the estate. ... Similarly, the debtor’s bare possessory interest in the premises without legal right is a residual interest which the debtor-in-possession may utilize as part of the estate to effectuate the reorganization. ... Good cause exists for the bankruptcy court to continue the automatic stay to allow the debtor-in-possession to pursue its legal remedies under state law.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an action against a debtor upon its bankruptcy filing, but does not stay claims against nonbankrupt co-defendants.

Cornick v. Hi Grade Cleaners, Inc. · filed 1984-10-03(a)(1)

It is clear that under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the petition operates as a stay of this action against SDC. ... Such a stay, however, does not apply to the claims against SDC’s nonbankrupt co-defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a pending state court action against a debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and bars entry of a special judgment in that action.

Irving Levitt Co. v. Sudbury Management Associates, Inc. · filed 1984-11-28(a)(1)

The fact that the judgment involved was “special” under G. L. c. 235, § 24, makes no difference; the automatic stay forbade its making and entry.

Section 362(a) does not require a creditor to obtain stay relief before filing a counterclaim against the debtor in an action pending in the bankruptcy court where the petition was filed.

American Spinning Mills, Inc. v. Kubicek (In Re American Spinning Mills, Inc.) · filed 1984-10-15(a)

Since the case at bench was removed from state court to this court, a creditor may file a counterclaim here against the debtor without requesting relief from the automatic stay, and thus the debtor’s objection on this basis is without merit.

Section 362(a) bars a landlord from continuing to refuse a debtor possession of premises after bankruptcy filing when the debtor retained an interest in those premises.

Morales v. Housing Authority of the City of Allentown (In Re Morales) · filed 1985-01-18(a)

Therefore, HACA’s continuing refusal to allow the debtor to regain possession of the subject premises (or of comparable premises administered by HACA) following her bankruptcy filing would constitute a violation of the automatic stay of § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay an appeal filed by the debtor, but it stays trial court proceedings against the debtor on remand.

Knights of Columbus Federal Credit Union v. Salisbury · filed 1985-01-22(a)(1)

We agree with the Appeals Court of Massachusetts that an appeal filed by the debtor is not a judicial proceeding against the debtor and, therefore, the petition in bankruptcy does not stay the present appeal. ... On remand, the judicial proceeding will be an action against the debtor and consequently the proceedings will be stayed.

Section 362(a) stays actions against the debtor but does not bar the debtor from prosecuting its own pending action in another court.

In Re Convention Masters, Inc. · filed 1985-02-08(a)

The language of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 extend only to actions “against the debtor.”

Section 362(a) does not stay a landlord from recovering possession under a lease terminated before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

In Re Scarsdale Tires Inc. · filed 1985-03-18(a)

It is settled law that a lease or license that was terminated before the filing of a bankruptcy petition is neither affected by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) nor may it be assumed by the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 365.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay proceedings on a debtor’s third-party claim, even when that claim was brought in a lawsuit originally filed against the debtor.

Jefferson Ward Stores, Inc. v. Doody Co. · filed 1985-03-20(a)(1)

Because Doody’s third-party complaint and the motions filed in connection with it are not proceedings against the debtor, the automatic stay did not apply to the order denying Doody’s 54(b) motion and the order was not void under § 362.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a suit for contribution or indemnity based on the debtor’s prepetition conduct even if the cause of action matures after the bankruptcy petition.

Baldwin-United Corp. v. Named (In Re Baldwin-United Corp.) · filed 1985-04-10(a)(1)

Thus, while the third-party cause of action of the accounting firm in Frenville matured post-petition, the firm nonetheless had a prepetition claim in the form of an unmatured right to payment arising from debtor’s alleged prepetition misconduct. Because it was attempting “to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title” under § 362(a)(1), the Third Circuit’s holding cannot withstand scrutiny.

Section 362(a) automatically stays state court proceedings against a debtor when a bankruptcy petition is filed.

List v. St. Petersburg Hotel Ass'n · filed 1985-04-12(a)

The filing of the petition in bankruptcy automatically stayed proceedings in state court against Bayfront Concourse.

Section 362 does not stay dismissal of a crossclaim brought by a debtor, because the automatic stay applies to proceedings against the debtor.

Trans Caribbean Lines, Inc. v. Tracor Marine, Inc. · filed 1985-05-08

If prosecution of a counterclaim (or a crossclaim) is not barred by Section 362, then dismissal of that counterclaim (or crossclaim) cannot be prohibited by that statute.

Section 362 does not stay an interpleader action merely because one claimant has filed for bankruptcy.

Price & Pierce International Inc. v. Spicers International Paper Sales, Inc. · filed 1985-05-20

Nonetheless, the right to pursue an interpleader action is not affected by the fact that one of the claimants has filed a petition in bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) does not automatically stay National Mediation Board representation proceedings concerning a debtor airline because those proceedings are not against the debtor.

National Mediation Board v. Continental Airlines Corp. (In Re Continental Airlines Corp.) · filed 1985-05-31(a)(1)

But given Continental’s lack of any legitimate interest in this representation proceeding, it would unduly strain the reach of the automatic stay to characterize this proceeding as being “against” Continental for § 362(a)(1) purposes. This Court therefore concludes that this NMB proceeding falls outside the implicit limits circumscribing the automatic stay’s scope.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay counterclaims arising after the petition in response to an action brought by the trustee.

In Re Bell & Beckwith · filed 1985-06-04(a)(1)

Since the Trustee’s action must necessarily have been filed subsequent to the initiation of liquidation proceedings, the filing of these particular counterclaims was not a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays nonjudicial proceedings against a debtor, including an airline scheduling committee’s reallocation of the debtor’s airport slots.

Matter of American Cent. Airlines, Inc. · filed 1985-08-07(a)(1)

Although the procedures employed by the Defendants to reallocate the Debtor’s O’Hare slots are non-judicial in nature, the result of the procedures will be to deprive the Debtor of access to O’Hare. As such, the Defendants’ actions in reallocating the Debtor’s slots constituted a proceeding against the Debtor in contravention of Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362 stays the action against a debtor but permits it to proceed against a nondebtor defendant when the debtor is not an indispensable party.

Wicks v. O'Connell · filed 1985-08-07

In this circumstance, O’Connell was not an indispensable party and, under 11 USC § 362 (1983), the case could proceed against Fawcett alone.

Section 362 prevents a creditor from continuing a prepetition action to obtain a personal judgment against the debtor after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Savidge · filed 1986-01-31(a)(1)

ITT was prevented by the automatic stay provisions of Section 362 from proceeding to judgment in the Superior Court action against Savidge personally after he filed for bankruptcy.

Section 362(a) stays state court actions involving the bankruptcy estate.

Klenske v. Goo · filed 1986-02-04(a)

Yamamoto's contention that our jurisdiction is preempted by the state court proceeding is meritless. Federal bankruptcy proceedings stay state court actions involving the bankrupt estate.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a landlord from terminating a prime lease to recapture premises in which a debtor has a sublease or possessory interest, even when the landlord serves termination notices on the nondebtor prime tenant.

48th Street Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Center, Inc. (In Re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc.) · filed 1986-05-28(a)(3)

That the landlord served the notices on ISH, rather than 48th Street, does not insulate the landlord. Indisputably, the landlord’s actions were intended to obtain for it by indirection that which it recognized it could not obtain directly — recapture of the premises in which 48th Street had an interest. But that effort cannot be allowed to succeed, for section 362(a)(3) stays not only acts to obtain “property of the estate” but acts to obtain “property from the estate” and the attempt to wrest possession of property away from a debtor without the imprimatur of the bankruptcy court is therefore proscribed.

Section 362 protects a debtor’s interest in an unexpired residential lease that remains assumable after bankruptcy.

Dellway Villa Apartments v. Goodloe (In Re Goodloe) · filed 1986-07-15

Her interest is protected by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 ed., Supp. II 1984).

Section 362 stays a state court from setting aside a judgment against a debtor while the debtor’s bankruptcy is pending.

Hirschkop & Associates v. Clay · filed 1986-08-29(a)(1)

The Court is of the opinion that the automatic stay provisions referred to above prevented this Court from exercising its jurisdiction to set aside the judgment against Mr. Clay.

Section 362(a) continues to stay a landlord’s eviction efforts after a nonresidential lease is deemed rejected under § 365(d)(4).

In Re Adams · filed 1986-10-08(a)

We have already expressed our view that § 365(d)(4) does not supersede § 362(a) of the Code.

An automatic stay may halt a pending proceeding involving the debtor, but it does not divest the court hearing that proceeding of jurisdiction.

Fraidin v. Stutz · filed 1986-10-10(a)

Although a stay may halt other judicial proceedings involving the bankrupt, it does not divest the court wherein those proceedings are pending of jurisdiction.

Section 362(a) stays court proceedings but does not deprive a state court of jurisdiction over the matter.

Shingler v. Coastal Plain Production Credit Ass'n · filed 1986-10-14(a)

“[I]t is well-settled that the automatic stay of [11 USC] section 362 acts as a stay of court proceedings but does not deprive the state court of jurisdiction over the matter.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from enforcing a bankruptcy default clause while the bankruptcy case is open.

In Re Winters · filed 1986-10-27(a)

I find that the bankruptcy default clause is unenforceable and that any action to enforce the provision would violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 while the bankruptcy is open and would violate the statutory injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) after the bankruptcy is closed.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of a prebankruptcy action against the debtor, including the debtor’s attempt to obtain relief from a prebankruptcy default judgment, until relief from the stay is obtained.

Hirschkop & Associates, P.C. v. Clay · filed 1987-01-29(a)(1)

Since the Court has interpreted the Automatic Stay provisions to have stayed the running of the twenty-one days contained in Rule 1:1 of the Rules of Court, with regard to the finality of orders, Clay was free to seek relief in the Bankruptcy Court from the Stay for purposes of seeking relief from the default judgment. This was true from June 6, 1986, up to and including the time that the nunc pro tunc order was entered by the Court relieving the Defendant Cajun King of the default judgment. Clay, for whatever reason, did not seek relief from the Stay nor any relief from the Bankruptcy Court as to the default judgment.

Section 362 stays a pending action against a debtor upon a bankruptcy filing rather than requiring dismissal of the action.

Central Trust Co. v. B & L LEASING · filed 1987-08-21

Market Meats’ petition for bankruptcy operates as a stay of plaintiff’s action against Market Meats, not a dismissal.

Section 362(a) requires a court to stay proceedings covered by the automatic stay after a party files a bankruptcy petition.

Caudle v. Betts · filed 1987-09-09(a)

Because we have received a copy of an order of the bankruptcy court indicating that one of the parties herein has filed a petition in bankruptcy, however, the court of appeal is instructed that upon receiving this case on remand it shall comply with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by staying any proceedings provided for therein.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a counterclaim that arose after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

Fitzgerald v. Critchfield · filed 1987-10-08(a)(1)

By its terms, the automatic stay applied to actions that could have been brought or to claims that arose prior to the filing of Fitgerald’s petition. In the case before us, there is no evidence or contention that appellant’s counterclaim arose prior to Fitzgerald’s petition.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a non-suit against the debtor because a non-suit terminates the action rather than commencing or continuing it.

Orion Investments, Inc. v. Dunaway and Associates, Inc. · filed 1988-11-10(a)(1)

The automatic stay is violated by “the commencement or continuation” of a suit against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(1). A non-suit is a termination of a case and does not violate the terms of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the filing of a state court cross-complaint against a debtor during the bankruptcy case.

Sansone v. Walsworth (In Re Sansone) · filed 1989-05-15(a)(1)

When Walsworth and Sigler filed their state court cross-complaints they commenced judicial proceedings against San-sone, who at the time was protected by the automatic stay. The filing of the cross-complaints were violations of § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) stays an arbitration panel’s postpetition deliberations in a proceeding begun against the debtor before bankruptcy, and an award resulting from those deliberations is void.

In Re KNIGHTSBRIDGE DEVELOPMENT CO. INC. · filed 1989-09-01(a)(1)

According to the plain sense of Sec. 362(a)(1) and case law that condones only rote post-petition activity, the bankruptcy court ought to have declared the arbitration award void as the product of a continuing pre-petition proceeding.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a pending arbitration against the debtor when the panel continues deliberating after the bankruptcy petition; only clerical recording of an award already decided before the petition may proceed.

Savers Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. McCarthy Construction Co. (In re Knightsbridge Development Co.) · filed 1989-09-01(a)(1)

We may approve the award as valid under the stay only if the panel decided it in word and deed before January 5, 1987, leaving for post-petition achievement only the clerical act of recording the award.

Section 362 stays proceedings against a Chapter 11 debtor in any court until the stay is lifted.

VMS/PCA Ltd. Partnership v. PCA Partners Ltd. Partnership · filed 1989-10-05

Thus, under the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362, VMS may not proceed against PCA in this or any other court until the stay is lifted.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit procedural notices of acceleration under an indenture when they neither seek debtor property nor demand payment from the debtor.

First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc. (In Re Prime Motor Inns, Inc.) · filed 1991-07-30(a)

The notices of acceleration sent by the Indenture Trustee were not intended to obtain property of Prime or to collect payment from Prime. They were a procedural device under the indenture, not required by the letter of credit contracts, and do not rise to a level that violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an attempt to terminate a debtor’s contract to obtain property of the bankruptcy estate, and the attempted termination is void.

Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp. · filed 1992-04-21(a)(3)

First, contract rights existing under the 1988 Agreement constituted property of Majestic’s bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, Sebro’s attempt to terminate the Agreement during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was an attempt to obtain property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay provision of § 362 and was “void and without effect.”

Section 362(a) stays a postpetition state court action against a debtor unless the plaintiff obtains relief from the stay.

International Fidelity Insurance v. Robb (In Re Robb) · filed 1992-05-06(a)

This state court action violated the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) because the plaintiff never obtained from this court an order for relief from the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a prepetition action against a debtor seeking an injunction even when the challenged conduct continues after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation · filed 1992-05-28(a)(1)

Nothing in § 362(a)(1) suggests any difference between legal and equitable relief. ... And the continuation during bankruptcy of conduct (such as the sale of catheters) begun beforehand is most certainly one in which an action “was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the ease under this title”.

Section 362(a)(1) stays a petition to fix fair market value for a deficiency judgment when the petition continues a foreclosure proceeding begun before bankruptcy.

Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City v. Gold · filed 1995-01-05(a)(1)

Accordingly, we find that the petition to fix fair market value constituted a continuation of the judicial proceeding against the Golds, namely the foreclosure proceeding, which was commenced before they filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, the petition to fix fair market value was stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362 supports dismissing without prejudice a claim or cross-claim against a defendant whose Chapter 11 bankruptcy is pending.

Tucker Leasing Capital Corp. v. Farber · filed 1995-04-17

In its order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the Court also dismissed this action without prejudice against the defendant Marin Medical in accordance with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. At the time, Marin Medical’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy was pending in the Northern District of California. As a result of the dismissal of the action against Marin Medical, the defendants’ cross-claim against Marin Medical should also have been dismissed without prejudice, on the same ground.

Section 362(a)(3) prevents a party from unilaterally terminating an executory contract that is property of the estate without relief from the stay.

In Re Redpath Computer Services, Inc. · filed 1995-05-15(a)(3)

The attempted termination was just that: a termination, not merely exercise of a right under the contract to use other suppliers. As such, there was a stay violation.

Section 362(a) stays state court litigation concerning jointly held property after a bankruptcy petition is filed until the bankruptcy court lifts the stay.

Bogart v. Bogart · filed 1995-11-28(a)

The filing of her petition mandated that no state court litigation concerning the parties' jointly held property could proceed without the bankruptcy court lifting its automatic stay.

Section 362(a) protects a debtor’s enforceable rights under an employment contract during reorganization and requires an entity seeking to end or act adversely to those rights to obtain relief from the stay.

Hutchins v. Fordyce Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Hutchins) · filed 1997-09-16(a)

If a debtor seeking reorganization holds a contract with particular, enforceable rights, the debtor and the rights under the contract are protected by the automatic stay. An entity seeking release from that contract or otherwise taking action adverse to that contract is required to seek relief from the automatic stay.

The automatic stay suspends pending proceedings against a debtor but does not dismiss the debtor as a party.

SUTTON WOODWORKING MACH. CO., INC. v. Mereen-Johnson MacH. Co. · filed 2004-07-29(a)(1)

The automatic stay triggered by Group Seven’s Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy is not tantamount to a dismissal of Group Seven from the case, and merely suspends the proceedings pending against Group Seven.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a foreign declaratory judgment action against a debtor concerning prepetition conduct that could have been commenced before bankruptcy, even if characterized as purely defensive.

In Re Peregrine Systems, Inc. · filed 2004-09-08(a)(1)

The German Action was clearly one that arose in connection with prepetition conduct alleged by Debtors against AA WPG. It is barred by the stay as an “action or proceeding against the debtor that ... could have been commenced” prepetition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). ... As such, AA WPG’s German Action was an action against the Debtors in violation of the stay, as the theory of relief is styled with respect to prepetition events that were known to the parties.

Section 362 imposes an automatic stay prohibiting the commencement or continuation of judicial actions or proceedings against a debtor.

Dale Sue Jones and Stanley Ray Jones v. Ted Scott, M.D. · filed 2004-12-03(a)(1)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay is imposed prohibiting the commencement or continuation of any judicial actions or proceedings against a debtor.

Section 362 stays termination of an executory contract under an ipso facto clause and requires the nondebtor party to obtain relief from the stay before exercising a termination right permitted by § 365(e)(2)(A).

Bonneville Power Administration v. Mirant Corp. · filed 2006-02-13(a)(3), (d)

Given that the actual test applies based upon the plain language of § 365(e)(2)(A), we next conclude that the automatic stay must precede any enforcement of an ipso facto clause ultimately permitted by a bankruptcy court under § 365(e)(2)(A).

Section 362(a)(6) does not bar a nondebtor party from withholding performance under an executory contract when the debtor’s prepetition breach excuses that performance.

In Re Lucre, Inc. · filed 2006-03-20(a)(6)

SBC’s unwillingness to perform on an agreement for which its failure to perform is excused does not violate the automatic stay nor does it impair Lucre’s right as debtor-in-possession to avail itself of Section 365’s curative powers.

Section 362(a) prohibits a nondebtor's affirmative postpetition act to terminate a partnership agreement that was not effectively terminated before the petition.

In Re St. Casimir Development Corp. · filed 2007-01-11(a)

Because the final removal letter constitutes “an affirmative act of the non-debtor party,” which is prohibited by the automatic stay, the Partnership Agreement remains executory.

The automatic stay protects a debtor’s equitable interests in a month-to-month nonresidential lease, structures built on the leased land, and sublease rents despite the lessor’s postpetition termination notice.

Vidal v. Alvarado · filed 2007-10-26(a)(3), (b)(10)

Neither Mrs. Vidal nor Appellant moved the Bankruptcy Court to lift the stay before seeking to evict the Debtors. ... Here, the Debtors have an equitable interest in the lease agreement for the lot of land, in the structures built and in the rents payments they received for renting the structures built. In light of the above, the court holds that the Bankruptcy Court did not err as a matter of law when it considered that Appellant was subject to the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits interference with a debtor’s rights under an executory contract by refusing performance, and § 362(a)(6) prohibits conditioning access to contractual benefits on payment of prepetition debts.

Broadstripe, LLC v. National Cable Television Cooperative, Inc. (In Re Broadstripe, Inc.) · filed 2009-03-09(a)(3), (a)(6)

By refusing to perform its obligations under the Member Agreement, NCTC is interfering with Broadstripe’s property rights under the Member Agreement and acting in violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). ... NCTC’s conduct in attempting to collect payment on all outstanding prepetition invoices as a precondition to allowing Broadstripe access to other Master Agreements further violates § 362(a)(6) of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) protects an estate’s postpetition leasehold interest, so terminating the lease for nonpayment of rent requires relief from the automatic stay.

Jahn v. Bacon (In re East Tech Co.) · filed 2015-03-26(a)(3)

In this case, the Debtor negotiated for the right to possess the tenancy with the landlord’s support and full disclosure to the landlord that it was in bankruptcy. As such, the lease was property of the estate and termination for nonpayment of rent required relief from the stay.

Section 362 generally bars amendments to preexisting contracts during a pending bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court may allow an amendment when the debtor shows supporting circumstances.

Angle, R. v. Smith, A. · filed 2017-05-05(a)(5)

While it is a general rule that amendments to pre-existing contracts made during a pending bankruptcy violate the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(S), the bankruptcy court has the discretion to effectuate an amendment to a contract where a debtor proves that circumstances support that decision. See Graziani v. Randolph, 887 A.2d 1244, 1246-(Pa. Super. 2005). However, neither of the Smiths testified that they sought the required approval from the bankruptcy court.

Section 362's automatic stay suspends a dismissal as to a debtor even when the same dismissal remains effective as to a nondebtor codefendant.

Robison v. Canterbury Village · filed 1988-06-03

Robison now complains on appeal that it is unfair that the order of dismissal "applicable to two defendants equally is suspended as to one." Appellants' Brief at 8. However, that is the inevitable result of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor named as a defendant but does not extend to claims against its nondebtor codefendants.

FLECTAT, LTD. v. 4747 Montgomery Road Partners · filed 2021-08-27(a)(1)

Based on the record, the undersigned finds the automatic stay provision to apply to R Investments. Should Flectat wish to proceed against that Defendant in this case, it first must seek relief from the stay in bankruptcy court. However, the stay does not apply to the other (solvent) Defendants named in this case.

Section 362(a)(1) generally protects a Chapter 7 debtor, not its nonfiling co-defendants.

Zilkha Biomass Selma LLC · filed 2021-09-14(a)(1)

This Court believes such language is sufficiently clear to conclude that the automatic stay is intended to protect the debtor and not non-filing co-defendants in Chapter 7 proceedings.

Section 362 generally stays actions against a bankruptcy debtor but does not extend the automatic stay to the debtor’s codefendants unless a narrow exception applies.

Parker v. Ramana · filed 2021-04-01

While 11 U.S.C. § 362 extends the automatic-stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the bankruptcy “debtor,” the rule followed in the Tenth Circuit and by the majority of other circuits is that the stay provision does not extend to the debtor’s codefendants. See Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1984). A narrow exception to the rule has been recognized, see Okla. Federated Gold & Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 141 (10th Cir. 1994), but the record before the Court does not indicate that Dr. Ramana’s codefendants Naadi Healthcare, LLC (“Naadi”) and Pinnacle Interventional and Vascular Care, LLC (“Pinnacle”) would fall within that exception.

Section 362(a)(1) does not extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor co-buyer independently liable on the debt.

Ford Motor Credit Company v. McCleod · filed 2021-02-17(a)(1)

But we find nothing unusual about the agreement McLeod signed as a “co-buyer” that would permit him as a guarantor of Peterson’s loan to receive the statutory protection of section 362.

Section 362(a)(1) does not extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor codefendant whose liability rests on its own breach of duty.

Coscarelli v. Esquared Hospitality LLC · filed 2021-01-28(a)(1)

Thus, ESquared’s liability “rests upon [its] own breach of a duty,” and it would not be appropriate to stay this action against ESquared in its entirety pending the resolution of BCHG’s bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 362 permits a stay against nonbankrupt codefendants when a judgment against them would effectively be a judgment against the debtor.

Hsieh v. Apache Deepwater, LLC · filed 2021-02-02

Absent any objection from Defendants, the Court concludes that there is no risk that a judgment against the non-bankrupt Defendants will, in effect, be a judgment or finding against ENSCO, and that therefore the stay should be lifted as to all Defendants except ENSCO.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a creditor’s personal alter-ego suit against a nondebtor corporate insider.

Brown v. Knowles · filed 2013-08-16(a)(1)

Neither the automatic stay provision of § 362(a)(1) nor the discharge injunction provision of § 354 prevent a creditor’s personal alter-ego suit from proceeding outside of bankruptcy.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against a debtor, but generally does not extend to nondebtor codefendants absent unusual circumstances.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Olympia Mortgage Corp. · filed 2013-06-21(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) operates to stay prosecution of or recovery in connection with claims asserted against a debtor only, and, absent unusual circumstances, its protections are generally not extended to non-debtor co-defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay independent claims against a non-debtor based on duties owed to third parties.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC · filed 2013-04-15(a)(1)

Because the NYAG’s and Receiver’s actions are independent claims against a non-debtor, the Trustee cannot seek application of the automatic stay under Section 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays judicial proceedings against a debtor upon a bankruptcy filing, but does not extend that protection to non-debtor third parties or co-defendants.

Villafañe-Colon v. B Open Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2013-03-26(a)(1)

The Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of judicial proceedings against debtors when they seek bankruptcy protection, but that protection does not extend to non-debtor third parties or co-defendants.

Section 362(a)(6) does not stay independent claims against a nondebtor merely because those claims and a trustee’s claim compete for the nondebtor’s limited assets.

Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (In re Madoff) · filed 2013-03-20(a)(6)

Such an expansive interpretation of § 362 would obliterate the requirement that stayed actions bear some relation to the “debtor” and would enable the Trustee to subjugate independent legal claims of parties unrelated to the bankruptcy estate merely because both parties seek recovery from the same limited pool of funds. The Trustee has cited no applicable authority supporting this novel proposition and therefore the Court finds that the Proposed Settlement does not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but proceedings against solvent codefendants may continue without a formal order severing, staying, or dismissing the debtor.

Bradberry v. Carrier Corp. · filed 2011-12-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not violate the automatic-stay provision of § 362 by letting the case proceed on the solvent defendants’ summary-judgment motions without first entering a formal order severing and staying the action as to Leslie Controls or dismissing Leslie Controls from the case.

Section 362 does not prevent an attorney from seeking state court relief for individuals who are not debtors in the bankruptcy case.

In Re Moohaven Dairy LLC · filed 2011-11-28

Since the automatic stay did not prohibit Mr. Cubitt from attempting to obtain relief for these individuals in the Sanilac County Circuit Court, Bank of America had to respond to the Motion to Set Aside Judgment regardless of Mr. Cu- ... bitt’s action that appeared to have been taken on behalf of the Debtor.

Section 362 does not stay a contempt award against a debtor’s attorney payable from the attorney’s personal assets when the debtor’s assets are not jeopardized.

In Re Benson · filed 2011-09-06(a)(3)

The assets of the debtors had already been fully distributed from Benson's escrow account, and as in Fox Valley, Benson is seeking application of the automatic stay to protect his own personal assets, not those of the debtors.

Section 362(a) generally does not stay proceedings against a nondebtor codefendant, absent exceptional circumstances.

Cross v. Cooper · filed 2011-07-11(a)

Generally, however, the automatic stay of judicial proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy does not apply to nondebtor codefendants.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the bankruptcy debtor, but does not extend the stay to nonbankrupt codefendants.

Chang v. Buffington · filed 2011-07-13(a)(1)

It is well established that the automatic stay is limited to proceedings against debtors and does not apply to non-bankrupt codefendants.

Section 362(a) does not supply the authority to enjoin proceedings against nondebtors; that authority comes from Section 105.

Union Trust Philadelphia, LLC v. Singer Equipment Co. (Union Trust Philadelphia, LLC) · filed 2011-06-30(a)

Contrary to the Debtor’s characterization, this power does not stem from and is independent of Section 362 of the Code.

Section 362(a)(3) extends the automatic stay to an action against a non-debtor when the action would inevitably have an adverse impact on property of the bankruptcy estate.

National Bank of Arkansas v. Panther Mountain Land Devel. · filed 2011-04-15(a)(3)

Based on that finding, we hold that the Court properly held that this case presents the type of “unusual circumstances” which justify the application of § 362(a)(3) to extend the automatic stay to a non-debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) does not extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor corporate codefendant when continuing the action will not hamper the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.

Uto v. Job Site Services, Inc. · filed 2011-02-09(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code will not be applied to the non-debtor corporate defendant, Job Site Services, Inc., and this action will proceed with respect to that entity on the schedule previously set by the Court.

Section 362(a) stays an action against a bankruptcy debtor but does not automatically stay the action against nondebtor codefendants.

Hounddog Productions, L.L.C. v. Empire Film Group, Inc. · filed 2011-03-02(a)

The fact that Bornstein has filed for bankruptcy does not stay Plaintiffs’ case against the other defendants, as case law makes clear.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not extend to proceedings against a nondebtor merely because the nondebtor is closely connected to the debtor.

State Ex Rel. Udall v. Wimberly · filed 1994-08-30(a)(3), (a)(4)

The automatic stay statute does not control actions brought against non-debtor entities, even where there is a close nexus between those non-debtors and their bankruptcy affiliates.

Section 362 protects a debtor’s possessory interest in property but does not bar foreclosure of a nondebtor owner’s title when the debtor lacks an ownership interest.

In Re Walker · filed 1994-08-11(a)

However, we conclude that, since the Debtor did not have, and has no prospect of obtaining, any title interest in the Property at present, the Sheriffs sale of the Property did not violate the automatic stay. The owner of the Property is, and has at all relevant times been, the Debtor’s mother, who has been for some time a debtor in her own case. The Debtor’s possessory and alleged leasehold interest in the Property, while itself protected by the stay, did not preclude the sale of his mother’s interest at the sale.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a case from proceeding against a nondebtor codefendant unless the bankruptcy court stays those proceedings as to that codefendant.

Nordictrack, Inc. v. Consumer Direct, Inc. · filed 1994-07-05

In view of the filing of a Chapter 11 Petition by the Defendant Consumer Direct, Inc. ("CDI"), and the resultant potentiality that the resolution of the issues before the Court had been mooted, our determination of the issues was deferred pending additional argument and briefing by the parties on the impact of the automatic stay provisions of Title 11 U.S.C. § 362. The issue has now been fully briefed, and we are satisfied that, barring the Bankruptcy Court's grant of CDI's Motion to stay these proceedings as to the Defendant Richard A. Suarez, this matter should proceed to the previously established trial date of July 19, 1994.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay claims against a nondebtor codefendant when those claims are separate and independent from the claims against the debtor.

Oklahoma Federated Gold and Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett · filed 1994-05-16(a)(1)

Mr. Blodgett does not fit into this narrow exception because Oklahoma Federated’s claims against Mr. Blodgett are separate and independent from the claims asserted against T.G. Morgan which were stayed following its petition in bankruptcy. Section 362(a)(1) does not operate to stay Oklahoma Federated’s claims against Mr. Blodgett.

Section 362(a)(3) does not stay independent claims against a nondebtor when pursuing them does not obtain or exercise control over property of the debtor’s estate.

Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Bowen (In Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation) · filed 1994-03-14(a)(3)

In conclusion, we hold that the Equity Actions do not constitute acts to obtain or exercise control over the property of the Debtor’s estate and, therefore, we hold that § 362(a)(3) does not apply to stay the Equity Actions.

Section 362(a)(1) stays creditors’ actions against third parties to collect claims against the debtor, including claims to recover transferred assets, even when the claims are not themselves property of the estate.

Keene Corp. v. Coleman (In Re Keene Corp.) · filed 1994-03-03(a)(1)

The commencement or continuation of any actions concerning these claims is barred by the automatic stay. Even if the claims are not, themselves, property of the estate, they represent attempts by creditors to collect claims against the debtor from third parties which the trustee is authorized to recover under his or her “strong arm” or avoiding powers. Any property recovered by the trustee would be property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3), and the commencement or continuation of creditor action is stayed by Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to a nondebtor codefendant merely because the debtor may have to indemnify it, where enforcement of that agreement is unconnected to the creditor’s claim against the codefendant.

Owen Healthcare, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hospital · filed 1993-09-30(a)

We conclude, however, that this situation does not present unusual circumstances which require an extension of the automatic stay to proceedings against Hampton. Whether or when Hampton may enforce the purported indemnity agreement has no connection to Owen’s case against Hampton.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay an action against a nondebtor when the debtor is not a party and estate property is not involved.

Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. The First National Bank · filed 1991-01-23(a)(1), (a)(3)

The court had to rely upon its broad equitable power under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]") as the source of its authority to issue the injunction, because LDP was not a party to the state action, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(1) (automatic stay of proceedings "against the debtor"), LDP's property also was not involved, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(3) (automatic stay of "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate"), and the injunction was expressly intended to continue in effect following conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, see 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(c) (automatic stay expires when case is closed, proceeding is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied).

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar entry of judgment against a separate nondebtor entity merely because the judgment rests on findings involving debtors protected by the automatic stay.

Ayres v. Red Cloud Mills, Ltd. · filed 1990-11-27(a)(1)

The judgment, although premised on findings against Red Cloud Limited and Red Cloud Mining, is limited to lessor Yuma Metals, the owner of the Mine against which plaintiffs held valid lien rights. We do not perceive how entry of judgment against Yuma Metals violated the automatic stay provision in effect as to Red Cloud Limited and Red Cloud Mining.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar proceedings against a nondebtor when no relief is sought against the debtor.

Polanco v. 21 Arden Realty Corp. · filed 1990-11-01

Since no relief is being sought against the debtor, there has been no violation of the automatic stay provision.

Section 362(a)(3) does not extend the automatic stay to a creditor’s suit against a debtor partnership’s general partners when a deficiency claim against them remains speculative.

Marley Orchards Income Fund I, Ltd. Partnership v. Walker (In Re Marley Orchards Income Fund I, Ltd. Partnership) · filed 1990-10-17(a)(3)

At present the Court is reluctant to anticipate this scenario and therefore determines the automatic stay does not extend to Walkers’ suit against the general partners.

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not automatically stay actions against the debtor’s individual guarantors.

Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Dube · filed 1990-09-12(a)

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor only and not co-debtors.

Section 362(a) does not protect nondebtors from litigation or discovery against them.

GEC Industries, Inc. v. Noma Industries, Ltd. (In re GEC Industries, Inc.) · filed 1990-07-09(a)

The § 362(a) provisions are not available nor do they inure to the benefit of non-debtors. Consequently, there has been no violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to a solvent nondebtor codefendant without evidence that litigation against the codefendant would affect the debtor’s reorganization.

CAE Industries Ltd. v. Aerospace Holdings Co. · filed 1990-05-15(a)

In the absence of evidence which demonstrates any impact upon the debtor’s reorganization effort, the stay cannot be extended to a solvent co-defendant, such as Bilzerian.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to Chapter 11 co-debtors or their property.

Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In Re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.) · filed 1990-05-09(a)

We hold that section 362(a) does not authorize stays to co-debtor’s and therefore, section 7.05 of the Plan, insofar as it applies to co-debtors, is not authorized by section 362(a).

Section 362 stays proceedings against an individual debtor but does not ordinarily stay proceedings against other defendants, including corporations of which the debtor is an officer or director.

United States Ex Rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. · filed 1990-04-11

Moreover, in applying section 362, courts do not disregard the distinction between the individual debtors and the non-debtor corporations of which they are officers or directors.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against the debtor but does not extend the stay to claims against non-bankrupt codefendants.

In Re Related Asbestos Cases · filed 1982-09-23(a)(1)

In light of the above authority, this court concludes that section 362 does not apply to claims against non-bankrupt codefendants.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay foreclosure of a codebtor's property merely because the sale reduces the value of the debtor's redemption right.

Harsh Investment Corp. v. Bialac (In Re Bialac) · filed 1982-10-01(a)(4)

That the potential value of the redemption right may have been reduced by the sale does not transmute the act of enforcing a lien against a third party’s property into an act covered by § 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a) does not stay products liability litigation against solvent co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor.

Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1982-10-05(a)

We nonetheless do not believe that Congress intended section 362(a) to extend to solvent co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor.

Section 362 does not stay actions against nondebtor co-obligors or guarantors or foreclosure of their property merely because the debtor is in bankruptcy.

Kash & Karry Wholesale, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina (In Re Kash & Karry Wholesale, Inc.) · filed 1982-11-23(a)

Section 362 provides no stay of actions against third parties and their property.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a contribution action against nonbankrupt co-guarantors of a debtor’s loan merely because the debtor is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Caspescha v. Plum · filed 1982-11-23(a)(1)

Plaintiffs’ action against defendants, as co-guarantors of a loan to Perkiomen, is not stayed because of Perkiomen’s involvement in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362 does not prevent a creditor from pursuing a nondebtor spouse for a family expense owed by that spouse, and the creditor is not in contempt of the automatic stay for doing so.

In re Stanton-Rieger · filed 1982-12-20

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Business Adjustment Service is not in contempt of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act or of any other sections of the Bankruptcy Code; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Business Adjustment Service is allowed to proceed in its case against Mark Rieger as set forth above.

Section 362(a) stays actions against a debtor's insurers based on the debtor's alleged liability when they interfere with estate property, but does not stay actions against supersedeas bonds that are not estate property.

Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group (In Re Johns-Manville Corp.) · filed 1983-01-26(a)

Pursuant to Section 362(a) of the Code, all persons and entities are stayed and enjoined from commencing or continuing any proceeding or action to obtain possession of or interfere with property of Manville's estates or property from Manville's estates and, accordingly, are stayed and enjoined from commencing or continuing any proceeding against Manville's insurers based on the alleged liability of Manville, its affiliates, officers, directors or employees, except with respect to supersedeas bonds such as those involved in the Hansen or Janssens cases, which are not property of Manville's estates, or as may otherwise be allowed by this Court.

Section 362(a)'s automatic stay applies only to the bankrupt debtor, not its solvent codefendants.

Margaret Austin, Etc. v. Unarco Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-03-30(a)

As an initial matter and because we expect that the issue will arise again in this circuit, we express our judgment that the Bankruptcy Court was correct in deciding that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) apply only to the bankrupt debtor.

Section 362 does not stay actions to perfect mechanic’s liens against property owners when the debtor is not a party and no longer possesses the property.

Lionel Corp. v. Lozier Store Fixtures, Inc. (In re Lionel Corp.) · filed 1983-04-19

For these reasons, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 must be held not to apply to Lozier’s actions in perfecting its mechanic’s liens against the owners of the California properties, where Lionel has not been made a party to the action and is no longer in possession of the real property in question.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays actions against the debtor, but does not extend that stay to the debtor’s co-defendants.

Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp. · filed 1983-05-24(a)(1)

At trail’s end we conclude that § 362 does not operate as an automatic stay of claims against the co-defendants of Johns-Manville and Unarco.

Section 362(a) does not stay tax-valuation proceedings concerning property owned by a nondebtor merely because the debtor holds a leasehold interest in it.

Spector Terminals, Inc. v. Board of Education · filed 1983-06-22(a)

Neither the proceeding instituted to object to the valuation of the property, nor the subsequent ruling, was contrary to Section 362, Title 11, U.S. Code, as appellant was not the fee owner. Appellant is the only party to whom the automatic stay in bankruptcy applies.

Section 362 does not stay an action against a corporate debtor’s president to pierce the corporate veil when the action affects neither the debtor nor its property.

Sioux City Foundry Co. v. Penrod (In re Dakotas' Farm Manufacturing Co.) · filed 1983-06-29

Under these narrow facts, it is clear that neither the debtor herein nor the debtor’s property is affected by the state court proceedings against Obert Penrod, Jr. Therefore, this Court finds that the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not prohibit the continuation of the action in state court by Sioux City Foundry Company against Obert Penrod, Jr.

Section 362(a) does not extend the automatic stay to solvent co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor merely because they share a legal or factual connection with the debtor.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit · filed 1983-07-01(a)

It is universally acknowledged that an automatic stay of proceeding accorded by Sec. 362 may not be invoked by entities such as sureties, guarantors, co-obligors, or others with a similar legal or factual nexus to the Chapter 11 debtor.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a Chapter 11 debtor, but does not extend the automatic stay to the debtor’s solvent co-defendants.

Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1983-07-01(a)

In the action sub judice, such a construction of Chapters 11 and 13 of the Code support the proposition that Congress did not envision or intend the automatic stay of proceedings to be available to solvent co-defendants of a Chapter 11 debtor.

Section 362(a) automatically stays actions against the debtor but does not extend the stay to the debtor’s individual codefendants.

In Re Anje Jewelry Co., Inc. · filed 1983-07-11(a)

The automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code apply only to the debtor, and cannot be construed to apply to its co-defendants as well.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not automatically stay proceedings against nondebtor codefendants.

Williford v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-08-12(a)(1)

In concluding that the remaining co-defendants cannot avail themselves of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), applicable to those defendants under the protection of the bankruptcy court, we need only examine the plain wording of the statute itself. It provides only for an automatic stay of any judicial proceeding “against the debtor.”

Section 362(a) does not stay a creditor’s suit against a nondebtor guarantor when a judgment against the guarantor would not bind the debtor or its estate.

Plessey Precision Metals, Inc. v. Metal Center, Inc. (In Re Metal Center, Inc.) · filed 1983-07-12(a)

Accordingly, I conclude that the debtor would not be bound by any judgment Plessey might obtain against Gardner in state court, and consequently, Gardner is not protected by the automatic stay.

Section 362 does not stay a suit against a corporate debtor’s officers and shareholders to reach their personal assets when the debtor is not a party and the suit does not seek estate property.

In Re Nashville Album Productions, Inc. · filed 1983-08-01(a)(1), (a)(3)

Section 362 only stays actions against the debtor or actions seeking to obtain property of the estate.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay claims against a Chapter 11 debtor’s co-defendants.

Ned Wedgeworth, Jr. v. Fibreboard Corporation · filed 1983-09-12(a)

At trail's end we conclude that Sec. 362 does not operate as an automatic stay of claims against the co-defendants of Johns-Manville and Unarco.

Section 362(a) does not stay a creditor’s action against a third-party garnishee for its own liability when the action reaches neither the debtor nor estate property.

United States v. Allen Brothers of Homer, Inc. · filed 1984-01-19(a)

Section 362 will only stay actions against the debtor, or property of the debtor’s estate. Clearly, the United States of America in this action is not proceeding against the debtor, but rather is proceeding against “some third party.” In addition, the United States cannot be said to be proceeding against “the property of the estate.”

Section 362(a) does not stay claims against cosigners and guarantors of a chapter 11 debtor’s debts.

Anniston Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. E.K.P., Inc. (In re E.K.P., Inc.) · filed 1984-03-02(a)

The Court having determined that there is no stay imposed by § 362(a) against the cosigners and guarantors of the chapter 11 debtor, the plaintiff’s motion for relief from the stay to pursue its claims against the cosigners and guarantors of the debtor’s debt may be dismissed.

Section 362(a)(1) does not automatically stay claims against a debtor’s solvent codefendants; any stay of those claims must rest on another basis.

Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp. · filed 1984-05-23(a)(1)

The case establishes beyond purview, we think, that these defendants cannot seek the benefit of the § 362 stay per se; rather, any stay must be based on either considerations such as Rule 19 or upon purely equitable considerations as determined by courts considering invocation of inherent power principles.

Section 362 does not stay a subcontractor’s action against a debtor contractor’s surety on a Miller Act bond when the bond is not property of the debtor’s estate.

Capitol-York Construction Corp. v. Lynnhaven Marine Construction, Inc. (In Re Capitol-York Construction Corp.) · filed 1984-09-24

A subcontractor’s action against a general contractor’s surety to recover under a Miller Act bond which was posted to protect materialmen for public works projects does not implicate Code § 362 because the bond is not property of the debtor’s estate.

Section 362 automatically stays an action against a debtor corporation, but does not require a stay against its purportedly solvent individual co-defendants.

Massachusetts State Carpenters Pension Fund v. Atlantic Diving Co. · filed 1984-10-12

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362 any action against the defendant Atlantic Diving Company, Inc. is stayed automatically. I find no reason in law or equity to stay the action against the purportedly solvent individual co-defendants.

Section 362’s automatic stay affects continuation of an action against the debtor, but does not stop that action against other defendants.

Jefferson State Bank v. Welch · filed 1984-11-07

Assuming that an order for discharge has been entered in bankruptcy, the automatic stay provided by 11 USC § 362 (see ORAP 12.25) affects only the continuation of the action against that debtor.

Section 362 stays proceedings against a bankruptcy debtor but does not extend the automatic stay to nonbankrupt codefendants in the same proceeding.

Moore v. Seabaugh · filed 1984-12-04(a)(1)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition stays legal proceedings against the debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. The plain language of Section 362 clearly and repeatedly refers to actions against the debtor. Nowhere does the statute imply that the stay applies to actions against non-bankrupts, as well as the bankrupts, in a single proceeding.

Section 362(a)(1) stays litigation against the debtor but does not protect solvent co-defendants from suit.

John N. Fortier and Linda M. Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, James A. Peterson, Peterson Properties, Inc. · filed 1984-12-17(a)(1)

Accordingly, we join the other circuit courts in concluding that 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays litigation only against the debtor, and affords no protection to solvent co-defendants.

Section 362 does not automatically stay an action against a third party that is not the bankrupt debtor.

St. Regis Paper Co. v. Quality Pipeline · filed 1985-04-24

We note that there was no need to obtain relief from the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). St. Regis' action against Quality was not an action against the bankrupt debtor Sunshine and therefore not subject to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not stay claims against nonbankrupt co-defendants.

Duffy v. Grogan Enerserv Corp. · filed 1985-09-26(a)

Section 362(a) by its terms stays proceedings only “against the debtor,” here DHMC. There is nothing in the statute which purports to stay claims against co-defendants of the debtor.

Section 362 does not stay an action against nondebtor individuals on their personal debt when the action seeks no relief against the debtor corporation or its property.

Bethea v. Kennedy · filed 1985-10-03

Under these facts, it is clear that neither the debtor corporation nor the debtor corporation’s property is affected by the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants. Therefore, we find the automatic stay provided by 11 USC § 362 does not prohibit this action.

Section 362(a) does not automatically stay actions against a debtor’s principals, guarantors, or co-defendants.

Philadelphia Gold Corp. v. Fauzio (In Re Philadelphia Gold Corp.) · filed 1985-12-12(a)

Actions against principals of the debtor, guarantors or co-defendants are not barred by the automatic stay of § 362(a).

Section 362 stays proceedings against a debtor but does not stay proceedings against the debtor’s surety.

Klimek v. Continental Insurance · filed 1985-12-04

We first note that, although a proceeding in a bankruptcy court stays other court proceedings against the bankrupt, it does not serve to enjoin a proceeding against a surety of the bankrupt.