11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(54)’s definition of “transfer” excludes setoffs, so recovery of a setoff is governed by § 553(b) rather than § 547.

Remillong v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Remillong) · filed 1991-05-15(54)

In re Balducci Oil Co., 33 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr.Colo.1983), explains that the definition of “transfer” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) excludes setoff and recovery of the setoff is governed by section 553(b), not § 547. ... By reason thereof, the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there has been no transfer under § 547.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include creating or replacing an escrow agreement and paying funds out of escrow.

Makoroff v. Allegheny Graphics, Inc. (In Re Allegheny Label Inc.) · filed 1991-06-28(54)

Defendants cannot dispute that the following transactions all qualify as transfers in connection with the debt owed to Roughen by debtor: (1) the creation of the first escrow agreement and the depositing of $50,000.00 with the escrow agent on March 30, 1990; (2) the creation of the second escrow agreement in May of 1990; and (3) the payment on August 14, 1990 of the sum of $32,411.61 by the escrow agent to Roughen.

Section 101(50)'s definition of transfer includes granting a security interest in the debtor’s property.

Security Services, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (In Re Security Services, Inc.) · filed 1991-09-13(50)

It is well established that the transfer of a security interest in the debtor’s property is a “transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” as that phrase is used in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include a judicial proceeding that fixes a lien on a debtor’s property.

Peterson v. Chas. Bender Co. (In Re Lifchitz) · filed 1991-09-17(50)

This definition of “transfer” has been held to include any judicial proceeding that fixes a lien upon property of the debtor. ... Thus, a “transfer” of an interest in Debtor’s real property took place within the meaning of Section 547(b) when and at the times Bender recorded his two memoranda of judgment with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds.

Section 101(54) defines “transfer” broadly enough to encompass a leveraged buyout involving a debtor’s property interests.

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc. · filed 1991-09-25(54)

The definitional section of the Act states that transfer means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54). This definitional language is sufficiently broad to encompass a leveraged buyout transaction that falls within its terms.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to encompass a leveraged buyout transaction.

Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications · filed 1991-10-28(54)

The definitional section of the Act states that transfer means "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). This definitional language is sufficiently broad to encompass a leveraged buyout transaction that falls within its terms.

Section 101’s broad definition of transfer does not encompass a reimbursement arrangement that leaves the debtor’s liability and the creditor’s claim unchanged.

Port Terminal Railroad v. Pettibone Corp. (In Re Pettibone Corp.) · filed 1991-10-31

While the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines what constitutes a transfer, ... the purpose behind this definition is to allow debtors to avoid circuitous arrangements which have the effect of enabling one creditor to gain an advantage over other creditors from the same class. ... This arrangement does not affect the Debtor’s liability to Gilliam or the PTRA’s status vis-a-vis the Debtor. Indeed, the PTRA is not a creditor of Pettibone or assignee of a creditor. Gilliam’s claim has not been assigned or transferred to the PTRA, and Rule 3001(e) is not applicable in this case.

Perfection of a security interest is a transfer under § 101(54).

Woodson v. City Finance Co. (In Re Holloway) · filed 1991-11-14(54)

The act of perfecting a security interest is a transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) treats the creation of a leasehold interest as a transfer of property.

Webber Lumber & Supply Co. v. Trucklease Corp. (In Re Webber Lumber & Supply Co.) · filed 1991-11-19(54)

Reference to “transfer” in the statute includes outright transfers as well as security transfers. ... The execution of this lease transferred to the Lessee an interest in the property consisting of the leasehold thereby created, so that with respect to the lease the Debtor is clothed with bona fide purchaser rights as well as judicial lien and judgment creditor rights.

Section 101(54) includes a check as a conditional transfer of funds.

Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co. · filed 1991-11-19(54)

A check is a “conditional” transfer of funds (the condition is the drawee’s acceptance). By postponing the “transfer” until final payment, Antweil dishonors the language of § 101(54).

Section 101(50) defines transfer to include forfeiture of a buyer’s equity interest under a real estate contract.

Veretto v. Boone Trust (In Re Veretto) · filed 1991-11-25(50)

To the extent that Wey and McConnell are in conflict, this Court adopts the holding of In re McConnell, and holds that a forfeiture of an equity interest under a real estate contract constitutes a transfer.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer includes garnishment liens.

Bleau v. First of America Bank-Central (In Re Arnold) · filed 1991-09-27(54)

Because of the Code’s expansive definition of the term “transfer,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), there can be little doubt, nor does the Bank dispute, that garnishment liens are within the scope of § 547(b).

Section 101(54) includes involuntary transfers in the definition of transfer for purposes of avoidable preferences under section 547(b).

In The Matter Of T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. · filed 1992-01-24(54)

Thus, Alaska's position is untenable, for the Bankruptcy Code expressly includes involuntary transfers in its definition of transfer for the purposes of all section 547(b) avoidable transfers.

Section 101(54) treats acts required to complete a transfer of title as part of the transfer, even when the tax sale occurred before the bankruptcy petition.

In The Matter Of Natchez Corporation Of West Virginia · filed 1992-01-28(54)

These two acts--filing the Report and causing the Notice to Redeem to issue--were clearly necessary to complete the transfer of title to the Property from Natchez to Lilly. Therefore, while the tax sale occurred prior to the filing of the Natchez petition, the statutorily mandated follow-up acts that perfected the transfer occurred subsequent to the petition date. The transfer was therefore "completed" post-petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) includes acts needed to complete a transfer of title after a bankruptcy petition, even when the tax sale occurred before the petition.

Lilly v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re Natchez Corp. of West Virginia) · filed 1992-01-28(54)

Therefore, while the tax sale occurred prior to the filing of the Natchez petition, the statutorily mandated follow-up acts that perfected the transfer occurred subsequent to the petition date. The transfer was therefore “completed” post-petition.

Section 101(50) treats the attachment of a lien on estate property as a transfer of property.

In the Matter of Martha Jo Pointer, Debtor. City of Farmers Branch and Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School Dist · filed 1992-02-11(50)

Attachment of a lien on property of the estate is clearly a “transfer” of property.

Section 101(54) treats an actual transfer of a debtor’s property as a transfer, even when the payment is described as a setoff.

Jarboe v. United States Small Business Administration (In Re Hancock) · filed 1992-03-09(54)

Where a transaction actually appears to be “somewhat different” from the general run of preferences, in that it involves a mere netting-out of counterclaims or reconciliation of accounts and not a transfer of money or property, then such transaction may be considered a “set-off” within the meaning of § 553 and subject to special treatment under § 553(b). Any other transaction should be recognized as a “transfer” under § 101(54) and subject to avoidance as provided by § 547.

Section 101(54) does not treat a note or guarantee as a transfer; each is an obligation.

Covey v. Commercial National Bank of Peoria · filed 1992-04-03(54)

Although a note or guarantee is not a “transfer” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), see Barnhill v. Johnson, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 118 L.Ed.2d 39 (1992) (check is not a transfer until paid), both note and guarantee are obligations.

For payment by ordinary check, a transfer under Section 101(54) occurs when the drawee bank honors the check.

Barnhill v. Johnson · filed 1992-03-25(54)

For the purposes of payment by ordinary check, therefore, a “transfer” as defined by § 101(54) occurs on the date of honor, and not before.

Section 101’s definition of transfer includes a separate transfer when a creditor completes the legal step required to enforce a previously perfected security interest.

Financial Center Associates of East Meadow, L.P. v. TNE Funding Corp. (In Re Financial Center Associates of East Meadow, · filed 1992-05-14(54)

Transfer is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(58). ... Both the mortgage and the assignment of rent as additional security involve multiple transfers: one taking place at the time of the perfection of the security device ... by establishing its priority; and another occurring upon the completion of the legal procedure upon which enforcement of the security is conditioned — the so-called “triggering event.”

Section 101(54)'s definition of “transfer” excludes setoff, so recovery of a prepetition setoff is governed by the setoff provisions.

Smith v. Worthen National Bank (In Re Smith) · filed 1992-09-04(54)

Recovery by a debtor of pre-petition set off is not governed by the general, provision regarding recovery or transfers, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547, because the statutory definition of a “transfer” excludes set off.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer does not cover the termination of a contract that had already expired, because the debtor has no rights to relinquish.

Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc. v. Navistar International Transportation Co. (In Re Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc.) · filed 1992-12-02(54)

The term “transfer” is defined by § 101(54) of the bankruptcy code as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. 1992). ... Coast Cities possessed no rights as a matter of law which it could relinquish since the contract between Navistar and the debtor had expired by its own terms. ... Therefore, this case presents no transfer for which to base a § 548 claim.

Section 101(54) treats a beneficiary’s disclaimer of a vested property interest as a transfer, even when state law relates the disclaimer’s effect back to the decedent’s death.

Lowe v. Brajkovic (In Re Brajkovic) · filed 1993-01-06(54)

When a beneficiary executes a disclaimer, she “parts with” an “interest in property,” i.e., her vested, albeit inchoate, interest in property of the decedent. The moment prior to the execution, she has an equitable interest. The moment after, she does not. That is a transfer, pure and simple, and no matter what state law says the effect of such a disclaimer might be, state law may not define the transfer away if, as of the moment of execution, all the requisites for transfer under the Bankruptcy Code are present.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a state court judgment dismissing a debtor’s claims with prejudice.

Besing v. Hawthorne (In Re Besing) · filed 1993-01-28(54)

In light of the Bankruptcy Code's expansive definition of "transfer," which literally encompasses "every" mode of parting with an interest in property, and the express intent of Congress that this definition be read as broadly as possible, we must agree with the Debtors' contention that the Texas court's dismissal of their claims caused them to "part with" their claims.

Section 101 defines “transfer” broadly to cover direct, indirect, conditional, and involuntary ways of parting with property or an interest in property.

Glinka v. Bank of Vermont (In Re Kelton Motors, Inc.) · filed 1993-03-31(54)

A “transfer” is broadly defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 as ... Under this comprehensive definition, every conceivable type of transfer may be avoided if the other requirements of § 547(b) are satisfied.

Section 101’s definition of transfer includes a debtor’s grant of a security interest in property.

Regency Consumer Discount Co. v. Beransen (In Re Beransen) · filed 1993-04-02(54)

A transfer, being defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101 as “every mode ... of ... parting ... with an interest in property”, certainly would include Debtors’ conveyance of a security interest ultimately assigned to the Movant.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include an assignment of a partnership interest that conveys a right to profits, even if the other partners’ consent is deficient.

Dews v. Dews (In Re Dews) · filed 1993-04-06(54)

By making the March 21, 1986 assignment, John Dews transferred to Julie Dews a valuable interest in property. ... Therefore, John Dews transferred to Julie Dews an interest in property on March 21, 1986, but that transfer is not avoidable under § 548(a)(2) because it occurred more than one year before bankruptcy.

Section 101(58) defines a transfer as disposing of or parting with property or an interest in it; a tax surcharge on early IRA distributions does not restrict such a transfer.

Bohm v. Brewer (In Re Brewer) · filed 1993-05-17(58)

“Transfer” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “every mode of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest therein ...” (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 101(58). Section 72(t) of the Internal Revenue Code does not place any restrictions on debtor’s “disposing of or parting with” his interest in the IRA. Rather, it imposes a tax surcharge on debtor’s receipt of a distribution from the IRA before he reaches a specified age.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly to include granting a security interest.

Long v. Joe Romania Chevrolet, Inc. (In Re Loken) · filed 1993-07-09(54)

“Transfer” is defined broadly in § 101(54) to include the act of granting- a security interest.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include both direct and indirect transfers of property or an interest in property.

Berisford, Inc. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan (In re 1634 Associates) · filed 1993-08-17(54)

Given the Supreme Court’s pronouncements with regard to the broad interpretation of the term and the clear language of § 101(54), this court can only conclude that § 548(b) is meant to encompass indirect as well as direct transfers to the general partner of a partnership.

Section 101(54) includes a transfer of the debtor’s property interest by operation of law when a tax deed vests that interest in the state.

In Re Slack-Horner Foundries Company, Debtor. Jeffrey A. Weinman, Trustee v. Simons · filed 1993-08-06(54)

Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." ... Upon the signing of the treasurer's deed, the debtor's interest in property, if it were "transferred," was transferred by operation of law from the debtor to the state, which in turn transferred all interest in the property to Simons. ... Thus, the debtor's interest in property was transferred to the state.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include disposing of property or an interest in property.

Slone v. Integra Bank/Pittsburgh (In Re International Building Components) · filed 1993-09-23(54)

11 U.S.C. § 101(58)[54], Debtor voluntarily disposed of its interest in the floor joist system when it was sold to Sylvester in exchange for the payment by Sylvester to UNB of the outstanding balance of the so-called "lease payments”.

Section 101’s broad definition of transfer can include the termination of a franchise agreement.

Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. (In Re Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc.) · filed 1993-10-28(54)

Given this definition, the termination of a franchise agreement can be found to constitute a transfer within the meaning of §§ 101(58) [54] and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer treats an ordinary check as transferred when the drawee bank honors it.

Ellenberg v. Plaid Enterprises, Inc. (In Re T.B. Home Sewing Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-23(54)

For purposes of § 547(b), a “transfer” of an ordinary cheek as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) occurs on the date of honor by the drawee bank.

Section 101 defines a transfer to include granting a security interest in the debtor's property to a third party.

Fitzgerald v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. (In Re Walker) · filed 1993-12-03(54)

The term "transfer” is defined broadly in bankruptcy, and expressly includes the granting of a security interest in the debtor's property in favor of a third party.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer by the disposition of property, rather than by the benefit a creditor receives.

Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners) · filed 1993-12-28(54)

This “two-transfer” theory incorrectly defines transfer as a benefit received instead of property disposed.

Section 101(54) treats payment by check as a transfer when the bank honors the check, rather than when the debtor delivers it.

Barber v. Reynolds State Bank (In re Jones) · filed 1993-12-28(54)

The BANK had taken no steps which would constitute final payment under § 4-215(a). The check by its own terms was not payable until August 27, 1992. While the BANK held the check the Debtor could have stopped its payment or an IRS levy could have intervened and obtained priority. Under Barnhill v. Johnson, the transfer did not occur before August 27, 1992, and therefore falls within the 90-day preference period.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer by the debtor’s disposition of property, rather than by each benefit a creditor receives.

In Re Meridith Hoffman Partners · filed 1994-01-20(54)

This "two-transfer" theory incorrectly defines transfer as a benefit received instead of property disposed. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(54) (defining "transfer" as "disposing of or parting with property" by any means); C-L Cartage, 899 F.2d at 1495.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s funds paid through a cashier’s check.

Richardson v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In Re M. Blackburn Mitchell Inc.) · filed 1994-02-14(54)

The term “transfer,” however, is included in the "Definitions” section of the Code with a broad definition: " '[T]ransfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer covers a debtor’s deposits that a bank sets off against overdraft debt.

Martino v. First National Bank in Harvey (In Re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc.) · filed 1994-02-17(54)

When the Debtor subsequently made deposits into the account to cover the overdrafts, and the Bank set off those deposited funds against the debt created by the overdrafts, the Debtor transferred funds of the estate to the Bank. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(6) and 541(a)(7) (defines what constitutes property of the estate); 11 U.S.C. § 101(58)[54] (broad definition of “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code).

Section 101(54) treats the attachment of a judgment lien and a later execution sale as separate transfers of a debtor’s interests in property.

MacDonald v. Tack (In Re MacDonald) · filed 1994-02-22(54)

The first transfer occurred when the judgment lien attached to the Property; such transfer resulted in the Plaintiff involuntarily “parting with an interest” in property under Code § 101(54). Subsequent to the attachment of the judicial lien, a second transfer occurred when the Property was sold at the execution sale; such transfer being an “involuntary disposal of property” under Code § 101(54).

Section 101(54) includes foreclosure sales in the definition of transfers that may be avoided under several Bankruptcy Code provisions.

BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation · filed 1994-05-23(54)

The first of these provisions establishes that foreclosure sales fall within the general definition of “transfers” that may be avoided under several statutory provisions, including (but not limited to) §548.

Section 101’s definition of transfer requires property of the debtor, or an interest in it, to pass to the alleged transferee.

O'Neal v. Southwest Missouri Bank of Carthage (In Re Broadview Lumber Co.) · filed 1994-06-28(54)

A transfer means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debt- or’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(58)[54]. In order to find the banks were transferee, I must find that the banks acquired property of debtor or an interest in property of debtor following the transfer. Id. I do not so find.

Section 101(54) treats foreclosure of a debtor’s right of redemption as a separate transfer when that right is extinguished.

T.F. Stone Companies, Inc. v. Harper (In Re T.F. Stone Companies, Inc.) · filed 1994-07-07(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the foreclosure (extinguishing) of a right of redemption as a transfer in and of itself. Bankr.Code § 101(54). It cannot be merged back with the prior tax sale.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include granting a security interest in the debtor’s property.

Spearing Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. Buccaneer Tool & Die Co. (In Re Spearing Tool & Manufacturing Co.) · filed 1994-09-06(54)

This provision of the Code requires: (1) a “transfer,” defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(58)[54] as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption,” and (2) the creditor whose right is asserted must be a “creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.” Spearing has met both of these requirements. First, by granting the defendants a security interest in all of its assets, Spearing gave up an interest in its property, thereby constituting a transfer.

Under § 101(54), payment by ordinary check becomes a transfer when the drawee bank honors the check.

Wittman v. State Farm Life Insurance (In Re Mills) · filed 1994-11-15(54)

Because the payee receives no interest in the drawer’s property until the check is honored, the mere delivery of the check does not constitute a “transfer” as defined at § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include indirect transfers through a third party.

Carmel v. River Bank America (In Re FBN Food Services, Inc.) · filed 1994-12-06(54)

As is evidenced in the definition, a transfer does not have to be made directly by a debtor. The term “transfer” as used in various bankruptcy statutes has been broad enough to cover such indirect transfers and to catch various circuitous arrangements which have the effect of a fraudulent conveyance.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer includes forfeiture of an interest under a land sale contract.

Vermillion v. Scarbrough (In Re Vermillion) · filed 1994-12-23(54)

Although forfeiture of an interest under a land sale contract is not specifically mentioned, this definition is broad enough, and, particularly in light of the 1984 clarification, should be interpreted, to include such forfeiture.

Section 101(58) defines a transfer to include the fixing of a lien on the debtor’s property.

Prior v. Farm Bureau Oil Co. (In Re Prior) · filed 1995-01-05(58)

The Bankruptcy Code definition of “transfer” includes the fixing of a lien on property of the debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(58), 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 547.03[1][A], and, for purposes of § 547, a transfer is deemed to have been made when a judicial lien attaches to the debtor’s property under state law.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly but does not include a transferee’s later recordation of an existing transfer.

Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt (In Re Roosevelt) · filed 1995-01-12(54)

Although the definition of transfer is broad, it does not include any action taken by the transferee subsequent to the transfer such as recordation.

Section 101(58) treats a debtor's grant of a security interest in property as a transfer even when the lien is noted on the certificate of title issued to the debtor.

In Re Christine Edney, Debtor. David M. Whittaker, Trustee v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1995-01-17(58)

The definition of "transfer" in Sec. 101(58) of the Bankruptcy Code turns on "property" and "interest" in property. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(58). What constitutes an "interest" in property is a matter of state law. Barnhill, 112 S.Ct. at 1389. Therefore, this court looks to Ohio law to determine the scope of Edney's interest in the automobile. ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the issuance of the certificate of title noting FMCC's lien was a "transfer of an interest of the Debtor in property," within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 547(b).

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes using funds from a joint account to purchase an annuity.

Ameritrust National Bank v. Davidson (In Re Davidson) · filed 1995-02-24(54)

The Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that the purchase of the Annuity constituted a “transfer” under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2) and 101(54).

Section 101’s definition of transfer excludes a prepetition lease termination made under the lease’s terms.

Haines v. Regina C. Dixon Trust (In Re Haines) · filed 1995-02-28(54)

The court will follow the reasoning in Jermoo’s and Coast Cities and find that a lease termination pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties, prior to the bankruptcy filing, is not a transfer.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include parting with an interest in property; the purchaser’s delivery of a cashier’s check transfers that interest to the payee.

Hall-Mark Electronics Corp. v. Sims (In Re Lee) · filed 1995-03-20(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... In this sense, the cashier’s check, like an ordinary check, is utilized as a means of transferring the purchaser’s cash to the check’s payee. The issuing bank is not a transferee, it is simply a conduit.

Section 101(54) treats a foreclosure sale as a transfer from the debtor to the foreclosing creditor.

Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. · filed 1995-07-12(54)

A foreclosure sale is treated as a transfer from the debtor to the foreclosing creditor for purposes of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(54).

Section 101(54)’s definition of “transfer” requires a third party to acquire an interest in property; declaring a Massachusetts homestead is not a transfer.

Feinman v. Messia (In Re Messia) · filed 1995-07-13(54)

Applying these definitions to a Massachusetts declaration of homestead, I find that it is not a transfer, and hence cannot be avoided by the Trustee. My conclusion is mandated by the language of the Code itself. Inherent in the quoted definitions is a requirement that a “transfer” include the acquisition of an interest by a third party.

Section 101(54) defines “transfer” broadly enough to cover the release of a debtor’s claims in exchange for a payment made directly to a creditor.

Carmel v. River Bank America (In Re FBN Food Services, Inc.) · filed 1995-07-17(54)

The Code defines transfers to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... We agree with the court below that, given the expansive interpretation mandated by the Code, the transactions at issue in this case constituted a “transfer.”

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer does not prevent a court from treating a debtor’s timely recovery of transferred property as undoing the transfer for purposes of § 727(a)(2)(A).

Martin v. Bajgar (In Re Bajgar) · filed 1995-08-28(54)

The issue for me to determine is whether “transferred” is limited in scope to the statutory definition in § 101(54), per Davis, or can be explicated as in Adeeb. I believe that the latter approach is both authorized and preferable.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer is broad enough to include a transfer of goodwill through employment agreements and covenants not to compete.

Rockman v. Eastern Container Corp. (In Re Corrugated Paper Corp.) · filed 1995-08-31(54)

The definition of “transfer” as used in section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code is nevertheless sufficiently flexible to include the transfer of goodwill by such means.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a creditor’s attachment of a debtor’s interest in property.

In Re Yuhas · filed 1995-09-15(54)

Given the broad definition of the term “transfer” and the myriad circumstances under which it has been held to apply, there can be little doubt that attachment by a creditor of a debtor’s interest in property constitutes a transfer under the Code.

Section 101(54)’s definition of “transfer” does not include a debtor’s postpetition election to have a pre-1980 tenancy by the entirety treated under Massachusetts statutory rules.

In Re Robbins · filed 1995-09-22(54)

The election is not a “mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of property or an interest in property...." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). In short, the predicate for avoidance under section 549, a “transfer,” is absent from the facts of the case and the post-petition timing of the election should not dictate a contrary result.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include an indirect disposition of a debtor’s interest when a corporation conveys its sole asset and strips the debtor’s stock of its value.

Schieffler v. Coleman (In Re Beshears) · filed 1996-02-07(54)

A transfer means, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). This section is interpreted broadly to effect the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. ... Although the mere form was a transfer by the corporation, the substance was a transfer of the entire value of the asset, depriving the bankruptcy estate of that valuable asset.

Section 101(54) treats a creditor’s prepetition garnishment lien on funds as a transfer.

Morris v. St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc. (In Re Fisher) · filed 1996-03-29(54)

St. Joseph obtained a hen on the garnished funds pre-petition, which would constitute a transfer for purposes of § 547. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54) and 547(e).

Section 101(54) requires a disposition of or parting with property for a transfer to occur.

Litzler v. American Elk Conservatory, Inc. (In Re Kelso) · filed 1996-04-10(54)

Since “transfer,” as defined in the Code, is “disposing or parting with property,” to have a transfer it is necessary for the Court to determine that the “thing” being transferred is property; and under § 549, that the property is “property of the estate.”

Section 101(54) requires a transfer of property or an interest in property; the ability to convey property already transferred to someone else is not such an interest.

Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt · filed 1996-06-20(54)

Whether or not Steven’s ability to give a subsequent bona fide purchaser the right to defeat the initial grantee’s interest may be an “interest,” it must also be an interest in property for it to be subject to a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) requires a transfer to dispose of property or an interest in property.

Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt (In re Roosevelt) · filed 1996-06-20(54)

Although this definition is to be construed broadly, In re FBN Food Services, Inc., 185 B.R. 265, 272 (N.D.Ill.1995), aff'd, 82 F.3d 1387 (7th Cir.1996), the statute clearly requires that an interest in property be conveyed.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer by the passage of control over an asset, regardless of intent.

Shields v. Duggan (In Re Dartco, Inc.) · filed 1996-07-01(50)

Second, under the definition of 11 U.S.C. § 101(50), a “transfer” is identified by its simple functional aspect — a de facto passage of the control of the subject asset — and not by any intent to effect that passage.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer excludes setoff.

Braunstein v. Branch Group, Inc. (In Re Massachusetts Gas & Electric Light Supply Co.) · filed 1996-09-03(54)

Thus the legislative intent was to exclude setoff from the definition of transfer. Transfer should be construed accordingly.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include perfection of a creditor’s statutory right to attorney’s fees.

Homestead Partners, Ltd. v. Condor One, Inc. (In Re Homestead Partners, Ltd.) · filed 1996-09-06(54)

Any mode, “direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property” will qualify as a transfer for the purposes of section 547(b). ... Here, by sending the Debtor a “ten-day letter,” Condor accomplished the perfection of its statutory right to attorney’s fees, and consequently, a transfer then took place for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) treats withdrawing funds from a bank account as a transfer because the debtor parts with a claim against the bank in exchange for cash.

In Re Alan Bernard, Linda Bernard, Debtors. Alan Bernard, Linda Bernard v. Clement Sheaffer, Mary Sheaffer · filed 1996-09-25(54)

Instead of owning money sitting in their accounts, the Bernards owned claims against their bank. When they withdrew from their accounts, they exchanged debt for money (which, more than incidentally, was more difficult for the Sheaffers to acquire). Thus, when the Bernards made their withdrawals they parted with property, satisfying the Code's definition of transfer.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include perfection of a lien.

In Re Badger Lines, Inc. · filed 1996-08-21(54)

The definition of “transfer” is worded as broadly as possible. ... The act of perfecting is a transfer.

Section 101(54)’s definition of “transfer” encompasses the perfection of a mortgage lien securing attorney’s fees when statutory notice makes the lien effective against a good faith purchaser.

Condor One, Inc. v. Homestead Partners, Ltd. (In Re Homestead Partners, Ltd.) · filed 1996-10-29(54)

Likewise, under the standards set forth by the Bankruptcy Code, no “transfer” relating to the Creditor’s lien for attorney’s fees consequently may be said to have occurred until the satisfaction of O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11’s “perfection through notice” requirement. ... Such a “protracted transfer,” of course, is specifically contemplated by the terms of section 547(e), and may be found in other applications of section 101(54)’s “transfer” definition as well.

Section 101(54) includes replacement promissory notes that convey property and alter the creditor’s legal rights within its definition of a transfer.

Weaver v. Kellogg · filed 1997-01-08(54)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, as a matter of law, the execution of the new notes constituted transfers because they conveyed property to Defendants and altered TMHI’s rights against Defendants.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include the fixing of a judicial lien.

Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In Re Criswell) · filed 1997-01-09(54)

Turning now to the application of § 547(b) to the specific facts of this case, we first observe that the definition of "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code is comprehensive and includes every conceivable mode of alienating property, whether directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Section 101(54) treats a debtor’s grant of a security interest in property as a transfer.

In Re Ulrich · filed 1997-01-10(54)

The Debtor may not use §. 522(g)(1) to claim an exemption in the Ford Thunderbird because the Debtor’s grant of a security interest in his vehicle to the Bank was a transfer of property as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly; reconveying property after filing does not erase an earlier transfer.

In Re Juraj J. Bajgar, Debtor. Carol B. Martin, Administrator of Estate of Francis A. Martin, Plaintiff/creditor v. Jura · filed 1997-01-17(54)

The Bankruptcy Code, moreover, defines the term “transfer” broadly as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Limiting the definition of “transferred” to “transferred and remained transferred,” in fact, would contradict the drafters’ intent.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a procedure by which creditors reach funds in an IRA.

In Re: Ronald Yuhas · filed 1997-01-22(54)

Any procedure by which funds in an IRA might be reached to satisfy the "claims of creditors" (N.J.S.A. § 25:2-1(b)) would seem to fall within this broad definition and ... thus constitute a "transfer."

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to cover a creditor’s reaching funds in an IRA.

In Re Ronald J. Yuhas, Debtor. Thomas J. Orr v. Yuhas · filed 1997-02-26(54)

11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Any procedure by which funds in an IRA might be reached to satisfy the “claims of creditors” (N.J.S.A. § 25:2-l(b)) would seem to fall within this broad definition and thus constitute a “transfer.”

Section 101(54) treats the grant of a security interest as a transfer.

Gullickson v. Brown · filed 1997-03-12(54)

However, there is no question that the grant of a security interest does constitute a transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes a mortgage modification that substantially reduces a debtor’s liability.

Rosen v. MIF Realty, L.P. (In re Vuckovic) · filed 1997-03-19(54)

As such, the Mortgage Modification, which substantially reduced the Vuckovics’ liability to MIF, constitutes a transfer.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer does not include a bank's security interest in deposited checks arising when a customer withdraws provisionally credited funds, because the customer receives substituted funds without depleting its estate.

In Re Consolidated Pioneer Mortg. Entities · filed 1997-04-22(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" broadly to include "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... For similar reasons, the U.C.C. security interest in deposited checks that arises in favor of the bank when the customer withdraws provisionally credited funds is not a transfer.

Section 101(54) does not treat the creation of a bank’s security interest in deposited checks as a transfer when the customer receives access to provisionally credited funds in exchange.

Pioneer Liquidating Corp. v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank · filed 1997-04-22(54)

The security interest is not a “parting” with property because the customer gets access to substituted funds in exchange. Because the creation of the security interest does not require the customer to surrender an interest that it could otherwise retain, the creation of the security interest is not a transfer.

A grant of a security interest constitutes a transfer under § 101(54).

In Re Guy Benny Brown, Debtor. Ronald D. Gullickson v. Brown · filed 1997-04-29(54)

However, there is no question that the grant of a security interest does constitute a transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include perfection of a supplementary receiver’s lien.

In Re Badger Lines, Inc. · filed 1997-03-13(54)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer is defined broadly as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property____” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Thus, under the facts of this case, it was not erroneous for the bankruptcy judge to conclude that a transfer under § 547 occurred when the supplementary receiver’s hen was perfected.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include the creation of a judicial lien by filing an abstract of judgment.

Cullen Center Bank v. Hensley · filed 1997-06-02(54)

Turning now to the application of § 547(b) to the specific facts of this case, we first observe that the definition of "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code is comprehensive and includes every conceivable mode of alienating property, whether directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include the disposition of proceeds from the sale of a debtor’s property.

Swanson v. Montello State Bank (In Re Hill) · filed 1997-07-01(54)

In this proceeding, the trastee has established through stipulated facts and exhibits that a transfer occurred.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include parting with an interest in property, including granting a possessory lien or pledging stock as security.

Clark v. Allen (In re Allen) · filed 1997-07-09(54)

The term “transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Therefore, the element of transfer is satisfied as to the Mass Mutual IRA and Dudley D. Allen, P.A’s stock.

Section 101(54) treats granting security for a debt as a transfer of property.

Hughes v. Lawson · filed 1997-08-19(54)

Granting of security for a debt is a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (transfer includes every mode of disposition of property or an interest in property). Thus, Lawson’s grant of a deed of trust on the Edgemar residence to her mother constitutes a transfer of property for the purposes of section 727(a)(2).

Section 101(54) defines transfer to include the reduction or extinguishment of an enforceable obligation owed to a debtor.

Breeden v. Bennett (In Re Bennett Funding Group, Inc.) · filed 1997-10-09(54)

The term transfer, as used in Code § 548, “means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including the retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... To the extent that any of the Pre-Sale Obligations were valid and enforceable and subsequently reduced and/or extinguished, a transfer of BMDC’s property and/or interest in property clearly occurred for purposes of Code § 548 and NYD&CL §§ 273 and 276, and the Trustee has standing to attempt to avoid any such transfer.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include involuntary debits from a debtor’s bank account.

State Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Coulter (In re Coulter) · filed 1997-10-14(54)

Because “transfer” is broadly defined in Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code to include involuntary dispositions of property, the debits made by State Bank to Coulter’s Account on March 6, 1996, and March 11, 1996, which collectively constituted the First Transfer of Property, were transfers of property of Coulter’s Chapter 11 estate.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include a transfer of possession even without a transfer of title.

Curry v. Wojcik (In re Knoth) · filed 1997-10-14(50)

There is no provision in either 11 U.S.C. Section 549 or 11 U.S.C. Section 550 which limits the term “transfer” to some other meaning than that provided in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(50). A transfer of possession is a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Section 550.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include relinquishing a right to payment by placing it in another entity’s contract.

Manuel v. Allen (In Re Allen) · filed 1998-02-17(54)

A “transfer” is broadly defined by the Bankruptcy Code as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1998). ... He relinquished that interest when he signed the Contract Employing Attorney on behalf of the P.A because he was no longer individually entitled to compensation for his prepetition services.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes parting with possession or control; a cashier’s check is transferred when the intended payee obtains physical possession or control.

Vasquez v. Mora (In Re Mora) · filed 1998-02-19(54)

Quoting § 101(54)’s legislative history, we have recognized that this definition of transfer includes any transfer of “possession, custody, or control.” ... In accordance with Lee, we now hold that a cashier’s check is transferred for purposes of § 549(a) when it is in the physical possession or control of the intended payee.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include an involuntary levy on a debtor’s stock account to execute a judgment.

Womack v. Houk (In Re Bangert) · filed 1998-03-11(54)

The levy on Bangert’s D.A. Davidson stock account upon execution of a judgment falls within the broad definition of involuntary transfer under § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines “transfer” broadly, but a payment by someone who owes the estate does not transfer an estate receivable when the payment satisfies the payor’s own liabilities.

Tri-Co. v. Star Building Systems (In Re Tri-Co.) · filed 1998-05-14(54)

The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines “transfer.” “[Tjransfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994). ... It is thus unrealistic to treat the payment as a transfer of the receivable ... and its proceeds. The payment was in substance a satisfaction of Addison’s liabilities to the surety and the Defendant.

Section 101(54) treats using nonexempt funds to purchase an exempt homestead as a transfer.

Lambrakis v. Segal (In Re Segal) · filed 1998-06-02(54)

When the Debtors used $50,000 from the sale of Dan’s News to purchase their homestead, they effectively put these funds out of the reach of creditors such as the Plaintiffs. This is a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) does not treat one spouse’s greater financial support, balanced by the other’s domestic labor, as a transfer between them.

Kaler v. Craig · filed 1998-06-11(54)

In such a case, this court is not in a position to conclude that one spouse's contribution so overwhelmed the other's as to constitute a transfer of assets between marital partners.

Section 101(54) treats giving another person possession of property as a transfer even without a change in title.

Leucht v. Leucht (In Re Leucht) · filed 1998-06-29(54)

Further, the legislative history of § 101(54) provides that “any transfer of an interest in property is a transfer, including a transfer of possession, custody, or control even if there is no transfer of title because possession, custody, and control are interests in property.” S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 27 (1978), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, pp. 5787, 5813. Therefore, when Defendant “left” items with Maria Leucht, which gave her possession of the property, he transferred the property within the meaning of § 727(a)(2)(A).

Section 101(54)’s broad definition of transfer includes diversions of a debtor’s property or its proceeds to affiliates and payments of management fees.

Nisselson v. Drew Industries, Inc. (In Re White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp.) · filed 1998-07-14(54)

The second and third claims allege diversion of the debtor’s property, or the proceeds of the debtor’s property, to Leslie and Drew. The fourth claim avers that the debtor paid management fees to Drew. These transactions satisfy the broad definition of transfer contained in the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), and incorporated into 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).

Section 101(54) includes voluntary and involuntary transfers of a security interest in a motor vehicle.

Torgenrud v. Missoula Federal Credit Union (In Re Reinertson) · filed 1998-08-27(54)

Since § 101(54) includes voluntary and involuntary transfers, the transfer of a security interest in a motor vehicle is avoidable as a preference if the other § 547(b) requirements are met.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s surrender of possession, control, and dominion over property.

Matson v. Grease Monkey Int'l. Inc. (In Re BEV of Virginia, Inc.) · filed 1998-09-28(54)

Transfer is given the broadest definition possible. ... The debtor was in possession of the assets prior to March 18 after which time the debtor relinquished possession, control and dominion over the assets to GMI.

Section 101(54) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a corporation’s revocation of its subchapter S election.

Parker v. Saunders (In Re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.) · filed 1998-10-16(54)

The rationale and holdings of Russell and Trans-Lines, as well as the broad definition of “transfer” under the Code, compel the conclusion that the trustee in this case has the power to avoid the debtor’s revocation of its subchapter S status.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include the granting of a security interest.

Hunter v. Snap-On Credit Corp. (In Re Fox) · filed 1998-11-24(54)

The granting of a security interest is clearly a transfer within the definition of § 547(b). ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) defines a transfer as, every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with properly or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption.

Section 101(54) includes a notice of lis pendens in the definition of “transfer” when the notice establishes a creditor’s priority against later lienholders or purchasers.

Doub v. Hartford Fire Insurance (In Re Medlin) · filed 1998-12-17(54)

Under North Carolina law, the lis pendens established the priority of Hartford’s claim as against subsequent lienors or bona fide purchasers, since any lien obtained by Hartford would relate back to the filing of the lis pendens. In the court’s view, these effects make the lis pen-dens a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) requires property or an interest in property to pass to a recipient for a transfer to occur.

Leonard v. First Commercial Mortgage Co. (In Re Circuit Alliance, Inc.) · filed 1998-12-24(54)

The decisions never really address the conundrum of how a party outside the formal chain of title and possession can be deemed the recipient of a “transfer,” given the requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) ... that “property or ... an interest in property” pass to the transferee.

Section 101(54) does not treat movement of property between entities that are alter egos of the debtor as a transfer.

In Re Altman · filed 1999-02-01(54)

The transfer of the inventory to ABFA is not considered a transfer as defined by Code § 101(54) because those entities are the alter ego of the debtor.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include an election to carry forward a net operating loss that gives up the debtor’s right to a carryback tax refund.

United States v. Towers (In Re Feiler) · filed 1999-02-09(54)

The term “transfer” is defined broadly to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Thus, the consequence of the Election, the bankruptcy estate’s loss of its right to carry back the NOL and receive a tax refund, constituted a transfer for purposes of § 548.

Section 101(54) treats the creation of a security interest as a transfer of property.

Kopel v. Campanile (In Re Kopel) · filed 1999-03-01(54)

The creation of a security interest is a transfer of property.

Section 101(54)'s definition of a transfer does not include a setoff.

French v. Bank One, Lima N.A. (In Re Rehab Project, Inc.) · filed 1999-04-15(54)

First, the statutory language of § 547(b) states that it only applies to “transfers,” and under the Bankruptcy Code, a setoff is not included within the definition of a transfer. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include perfection of an involuntary lien.

Malloy v. St. John Medical Center (In Re Woodward) · filed 1999-05-11(54)

A “transfer” is defined to include “every mode, direct or indirect, voluntary or involuntary, of dis posing of or parting with property or an interest in property.” ... The perfection of an involuntary lien constitutes a transfer for purposes of this section.

Section 101(54) treats a debtor’s grant of a mortgage as a transfer when the mortgage is executed.

Bash v. Lepelley (In Re Lepelley) · filed 1999-05-11(54)

From this broad definition, it is clear that a transfer of property interest occurred on April 9, 1998 when the Debtors executed a mortgage with No-vastar, as that execution constituted the transaction of an interest in property including retention of title as a security interest.

Section 101(54) treats the grant of a mortgage security interest as a transfer of the debtor’s interest in property.

Vieira v. Pearce (In Re Pearce) · filed 1999-07-16(54)

The granting of a security interest — -here, the mortgage given to Burnett by the debtors— constitutes such a “transfer” of the debt- or’s interest in property.

Section 101(54) does not treat a deposit into an account the debtor owns and controls as a transfer to a creditor.

Chambers v. Pickard (In Re Wayne) · filed 1999-07-29(54)

Section 101(54) defines transfer to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or departing with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1999). Although this definition is very broad, certain limits exist. ... Nor is the opening of a bank account a transfer.

Granting a lien is a transfer of an interest in property under § 101(54).

In Re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Foundation, Inc. · filed 1999-08-20(54)

The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that when a hen is granted, there has been a transfer of property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) defines the term “transfer” to mean “every mode,, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.”

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include an advance that reduces a bankruptcy estate’s equity in property securing the advance.

Beeler v. Stanton (In Re Stanton) · filed 1999-09-17(54)

The effect of each advance was to increase the amount of debt secured by the debtors’ residence and thus decrease the bankruptcy estate’s equity in the residence. Each advance was a transfer of the estate’s equity to IFI. As the total advances increased the amount of equity available for distribution to the unsecured creditors decreased. The Court concludes that a transfer occurred.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly to include parting with an interest in property, including through a security interest or foreclosure.

Schreiber v. Emerson (In Re Emerson) · filed 1999-10-26(54)

As stated above, the concept of a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code is very broad and includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). In a routine secured loan, a “transfer” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code occurs whenever an interest of the debtor in property is transferred.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer requires a parting with property or an interest in property, so a court must first determine whether that interest exists.

Wood v. Bright (In Re Bright) · filed 1999-11-04(54)

Furthermore, the definition of transfer under § 101(54) requires a parting with "property or with an interest in property ...” Thus, were a court to set out to determine whether a transfer occurred, it would first have to determine whether there was an interest in property to be transferred.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer does not treat mailing a cashier’s check as a transfer to the payee; the payee must receive it.

Mora v. Vasquez · filed 1999-12-21(54)

A “transfer” is broadly defined by the Code as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” ... In other words, merely dropping a check in the mail — even if it is a cashier’s check — -does not unconditionally guarantee receipt by and payment to the payee; therefore, mailing cannot constitute “delivery” for purposes of determining whether there was a transfer.

Under § 101(54), mailing a cashier's check does not itself transfer the debtor's interest; the check must be delivered to the payee.

In Re Joseph A. Mora · filed 1999-12-21(54)

A "transfer" is broadly defined by the Code as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. S 101(54)(1994). ... In other words, merely dropping a check in the mail -even if it is a cashier's check -does not unconditionally guarantee receipt by and payment to the payee; therefore, mailing cannot constitute "delivery" for purposes of determining whether there was a transfer.

Section 101(54) treats payment by check as a transfer when the drawee bank honors the check.

Southmark Corp. v. Schulte, Roth & Zabel, L.L.P. · filed 1999-11-17(54)

R & P implemented a mode of disposing of at least $1 million of Southmark’s funds when First Union honored the $1 million check from R & P to Byron. As a result, the court finds that a $1 million transfer from R & P to Byron occurred on May 30,1989, wherein Byron received a portion of Southmark’s property.

Section 101(54) treats a debtor’s disclaimer of an inheritance as a transfer despite a state law rule relating the disclaimer back to the decedent’s death.

In Re Kloubec · filed 2000-03-14(54)

The rule in the Northern District of Iowa has been, since 1993, that the disclaimer of an inheritance can form the basis of a fraudulent transfer. ... It is the conclusion of this Court that the disclaimer of inheritance filed by Myron Kloubec the day prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition was a fraudulent transfer.

Section 101(54) broadly defines a transfer to include disposing of or parting with an interest in property.

First Union National Bank v. Golob (In Re Golob) · filed 2000-03-23(54)

“Transfer” is broadly defined in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest ....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Therefore, there was an actual transfer of valuable property belonging to the debtor which reduced the assets available to the sole creditor.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include a debtor’s voluntary grant of a security interest in property.

In Re Donahue · filed 2000-03-30(54)

By definition, transfer means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). The bank’s acquisition of a security interest through the consent and voluntary act of the Debtor constitutes a transfer.

Section 101(54) treats perfection of a security interest as a transfer for preference avoidance purposes.

Fluharty v. Citizens National Bank (In Re Horner) · filed 2000-05-18(54)

In this case, the transfer at issue is the perfection of the Bank’s security interest in the Debtor's vehicle. For purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 547, the perfection of a security interest is a transfer subject to avoidance. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include granting and perfecting a new security interest during refinancing, even when the estate is not diminished.

Gregory v. Community Credit Co. (In Re Biggers) · filed 2000-06-22(54)

However, the definition of transfer for preference purposes does not require valuation of the estate or a finding that the estate is diminished. ... The refinancing effected a “transfer of an interest of the debtors” to CCC at least when the Debtors granted a new security interest in the pickup and when CCC perfected a new hen.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include an involuntary act that parts a debtor from an interest in property.

Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank (In Re Churchill Nut Co.) · filed 2000-07-26(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines transfers as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... The breadth of § 547(b) includes the involuntary transfer of the walnuts to the Sheriff.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include an involuntary disposition of property or an interest in property.

In Re Robert N. Jones and Margaret N. Jones, Debtors, Philip F. Boberschmidt, Trustee v. Society National Bank, N/k/a Ke · filed 2000-08-31(54)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, “‘transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Therefore, the fact that the transfer was made pursuant to a state court judgment rather than voluntarily does not alter our analysis.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include the postpetition cancellation and transfer of a stock certificate.

Ramette v. Al & Alma's Supper Club Corp. (In Re Bame) · filed 2000-08-22(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... The Trustee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law declaring that the postpetition actions of the Defendants with respect to Certificate No. 1 constituted an avoidable postpetition transfer, conversion, and a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 101(54) includes involuntary transfers, so payment under a state court foreclosure judgment can be a transfer.

Society Nat'l Bank v. Boberschmidt, Philip · filed 2000-08-31(54)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, "’transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(54). Therefore, the fact that the transfer was made pursuant to a state court judgment rather than voluntarily does not alter our analysis.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer requires the debtor to part with an interest in property that the debtor has acquired.

In Re Mays · filed 2000-12-19(54)

The court’s statement that a debtor will not acquire rights in the property transferred — i.e., garnished wages— does not concur with the definition of “transfer” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) which defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with real property or with an interest in property.” This definition demonstrates that a transfer of an interest in property must involve a passing of rights from the debtor.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly to include an unconditional shift of a debtor’s interest.

In Re Schuster · filed 2000-12-21(54)

The Bankruptcy Code takes an expansive view of transfers. ... a “transfer” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code occurs when some interest of the debtor is unconditionally shifted.

Section 101(54) includes garnishment of wages as an involuntary transfer of the debtor’s interest in property.

In Re White · filed 2001-01-25(54)

Garnishment is therefore an involuntary transfer of the debtor’s interest in wages earned or in other sums as they become due to the debtor.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes the attachment of a garnishment lien to a debtor’s wages.

Jackson v. K.A.S. Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Jackson) · filed 2001-03-23(54)

The attachment of the garnishment lien to the Plaintiffs wages was a transfer of a debtor’s interest in postpetition wages (wages garnished between April 10, 2000 and May 4, 2000) to a creditor on account of a prepetition dischargeable debt.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include a foreclosure sale that disposes of the debtor’s interest in property.

Norwest Bank Minnesota v. Andrews (In Re Andrews) · filed 2001-04-13(54)

Is a Sheriffs sale a transfer under the general provisions of the Code? Initially, I look to 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) for the definition of “transfer” which reads, “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption. ’’(Emphasis ours.) But are Sheriffs sales subject to avoidance under § 547?

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include an involuntary parting with property, such as a wage garnishment.

In Re: Sheri Whorley Morehead, A/K/A Sheri Lynn Whorley, Debtor. Sheri Whorley Morehead v. State Farm Mutual Automobile · filed 2001-05-03(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Because a wage garnishment is an involuntary mode of parting with property, it constitutes a transfer under the Code.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes a debtor-controlled corporation’s withdrawal as general partner when the withdrawal disposes of the value of its general partner interest.

Jones Ex Rel. Estate of Hill v. Hill Development Co. (In Re Hill) · filed 2001-06-14(54)

The Court finds that RJH’s withdrawal as general partner of HDC was a transfer.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include an indirect transfer by a third party to a creditor on the debtor’s behalf.

Warsco, Mark A. v. Preferred Technical · filed 2001-07-03(54)

As the explicit language of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear, however, the transfer need not be made directly by the debtor; indirect transfers made by third parties to a creditor on behalf of the debtor may also be avoidable under the Code.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include giving a mortgage.

In Re Kaplan Breslaw Ash, LLC · filed 2001-06-20(54)

A "transfer” is defined in § 101(54) as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” Giving a mortgage plainly qualifies as such.

Section 101(54) treats the grant of a security interest in a debtor’s property as a transfer.

Boyd v. Superior Bank FSB (In Re Lewis) · filed 2001-11-15(54)

The granting of a security interest, the mortgage given to Superior by Lewis, Bigger and DePeel, constitutes a “transfer” of the Debtor’s interest in property. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s endorsement and delivery of checks to others.

Helms v. Roti (In Re Roti) · filed 2002-01-07(54)

The Court finds that the Debtor’s endorsement of the six checks and the delivery of them to the Defendants constitutes a transfer under § 548(a)(1). The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” broadly and includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) excludes setoffs from the definition of “transfer,” so they cannot be avoided as preferential transfers under § 547(b).

Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc. v. Health Care Financing Administration (In Re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc.) · filed 2002-01-11(54)

The legislative history of the definition of § 101(54) clearly illustrates that Congress intended to exclude setoff from the “transfer” definition in order to assure that setoff would be treated exclusively under the provisions of § 553.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer does not cover a consolidated tax group’s required use of a member’s hypothetical stand-alone net operating losses when the member has no separate property interest in those losses.

Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. v. MAFCO Holdings, Inc. (In Re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc.) · filed 2002-02-06(54)

Thus, no actual transfer occurred when those NOLs were applied to the calculation of income tax due. Accordingly, the court finds that Mafco’s application of NOLs attributable to Marvel in the federal income tax filings of the Mafco consolidated group does not constitute a transfer from Marvel to Mafco that is cognizable under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include a debtor’s change of ownership of an annuity to another person.

Youngblut v. Pepmeyer (In Re Pepmeyer) · filed 2002-02-15(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... It was not until early November that Debtor signed the ownership designation which was accepted by Northwestern Mutual on November 21, 2000. The Court finds this constitutes a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) includes the assignment of an existing contractual right to future payment within the definition of a transfer.

Desmond v. State Bank of Long Island (In re Computer Engineering Associates, Inc.) · filed 2002-03-15(54)

Determining whether a transfer has occurred (regardless of perfection) is straightforward. CEA has assigned to SBLI its right to payment under an execu-tory contract with the Air Force. A future right to payment is an interest that can be assigned, and is an interest that exists in the present.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to cover a conveyance supported by recorded deeds and consideration, even without physical delivery of the deeds.

McWilliams, Daniel L v. Village of San Jose · filed 2002-03-27(54)

The recording of the deeds and acceptance of consideration demonstrates that the conveyance in this case was a "transfer" under the definition in 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a conveyance shown by recording deeds and accepting consideration, even without physical delivery of the deeds.

Village of San Jose, a Municipal Corporation v. Daniel L. McWilliams and Ida M. McWilliams Debtors-Appellees · filed 2002-03-27(54)

The recording of the deeds and acceptance of consideration demonstrates that the conveyance in this case was a “transfer” under the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines transfer to include an involuntary forfeiture of a debtor’s ownership interest in pawned property.

Bell v. Instant Car Title Loans (In Re Bell) · filed 2002-06-17(54)

On December 17, 2001, as Pawnbroker contends and as set forth above, the operation of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-403(b)(3) effected an involuntary transfer, as defined in § 101(54), of Debtor’s ownership interest in the vehicle to Pawnbroker in exchange for the amount then due, $ 5,300.

Section 101(54) defines transfer under federal law, but state law determines whether a property interest was created.

Frierdich, Michael V v. Mottaz, Steven · filed 2002-06-21(54)

Although this definition of transfer is obviously federal, its references to “property” and “interest in property” require an analysis of whether a ... property interest was created under state law.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer covers property conveyed to a spouse through a divorce settlement.

Rogers v. Boba (In Re Boba) · filed 2002-07-16(54)

Moreover, Debtor was advised by counsel who was aware of the divorce settlement and thus fully capable of advising him on the need to schedule the transfers in the bankruptcy. Debtor’s counsel was responsible to know that such transfers were covered under the definition at 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include any mode of parting with property or an interest in property; a debtor does not transfer a tax loss it never owned.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Forman Enterprises, Inc. v. Forman (In Re Forman Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 2002-08-02(54)

Every mode of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property, whether direct or indirect, voluntary or involuntary, absolute or conditional, qualifies as a transfer for pm-poses of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). It follows from the previous determination that the NOL and the right to use it were not property of debtor’s bankruptcy estate, that debtor did not part with an interest therein, and that no transfer for purposes of § 549 consequently occurred when defendants determined not to waive the loss carrybacks and to carry the NOL forward to future taxable years.