11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101’s definition of transfer includes a debtor’s voluntary grant of a security interest.

In Re Dipalma · filed 1982-11-02(40)

The voluntary grant of a security interest, as opposed to a lien created by operation of law or the fixing of a judicial lien, is clearly a voluntary transfer.

Section 101(40) includes involuntary dispositions of property in the definition of a transfer.

Ellenberg v. DeKalb County (In Re Maytag Sales & Service, Inc.) · filed 1982-09-24(40)

Moreover, since an involuntary disposition of the debtor’s property is within the inclusive definition of “transfer”, the garnishment of the debtor’s bank account in this case qualifies as a transfer for the purposes of section 547(b).

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include granting a mortgage interest in property.

Stratton v. Sioux Falls Paint & Glass (In Re Stratton) · filed 1982-09-30(40)

A transfer is “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). By executing a mortgage in favor of creditor, debtors clearly transferred an interest in their property.

Section 101(40)’s general definition of transfer yields to § 547(e)(2) when determining when a transfer occurred for preference purposes.

Lubman v. J. B. Eurell, Co. (In Re Fregosi) · filed 1982-10-01(40)

This general definition of “transfer” is superseded for the purposes of § 547 by the definition of “transfer” contained in § 547(e)(2).

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include a judgment lien involuntarily obtained against a debtor.

Pongetti v. Ship 'N Shore, Inc. (In re Underwood) · filed 1982-11-09(40)

Although there is not an abundance of authority construing said recently adopted statutory redefinition of a transfer within the meaning of section 547, the well-reasoned opinion of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey in In the Matter of Jordan, 5 B.R. 59, 6 B.C.D. 630, 631, (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1980), reinforces Collier’s rationale, whereunder it is logical to infer that not only is a voluntary confession of judgment a transfer, but also that a judgment lien involuntarily obtained against a debtor constitutes a transfer.

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include payment of garnished proceeds as a separate transfer when the money is paid.

Goldstein v. Beeler (In Re Rose) · filed 1982-12-23(40)

The word “transfer” has been construed broadly under the Act and has been defined to include every method of disposing of or parting with property or its possession. ... More importantly, it is clear that the transfer of proceeds pursuant to a writ of garnishment constitutes a separate and distinct transfer of property of the debtor to a creditor, the relevant date of transfer being the day the payment of money took place.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include fixing a lien on property.

Beneficial Finance Co. of Virginia v. Franklin · filed 1983-01-04(40)

A “transfer,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40), “means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” This term includes the “fixing of a lien” as used in § 522(f).

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly to include deposits in a bank account.

Redmond v. Lamonte Russell Tuttle and Ruth Ella Tuttle · filed 1983-01-20(40)

“Transfer” is broadly defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) to include every means of parting with property or an interest in property, even by deposits in a bank account.

A debtor transfers a property interest up to the lien amount when the debtor executes a security agreement, even if the security interest is unperfected.

Evingham v. Trucking Affiliates of Central New York Credit Union (In Re Evingham) · filed 1983-02-09(40)

The transfer occurred not at the time of the repossession and sale, but at the time of the execution of the security agreement. At that time, the Credit Union secured the property interest of the debtor up to the amount of the lien.

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include the disposition of a debtor’s equity at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.

Rosner v. Worcester (In Re Worcester) · filed 1983-04-08(40)

11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest”. Although the authorities are in conflict, this court is of the view that the quoted definition is sufficiently broad to include the disposition of the debtor’s equity in property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.

Section 101(40) includes involuntary disposal of property in the definition of a transfer.

Quinn v. TTI Distribution Corp. (In Re Moran Air Cargo, Inc.) · filed 1983-06-17(40)

Since 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines a transfer to include an involuntary disposal of property, the deposit by TTI of funds due Moran into TTI’s own account constitutes a transfer by the debtor within the meaning of § 547(b).

A restraining notice that transfers control of settlement funds effects an involuntary transfer under § 101’s transfer definition.

Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Sullivan (In Re Sullivan) · filed 1983-07-07(40)

Section 101(4) of the Code is intended to define “transfer” as broadly as possible to include any disposition of property or an interest in property. ... The Court holds that the Trust Company’s action of serving a restraining notice upon Metropolitan effected an involuntary transfer of control of the subject insurance settlement from Metropolitan to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Tompkins.

Section 101(40) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include the purchase of property at a trustee’s sale.

Bates v. Two Rivers Construction (In Re Bates) · filed 1983-07-28(40)

Issue 1: 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) provides a sweeping definition of the word “transfer” for use in the Bankruptcy Code. ... In light of these facts, the Court finds no difficulty in concluding that the purchase of property at a Trustee’s sale under California Civil Code section 2924 et seq., is a “transfer” as defined in the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include a conditional, involuntary parting of an interest in property.

Putterbaugh v. International Harvester Credit Corp. (In Re Mills) · filed 1983-08-10(40)

A “transfer,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40), includes a conditional, involuntary parting of an interest in property. ... Thus, after the attachment in this case was recorded in May, 1979, the transfer had taken place.

Section 101(40) excludes setoffs from the definition of “transfer,” so a setoff itself cannot be avoided as a preferential transfer under § 547.

Eckles v. Petco Inc., Interstate (In Re Balducci Oil Co.) · filed 1983-09-16(40)

I hold that § 547 may not be used to avoid the setoff itself. The general reason is that Congress defined “transfer” in § 101(40) to exclude setoffs.

Section 101(40) includes indirect transfers within the definition of a transfer, so they may be avoided as preferences.

Cohen v. Kern (In Re Kennesaw Mint, Inc.) · filed 1983-08-25(40)

Such indirect transfers are avoidable as preferences.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include the involuntary loss of a debtor’s equitable ownership through strict foreclosure.

Berge v. Sweet (In Re Berge) · filed 1983-10-03(40)

The term “transfer” is defined broadly in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” In the present case debtors were equitable owners of the property. When the Adams County strict foreclosure judgment was docketed they lost that equitable interest. This involuntary termination of debtors’ equitable ownership by judicial proceeding is a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(40), 548.

Section 101(40)’s definition of transfer includes a deed conveying property.

In Re Jacoby-Bender, Inc. · filed 1983-10-24(40)

Certainly a deed is an instrument of transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (“transfer means every mode . .. of disposing or parting with property .... ”).

An assignment of a security interest in property is a transfer under § 101’s transfer definition.

Young v. Chief Associates (In re Ruemil Contract Interiors, Inc.) · filed 1983-10-27(40)

The term “transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). There can be no dispute that the assignment by the Debtor to Chief of the security interest in the Billbobich goods was a transfer within the meaning of the definition.

Section 101(40)'s definition of transfer includes payment by check.

Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc. v. Pro Group, Inc. (In Re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc.) · filed 1983-11-08(40)

The broad definition of transfer in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) leaves no doubt that a payment by check is a transfer of property.

Section 101(40) generally defines “transfer,” but § 548(d)(1)’s specific definition controls for purposes of § 548.

Calairo v. Pittsburgh National Bank (In Re Ewing) · filed 1984-01-18(40)

It is acknowledged that 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) generally defines “transfer” as “... every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest”. However, the specific definition of “transfer” set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) is applicable to § 548 and controls here.

Section 101(41) broadly defines transfer to include delivery of a check, but state law determines when that transfer is complete.

Dubuque Packing Co. v. Stonitsch (In Re Isis Foods, Inc.) · filed 1984-01-30(41)

Under this broad definition, delivery of a check constitutes a transfer of property; however, it is necessary to examine state law to determine when the transfer is complete.

Section 101(40) includes a judicial proceeding that fixes a lien on a debtor’s property within the definition of a transfer; the transfer occurs when the lien attaches under state law.

Foluke v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. (In Re Foluke) · filed 1984-04-09(40)

In determining whether a judicial lien is avoidable as a preferential transfer, a transfer is deemed to have been made when the judicial lien attached to the debtor’s property, a question controlled by state law.

Section 101(40) treats a creditor’s acquisition of a lien on the debtor’s property as a transfer that may qualify as a preference.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Davis · filed 1984-05-03(40)

The acquisition by a creditor of a lien on property of the debtor can be a preferential transfer under § 547. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(41)'s definition of transfer covers a foreclosure sale that disposes of a debtor's equity of redemption.

Lakeview Investment Group, Inc. v. Pemberton (In Re Lakeview Investment Group, Inc.) · filed 1984-06-04(41)

The foreclosure sale disposes of the debtor’s interest in the property. It might be argued that an interest in property is not transferred and that the foreclosure sale simply “extinguishes” the debtor’s right of redemption. However, regardless of the semantics, a property right of the debtor is “disposed” of by the sale and this is clearly within the definition of a transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).

Section 101(40)’s definition of transfer encompasses a debtor’s payment to a creditor and the resulting release of insider guarantors’ contingent liability as two transfers.

Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In Re Mercon Industries, Inc.) · filed 1984-06-07(40)

The breadth of the Code’s definition of a transfer, expressed below, supports the existence of two transfers: “A ‘transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(41) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a garnishment lien.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,897 in Re Conner, Debtor. Askin Marine Company v. Clark N. Conner and Doretha S. Conner · filed 1984-06-11(41)

Under the Bankruptcy Code a “transfer” includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” Id. § 101(41). This exceptionally broad definition encompasses garnishment liens.

Section 101(41) defines transfer to include an involuntary foreclosure of a debtor's property interest, even when the debtor does not carry out the transfer.

First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bismarck, Inc. v. Hulm (In re Hulm) · filed 1984-07-05(41)

If at the time of the mortgage foreclosure Hulm held an interest in the property, the language of section 101(41) clearly establishes that the mortgage foreclosure procedure in this case effected a transfer. Section 101(41) expressly includes involuntary transfers, and neither section 101(41) nor section 548(a) indicates that to fall within their terms the transfer had to be made by Hulm himself.

Section 101(40) treats a debtor’s conveyance of real estate from his sole ownership to a tenancy by the entireties as a transfer.

Ford v. Poston (In Re Ford) · filed 1984-07-20(40)

When the debtor relinquished his fee simple interest in the real estate to a tenancy by the entireties with a right of survivorship as at common law, he transferred property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(40) broadly defines a transfer to include payment of a debt by check.

Merrill v. Abbott (In Re Independent Clearing House Co.) · filed 1984-08-06(40)

The definition of a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code is extensive and includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). ... I therefore find that the payments to defendants constitute transfers of property of the debtors.

Section 101(41) defines a transfer to include foreclosure, even when the security interest was perfected earlier.

New Yorketown Associates v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc. (In Re New Yorketown Associates) · filed 1984-05-23(41)

We believe that Durrett is the more convincing view in recognizing that a transfer occurs at the time of foreclosure as well as on the perfection of the security interest.

Section 101(41) treats a sheriff’s attachment of a debtor’s property for a creditor’s benefit as a transfer.

Butler v. Southeastern Millworks, Inc. (In Re Builders Supply of Wilmington, Inc.) · filed 1984-06-04(41)

In the present case, it is clear that property of the debtor was transferred to the Sheriff for the benefit of the defendant. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).

Section 101(40)’s broad definition of transfer includes an IRS levy on a debtor’s property, even when the tax lien arose before the preference period.

Daniel v. United States Dept. of Treasury (In Re R&T Roofing Structures & Commercial Framing, Inc.) · filed 1984-09-20(40)

... to say no transfer occurred when the levy was made unnecessarily tortures the expansive language of Code § 101(40). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes the IRS-levy constituted a “transfer” for purposes of § 547(b).

Section 101(41) includes the loss of an interest in homestead property through a divorce decree within the definition of a transfer.

Conti-Commodity Services, Inc. v. Clausen (In Re Clausen) · filed 1984-10-02(41)

11 U.S.C. § 101(41) defines a “transfer” as “every mode ... voluntarily or involuntarily of ... parting with ... an interest in property.” The loss of title to homestead property by means of a divorce decree is a “transfer”.

Section 101(41) treats a change in tenancy by the entirety as a transfer when the debtor gives up substantial rights to possession and profits.

In Re Oliver · filed 1984-10-23(41)

Given the drastic change in the distribution of rights between tenants in the entirety that the 1980 statute wrought, David Oliver parted with quite a considerable interest in property when he and his wife changed their old common law tenancy into one governed by the new statute. David Oliver gave up his exclusive rights to possession and profits, and created a tenancy in which he would share them equally with his wife. This amounts to a transfer within the meaning of § 101(41).

A debtor’s payment of money is a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of transfer.

Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc. v. Confidence Golf Co. (In Re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc.) · filed 1984-11-09(41)

Initially, of course,, there must be a transfer of property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). There can be no doubt but that debtor’s payment of the sum of $4,750.00 satisfies that requirement. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).

Section 101(40) defines a transfer broadly enough to include both the creation of an escrow and the fulfillment of its condition.

In the Matter of Arthur D. And Patricia Newcomb, Debtors. Thomas J. Carlson, Trustee v. Farmers Home Administration · filed 1984-11-28(40)

This definition is broad enough to include both the transfer that occurs when an escrow is created and the transfer that occurs when the condition of an escrow is met.

Section 101(41)’s definition of transfer includes an assignment of a future right to payment.

Trejo v. County of Sacramento (In Re Trejo) · filed 1984-12-05(41)

The court finds that the debtor assigned her right to payment to the county ... and that this assignment was a transfer within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(41) defines transfer broadly enough to include a Minnesota mortgage foreclosure sale in which the debtor parts with an interest in property.

Kjeldahl v. United States (In Re Kjeldahl) · filed 1985-02-15(41)

This court holds, that under Minnesota law, the foreclosure sale involved a transfer within the broad meaning of 11 U.S.C. 101(41).

Section 101 defines transfer broadly, but its definition cannot be applied mechanically when doing so would produce inequity.

In Re Flanagan Bros., Inc., Debtor · filed 1985-03-14(40)

Although 11 U.S.C. § 101(40), which has been redesignated as § 101(48) by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, defines a transfer broadly, this definition cannot be blindly applied to the facts of this case due to the inequity which would result.

Section 101(48) treats a foreclosure sale as a transfer of the debtor’s interest in property even before a trustee’s deed issues.

Christian v. Ryan (In Re Christian) · filed 1985-04-17(48)

11 U.S.C. § 101(48) defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” If, at the time of the sale, Plaintiff held an interest in the property in question, the language of § 101(48) clearly establishes that the sale in this case effected a transfer under federal bankruptcy law.

Section 101’s definition of “transfer” includes a foreclosure sale and issuance of a certificate of purchase; the 1984 amendments did not change that result.

Hoffman v. Heritage Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Garrison) · filed 1985-04-18(48)

This Court finds, however, that the amendments did not effectively alter the definition of “transfer” under 11 U.S.C. § 101 and the right to avoid a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548. Therefore, the decision rendered in Christian v. Ryan will be applied to this proceeding, and the foreclosure sale and issuance of a certificate of purchase by the Public Trustee to Heritage was a transfer of an interest of the Debtors in property, subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 548.

Section 101(48) treats creation of a lien on a debtor’s property as a transfer of an interest in that property.

Dicello v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 639 (In Re La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd.) · filed 1985-06-07(48)

Creation of a lien on property constitutes a "transfer’’ of an interest of the debtor in that property, according to the definition of the word "transfer” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(48).

Section 101(48) includes termination of a lease within the definition of a transfer when the lessee thereby parts with an interest in property.

Eder v. Queen City Grain, Inc. (In Re Queen City Grain, Inc.) · filed 1985-06-25(48)

There is just no getting away from the fact that upon the termination of Inc.’s lease, there was a “parting with ... an interest in property”, for after the termination of the lease Inc. no longer had an interest in the Kellogg Avenue grain elevator facility.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include deposits that provide new collateral for an antecedent debt.

Armstrong v. Marine Bank Dane County (In Re Prescott) · filed 1985-07-11(48)

To the extent that deposits to accounts with positive balances constituted new collateral for the note, they too were transfers applied against antecedent debt.

Section 101(40)’s definition of transfer calls for a fact-specific inquiry into whether a payment by cashier’s check parted with an interest in the debtor’s property.

Ellis v. Dakota Bank & Trust (In Re Archie Campbell, Inc.) · filed 1985-07-01(40)

The court's inquiry must focus on whether there has been a disposition of or parting with an interest in the debtor’s property. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1982) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1984)). ... This court holds that whether a transfer of funds by cashier’s check represents a transfer of debtor’s property is dependent upon the facts of each individual case.

Section 101(48) defines “transfer” but does not specify when a transfer occurs, so state law may determine when a check transfers funds.

Matter of Almarc Mfg., Inc. · filed 1985-08-08(48)

Moreover, although the Bankruptcy Code does define the term "transfer," see 11 U.S.C. § 101(48), the Code does not list the necessary events that cause a transfer to occur. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider state law on this issue.

Section 101(48) treats an inchoate interest in a debtor’s property created by trustee process as a transfer.

In re Clough Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1985-10-07(48)

Consequently, we find the inchoate interest that arose under 12 V.S.A. § 3013 is a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) and the trustee in bankruptcy is therefore entitled to recover from VNB for the benefit of the estate.

Section 101(48) defines “transfer” but does not specify when a check effects one, so a court may consider state law to determine the timing.

Chaitman v. Chicago Boiler Co. (In re Almarc Manufacturing, Inc.) · filed 1985-08-08(48)

Moreover, although the Bankruptcy Code does define the term “transfer,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(48), the Code does not list the necessary events that cause a transfer to occur. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider state law on this issue.

Section 101(48) treats a mortgage or security interest as a transfer that may be avoided in bankruptcy.

Velikopoljski v. Florida National Bank (In Re Velikopoljski) · filed 1985-11-04(48)

Such avoidance powers can affect any transfer, including but not limited to a mortgage or a security interest (11 U.S.C. § 101(48j).

Section 101(48) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a conveyance of real property by deed.

First Eastern Bank, N.A. v. Jacobs (In Re Jacobs) · filed 1985-12-30(48)

The definition of “transfer” in the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(48), is to be construed broadly.

Section 101(48) treats the grant of a mortgage deed in settlement of a lawsuit as a transfer.

Terry v. Witten & Carter, P.C. (In Re Terry) · filed 1986-01-03(48)

The debtors settled the lawsuit and executed a promissory note and a Vermont mortgage deed to the defendant on June' 14, 1985, a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Section 101(48).

Section 101(48) includes sales and pledges within the definition of a transfer.

Malone v. Celeron Oil & Gas Co. (In re Currie) · filed 1986-01-24(48)

The Trustee is entitled to the rights and powers of third parties to avoid transfers of property: 11 U.S.C. § 544. Sales, not mortgages, and pledges are all transfers: 11 U.S.C. § 101(48).

Section 101(48) defines transfer broadly enough to include a foreclosure sale that involuntarily disposes of a debtor’s interest in property.

In Re Ristich · filed 1986-01-31(48)

The issue of whether a specific act is a transfer must be determined under the broad definition contained in § 101(48) which states: ... As discussed in part (a) hereof (p. 574), the foreclosure sale here under Illinois law was an involuntary disposition of debtor’s absolute title. It therefore comes within the purview of § 548(a)(2) as a “transfer”.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include parting with an interest in property, even when the transferor retains possession.

In Re Black & White Cattle Co. · filed 1986-03-05(48)

The bankruptcy definition of "transfer" is at least as broad as the California definition, and it expressly encompasses transfers of an interest in property as distinct from transfers of the property itself. Since the bankruptcy court was correct in holding that a transfer sufficient to invoke the California statute occurred, it follows that a transfer within the meaning of the bankruptcy statute also occurred.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include the creation of a judicial lien on property in which the debtor has an interest.

Syed Industries Corp. v. Cohen (In Re Syed Industries Corp.) · filed 1986-03-25(48)

The broad language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) ... leaves no doubt that the creation of a judicial lien on property in which the debtor has an interest is a transfer as contemplated by Section 547.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include involuntary transfers, including foreclosures.

Louis L. Lasser & Stanley M. Kahn v. Robins Nest Development Corp. (In Re Louis L. Lasser & Stanley M. Kahn) · filed 1986-04-30(48)

Although the 1984 amendments were enacted after the sale of the property in this case, the court follows the Fifth and Eighth Circuit holdings that the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of transfer in 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) allows avoidance of involuntary transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548.

Section 101(48)’s definition of transfer encompasses the creation and release of liens.

In Re GEORGE RODMAN, INC., Debtor. Thomas J. KENAN, Trustee, Appellee, v. FORT WORTH PIPE COMPANY, Appellant · filed 1986-05-29(48)

This broad definition encompasses the creation and release of liens.

Section 101(40) treats a grant of a security interest as a transfer, but issuance of an unsecured letter of credit does not transfer the debtor’s property.

Luring v. Miami Citizens National Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Val Decker Packing Co.) · filed 1986-06-04(40)

Since Decker did not grant a security interest to the Bank when the Bank issued its letter of credit on April 22, 1977, no transfer of Decker’s property occurred at that time. ... However, no property of the debtor was disposed of until June 19,1980, when Decker granted the Bank a security interest in its inventory and accounts receivable.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer broadly enough to include filing a lis pendens that conditionally disposes of a debtor’s property interest.

Matter of Ottaviano · filed 1986-07-11(48)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” in broad terms. “ ‘[T]ransfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(48). The movant’s filing of a notice of lis pendens constitutes an involuntary conditional disposition of the debtor’s interest in the residence, in light of the discussion in Part A., supra.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.

Bundles v. Baker (In Re Eugene) · filed 1986-06-17(48)

Therefore, pursuant to Section 101(48), at least two property interests of the debtor are transferred by the foreclosure sale, the debtor’s right to possession of the realty, and “foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.”

Section 101(41) broadly defines a transfer to include parting with a present right under a letter of credit.

Perlstein v. Lambert Coal Co. (In Re AOV Industries, Inc.) · filed 1986-09-10(41)

Furthermore, section 101 of the Code defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1983). ... The statutory language of sections 101(41) and 547(e)(3) militates in favor of the earliest possible date for transfer.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a state agency’s prepetition withholding of funds owed to a debtor.

WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Ex Rel. Department of Public Welfare (In Re WJM, Inc.) · filed 1986-09-16(48)

As a consequence, the Court again finds that Haverhill Manor is not determinative of the issue presented and that “transfers” took place for purposes of section 547.

Section 101(40)’s definition of “transfer” includes service of a notice of levy on a third party that owes money to the debtor.

Momentum Computer Systems International v. Cortani.Brown.Rigoli (In Re Momentum Computer Systems International) · filed 1986-10-28(40)

11 U.S.C. § 101(40). When CBR served notice of levy on Sytek, this constituted a “transfer” under the Code’s definition.

Section 101(48) includes bank deposits within the definition of a transfer, including deposits applied to repay overdrafts.

Marine Bank Dane County v. Prescott · filed 1986-11-04(48)

Deposits into bank accounts clearly can be transfers under the new Bankruptcy Code. ... Here, to the extent the deposits compensated for overdrafts, they were payments on an obligation.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a deposit into a bank account.

In re Prescott · filed 1986-11-04(48)

Deposits into bank accounts clearly can be transfers under the new Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(48)’s definition of “transfer” covers an offset against payments in which the debtor has a property interest.

WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Ex Rel. Department of Public Welfare · filed 1986-12-30(48)

Under the circumstances present in this case, the Bankruptcy Court correctly found that Haver-hill Manor is not determinative of the issue presented, that the nursing homes have property interests in funds owed by the DPW, and that “transfers” occurred for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 547.

Section 101(50) treats a debtor’s surrender of a leasehold interest as a transfer.

Fitzgerald v. Cheverie (In Re Edward Harvey Co.) · filed 1987-01-09(50)

Transfer “means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). ... The Court finds that the Trustee has unequivocably established that a transfer occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition and that the Debt- or was insolvent at the time of that transfer.

Section 101(48)’s definition of transfer includes transfers made in a leveraged buyout.

Ohio Corrugating Co. Ex Rel. Official Creditors Committee v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (In Re Ohio Corrugat · filed 1987-03-11(48)

11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 extends to any “transfer”, defined in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(48) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest....” ... A leveraged buyout, by definition, involves a transfer or conveyance as those terms are used in the Bankruptcy Code and in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act as adopted in Ohio.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer as parting with property or an interest in it; a lease that only creates obligations to perform is not a transfer.

Smith v. Ball (In Re Smith) · filed 1987-03-13(48)

First, the lease is not a transfer. ... The Debtors, in the lease, did not part with property but merely undertook an obligation to perform the duties required of a lessor under a conventional obligation of lease and under an obligation to sell.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer to include foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.

Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In Re Pruitt) · filed 1987-04-15(48)

The definition of “transfer” contained in § 101(48) was also amended to encompass a “foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption”, even though that subsection had always included within its definition “every mode ... voluntary or involuntary ... disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property ...” [Emphasis supplied]. These Amendments clearly indicate that Congress intended to allow a trustee to avoid a foreclosure sale that meets the test of § 548(a)(2).

Section 101(50)'s definition of “transfer” includes a judgment lien on the debtor's property.

Matter of Lively · filed 1987-05-06(50)

A judgment lien is a "transfer" of an interest of the debtor in property, 11 U.S.C. § 101 (50), and is therefore voidable under Section 547(b) if such lien arises within ninety days before the date of filing.

Section 101’s definition of “transfer” includes indirect dispositions of property and interests in property.

Jet Florida, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In Re Jet Florida System, Inc.) · filed 1987-05-14(41)

In paying ACH and agreeing to settle its claims against American, Air Florida “transferred” property to ACH for the benefit of American. It is clear under 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) of the Bankruptcy Code in effect with respect to the Air Florida bankruptcy, now 11 U.S.C. § 101(48), that “transfers” include indirect dispositions of property and interest in property.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.

Butler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In Re Butler) · filed 1987-06-18(50)

There is no question, apparently even in the Ninth Circuit, that the 1984 Amendments to the Code adding the phrase "and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption" to the definition of "transfer” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (now § 101(50)) and adding the words "voluntarily or involuntarily" to § 548(a)(2) eliminated reliance on the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Madrid, holding that a foreclosure sale was not a “transfer.”

Section 101(48) includes judicial foreclosure sales in its definition of a transfer.

Roy v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1987-07-28(48)

However, given the subsequent expansion of the term “transfer” by the 1984 amendments to the Code this distinction is no longer valid. The trustee has thus satisfied the first element of a fraudulent conveyance action: the subject transfer of property took place February 11, 1986, well within the year of the debtor’s petition which was filed February 25, 1986.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include parting with an interest in property, allowing an avoided lien to be preserved for the estate.

In Re McLean Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-07-29(50)

Since a transfer includes the parting with an interest in property, 11 U.S.C. § 101(50), avoided liens can be preserved.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer broadly to include indirect ways of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.

Smith v. Moody (In Re Moody) · filed 1987-08-11(48)

The bankruptcy code defines the term “transfer” broadly. 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) defines transfer as every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the Debtor’s equity of redemption.

Section 101(50) includes foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption in the definition of a transfer.

Jackson v. Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Jackson) · filed 1987-08-13(50)

The decision in Durrett was confirmed by the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and, in particular, by the inclusion of the foreclosure of the Debtor's equity of redemption in the definition of a transfer.

Section 101(50) includes indirect transfers, such as when a debtor pays for property but takes title jointly with others.

Tapper v. Herbst (In Re Herbst) · filed 1987-09-03(50)

Tapper has not pleaded a direct transfer; he has pleaded that the Debtor, by electing to take a joint tenancy with his father and wife, effectuated an indirect transfer to them through the seller. An indirect transfer such as this is included with the concept of transfer.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly; a transfer by check occurs when the payee receives the check, provided it is presented within a reasonable time and honored.

Tarver v. Trois Etoiles, Inc. (In Re Trois Etoiles, Inc.) · filed 1987-09-11(50)

The Code broadly defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). ... In the interests of uniformity and consistency, we hold that a transfer by check occurs when the check is received by the payee for purposes of Section 549.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a purchaser’s involuntary forfeiture of an interest in property after default.

Sullivan v. Willock (In Re Wey) · filed 1987-10-29(48)

Congress undoubtedly intended this definition to be “as broad as possible” — to encompass any surrender of an interest in property. ... Applying this meaning, the Court concludes the forfeiture embodied a transfer.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include the fixing of an involuntary lien on property.

In Re Ridgley · filed 1987-12-04(50)

This definition is very broad and has been generally recognized to include the fixing of an involuntary lien on property.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s pledge of collateral to secure a letter of credit.

In the Matter of Compton Corp., Debtor. Walter Kellogg, Trustee v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc., and Mbank Abilene, N.A. · filed 1988-01-12(50)

By subjecting its assets to MBank’s reimbursement claim in the event MBank had to pay on the letter of credit, Compton made a transfer of its property. The broad definition of “transfer” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) is clearly designed to cover such a transfer.

A debtor’s grant of a security interest in contract rights is a transfer under § 101(50).

Leake v. Valley Feed Co. (In Re Propst) · filed 1988-01-20(50)

This court is satisfied that the debtor’s execution of form 36-1 to grant Valley Feed a security interest in his contract with the Federal Government under the dairy termination program was a transfer as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(50) broadly defines a transfer to include withholding payments in which the debtor has a property interest.

Wjm, Inc., Etc. v. Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare · filed 1988-02-24(50)

Once this premise is accepted there seems little doubt, in light of the Code’s broad definition of “transfer,” that the DPW’s withholdings were transfers of property for the purposes of section 547.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include an involuntary disposition of property through judicial execution.

Norman v. Jirdon Agri Chemicals, Inc. (In Re Cockreham) · filed 1988-04-04(50)

A transfer for purposes of the Code is “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (Supp.IV 1986). Non-consensual transfers such as executions obtained through judicial proceedings are within the purview of this definition.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough that a single transaction can involve several distinct transfers.

Hoffman v. Central Pennsylvania National Bank (In Re Hoffman) · filed 1988-05-26(50)

There were several transfers involved within this transaction. The term “transfer” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) “means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with any interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.... ” The definition is broad and comprehensive. As a result, a single transaction, such as the selling of a house, often involves several transfers.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include payment by check.

Armstrong v. First American Bank (In Re Haugen Construction Service, Inc.) · filed 1988-06-03(50)

Pursuant to § 101, “transfer" means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” This definition clearly encompasses the debtor’s alleged transaction with Bank.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include conduct that disposes of a debtor’s equitable interest in property by creating a constructive trust.

Belisle v. Plunkett (In Re Plunkett) · filed 1988-06-16(50)

That being so, the actions which gave rise to the constructive trust effectuated a transfer by disposing of Plunkett’s equitable interest in the leasehold.

Section 101’s definition of transfer includes foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.

Ananko v. Harsanyi (In Re Ananko) · filed 1988-07-11(50)

While there had been debate on the holding in Durrett v. Washington, infra, that a foreclosure sale was a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, the addition of the phrase "foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption” to the definition of "transfer" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) now (50) and the phrase "voluntarily or involuntarily” at the end of the introductory paragraph in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) by the Bankruptcy amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 seems to end that debate.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include disbursement of funds from a debtor’s checking account.

Clendenen v. Van Dyk Oil Co. (In Re By-Rite Distributing, Inc.) · filed 1988-07-27(50)

11 U.S.C. § 101(50) defines a transfer to mean “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or parting with property or with an interest in property.” Under this broad definition, disbursement of funds from the debtor’s checking account falls within the statutory definition of a transfer.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include filing a new financing statement to reperfect a lapsed security interest.

Anderson v. Blackman (In Re Karisda, Inc.) · filed 1988-08-10(50)

For the purposes of § 547(b), "transfer” means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” § 101(50). ... Having done so, it appears that the filing of the second financing statement on January 15, 1988, constitutes a “transfer” for the purposes of § 547(b).

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include terminating a debtor’s lease and exercising an option to repurchase the debtor’s stock.

Pinto v. Philadelphia Fresh Food Terminal Corp. (In Re Pinto) · filed 1988-08-11(50)

Given the broad definition of the term “transfer” under the Code, as amended, as well as the extensive application of § 548(a) to a variety of transactions, we have no doubt that there was a “transfer” of Pinto, Sr.’s interest in both the leasehold and the stock.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a judgment that restores an expired lease and requires the landlord to part with a property interest.

Thrifty Dutchman, Inc. v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc. (In Re Thrifty Dutchman, Inc.) · filed 1988-08-17(50)

The Final Judgment was in fact the mode, method, or instrument which resurrected a previously expired Lease and which required the Plaintiff to involuntarily dispossess itself of a property interest which it ... had in the property involved herein, and as such, certainly fits within the broad definition of “transfer” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer includes a citation lien that attaches to a debtor’s property interest.

Maxwell v. Pacesetter Steel Services, Inc. (In Re Waner Corp.) · filed 1988-09-01(50)

Section 101(50) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a “transfer” as: “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” ... Accordingly, Pacesetter obtained a citation lien on, and thereby received “transfer” of all interest in the moneys and accounts of Debtor involved here, all before the 90-day period under § 547(b)(4)(A).

Section 101(41)'s definition of transfer includes payment by check.

Durham v. SMI Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-09-06(41)

As defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982), “ ‘transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property of with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” Obviously, payment by check fits squarely within this broad definition.

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer does not include the loss of rights when a contract terminates by its own terms.

In the Matter of Dan L. Wey, Debtor. Appeal of Robert L. Sullivan, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. William W. Willock, Jr. And · filed 1988-08-17(50)

When a termination is pursuant to the terms of a contract, there is no transfer.

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer treats delivery of a signed check as a transfer, even if the bank honors it after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Quinn Wholesale, Inc. v. Northen · filed 1988-08-23(50)

In contrast, the general definition of “transfer” in Section 101(50) of the Code applies to all transactions and is sufficiently broad that it need not be interpreted as making the timing of a transfer dependent on the respective rights of the payee against other creditors. ... However, upon consideration of the equities and commercial realities the court finds that the better interpretation of the rule, to be uniformly applied, favors treatment of transfers by check as made at the time of delivery.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include every mode of parting with property or an interest in property, including returning equipment to a creditor.

Luper v. Southeastern Equipment Co. (In re Walls) · filed 1988-09-08(50)

The Stipulation establishes that a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property occurred on June 10, 1986, when the hydraulic compactor was returned by the debtor to Southeastern. “Transfer” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) as every mode of parting with property or with an interest in property.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include granting a security interest in property.

Evans v. Robbins (In Re Robbins) · filed 1988-09-13(50)

In this case, (1) a transfer occurred within the definition set out in 101(50) because the Bank took a security interest in the Ranch; (2) as discussed above, the Ranch was property of the estate; (3) the two transfers occurred after the commencement of the case, January 7, 1985 and March 13,1986; and, (4) the transfers were not authorized by the bankruptcy court.

Section 101(50) includes foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption in the definition of transfer, but that addition does not change when a secured real-property transfer occurs for preference purposes.

Ehring v. Western Community Moneycenter (In Re Ehring) · filed 1988-09-22(50)

On its face, the amendment to Section 101(50) does not clearly express an intent to overrule Madrid. Congress altered the definition of "transfer" found in Section 101(50) to specifically include the "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption."

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer does not include correcting collateral references on notes that were already secured.

Carmack v. Tri-County Trust Co. (In Re Carmack) · filed 1988-09-29(50)

As the notes were already secured, Mr. Renne’s actions could not “transfer” any interest to the debtor’s property to the bank.

Section 101(50)’s definition of “transfer” is broad enough to include divesting the estate of its interest in property through abandonment.

In Re McGowan · filed 1988-10-04(50)

The definition of “transfer” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) certainly appears broad enough to include the divesting of the estate’s interest in property by abandonment.

Section 101(50) treats foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption as a transfer.

Ananko v. Harsanyi · filed 1988-10-12(50)

This equity interest of the debtor is “transferred” within the meaning of the Code, when the house is sold at a foreclosure sale.

Section 101(50) broadly defines “transfer” but does not specify when a transfer occurs.

Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Belknap, Inc. Ex Rel. Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler Co. (In Re Belknap, Inc.) · filed 1988-10-29(50)

Although this provision very broadly delineates what a transfer consists of, we discern nothing therein which purports to define when a transfer occurs.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough that misappropriating estate funds can be a transfer without a finding of conversion.

Ross v. John Mitchell, Inc. (In Re Dietz) · filed 1988-11-28(50)

Given the broad language of § 101(50) (supra), a finding that a “transfer” occurred does not require a finding that the debtor had actually “converted” the funds.

Section 101(50) treats an agent’s pledge of estate property for personal loans as a transfer when the agent uses the property for his own benefit.

Robinson v. Home Savings of America (In Re Concord Senior Housing Foundation) · filed 1988-12-12(50)

The initial transfer of property from Concord’s estate occurred when Gerwer used the CD for his own benefit by pledging it to secure his loans from Home Savings. When Gerwer misappropriated the funds, he exercised sufficient control over the CD so as to make him a transferee within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(50) and 550(a).

Section 101(50) treats mortgaging property, pledging a note, and borrowing against life insurance as transfers even if the debtor's intended exemption fails.

In The Matter Of C. Ritchey Smiley · filed 1989-01-09(50)

The $158,000 additional mortgage on the O'Fallon residence, the pledging of the Kim Note to secure a $200,000 loan and the borrowing of an additional $36,500 on his life insurance constitute transfers under the present statutory definition, whether the Smileys were ultimately successful in getting the assets classified as exempt or not.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to cover mortgaging or pledging property even when a later claim that the property is exempt fails.

Smiley v. First National Bank of Belleville (In re Smiley) · filed 1989-01-09(50)

Under that Act, “transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1982). ... The decision about whether a person’s property is exempt is separate from and subsequent to the question of whether any transfers were made.

Section 101(40)'s definition of transfer includes a sheriff's levy on a debtor's property.

In Re Bistransin · filed 1989-01-12(40)

Under the all-encompassing definition of § 101(40), however, the sheriffs levy also constituted a transfer.

Section 101(48) defines a transfer as every direct or indirect method of disposing of or parting with property.

Smith v. Moody · filed 1989-01-12(48)

Section 101(48) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(48), defines “transfer” as every method, direct or indirect, of disposing of or parting with property. Moody’s numerous transactions clearly indicate a fraudulent intent to impair creditors, in violation of sections 548(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Code, and Moody’s transfer from SMHC to himself of the 200-acre parcel occurred within one year of the date of his filing the bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough to include perfection of a security interest in the debtor’s property at the time of perfection.

Four Winds Enterprises, Inc. v. First National Bank (In Re Four Winds Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1988-12-13(50)

The definition of “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code is very broad and means “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). Perfection of a security interest in the debtor’s property is a transfer at the time of perfection of that interest.

For the preference period, a transfer by check under § 101(50) occurs when the bank honors the check.

AMWC, Inc. v. General Electric (In Re AMWC, Inc.) · filed 1988-12-20(50)

Transfer is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary of disposing of or parting with property ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). ... The Court holds that the transfer to GE from AMWC was effective on the date the bank honored the check.

Section 101(50)'s definition of a transfer excludes a setoff.

Lucier v. Kuhlman Electric Co. (In re K.I.T. Motor Express, Inc.) · filed 1989-02-27(50)

If the Court concludes that such a setoff took place, then it is well settled that the preference test under § 547 cannot be satisfied since a ‘transfer’ of property is not defined as including the act of setoff.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough to cover payments made from a debtor’s funds toward another person’s promissory note.

Rafoth v. First National Bank of Barnesville (In Re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc.) · filed 1989-03-15(50)

The manner in which the transfers were made falls within the definition of “transfer” contained in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(50).

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include taking a security interest in real estate.

Brown v. Harris (In Re Auxano, Inc.) · filed 1989-03-28(50)

Taking a security interest in real estate is a “transfer” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(50).

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include voluntary or involuntary dispositions of property or interests in property, regardless of the parties’ intent.

Sicherman v. General Highway Express, Inc. (In re Service Bolt & Nut Co.) · filed 1989-04-24(50)

Under § 101(50), transfer “means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property_” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). The underlying intent or motive for the transfer is irrelevant. It is the “effect” of the transaction, rather than the debtor’s or creditor’s intent that is controlling.

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer includes a trustee’s abandonment of estate property.

Samore v. Olson (In Re Olson) · filed 1989-04-27(50)

The definition of “transfer” within the Bankruptcy Code is broad enough to encompass abandonments, and § 1398(f)(2) of Title 26 enables the court to determine the liability issue.

Section 101 defines “transfer” broadly enough to include indirect transfers of a debtor’s property.

Zeisler v. Bank of Montreal (In Re Grambling) · filed 1989-05-18(40)

The narrow question of substantive law here is whether a trustee may avoid an indirect transfer. ... This holding under the Act has survived the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (West 1979) (“ ‘transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, ... of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....”).

Section 101(50) does not treat a purported conveyance to a trust as a transfer when the assets remain within the debtors’ creditors’ reach.

Roberts v. Harris (In Re Harris) · filed 1989-05-31(50)

Therefore, the “transfer” that concerns the Trustee is illusory because the assets of the Trust, whether the Trust was valid or not, were never beyond the reach of the Debtors’ creditors and thus never “transferred” from the Debtors’ estate.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly, but a prepetition inheritance disclaimer is not a transfer when state law prevents the inheritance from vesting in the debtor.

Jones v. Atchison (In Re Atchison) · filed 1989-07-10(50)

Federal law is controlling as to the meaning of “transfer,” and this term has been construed broadly to include every method of disposing of or parting with property. ... As a result, the disclaimer executed by debtor did not operate as a transfer of an interest in property for purposes of §§ 544(b) and 548(a).

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include an indirect payment made through a third party for the debtor’s benefit.

Waechter v. Sunnyside Beverage, Inc. (In Re Sunnyside Beverage, Inc.) · filed 1989-08-15(50)

Title 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) states that a “transfer” includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property....” 11 U.S.C. 101(50) (Callaghan 1988) (emphasis added). This definition is to be construed broadly. ... Hence, § 547 plainly includes the transfer from Sunnyside to Capital albeit Elkhart Beverage served as the conduit in making the payment for Sunnyside’s benefit.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough to include the grant of a mortgage lien.

In Re Amsterdam Avenue Development Associates · filed 1989-09-05(50)

The grant of a mortgage lien falls easily within the broad range of transfers defined by section 101(50) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1986).

Section 101(50) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a garnishment lien even when the debtor retains an interest in the property.

Dura-Built Homes, Inc. v. Dobbins Forest Products, Inc. · filed 1989-09-18(50)

The Code’s definition of transfer is exceptionally broad. A debtor’s interest in his property need not be extinguished for a transfer to have occurred.

Section 101(50) treats the creation of a security interest as a transfer.

Osage Crude Oil Purchasing, Inc. v. Osage Oil & Transportation, Inc. (In Re Osage Crude Oil Purchasing, Inc.) · filed 1989-07-21(50)

The creation of a security interest constitutes a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) as to creditors then existing without regard to actual intent and as above mentioned the creation of this security interest, this transfer, is in fact a ... transfer incurred without fair consideration.

Section 101(50) treats a creditor’s improvement from unsecured to secured status through perfection by possession as a transfer.

Pokela v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. (In Re Dakota Country Store Foods, Inc.) · filed 1989-12-11(50)

A creditor’s improvement in status from unsecured to secured is a transfer. A transfer includes voluntary and involuntary transfers. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50); ... Perfecting by possession, as well as actually transferring the store to Red Owl, constitutes a transfer, although they are tied together in that possession resulted in perfection of the security interest.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include an indirect disposition of an interest in property, which can include transferring control of a corporation through a merger.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,158 United States of America v. Goodstein · filed 1989-11-14(50)

In any event, by reason of the change in control, the ultimate “interest” in the property of Paine would be transferred to Caldwell.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include granting a mortgage and making payments from the proceeds of a secured loan.

Hill v. Southeast Bank, N.A. (In Re Continental Country Club, Inc.) · filed 1989-11-28(50)

The granting of a mortgage on a portion of the debtor’s real property was a transfer contemplated by the statute. So, too, were payments to Southeast from proceeds of the loan closed on November 14, 1984.

Section 101(50) treats the creation of a lien as a transfer.

Aspen Data Graphics, Inc. v. Boulton (In Re Aspen Data Graphics, Inc.) · filed 1990-01-19(50)

The creation of a lien is a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(50), and certainly had this garnishment occurred during the ninety day preferential period prior to bankruptcy it could have been challenged.

Section 101(50) defines transfer broadly enough to include a convertible mortgage that conveys an interest in the debtor’s property.

City of New York v. Baldwin League of Independent Schools (In Re Baldwin League of Independent Schools) · filed 1990-01-30(50)

The City’s argument that this definition includes only “document[s], such as a deed, which transfers the title to property absolutely,” clearly contradicts the intended reach of the statute. The convertible mortgage here represents a transfer of Debtor’s principal asset, to the satisfaction of the third “precondition” of § 1146(c).

Section 101(50) includes foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption in the definition of a transfer.

Barrett v. Commonwealth Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1990-02-14(50)

“Transfer” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” ... Here, the bankruptcy judge’s determination that the foreclosure sale constituted such a transfer does not appear to have been erroneous.

Section 101(50) treats a disposition of the debtor’s interest in rental payments as a transfer when lessees pay the creditor directly.

Funding Systems Asset Management Corp. v. Chemical Business Credit Corp. (In Re Funding Systems Asset Management Corp.) · filed 1990-03-12(50)

The rental payments at issue here constitute “transfers” under the Bankruptcy Code. Debtor’s interest in the rental payments was disposed of when the user-lessees made payments directly to Chemical.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include the perfection of a previously attached lien or security interest.

In Re Klingbeil · filed 1990-03-30(50)

The perfection of a previously-attached lien or security interest is also a “transfer” within the meaning of § 101(50) and within the contemplation of § 547(b).

Section 101(50) includes foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption in the definition of a transfer.

In Re Ehring · filed 1990-04-03(50)

However, the Code definition of "transfer" has since been amended to explicitly include "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(50). ... Although we find that there was a transfer at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the creditor did not receive more than it would have under Chapter 7.

Section 101(50)'s definition of transfer does not include a receiver's statutory succession to a failed bank's assets.

Wright v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In Re Still) · filed 1990-04-23(50)

Thus, the FDIC succeeds to the assets of the failed institution, but there is no “transfer” even within the broad definition of that term in § 101(50) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include parting with an interest in property; a replacement security transaction was not complete until the original deed of trust was released.

In re Appleby · filed 1990-04-24(50)

Although the new note was signed on February 4, the transfer was not completed until Associates released the April 10, 1987 deed on March 2.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include any direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary way of parting with property or an interest in it.

Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Specialty Plastics, Inc. v. Doemling (In Re Specialty Plastics, Inc.) · filed 1990-05-03(50)

Any mode, whether direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property (or an interest therein) constitutes a transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).

Section 101(50) defines “transfer” to include foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.

Troy Davis Homes, Inc. v. American Continental (In Re Troy Davis Homes, Inc.) · filed 1990-05-04(50)

Since In re Garrison, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to provide that the term “transfer” includes “foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). Thus, it is now clear that, if the other requirements of § 548 are met, a trustee can avoid the foreclosure of the debtor’s property as a fraudulent conveyance under this section.

Section 101(50) includes an assignment of a tax refund to a lender within its definition of a transfer.

Fitzgerald v. H & R Block, Inc. (In re Swartz) · filed 1990-06-01(50)

By the execution of IRS Form 8453, which authorizes the IRS to deposit the refund check with BNB, which authorization is irrevocable since the IRS will not authorize revocation, and by execution of the H & R Block agreement, the taxpayer effectively assigns the repayment to the Bank. Thus, at the time of the execution of these documents an effective assignment or “transfer” of the debtor-taxpayer occurs under the “transfer” definition of Section 101(50).

Section 101(50) treats the attachment of a lien as a transfer of property.

Matter of Timberline Property Development, Inc. · filed 1990-06-14(50)

Since attachment of a lien is such a transfer, it is subject to court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).

Section 101(50) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include indirect transfers of a debtor’s property that benefit a creditor.

Metro Communications, Inc. v. Pacific-10 Conference (In Re Metro Communications, Inc.) · filed 1990-06-25(50)

The indirect transfer arising therefrom, even though it arises from the same transaction by the debtor, may constitute a voidable preference as to the creditor who indirectly benefitted from the direct transfer to the third party. ... The expansive definition of "transfer” set forth in the Bankruptcy Code implicitly embraces this distinction.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer to include foreclosure of a debtor’s right of redemption.

Decalcomania Mfg. Corp. v. City of Camden (In Re Decalcomania Mfg. Corp.) · filed 1990-10-19(50)

Title 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of redemption.” ... The entry of the December 27, 1989 In Rem Final Judgment effected a transfer of Decalcomania’s right of redemption subject to the recording of the judgment in the office of the county recording officer.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a payment made through another corporation.

Huennekens v. Tye (In Re Kel-Wood Timber Products Co.) · filed 1990-10-05(50)

11 U.S.C. § 101(50). Undoubtedly, the sum of $25,000.00 was transferred to defendant.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer includes a creditor’s improvement from unsecured to secured status.

Waldschmidt v. Park Bank (In Re Rude) · filed 1990-12-10(54)

The word “transfer” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code as: ... This definition is worded as broadly as possible. ... A creditor’s improvement in status from unsecured to secured is a transfer within the meaning of § 547(b).

Section 101(50) defines “transfer” to include a foreclosure sale of the debtor’s equity of redemption.

Williams v. United Investment Corp. (In Re Williams) · filed 1991-02-15(50)

Madrid has thus been legislatively and judicially overruled: a foreclosure sale does constitute a “transfer” within the meaning of Section 101(50), and therefore is subject to avoidance under sections 547, 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(50) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a debtor's irrevocable election to carry forward net operating losses.

In Re Herbert E. Russell. William Russell Gibson and F.H. Martin, Co-Trustees of the Estate of Herbert E. Russell v. Uni · filed 1991-03-07(50)

Russell's irrevocable election constitutes a transfer because he "disposed" of the bankruptcy estate's right to carry forward the NOLs: once Russell made the election, it could not be changed. Therefore, Russell transferred property of the estate.

Section 101(50)’s definition of transfer does not include a valid Illinois inheritance disclaimer when state law treats the debtor as never having held the property interest.

In Re Darrell Ray Atchison and Anola Marie Atchison, Debtors. Charles E. Jones, Trustee v. Atchison · filed 1991-03-18(50)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the word “transfer” to include “every mode ... of ... parting with ... an interest in property”, 11 U.S.C. § 101(50), but it does not define what constitutes an interest in property. ... Therefore, we hold that the disclaimer does not constitute a transfer of an interest in property which the trustee may avoid under Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s deposit of a cash bond with a court clerk to stay execution pending appeal.

In Re Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc. · filed 1991-03-19(54)

Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” broadly to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest ...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1990). There is no question that the cash bond TMSI posted to the Clerk of the Denver District Court (“the Clerk”) was a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(50) treats foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption as a transfer separate from the grant of a security interest.

Allegheny International Credit Corp. v. DeBois Investment Group (In Re Allegheny International Credit Corp.) · filed 1991-04-04(50)

The effect of the 1984 amendment to define a transfer as a foreclosure of the equity of redemption, was to statutorily recognize that while the granting of a security interest may be one transfer, a second transfer occurs upon foreclosure of the debtor’s equity interest.

Section 101(50) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a pre-petition lease termination that parts a debtor from an interest in property.

In Re Indri · filed 1991-04-24(50)

It is apparent from the Code’s broad language that a pre-petition lease termination constitutes a transfer within the meaning of § 101(50).