11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(5) excludes an equity interest from the definition of a claim.

SVB Financial Group and SVB Financial Trust · filed 2025-02-11(5)

In general, an equity interest does not constitute a “claim” under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code and should not be filed on a proof of claim.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance as a claim if the breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2025-02-28(5)(B)

Moreover, such a request is beyond the scope of the Claims Procedures and outside the power of the bankruptcy court. Under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.

Section 101(5) treats equitable relief as a bankruptcy claim only if it gives rise to a right to payment; a RCRA injunction that cannot be reduced to payment is not discharged.

Hammond City of v. ASARCO Master Inc · filed 2025-03-25(5)

The focus is not whether the site was contaminated pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy but whether the request for injunctive relief under RCRA can be reduced to a right to payment such that it is a “claim” under the bankruptcy code.

Section 101(10)(A) requires a claim against the debtor for an entity to be the debtor’s creditor; a claim solely against the debtor’s LLC does not qualify.

Dombrowski v. Legacy Mountain Homeowners Association Inc · filed 2025-03-10(10)(A)

... only MGD is liable to Legacy—not Dombrowski, and Legacy accordingly is not a creditor of Dombrowski.

A 50% owner of a two-member company has a claim as a creditor when the other owner embezzles the owner's share of company funds.

DiBassie · filed 2025-03-31(10)(A), (5)(A)

The bankruptcy code’s definition of “creditor” includes an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). The bankruptcy code’s definition of “claim” includes a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... The Court finds this argument unconvincing. The bankruptcy court found that Reeves was a 50% owner of a two-member limited liability company and that the other 50% owner embezzled funds from the company. Under the bankruptcy court’s fact findings, the money that DiBassie took was half hers and half Reeves’s, which is why the bankruptcy court awarded Reeves only half of what DiBassie actually took. The Court concludes that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Reeves had standing to pursue an embezzlement claim under Section 523(a)(4).

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; a tort that creates no compensable liability creates no debt.

Holloway v. Harris · filed 2025-04-07(5)(A), (12)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim," and a "claim" as a "right to payment." 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12) & 101(5)(A). ... As applied here, even if the conduct of Mr. Harris technically constituted a tort, there is no evidence of record that it resulted in a compensable injury and damages to Ms. Holloway, and thus, no liability.

A creditor holds a claim under section 101 only to the extent it has a right to payment for the asserted liability and the claim is otherwise allowable.

Branded Operations Holdings, Inc. · filed 2025-04-17(5), (10)

Pursuant to section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor holds a claim against a bankruptcy estate only to the extent that (a) it has a “right to payment” for the asserted liabilities and (b) the claim is otherwise allowable.

Section 101 defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor and defines a claim to include a right to payment or an equitable remedy for breach of performance.

King v. WNB Financial National Association · filed 2025-05-27(5), (10)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the term creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). A claim means “right to payment . . . or right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Here, the King Kids had a claim against King before the judgment was issued by the state court.

Section 101(5)(A) includes contingent rights to payment in the definition of a claim; fees arising from a debtor’s voluntary pursuit of litigation after confirmation are not a preconfirmation contingent claim when liability was not triggered until the opposing party prevailed.

Cashman Equipment Corporation, Inc. v. Cardi Corporation, Inc. · filed 2025-06-03(5)(A)

Specifically included in the definition of a “claim” are “contingent” claims. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). ... Under that premise, we agree with the trial justice and hold that Cashman’s liability for SDS’s fees was not triggered until SDS prevailed on its motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 101(5) treats a right to payment for unpaid pre-petition legal services as a claim.

Brick Law PLLC v. Sticky's Holdings LLC · filed 2025-06-03(5)

These are “Claims” as defined in the Plan and in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 treats a disputed or stale right to payment as a claim and its holder as a creditor.

Otha Marvin Delaney · filed 2025-08-12(5), (10)

This statutory intent is reflected in the Code’s definition of “claim” as a “right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... A “creditor,” in turn, is defined as an entity holding a “claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). ... Though that claim may be stale, First Financial is still a “creditor” as that term is defined in the Code.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a prepetition claim against the debtor; under § 101(5), a claim can be disputed or contingent.

Fanale v. Schlomer · filed 2025-06-27(10)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “creditor” as an entity that has a pre-petition claim against the debtor.52 “Claim” is also broadly defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment.

Carbaidwala v. Gerleman · filed 2025-07-25(5), (12)

As the Court in Burg explained, "debt" is a defined term meaning "liability on a claim" and "claim" is a defined term meaning a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . ." In re Burg, 641 B.R. at 131; 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12) and 101(5). ... The Court finds Plaintiff has established that a debt exists which is owed to him by Defendant.

Section 101 defines “debt” and “claim” broadly enough to include punitive damages and attorney fees arising from a fiduciary breach.

Robertson v. Bunch · filed 2025-07-31(5)(A), (12)

And while the award of punitive damages and attorney fees to the Plaintiff occurred long after the actual breach of the Defendant’s fiduciary duty to her they are excepted from discharge as well based upon the broad definitions of “debt” and “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(B) treats a right to an equitable remedy as a bankruptcy claim but does not itself provide grounds to deny a discharge.

Lessard Design, Inc. v. Paul · filed 2025-07-31(5)(B)

Section 101(5)(B) is not a basis for denial of a discharge, but is an operative section of the Code which defines a right to an equitable remedy as a claim in a bankruptcy case.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly as a right to payment; an allowed claim need not be for the debtor’s property.

Boynes v. Limetree Bay Ventures, LLC · filed 2025-08-07(5)

This broad definition of “claim” does not comport with Sedgwick’s argument that a bankruptcy court would never grant a party a claim unless the claim was for the debtor’s property—a position for which it provides no authority in support.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the time of the order for relief.

INDVR Brands, Inc. v. Mascio · filed 2025-08-08(10)(A)

Based on the foregoing, which the Court must accept as true at this stage, the Plaintiffs are creditors of the Debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (“The term ‘creditor’ means . . . entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.”) Creditors plainly have standing to pursue Section 727 and 523(a) claims against bankruptcy debtors.

Section 101(5)(A) treats a contingent right to payment as a claim, including a SAFE investor’s right to a Cash-Out Amount upon a Liquidity or Dissolution Event.

Rhodium Encore LLC and Air HPC LLC · filed 2025-08-30(5)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code considers a contingent right to payment as a claim. Here the SAFE Agreement, upon a Liquidity or Dissolution ... Event, makes due and payable to an investor, the Purchase Amount/Cash-Out Amount.

Section 101(5) includes a contingent right to attorney’s fees from pre-petition litigation within the definition of a bankruptcy claim.

Andrzejkiewicz v. Old High School · filed 2025-09-16(5)

In unresolved pre-petition litigation involving a potential right to attorney’s fees, that unliquidated, contingent, unmatured, or disputed right to fees generally is a “claim” for purposes of § 101.

Section 101(5) excludes forward-looking equitable relief with no monetary equivalent from the definition of a claim.

Justen v. Wellpath · filed 2025-09-26(5)

This type of prospective relief is not a claim for the purposes of the bankruptcy code because it has no monetary equivalent and is forward-looking.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment; filing a proof of claim is not required.

JT Johnson, Jr. · filed 2025-10-07(5)

The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” does not require the filing of a proof of claim or any other condition precedent.

A creditor seeking a nondischargeability determination must hold a claim, meaning an enforceable right to payment.

Slowinski v. Garriga · filed 2025-10-07(5)(A), (10)(A)

A “right to payment” means “an enforceable obligation.” ... Here, the record before the Court does not conclusively establish that Slowinski has a right to payment for the value of the Personal Property.

Section 101’s definitions of claim and creditor allow a party omitted from the debtor’s creditor list to assert a claim against the estate.

In re: Andy Atiyeh · filed 2025-10-07(5), (10)

Debtor’s omission of a party from his list of creditors does not deprive that party from the ability to assert a claim against the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (10) (definitions of claim and creditor).

A person with a claim for fraud damages against the debtor qualifies as a creditor even if that person was not a party to the sale induced by the fraud.

Sanders · filed 2025-10-17(10)(A)

As used in the bankruptcy code, a creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... Appellant’s argument that Brooks cannot qualify as a creditor because he was not a party to the agreement whereby the business was sold is inapposite. The bankruptcy court determined appellant owes Brooks a debt for fraud, a tort. Thus, it is of no import that Brooks is not a party to the sale agreement.

A mortgage assignment does not, by itself, give the assignee a claim against the assignor or make it the assignor’s creditor under Section 101.

Jan N. Evola · filed 2025-12-17(5), (10)

The Code defines the term “claim” to mean “a right to payment” or “a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... WSFS was not obligated in any way to file a proof of claim in the Ditech bankruptcy and all of the Debtor’s arguments regarding Section 502 fail.

A creditor can hold a contingent claim before issuing an invoice or filing a proof of claim.

In re CalPlant I, LLC · filed 2025-10-27(5)(A), (10)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code, not the existence of an invoice, determines an entity’s status as a creditor.

Sections 101(5) and 101(10) treat a holder of a potentially time-barred right to payment as a creditor because the debt remains a claim.

Otha Marvin Delaney · filed 2025-11-17(5), (10)

An unenforceable obligation is nonetheless a “right to payment,” and therefore a “claim,” under the Bankruptcy Code. Midland Funding, 581 U.S. 224 at 229. ... Though that claim may be stale, First Financial is still a “creditor” as that term is defined in the Code.

A loan made on a promise to repay is a debt under § 101’s definitions.

Rhodes · filed 2025-10-27(12), (5)(A)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Rhodes considered all of the loans described above to be loans, not gifts. Rhodes credibly testified that each of the described loans came at White’s request and upon his promise to repay them. No contrary evidence was received. Each of the loans is a debt owed to Rhodes. See 11 U.S.C. §101(12); id. §101(5)(A).

A right to payment under a merchant cash advance agreement may be a claim that forms a debt, even if the agreement is a sale.

In re JLK Construction, LLC · filed 2025-12-18(5), (12)

Specifically, the Code broadly defines the term “debt” to mean “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and the term “claim” to include rights to payment or equitable remedies for breach of performance, § 101(5). ... Thus, the allegations in the complaint support the reasonable inference that the MCA agreements gave rise to a right to payment that would form the foundation for a “debt” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and includes unliquidated rights to payment within a claim.

Rosado · filed 2025-12-19(5), (12)

Pursuant to section 101(12), the term “debt” means liability on a claim. ... In turn, a “claim” is broadly defined in section 101(5) as a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. ... Accordingly, “[a] bankruptcy court may determine the dischargeability of an unliquidated debt, or, a cause of action, without liquidating the debt.”

Section 101 treats a right to payment, including an unliquidated right to damages, as a claim and liability on that claim as a debt.

Moodie · filed 2026-01-15(5), (12)

Moodie’s §523(a)(4) claim first requires her to plead the existence of a debt, i.e., that Moodie has a claim against Olson. See 11 U.S.C. §§101(5) (defining “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not such right is . . . liquidated[ or] unliquidated”), 101(12) (“The term ‘debt’ means liability on a claim”), & 523(a)(4) (excepting from an individual debtor’s chapter 7 discharge “any debt . . . for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny”). ... These allegations are sufficient to plead that Moodie has a right to damages from Olson under Wis. Stat. §§779.02(5) and 895.446, thus, a debt for purposes of §523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage creditor’s claim against the debtor’s property even when the debtor has no personal liability or contractual privity.

Dickens v. PHH Mortgage Services · filed 2025-10-28(5)

Here, the Court finds that the Creditor holds a valid claim under the bankruptcy code, irrespective of Debtor’s lack of personal liability or contractual privity.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an enforceable right to payment as a claim even when the original promissory note has been lost.

BL Santa Fe, LLC v. Realty Financial Resources · filed 2025-10-31(5)(A)

The mere fact that the Promissory Note was lost does not preclude RFR from establishing a bankruptcy claim “right to payment” (11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a)) because RFR could “still enforce the Note even without possession.”

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a right to payment that a claimant could fairly contemplate before a bankruptcy petition, even if the cause of action had not yet accrued.

Hill · filed 2025-12-02(5)

“The Bankruptcy Code defines ‘claim’ as a ‘right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.’” Id. at 761 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)). ... The plaintiff’s claim arose before Detroit entered into bankruptcy, and he failed to present his claim in the bankruptcy court before all pre-petition claims were extinguished by the 2014 municipal bankruptcy discharge.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment, including a disputed or unliquidated right, and the court found that the plaintiff held a claim under that definition.

Nouranifar · filed 2026-01-14(5)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim,” and “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12). ... The Court has determined that Plaintiff holds a claim within the meaning of the Code.

Sections 101(5) and 101(12) include a prepetition lease guaranty as a contingent claim and debt even when the tenant defaults after discharge.

Denise Marie Leslie · filed 2025-12-22(5), (12)

Here, the Guaranty falls under the broadly defined terms “debt” and “claim” and was therefore a dischargeable contingent claim.

Section 101 treats a co-owner’s interest in funds embezzled by the debtor as a claim against the debtor, making the co-owner a creditor.

DiBassie v. Reeves · filed 2026-02-03(5)(A), (10)(A)

Based on that ownership interest, Reeves possessed a “claim” against DiBassie, the debtor, within the meaning of § 101(5), and he thus qualified as a “creditor” of her estate under § 101(10).

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment, including a right to payment from proceeds held by the debtor.

Heritage Collegiate Apparel, Inc. v. Elemental Capital · filed 2026-01-20(5)(A)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “claim” is defined as “a right to payment,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), and Elemental’s proof of ... claim asserts that, by virtue of its ownership right, it has a right to a payment of $4,596,132.00 from the Sales Proceeds the Debtor is holding.

An asserted ownership right to payment from proceeds held by a debtor is a claim under § 101(5)(A).

HERITAGE COLLEGIATE APPAREL, INC. v. VAULT 26 CAPITAL, LLC · filed 2026-01-20(5)(A)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “claim” is defined as “a right to payment,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), and Vault Capital’s proof of claim asserts that, ... it has a right to a payment of $860,700.00 from the Sales Proceeds the Debtor is holding.

Section 101(5)(A) includes disputed rights to payment within the definition of a claim, so a pending appeal does not eliminate a judgment creditor’s claim.

Lillie Marie Coley · filed 2026-03-10(5)(A)

While the Debtor’s pending appeal may result in the claim being disputed, it does not alter the fact that Carter holds a claim. Consequently, Carter is a creditor.

Section 101(10) treats a holder of a claim secured by the debtor’s property as a creditor even if the debtor has no personal liability.

In Re Nelson · filed 2026-03-13(10)

A party is a creditor if it holds a claim secured by the debtor’s property, even if the debtor has no personal liability.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity whose claim against the debtor arose at or before the order for relief.

Henderson v. US Trustee · filed 2026-03-27(10)(A)

Similarly, LULU cannot be a creditor because its “claim against the debtor” arose in the Agreed Judgment — well after “the order for relief concerning the debtor.”

A disputed right to payment is a claim under § 101(5)(A), and its holder is a creditor under § 101(10)(A) even if the debtor denies liability.

Evangelia Ismailos · filed 2026-05-04(5)(A), (10)(A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a creditor as “an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). ... That Debtor denies liability under the Lerebours Claim is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of whether Movant is a “known creditor” of the Debtor entitled to notice in the chapter 11 case.

Section 101 defines a debt as liability on a claim and a claim as a right to payment or a qualifying equitable remedy.

Hang · filed 2026-03-31(5), (12)

A “debt” is “liability on a claim.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). A “claim” is a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Thus, the relief that the Court can grant on the Lee Parties’ claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) is limited to a declaration that their right to payment of money obtained by fraud continues notwithstanding the Debtors’ discharge.

Section 101 defines debt as liability on a claim and broadly includes disputed, contingent, and unsecured rights to payment within the definition of claim.

Claude Dennis Wilkes · filed 2026-04-22(4)(A), (11)

This conclusion derives from the Code’s expansive definition of the terms “claim” and “debt.” Buckenmaier, 127 B.R. at 238. Section 101(11) defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim” and a “claim” is defined by § 101(4)(A) as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(11), 101(4)(A). Here, the claims arise from Debtor’s 2007 purchase of the Condo and the related contract between Debtor and the HOA. Therefore, they are pre-petition claims.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; an alleged injury that may create a right to payment can support a cognizable debt.

Flebbe · filed 2026-05-01(5)(A), (12)

A debt is defined as “liability on a claim[,]” § 101(12), and a claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured[.]” Id. § 101(5)(A) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from Defendants’ actions for which he may have a right to payment; therefore, Plaintiff has asserted a claim.

Section 101(5)(A) requires a right to payment for an amount to qualify as a claim.

In re Toco Holdings, L.L.C. · filed 2026-04-08(5)(A)

Indeed, ... “without a right to payment, Mr. Berger has no claim” for either of those amounts.

Section 101(5) defines a claim broadly enough to include a potential right to payment that has not yet been established in litigation.

In re Goldner Capital Management, LLC · filed 2026-04-10(5)

Bankruptcy Code Section 101(5) defines a claim very broadly: ... Omega knew, or should have known, when it commenced the Illinois Action in 2023 that it might have claims against GCM, and certainly knew, or should have known, of such claims by mid-2024, while the motion practice concerning joining additional parties was on going.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment; an allowed claim does not itself establish an actual payment or a concrete promise to pay.

Mondara Condominiums Association, Inc. v. Stillwater Abbott Development · filed 2026-05-08(5)(A)

At bottom, the Defendants misconstrue a payment or promise to pay and a “Claim”—a “right to payment” pursuant to § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(5)(A) defines a claim as a right to payment.

Stolte · filed 2026-04-10(5)(A)

Debt is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as “liability on a claim,”22 while a claim is defined as “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”23 ... But Exhibit A does not indicate this creditor had a claim against this debtor prior to these transfers.

Section 101(10)(A) treats a lawyer with an unsecured right to payment arising before a Chapter 13 petition as a creditor.

City of Chicago v. Falkner · filed 2026-06-10(10)(A)

Given the Code’s statutory definitions, it stands to reason that any lawyer who accrues an unsecured right to payment before the debtor files a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition would qualify as an unsecured creditor who would then be able to receive projected disposable income.

A creditor under § 101(10) must have a claim against the debtor; claims dismissed with prejudice that can no longer be asserted do not establish creditor status.

HINTON · filed 2026-06-15(10)

In order to have standing to pursue their 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 and/or 727 claims, the Hintons must be creditors ... within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). ... The District Court dismissed all of the Hintons’ claims against the Maerses with prejudice. As a result, the Hintons cannot now assert those claims in this Court. The Hintons are not creditors within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an entity with a claim against the debtor that arose by the petition date.

In re The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. · filed 2026-06-17(10)(A)

Additionally, that McKesson Systems was a creditor of the debtor7 at the time of the transfers is also apparent given that McKesson Systems had a right to payment upon providing the specific goods and services on which account the transfers here were made.

Section 101(10)(A) includes an entity with a right to payment against the debtor that arose before the petition date within the definition of a creditor.

In re The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. · filed 2026-06-17(10)(A)

Additionally, that McKesson Specialty was a creditor of the debtor9 at the time of the transfers, is also apparent given that McKesson Specialty had a right to payment upon providing the specific goods on which account the transfers here were made.

Section 101 defines a claim as a right to payment and a debt as liability on a claim; alleged injury caused by individual debtors can therefore support a cognizable debt.

Flebbe · filed 2026-06-16(5)(A), (12)

A debt is defined as “liability on a claim[,]” § 101(12), and a claim is defined as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured[.]” Id. § 101(5)(A). Plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from Defendants’ actions for which he may have a right to payment; therefore, Plaintiff has asserted a claim and sufficiently plead a cognizable debt.

A judgment creditor’s right to payment is a claim that creates a debtor-creditor relationship and a debt.

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Rose (In Re Rose) · filed 1984-03-14(4), (11)

Hartford holds a right of payment against the debtor by way of its default judgment in the District Court of South Carolina. In accordance with the above-quoted language from the District Court in Newton, Hartford’s debt is dischargeable unless it falls within one of the two statutory exceptions to § 1328(a), which it plainly does not.

A claim requires a right to payment; expenses for which the debtor disavowed liability created no claim against it.

Dicello v. Jenkins (In Re International Loan Network, Inc.) · filed 1993-10-06(5)(A)

The Code defines “debt” as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and a “claim” includes any “right to payment ...” or any “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)-(B). ... The defendants never had a right to payment for these expenses.

Section 101(4) broadly defines a claim; determining when one arises requires examining the acts that gave rise to liability and may require considering competing interests under other federal laws.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1988-06-22(4)

Notwithstanding widespread bankruptcy court disapproval of Frenville, this and other district courts from this Circuit have held that the issue of when a claim arises cannot always be resolved solely with reference to the Code but sometimes requires an analysis of competing interests behind other federal laws.

Section 101(4) includes a right to payment of earned deferred compensation as a claim even when payment is due after the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Connally · filed 1989-01-17(4)

11 U.S.C. § 101(4) defines a claim as follows: “(4) “Claim” means — (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ...” The Debtor’s claim to payment of the deferred amounts earned prior to bankruptcy is a legal interest within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

Section 101(4) includes a right to payment for breach of a noncompete covenant within the definition of a claim when the injury can be calculated in money damages.

Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Register · filed 1989-05-16(4)

Pertinent to this proceeding and the issues herein is 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), which states that a "claim” is a "right to payment" or a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.”

Section 101(4)(A) treats a right to payment as a claim when the acts giving rise to liability occurred before the bankruptcy petition, even if the liability remains contingent.

LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1990-05-24(4)(A)

Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that the PBGC’s contention is correct, this Court’s examination of this issue, de novo, still brings about an identical result. ... Consistent with the Code’s objectives of providing a fresh start for debtors and treating creditors fairly and equitably, courts have held that the appropriate focus for determining when a claim arises is at “the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed” since only reference to prepetition acts of the debtor will result in the equitable treatment of liabilities flowing from such acts.

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage interest that survives discharge of the debtor’s personal liability within the definition of a claim.

Ricky Lawson and Nancy Lawson v. Bancboston Mortgage Corporation · filed 1991-08-08(5)

The Supreme Court resolved the question presented in Johnson by holding that a mortgage interest that survives the discharge of a debtor's pesonal liability is a "claim" within the terms of section 101(5). ... In light of the Court's decision in Johnson, the judgment of the district court is reversed.

Section 101(4)(A) includes a right to payment in the definition of a claim even when that right has been reduced to judgment.

Kohn v. Leavitt-Berner Tanning Corp. · filed 1993-08-18(4)(A)

A "claim” includes the "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment-” 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (emphasis added).

Section 101(5) includes a mortgage enforceable against the debtor’s property as a claim, even when the creditor cannot vote or receive a distribution because it filed no timely proof of claim.

In Re Claremont Towers Co. · filed 1994-12-15(5)

Thus, all that is required is a “claim” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). ... Since ICC is the holder of a claim under the Johnson decision, pursuant to the plain meaning of § 1111(b) ICC has the right to make an 1111(b) election.

Section 101(5) defines a claim as a right to payment or remedy.

In Re Cook · filed 1996-05-31(5)

A claim is a right to payment or remedy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). If a creditor has a right to payment which the debtor does not dispute, any proof of claim filed by that debtor must be accurate to the best knowledge of the debtor.

Section 101 treats people with contingent claims against a bankruptcy estate as creditors.

The Home Insurance Company v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd. · filed 1989-11-13(4), (9)

Yet either effect on the estate is possible only if the associates — whose contingent claims make them the estate’s “creditors” for purposes of bankruptcy law, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (9) — have filed by the bar date.

A co-maker with a contingent right to contribution from the debtor is a creditor because that right is a claim.

Roost v. U.S. National Bank of Oregon (In Re Ishaq) · filed 1991-06-18(9)

Because under Oregon law the co-maker has a right to contribution from the debtor on the debt to the bank, he is a “creditor” of the debtor and the Deprizio doctrine may apply.

Section 101(5)(A) includes an unmatured right to payment within the definition of a claim.

In re Kido · filed 1992-05-29(5)(A)

Since it has been determined the claim of Emi Kido is a secured claim, it is appropriate to pay the claim from the proceeds of sale of the secured property under the circumstances of this case even though the claim is unmatured.

A guarantor with a contingent right to payment from the debtor is a creditor under § 101(10).

Murphy v. Wainwright Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Jameson Travel, Inc.) · filed 1992-12-03(10)

With respect to the case at hand, the Trustee’s argument is premised upon two valid assumptions recognized by the court in Erin Food Services, Inc.: (1) guarantors are creditors of the debtor because of their contingent right to payment, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and (10); and (2) payments to the non-insider creditor are “for the benefit of” insider/guarantors because the payments to the non-insider creditors reduced the exposure of the guarantors on their guaranties.

An equitable distribution award to a nondebtor spouse gives the spouse a general unsecured claim against the debtor’s estate.

In Re Price · filed 1993-04-14(9)

With respect to the equitable distribution of property contained in the judgment, such determination establishes Mr. Price’s claim based on the award, but that claim is merely a general unsecured claim against this estate.

A Ponzi scheme investor’s fraud or restitution right is a claim and corresponding debt even when the investor holds an equity interest.

Perkins v. Haines · filed 2011-10-27(5), (12)

Although antecedent debt is not defined, the term “debt” is stated to include “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and “claim” is broadly defined as the “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).4 ... Under AFI Holding and the general rule, later transfers from the Debtors up to the amount of the investment satisfied the investor defendants’ restitution or fraud claims and provided value to the Debtors.

A creditor includes an entity with a claim against the debtor, and a claim is a right to payment.

Miller v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2012-02-01(10)(a)

According to the Bankruptcy Code, a “creditor” includes an “entity that has a claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(a). A “claim” is a “right to payment.” Id. § 101(5)(A).

Section 101’s definition of a claim includes equitable rights, so a defective mortgage or assignment does not necessarily defeat creditor status.

In Re Lee · filed 2012-04-18(5)(A)

Assuming, arguendo, that the mortgage or assignment in this case was somehow defective, that defect would not defeat Ap-pellee’s status as a creditor in Debtor’s case within the meaning of § 1109(b). Although a defective mortgage or assignment may extinguish a creditor’s legal interest in the property and/or defeat his interest as against a subsequent lien creditor or bona fide purchaser, the creditor would still have an equitable interest therein as against the mortgagor.

Section 101(54)(D)(ii) defines a transfer as disposing of or parting with an interest in property; receiving funds does not qualify.

In re: Eric S. Gilbert v. · filed 2024-10-24(54)(D)(ii)

But Gilbert’s receipt of funds (into the Retirement Plans) is not a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, which defines a transfer as any “mode . . . of disposing of or parting with . . . an interest in property.” Id. § 101(54)(D)(ii). And he did not “part with” this money—he received it; the transferred funds were his ex-wife’s and business’s property, not his. So McDonnell’s arguments fail as a matter of law.

Section 101(54)(D)(ii) defines a transfer as disposing of or parting with an interest in property; receiving funds is not a transfer.

In re: Eric S. Gilbert v. · filed 2024-11-01(54)(D)(ii)

But Gilbert’s receipt of funds (into the Retirement Plans) is not a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, which defines a transfer as any “mode . . . of disposing of or parting with . . . an interest in property.” Id. § 101(54)(D)(ii). And he did not “part with” this money—he received it; the transferred funds were his ex-wife’s and business’s property, not his.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include spending proceeds from the sale of property.

Keils v. Villarreal · filed 2024-11-08(54)

Here, the Debtor’s lavish spending of the proceeds from the sale of the house is considered a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code.

Granting a security interest in accounts receivable is a transfer of an interest in property under Section 101(54)(D).

Firestar Diamond, Inc. v. Levin · filed 2024-05-20(54)(D)

The Affiliates’ receivables against FDI were property; when the Affiliates gave the Banks a security interest in those receivables, they disposed of or parted with an interest in their property.

Section 101(54)(C) includes the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption in the definition of a transfer.

Fernando A. Neiva - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2024-02-09(54)(C)

In short, this Court agrees with the analysis and the holding set forth by the court in Mularski and rules that (1) the foreclosure of the Debtor’s equity of redemption was a transfer of property of the Debtor, (2) that transfer was not evidenced by a recording at the Registry as required to be effective against third parties under Massachusetts law, and (3) the transfer is therefore avoidable by a trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).

Section 101(54) treats the conveyance of a lien interest as a transfer.

Holtschlag v. Colony American Finance Lender LLC · filed 2024-03-07(54)

Conveying such an interest is itself recognized as a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Section 101(54)(D) defines a transfer broadly enough to include payment of settlement proceeds, including an attorney’s share based on a prepetition contract.

Gordon, Trustee v. Hines · filed 2023-10-18(54)(D)

A “transfer” is defined to include “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). ... The payment of settlement proceeds, including a portion of funds to which an attorney had pre-petition contractual entitlement, constitutes a transfer.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include disposing of property or an interest in property, and a debtor can make a transfer in both an individual and a corporate capacity.

Web Holdings, LLC v. Cedillo (In re Cedillo) · filed 2017-09-11(54)(D)(i)-(ii)

“Transfer” is defined in Bankruptcy Code Section 101(54) as “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)(i)-(ii). ... And as such, the record shows that Mr. Cedillo transferred the Hardware Store Assets in both his individual capacity and on behalf of K&R Hardware.

Section 101(54) treats the grant of a mortgage as a transfer, but recording the cancellation of a mistaken satisfaction does not transfer property between the mortgage parties when their rights remain unchanged.

Trinity 83 Development, LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding, LLC (In re Trinity 83 Development, LLC) · filed 2017-09-13(54)

This case requires the court to consider whether, in Illinois, the cancellation of a mistaken satisfaction of mortgage in the record system constitutes a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). As explained below, the cancellation did not constitute a “transfer,” and the court must dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer can include a disposition of possession, custody or control.

RES-GA Diamond Meadows, LLC v. Robertson (In re Robertson) · filed 2017-09-28(54)

Under the broad definition of transfer in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), even a disposition of possession, custody or control could qualify as a transfer.

Section 101(54)(D)’s definition of “transfer” does not determine who is an initial transferee under § 550(a)(1).

Henry v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Walldesign, Inc. (In Re Walldesign, Inc.) · filed 2017-10-02(54)(D)

Thus, any reliance on the meaning of “transfer” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) is misplaced in connection with the inquiry at hand: determining whether the Bureshes and Ms. Henry qualify as “initial transferees” under § 550(a)(1).

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer covers a bank’s stopping payment on a cashier’s check and retaining the funds when that action changes the debtor’s rights in the funds.

In re Essex Construction, LLC · filed 2017-08-01(54)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” broadly to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” ... Accordingly, the court concludes that an avoidable transfer occurred once M & T stopped payment on the cashier’s check and retained the funds.

Section 101(54)'s definition of transfer can include a disposition of possession, custody, or control of property.

White v. White (In re White) · filed 2017-03-20(54)

Under this broad definition of transfer, even a disposition of possession, custody or control could qualify as a transfer.

Section 101(54)(D) defines a transfer as disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.

In re Philadelphia Entertainment & Development Partners, LP · filed 2017-03-29(54)(D)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D), the term “transfer” is to defined to mean “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with — (i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.” ... Following revocation, the Debtor did not dispose of or part with any property or any interest in property.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include the creation of a lien.

Luper v. Valueland Auto Sales Inc. (In re Haggerty) · filed 2016-12-14(54)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), a “transfer” includes the creation of a lien.

Section 101(54) includes the grant of a security interest in its definition of a transfer, but receiving a transfer does not necessarily make someone a transferee.

Meoli v. The Huntington Nat'l Bank · filed 2017-02-08(54)

Finally, the Trustee erroneously argues that because the grant of a security interest is a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code, the Code therefore makes the recipient of that “transfer” a “transferee.” The Code defines a “transfer” very broadly to include the grant of a security interest.

Section 101(54) includes a quitclaim deed in the definition of transfer when the grantor parts with an interest in land, even if the deed is not promptly recorded.

Lee v. Walro (In re Lee) · filed 2017-02-13(54)

When Lester executed the quitclaim deed for Property No. 2 in favor of Brenda, he made a transfer because he parted with his interest in the land.

Section 101(54)(C) defines the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption as a transfer.

Weiss v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Mularski) · filed 2017-02-14(54)(C)

And the termination of a debtor’s equity of redemption is explicitly recognized as a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code. ... Since U.S. Bank’s foreclosure sale foreclosed Ms. Mularski’s equity of redemption in the Easthampton property, it effected a “transfer of property of the debtor.”

Section 101(54)(D) defines a transfer broadly enough to cover a deposit into a bank account that gives the bank title to the funds and a security interest in them.

Tenderloin Health v. Bank of the West · filed 2017-03-07(54)(D)

The deposit would also constitute a “transfer” under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. It would subject the funds to BOTW’s security interest, give BOTW title to the funds, and deplete the assets available for distribution to Tenderloin’s creditors.

Section 101(54)(D) defines transfer broadly enough to include cancellation of a promissory note, even when the note is fully encumbered.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Fountainhead Group, Inc. (In re Bridgeview Aerosol, LLC) · filed 2015-09-28(54)(D)

“Transfer” is broadly defined under the Bankruptcy Code as including “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). Cancellation of the 2007 Promissory Note constituted a transfer of an interest in property.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s deposit into the debtor’s own bank account.

Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2015-10-01(54)(D)(ii)

Thus, Debtor here, who deposited into his own account, did effectuate a transfer under § 101 and, due to the Ponzi presumption, is deemed to have the requisite fraudulent intent under § 548.

Section 101(54)(D) defines a transfer to include voluntarily disposing of property or an interest in property.

Spradlin v. Khouri (In re Bruner) · filed 2015-08-10(54)(D)

The Code defines a transfer as “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with (i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). The upshot of these provisions is clear: Estate property that is disposed of (transferred) post-petition is no longer property of the estate, and does not re-enter the estate unless its transfer is avoided.

Section 101(54)(D) covers a debtor’s direction to pay settlement proceeds to an attorney in exchange for future legal services.

White v. Coyne, Schultz, Becker & Bauer, S.C. (In re Pawlak) · filed 2012-08-29(54)(D)

Regardless of the characterizations found in the statement of financial affairs, the reality is that he gave the defendant something that otherwise would have belonged to him in exchange for future legal services; that is a "transfer of an interest in property” within the meaning of the code.

Section 101(54)(D) broadly defines a transfer to include disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.

Crawford v. Zambrano (In re Zambrano Corp.) · filed 2012-09-17(54)(D)

“Transfer” has a broad definition: “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)(i), (ii). ... The Hillcrest Transfer fails the “objective test of economic reality”; this Court finds that the Hillcrest Transfer is not a loan, and is a transfer for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 548.

Section 101(54) treats a security interest in a debtor’s previously unencumbered vehicle as a transfer.

In re Grayson · filed 2012-09-18(54)

UTI also received a security interest in Grayson’s previously unencumbered vehicle, which constitutes a transfer under the ... Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).

Under § 101(54), a third party’s payment from its own funds is not a transfer of the debtor’s property when the debtor has no interest in the payment source.

Dubois v. Imbr Crane (In re Scott Fabricating, Inc.) · filed 2012-09-28(54)

In order for the Trustee to succeed, the Trustee must establish that the circumstances of this case in relation to the payment made by Berglund to IMBR constitutes a “transfer” of an interest in property of Scott Fabricating, Inc., as the term “transfer” is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). There is no evidence in this record that a “transfer” was made within the definition of that statute.

Section 101(54) defines transfer broadly enough to include re-perfection of a lien after its earlier perfection lapses.

Ward v. Bank of Granite (In re Hickory Printing Group, Inc.) · filed 2012-07-23(54)

A transfer, for purposes of bankruptcy law, is defined very broadly, and includes “the creation of a lien” as well as “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A) & (D). It follows, therefore, that because the Original Financing Statement became ineffective upon filing of the Termination Statement and resulted in an unperfected Lien, the re-perfection of the Lien qualifies as a transfer under bankruptcy law.

Section 101(54)(D)’s definition of transfer does not include claiming an exemption on Schedule C.

In re Earned Income Tax Credit Exemption Constitutional Challenge Cases · filed 2012-08-02(54)(D)

The Court first observes that the claiming of an exemption on Schedule C does not constitute a transfer.

Section 101(54)’s definition of transfer excludes setoffs, so a setoff cannot be avoided as a preferential transfer.

Riley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development (In re Riley) · filed 2012-06-07(54)

The definition of "transfer” does not include the term "setoff”.

Section 101(54)(D) defines a transfer of property to include either an assignment or a sale.

In Re KB Toys, Inc. · filed 2012-05-04(54)(D)

Therefore, a "transfer” of property can be either an assignment or a sale.

Section 101(54) includes the creation of a lien as a transfer, but a Pennsylvania foreclosure judgment does not itself transfer the debtor’s interest in the property.

Stewart v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart) · filed 2012-05-21(54)

Therefore, the only “transfer” with regard to the Debtors’ interest in the Property occurred when the Debtors secured refinancing on October 26, 2007, creating the lien in favor of WaMu. ... As such, the entry of the judgment in mortgage foreclosure would not somehow effect a further transfer of the Debtors’ interest in the Property.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include the creation of a lien.

Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.) · filed 2012-04-30(54)

It is well-established that the grant of a lien is a "transfer” within the scope of fraudulent transfer law.

Section 101(54)(A) defines a transfer to include the creation of a lien.

Grochocinski v. Panzarino (In Re Panzarino) · filed 2012-03-09(54)(A)

The term “transfer” is defined in § 101(54)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to include the creation of a lien.

Section 101(54) defines a transfer to include parting with property or an interest in property.

Rosen v. Dahan (In Re Minh Vu Hoang) · filed 2012-03-09(54)

In each case, Debtor appears to have “part[ed] with property or with an interest in property,” which is the definition of a “transfer” pursuant to § 101(54).

Section 101(54) defines a transfer as parting with property or an interest in property; incurring an obligation alone is not a transfer.

Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In Re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.) · filed 2012-04-19(54)

Looking at this definition, the incurrence of an obligation by itself does not constitute a mode of “disposing or parting with” property. Instead, it is a preliminary aspect of a transactional process that must occur prior to or as a condition of transferring property or an interest in property.

Section 101(54) treats an irrevocable revocation that terminates a debtor subsidiary’s QSub status and removes property from the estate as a transfer.

Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC) · filed 2012-01-24(54)

The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines transfer to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). ... Similarly, in the present case the Defendants’ Revocation of BDI’s “S” corporation status, automatically and irrevocably terminated MSC IBs QSub status and as a result the Revocation caused a transfer of property from the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(40)’s definition of transfer includes payment by check; the transfer occurs when the check is paid, not when it is delivered.

Matter of Duffy · filed 1980-03-21(40)

That a payment of a debt by check is a transfer of property is manifestly expressed in the broad definition of “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). It is clear that payment of the debt did not occur when the debtor delivered the postdated check to Avis. A check itself does not vest in the payee any title to or interest in the funds held by the drawee bank. See U.C.C. § 3-409. The check is simply an order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated and does not constitute a transfer and delivery of the fund until it is paid. The date of payment, and not the date of delivery is crucial in determining when the preferential transfer occurred.

Section 101(40) treats the grant of a security interest as a transfer.

In Re Kelley · filed 1980-05-06(40)

The grant of the security interest is the transfer in question. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1979).

Section 101(40) treats the grant of a security interest as a transfer.

Weill v. Tennessee Central Credit Union (In re Kelly) · filed 1980-05-06(40)

The grant of the security interest is the transfer in question. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1979).

Section 101(40) treats an assignment of a right to receive lawsuit proceeds as a transfer even before the assignee receives payment.

Sun Railings, Inc. v. Silverman (In Re Sun Railings, Inc.) · filed 1980-07-14(40)

Defendant argues that the assignment was not a transfer, because he has received no payment as a result of the assignment. I disagree. The assignment is an.“interest in property” within the statutory definition of a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) treats the grant of a security interest as a transfer even when the creditor does not retain title.

Styler v. Local Loan Financial Services (In Re Lanctot) · filed 1980-10-10(40)

Even though Local Loan did not retain title in this case, with the acquisition of its security interest in the property, a transfer was made. In which party title vests is not a consideration in finding a transfer.

Section 101(40) includes an involuntary sheriff’s sale of a debtor’s property within the definition of a transfer.

Roberson v. Hunter (In Re Roberson) · filed 1980-10-17(40)

The Sheriff’s sale was an involuntary transfer of debtors’ property prior to their request for relief. [11 U.S.C. § 101(40)].

Section 101(40) defines a transfer broadly enough to include an involuntary judicial lien.

Strickler v. Thomas (In Re Thomas) · filed 1980-11-25(40)

Transfer would, of course, include a judicial lien according to 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) which reads: “ ‘transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.”

Section 101(40) treats a judgment lien attaching to a debtor’s property as a transfer.

Pfeiffer v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. (In re Dutt) · filed 1981-02-04(40)

Thus, a transfer occurs when a creditor’s judgment lien attaches to specific property within 90 days prior to the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(40) treats the grant of a security interest in exchange for a loan as a transfer.

Steinberg v. National Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Independence Land Title Corp.) · filed 1981-03-04(40)

The transfer in question is the giving of the security interest in exchange for the loan. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) treats a debtor’s execution and delivery of a mortgage on homestead property as a transfer, even when the mortgage serves only as security.

Stratton v. Sioux Falls Paint & Glass (In Re Stratton) · filed 1981-02-06(40)

A transfer as defined by 11 U.S.C. Section 101(40) does occur when a debtor executes and delivers to a creditor a mortgage upon his homestead property, regardless of whether that mortgage is held only as security.

Section 101(40) treats the fixing of a lien as a transfer, but the lien itself is not a transfer.

Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In Re Giles) · filed 1981-02-12(40)

Technically the fixing of a lien is a transfer, but the lien itself is not. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1979) (Transfer defined).

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include an attachment that conditionally transfers a property interest pending judgment.

Suppa v. Capalbo (In Re Suppa) · filed 1981-02-20(40)

The definition of a transfer under the Code is extensive, and includes “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). ... Thus an attachment, while not an absolute transfer of property rights, ... does constitute a conditional “transfer” of a property interest subject to the later acquired judgment.

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include an attorney’s payment to himself from funds held for the debtor.

In Re Peninsula Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. · filed 1981-02-23(40)

Under this broad definition there can be no doubt that the payment by Tuttle as trustee of the $3,250.00 fund to himself to apply on the debt due him was a transfer under Sec. 547.

Section 101’s definitions of purchaser and transfer treat a perfected secured creditor’s lien as a purchase.

ATC Systems, Inc. v. Valairco, Inc. (In Re Valairco, Inc.) · filed 1981-02-24(32), (40)

A perfected secured creditor’s lien is, thus, a purchase within the contemplation of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, and, as such, renders a subsequent mechanics-type lien avoidable by a trustee.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include the grant or retention of a security interest.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In Re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc.) · filed 1981-04-14(40)

11 U.S.C. § 101(40). Obviously the grant or retention of a security interest is a transfer.

Section 101(40) treats the recording of a deed of trust as a transfer.

In Re Elkind · filed 1981-06-04(40)

It is evident that the recording of the deed of trust was a transfer, (11 U.S.C. § 101(40)).

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include depositing money in a bank account, even when the debtor mistakenly believes the account is closed.

Redmond v. Tuttle (In Re Tuttle) · filed 1981-06-05(40)

The Code’s definition of “transfer” is phrased in broad language. ... In this case, the Tuttles transferred the subject funds by deposit with the First National Bank in Quinter, Kansas.

Section 101(40) defines transfer to include an involuntary transfer through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.

Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In Re Madrid) · filed 1981-05-01(40)

Although a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is an involuntary transfer, it clearly falls within the definition of transfer in 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) treats the fixing of a lien as a transfer, but not the lien itself.

Pine v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In Re Pine) · filed 1981-05-26(40)

Technically the “fixing of a lien” is a transfer, but the lien itself is not. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1979). (Transfer defined).

Section 101(40) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a debtor’s payments by check.

Trimble v. McCoy Bros. (In Re Hawkins Manufacturing, Inc.) · filed 1981-06-10(40)

“transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest. The payment of $30,000.00 by the Debtor by means of two checks clearly falls within the ambit of this definition.

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include a judicial proceeding that fixes a lien on a debtor’s property.

Anderson v. Burnham (In Re Burnham) · filed 1981-06-18(40)

Under the Bankruptcy Code a transfer encompasses “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). This definition is broad enough to include any judicial proceeding that fixes a lien upon the property of a debtor.

Section 101(40) treats the gross amount the debtor parts with as the amount transferred.

Chrystler v. Mersman Tables, Inc. (In Re Furniture Den, Inc.) · filed 1981-07-14(40)

Aside from the stipulation in paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 that the defendant “received payments” or “was paid” the total sum of $3,003.37,11 U.S.C. § 101(40) indicates that the transfer consists of the gross amount which the debtor parted with.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer broadly enough to include recording a judgment against a debtor’s real property to create a lien securing a debt.

McWilliams v. Gordon (In Re Camp Rockhill, Inc.) · filed 1981-07-17(40)

Section 101(40) of the Code defines the term “transfer” as broadly as possible to include any disposition of property or an interest in property. ... We are convinced that the taking and recording of a judgment against the debtor’s real property, thereby creating a lien and security for a debt, constitutes a transfer within the purview of section 547.

Section 101(40) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include a debtor’s bank deposit even when the bank places the funds in a different account without the debtor’s direction.

Redmond v. Tuttle (In Re Tuttle) · filed 1981-10-22(40)

Since the debtors’ deposits were clearly the type of transfer contemplated by the bankruptcy code, their final argument raised on appeal must also fail.

Section 101(40) includes a real estate attachment within the definition of a transfer.

Sid Kumines, Inc. v. Wolf (In Re Wolf) · filed 1981-07-30(40)

The parties here do not dispute the fact that the attachment obtained by Kumins is considered a transfer for purposes of § 547. This Court concurs with that analysis.

Section 101(40)'s definition of transfer does not include declaring or increasing a homestead exemption.

In Re McDaniel · filed 1981-08-07(40)

The declaration of or an increase in, a homestead exemption is neither a transfer nor an obligation incurred.

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include an involuntary seizure of a debtor’s property.

Butz v. Bancohio National Bank (In Re Toriello) · filed 1981-08-26(40)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term, transfer, broadly to include the instant involuntary seizure of debtor’s property.

Section 101(40) defines “transfer” to include a transfer of a security interest.

Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In Re Burnette) · filed 1981-10-26(40)

“Transfer” includes a transfer of a security interest, not just transfers of cash.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include an involuntary disposition of property, such as a sheriff’s levy.

Rocky Mountain Ethanol Systems, Inc. v. Mann, Inc. (In Re Rocky Mountain Ethanol Systems, Inc.) · filed 1981-12-01(40)

First, preferential transfers require a “transfer,” defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(40) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” Nonconsensual transfers, such as executions or other liens obtained through judicial proceedings, fall within this definition.

Section 101(40) defines “transfer” broadly enough to include an assignment of part of a debtor’s tax refund proceeds to a spouse.

Butz v. Wheeler (In Re Wheeler) · filed 1981-12-04(40)

The Court does note, however, that, under the Code’s broad definition of “transfer,” Mr. Wheeler’s “assignment” did constitute a “transfer” of one-half of the check proceeds since the proceeds in their entirety were Mr. Wheeler’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) defines a transfer to include a judicial lien or attachment.

Whitlock v. Worrall (In Re American Aluminum Window Corp.) · filed 1981-12-09(40)

That a judicial lien or attachment is a transfer within the expansive definition of 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) has previously been treated within this memorandum.

A lien debtors grant to secure an obligation is a voluntary transfer.

Owens v. National Boulevard Bank (In Re Smith) · filed 1981-12-17(40)

The lien the Smiths gave to the National Boulevard Bank was a voluntary transfer.

Section 101(40) includes a creditor’s recovery of money through satisfaction of a writ of execution within the definition of a transfer.

Seidle v. Kwik Copy, Inc. (In Re Belize Airways Ltd.) · filed 1982-02-26(40)

The recovery of the sum of $3,817.26 by the Defendant pursuant to the return and satisfaction of the writ of execution is a transfer as that term is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).

Section 101(40) defines transfer broadly enough to include a garnishment lien.

Eggleston v. Third National Bank (In Re Eggleston) · filed 1982-03-29(40)

11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest." This definition is broad enough to include a garnishment lien.

Section 101(40) broadly defines a transfer to include a judgment lien on the debtor’s real estate.

Camacho v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Sterling (In re Camacho) · filed 1982-03-30(40)

Accordingly, under the broad definition of “transfer”, the transfer of the debt- or’s interest for the purpose of any possible preference to a creditor on behalf of an antecedent indebtedness occurred when the transfer was so far completed that it was effective as against a bona fide purchaser.

Section 101 treats the recording of a deed of trust, rather than its later non-judicial foreclosure, as the transfer in these circumstances.

Alsop v. Alaska, Commissioner of Revenue for the Public Employees Retirement Fund (In Re Alsop) · filed 1982-05-05

This appeal presents a single issue of law: does a non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust constitute a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101? The bankruptcy judge held that it does not and this appeal followed. ... The transfer in this case, therefore, occurred when the deed of trust was recorded and was not within the year preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. ... The decision of the bankruptcy judge is AFFIRMED.

Section 101(40) treats the filing of a financing statement that perfects a security interest as a transfer.

Knauer v. Enlow (In Re Enlow) · filed 1982-06-01(40)

The filing of a financing statement, thereby perfecting a security interest, Ind. Code Ann. § 26-1-9-401 (Burns 1974), constitutes a transfer under Section 101(40) of the Code.

Section 101(40) covers the transfer of garnished wages paid to a creditor when the debtor retained title to the funds under state law.

Conner v. Mount Carmel Country Estates (In re Conner) · filed 1982-07-13(40)

Thus, the transfer of garnishment funds is clearly the transfer of property of the debtor within the ambit of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(40) and 547.

Section 101(40)’s definition of transfer includes the creation of a garnishment lien.

In Re Fagan · filed 1982-08-17(40)

Within the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer occurs when the garnishment lien of the debtor’s judgment creditor is created.

Section 101(40) defines a transfer broadly enough to include a debtor’s payment by check.

Hertzberg v. H. Hirschfield & Sons, Inc. (In Re Caro Products, Inc.) · filed 1982-09-29(40)

First, Section 101(40) of the Code defines ... the term “transfer” to include “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest.” At bar, a transfer clearly occurred. Caro parted with money when it paid Defendant by check on August 14, 1979.

Section 101(40) treats an insider’s reduction of his debt to the corporation as a transfer when the claimed setoff is rejected.

Moore v. Grasso (In Re Formaggio Mfg., Inc.) · filed 1982-10-14(40)

The application of equitable principles to the facts in this proceeding requires that the Defendant’s claim of setoff be rejected and that the transaction be treated as a transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(40).