Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401

Subsection (2)(a) makes delivery of a Schedule I or II narcotic drug a class B felony punishable by up to ten years.

State Of Washington, V Edward Junior Pinkney, Iii · filed 2016-12-13(2)(a)

Under RCW 69.50.401(1)-(2)(a), a person who manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver a “controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug . . . is guilty of a class B felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten years.” ... Accordingly, the object of Pinkney’s conspiracy was the class B felony of delivering the schedule II narcotic drug of cocaine, which was punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) (1998); RCW 69.50.401(1)-(2)(a).

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver; possession alone does not establish intent to deliver, and at least one additional factor indicating that intent is required.

State Of Washington v. Whitaker · filed 2017-07-24(1)

As the trial court correctly observed, the law is well settled that possession of drugs, without more, does not raise an inference of the intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) is overbroad compared with the federal drug-trafficking definition because Washington accomplice liability requires only knowledge rather than the federal specific intent, and the statute is not divisible as to principal and accomplice liability.

United States v. Valdivia-Flores · filed 2017-12-07(a)

Under a straightforward application of the categorical approach, Washington’s drug trafficking statute is overbroad compared to its federal analogue, and Valdivia-Flores’s conviction cannot support an aggravated felony determination. ... Because a jury need not distinguish between principals and accomplices, the drug trafficking statute is not divisible so far as the distinction between those roles is concerned, so the modified categorical approach may not be applied, and it was error for the district court to do so.

Section 69.50.401(2) makes possession with intent to deliver cocaine a class B felony, while possession with intent to deliver an unspecified other controlled substance supports only the lower class C felony sentencing range.

State Of Washington v. Ibrahim · filed 2018-01-16(2)

Possession with intent to deliver cocaine is a class B felony, punishable by a sentence of up to 10 years. Possession with intent to deliver other controlled substances are class C felonies, punishable by up to 5 years. RCW 9A.20.021(1); RCW 69.50.206(b)(4); RCW 69.50.401(2).

Section 69.50.401 is categorically overbroad because Washington's aiding-and-abetting liability is broader than the generic federal definition, and the statute is indivisible, so the modified categorical approach cannot be applied.

United States v. Paniagua-Paniagua · filed 2018-01-29(2)(b)

We agree with Appellant that Washington’s definition of aiding and abetting liability is broader than the generic federal definition and that the implicit nature of aiding and abetting liability in every criminal charge renders Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 categorically overbroad. United States v. Valdivia-Flores, No. 15-50384, 2017 WL 6044232 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2017). We also agree that Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 is indivisible, thus precluding application of the modified categorical approach. Id.

Section 69.50.401(2)(b) sets a 10-year statutory maximum for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and a sentence including community custody may not exceed that maximum.

State Of Washington, V Allen · filed 2018-03-06(2)(b)

Allen also argues that, after factoring in community custody, his total sentence of 123 months exceeds the 10 year statutory maximum for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. RCW 69.50.401(2)(b). Allen is correct. With respect to Allen’s methamphetamine conviction, the sentencing court imposed a standard range sentence of 51 months, to which it added 24 months for the bus stop enhancement and 36 months for the firearm enhancement. The court also imposed 12 months of community custody, bringing Allen’s total sentence for this count to 123 months. The State acknowledges Allen’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum by three months, and recommends resentencing.

Section 69.50.401(1), when applied through Washington’s accomplice-liability rule, reaches drug-trafficking conduct with a less demanding mental state than generic federal law, so it is broader than the generic federal drug-trafficking offense and is not categorically an ACCA serious drug offense.

United States v. Franklin · filed 2018-09-13(1)

A conviction under Washington’s accomplice liability statute renders its drug trafficking law broader than generic federal drug trafficking laws under the INA and, as we hold now, under the ACCA. Washington’s drug trafficking law is thus not categorically a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA.

Section 69.50.401(2)(a) authorizes up to 10 years’ imprisonment for violations involving Schedule I or II narcotics.

State Of Washington, V Miguel A. Trujeque-magana And Luciano Rios · filed 2019-02-06(2)(a)

RCW 69.50.401(2)(a) states that violations of that section for schedule I or II narcotics are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment.

Section 69.50.401(2)(a) classifies possession with intent to distribute Schedule I or II narcotics as a class B felony, subject to a maximum sentence of ten years’ confinement.

State Of Washington, V. Purves · filed 2023-02-28(2)(a)

Possession with intent to distribute Schedule I and II narcotics is identified as a class B felony in RCW 69.50.401(2)(a). ... Thus, the statutory maximum is ten years or 120 months confinement, but Purves was sentenced to 120 months confinement for each count (concurrent) plus 12 months of community custody.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and an intended placement of the substance in a shared container for another person to access may constitute constructive transfer.

State Of Washington v. Smith · filed 2018-12-03(1)

Smith's intent to transfer the methamphetamine to his girlfriend is plainly indicated by this evidence as a matter of logical probability. The intended transfer to a container in the bedroom was constructive because Smith planned to place the methamphetamine in a container to share with his girlfriend. As a result, the prosecutor's statement that such evidence constituted constructive transfer was not improper.

For unlawful delivery, the identity of the controlled substance is an essential element when it changes the maximum sentence, and delivery of heroin carries the higher felony classification.

State Of Washington, V Waldeck · filed 2019-03-26(2)(b)

Here, the identity of the substance that the State alleged Waldeck delivered, heroin, was an essential element because it exposed him to greater punishment. See Gonzalez, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 106. Delivery of heroin is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of ten years, whereas delivery of other controlled substances is a class C felony with a maximum sentence of five years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(b), (c).

Section 69.50.401 classifies delivery of heroin as a class B felony and delivery of an unspecified controlled substance as a class C felony, making the substance’s identity material to the offense and maximum sentence.

State Of Washington, V. Rasmussen · filed 2023-03-28(2)(a), (2)(c)

Rasmussen was charged under RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (heroin). Delivery of heroin is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 10 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(a). In contrast, delivery of “controlled substances” is a class C felony with a maximum sentence of 5 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(c); RCW 9A.20.021.

Under § 69.50.401(2)(b) and (2)(a)(i), separate convictions for possessing different controlled substances with intent to distribute are permitted because each conviction requires proof that the defendant possessed and intended to deliver the specific substance charged.

State Of Washington v. Stone · filed 2019-03-26(2)(b) and (2)(a)(i)

Stone was convicted for possessing three different controlled substances with intent to distribute. Each count was charged as a violation of RCW 69.50.401, under two different subsections. Stone’s methamphetamine count was charged as a violation of RCW 69.50.401(2)(b), while his hydrocodone and oxycodone counts were each charged as violations of RCW 69.50.401(2)(a)(i). As in O’Neal, we use the same evidence test where the convictions for possessing with intent to distribute different substances come under separate statutory subsections. ... Applying the same evidence test in this case, each count requires proof of an element that the other does not. Each count required the State to prove that Stone possessed and intended to deliver that specific substance. Stone’s three convictions did not violate his double jeopardy rights.

Delivery of methamphetamine is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 10 years.

State of Washington v. Jones · filed 2017-04-27(2)(b)

Delivery of methamphetamine is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 10 years of incarceration. RCW 69.50.401(2)(b).

Subsection (2)(b) sets a 10-year maximum sentence for delivery of methamphetamine.

State of Washington v. Cobos · filed 2019-05-02(2)(b)

The maximum sentence for delivery of methamphetamine is 10 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(b).

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, unless authorized by the chapter.

State of Washington v. Berrian · filed 2019-07-11(1)

Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. ... Defense counsel correctly concluded that the Georgia statute was not broader than the Washington statute and acknowledged that the Georgia crime was legally comparable to a Washington crime. We conclude the trial court did not err when it agreed that the Georgia crime was comparable to a Washington crime.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) is no broader than the federal Controlled Substances Act because the federal Act's prohibition on dispensing includes administering a controlled substance.

Bourtzakis v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-10-09(a)(1)(i)

The federal Act prohibits not only “distribut[ing]” a controlled substance, but also “dispens[ing]” a controlled substance. ... And “dispens[ing]” means “to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance.” ... So the federal Act’s prohibition of dispensing a controlled substance includes “administering” a controlled substance, and the Washington statute is no broader than the federal Act in this respect.

Former RCW 69.50.401 classified possession of marijuana as a misdemeanor and possession of other controlled substances as a felony.

State Of Washington, Resp/cross-app v. Bradley Michael Martin, App/cross-resp · filed 2019-12-16(d)-(e)

The federal statute classified possession of all controlled substances as a misdemeanor for first time offenders. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). RCW 9.94A.525(3) provides that federal convictions shall be classified according to comparable Washington offense definitions and sentences.1 So, the federal offense should be classified according to its Washington counterpart: possession of marijuana is a misdemeanor, while possession of other controlled substances is a felony. Former RCW 69.50.401 (d)-(e) (1996).

Section 69.50.401(1) and (2)(b) classify unlawful possession of methamphetamine or heroin with intent to deliver as class B felonies punishable by up to 10 years of confinement.

State Of Washington, V. Labounty · filed 2021-05-18(1) and (2)(b)

Both unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of heroin with intent to deliver are class B felonies, with statutory maximums of 10 years (120 months) confinement. RCW 69.50.401(1) and (2)(b).

Section 69.50.401(2)(b) classifies delivery of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver as class B felonies.

State of Washington v. Waltari · filed 2019-12-12(2)(b)

RCW 69.50.401(2)(b) explicitly lists delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (methamphetamine) as class B felonies.

Section 69.50.401(3) treats compliance with the listed lawful marijuana activities as an exception to the manufacturing offense that the defendant must prove.

State of Washington v. Carlos Negrete, Jr. · filed 2018-04-12(3)

As the State contends, those are plainly exceptions to the proscribed criminal conduct in subsection (1) and provide a basis for a person to defend against charges or claim exemption from prosecution.

Section 69.50.401(3) exempts marijuana production from violating chapter 69.50 or other Washington law only when it complies with the terms of RCW 69.50.366.

U4ik Gardens LLP, V State Liquor Control Board · filed 2021-07-20(3)

RCW 69.50.401 makes it illegal to possess controlled substances with the intent to manufacture or deliver except as authorized by chapter 69.50 RCW. RCW 69.50.401(3) states that “[t]he production . . . of marijuana in compliance with the terms set forth in RCW . . . 69.50.366 shall not constitute a violation of this section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington state law.” ... Thus, failure to comply with the Board’s regulations violates RCW 69.50.366 and therefore constitutes a violation of chapter 69.50 RCW.

Section 69.50.401(a)(i) makes it a crime to knowingly deliver heroin to another person.

State v. Bernal · filed 2001-11-09(a)(i)

Count II charged delivery of heroin to a minor in violation of RCW 69.50.401(a)(i) and RCW 69.50.406(a). According to the first of those statutes, a person is guilty of that crime if he or she knowingly delivers heroin to another.

An information charging possession with intent to manufacture or deliver under subsection (a) need not expressly allege guilty knowledge if it follows the statute’s language.

State v. Sims · filed 1990-09-10(a)

To summarize, the information here followed the language of the statute which clearly defined a crime. The nonstatutory element of guilty knowledge created by case law, which the State is required to prove for a conviction under RCW 69.50.401(a) (State v. Boyer, supra), was not necessary for an adequate statement or definition of the crime charged. Therefore, it was not necessary to include it in the information to satisfy constitutional requirements.

An information charging unlawful delivery in the language of § 69.50.401(a) need not expressly allege guilty knowledge, an implied element of the offense.

State v. Johnson · filed 1990-12-18(a)

Under both State v. Smith, 104 Wn.2d 497, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985) and Sims, an information which charges a crime in the language of RCW 69.50.401(a) is sufficient, and it is not necessary to include the nonstatutory element of guilty knowledge.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) covers cocaine as a narcotic drug because cocaine is a derivative of coca leaves.

State v. Valdobinos · filed 1993-09-09(a)(1)(i)

He maintains cocaine is not a narcotic drug, and it therefore cannot form the basis of a violation of RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i), which requires the substance to be both a scheduled drug and a narcotic. That argument plainly fails an examination of the pertinent statute. Contrary to Valdobinos1 s assertion, cocaine is a narcotic drug under the statute, because it is a derivative of coca leaves.