Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the required culpable mental state is intent to deliver.

State v. Atsbeha · filed 2001-02-01(a)

The statutory elements for this crime include (1) unlawful possession of (2) a controlled substance (3) with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that the defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

State v. Valencia · filed 2009-01-13

To convict Sanchez Valencia and Sanchez of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove that they (1) unlawfully possessed (2) a controlled substance (3) with intent to deliver.

(1) makes it a crime to unlawfully possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver it; intent to deliver may be inferred from possession plus additional facts suggesting a sale, but not from possession alone.

State v. O'CONNOR · filed 2010-03-18(1)

The elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) are (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance. Intent to deliver may be inferred where the evidence shows both possession and facts suggestive of a sale. State v. Hagler, 74 Wash.App. 232, 236, 872 P.2d 85 (1994). Mere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver. State v. Lopez, 79 Wash.App. 755, 768, 904 P.2d 1179 (1995). At least one additional fact must exist, such as a large amount of cash or sale paraphernalia, suggesting an intent to deliver. Hagler, 74 Wash.App. at 236, 872 P.2d 85 (large amount of cocaine and $342 sufficient to establish intent to deliver); State v. Lane, 56 Wash.App. 286, 297-98, 786 P.2d 277 (1989) (one ounce of cocaine, large amount of cash, and scales). Here, the large amount of marijuana, the sophistication of the grow operation, and the scale sufficiently support an intent-to-deliver inference to convict.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and intent to deliver requires an additional factor supporting that inference beyond possession.

State v. Slighte · filed 2010-08-24(a)

To convict Slighte of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Slighte unlawfully possessed (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. RCW 69.50.401(a). Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver requires proof of both drug possession and some additional factor supporting an inference of intent to deliver it.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess marijuana with intent to deliver, and conviction requires proof of possession plus intent to deliver.

State v. Reichert · filed 2010-11-02(1)

To prove that Reichert committed unlawful possession of a controlled substance — marijuana—with intent to deliver, the State had to show that he or an accomplice (1) possessed marijuana (2) with the intent to deliver. RCW 9A.08.020(3); RCW 69.50.401(1), (2)(c). ... Mere possession of drugs, without more, does not raise an inference of the intent to deliver. ... Rather, the State must prove at least one additional factor, suggesting a sale and not mere possession, to corroborate the defendant’s intent to deliver. ... We hold that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Reichert had the intent to deliver the marijuana he constructively possessed.

Under § 69.50.401(1), proof that a person possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver necessarily establishes the required knowledge, so no separate guilty-knowledge element is required.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-08-30(1)

It is impossible for a person to intend to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance without knowing what he or she is doing. By intending to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, one necessarily knows what controlled substance one possesses as one who acts intentionally acts knowingly. . . . Therefore, there is no need for an additional mental element of guilty knowledge. State v. Sims, 119 Wash.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992). Accordingly, the instruction was not deficient for failing to state that Jones "knowingly, unlawfully, and feloniously" possessed the substance with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

Under RCW 69.50.401(1), the intent-to-deliver element may be satisfied by an agreement for delivery of marijuana to the intended recipient; no agreement for a later delivery beyond that recipient is required.

State Of Washington, App. v. Keith Thomas Blair, Res. · filed 2013-02-25(1)

We disagree with Blair's contention that the State was required to establish that an agreement existed between Blair and Yates to deliver marijuana to individuals other than Yates or Blair. The intent to deliver element was satisfied by evidence of an agreement between Blair and Yates whereby Dunham would deliver the marijuana she possessed to Yates outside of the jail. Evidence that Yates and Blair agreed that the marijuana would be delivered beyond Yates's possession once he received it was not necessary.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver; knowingly is inherent in the required mental state of intent.

State of Washington v. Richard Eugene Cornwell, Jr. · filed 2015-02-24(1)

To convict Mr. Cornwell of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) unlawfully possessed (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401 (1).

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the same controlled substance he intended to deliver, and circumstantial evidence such as packaging, a scale, cash, and a ringing phone may establish intent to deliver.

State of Washington v. Marquette · filed 2015-03-17(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) provides, in relevant part: "Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." ... Larry Marquette is correct that the State must prove a defendant possessed the same controlled substance he intended to deliver. ... Although the two weighings of methamphetamine differed, the trial court considered the discrepancy and found it did not call into question the validity of the evidence. The trial court also considered the attendant circumstances and found the evidence sufficient to reasonably infer intent to deliver. Those circumstances included small baggies, a scale, cash, and a repeatedly ringing cell phone in Marquette's possession. Sufficient evidence supports the conviction.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and intent to deliver cannot be inferred from mere possession alone but may be inferred from possession plus at least one additional factor.

State Of Washington v. Scott · filed 2016-04-18(1)

"[I]t is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." RCW 69.50.401(1). To convict Scott of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the jury was required to find that each of the following elements of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt: ...

The offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver does not require proof that the defendant owns or rents the location where the drugs were found.

State Of Washington v. Sanabria · filed 2016-05-03(1), (2)(b)

But officers testified that they discovered photographs of Sanabria, his driver’s license, and photo IDs. They also testified that Sanabria’s mother owned the trailer. The jury was entitled to weigh this evidence of Sanabria’s relationship to the double-wide, as well as his possession of the methamphetamine on his person. Sanabria’s ownership or rental agreement over the double-wide where the search occurred was not an element of the charged offense. RCW 69.50.401. Thus, we hold that the evidence supported the charge and conviction.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both unlawful possession of a controlled substance and intent to deliver for a conviction of possession with intent to deliver.

State of Washington v. Ramirez · filed 2014-10-23(1)

To be convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance and had the intent to deliver the controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(1) does not require proof of an actual drug sale; possession with intent to deliver requires an intent to transfer the controlled substance to another person.

State of Washington v. Huerta · filed 2016-02-02(1)

Under RCW 69.50.401 and a companion federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l), the State need not prove a sale of a drug, only an intent to transfer drugs from one person to another.

Section 69.50.401(1) and (2)(b) prohibits manufacturing, delivering, or possessing methamphetamine with intent to manufacture or deliver, and a conviction may rest on principal or accomplice liability when the evidence establishes possession with intent to deliver.

State Of Washington, Res/cross-appellant v. Jesus Solis-vazquez, App/cross-respondent · filed 2017-01-24(1) and (2)(b)

Under RCW 69.50.401(1) and (2)(b), it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver methamphetamine. ... In sum, the untainted overwhelming evidence would necessarily lead to a finding that Solis-Vazquez possessed methamphetamine with intent to deliver pursuant to RCW 69.50.401(1) and (2)(b) under either principal or accomplice liability. We hold that even assuming the admission of Deputy Spaulding’s statement was manifest constitutional error, any error was harmless in light of the untainted overwhelming evidence.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver it.

State Of Washington v. Greene · filed 2017-03-13(1)

Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed Greene and Fortson were associated with each other and that Greene was not merely present. Officer Edison observed them stand together and act in concert through three transactions with three different individuals, exchange drugs for money, and leave the area shoulder to shoulder. In each transaction, the buyer approached them, made contact with Greene, and Greene directed the buyer to Fortson. Officer Edison saw Greene give rocks of cocaine to Fortson and saw Fortson exchange the rocks of cocaine with customers for money. ... We can reasonably infer from the direct and circumstantial evidence that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt in both the first and second trial.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that the defendant possessed methamphetamine and intended to distribute it; possession alone, even of an amount exceeding usual personal use, does not establish intent to deliver, and constructive possession requires dominion and control.

State Of Washington v. Barnes · filed 2017-10-10

Here, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Barnes possessed methamphetamine (2) with the intent to distribute it. RCW 69.50.401. Possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive. ... And possession of a controlled substance, standing alone, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver, even if the amount is greater than is deemed usual for personal use. ... Generally, at least one factor, in addition to possession and suggestive of sale, is required to establish an inference of intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and conviction requires proof of intent to deliver but not an actual sale or delivery.

State of Washington v. Mata · filed 2018-01-04(1)

Under the crime of possession with intent to deliver, the State need not show a sale or even a delivery of a controlled substance, only an intent to deliver at some time in the past or future.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the court held the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for that offense.

State Of Washington v. Eddie Monk · filed 2018-03-13(1)

Under RCW 69.50.401(1), “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” ... Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Monk of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof of possession of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor indicating intent to deliver to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to deliver.

State Of Washington, V Hayes · filed 2018-05-08

The law is well settled that mere possession of drugs, without more, does not raise an inference of the defendant’s intent to deliver a controlled substance. State v. Reichert, 158 Wn. App. 374, 391, 242 P.3d 44 (2010). The State must prove possession of narcotics and at least one additional factor that indicates an intent to deliver in order to convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 783, 83 P.3d 410 (2004).

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver it.

State Of Washington v. Tammy Rush · filed 2018-10-09

To convict Rush of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she (1) possessed (2) a controlled substance (3) with intent to deliver the controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401. ... The evidence was also sufficient to prove that Rush possessed the methamphetamine with intent to deliver. In addition to the large quantity of methamphetamine found by officers, officers found several items in the garage on January 30, 2015 associated with drug delivery, including a digital scale and packaging material. ... In light of the evidence described above, Rush’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting her convictions lacks merit.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled substance and intended to transfer it to another person; possession alone cannot establish intent to deliver without an additional factor corroborating a sale.

State of Washington v. Alatorre · filed 2019-03-19(1)

In order to prove the charge, the State was required to establish both that Ms. Alatorre possessed the methamphetamine and that she intended to transfer it to another person. RCW 69.50.401(1). Merely possessing drugs is insufficient to allow an inference of intent to deliver. State v. Reichert, 158 Wn. App. 374, 391, 242 P.3d 44 (2010). Instead, there must be “at least one additional factor, suggesting a sale and not mere possession, to corroborate the defendant’s intent to deliver.” Id.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of possession of a controlled substance together with the intent to deliver for a possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction.

State Of Washington v. Hayes · filed 2019-09-17(1)

For possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... Viewing the above evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hayes constructively possessed the methamphetamine and oxycodone. Therefore, Hayes’s insufficiency of the evidence challenge to the possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver and possession of a controlled substance (oxycodone) convictions fail.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver, requiring the State to prove possession and intent to deliver.

State Of Washington v. Gloria N. Iniguez Gonzalez · filed 2019-10-22(1)

To prove possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, the State had to show Iniguez Gonzalez possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it. RCW 69.50.401(1), (2)(b). ... Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, the evidence supported a conclusion that Iniguez Gonzalez provided her van and was aiding in the delivery of drugs, and therefore acted as an accomplice. For the reasons stated above, we hold that Iniguez Gonzalez’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver was supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 69.50.401(1) criminalizes possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the substance's identity is immaterial to that statutory intent.

State of Washington v. Swarers · filed 2019-12-05(1)

Former RCW 69.50.401(1) provides that it is unlawful to “possess with intent to . . . deliver, a controlled substance.” Under this statute, the accused commits the crime with an intent to deliver any controlled substance and the identity of the substance is immaterial.

Section 69.50.401 prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the offense may be established through constructive possession or accomplice participation that facilitates the possession.

State Of Washington v. Sumbundu · filed 2019-12-16

Constructive possession means the defendant does not have actual physical possession but rather dominion and control over the controlled substance. ... The totality of the circumstances and the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the State supports the jury finding that Sumbundu had dominion and control over the kilogram of cocaine the police seized from the trunk of his car. ... Here, the jury could reasonably find Sumbundu aided, encouraged, and promoted Hilal in the commission of the crime and was an accomplice involved in the possession of the kilogram of cocaine with the intent to deliver. When considering accomplice liability, whether one or the other of the accomplices “actually possessed” the controlled substance is not dispositive. ... The focus is on whether the defendant by his “presence and actions” attempted to facilitate possession with intent to deliver. ... We conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury finding Sumbundu guilty of possession of a kilogram of cocaine with intent to deliver.

Subsection (1) requires proof of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; intent to deliver may be inferred from a significant quantity plus at least one additional indicator.

State Of Washington v. Avery · filed 2020-01-22(1)

In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... But a finder of fact can infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor. ... Here, both Riley and Hall testified that the amount of methamphetamine that Avery possessed was far more than a typical user would possess. This evidence supported an inference that Avery intended to deliver the drug because of the quantity she possessed. Further, three additional factors supported the jury’s finding that Avery possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and intended to deliver it; possession may be actual or constructive, and mere possession alone does not establish intent to deliver.

State Of Washington, V Kyllo · filed 2020-02-11

To convict Kyllo of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) possessed (2) a controlled substance (3) with intent to deliver the controlled substance. Former RCW 69.50.401 (2015).

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it a crime to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and requires proof of unlawful possession, a controlled substance, and intent to deliver.

State Of Washington, V. Jim Delarosa Castilla Whitehawk · filed 2021-05-25(1)

Generally, it is a crime “for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” RCW 69.50.401(1). In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1).

Section 69.50.401(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver it.

State of Washington v. Delesdernier · filed 2020-12-22(1)

In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant (1) unlawfully possessed, (2) a controlled substance, (3) with the intent to deliver the controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and intent may be inferred from a significant quantity plus at least one additional fact suggesting distribution; the offense does not require proof of a sale for profit.

State Of Washington, V. Canales · filed 2022-01-03(1)

In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... As a general rule, however, “[m]ere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver.” ... A finder of fact may infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional fact suggesting the intent to deliver. ... We conclude there is more than sufficient evidence to prove Canales’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Because Canales’s conduct could not be charged under both RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.60.410, the State did not abuse its discretion in charging Canales with possession with intent to deliver heroin rather than the sale or attempted sale of that controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; intent may be inferred from a significant amount of the substance plus an additional factor such as cash or sale paraphernalia.

State Of Washington, V. Moreno · filed 2022-04-19(1)

For possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove (1) possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... Generally, “[m]ere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver.” ... But a factfinder can infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor, “such as a large amount of cash or sale paraphernalia.”

For possession of heroin or methamphetamine with intent to deliver, subsection (2)(a) carries a 10-year statutory maximum, which may be doubled for an offense committed in a public park under RCW 69.50.435.

State Of Washington, V. Allen · filed 2022-05-24(2)(a)

Relevant here, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is a felony and carries a 10 year statutory maximum sentence when the controlled substance is heroin or methamphetamine. RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), (b). The statutory maximum sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver can be doubled if the offense takes place in a public park. RCW 69.50.435(1)(e), (j). ... By doubling the statutory maximum sentences, the trial court correctly lengthened the statutory maximum sentences to 20 years, which brought the length of the corresponding firearm enhancements to 60 months. See RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), (b); RCW 9.94A.533(3)(a).

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and a separate intent to deliver, with intent requiring at least one additional fact beyond possession that suggests delivery.

State of Washington v. Grout · filed 2022-06-21(1)

The elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) are (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance. State v. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010). Each of these elements are separate and require specific proof. For example, proof of the element of possession is not by itself sufficient to also prove the element of intent to deliver. See Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d at 7. This is true even when the amount of drugs possessed exceed what would be expected of simple possession. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. at 290. To prove intent to deliver, “[a]t least one additional fact must exist,” beyond mere possession “such as a large amount of cash or sale paraphernalia, suggesting an intent to deliver.” Id.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver it.

State of Washington v. Edwards · filed 2022-09-27(1)

To convict Mr. Edwards of possession of heroin with intent to deliver, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Edwards possessed the heroin for delivery. RCW 69.50.401(1), (2)(a); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). ... The evidence in this case was only of possession of more heroin than was typical for personal use. It was insufficient.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires the State to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance and intent to deliver.

State of Washington v. Hand · filed 2023-12-19(1)

In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. State v. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010); RCW 69.50.401(1). ... But a finder of fact can infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor, “such as a large amount of cash or sale paraphernalia.” ... Accordingly, we hold that sufficient evidence exists to convict Hand of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of heroin with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) punishes possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, so the rule in Blake concerning simple possession without mens rea does not apply.

State Of Washington, V. Soren Richard Olsen, Ii · filed 2024-01-22(1)

Olsen next argues that RCW 69.50.401, the possession statute he was convicted of violating, is unconstitutional because “knowingly is absent in this RCW.” He relies on State v. Blake, but the statute at issue in Blake punished simple possession without any mens rea or proof of an intent to commit an unlawful act. See 197 Wn.2d 170, 180, 183, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Blake does not apply to the statute Olsen was convicted of violating, which punishes possession with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and intended to deliver it to another.

State Of Washington, V. Guillermo Othon, Iii · filed 2024-04-09(1)

To establish possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and they had the intent to deliver the substance to another. Former RCW 69.50.401(1) (2019).

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and convictions for manufacture and possession with intent to deliver are distinct offenses for double-jeopardy purposes.

State Of Washington, V. Le · filed 2025-02-19(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) provides that except as authorized by law, “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” ... Further, under Maxfield’s application of the same evidence test, convictions for manufacture of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver do not violate double jeopardy. ... The offenses are different in both law and fact, so Le’s convictions for each are not barred by double jeopardy under the same evidence test.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of unlawful possession, intent to deliver, and a controlled substance, while subsection (2)(a)'s controlled-substance classification determines punishment but is not an element the State must prove to the jury.

State Of Washington, V. Favro · filed 2026-02-24(1), (2)(a)

The legal classification of the controlled substance, fentanyl, as a schedule I or schedule II narcotic or flunitrazepam is not an element of possession with intent to deliver; therefore, the State did not need to prove this to the jury. Rather, the classification of fentanyl by statute as a schedule II controlled substance is a pure legal question. RCW 69.50.206(c)(9).

Section 69.50.401(2)(a) makes possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver a class B felony with a 10-year statutory maximum.

Personal Restraint Petition of Michael Walter Wood · filed 2026-05-12(2)(a)

UPCS with intent to deliver is a class B felony with a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(a)-(b), RCW 9A.20.021(b).

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it, and the State must prove both possession and intent to deliver.

State of Washington v. Toral · filed 2025-02-13(1)

To prove Julian Toral possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, as the name of the crime suggests, the State must establish that Toral possessed the controlled substance and that he possessed the drug with the intent of delivering it.

A conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver requires substantial corroborating evidence beyond mere possession, but a jury may infer intent from the totality of objective facts and officer testimony.

State Of Washington V. Hoover · filed 2025-12-22(1)

Taken together, we hold that the objective facts and the officers’ various opinion testimony constitute “substantial corroborating evidence in addition to the mere fact of possession,” from which a rational trier of fact could infer Hoover’s intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of unlawful possession, intent to deliver, and a controlled substance, including proof of the substance’s identity.

State Of Washington, V. Blackburn · filed 2026-03-03(1)

“The elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(1) are (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to deliver (3) a controlled substance.”

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver; possession alone, even in quantities exceeding personal use, does not support that intent inference without an additional factor.

State Of Washington, V. Thomas · filed 2026-05-19(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to . . . possess [a controlled substance] with intent to . . . deliver.” “‘Mere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver.’” State v. Sprague, 16 Wn. App. 2d 213, 233, 480 P.3d 471 (2021) (quoting State v. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010)). There must be some additional factor that suggests intent. Id.

Section 69.50.401 prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; the offense may be proved through accomplice possession and intent without identifying the exact pills or intended buyers.

State Of Washington v. Edwards · filed 2016-03-01

Possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance required the State to prove that, on or about October 25, 2012, Job or an accomplice possessed a controlled substance and that he or an accomplice intended to deliver it. RCW 69.50.401. Contrary to Job’s contention, the State did not need to prove that Job supplied the exact pills that were to be delivered to DJ and Geeson or that he had the intent of selling specifically to them. Rather, the State only needed to show that Job was an accomplice to Michael’s and Frietas’s possession of the substance and their intent to distribute to DJ and Geeson.

The section requires proof of intent to deliver for a conviction.

State v. Gocken · filed 1994-02-08(a)

Likewise, proof of intent to deliver, necessary to support a conviction under RCW 69.50.401(a), is not required to support a conviction for use of drug paraphernalia.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1) makes possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it a crime.

State v. Fisher · filed 1994-07-21(a)(1)

We therefore find that the evidence was sufficient to support Fisher’s conviction for an accomplice to possession with the intent to deliver cocaine.

Section 69.50.401 prohibits possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

State of Washington v. Robertson · filed 2017-11-16

Under the current code, the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Cassie Robertson of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver requires intent to deliver.

State v. Rodriguez · filed 1991-07-10(a)

Intent to deliver is a statutory element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) treats delivery and possession with intent to deliver as the same crime; a separate conviction for possession with intent to deliver requires a distinct intent involving drugs possessed after the delivery.

State v. Garcia · filed 1992-05-18(a)

Thus, although delivery of a controlled substance is statutorily the same crime as possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (see RCW 69.50.401(a)), if the proof of the intent elements are distinct, a party can be convicted of both if the possession with intent to deliver charge is predicated upon the presence of controlled substances after the actual delivery at issue is made.

Section 69.50.401 treats manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver as separate offenses because each requires an element the other lacks.

State v. Maxfield · filed 1994-12-08

Therefore, in this case, each offense contained an element not contained in the other; hence, they are not the "same offense” and double jeopardy is not violated.

Under the 1977 version, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver carried a maximum term of five years.

State v. Cameron · filed 1996-01-19(a)(1)(ii)

According to RCW 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii), the maximum term for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver is five years.

Possession with intent to deliver requires specific intent to deliver a controlled substance.

State v. Hernandez · filed 1999-05-07(a)(1)

Specific intent to deliver a controlled substance is a statutory element of the crime of possession with intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(a)(1).

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits possessing prescribed oxycodone with intent to deliver it to another person.

State of Washington v. Knudson · filed 2024-02-06(1)

Knudson cites no law that excuses her from the crime because she possesses a ... 28 ... No. 38799-2-III State v. Knudson prescription, if she intends to deliver the medication to another person.

For possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the statute requires intent to deliver as the culpable mental state.

State v. Atsbeha · filed 2001-02-01(a)(1)(i)

The culpable mental state for the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) is intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent to deliver, and mere possession of a large quantity plus an officer's opinion is insufficient without additional evidence suggestive of sale.

State v. Huynh · filed 2001-06-11(a)

An inference of intent to deliver may not be based on “ ‘bare possession of a controlled substance, absent other facts and circumstances.’ ” ... Proof of mere possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance, without an additional factor, may not support a finding of intent to deliver. ... “The additional factor must be suggestive of sale as opposed to mere possession in order to provide substantial corroborating evidence of intent to deliver.” ... But a police officer’s opinion that a defendant possessed more drugs than normal for personal use is insufficient as corroborating evidence to establish intent to deliver. ... As an initial matter, Huynh’s mere possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance alone and the officers’ opinions that Huynh intended to deliver the cocaine do not support a finding of intent to deliver. ... We conclude that no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Huynh possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver based on the arguments presented by the State.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; significant quantity plus at least one additional factor may support the intent-to-deliver finding, while possession alone is insufficient.

State Of Washington v. Canning · filed 2019-02-13(1)

In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State had to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) of a controlled substance (3) with the intent to deliver. RCW 69.50.401(1). ... As a general rule, “[m]ere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver.” ... But a finder of fact can infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor. ... Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Canning possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Canning of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it to another person.

State Of Washington v. Van Damme Buth · filed 2017-03-28(1)

Intent to deliver a controlled substance to another person clearly is an element of the offense.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and intent may be inferred from a significant amount plus at least one additional factor.

State Of Washington v. Ryan · filed 2020-08-03(1)

In order to prove the offense with which Ryan was charged, the State had to prove that he (1) unlawfully possessed (2) a controlled substance with (3) the intent to deliver it. RCW 69.50.401(1). As a general rule, “[m]ere possession of a controlled substance, including quantities greater than needed for personal use, is not sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver.” State v. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010). However, a finder of fact may infer intent to deliver from possession of a significant amount of a controlled substance plus at least one additional factor. O’Connor, 155 Wn. App. at 290.

The intent-to-deliver element cannot be inferred from possession of a controlled substance alone, regardless of the amount; at least one additional factor indicating a sale is required.

State of Washington v. Ortiz · filed 2022-10-13(1)(2)(a)

While the intent element can be inferred from the evidence, Washington case law forbids the inference of intent to deliver based on mere possession of a controlled substance regardless of volume, without at least one additional factor indicating sale.

Possession of nine rocks of cocaine weighing 1.3 grams, without additional evidence suggesting distribution, is insufficient to prove intent to deliver.

State v. Wade · filed 1998-10-16(a)(1)(f)

We agree with Wade that there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of intent to deliver those narcotics.

Under subsection (1), the quantity of drugs plus packaging suited to individual sales can support an inference of intent to deliver.

State Of Washington v. Broussard · filed 2020-04-28(1)

But the quantity of drugs plus the nature of the packaging supports an inference of possession with an intent to deliver the cocaine.

Under § 69.50.401(d), unwitting possession can defeat an unlawful-possession conviction, and whether that possession continued after discovery is a fact question for the jury.

State v. Staley · filed 1993-03-30(d)

Whether under all the circumstances his original unwitting possession reasonably continued until he was stopped by the police for driving while under the influence, 15 minutes later, on his way home is a question of fact for the jury, not an issue of law for the judge to decide.

Under § 69.50.401(a)(1)(i), possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana is not a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver.

State v. Hutchins · filed 1994-03-01(a)(1)(i)

Possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana is not a lesser included offense of intent to deliver.

For a prosecution under subsection (d), independent evidence that someone possessed a controlled substance makes a prima facie corpus-delicti showing; the State need not independently prove that the defendant specifically possessed it before introducing the defendant’s admissions.

State v. Solomon · filed 1994-04-11(d)

Possession of a controlled substance is not a crime of that nature. Rather, in a possession case, it is clear that a crime occurred if drugs are in the possession of someone; identity is not essential to establish the fact that a crime occurred. ... Thus, contrary to Solomon’s contention, the State did not need to present independent proof that Solomon, in particular, possessed the cocaine. ... Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the evidence showed that a quantity of cocaine was discovered in the bedroom of an inhabited apartment. The evidence therefore supports a logical and reasonable deduction that someone possessed a controlled substance. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the State presented prima facie proof, independent of Solomon’s extrajudicial admissions, which established the corpus delicti of the crime of possession of a controlled substance.

Under § 69.50.401(a), the State must allege and prove the specific identity of the controlled substance when that identity increases the offense's statutory maximum sentence.

State v. Goodman · filed 2004-01-15(a)(1)(ii)

We conclude under Apprendi the State must allege the specific identity of the controlled substance. Consequently, the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent and is hereby disapproved.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires the prosecution to allege and prove the specific controlled substance when that substance determines the applicable statutory maximum sentence.

State v. Goodman · filed 2004-01-15(a)

Therefore, the prosecution was obligated to allege and prove the substance Goodman possessed was methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof that the defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine to sustain a manufacturing conviction.

State v. Jacobs · filed 2004-03-23(a)

To convict a defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine, the State must prove that the defendant (1) intended to (2) manufacture methamphetamine. RCW 69.50.401(a).

The identity of the controlled substance is an essential element when it increases the maximum sentence; under former subsection (2)(b), possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine carried a maximum sentence of 10 years.

State v. Sibert · filed 2010-02-25(2)(b)

Under former RCW 69.50.401(2)(b) (2003), a conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine carried a maximum sentence of 10 years.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that the defendant delivered a controlled substance and knew it was a controlled substance.

State v. Shupe · filed 2012-12-11

The State had to prove that on or about September 9, 2009, Mr. Shupe delivered a controlled substance and knew it was a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401. ... We conclude that the evidence here was insufficient to support a conviction for delivery of a controlled substance in any event.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes a person guilty of controlled-substance manufacturing when the person prepares, processes, or produces a controlled substance.

State of Washington v. Walker · filed 2013-06-06(1)

A person is guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance when he prepares, processes, or produces a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.101(p); RCW 69.50.401(1). ... The evidence easily supports the jury's determination that manufacture of a controlled substance occurred at the Leckenby residence.

Section 69.50.401's controlled-substance distribution offense is incorporated into § 69.50.406, so a prosecution for distribution to a minor still requires proof that the substance distributed was a controlled substance.

State of Washington v. Crowder · filed 2016-12-01

The statute governing distribution to minors (RCW 69.50.406) incorporates the distribution statute (RCW 69.50.401) and simply adds elements regarding the age of the distributor and recipient. Compare RCW 69.50.401 with RCW 69.50.406. Given the State must prove the presence of a controlled substance in a normal distribution case, the same is necessarily true in a case alleging distribution to a minor.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant delivered a controlled substance to another, and possessing the oxycodone under a valid prescription does not preclude an unlawful-delivery conviction.

State Of Washington, V Moore · filed 2019-01-15(1)

The State had to prove that Moore delivered a controlled substance to another. RCW 69.50.401(1). It was undisputed at trial that Moore possessed the oxycodone with a valid prescription. At trial, the State presented evidence from Hotz that Moore admitted giving away oxycodone. And Scanlan testified that Moore had lent some oxycodone pills to a man that later paid him back once he got his own prescription filled. This was sufficient evidence to show an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of delivery and guilty knowledge—that the defendant knew the substance was a controlled substance—but not knowledge of its specific nature or identity.

State of Washington v. Backherms · filed 2020-05-12(1)

The elements of delivery are (1) delivery and (2) guilty knowledge. State v. Nunez-Martinez, 90 Wn. App. 250, 253, 951 P.2d 823 (1998); RCW 69.50.401(1). Proof of “guilty knowledge” is an essential element of the crime of delivering a controlled substance even though the statute does not contain a knowledge element. State v. Clark-El, 196 Wn. App. 614, 625, 384 P.3d 627 (2016). Guilty knowledge is “knowledge that the substance being delivered is a controlled substance.” State v. Nunez-Martinez, 90 Wn. App. at 254. But, the accused need not know the nature of the forbidden substance. State v. Hudlow, 182 Wn. App. 266, 285, 331 P.3d 90 (2014).

The statute makes possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a specified controlled substance a class B felony, while possession with intent to manufacture or deliver an unspecified controlled substance is a class C felony, so the specific substance must be found by the jury when it increases punishment.

State Of Washington, V. Rotter · filed 2025-02-18(2)(a), (2)(c)

All three substances elevate the crime of possession and intent to distribute to a class B felony. ... But the to-convict instruction required the jury to find only that Rotter had the intent to manufacture or deliver “a controlled substance,” which is a class C felony. ... Still, the court sentenced Rotter as if the jury found him guilty of a class B felony. ... The State concedes that sentencing Rotter to a class B felony without a finding from the jury that Rotter possessed a specific controlled substance was error. ... We accept the State’s concession and remand for resentencing on count 3.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof that the defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance, and coordinated conduct directing another person’s transfer can satisfy the delivery offense through accomplice liability.

State of Washington v. Reyes · filed 2025-02-25

To convict on delivery of a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance.

For manufacturing methamphetamine, the court may impose a discretionary fine whose first $3,000 must be deposited with the responsible law-enforcement agency for laboratory cleanup.

State v. Mayer · filed 2004-03-18(1)(a)(ii)

The $3,000 clean-up fee is a component of the fine the trial court may impose for manufacturing amphetamine or methamphetamine. RCW 69.50.401(1)(a)(ii). In other words, if the trial court imposes a discretionary fine for manufacturing methamphetamine, the first $3,000 collected from that fine "must be deposited with the law enforcement agency having responsibility for cleanup of laboratories, sites, or substances used in the manufacture of the methamphetamine," to be used for clean-up costs.

Section 69.50.401(2) permits, but does not require, a sentencing court to impose a $3,000 methamphetamine cleanup fee on a conviction for possessing methamphetamine.

State of Washington v. Jones · filed 2024-03-19(2)

RCW 69.50.401(2) authorizes the sentencing court to impose a $3,000 fee on a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in order to help defray law enforcement’s costs of eradicating the dangerous drug. Still, the fine is discretionary.

Section 69.50.401 permits manufacturing liability for indirectly participating in marijuana production by choosing to provide a grow site in a shared residence.

State of Washington v. Amie Nicole Braunstein aka Amie N. Meland · filed 2018-09-13

The trial court's instruction here defining manufacture was an accurate statement of law and allowed the State to argue Ms. Meland indirectly participated in manufacturing ... marijuana by choosing to provide her boyfriend a grow site. This was a viable theory of liability.

Section 69.50.401(a)'s manufacturing penalty does not apply to a pharmacy that repackages and relabels drugs in the course of its professional practice.

Farina v. Department of Health · filed 1999-03-02(a)

The Board imposed penalties on C.A.PS. under RCW 69.50.401(a) for manufacturing drugs without a license or registration. ... A pharmacy that repackages and relabels drugs in the course of its professional practice, as C.A.ES. does, is not manufacturing. Therefore, the controlled substance registration and penalty provisions of RCW 69.50 clearly do not apply.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits knowingly manufacturing a controlled substance, and manufacture includes preparing or processing it even when the defendant does not possess the completed drug.

State v. Keena · filed 2004-04-13(a)

The statutes answer yes. RCW 69.50.101(p) defines "[m]anufacture" as "the production, preparation, propogation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container." ... The evidence shows that Keena had in his house, in plain view, most of the objects and substances needed to "prepare" or "process" methamphetamine, and a rational trier applying RCW 69.50.101(p)s broad definition of manufacture could find that he was "preparing" or "processing" that drug. ... Based on all these authorities, we conclude that if the defendant had a combination of items that generally has no purpose other than the manufacture of methamphetamine, the evidence is sufficient to support reasonable inferences of "preparation" and "processing," and thus of manufacture, even if the evidence does not show that the defendant had the completed drug. As a result, the evidence is sufficient here.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) requires proof that the defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine.

State v. Jacobs · filed 2004-04-27(a)(1)(ii)

To convict a defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine, the State must prove that the defendant (1) intended to (2) manufacture methamphetamine.

Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) includes methamphetamine hydrochloride within its reference to methamphetamine.

State v. Malone · filed 2007-05-10(a)(1)(ii)

Thus, when the legislature used the word "methamphetamine" in former RCW 69.50.401 the word included "all forms of the substance." Id. Mr. Malone's argument is without merit.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof of a completed delivery of a controlled substance; an attempted delivery is insufficient.

State Of Washington, V. Pizano · filed 2023-12-05(1)

But the offense of delivery of a controlled substance requires proof of a ... completed delivery. Former RCW 69.50.401(1) (2019); former RCW 69.50.101(h) (2019).

Section 69.50.401(a) requires a completed delivery of a controlled substance, which means the transferor must relinquish possession or control to the transferee.

State v. Martinez · filed 2004-10-26(a)

The State had to prove that Martinez (1) delivered a controlled substance, and (2) knew the delivered substance was controlled. ... In other words, completing a "delivery," constructive or otherwise, requires the transferor to relinquish possession to the transferee. ... We hold, therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for completed delivery of a controlled substance.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires more than bare possession to prove intent to manufacture or deliver, and repackaging evidence may support an inference of intent to manufacture.

State of Washington v. Matz · filed 2013-08-29(1)

Bare possession of a controlled substance is not enough to support conviction for an intent to manufacture or deliver; at least one other factor supporting an inference of intent must exist. ... Here, Mr. Matz admitted that he bought 33 grams of heroin the day before his arrest and he had only 13 grams remaining when arrested. A number of individuals detained at the home at the time of the search were found to be carrying loaded syringes and one-Carrie Leslie-testified that Mr. Matz provided her with the syringe of heroin found in her purse. Evidence was presented that there were more baggies and dozens of clean syringes in the home. Accordingly, while it is true that some manufacture-repackaging almost 10 grams into the nine baggies-was completed, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Matz intended to further prepare, convert, or repackage the heroin in his possession into more usable form. Because the evidence was sufficient to prove the intent to both deliver and manufacture, we need not determine whether they are alternative means of committing the crime.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver; possession alone is insufficient, but additional evidence such as drugs, cash, scales, and baggies can support an inference of intent to deliver.

State Of Washington v. Potts · filed 2019-01-03(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful for any person to “possess with intent to manufacture or deliver” a controlled substance. In order to convict, the jury instructions in this case required that the jury find: “(1) That on or about November 12, 2015, the defendant possessed a controlled substance, [methamphetamine/heroin]; (2) That the defendant possessed the substance with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, [methamphetamine/heroin]; and (3) That the acts occurred in the State of Washington.” ... Mere possession of a controlled substance without more is insufficient to support a conviction of intent to deliver. ... In this case, the police found a large quantity of drugs, a scale with white crystal residue on it, $600 cash, $450 of which was on Potts’s person, and numerous plastic baggies associated with drug trafficking. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could conclude that Potts had the intent to deliver both methamphetamine and heroin. Sufficient evidence supports his convictions.

Section 69.50.401(a) requires proof of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, with intent to manufacture or deliver, and that the substance is controlled.

State Of Washington, V. Jensen · filed 2024-04-22(a)

Thus, to prove the crime charged in count 2, the State was required to prove (1) unlawful possession (2) with intent to manufacture or deliver (3) a controlled substance. Sims, 119 Wn.2d at 141 (citing RCW 69.50.401(a)).

The former subsection (a)(1)(i) offense of possessing cocaine with intent to manufacture or deliver was not invalidated by Blake because it retained an intent element.

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Allah Allah · filed 2022-11-17(a)(1)(i)

Mr. Allah’s second controlled substance conviction, for possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture or deliver in violation of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) is unaffected by Blake.

For manufacturing methamphetamine, the statute's doubled maximum is 20 years, supporting a 60-month firearm enhancement; manufacturing marijuana has a five-year maximum unless the court exercises discretion to double it, so without doubling the enhancement is 18 months rather than 36 months.

State v. O'NEAL · filed 2005-03-15(a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(iii)

Here, the trial court properly calculated the length of the 60-month firearm enhancement. Under the doubling statute, Greg's maximum sentence on the methamphetamine count was 20 years. Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii); RCW 69.50.408. Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed a 60-month firearm enhancement for the methamphetamine count. Former RCW 9.94A.510(3)(a). ... But the trial court erred when it imposed the 36-month firearm enhancement for the marijuana count. Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii). As noted, the statutory maximum sentence for the manufacture of marijuana is five years. A trial court has discretion to utilize the doubling provision of RCW 69.50.408. ... Exercising this discretion, the trial court did not double the maximum on the marijuana count. In its order amending the judgment and sentence, however, the trial court imposed a 36-month enhancement for the marijuana charge. ... But when the crime has a statutory maximum of five years, the trial court adds 18 months to the offender's sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.510(3)(c). The trial court incorrectly imposed the 36-month firearm enhancement.

Section 69.50.401 permits separate convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine and marijuana because those offenses differ in law and fact.

State v. O'Neal · filed 2005-03-15(1)

Greg further contends that because RCW 69.50.401 prohibits manufacture of “a controlled substance,” rather than specifying a particular substance, his convictions of methamphetamine and marijuana manufacture represent two convictions for the same crime. Because the manufacture of methamphetamine and marijuana differ both in law and in fact, this argument fails.

Section 69.50.401(a) prohibits manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and accomplice liability can apply without participation in every element.

State v. Galisia · filed 1992-01-21(a)

Clauses in both the Washington and the federal statutes distinguish between delivery or distribution alone, and possession with the intent to deliver or distribute. See RCW 69.50.401(a); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Washington courts, however, have not adopted the distinction made by the Jackson court and we decline to do so here. Accomplice liability in Washington is premised on the notion that a defendant need not participate in each element of the crime, nor need he share the same mental state that is required of the principal. See State v. Rotunno, 95 Wn.2d 931, 934, 631 P.2d 951 (1981); State v. Bookman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 491-92, 682 P.2d 925, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1002 (1984). Rather, it is the intent to facilitate another in the commission of a crime by providing assistance through his presence or his act that makes the accomplice criminally hable.

Section 69.50.401(d) and (e) treats possession as one unit of prosecution when the statute does not indicate that possessing drugs in different places supports multiple offenses, regardless of intent or source.

State v. Chenoweth · filed 2005-05-16(d), (e)

Former RCW 69.50.401(d), as the section at issue in Adel, former RCW 69.50.401(e), did not indicate whether the Legislature intended to punish a person multiple times for having amounts of the drug in more than one place within the person's actual or constructive possession. ... But the unit of prosecution test and the rule of lenity require a different result. Because the statute prohibits possession, regardless of intent or source, and nothing in the record suggests a separate unit of prosecution, double jeopardy concerns require dismissal of one count of possession.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) applies to possession with intent to deliver and delivery of amphetamine and methamphetamine in any form, including salts, with penalties determined by the amount involved.

State v. Cromwell · filed 2005-05-31(a)(1)(ii), (A)

We conclude instead that, depending upon the amount involved, the Legislature intended to penalize the possession with intent to deliver and delivery of amphetamine and methamphetamine in any form more harshly than the possession with intent and delivery of any other controlled substances listed in the Schedules.

Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) prohibits unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine, and a defendant may be convicted based on participation in an ongoing manufacturing process without possessing the final product.

State v. Poling · filed 2005-08-03(a)(1)(ii)

Poling further contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he manufactured methamphetamine. We disagree. ... Because manufacturing is often an ongoing process involving many steps, a defendant need not possess the final product in order to meet the statutory requirements of RCW 69.50.101(p). ... Thus, "a person who knowingly plays even a limited role in the manufacturing process is guilty, even if someone else completes the process." Davis, 117 Wash.App. at 708, 72 P.3d 1134. ... Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational fact finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Poling manufactured methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401 requires proof of knowing delivery of a controlled substance; testimony that Wilks supplied marijuana during the charging periods supported his delivery convictions.

State Of Washington, V Wilks · filed 2019-04-23

To prove Wilks was guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance to a minor, the State had to prove that Wilks knowingly delivered marijuana to BS and MR who were both under the age of 18 at the time, and that Wilks was at least three years older than BS and MR. RCW 69.50.401, .406(2). ... Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported Wilks’s convictions for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.

Under former § 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), sentencing for methamphetamine base requires a jury finding identifying that substance when the verdict could also rest on methamphetamine hydrochloride.

State v. Evans · filed 2005-08-23(a)(1)(ii)

We cannot discern whether the jury premised the convictions on methamphetamine base, methamphetamine hydrochloride, or both substances. Under Blakely, the trial court invaded the province of the jury when it sentenced Evans under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) because this necessarily involves a factual finding that Evans manufactured and unlawfully possessed methamphetamine base with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401 requires sufficient evidence that the defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance to sustain a conviction.

State v. Colquitt · filed 2006-06-29

To support a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State has the burden to present sufficient evidence to show the defendant had unlawful possession of a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401.

Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) covers possession, manufacture, or delivery of all forms of methamphetamine, including methamphetamine in its salt form.

State v. Cromwell · filed 2006-08-10(a)(1)(ii)

We disagree and hold that the plain language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) encompasses all forms of methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) covers methamphetamine hydrochloride, the salt form, because “methamphetamine” includes all forms of the substance.

State v. Malone · filed 2007-01-09(a)(1)(ii)

The Washington Supreme Court found this to be incorrect. Cromwell, 157 Wash.2d at 535-37, 140 P.3d 593. Salt and base methamphetamine are the same chemical substance. Id. at 535-36, 140 P.3d 593. Converting the liquid base into a solid methamphetamine salt is a functional refinement only. Id. at 536-37, 140 P.3d 593. Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court held that it is reasonable to infer that the definition of methamphetamine includes its salt form. Id. at 537, 140 P.3d 593. In other words, when the legislature used the word "methamphetamine" in the former RCW 69.50.401 the word included "all forms of the substance." Id. Therefore, Mr. Malone's argument is without merit. And we therefore dismiss the petition.

The term “methamphetamine” in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) covers all forms of the drug, so the jury need not identify the particular methamphetamine substance before sentencing under that provision.

State v. Forrester · filed 2006-10-03(a)(1)(ii)

But in overruling Morris, our Supreme Court recently held that the term "methamphetamine" as used in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), means all forms of the drug. State v. Cromwell, 157 Wash.2d at 535-36, 140 P.3d 593. Thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing Forrester under that statute because, under Cromwell, the jury was not required to determine the particular substance underlying her conviction.

Former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) encompasses all forms of methamphetamine.

State v. Ague-Masters · filed 2007-04-17(a)(1)(ii)

Our Supreme Court held that former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) encompasses all forms of methamphetamine in State v. Cromwell, 157 Wash.2d 529, 536-37, 140 P.3d 593 (2006). [8] Although the court addressed the 2002 version of the statute, that version is the same as the version in effect when Ague committed his crime. When our Supreme Court construes a statute, it clarifies the statute's original meaning. In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wash.2d 687, 693 n. 7, 9 P.3d 206 (2000). The trial court did not err when it sentenced Ague under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii).

In an attempted-manufacture prosecution under former § 69.50.401(a)(l)(ii), the State need not prove that manufacturing had begun; taking some step toward the manufacturing process is sufficient.

State v. Brockob · filed 2006-12-28(a)(l)(ii)

We conclude the independent evidence was sufficient to corroborate Gonzales’ incriminating statement under the corpus delicti rule because he possessed ephedrine and coffee filters and was apparently working in concert with another person to acquire more than the legal amount of ephedrine. ... Second, the State is correct that Gonzales need not have begun the manufacturing process to be convicted of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine. He need only have taken some step toward that process. ... We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Gonzales’ conviction and affirm the trial court.

For the methamphetamine offense, independent evidence must corroborate intent to manufacture; possession of precursor chemicals alone is insufficient, while precursor chemicals plus coffee filters and coordinated acquisition may suffice.

State v. Brockob · filed 2007-01-26(a)(1)(ii)

We conclude the independent evidence was sufficient to corroborate Gonzales' incriminating statement under the corpus delicti rule because he possessed ephedrine and coffee filters and was apparently working in concert with another person to acquire more than the legal amount of ephedrine.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits manufacturing methamphetamine, and a conviction under that provision requires sufficient evidence that the accused committed the manufacture.

State v. Enlow · filed 2008-03-06(1)

Under RCW 69.50.401(1), "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture [methamphetamine]." ... The court's findings do not support the court's conclusion that Mr. Enlow is guilty of the manufacture of methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(f) prohibits affirmative conduct that brings a minor into an unlawful drug transaction, but it does not cover merely selling drugs in the minor's presence.

State v. Flores · filed 2008-06-26(f)

We hold the offense of involving a minor in a drug transaction, former RCW 69.50.401(f) (1998), recodified as RCW 69.50.4015, does not encompass the act of merely allowing a minor to remain present during the transactions that took place at Flores' [1] residence. Accordingly, we reverse his convictions on those charges for insufficient evidence.

Section 69.50.401(f) requires an affirmative act directed at a minor to bring or attempt to bring the minor into an unlawful drug transaction; merely allowing the minor to remain present is insufficient.

State v. Flores · filed 2008-06-26(f)

We hold that allowing a minor to remain present during a drug transaction is not among the acts encompassed by former RCW 69.50.401(f) (involving a minor in a drug transaction). The statute requires evidence that the defendant committed some act, directed at the minor, to bring or attempt to bring the minor into the transaction.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver it.

State v. Brewer · filed 2009-03-24(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) makes it "unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." ... Under this statutory definition, simply possessing a precursor ingredient with "the intent to manufacture" can establish the crime of possession with intent to manufacture. ... Adopting Division One's Gaworski analysis, we hold that Defendants' two methamphetamine offenses do not meet the "same elements" test, they do not merge, and the convictions do not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

For a methamphetamine offense involving less than two kilograms, the statute makes imposition of a fine, including the $3,000 drug clean-up fine, discretionary.

State v. Corona · filed 2011-09-20(2)(b)

Because Corona’s offense involved less than two kilograms, the imposition of a fine, including a $3,000 drug clean-up fine, is discretionary under RCW 69.50.401.

Section 69.50.401(1) requires proof that the defendant knew he was delivering a controlled substance, but not that he knew the specific controlled substance being delivered.

State Of Washington v. Ahmed · filed 2013-06-03(1)

The crime of delivery of a controlled substance requires the State to allege and prove a defendant knew he was delivering a controlled substance, but it is not required to allege or prove a defendant knew what specific controlled substance he was delivering.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and requires the actual existence of the controlled substance.

State Of Washington v. Woody · filed 2013-07-08(1)

In contrast, Washington law establishes that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." RCW 69.50.401(1). This statute requires the actual existence of the controlled substance.

For controlled substances homicide, the charging document must identify the controlled substance, the applicable RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), (b), or (c) subsection, or the substance's schedule because merely alleging delivery of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401 is overinclusive.

State v. Zillyette · filed 2013-08-01(2)(a)-(c)

To establish the illegality of controlled substances homicide, the State must at least specify the applicable RCW 69.50-.401(2) subsection ((a), (b), or (c)) or identify the schedule of the controlled substance that caused the user’s death. Simply alleging that an accused person delivered a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401 does not satisfy the essential element rule because it is overinclusive; that is, it alleges both criminal and noncriminal behavior.

For controlled substances homicide, the State must identify the controlled substance, specify the applicable subsection (2)(a), (b), or (c), or identify the substance's schedule.

State v. Zillyette · filed 2013-08-01(2)(a)-(c)

Identification of the controlled substance, or, alternatively, specification of the RCW 69.50.401(2) subsection ((a), (b), or (c)) or the schedule of the controlled substance, is an essential element of controlled substances homicide.

Section 69.50.401(1) provides three alternative means of committing an offense: manufacture, delivery, and possession with intent to manufacture or deliver; the two possible intents within possession are not separate means.

State v. Huynh · filed 2013-08-12(1)

The statute at issue here, RCW 69.50.401(1), describes three distinct acts that amount to a violation of the statute: (1) manufacture, (2) delivery, and (3) possession with intent to manufacture or deliver. These distinct acts constitute three alternative means. ... Possession with intent to manufacture or deliver is not an alternative means crime.

Section 69.50.401(1) defines three alternative acts of violation—manufacture, delivery, and possession with intent to manufacture or deliver—but possession with intent is not itself an alternative-means crime because possession is the physical act and intent is a subjective mental state.

State Of Washington v. Huynh · filed 2013-08-12(1)

The statute at issue here, RCW 69.50.401(1), describes three distinct acts that amount to a violation of the statute: (1) manufacture, (2) delivery, and (3) possession with intent to manufacture or deliver. These distinct acts constitute three alternative means. But, the same cannot be said of possession with intent to manufacture or deliver. The only physical act involved in "possession] with intent to manufacture or deliver" is the act of possession. The intent to manufacture and the intent to deliver elements of the crime address the defendant's subjective mental state. An element dealing with a defendant's subjective mental state generally cannot be the subject of an alternative means analysis. Possession with intent to manufacture or deliver is not an alternative means crime.

Section 69.50.401 prohibited manufacturing marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, and a medical-marijuana permit did not negate probable cause to believe that the statute had been violated.

Sinclair v. City of Grandview · filed 2013-09-26

Moreover, the manufacturing of marijuana, a Schedule One controlled substance, was prohibited under Washington law at all times relevant to this suit. RCW 69.50.204, .401 (2008). ... Thus, the warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe that Plaintiffs were growing marijuana in violation of Washington law even if all alleged falsifications and omissions were cured.

Section 69.50.401(1)'s general prohibition on manufacturing marijuana is subject to a potential medical-use exception, but an affidavit need not disprove that exception to establish probable cause for a search warrant.

State of Washington v. Ellis · filed 2014-01-09(1)

Interpreting these statutes together, we conclude MUCA created a potential medical use exception to the CSA's general rule criminalizing marijuana manufacturing. ... ConSidering all, we hold an affidavit supporting a search warrant presents probable cause to believe a suspect committed a CSA violation where, as here, it sets forth enough details to reasonably infer the suspect is growing marijuana on his or her property. The affidavit need not also show the MUCA exception's inapplicability.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, unless authorized by the chapter.

State Of Washington v. Wade · filed 2015-03-30(1)

Washington prohibits delivery of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401. RCW 69.50.401(1) states, "Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." ... Therefore, ifWade was convicted under UC 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) for attempting to "distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance," the crime is legally comparable to an attempt to commit a crime under either RCW 69.50.401 or RCW 69.50.4011, which is a class C felony in Washington. RCW 9A.28.020(3)(c).

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful for any person to deliver a controlled substance.

State of Washington v. Watts · filed 2015-08-06(1)

RCW 69.50.401 (1) provides "it is unlawful for any person to deliver ... a controlled substance."

Section 69.50.401 delivery charges may be proved with circumstantial evidence; direct evidence that the defendant knew the substance was methamphetamine is not required.

State v. Hudlow · filed 2014-05-13(1) and (2)(b)

To sustain charges of delivery of a controlled substance, the State need not present direct evidence. ... Circumstantial evidence in this case showed Hudlow knew he delivered methamphetamine. ... Based on Hudlow accepting a price suitable for the amount of methamphetamine sold, the jury could reasonably infer that Hudlow knew the substance delivered was methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, but a defendant may present a MUMA affirmative defense to manufacturing and possession-with-intent charges when the evidence supports it.

State v. Markwart · filed 2014-07-03(1)

RCW 69.50.401(1) renders it “unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” ... The MUMA defense is available to Tyler Markwart on the charge of possession with intent to deliver.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver; a cocaine violation is a class B felony.

State v. Winings · filed 2005-02-23(1)

And Winings' conviction of possession of a controlled substance for sale is comparable to RCW 69.50.401(1), which provides that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." (Emphasis added). Under that statute, a violation with respect to cocaine, which is a schedule II drug, is a class B felony. RCW 69.50.206(a) and (b)(4)-(6); RCW 69.50.401(2)(a).

Section 69.50.401 makes growing marijuana without an applicable medical-use protection criminal, and an affidavit establishing probable cause that the statute is being violated need not also show that the medical-use exception is inapplicable.

State of Washington v. Morgan Hale Davis · filed 2014-07-31

Second, this court has previously determined that where an affidavit sets forth enough details to reasonably infer the suspect is growing marijuana on his or her property in violation of the uniform controlled substances act, chapter 69.50 RCW, the affidavit does not need to show the MUCA's inapplicability to establish probable cause. ... The affidavit supporting the search warrant presents probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed in Mr. Davis's greenhouses. The affidavit sets forth enough details to reasonably infer that Mr. Davis was growing marijuana on his property. The MUCA has no effect on the validity of the warrant to search Mr. Davis's greenhouses.

Section 69.50.401 permits liability for constructive delivery when the defendant directs another person to deliver controlled substances on the defendant's behalf.

State Of Washington v. Malone · filed 2014-08-19

While Malone was not physically present at the October 28, 2010 buy site, the Act allows enhanced sentences for those who constructively transfer controlled substances within 1, 000 feet of a bus stop. RCW 69.50.401 ( proscribing delivery of a controlled substance within 1, 000 feet of a bus stop); RCW 69. 50. 435( 1) ( delivery may be actual or constructive). ... As we have explained, Malone constructively delivered the controlled substances through,her designated others, and the legislature approved of liability under these circumstances through RCW 69. 50. 401 and RCW 69. 50. 435( 1).

Former RCW 69.50.401(e) made possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana a simple misdemeanor with a statutory maximum sentence of 90 days in jail.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Derrick O. Stanton · filed 2014-10-06(e)

Possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana was a simple misdemeanor with a statutory maximum of 90 days in jail. See Former RCW 69.50.401(e) (1989); RCW 9A.20.021(3) (1982). The 420-day sanction imposed thus exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for both causes.

Section 69.50.401 defines four distinct offenses: manufacturing, delivering, possessing with intent to manufacture, and possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

State of Washington v. Ellsworth · filed 2014-10-14(1)

RCW 69.50.401 thus defines four separate crimes: manufacturing a controlled substance, delivering a controlled substance, possessing a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture it, and possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it. The facts of this case demonstrate the distinctness of two of these crimes.

Section 69.50.401(2)(c) makes distributing marijuana, a Schedule I substance, a class C felony punishable by a maximum five-year prison term.

State of Washington v. French · filed 2014-12-16(2)(c)

Jason French distributed marijuana to K.M., which is a schedule I substance under RCW 69.50.204, and a class C felony under RCW 69.50.401(2)(c). The maximum prison term is five years under RCW 9A.20.021(c).

Section 69.50.401(a) is not categorically overbroad based only on the theoretical possibility that its prohibition on delivery could reach administering a drug; the defendant must show a realistic probability of prosecution for administering.

United States v. Burgos-Ortega · filed 2015-02-05(a)

We hold that Burgos-Ortega has not shown the realistic probability of prosecution for administering a drug required to establish that RCW § 69.50.401 is categorically overbroad.

Section 69.50.401(2)(c) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused manufactured marijuana and knew the substance manufactured was marijuana.

State of Washington v. Flores · filed 2015-08-06(2)(c)

A conviction for manufacture of a controlled substance requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused manufactured marijuana and knew the substance manufactured was marijuana.

Section 69.50.401(1) prohibits manufacturing a controlled substance; evidence that a person assisted in growing marijuana can support a manufacturing conviction.

State Of Washington, V Gebremariem · filed 2018-06-26(1)

Gebremariem was convicted of manufacturing marijuana under RCW 69.50.401(1), which provides that “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent ... to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” ... It is reasonable to infer that Gebremariem was present at the house to assist in the substantial growing operation, which involved the production, preparation, and propagation of marijuana. ... Accordingly, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Gebremariem’s conviction of manufacturing marijuana.

Section 69.50.401(2)(b) permits, but does not require, a court to impose a $3,000 methamphetamine cleanup fine; if imposed, the first $3,000 collected must be used for laboratory, site, or substance cleanup.

State of Washington v. Sanchez · filed 2016-01-21(2)(b)

The trial court incorrectly assumed that the fine was required by statute. It thereby abused its discretion, and the case will be remanded for resentencing as to any fine.

Section 69.50.401(2) makes the methamphetamine cleanup fine mandatory when the quantity exceeds two kilograms and discretionary otherwise.

State of Washington v. Vazquez · filed 2020-06-11(2)

Methamphetamine ... possession under RCW 69.50.401(2) requires a mandatory cleanup fine when the quantity exceeds two kilograms, but it is otherwise discretionary.

For possession with intent to deliver, each separate and distinct intent to deliver constitutes a unit of prosecution; duplicate convictions for the same drug violate double jeopardy when the evidence shows only one intent.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. James Master Ocain, App. · filed 2016-04-18(2)(a), (2)(b)

Implicit in Adel's discussion of Lopez and McFadden is the recognition that conduct demonstrating a "separate and distinct" intent to deliver forms the unit of prosecution for the possession with intent to deliver statute. ... The evidence does not show that O'Cain had an intent to deliver the cocaine on his person that was separate and distinct from his intent to deliver the cocaine in the locked safe. The same is true of the methamphetamine and heroin. The evidence failed to establish more than one intent to deliver drugs in the future, as in Lopez. His convictions for possession with intent to deliver the same drugs therefore punish a single unit of prosecution. His second convictions for cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine violate double jeopardy and must be stricken.

Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) are separate statutory provisions, so the unit-of-prosecution test for multiple violations of the same statute does not apply to convictions under those different provisions.

State Of Washington, V. Larsen · filed 2021-12-14(2)(a), (2)(b)

Here, the possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine charge was under RCW 69.50.401(2)(b), and the possession with intent to deliver heroin charge was under RCW 69.50.401(2)(a). Because Larsen was convicted under two separate statutory provisions, the unit of prosecution test does not apply and this argument fails.

Section 69.50.401(1) does not require possession of a precursor ingredient to prove manufacturing, so a manufacturing conviction does not merge with a conviction for possessing pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture.

State v. Brewer · filed 2009-02-10(1)

In contrast, RCW 69.50.401(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” ... Adopting Division One’s Gaworski analysis, we hold that Defendants’ two methamphetamine offenses do not meet the “same elements” test, they do not merge, and the convictions do not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

Section 69.50.401’s possession-with-intent-to-deliver and delivery offenses lack the additional elements of leading organized crime and therefore are distinct offenses for the double-jeopardy same-evidence analysis.

State Of Washington v. Potts · filed 2016-07-06

In Potts’s case, the predicate offenses of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver or delivery of methamphetamine do not have these additional elements. RCW 69.50.401. They are also distinguishable from each other because each has a different date.

An offense under former RCW 69.50.401(d) was excluded from the statutory penalty-doubling provision, so its five-year imprisonment and $10,000 fine maximum was not doubled.

State Of Washington v. Pink · filed 2016-11-08(d)

At the time of Pink’s offense, convictions under RCW 69.50.401 were excluded from the doubling statute. Specifically, former RCW 69.50.408(c) (1989) provides, “this section does not apply to offenses under RCW 69.50.401.” Accordingly, Pink’s sentence for his former RCW 69.50.401 offense was not subject to doubling. He was correctly advised of the maximum sentence when he pleaded guilty in 1995 to delivery of methamphetamine.

Section 69.50.401(d) imposes a five-year maximum term of imprisonment, making an offense under it punishable by more than one year for federal felony-drug-offense enhancement purposes.

United States v. Rosales · filed 2008-02-13(d)

The maximum penalty for the crime to which Rosales pled guilty is five years of imprisonment. Wash. Rev.Code § 69.50.401(d). Because this maximum is greater than one year, the conviction is a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed.

Section 69.50.401(1) makes delivery of a controlled substance a Washington offense for which an out-of-state conviction for attempting to distribute a controlled substance can be legally comparable.

State v. Wade · filed 2015-03-30(1)

Therefore, if Wade was convicted under UC § 58-37--8(l)(a)(ii) for attempting to “distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,” the crime is legally comparable to an attempt to commit a crime under either RCW 69.50.401 or RCW 69.50.4011, which is a class C felony in Washington.

Former subsection (e) made possession of 40 grams or less of marijuana a misdemeanor; because methamphetamine possession carried a higher maximum sentence, the State had to prove the substance was methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.

State of Washington v. Curtis · filed 2015-04-28(e)

Had he been convicted of possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor under former RCW 69.50.401(e) (1998),2 his maximum sentence would have been 90 days. ... Thus, because the statutory maximum sentence increased depending on which controlled substance Mr. Curtis ... possessed, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance Mr. Curtis possessed was methamphetamine.

When the substance identity changes the maximum penalty under the statute, that identity is an essential element that must appear in the to-convict instruction; omission can be harmless as to conviction but not as to the sentence.

State Of Washington v. Clark-el · filed 2016-11-07(2)(b), (c)

When a defendant is charged with delivering a controlled substance, the identity of the substance is an essential element that must be stated in the to-convict instruction if it increases the maximum sentence the defendant will face upon conviction. In such a case, omission of the essential element is subject to harmless error analysis as to the conviction but not as to the sentence.

When the identity of the controlled substance changes the maximum punishment, that identity is an essential element of the delivery offense; if it is omitted from the to-convict instruction, the defendant may be resentenced only for the lower-level offense under subsection (2)(c).

State Of Washington, V Warner · filed 2019-09-17(2)(b) and (2)(c)

Here, Warner was charged under RCW 69.50.401(2)(b), with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). Delivery of methamphetamine is a class B felony with a maximum sentence of 10 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(b). In contrast, delivery of “controlled substances” is a class C felony with a maximum sentence of 5 years. RCW 69.50.401(2)(c); RCW 9A.20.021. Thus, the identity of the substance that the State alleged Warner delivered, methamphetamine, was an essential element of the crime charged because it exposed him to greater punishment. But the to-convict instruction did not specify the identity of the controlled substance that the State charged Warner of delivering. Therefore, because Warner’s conviction for delivery of methamphetamine exposed him to a sentence of 10 years as opposed to a sentence of 5 years for a conviction for a different controlled substance, the trial court’s omission of the identity of the controlled substance from the jury instructions was error.

The identity of the controlled substance is an essential element of a section 69.50.401 offense when it increases the maximum sentence.

State v. Sibert · filed 2010-04-01(2)(b)

Under former RCW 69.50.401(2)(b) (2003), a conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. ¶ 12 A conviction based on a different controlled substance may have resulted in a maximum sentence of five years. Therefore, the identity of the controlled substance in this case determined the level of the crime and its penalty, rendering it an "essential element" under the reasoning set forth in Goodman, 150 Wash.2d at 785-86, 83 P.3d 410; see also State v. Eaton, 164 Wash.2d 461, 468-70, 191 P.3d 1270 (2008) (Johnson, J., concurring).