Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Khmaissi v. Navient Solutions LLC · filed 2021-01-25(2)

The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7) should be granted and the case should be dismissed with prejudice. The Plaintiff alleges that she took her loan out 17 years ago and the Defendant failed to inform her of the loan forgiveness program 10 years ago. The Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract is barred by the six-year statute of limitation (RCW 4.16.040(1)), her CPA claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitation (RCW 19.86.120) and her breach of fiduciary duty claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitation (RCW 4.16.080(2)). Moreover, the Plaintiff fails to respond to the motion to dismiss.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on the parents’ damages claim under RCW 4.24.010.

Berg v. Bethel School District · filed 2021-04-19(2)

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Parents’ claim for damages under RCW 4.24.010 is not subject to the minor tolling provision and is subject to the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to RCW 4.16.080. Curtin, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 224 (“Requiring parents, but not minor children, to abide by the general limitations period of RCW 4.16.080(2) is consistent with the objectives of the statutory limitations scheme.”).

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year limitations period for the claims at issue, so the actionable period is measured backward from the filing date.

Wood v. The Boeing Company · filed 2021-04-30

As Boeing correctly notes, all of Wood’s claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080; Antonius v. King Cty., 153 Wn.2d 256, 261 (2004) (three year statute of limitations for WLAD claims); Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wn. App. 176, 192 (2009) (three year statute of limitations for IIED and negligent supervision claims). Because Wood filed her complaint on March 13, 2020, the Court limits her claims to events occurring after March 13, 2017.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on the state-law claims at issue, requiring claims based on conduct before February 12, 2018, to be dismissed as untimely when this action was filed on February 12, 2021.

Gianesini v. The Boeing Company · filed 2021-08-10(2)

Each of plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to a three-year limitations period. See Order at 7 (docket no. 23) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2); Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 261-62, 103 P.3d 729 (2004); Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 174 Wn. App. 475, 485, 302 P.3d 500 (2013); Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wn. App. 176, 192, 222 P.3d 119 (2009)). Because plaintiff initiated this action on February 12, 2021, the conduct giving rise to plaintiff’s claims must have occurred on or after February 12, 2018.

Section 4.16.080(2) bars WLAD accommodation claims based on events occurring more than three years before suit.

Asha Singh, Et Ano., V. State Of Washington Et Ano · filed 2021-08-16(2)

Singh’s accommodation claim is limited to the University’s discontinuance of a student “support for assistance” in September 2015, as any earlier claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2); Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 261-62, 103 P.3d 256 (2004).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for wrongful-death and negligent-retention claims.

Dold v. Snohomish County · filed 2021-10-13(2)

Further, her state law claims are dismissed with prejudice because the three-year statutes of limitation for wrongful death and negligent retention claims have now lapsed. RCW 4.16.080(2); Huntington v. Samaritan Hosp., 680 P.2d 58, 59 (Wash. 1984).

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for tort claims such as bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence, running when the cause of action accrues.

Segar v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2022-01-11(2)

Under Washington law, claims for bad faith under an insurance contract sound in tort and are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims are likewise subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2); ... The limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which is when “the party has the right to apply to a court for relief.”

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for Washington claims, which the court applies as the limitations period for federal § 1983 actions.

McGary v. Inslee · filed 2022-06-15(2)

In Washington, a plaintiff has three years to file an action. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981); RCW 4.16.080(2). Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. ... Plaintiff filed this action on May 4, 2022. Therefore, claims which accrued before May 4, 2019 are time-barred.

Section 4.16.080’s three-year limitations period bars negligence claims arising from events more than three years before suit.

Sara Maynard, V. John And Mary Maynard, Respondent's · filed 2022-11-14

As a result, any claims arising out of alleged events before August 26, 2016 (three years before she filed this action) are time-barred under RCW 4.16.080 (three-year statute of limitations applies to claims of negligence), or RCW 11.96A.070 (three-year statute of limitations applies to claim against trustee for breach of fiduciary duty).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for a loss-of-consortium claim.

T.S. v. Seattle School District No 1 · filed 2023-03-24(2)

The limitations period for a loss-of-consortium claim is three (3) years. See RCW 4.16.080(2). Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that (i) T.S. “knew or should have known” the elements of her loss-of-consortium claim on January 20, 2016, when T.A. was allegedly maltreated by his teacher, (ii) T.S. did not commence this action within three years, and (iii) T.S.’s loss-of-consortium claim is time barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) establishes a three-year limitations period for the claim at issue, subject to tolling under Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190.

Youker v. Hillhouse · filed 2023-03-27(2)

The district court erred in concluding that Youker’s Fourth Amendment claim, Claim 1, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). See Boston v. Kitsap Cnty., 852 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that federal courts look to state law for the statute of limitations in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.190 while Youker was imprisoned on criminal charges prior to his sentencing on May 24, 2016.1 He filed his complaint exactly three years later on May 24, 2019.

Section 4.16.080(2) subjects the claim at issue to a three-year statute of limitations.

Love v. Tytus · filed 2023-04-17(2)

Plaintiff’s claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See RCW 4.16.080(2); RCW 4.16.170. Washington courts have repeatedly held that the filing of a complaint does not constitute the commencement of an action for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. ... The plaintiff must still serve a defendant within ninety days of the date of filing in order for the commencement to be complete. Id.; see also RCW 4.16.170 (providing that an action is “commenced” for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations only if the plaintiff serves process upon “one or more of the defendants” within 90 days of the date of filing the complaint).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for WLAD discrimination claims, but related acts forming the same hostile work environment practice may be considered even when they occurred outside that period.

Gillian Marshall, V. University Of Washington · filed 2023-05-02(2)

A claim of discrimination under the WLAD is subject to the general three-year statute of limitations stated in RCW 4.16.080(2) for personal injury actions. Antonius, 153 Wn.2d at 261-62. However, courts can consider acts that extend beyond the statute of limitations if they are “ ‘part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice.’ ” Id. at 271 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002)). To constitute part of the same practice, the acts must have “some relationship to each other.” Antonius, 153 Wn.2d at 271. But if there is no relationship between the actions or there is an intervening act by the employer, then the previous acts cannot be considered a part of one hostile work environment claim. Id.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives Washington breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a three-year limitations period, and the claim accrues when the continuing fiduciary duty is repudiated.

First American Title Insurance Company v. Northwest Title Company LLC · filed 2023-06-23(3)

There is a three-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims in Washington State. RCW 4.16.080(3); Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wash. App. 866, 872–73, 6 P.3d 615 (2000). ... Because Defendant had an ongoing duty to Plaintiff to hold the premiums in trust, Plaintiff’s claim accrued when it became aware that Defendant intended to repudiate this duty. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim accrued in the Spring of 2021, Plaintiff commenced suit in August 2021, and the claim is not barred by any statute of limitations.

Under § 4.16.080(2), Washington’s three-year limitations period applies to WLAD and § 1983 Equal Protection claims.

Diemert v. City of Seattle · filed 2023-08-28(2)

The statute of limitations under the WLAD is three years. Antonius v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004) (citing RCW § 4.16.080(2)). ... A three-year statute of limitations applies to Diemert’s Equal Protection Claim. See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing RCW § 4.16.080(2)).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for WLAD claims because the WLAD has no limitations period of its own.

Bernal v. The Boeing Company · filed 2024-01-22(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to WLAD claims. Antonius v. King Cnty., 153 Wn.2d 256, 261–62, 103 P.3d 729 (2004) (explaining that because WLAD does not contain its own limitations period, the general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in RCW 4.16.080(2) applies).

Subsection (2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims to which it applies, including the claims addressed here.

St Clair v. Okanogan County Washington · filed 2024-02-12(2)

Because § 1983 does not have its own statute limitation, federal courts will apply the forum state’s limitation period for tort actions. Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under Washington law, this period is three years. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions in Washington.

Ewalan v. Schreiber · filed 2024-04-08(2)

The relevant limitations period is three years. See Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1981) (identifying RCW 4.16.080(2) as the applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions in Washington); see also RCW 4.16.080(2) (imposing three-year limitations period).

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion and other specified tort claims, including negligence and personal-injury-based § 1983 claims.

Ferguson v. M/V The Porn Star · filed 2024-05-31(2)

First, the Court interprets Plaintiffs’ claims for “theft” as one for common law conversion. See Olin v. Goehler, 694 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (“A conversion is a willful interference with a chattel without lawful justification, whereby a person entitled thereto is deprived of the possession of it.”). The statute of limitations for conversion is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which the court applied to an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

Brooks Jr v. Ballard · filed 2024-06-10(2)

Plaintiff’s allegations that Ms. Pinkert’s actions in 2012 amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the statute of limitations. See Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wash.2d 192, 193 n. 1 (2003). (“‘Outrage’ and ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress’ are synonyms for the same tort.”); Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wash. App. 176, 192, 222 P.3d 119, 127 (2009) (applying three-year statute of limitations from RCW 4.16.080(2) to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on the claims at issue, with accrual evaluated under the discovery rule and the claimant bearing the burden to show due diligence.

Interface Technologies Northwest Inc. V. Schmidt & Schmidt Llp · filed 2024-12-09

Under the discovery rule, Ramsey bears the burden of proving that the necessary facts could not be discovered in time. ... Thus, the question at summary judgment and before us is whether the Appellants point to evidence that would meet their burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ramsey did not discover, and in the exercise of due diligence should not have discovered, the factual basis for any of these four claims before October 25, 2015, three years before the action was filed. RCW 4.16.080 (statute of limitations is three years).

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury torts, including the period used for § 1983 claims in Washington.

Fair v. King County · filed 2025-04-25(2)

In Washington, personal injury torts have a three-year statute of limitations period. RCW 4.16.080(2). And the statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims under Section 1983 is established by the forum state’s law for personal injury actions. See Bonelli v. Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 953 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019)). Thus, in a Washington forum, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is three years. See A.T. v. Everett Sch. Dist., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1252 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 794 F. App’x 601 (9th Cir. 2019); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on covered claims, including the unjust-enrichment claim described here.

Clark v. Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company · filed 2025-06-09(2)

Unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. RCW §§ 4.16.080(2)–(3); see Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 147 Wn. App. 704, 737, 197 P.3d 686 (2008) (“[T]he statute of limitations applicable to a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment . . . is three years.”); Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wn. App. 866, 873, 6 P.3d 615 (2000) (three-year statute of limitations applies for claims arising “not on breach of a specific term of the contract, but on a tortious breach of fiduciary duty arising from the contract”).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a WLAD failure-to-accommodate claim, accruing when the employer’s decision not to accommodate is communicated to the employee.

Topolski v. Washington State Department of Licensing · filed 2025-07-07(2)

The statute of limitations on a failure to accommodate claim under the WLAD is three years. ... For statute of limitation purposes, a failure to accommodate claim “accrues when the employer makes the decision not to accommodate the employee’s disability and that decision is communicated to the employee.” ... The same accrual analysis applies to the failure to accommodate a religious practice. ... Accordingly, the statute of limitations expired on September 30, 2024, and it had run by the time the case was filed on October 16, 2024.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year statute of limitations for Washington personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims borrowing that limitations period.

Johnston v. Doe 1 · filed 2025-07-09

Federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). A three year statute of limitations applies in Washington. RCW § 4.16.080; RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff here alleges wrongful conduct that took place in or around 2009, some sixteen years ago, and he does not identify any facts that would enable him to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s claims therefore appear to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The three-year limitations period for relief on the ground of fraud applies to claims based on innocent misrepresentations, and the claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Western Lumber, Inc. v. City of Aberdeen · filed 1973-12-28(4)

We are of the opinion that the holding of the court in Pratt v. Thompson, supra, is directly on point and that on the controlling authority of this case, RCW 4.16.080(4) is the statute of limitations which should have been applied by the trial court.

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period for fraud actions that begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud; actual knowledge is inferred if due diligence would have led to discovery.

Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corporation · filed 1973-03-15(4)

The State of Washington provides a three year statute of limitations period in actions for fraud. ... Actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it.

For fraud claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, and when that discovery occurred is a question of fact.

Singer Credit Corp. v. Mercer Island Masonry, Inc. · filed 1975-07-14(4)

By the express terms of RCW 4.16.080(4) (the 3-year statute), a cause of action for fraud does not accrue “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” The question of when an aggrieved party realizes that he has been defrauded is obviously one of fact.

Section 4.16.080(4) starts the limitations period for a fraud claim when the claimant discovers, or through due diligence could discover, the facts constituting the fraud; filing a public financing statement provides constructive notice and starts the period.

Western Washington Laborers-Employers Health & Security Trust Fund v. Harold Jordan Co. · filed 1988-09-12(4)

A fraud action accrues when the aggrieved party actually discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence could have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud. See RCW 4.16.080(4); Strong, at 232. ... We conclude that the filing of the U.C.C. financing statement in this case had the same effect. A properly filed financing statement gives notice to the world that designated parties have entered into a secured transaction covering described collateral. Hobart Corp. v. North Cent. Credit Servs., 29 Wn. App. 302, 305, 628 P.2d 842 (1981). Like a recorded deed, the statement invites further inquiry by one reading it. We, therefore, hold that when the statement was filed by HJI, the statute of limitations began to run against the Trusts' fraudulent conveyance claim.

The three-year limitations period for fraud claims begins when the plaintiff learns, or reasonably should have learned through reasonable diligence, the facts giving rise to the claim.

Snedigar v. Hodderson · filed 1989-02-21(4)

In actions based on fraud, RCW 4.16.080(4) does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts which gave rise to the cause of action.

For a fraud claim, the three-year limitations period begins when the claimant actually discovers, or through due diligence could have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud; mere suspicion is insufficient.

Busenius v. Horan · filed 1989-03-20(4)

Here, the parties agree that the statute of limitations for Horan's claim is 3 years, as provided in RCW 4.16.080(4). However, the parties disagree on what event triggered the running of the statute. A fraud action accrues when the aggrieved party actually discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence could have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4); Strong v. Clark, 56 Wn.2d 230, 232, 352 P.2d 183 (1960). Mere suspicion of wrong is not discovery of the fraud.

Section 4.16.080(4) allows the discovery rule to govern when a fraud claim accrues.

Cindy Alexander, Appellants/cross-resp. v. Gary Sanford, Respondents/cross-app. · filed 2014-05-12(4)

The discovery rule can apply to fraud claims. RCW 4.16.080(4). ... Thus, the doctrine of adverse domination applies to Homeowners' fraud claims.

Subsection (4) imposes a three-year limitations period on misrepresentation actions, measured from discovery of the misrepresentation.

Ted A. Thomas and Debra A. Thomas v. Specialized Loan Servicing · filed 2018-08-13(4)

An action for misrepresentation must be brought within three years of discovery of the misrepresentation.

Subsection (4) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud-based claims.

Appleton v. Bohart · filed 2019-02-22(4)

Appleton failed to file her action within the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (4) gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period running from discovery of the facts constituting fraud.

Khalid v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2019-09-04(4)

In the state of Washington, an action claiming fraud must be commenced within three years upon “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud;”

For fraud-based claims to set aside a real-property conveyance, RCW 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period beginning when the aggrieved party discovers the fraud, including through constructive notice from a recorded instrument.

Katz v. Katz · filed 2022-11-29(4)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to claims “for relief upon the ground of fraud,” including actions to set aside a conveyance of real property based on an allegation of fraud. ... The statute of limitations begins to run when there is “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” RCW 4.16.080(4). A plaintiff has constructive notice if he could have discovered the facts constituting the fraud by examining the record and if “ordinary prudence and business judgment” required examination of the record. ... “When the facts upon which the fraud is predicated are contained in a written instrument placed on the public record, there is constructive notice of its contents, and the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of the recording of the instrument.” Id. ... As a result, the three-year statute of limitations for an action to set aside a quit claim deed on the basis of fraud expired no later than June 1, 2019. See RCW 4.16.080(4). Because Matthew did not file this action until January 20, 2022, his declaratory judgment, fraud, and quiet title claims seeking to set aside the Quit Claim Deed on the basis of fraud are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) supplies a three-year limitations period that, when applied to a Washington securities fraud claim, begins on actual or inquiry notice of the fraud.

Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp. · filed 1992-05-11(4)

For a claim arising in Washington, the Ninth Circuit had adopted the three year statute of limitations established by RCW 4.16.080(4). ... However, the Circuit had held that the statute is not triggered until the person defrauded has “actual or inquiry notice of a fraudulent misrepresentation.” ... Thus, the plaintiffs’ § 10(b) claims were timely.

Fraud and misrepresentation claims must be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues.

William Bradley Willard, Jr. v. Benjamin Addink, et ux · filed 2019-04-23(4)

Claims of fraud and misrepresentation must be filed within three years of when a cause of action accrues. RCW 4.16.080(4); First Maryland Leasecorp v. Rothstein, 72 Wn. App. 278, 286, 864 P.2d 17 (1993).

For a contract for continuous services, the limitations period does not begin until the contract is terminated, so the cause of action accrues when the services are completed.

Richards v. Pacific National Bank · filed 1974-01-31(3)

Suffice it to say that the trial court specifically found, and we agree, that there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support an implied contract for “continuing and overlapping services.” The statute of limitations on amounts due under a contract for continuous service does not begin to run until the contract is terminated. ... We therefore hold that plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until completion of the contract, which occurred at decedent’s death. Plaintiff’s action was therefore not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action to recover illegal taxes when the repayment liability is implied and not based on a written instrument.

Carrillo v. City of Ocean Shores · filed 2004-07-13(3)

Moreover, the correct time limit for seeking a refund of an illegal tax or fee is determined by RCW 4.16.080.12 Under that statute, suits for refund of illegal taxes “ ‘are actions arising out of implied liabilities to repay money unlawfully received.’ ” Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 124 Wn.2d 240, 248, 877 P.2d 176 (1994) (quoting Adams County v. Ritzville State Bank, 154 Wash. 140, 144, 281 P. 332 (1929)). The statute of limitations for such claims is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3).

Subsection (4) gives a three-year limitations period for fraud-based relief, with accrual delayed until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Saepoff v. North Cascade Trustee Services, Inc · filed 2019-09-23(4)

With regard to plaintiff’s alternate fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the statute of limitations is three years. RCW 4.16.080(4). A cause of action “accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known all the facts underlying the essential elements of the action.” ... Plaintiff must be “charged with what a reasonable inquiry would have discovered.” ... Her claim of fraudulent misrepresentation is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for federal civil-rights claims in Washington, making claims accruing around 2002 time-barred in 2020.

Paulson v. City of Mountlake Terrace · filed 2020-01-15(2)

In Washington, federal civil rights claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Joshua v. Newell, 871 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1989); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)). ... Thus, Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims began to accrue in or around 2002, when the statement was allegedly made, and fall well outside of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to federal civil rights claims in Washington. ... Therefore, in addition to the deficiencies identified by the Court above, Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims are time-barred, and Defendant’s motion is GRANTED on this ground.

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year limitations period for the FIPA, fraud, and negligent-misrepresentation claims at issue here.

Velicer v. Falconhead Capital LLC · filed 2020-03-11

The parties agree that a three-year limitation period applies to Plaintiffs’ remaining FIPA claims, as well as to Plaintiffs’ fraud and negligence misrepresentation claims, and that a four-year period applies to Plaintiffs’ CPA claim. (See MTD at 10-11 (citing RCW 4.16.080 & McGowan v. Pillsbury Co., 723 F. Supp. 530, 537 (W.D. Wash. 1989)); id. at 20 (citing RCW 19.86.120); Resp. at 7 (“The parties agree that there is a three-year statute of limitations for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and FIPA fraud and a four-year statute of limitations for the violations of the CPA.”).) The court agrees with the parties and applies these limitation periods respectively.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on the WLAD claim at issue.

Taylor v. Lowe's Corporation · filed 2021-07-08(2)

Any WLAD claim was untimely, because Taylor filed his federal complaint in August 2018, more than three years after Lowe’s failed to interview him for the delivery manager position in July 2015. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on the claims at issue, so claims based on conduct before the 2021 revision application were time-barred.

Marcus Gerlach, V. City Of Bainbridge Island · filed 2025-03-24

The alleged misconduct during this process is outside the three-year statute of limitations. See RCW 4.16.080. Accordingly, to the extent that the Gerlachs’ claims were based on or supported by conduct before the 2021 revision application, those claims were barred by the statute of limitations and were properly dismissed on summary judgment.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation period only on contractual liability, not on liability created solely by statute.

Urban Construction Co. v. Seattle Urban League · filed 1975-03-17(3)

Neither statute is applicable here. RCW 4.16.080(3) applies only to contractual liability and not to liability created by statute.

Section 4.16.080(3)'s limitations period does not apply to an action seeking adjudication of an interest in a contract for the purchase of real property when the action is for recovery of an interest in real property.

Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, Inc. · filed 1969-05-22(3)

The statute of limitations relied on (RCW 4.16-.080(3) — an action based on an oral contract) has no application.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives actions on oral agreements a three-year statute of limitations.

Hopper v. Hemphill · filed 1978-02-27(3)

This is an action on an oral agreement. The 3-year statute of limitations therefore applies. RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitation does not begin an uninsured-motorist claim running at the accident because the claim is contractual and accrues when the insurer breaches the contract.

Safeco Insurance Co. v. Barcom · filed 1987-12-15(2)

Initially, Safeco contends that RCW 4.16.080(2), the 3-year statute of limitation, rather than RCW 4.16.040(1), the 6-year statute, is applicable and begins to run on the date of the accident. ... We are not persuaded by Safeco's argument. ... We agree with the rationale in Jacobs and hold that uninsured motorist claims are based on contract, thus the statute of limitation does not begin to run until a breach has occurred.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions based on oral agreements.

Sawyer Falls Co., Llc, V. Capri Investments, Llc · filed 2023-03-21(3)

An action on an oral agreement is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... “If resort to parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element, the contract is partly oral and the three-year statute of limitations applies.” ... We determine that the Indeterminate Amount provision is a valid written contract that is subject to the six-year statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, we hold that the Indeterminate Amount is governed by a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) sets a three-year limitations period for bringing a claim for unpaid wages.

Campeau v. Yakima HMA LLC · filed 2023-05-02(3)

the statute of limitations is three years for bringing a claim for unpaid wages. RCW 4.16.080(3); Seattle Pro. Eng’g Emps. Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 837-38, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000).

For a negligence-based claim, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff suffers actual and appreciable harm sufficient to establish a practical legal remedy, rather than upon a merely technical breach.

Haslund v. City of Seattle · filed 1976-03-25

The determination of the time at which a plaintiff suffered actual and appreciable damage is a question of fact. ... Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that respondents suffered actual and appreciable harm as of July 11, 1973. Since respondents filed their complaint in the present action on February 6, 1974, thus tolling the limitations period under RCW 4.16.170 well within either the 2- or 3-year period, their action is not barred by any statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years; filing the complaint tolls the limitations period only pending service within 90 days, and untimely service leaves the statute as a bar.

Fox v. Groff · filed 1977-02-16(2)

In this case both the summons and the complaint were filed within the 3-year period for commencing such an action, albeit the last day. RCW 4.16.080(2). Thus, the action was tentatively commenced, and the statute of limitations was tolled, pending service upon the defendants within 90 days of the filing. ... The action was not properly commenced since both the 90-day period and the statute of limitations had run before the defendants were served.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives personal-injury actions a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know all essential elements of the claim.

Davis v. Davis Wright Tremaine, L.L.P. · filed 2000-12-11(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), the statute of limitations for an action for personal injury is three years. Where a plaintiff could not have known of his or her injury or its cause, courts apply the discovery rule. Under that rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, all the essential elements of the cause of action.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three year limitation period for personal injury actions.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2002-09-16(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) provides a three year limitation period for personal injury actions.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Gausvik v. Abbey · filed 2005-02-23(2)

Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when a party has a right to apply to a court for relief. ... RCW 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitation period for personal injury actions. ... Thus, the factual basis for Gausvik's claim arose in 1995, and the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Gausvik did not file his claim until May 2001. The three-year statute of limitations clearly bars his claim.

Subsection (2)'s three-year personal-injury limitations period applies to a section 1983 action alleging due-process violations.

Nieshe v. Concrete School Dist. · filed 2005-08-09(2)

Thus, the three year statute of limitations for personal injury torts under Washington law applies to a § 1983 action alleging due process violations.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on personal-injury actions under its catch-all provision, running from accrual under the discovery rule.

York v. CSL Plasma, Inc. fka ZBA Plasma · filed 2015-07-23(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) describes the following actions as being barred by a three-year statute oflimitations: "An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated." ... This catch-all phrase has long been applied to personal injury actions, such as Mr. York's action. ... However, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered with the exercise of due diligence, the facts giving rise to the cause of action. ... The three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(2) lapsed in September 2012. Mr. York did not serve his personal injury complaint on CSL Plasma until September 12, 2013. His claim was time-barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for Washington discrimination claims, and discrete acts accrue from the date of the act itself.

Baumgarten v. Seattle Police Dept · filed 2020-02-24(2)

In Washington, discrimination claims must be brought within the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. RCW 4.16.080(2); ... In contrast, where discrete acts of discrimination are alleged, the three-year limitations period runs from the date of the act itself.

Subsection (2) provides the limitations period for a personal-injury claim, which applies to a § 1983 claim and bars an untimely action.

Massey v. Pierce County Sheriffs Department · filed 2021-07-28(2)

The district court properly denied Massey’s motion to proceed IFP because her § 1983 claim lacked legal merit due to being barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims in Washington.

Johnson v. City of Vancouver Police Department · filed 2023-06-26(2)

In Washington, that statute is RCW 4.16.080(2), which is a three-year limitations period. ... Therefore, in this District, the limitations period for a § 1983 claim is three years. Thus, the limitations period on Johnson’s a unconstitutional arrest claim expired November 9, 2022.

Section 4.16.080(2) and (4) provide three-year limitations periods for the personal-injury, fraud, and constitutional claims at issue.

Gene Palmer, II v. Milnor · filed 2023-10-04(2) and (4)

Washington law establishes a three-year statute of limitations for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, fraud, and constitutional claims brought under § 1983.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for the personal-injury claim at issue.

Fox v. County of Benton · filed 2023-08-08(2)

State law governs the timeliness of a § 1983 claim. Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2225 (2022). As such, a § 1983 claim must commence within the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the cause of action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Washington, a personal injury action expires at three years. RCW § 4.16.080(2); see also Bagley v. CMC Real Est. Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal as it is beyond the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Washington.

Jackson v. Liedkie · filed 2024-09-05(2)

For actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). In Washington State, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); see also Boston v. Kitsap Cnty., 852 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2017). ... Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Washington statute of limitations for personal injury cases.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires negligence-based personal-injury claims to be brought within three years.

Albert W. Coburn, V. Dept. Of Children Youth & Families · filed 2025-04-21(2)

Each of the claims brought by Coburn is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Personal injury claims based on negligence must be brought within three years. RCW 4.16.080. Similarly, an abuse of process claims falls within the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the termination of the acts constituting the abuse of complained of. Nave v. City of Seattle, 68 Wn.2d 721, 724, 415 P.2d 93 (1966). The statutory period for statute of limitations purposes commences when the plaintiff knew or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause. Green v. A.P.C.,136 Wn.2d 87, 95, 960 P.2d 912 (1998).

Subsection (2) sets a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which Washington discrimination claims borrow.

Albayati v. Cascade Windows · filed 2025-09-25(2)

However, WLAD looks to the personal injury statute of limitations, which requires claims to be filed within three years. Antonius, 153 Wash. 2d at 261–62; RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limit for personal injury actions, including § 1983 actions.

Shaw v. Hay · filed 2021-10-20(2)

Plaintiff has asserted no exceptions under any applicable statute of limitations, and ten years is well past the time when Plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that is the basis of the current action. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing application of state and federal law regarding statute of limitations in section 1983 actions); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (one-year state of limitations for habeas corpus petitions in federal court) RCW 4.16.080(2) (three-year limit for personal injury actions, including section 1983 actions).

The three-year limitation for a misrepresentation action runs from discovery, and in a community-property transaction one spouse's knowledge of the misrepresentation is imputed to the community.

Huling v. Vaux · filed 1977-07-25(4)

The second question is whether RCW 4.16.080(4) bars the action because it was not commenced within 3 years of the date of discovery. ... As the court found on substantial evidence that Mr. Huling was not told of the true boundary and did not discover it until September 1971, the question becomes whether the notice to Mrs. Huling was notice to the community. ... We believe that it was because of the following statement in Bowers v. Good, ... Mr. Huling may not accept the benefit of Mrs. Huling's purchase of the property as the agent of the community, but repudiate her knowledge of the transaction. Because Mrs. Huling knew of the "Geltz triangle" before her death on May 26, 1969, commencement of the action on March 19, 1974, was too late.

Section 4.16.080(4) bars a fraud claim brought more than three years after the fraud was discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

Douglass v. Stanger · filed 2000-06-22(4)

We believe that Mr. Douglass was on inquiry notice more than three years before he filed his lawsuit. ... Lack of knowledge of fraud can be excused, but only if the claimant shows “impediments to an earlier prosecution of the claim,” including the reasons why the claimant did not know of the cause of action, the means used by the culprits to keep him ignorant, and how he first obtained knowledge of the fraud. ... The question of due diligence is ordinarily a question of fact. But the issue can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion. ... Accordingly, we hold that both his cause of action for securities fraud and his claim of common law fraud are beyond the applicable statutes of limitation. RCW 21.20.430(4)(b); RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on fraud claims.

Hummel v. Northwest Trustee Service · filed 2018-10-18(4)

The district court correctly found any implied common law fraud claims time barred.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for unjust enrichment, running from when the claim fully matured.

Eckert v. Skagit Corp. · filed 1978-07-31(3)

The 3-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on unwritten contracts, RCW 4.16.080(3), applies to an action for unjust enrichment. ... Thus, the cause of action arose, if ever, when Skagit first made use of the device. The statute of limitations had not been effectively tolled within 3 years of that date; Eckert's claim is barred by RCW 4.16.080(3).

Subsection (3) gives legal malpractice actions a three-year limitations period that begins under the discovery rule when the client discovers, or should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim, including the injury or damage.

Huff v. Roach · filed 2005-02-10(3)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action in Washington is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3); Matson v. Weidenkopf, 101 Wn. App. 472, 481, 3 P.3d 805 (2000) (citing French v. Gabriel, 116 Wn.2d 584, 595, 806 P.2d 1234 (1991)). ... The discovery rule applies in legal malpractice actions, and the statute of limitations does not accrue “ ‘until the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts which give rise to his or her cause of action.’ ” Matson, 101 Wn. App. at 482 (quoting Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wn.2d 400, 406, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976)). ... The “injury” element refers to “damage,” as opposed to “damages.” “Damages” are the monetary value of the injury or damage proximately caused by the breach of alleged duty.

For an unjust-enrichment claim, the statute provides a three-year limitations period.

21st Mortgage Corporation v. Jack C. Cramer, Jr. · filed 2017-11-27

Cramer contends that 21st's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. It is not. The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is three years. RCW 4.16.080. The earliest payment which 21st seeks to recover was made on September 27, 2012. This action was brought on September 1,2015. Therefore, 21st's claims are within the three-year statute of limitation period.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires Washington unjust-enrichment claims to be brought within three years.

Anderson v. Meneses · filed 2020-09-30(3)

Additionally, claims for unjust enrichment in Washington must be brought within three years. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... Even considering the Amended Complaint and proposed second amended complaint with generous liberality, the Court cannot find any basis to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff Malone, while generally arguing that there could be a basis to toll the statute of limitations, offers none. Plaintiff Malone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for events occurring before June 20, 2016.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment.

O'Donnell/Salvatori Inc v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2021-02-12(3)

A three-year limitations period applies to duty of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment claims. RCW 4.16.080(3); ... Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a party has the right to apply to a court for relief. ... Based on ODS’s allegations, the Court finds the statute of limitations does not bar ODS’s claims.

Subsection (4) does not govern a constructive-trust claim based on unjust enrichment; subsection (3) supplies the three-year limitation for the common-law unjust-enrichment claim.

Gilbert Miller Testamentary Credit Shelter Trust v. Estate Of Mary E Miller · filed 2020-05-04(3) and (4)

The statute of limitations applicable to a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment is three years under RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for a common-law unjust-enrichment claim.

Melody Petlig, Appellant/cr-respondent V. The Estate Of Gary Webb, Respondent/cr-appellants · filed 2023-08-14(3)

“The statute of limitations applicable to a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment is three years under RCW 4.16.080(3).”

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitations period for unjust-enrichment claims, running under the discovery rule when the plaintiff should have discovered the facts necessary to establish the claim.

Kyle W. Laglow And Scott D. Hamilton, V. Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, Llp · filed 2023-11-13(3)

Washington applies a three-year statute of limitations to unjust enrichment claims. Seattle Prof’l Eng'g Emps. Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 837-38, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000) (citing RCW 4.16.080 (3)). ... Thus, applying the discovery rule, Lagow’s own words establish that the statute of limitations on his unjust enrichment claim began to run in 2017, if not earlier.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives unjust-enrichment actions a three-year limitations period, accruing when the claimant can establish the claim's elements and seek relief.

Elizabeth Parman, Appellant/Cross-Resp. v. Shawn Parman, Respondents/Cross-Apps · filed 2024-04-23(3)

Actions for unjust enrichment must be commenced within three years. RCW 4.16.080(3); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 147 Wn. App. 704, 737, 197 P.3d 686 (2008) (stating “the statute of limitations applicable to a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment . . . is three years”).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a § 1983 action in Washington, running from when the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Thomas v. Fischer · filed 2024-12-13(2)

To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation within the applicable limitations period. In Washington, a plaintiff has three years to file a § 1983 action from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim. RCW 4.16.080(2); Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Bagley v. CMC Real Est. Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying RCW 4.16.080(2) statute of limitations to a § 1983 action in Washington). Plaintiff did not timely file his complaint here, as the three-year statute of limitations expired on May 1, 2024.

The three-year limitations period in RCW 4.16.080(2) covers an action for injury to the person or rights of another, but it did not apply here because the direct injury was caused by the explosion rather than state officials' negligence.

Peterick v. State · filed 1978-12-12(2)

The plaintiffs Peterick and Wilson contend that since their cause of action is based upon a claim for wrongful death, the statutory limitation on bringing suit on this matter is governed by RCW 4.16.080(2) (the 3-year statute of limitations) instead of RCW 4.16.130 (the 2-year statute of limitations). ... As the plaintiffs did not file this cause of action against the State until sometime after the expiration of the 2-year limit, these two cases control the matter before us. ... The requisite direct liability for the 3-year statute of limitations sought to be enforced here does not arise out of the failure of the state officials to perform official duties, for this alleged failure would not have resulted in plaintiffs' injuries had the explosion not occurred. It was the explosion, however it was caused, that was the direct cause of the plaintiffs' injury, not negligence on the part of state officials. ... We hold that the 2-year statute of limitations applies, and that the claim against the state officials was properly dismissed.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for injury to personal property or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not otherwise enumerated.

Fittro v. Alcombrack · filed 1979-04-23(2)

Fittro's failure to serve State Farm within the 3-year statutory period bars her claim. ... RCW 4.16.080(2) provides for a 3-year statute of limitations in actions for "taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated".

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action based on a direct infringement of a person's legally protected right.

Washington v. Northland Marine Co., Inc., Shipscalers Local Union No. 541, Amos Burl, Intervenors · filed 1982-06-28(2)

Under the standard set forth by the Washington Supreme Court in Luellen and Bond, we believe that the three-year tort statute of limitations, Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2), is applicable in the present case. The union members clearly had a personal, legal right to representation by the union in grievance proceedings. The Local’s actions in not undertaking its duty of representation directly infringed that right, thus making the ensuing lawsuit one for “injury to the person or rights of another.” Accordingly, we hold that the district court clearly erred in not applying the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitation period for invasion-of-privacy actions.

Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co. · filed 1985-11-05(2)

Thus, we hold that until the Legislature directs otherwise, privacy actions are governed by RCW 4.16.080(2), the 3-year statute of limitation.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitation for actions involving direct or indirect injury to a person or the rights of another, unless another limitation provision applies.

Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co. · filed 1985-11-21(2)

We agree and now hold that it has and we overrule the direct/indirect injury distinction of Northern Grain and its progeny. The language of RCW 4.16.080(2) is clear and should apply to any other injury to the person or rights of another not enumerated in other limitation sections.

The three-year limitation period applies to an injury to a person's rights, including a buyer's right to a habitable structure under an implied warranty.

Vigil v. Spokane County · filed 1986-02-13(2)

Conversely, the buyer has a right to such a structure, and any injury to this right is covered by RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for injury to personal property or for other injury to a person or another's rights, including both direct and indirect injuries.

Honcoop v. State · filed 1986-03-31(2)

The court held that RCW 4.16.080(2) applies to causes of action claiming both direct and indirect injuries to the person or rights of another. ... Although the facts in Stenberg concerned injury to the person, RCW 4.16.080(2) also deals with injury to personal property. Therefore, we hold that the 3-year statute of limitations is applicable to the negligence claims of the appellants.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitations period applies to tort claims for outrage and infliction of emotional distress because those torts are not coextensive with assault and battery.

St. Michelle v. Robinson · filed 1988-08-29(2)

The 3-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080, provides in part: ... Within three years: ... (2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated[.] ... In this case, the 2-year limitation period bars St. Michelle's causes of action for assault and battery. However, we hold that her causes of action for outrage and infliction of emotional distress are not time barred, because the 3-year limitation period is applicable to the torts of outrage and infliction of emotional distress.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires an action for taking or injury to another's personal-property rights to be commenced within three years, subject to tolling under the discovery rule until the claimant knows or should know the action's essential elements.

Farrare v. City of Pasco · filed 1992-12-10(2)

As to a tort action, RCW 4.16.080 provides the following action must be commenced within 3 years: "(2) An action for taking .. . personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to . . . rights of another...". Ordinarily an action accrues when the act occurs. Gevaart v. Metco Constr., Inc., 111 Wn.2d 499, 501, 760 P.2d 348 (1988). The discovery rule, however, tolls the statute of limitation until the plaintiff, exercising due diligence, knows or should have known all the essential elements of the action. Hibbard, at 752 (filed after the parties filed their briefs). The statute is not tolled, however, because the claimant is unaware of the legal cause of action. ... There is no genuine issue of material fact as to her knowledge of all the essential elements. Her lack of knowledge of the legal cause of action is irrelevant. ... The statute of limitation bars Ms. Farrare’s claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) applies a three-year limitation to an action for an injury to a person's rights not otherwise enumerated, including a statutory wage-and-hour violation.

Sorey v. Oldsmobile · filed 1996-08-01(2)

The question presented here is whether Mr. Sorey’s claim is "an action . . . for any other injury to the person or rights of another” and subject to a three-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(2), or whether, instead, it falls within the general catchall two-year statute of limitations. We conclude that the three-year statute applies because Mr. Sorey’s claim falls generally within the purview of "any other injury to the person . . . .”

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on oral or partly oral contracts.

DePhillips v. Zolt Const. Co. · filed 1998-08-06(3)

If parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element, then the contract is partly oral and the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(3) applies.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action for injury to another’s person or rights, including an unpaid-wage claim under the MWA.

Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co. · filed 1998-08-31(2)

Thus, our task is to determine whether a statutory-wage act claim is an “injury to the person.” RCW 4.16.080(2). An injury is broadly defined in the law to include “[a]ny wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or property.” Black’s Law Dictionary 924 (4th rev. ed. 1968). The MWA creates a personal right for an employee “to be paid either his or her regular wage or, when appropriate, overtime for all time worked.” Mutual Benefit Life, 84 Wn. App. at 51. Consequently, the failure to pay an employee the required wage under the MWA violates the rights of the employee and is appropriately considered an injury to the person. Accordingly, we agree with Sorey and affirm the trial court’s determination that a three-year statute of limitation applies to the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action for injury to a person's rights, including a statutory wage claim.

SEATTLE PRO. ENG. EMP. ASS'N v. Boeing Co. · filed 1998-10-06(2)

Thus, our task is to determine whether a statutory wage act claim is an "injury to the person." RCW 4.16.080(2). An injury is broadly defined in the law to include "[a]ny wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or property." Black's Law Dictionary 924 (4th rev. ed.1968). The MWA creates a personal right for an employee "to be paid either his or her regular wage or, when appropriate, overtime for all time worked." Mutual Benefit Life, 84 Wash.App. at 51, 925 P.2d 212. Consequently, the failure to pay an employee the required wage under the MWA violates the rights of the employee and is appropriately considered an injury to the person. Accordingly, we agree with Sorey and affirm the trial court's determination that a three-year statute of limitation applies to the plaintiffs' claims.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for injury to a person or another's rights, including a wrongful-adoption negligence claim based on an agency's failure to disclose medical and social information.

Price v. State · filed 1999-07-16(2)

A cause of action against an adoption agency for the negligent failure to disclose medical and social information about the child falls within the general three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including federal § 1983 actions.

Doggett v. Perez · filed 2004-02-27(2)

Washington’s three year personal injury statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(2), applies in § 1983 actions.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action injuring another’s rights; the period generally begins when the injury occurs, subject to the discovery rule when the injury and knowledge are separated.

Will v. Frontier Contractors, Inc. · filed 2004-04-06(2)

The statute of limitations for an implied warranty of habitability claim is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2)[2]; Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 406, 415, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987); see Vigil v. Spokane County, 42 Wash.App. 796, 799-800, 714 P.2d 692 (1986). The three years begins to run, generally, when the plaintiff suffers an injury. Architechtonics Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Khorram, 111 Wash. App. 725, 728, 45 P.3d 1142 (2002).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an injury to a person or rights not otherwise covered by another statute of limitations.

French v. Uribe, Inc. · filed 2006-03-16(2)

Prior to the enactment of RCW 51.24.020, the three-year statute of limitations contained in RCW 4.16.080 applied to actions by an employee against the employer. ... Moreover, Washington courts have concluded that RCW 4.16.080(2) applies to any injury to a person or their rights not enumerated in other statute of limitations provisions. ... We conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that the three-year statute of limitations applies. Because RCW 4.16.080(2) applies, we need not address Uribe, Inc.'s argument that the catch-all provision, RCW 4.16.130, applies.

Subsection (2) sets a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and subsection (4) sets a three-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Westway Construction, Inc. v. Benton County · filed 2006-12-14(2) (4)

Because 42 U.S.C § 1983 does not have a specific statute of limitation, the United States Supreme Court has directed the lower federal courts to apply the general state law limitations period for personal injury claims. Cloud v. Summers, 98 Wn. App. 724, 733, 991 P.2d 1169 (1999). In Washington, this period is three years. See RCW 4.16.080(2); Conway v. Standard Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (E.D. Wash. 1998). Westway and Mr. Phelps did not raise the § 1983 claim until their amended complaint was filed on July 9, 2004. The facts giving rise to this claim occurred in 2000. The claim was untimely. ... The amended complaint was not filed until July 9, 2004, four years after the alleged tortious conduct. The statute of limitations bars this claim. See RCW 4.96.020, 4.16.080(2). ... This claim is also barred by the statute of limitations because it was not pleaded until July 2004. See RCW 4.16.080(4) (fraud has three-year statute of limitations).

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions for injury to a person or the person's rights, when not otherwise enumerated, to be commenced within three years.

French v. Uribe, Inc. · filed 2006-01-19(2)

We conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that the three-year statute of limitations applies.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions involving the taking of personal property or injury to other rights.

Anderson v. Baseball Club of Seattle · filed 2013-10-17(2)

Under Washington law, the statute of limitations for an action for the taking of personal property or injury to other rights is three years. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). The City informed Anderson on or before January 24, 2005, that it would not issue the stationary vending permit for which he had applied. Anderson commenced suit on June 18, 2009. His action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is therefore late by more than a year.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for actions for injury to the person or rights of another, and applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Leslie Spencer & Tammy S. Blakey, Apps./x-resp. v. Nancy Blakey & Glenda Blakey, Resps./x-app. · filed 2015-03-30(2)

To the extent their breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the first three theories, it is barred under the statute of limitations because it was not filed until January 4, 2013, more than three years after the claim accrued. RCW 4.16.080(2); Hudson v. Condon. 101 Wn. App. 866, 872-73, 6 P.3d 615 (2000) (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim is subject to the three-year tort statute of limitations).

Section 4.16.080(2) generally requires actions seeking damages for personal-property or personal-injury claims to be commenced within three years.

Ronald Auer And John Traster, App/cross-respondents v. Robert Leach, Et At., Resps/cross-app · filed 2015-10-27(2)

Generally a plaintiff must commence an action to recover damages to personal property or for personal injury within three years or the claim is barred.6 RCW 4.16.080(2); Brown v. Vail, 169 Wn.2d 318, 328, 237 P.3d 263 (2010). To commence a civil action, the plaintiff must either (1) file the complaint with the superior court or (2) serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the defendant. CR 3. Filing the complaint or serving the summons and complaint tolls, for purposes of commencing the action, the statute of limitations for 90 days. RCW 4.16.170.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation on actions for injury to a person or another’s rights when no other limitation section applies, but RCW 4.16.160 shields L&I from that limitation when pursuing an assigned third-party action.

Carrera Ex Rel. Department of Labor & Industries v. Olmstead · filed 2016-10-04(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2),3 the following must be brought within three years: An[y] action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated. ... A statute of limitations period for third party actions under the IIA is not among those enumerated elsewhere, so this three-year limitations period applies.4 Because L&I raised Carrera’s claims in a third party action more than three years after he was injured, it acted outside of this limitations period. Therefore, this third party action would be time barred, unless L&I is immune from operation of the statute. ... Because nothing in chapter 51.24 RCW expressly abrogates or limits sovereign immunity, RCW 4.16.160 insulates L&I from application of the statute of limitations found in RCW 4.16.080(2). The superior court erred by granting summary judgment on grounds that it was time barred under that statute.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for injury to a person or another's rights, including these claims.

Kris Barry Kilbourne, Et Ux. v. City Of Everett · filed 2018-05-21(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2), the general statute of limitations, governs an action "for any other injury to the person or rights of another not[otherwise] enumerated." The claims that Kris and Brigette Kilbourne assert in this action are within the scope of this statute. Because this statute bars their claims, summary dismissal was proper.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions for injury to another's person or rights, including alleged back-wage claims, to be commenced within three years.

In Re Writ Of Mandamus Of Carl Alonzo Brooks v. State Of Washington · filed 2019-04-22(2)

Pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(2), “[ajn action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated” must be commenced within three years. An action for alleged back wages is an invasion of a personal right subject to this three year statutory limitation period.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions for injury to a person or another's rights not otherwise enumerated to be commenced within three years.

McReynolds v. State of Washington · filed 2021-02-25(2)

The Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and for violation of RCW 71.09.070(5) for events occurring before June 25, 2016 (three years before he filed this case) should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. In Washington, a claim for negligence must be brought within three years under RCW 4.16.080(2). A claim for violation of RCW 71.09.070(5) must also be brought within three years under the “catch all” provision of Washington’s statute of limitations RCW 4.16.080(2). RCW 4.16.080(2) (providing the “following actions will be commenced within three years . . . an action for . . . injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated”). As stated above, Plaintiff’s claim for tolling under RCW 4.16.190 is unavailing.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions for injury to personal property, or for any other injury to a person or another's rights, including tort claims, to be commenced within three years.

Carolyn Sioux Green, V. State Of Washington, Dshs · filed 2022-09-13(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) provides that “[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another” shall be commenced within three years. This three-year statute of limitations applies to tort claims.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for any other injury to a person's or another's rights not otherwise enumerated.

Patrick v. Ramsey · filed 2023-10-12(2)

WCPA claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. RCW 19.86.120. Claims for negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy under Washington law are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2) (setting a three-year statute of limitations for actions for “any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated”). Plaintiffs filed this action on April 28, 2023. (See Compl.) Thus, absent an applicable exception, the relevant statutes of limitations bar negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy claims that accrued before April 28, 2020, and WCPA claims that accrued before April 28, 2019.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for actions for injury to a person or another’s rights not otherwise enumerated, including the Washington-law claims identified by the court.

Patrick v. Ramsey · filed 2024-02-23(2)

Claims for negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and conversion under Washington law are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2) (setting a three-year statute of limitations for actions for “any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated”). Plaintiffs filed this action on April 28, 2023. (See Compl.) Thus, absent an applicable exception, the relevant statutes of limitations bar negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy claims that accrued before April 28, 2020, and WCPA claims that accrued before April 28, 2019.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for taking personal property or injury to other rights.

Topolski v. Washington State Department of Licensing · filed 2025-03-11(2)

“Under Washington law, the statute of limitations for an action for the taking of personal property or injury to other rights is three years.” Anderson, 542 F. App’x at 619 (citing RCW § 4.16.080(2)). “Thus, the statute of limitations for Mr. Topolski’s claims against the Department of Licensing is three years—regardless of the basis for the policies or decision.”

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions arising from unwritten contracts.

Harberd v. City of Kettle Falls · filed 2004-02-26(3)

First, Mr. Harberd contends no statute of limitations exists on the issue of whether the City is a public utility. However, Mr. Harberd's objective was to establish the City's public utility status to support his breach of contract claim. Consequently, Mr. Harberd asserts a breach of contract claim subject to the three-year statute of limitations for actions arising from unwritten contracts. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... In any event, reasonable minds could reach one conclusion, that Mr. Harberd was on constructive notice no later than November 1997 that the City would no longer grant out of town water hookups. Given the constructive notice, and the lack of credible evidence of any adverse City decisions after that time, Mr. Harberd's March 16, 2001 breach of contract claim has to be time barred.

Section 4.16.080(4) supplies the limitation period for a common-law fraud action, with accrual upon discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

Kittilson v. Ford · filed 1979-05-22(4)

He contends that the court should apply the securities act limitation period because the act deals specifically with fraud in the sale of a security, while RCW 4.16.080 applies to fraud actions in general. We recognize the rule that a specific statute will prevail over a general statute where the statutes deal with the same subject matter and are in conflict. See Stephens v. Stephens, 85 Wn.2d 290, 296, 534 P.2d 571 (1975). However, we have held that the securities act does not preempt other remedies available to a defrauded plaintiff. Thus, the statutes in question do not deal with the same subject, but with two distinct causes of action.

Section 4.16.080(4) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud actions, but that period does not apply to a reformation claim based on mutual mistake.

Winmar Co. v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America · filed 1994-12-09(4)

Moreover, to the extent Winmar’s claim is based on mutual rather than unilateral mistake, there is no basis for applying Washington’s three-year statute of limitations for fraud. ... Section 4.16.080(4) of die Washington Revised Code establishes a three-year statute of limitations period for actions based on fraud.

Section 4.16.080(2) does not govern a physician-malpractice claim alleging a failure to diagnose when the specific medical-malpractice statute applies to professional negligence, including omissions.

Bixler v. Bowman · filed 1979-12-11(2)

The statute was amended in 1975 to include omissions as well as wrongful acts. Appellant argues that Dr. Bowman's failure to diagnose was an omission not covered by the above statute and therefore the prior statute, RCW 4.16.080(2), and its 3-year statute of limitation control. We find no merit to this contention. The legislature passed the specific medical malpractice statute in 1971 which included the "professional negligence" of a physician; it could not have been the intent of the legislature to cover wrongful acts in one statute and omissions in a prior statute. We find no distinction on a negligence theory between acts and omissions nor does appellant cite any authority for her position.

Section 4.16.080(2) does not apply to a medical-malpractice claim merely because the alleged negligence is an omission, where RCW 4.16.350 specifically governs medical-malpractice actions.

Bixler v. Bowman · filed 1980-08-07(2)

Plaintiff argues that, even if the date of the alleged wrongful act is April 29, 1975, what actually occurred was a wrongful omission and that the discovery of an alleged omission continues to be governed by RCW 4.16.080(2). ... It is implausible to believe the legislature, in enacting a specific medical malpractice act, would intend the acts of a physician to be covered by one statute while omissions would be covered by another.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies the three-year limitations period for product-liability personal-injury claims, with accrual determined under the discovery rule.

Martin v. Patent Scaffolding · filed 1982-07-19(2)

The statutes of limitations governing a product liability action are RCW 4.16.010 and RCW 4.16.080(2). They apply generally to personal injury actions and fix the period of limitation at 3 years after the cause of action shall have accrued.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on attorney-malpractice claims, accruing when the client discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim.

Crouch v. Friedman · filed 1988-06-13(3)

The statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice action is 3 years. ... The statute of limitations for legal malpractice should not start to run until the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts which give rise to his or her cause of action.

Subsection (3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims under Washington's Minimum Wage Act.

SPEEA v. Boeing Co. · filed 2000-01-27(3)

We hold the three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(3) applies to WMWA claims and take this occasion to overrule Cannon.

Section 4.16.080 gives bad-faith claims a three-year statute of limitations.

O'NEILL v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington · filed 2004-12-06

Under RCW 4.16.080, claims for bad faith are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) provides a three-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, which the court applied to the state-law unfair-competition claim.

Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc. · filed 2012-10-29(4)

There is an additional basis for dismissal of Cascade’s state law unfair competition claim, in that it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4). ... However, Cascade offers no convincing argument that its state law claim of unfair competition is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims. ... Accordingly the claim shall be dismissed on that basis as well.

For conversion claims, § 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues.

Vaughn v. Montague · filed 2013-02-14(2)

In Washington, conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2); Crisman v. Crisman, 85 Wash.App. 15, 931 P.2d 163, 165 (1997). The limitation period begins to run when the plaintiffs cause of action accrues. Crisman, 931 P.2d at 165. A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers the alleged injury. Id. ... Thus, Washington’s statute of limitation bars Mr. Vaughn’s claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires discrimination claims to be brought within three years under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Merriman v. Whatcom County · filed 2013-09-09(2)

Discrimination claims must be brought within three years under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. \± at 261-62; RCW 4.16.080(2). ... At the latest, then, the statute of limitations on Merriman's failure to accommodate claim accrued on February 10, 2006, when his request for accommodation was officially denied and communicated to him. Merriman did not file his complaint until September 22, 2009—well outside of the three year statutory limitations period.

Washington’s three-year limitations period applies to negligence claims, and accrual turns on when the plaintiff discovers or should discover the facts giving rise to the claim.

Affiliated FM Insurance v. LTK Consulting Services, Inc. · filed 2014-04-16

In Washington, a three-year statute of limitations governs claims of negligence. See Wash. v. Boeing Co., 105 Wash.App. 1, 19 P.3d 1041, 1050 (2000) (stating that negligence claims are subject to the three-year limitations period in RCW 4.16.080).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives conversion actions a three-year limitations period, running under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or should know the essential elements of the claim.

VFW 3348 Foundation v. Albert Brede and Sandy Brede · filed 2015-08-25(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), the statute of limitations to bring a suit for conversion is three years. ... VFW's cause of action accrued when it knew or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause of action. Based on the unchallenged findings of fact, this was no later than January 20, 2008. Because VFW knew or should have known of the essential elements of its conversion claim by January 20,2008, its claims for conversion occurring before that date had to be brought by the end of January 2011, or be barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) gives fraud claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Hummel v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. · filed 2016-03-23(4)

Fraud claims are subject to a three year statute qf limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) applies a three-year limitations period to WLAD discrimination claims.

Harbord v. Bean · filed 2017-06-12(2)

The three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims under the WLAD had therefore expired by the time Harbord filed this action on September 26, 2014.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s general three-year tort limitation does not govern wrongful-death claims based on medical negligence.

Fechner v. Scott Volyn dba Volyn Law Firm · filed 2018-05-22(2)

In cases where a plaintiff’s claim is for “wrongful death resulting from negligent health care,” the MNSOL applies, not the general torts catchall limitations period set forth at RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on Washington legal malpractice claims.

Peterson v. Subit · filed 2025-04-02(3)

Under Washington law, legal malpractice claims are subject to a three year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080 requires the action to be brought within three years of the injury or its discovery; locating a missing witness later does not toll the limitation period.

Buxton v. Perry · filed 1982-06-10

The statute of limitation requires the action here be brought within 3 years of the injury or discovery of it. RCW 4.16.080; ... Plaintiff argues that the statute runs from the time he discovers the witness to support or prove his case. This is not the law. ... The statute of limitation is not tolled because there may be missing witnesses.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year tort limitations period governs the claim, and accrual is postponed until the wrongful-death claimant knew or should have known the death was caused by asbestos exposure.

White v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1985-01-10(2)

The 3-year tort statute of limitation (RCW 4.16.080(2)) applies to the present action. ... The wrongful death statute of limitation accrues at the time the wrongful death claimant knew or should have known that the death of the decedent was caused by his exposure to asbestos.

Section 4.16.080 requires a claim subject to its three-year limitation to be filed within three years after accrual, including when the claim accrued within the six-year repose period but filing would otherwise extend beyond that period.

Gevaart v. Metco Construction, Inc. · filed 1988-09-01

However, once an action accrues it may also be subject to the 3-year limitation statute, RCW 4.16.080, when it extends the time for filing beyond the 6-year period. Thus the cause of action brought against Metco and Hale had to be brought within 3 years after it occurred, as the 6-year statute of repose ran out in August of 1984.

The three-year limitation period begins when the cause-of-action facts exist and the injured party knows or should know them, even without conclusive proof.

Beard v. King County · filed 1995-02-13(2)

Unless the discovery rule applies, all of Appellants’ causes of action are time barred under the 3-year limitation period, RCW 4.16.080(2), because this action was filed more than 3 years after the 1989 claim. ... This appeal presents the narrow issue of whether the discovery rule continues to toll the commencement of the limitation period after the injured party has specifically alleged the essential facts but does not yet possess proof of those facts. ... We hold that it does not. ... Following these rationales, the limitation period begins to run when the factual elements of a cause of action exist and the injured party knows or should know they exist, whether or not the party can then conclusively prove the tortious conduct has occurred. ... On these facts, the discovery rule does not apply to extend the commencement of the limitation period beyond the filing of the 1989 claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period, but under Washington’s discovery rule accrual is deferred until the plaintiff knew or should have known the claim’s essential elements.

Green v. A.P.C. · filed 1998-08-20(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) limits to three years a person’s ability to file a claim for injuries. However, under Washington’s discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a party knew or should have known the essential elements of the cause of action—duty, breach, causation, and damages.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for injury-to-person-or-rights claims, accruing when the claimant knows or reasonably should know the relevant factual basis of the claim through due diligence, even without recognizing the legal cause of action.

Germain v. Pullman Baptist Church · filed 1999-07-27(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year statute of limitation on actions for “injury to the person or rights of another[.]” The limitation period commences when the claim accrues. Under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until the claimant “discover[s] or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of [the] possible cause of action[.]” ... Knowledge of the factual, not the legal, basis of the action is the key consideration under the discovery rule. ... “The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are enough to establish a legal cause of action.” ... Here, the plaintiffs were all adults at the time of the alleged wrongful acts. It is undisputed that they considered the conduct to be wrong, at least in the sense that it had the potential of damaging their families and their own reputations if it became public knowledge. They also experienced psychological problems during and after the sexual misconduct, and they could have discovered the causal link between it and their injuries had they diligently sought treatment. ... In the circumstances present here, the trial court was correct in holding as a matter of law that the discovery rule did not extend the statute of limitation.

Sections 4.16.080(2) and (4) provide three-year limitation periods for negligence and negligent-misrepresentation claims, applied from the claims' accrual.

Sabey v. Howard Johnson Co. · filed 2000-07-24(2), (4)

Sabey's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are subject to three-year statutes of limitations.[54] ... Howard Johnson has not established that Sabey's negligence claims accrued earlier than March 1998 when he agreed to pay the PBGC. ... Sabey's claims are not time-barred.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitation on conversion, tort, fraud-based, and unwritten-contract claims, and a fraud claim accrues when the claimant discovers or should have discovered the fraud and sustains some appreciable damage.

Hudson v. Condon · filed 2000-08-10(2), (3), and (4)

Under the express terms of RCW 4.16.080(4), a cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. Sherbeck v. Estate of Lyman, 15 Wn. App. 866, 868, 552 P.2d 1076 (1976). We infer actual knowledge of fraud if the aggrieved party, through due diligence, could have discovered it. Id. at 868-69. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for a damage action based on fraud commences when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the fact of fraud and sustains some damage as a consequence. First Md. Leasecorp v. Rothstein, 72 Wn. App. 278, 283, 864 P.2d 17 (1993).

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, running from accrual and subject to the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or should know the facts necessary to establish the claim.

Giraud v. Quincy Farm and Chemical · filed 2000-08-17(2)

The statute of limitations for the negligence action is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). A limitation period begins to run when the plaintiff's cause of action accrues. ... The discovery rule operates to toll the date of accrual until the plaintiff knows or, through the exercise of due diligence, should have known all the facts necessary to establish a legal claim. ... Because the Girauds's negligence claim against Quincy Farm was filed more than three years after October 1994, it is barred by RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims not otherwise enumerated.

Woodward v. Taylor · filed 2016-01-14(2)

Because Washington's applicable limitation period is three years, RCW 4.16.080(2), Woodward's claim is not time barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) and (3) provide three-year limitation periods for claims covered by those subsections.

City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2017-02-22(2), (3)

All but one of Seattle’s .claims are subject to a three-year limitation period, see RCW 4.16.080(2), -(3); Seattle’s nuisance claim has a limitations period of two years, see RCW 4.16.130. ... Seattle’s claim for equitable indemnity, however, does not promote the public welfare: it asks Monsanto to indemnify Seattle as a corporate entity. Accordingly, that claim is brought “for. private corporate advantage” and is subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 generally requires a lawsuit to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, ordinarily when the act or omission occurs; a narrow discovery rule may postpone accrual when the claim or defendant's identity could not reasonably be discovered.

Sluys v. City Of Seattle, Wavedivision Holdings Llc And Broadstripe, Llc · filed 2018-04-09

Under RCW 4.16.080, a plaintiff must commence a lawsuit within three years from the date its cause of action accrues. Generally, the cause of action "accrues" at the time the act or omission occurs. ... Consequently, the statute of limitations expired on January 6, 2015. Sluys filed his amended complaint naming Broadstripe on March 11,2016—approximately 14 months after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period, and the discovery rule does not toll it when the claimant knew or should have known the essential elements of the claim.

Congdon v. Island County · filed 2020-04-13(2)

Finally, the statute of limitations bars claims arising out of the 2014 permit decision. See RCW 4.16.080(2) (three-year statute of limitations). The discovery rule does not apply here to toll the limitations period as Congdon claims.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitation period for legal-malpractice and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Sandra Ferguson And The Ferguson Firm, V. Brian J. Waid And Law Office Of Brian Waid · filed 2021-08-02

In Washington, the statutory limitation period applicable to a legal malpractice claim is three years, as is the period applicable to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. RCW 4.16.080; Cawdrey v. Hanson Baker Ludlow Drumheller, P.S., 129 Wn. App. 810, 816, 120 P.3d 605 (2005).

For fraud claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the injured party discovers or reasonably should discover the facts constituting the fraud.

Katz v. Katz · filed 2024-07-08(4)

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of David on Matthew’s fraud, declaratory judgment, and quiet title claims, because claims of fraud are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2)-(4). The three-year period began when Matthew discovered or could have discovered the salient facts in support of his claim with the exercise of reasonable diligence. RCW 4.16.080(4); Sanders v. Sheets, 142 Wn. 155, 158 (1927).

RCW 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period, and the limitations period for the claims addressed here began to run when plaintiffs knew or should have known the essential elements of their causes of action.

Colley v. Benton County Washington · filed 2024-08-19(2)

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are time barred by the relevant statute of limitation. See RCW 4.16.080(2) (providing a three-year limitation period). Under Washington law, the relevant period of accrual begins “when the plaintiff knew or should have known the essential elements of the cause of action,” and the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiffs may have viable actions in negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Lewis County, those actions began tolling in August 2019.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on personal-injury actions, including this § 1983 claim.

Young v. James R. Harvey, Husband and Wife, and the Marital Community Composed Thereof Jane Doe Harvey · filed 1992-01-10

Under Washington law, Young had three years to file his section 1983 action. Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives a claimant three years after an agency duty claim accrues to sue; the claim accrues when the claimant knows or should know its factual basis.

Pietz v. Indermuehle · filed 1998-01-16(3)

Both parties agree that a three-year statutory period applies. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... Accordingly, the three-year statutory period expired, at the latest, in 1991. Pietz filed the instant claim in 1992. The trial court properly held that this cause of action was time barred.

Section 4.16.080(2)’s filing period was not equitably tolled because the claimant showed no equitable grounds; the court left open tolling in other cases.

Douchette v. Bethel School District No. 403 · filed 1991-11-14(2)

While equitable grounds do not exist in the present case, we do not rule out the possibility there may be cases in which the filing deadline for a discrimination action may be equitably tolled.

Section 4.16.080(3) sets a three-year limitations period for claims to recover impact fees, subject to equitable estoppel.

Sundquist Homes, Inc. v. County of Snohomish · filed 2003-06-20(3)

Both parties acknowledge that the longest statute of limitation that might be applicable to plaintiffs’ claims is the three-year limitations period set forth in RCW 4.16.080(3). ... Because estoppel does not bar defendants’ assertion of the statute of limitation in this case, plaintiffs may not seek recovery of any impact fees paid before March 29,1999.

For damage to real property arising from construction or activity on adjacent property, the three-year limitation in § 4.16.080(1) accrues when the first substantial injury is sustained if damage had not occurred when construction was completed.

New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co. · filed 1983-02-17(1)

The trial court erred in applying RCW 4.16.300-.320; the proper statute of limitation is RCW 4.16.080(1).