Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies Washington’s three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 claims.

Fowler v. Guerin · filed 2021-07-23(2)

This leaves equitable tolling. Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations. Federal (and state, for that matter) courts instead “borrow “§ 1983 limitations periods from analogous state law. Specifically, they borrow the state’s “general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v Okure, 488 U.S. 235. 250 (1989). In Washington, that statute is RCW 4.16.080(2), which is a three-year limitations period. Bagley v CMC Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, in this District, the limitations period for a §1983 claim is three years. As Plaintiffs’ claim accrued in 2006, the limitations period expired in 2009, well before they filed their Fifth Amendment claim in this Court in 2015.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for tort actions, running when the cause of action accrues and, under the discovery rule, when the plaintiff knew or should have known the claim's essential elements.

Tatyana Mason, V John Mason And Laurie Robertson · filed 2021-10-19(2)

The statute of limitations for a tort action is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). It begins to run at the point at which a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues. ... Under the discovery rule, “‘a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known the essential elements of the cause of action.’” ... The discovery rule postpones the running of a statute of limitations until the date that the plaintiff “through exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the basis for the cause of action, even if actual discovery did not occur until later.”

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Washington.

Bishop-McKean v. Washington Department of Corrections · filed 2021-10-29(2)

Here, the law is clear that a three-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims in Washington. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1981); RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for tort claims, and accrual may be delayed under Washington’s common-law discovery rule.

M.L. v. craigslist Inc · filed 2022-04-25(2)

The relevant statute of limitations is three years. See RCW 4.16.080(2); Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wn. App. 176, 192 (2009) (outrage); Walker v. Orkin, LLC, 10 Wn. App. 2d 565, 567 (2019) (negligence). ... The Court agrees with the R&R; the common law discovery rule applies and whether M.L. exercised due diligence is a question of fact that the Court cannot determine on this summary judgment record.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on personal-injury and other unenumerated rights claims.

Fairley v. Pasco Police Department · filed 2022-04-29(2)

Here, the applicable Washington statute is RCW 4.16.080(2), which provides a three-year limitations period.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for WLAD claims because the WLAD has no limitations period of its own.

Bernal v. The Boeing Company · filed 2023-03-08(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to WLAD claims. Antonius v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that because WLAD does not contain its own limitations period, the general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in RCW 4.16.080(2) applies). The three-year clock begins to run when the decision to take the adverse employment decision is final and communicated to the employee, even if the effects of that decision are not felt until later.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for WLAD claims because WLAD has no limitations period of its own.

Bernal v. The Boeing Company · filed 2023-08-08(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to WLAD claims. Antonius v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that because WLAD does not contain its own limitations period, the general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in RCW 4.16.080(2) applies).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period that can bar constitutional or tort claims arising from the alleged conduct.

Owen v. State of Washington · filed 2023-10-06

Any constitutional or tort claim arising from the conduct at issue in the 2019 civil case is facially time-barred, as the applicable limitations period is three years. RCW 4.16.080.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on contract or liability claims that are not in writing and do not arise from a written instrument, running from accrual of the claim.

Trina Lyons, V. Dshs · filed 2024-04-09(3)

“[A]n action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... We hold that Lyons failed to establish that her claims were based on a written contract under RCW 4.16.040(1). Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations for actions based on oral agreements under RCW 4.16.080(3) applies here. ... There was roughly four years and, slightly more than, seven months between accrual and filing—clearly exceeding the three-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for Washington common-law trade-name-infringement claims.

Revelry Vintners LLC v. Mackay Restaurant Management Group Inc · filed 2024-07-01

Because the Lanham Act does not include a statute of limitation, courts must look to analogous state law causes of action. ... Here, it seems the most analogous cause of action in state law is Washington’s common law tort of trade name infringement, RCW 4.16.080, which contains a three-year statute of limitation. ... For the purposes of actual knowledge, Plaintiff’s suit filed in July of 2021 against Defendant Mackay is timely under the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Washington.

Nocita v. Housing Authority of Grays Harbor County · filed 2024-09-20(2)

In Rose, the Ninth Circuit determined the three-year limitations period identified in Revised Code of Washington 4.16.080(2) is the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 cases in Washington. 654 F.2d at 547; see R.C.W. § 4.16.080(2). ... Therefore, any claim arising prior to September 13, 2021 is barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 tort claims under Washington law.

McGary v. Inslee · filed 2024-10-16(2)

Section 1983 does not have its own statute of limitation, and thus federal courts will apply the forum state’s limitation period for tort actions. Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Under Washington law, this period is three years. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Washington, running from the date the claim accrued.

Thomas v. Fischer · filed 2024-11-07(2)

Under Washington law, Plaintiff had three years from the date his First Amendment retaliation claim accrued to file a § 1983 action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); Rose, 654 F.2d at 547 (three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in Washington State).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on Washington trade name infringement claims.

Pacific Landscape Management Inc v. Pacific Landscape Management LLC · filed 2025-02-11(2)

Under Washington law, the limitations period for trade name infringement claims is three years. ... Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to PLM-WA, the statute of limitations does not bar the trade name infringement claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years to file a § 1983 action, measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Gach v. Lyons · filed 2025-02-13(2)

To note, in Washington, a plaintiff has three years to file a § 1983 action, from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims when no more specific limitations period applies, including federal claims that borrow Washington’s period.

Smith v. Snohomish County · filed 2025-02-27(2)

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the Court applies the forum state's limitations period for personal injury claims. ... In Washington, this provision is found in Washington Revised Code § 4.16.080(2). Thus, Washington courts apply a three-year statute of limitations period to § 1983 claims.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years to file a § 1983 action, running from when the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Gach v. Lyons · filed 2025-03-06(2)

In Washington, a plaintiff has three years to file a § 1983 action from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a § 1983 claim in Washington, measured from when the plaintiff knew or should have known the factual basis for the claim.

Stephens v. UW Medicine · filed 2025-03-19(2)

In Washington, a plaintiff has three years to file a § 1983 action from the time they knew, or should have known, the factual basis for the claim. RCW 4.16.080(2); Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Bagley v. CMC Real Est. Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying RCW 4.16.080(2) statute of limitations to a § 1983 action in Washington).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Washington, measured from accrual.

Tschabold v. Pierce County · filed 2025-03-24(2)

Under Washington law, Plaintiff had three years from the date his conditions of confinement claims accrued to file a § 1983 action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); Rose, 654 F.2d at 547 (three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising in Washington State).

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on the common-law privacy claim, which the court found had expired by 2024.

Novelozo v. Port of Seattle · filed 2025-08-18(2)

Additionally, Novelozo cannot now exhaust this claim because it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations that expired in 2024. See RCW 4.16.080(2). For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES this claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Washington.

Moon v. Washington State University · filed 2025-09-03(2)

In Washington, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is three years. Joshua v. Newell, 871 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)).

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Beyhawck · filed 2026-01-27(2)

The limitations period for personal injury actions in Washington is three years. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). Thus, the limitations period for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is three years. See id.; Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1981). Three years is also the applicable limitations period for Plaintiff’s negligence, conversion, and malicious prosecution claims. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2); see also Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap Cty., 352 P.3d 807, 816 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (negligence); Michel v. Melgren, 853 P.2d 940, 943 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (conversion); Stansfield v. Douglas Cnty., 43 P.3d 498, 500 (Wash. 2002) (malicious prosecution).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year period for injury-to-person-or-rights claims not otherwise enumerated, while subsection (4) provides a three-year period for fraud claims running from discovery.

Jenkins v. Dep't of Social & Health Services · filed 2026-02-05(2), (4)

The applicable statutes of limitations are RCW 4.16.080(2) (three years for injury to person or rights not otherwise enumerated) and RCW 4.16.080(4) (three years for fraud, running from discovery), as well as RCW 4.16.350 for health care injuries (three years from the act or omission, or one year from discovery, whichever is later, but no claim may be commenced more than eight years from the act or omission). ... Even viewing the facts most favorably to Jenkins, he discovered or reasonably should have discovered the basis for his claims well before November 2019, three years prior to filing. ... Regardless, Jenkins still did not initiate an action within three years of June 2019 (withdrawal of creditor’s claim and release of lien). His lawsuit was not filed until November 2022.

For fraud and tortious-interference claims, § 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period, generally running when every element—including actual loss or damage—can be proved; the discovery rule can postpone it until reasonable due diligence should reveal the claim’s basis.

3s Network, Inc., Appellant/cr-respondent V. Zenisco, Inc., Respondent/cr-appellants · filed 2026-05-11(2), (4)

The statute of limitations for fraud and tortious interference is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2), (4); Crisman v. Crisman, 85 Wn. App. 15, 21 & n.2, 931 P.2d 163 (1997) (fraud); Woods View II, 188 Wn. App. at 19 (tortious interference). The statute of limitations period runs from the time an action has accrued, which is when “every element of an action is susceptible of proof, including the occurrence of actual loss or damage.” 7 Woods View II, 188 Wn. App. at 20 (citing Malnar, 128 Wn.2d at 529; Haslund, 86 Wn.2d at 619); RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on a contract claim when the agreement is partly oral because a material contract term must be established with parol evidence.

Wiker v. United Services Automobile Ass'n · filed 2026-05-28(3)

Under RCW 4.16.080(3), “an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument,” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period. ... Importantly, this court has opined that “[a] written agreement for purposes of the six-year statute of limitations must contain all the essential elements of the contract, and if resort to parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element, then the contract is partly oral and the 3-year statute of limitations applies.” ... Without the terms and conditions element in the proposal, it would be necessary to look to parol evidence to determine whether such work or coverage was agreed to by the parties. The contract is therefore partly oral and subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year limitations period for covered causes of action, running here from the crash.

O'KEEFE v. Boeing Company · filed 1971-12-07

Referring then to Washington, the statutory period applicable to - the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs is three years which began to run at the time of the crash, January 24, 1963. See Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080; Robinson v. Baltimore & S. Mining & Reduction Co., 26 Wash. 484, 67 P. 274 (1901).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for injuries to a person or another’s rights, including the period borrowed for § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

Rk Ventures, Inc. v. City Of Seattle · filed 2002-10-07(2)

The statute of limitations applicable to appellants' § 1983 and § 1985 claims is three years. See Joshua v. Newell, 871 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir.1989); Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2). To determine the timeliness of these claims, we must determine whether appellants have alleged "discrete acts" that would violate the Constitution that occurred within the limitations period. ... The City's decision to institute formal abatement hearings, and its notice to appellants of that decision, was the "operative decision" for the purposes of triggering the § 1983 statute of limitations. The actual beginning of the abatement hearing on November 14 was simply the effect of that decision and was not a separately unconstitutional act. ... A statute of limitations under § 1983, however, begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which is when the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury that is the basis of their action.

Section 4.16.080(2) bars claims based on citations received before September 7, 1997, as untimely.

Young v. Quatermass · filed 2003-03-19(2)

The magistrate judge properly determined that Young’s claims relating to citations he received prior to September 7, 1997, are barred by the statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev.Code §§ 4.16.080(2), 4.96.020; RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 4.16.080(2) bars a personal-injury action filed more than three years after the claim accrued.

Plush v. Smitty · filed 2003-08-21(2)

The district court properly dismissed Plush’s action as untimely because he filed it more than three years after the claims accrued. See Wash. Rev.Code §§ 4.16.080(2) & 4.16.190; Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir.1981).

For a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed in Washington, § 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations.

Kim v. Targa Real Estate Service, Inc. · filed 2009-08-19(2)

The district court properly dismissed Kim’s action because it was filed well after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action filed in Washington “is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2)”).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in Washington.

Eriksen v. Serpas · filed 2012-04-27(2)

The district court properly dismissed the action because the Eriksens filed it well after the applicable three-year statute of limitations period had run. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).”).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years from a discrete discriminatory act to bring a WLAD discrimination claim based on that act.

St Marie v. Jefferson County · filed 2024-08-29(2)

The Supreme Court of Washington has established that discrimination claims must be brought within the general, three-year statute of limitations. Antonius, 103 P.3d at 732 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)). ... On this basis, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim as to her alleged demotion is untimely and fails as a matter of law.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for failure-to-accommodate claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination.

Hassan v. The Boeing Company · filed 2025-04-08(2)

The statute of limitations on a failure to accommodate claim under the Washington Law Against Discrimination is three years. Wade v. Premera Blue Cross, No. CV-10-217-RMP, 2012 WL 12790, at *10 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2012) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)).

For an action based on fraud, the three-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers, or through due diligence could have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud, including when a recorded instrument gives constructive notice of those facts.

Strong v. Clark · filed 1960-05-12(4)

The statute begins to run in fraud cases when there is discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. ... When the facts upon which the fraud is predicated are contained in a written instrument which is placed on the public record, there is constructive notice of its contents, and the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of the recording of the instrument.

Section 4.16.080(4) starts the limitations period for fraud when the injured party discovers, or through due diligence could have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud.

Continental Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, Wash. · filed 1988-01-13(4)

Under Washington law, a cause of action for fraud does not accrue “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” RCW 4.16.-080(4). Actual notice of the fraud will be inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it.

For fraud claims involving a fiduciary relationship, the three-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Nord v. SHORELINE SAVINGS ASS'N · filed 1990-03-05(4)

Former RCW 4.16.080 sets forth the appropriate statute of limitations in pertinent part as follows: ... Actions limited to three years. Within three years: ... (4) An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud; ... A cause of action for fraud involving a fiduciary relationship is also governed by the 3-year statute of limitations and does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers acts constituting fraud. ... We hold that the jury reasonably could have determined the factual question before them by deciding that Nord and Childs only knew about the alleged fraud when they found out about the second deed of trust. ... Nord and Childs filed their action well within the 3-year statute of limitations, which began to run in the spring of 1986, when Nord discovered the second deed of trust on the Bo Van property.

Section 4.16.080(4)'s fraud limitations period accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or could have discovered all elements of the fraud claim.

Norris v. Church & Co. · filed 2002-12-20(4)

A cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers or could have discovered all elements of the claim.

The fraud limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Sloan v. Thompson · filed 2005-07-05(4)

Finally, the Sloans' fraudulent concealment claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for fraud does not begin to run until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.[40] Here, the Sloans did not discover the concealed framing defects until 2000, when Sloan removed the wall coverings after the second earthquake.[41] The Sloans then filed suit in January 2002, well within the time allowed. ... See RCW 4.16.080(4): "An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud."

Section 4.16.080(4) applies a three-year limitations period to fraud actions, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers or should have discovered the facts constituting the fraud and sustains actual damage.

Young v. Savidge · filed 2010-04-27(4)

Instead, we apply the three year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(4)14 to Young’s intentional misrepresentation claim. ... A fraud action accrues when the aggrieved party discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the fact of fraud, and sustains some actual damage as a result.

For fraud claims, the limitations period does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud; under the discovery rule, accrual occurs when the plaintiff knew or should have known the basis for the claim through due diligence.

Sectra Communications AB v. Absolute Software Inc · filed 2024-10-28(4)

However, claims of fraud are “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” RCW 4.16.080(4). ... Under the discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff, through the exercise of due diligence, knew or should have known the basis for the cause of action.” Shepard, 185 Wn. App. at 739 (quoting Green v. Am. Pharm. Co., 86 Wn. App. 63, 66, 935 P.2d 652 (1997), aff'd, 136 Wn.2d 87, 960 P.2d 912 (1998)). ... These examples are insufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that all necessary facts of Defendants’ communications with potential customers were known by Plaintiffs or knowable with reasonable diligence prior to discovery in this case. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that a genuine dispute as to material facts preclude summary judgment dismissal of these claims based on the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period, accruing when the plaintiff discovers or should discover the fraud.

Merle v. Teuscher · filed 1989-08-10(4)

Because a forum state’s statute of limitation for general fraud claims determines the limitation period for claims under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act8 and S.E.C. Rule 10(b)(5),9 we apply the three-year statute of Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080(4). See, e.g., Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir.1987); Hilton v. Mumaw, 522 F.2d 588, 601-02 (9th Cir.1975); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915-16 (9th Cir.1971). Federal law determines when the statute begins to run. Volk, 816 F.2d at 1412 (citing SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir.1982)). A defrauded person triggers the statute when he has actual or inquiry notice of a fraudulent *1501misrepresentation. Volk, 816 F.2d at 1412; see also Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir.1988) (actual knowledge of fraud or facts sufficient to put reasonable person on notice). The determination of whether a plaintiff knew or should have known of a cause of action presents a question for the trier of fact.10 Volk, 816 F.2d at 1417; Hilton, 522 F.2d at 602.

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud-based reformation claims, including claims based on concealing a material fact or breaching a duty to disclose, and its discovery rule applies whether fraud is expressly pleaded or proved through nondisclosure.

PBTM LLC v. Football Northwest LLC · filed 2021-01-05(4)

However, for reformation based on unilateral mistake by one party and inequitable or fraudulent conduct by the other, Washington courts apply the three-year limitations period under RCW 4.16.080 for actions involving conversion, tort or relief based on fraud. See RCW 4.16.080(4); Browning v. Howerton, 92 Wash. App. 644, 650–51, 966 P.2d 367 (1998) (reformation based on fraud subject to three-year rule of RCW 4.16.080(4)). ... For that reason, the three-year limitations bar applies to PBTM’s claim for reformation of the LEGION OF BOOM Agreement.

Subsection (4) gives three years to bring an action based on fraud, with accrual delayed until discovery of the facts constituting the fraud; fraudulent misappropriation of a principal’s funds by an agent qualifies.

Viewcrest Cooperative Assoc. v. Deer · filed 1967-01-19(4)

We agree with plaintiff that the case at bar is governed by subsection (4) of the statute, being an action “upon the ground of fraud.” When an agent violates his fiduciary duty by fraudulently misappropriating the funds of his principal, then an action to recover the funds is grounded upon fraud within the meaning of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080's three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known all essential elements of a negligence claim, subject to the plaintiff's duty of due diligence.

In the Matter of Estates of Hibbard · filed 1991-01-14

Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the plaintiff has an affirmative duty to exercise due diligence in pursuing all the elements of his or her cause of action.

Section 4.16.080 requires tort claims to be filed within three years after accrual, applying a discovery rule when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known the essential elements of the claim.

G.W. Construction Corp. v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-06-21

Because this lawsuit sounds only in tort, the tort statute of limitations applies. Under RCW 4.16.080, a plaintiff must commence a lawsuit within 3 years from the date its cause of action accrues. It accrues when a claimant knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, all the essential elements of the cause of action, specifically duty, breach, causation, and damages. ... All of these facts should have put G.W. on notice more than 3 years before commencement of this suit that the rebar was misplaced. Substantial evidence does not support the finding that G.W. could not have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to January 1988 that the rebar was misplaced. The statute of limitations has run on G.W.'s claim.

For claims under an agency agreement creating a de facto trust, the discovery-rule timing under RCW 4.16.080 is triggered by the same actual or constructive knowledge that triggers the limitations period for the related testamentary-trust claims.

Gillespie v. Seattle-First National Bank · filed 1993-06-29

Although the trial court held (and neither party disputes) that the agency agreement was governed by a different statute, RCW 4.16.080, it also is not disputed that the agency agreement gave rise to a "de facto" trust having the same general purpose as the testamentary trust and giving rise to the same type of fiduciary obligation as the testamentary trust. ... Accordingly, we see no reason, in this case, to distinguish the two types of beneficial interests for purposes of the application of the discovery rule. We hold that, for the purposes of this particular case, any actual or constructive knowledge which would have triggered the running of the statute of limitation as to the testamentary trust would also have triggered it as to the "de facto trust" agency agreement.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims; subsection (4) delays accrual of a fraud claim until discovery of the facts constituting fraud, and that discovery rule applies to a conversion claim when fiduciaries conceal the misconduct by breaching their duty to disclose.

Crisman v. Crisman · filed 1997-02-14(2), (4)

In this instance, Uhlich and Robert, acting as Crisman's agents, transferred corporate funds they received from the liquidation sale to their own benefit without Crisman's knowledge or consent. They were acting as Crisman's fiduciaries and, consequently, owed her an affirmative duty of disclosure. As Uhlich and Robert did not disclose their actions to Crisman, they breached this duty, and their silence constitutes an affirmative act of misrepresentation. Consequently, RCW 4.16.080(4), the statutory discovery rule for fraud, applies. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it held otherwise.

Section 4.16.080's discovery rule applies separately to each separate and distinct injury, so the limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of that particular injury.

Green v. American Pharmaceutical Co. · filed 1997-04-28

The trial court relied on ... the traditional discovery rule. RCW 4.16.080; RCW 7.72.060(3). Under this rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff, through the exercise of due diligence, knew or should have known the basis for the cause of action. ... Ms. Green argues that the discovery rule should apply separately to each injury because they are separate and distinct, rather than progressive. We agree. Under this rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or should have known she had an injury she could not have discovered earlier. ... On this record, Ms. Green’s injuries are separate and distinct, and the discovery rule applies separately to the later-discovered uterine condition. Applying this rule, the statute of limitations began to run in January 1992 when Ms. Green discovered that she had another injury caused by DES.

Section 4.16.080(4) gives fraud claims a three-year limitation period and delays accrual until the aggrieved party discovers, or through due diligence could discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

Freitag v. McGhie · filed 1997-12-18(4)

Fraudulent conveyance claims were ruled by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4) limits a claim for fraud to a three-year statute of limitations, and "the cause of action in such case [is] not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud...." The discovery rule contained in the statue of limitations for fraud was applied in actions under the former UFCA, and the statute of limitations began to run when there was discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. Strong v. Clark, 56 Wash.2d 230, 232, 352 P.2d 183 (1960). Further, actual knowledge of the fraud was inferred if the aggrieved party, through the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it. Strong, 56 Wash.2d at 232, 352 P.2d 183. Thus, the statute of limitations codified in RCW 4.16.080(4), and containing a discovery rule for fraud actions, was incorporated into the former UFCA.

For fraud, the three-year limitations period accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or could have discovered all elements of the claim.

Norris v. Church & Co., Inc. · filed 2003-02-07(4)

Church argues that the Norrises fraudulent concealment claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4). According to Church, the Norrises knew about the leaks in 1994 and did not file this action until June 9, 2000. The record is not clear whether Church properly presented this argument to the trial court. Nevertheless, an issue of material fact exists that prevents summary judgment on this basis. Although the Norrises learned of the leaks early on, a cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers or could have discovered all elements of the claim. Sherbeck v. Estate of Lyman, 15 Wash.App. 866, 868-69, 552 P.2d 1076 (1976). There is evidence that the Norrises did not know and could not have discovered the true causes of the leaks, that Church knew of the true causes, or the extent of damage until within three years of filing the action. Church is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud claims that begins when the injured party discovers, or should have discovered with due diligence, the fraud and sustains actual damage.

Ives v. Ramsden · filed 2008-01-02(4)

Here, the Ives Estate's claims of fraud and securities violations had a statute of limitation of three years after the cause of action accrued. RCW 21.20.430(4)(b); RCW 4.16.005, .080(4). Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitation for these actions begins only when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered by due diligence, the fact of fraud or securities fraud and sustains some actual damage as a result. RCW 21.20.430(4)(b); First Md. Leasecorp. v. Rothstein, 72 Wash. App. 278, 281-82, 864 P.2d 17 (1993) (citing RCW 4.16.080(4)).

Section 4.16.080(4) applies a three-year limitation period to fraud actions, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Young v. Savidge · filed 2010-04-27(4)

Accordingly, we follow Finch, Wright, and Bundrick in holding that Young's common law claim of intentional misrepresentation does not fall under chapter 7.70 RCW and former RCW 4.16.350. Instead, we apply the three year statute of limitation in RCW 4.16.080(4)[14] to Young's intentional misrepresentation claim. See Westway Const., Inc. v. Benton County, 136 Wash. App. 859, 868, 151 P.3d 1005 (2006).

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for negligent-misrepresentation claims, subject to accrual under the discovery rule.

Putz v. Golden · filed 2012-01-24

A three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent misrepresentation. RCW 4.16.080. ... The accrual of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is subject to the discovery rule. ... Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers or reasonably could have discovered all the essential elements of the cause of action. ... Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that there are numerous material issues of fact concerning whether Dr. Putz and Panonia were on inquiry notice prior to May 2007 concerning the Goldens’ alleged misrepresentations. Accordingly, the court denies the Goldens’ motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for misrepresentation based on expiration of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on personal-property and fraud claims, with accrual delayed under the discovery rule only when the plaintiff shows due diligence in discovering the facts supporting the claim.

Azpitarte v. Spino · filed 2015-06-15(2), (4)

For conversion, replevin, fraud, and civil conspiracy actions, the statute of limitations is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2) (for "[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof); RCW 4.16.080(4) (fraud). ... The discovery rule operates to toll the date of accrual until the plaintiff knows or, through the exercise of due diligence, should have known all the facts necessary to establish a legal claim. ... Azpitarte has not met his burden to show he acted with due diligence in discovering the basis for his causes of action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the discovery rule to Azpitarte's claims of conversion, fraud, civil conspiracy, and replevin. Consequently, these claims are time-barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limit on injury claims, and the discovery rule delays accrual only until the claimant knows or reasonably should have known the essential facts of the possible claim.

Tasha Ohnemus, Res/cross-appellant v. State Of Washington, App./cross-respondent · filed 2016-07-19(2)

We disagree and hold that Ohnemus’s negligence claims are barred by the three year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(2). ... RCW 4.16.080(2) places a three year limit on a person’s ability to file a claim for injuries. ... Under Washington’s discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a party knows or reasonably should have known the essential elements of the possible cause of action. ... We hold that summary judgment dismissal of Ohnemus’s negligence claims was proper because reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that she knew or should have known the factual basis for her current cause of action against the State more than three years prior to the August 2012 filing of this lawsuit.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives personal-injury negligence claims a three-year limitations period, and the discovery rule can delay accrual until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the facts underlying the claim.

Nichols v. Peterson Northwest, Inc. · filed 2016-10-25(2)

Peterson argues that the statute of limitations bars the Nicholses’ negligence claim because they should have discovered the water intrusion within the limitations period. We disagree because the Nicholses raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in this situation. ... Under the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or in the reasonable exercise of diligence should discover, the salient facts underlying the cause of action’s elements. ... Accordingly, Peterson’s claim based on the statute of limitations fails. ... Negligence claims for personal injury are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2); Woods View II, LLC, 188 Wn. App. at 20.

For a fraud action, the three-year limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Ibew Health & Welfare Trust Of Sw Wa, V Rutherford · filed 2017-01-23(4)

We conclude that under RCW 4.16.080(4), IBEW's cause of action for fraud did not accrue until March 2012. Because IBEW filed its complaint in July 2013, its claim is well within the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on fraud claims.

Pearse v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. · filed 2018-05-31(4)

Fraud claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(4), and CPA claims to a four-year statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.120.

Section 4.16.080(4) sets a three-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Tucker v. BMW of North America LLC · filed 2020-09-24(4)

A fraud claim in Washington must be brought within three years. RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on fraud claims.

Lang v. Strange · filed 2021-08-02

As with a § 1983 claim, negligent investigation pursuant to RCW 26.44.050 and fraud carry a three-year statute of limitations. Petcu v. State, 121 Wn. App. 36, 68 (2004) (negligent investigation); RCW 4.16.080 (fraud). ... These claims accrued in March 2017, so the statute of limitations for defamation expired in March 2019 and it expired in March 2020 for the claims of negligent investigation and fraud.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions for injury to personal property, personal injury, or another’s rights, while subsection (4) delays fraud accrual until discovery of the facts constituting fraud.

Kathleen E. Johnson, Et Ano, V. Kerk · filed 2022-04-04(2) and (4)

A three-year limitation period applies to any “action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter ... enumerated.” RCW 4.16.080(2). ... The same limitation period applies to “[a]n action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to ... be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080(4) delays accrual of a fraud-based claim until the plaintiff discovers, or through due diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud and resulting damage; the court applied that rule to negligent misrepresentation at the pleading stage.

Nippon Paper Industries USA Co Ltd v. Georgia Pacific LLC · filed 2023-09-06(4)

Under RCW 4.16.080(4), “a cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.” ... Courts infer actual knowledge of fraud “if the aggrieved party, through due diligence, could have discovered it,” and the statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s claim “commences when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the fact of fraud and sustains some damage as a consequence.”

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud-based claims, and subsection (2) likewise bars a newly asserted civil-conspiracy claim after three years.

Erickson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA · filed 2024-02-28(2) and (4)

Third, the Ericksons’ allegations of fraud are time-barred. ... Therefore, even if they did not discover the alleged fraud before that time, the three-year statute of limitations ran on May, 13, 2022—over a year before they filed this action.

Subsection (4) gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Grubert v. Caliber Home Loans Inc · filed 2024-10-04(4)

Fraud claims under Washington law are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See RCW § 4.16.080(4). A cause of action for fraud accrues upon “the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Id.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limit on actions based on contracts or liabilities that are not in writing and do not arise from a written instrument.

Central Heat, Inc. v. Daily Olympian, Inc. · filed 1968-07-11(3)

Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to find that this was an action upon a written contract, or that there was liability, express or implied, arising out of a written agreement. And thus, the 3-year statute of limitations was properly held applicable in this case.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action based on an unwritten contract or liability that does not arise from a written instrument, including an implied-in-law or quasi-contract claim.

Sheeran v. General Electric Company, a New York Corporation · filed 1979-01-24(3)

Thus if plaintiffs are to recover, their recovery must be outside of the basic written contract (as recovery of the overpayment was in the Halver case) and would result from an implied-in-law or quasi-contract. As such, the right of action must be limited by ROW 4.16.080, the three year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives a three-year limitations period for an action on an express or implied contract or liability that is not in writing and does not arise from a written instrument.

Hart v. Clark County · filed 1988-08-03(3)

Clark County had an implied liability to repay the fees previously received under the invalid ordinance. Therefore, the appropriate statute of limitations would be 3 years under RCW 4.16.080(3). ... The deferral agreement signed by Hart merely establishes the terms of payment of the invalid fees. The County's obligation to return the improper tax is based, not on the terms in the deferral agreements, but on the impropriety of the County's retention of illegally collected tax money.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions based on unwritten contracts or liability arising from unwritten contracts or instruments.

Pietz v. Indermuehle · filed 1998-02-27(3)

The relationship between a principal and agent is contractual. The breach of a fiduciary duty, however, imposes liability in tort. Miller v. U.S. Bank, 72 Wash.App. 416, 426, 865 P.2d 536 (1994). Actions upon unwritten contracts or liability arising from unwritten contracts or instruments are subject to a three-year statute of limitation. RCW 4.16.080(3). Here, Pietz, at the latest, learned of the factual basis underlying this claim against Fordham when Berry sued him in 1988. Accordingly, the statute of limitations, at the latest, expired in 1991. Pietz filed this action in 1992. The trial court properly dismissed this claim as untimely.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires an action on an unwritten express or implied contract or liability to be commenced within three years.

Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n · filed 2008-12-12(3)

The statute of limitations applicable to a common law cause of action for unjust enrichment (which, as noted above, is equivalent to a cause of action for restitution or implied in law contract) is three years. ... RCW 4.16.080(3); Seattle Prof’l Eng’g Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 837-38, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000). Insofar as pertinent here, RCW *7384.16.080(3) requires that an action be commenced within three years if it is “an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument.”

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitations period for unwritten contract or liability actions, except when RCW 4.16.040(2) applies.

Cawley-Bruso v. Ray Klein Inc · filed 2019-12-17(3)

The Court agrees with Defendant: RCW 4.16.040(2) is clearly intended by the legislature to be an exception to the 3-year statute of limitations created by RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080(3) supplies a three-year limitations period for pension-impairment claims treated as actions on contracts or liabilities not in writing, accruing at retirement.

Hester v. State · filed 2021-03-25(3)

Both parties dispute the trial court’s ruling that pension impairment claims have a statute of limitations that accrues upon retirement and lasts for a period of three years. We have previously addressed and resolved this issue as applied in pension impairment claims and have held that these types of claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations period, which accrues upon retirement. ... In analyzing the appropriate limitations period for pension impairment claims, Noah relied on the statute of limitation periods for contracts claims, which have a period that depends on whether the contract is in writing. RCW 4.16.080(3) (three-year statute of limitations for “an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing”), .040(1) (six-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a contract in writing”).

For medical-malpractice claims based on a foreign object left in a surgical wound, the three-year limitations period begins when the patient discovers, or should have discovered through reasonable care, the object.

Ruth v. Dight · filed 1969-04-10(2)

We adopt as the rule of this jurisdiction the principle that in those classes of cases where medical malpractice is asserted to have occurred through the negligent leaving of foreign substances or articles in a surgical wound and which remain in the body after the wound has been surgically closed, the statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080(2)), commences to run when the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reason able care for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the presence of the foreign substance or article in his body.

For medical-malpractice claims involving a foreign body negligently left in the patient's body, the limitations period begins when the injury is discovered or when the patient, exercising reasonable and ordinary care, should have discovered it.

Denison v. Goforth · filed 1969-05-01(2)

In overruling Lindquist, we adopted what appeared to be the better rule, that in medical malpractice cases involving the negligent leaving of foreign bodies or substances in the body, the statute of limitations shall commence to run with the discovery of the injury or at such earlier time as the patient in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care for her own health and safety should have discovered it.

For legal-malpractice actions, the three-year limitations period begins when the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim.

Peters v. Simmons · filed 1976-08-05(3)

It is apparent, then, that the statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(3) was not designed to compel, by the initiation of a lawsuit, the exercise of a right not discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, not discoverable within the time frame specified in the limitations statute. ... In view of these considerations, we hold that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice should not start to run until the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts which give rise to his or her cause of action.

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), the three-year limitations period for professional malpractice begins when the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; the discovery rule applies to accountants.

Hunter v. Knight, Vale & Gregory · filed 1977-10-13(2)

The discovery rule, i.e., when a client discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered an injury, has been extended in Washington and applied to a variety of actions for professional malpractice. ... Judicial policy dictates that the discovery rule be extended to accountants in order to protect clients who frequently do not have the means or ability to discover the perpetration upon them of professional malpractice. ... We do extend the discovery rule to the profession of accounting. ... Application of this rule to the case at bench would seem to dictate the plaintiffs' action against Knight, Vale and Gregory accrued on or before February 24, 1972—the date on which Mr. Hunter directed a letter to defendant accounting firm in which he complained of insufficiencies and inaccuracies alleged to have been made in the certified financial statements which the defendant firm had prepared. Clearly, Mr. Hunter knew of or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered injury to himself or to the corporation by February 24, 1972. Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit on March 19, 1975, more than 3 years after discovery of the wrong.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires a legal-malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the client discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim.

Matthies v. Knodel · filed 1977-12-12(3)

RCW 4.16.080(3) requires that actions for legal malpractice be commenced within 3 years from the date the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts which gave rise to the cause of action.

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions, but the discovery rule delays accrual until the client discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim.

Matson v. Weidenkopf · filed 2000-07-14(3)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action is three years. French v. Gabriel, 116 Wash.2d 584, 595, 806 P.2d 1234 (1991); RCW 4.16.080(3). But, because the discovery rule applies, the statute does not begin to run "until the client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts which give rise to his or her cause of action." Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash.2d 400, 406, 552 P.2d 1053 (1976); see French, 116 Wash.2d at 595, 806 P.2d 1234.

For negligent medical diagnosis, the three-year limitations period under § 4.16.080(2) begins when the injured party knows or, with due care, should know of the negligence and the resulting right to sue.

Janisch v. Mullins · filed 1969-12-01(2)

In our opinion, action upon the plaintiff’s request involves the performance of a judicial function. We are asked to construe and apply the word “accrued” with respect to negligent diagnosis as the word “accrued” is used in RCW 4.16.010 and 4.16.080 (2). ... The word “accrued” does not necessarily mean the same in all contexts under all circumstances and for all purposes. We bear in mind the fact that it is a limitation statute that we are construing and not merely a definition of a cause of action. We seek to construe the word “accrued” in a manner consistent with a prima facie purpose to compel the exercise of a right within a reasonable time (34 Am. Jur. Limitation of Actions §§ 9, 10 (1941)) without doing an avoidable injustice. The accomplishment of such a purpose seems fair only if the injured party knows or should know that he has a right to sue.

Section 4.16.080’s three-year limitations period for an unwritten implied contract begins when a continuous-services contract is terminated.

Culligan v. Old National Bank · filed 1970-02-11

Defendant next urges that plaintiff’s claim is barred by the 3-year statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080) as being an implied contract not in writing. However, plaintiff’s claim is based on continuous services and the statute did not commence to run until the implied contract was terminated. Heasley v. Riblet Tramway Co., 68 Wn.2d 927, 937, 416 P.2d 331 (1966).

An express trust is not subject to the statute of limitations until the trustee terminates or repudiates it, and the repudiation must be plain, strong, unequivocal, and brought home to the beneficiary.

O'Steen v. Estate of Wineberg · filed 1978-02-03

An express trust is not subject to the statute of limitations until it is terminated or repudiated by the trustee.

The three-year limitations period begins when all elements of the claim exist and the plaintiff has a right to seek relief; in negligent tax-preparation cases, actual injury occurs when the tax assessment becomes final and collectible.

Murphey v. Grass · filed 2011-10-31(3)

The statute of limitations for his claims is three years, and begins to run when all elements necessary to the claim exist and the plaintiff has a right to seek relief in the courts. ... When a taxpayer petitions for correction of an assessment, the appeals division final determination triggers the Department’s ability to collect. Under Feddersen’s analysis, only at this point does the taxpayer sustain harm and the claim accrue. ... Murphey’s liability was not certain until the appeals division made the assessments final, binding, and due for payment. “[Potential liability is not the equivalent of *595actual harm.”40 Thus, the limitations period did not commence before the appeals division final determinations.

Section 4.16.080(1) does not govern a wrongful-eviction claim when the defendant did not negligently enter real property or cause a third person to do so.

Keron v. Namer Investment Corp. · filed 1971-04-26(1)

However, appellant’s theory of trespass is not one of trespass governed by RCW 4.16.080(1), because Namer did not negligently enter upon real property or cause a third person to do so.

For a professional land-surveyor negligence claim, the three-year period runs from when the claimant discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury.

Kundahl v. Barnett · filed 1971-07-06(2)

Although Ruth v. Dight, supra, and subsequent decisions applying the discovery rule involve medical malpractice, the reasons given for the rule are as persuasive in this case where a landowner intending to build, and knowing that there were boundary location problems, obtained, for pay, the services of a professional land surveyor to locate his property. ... We see no distinction between the medical and other professions insofar as application of the discovery rule is concerned. ... The injustice caused by the strict definition of “accrual” can be avoided by the application of the discovery rule.

For malpractice actions, the three-year limitation period begins when the injured party knows, or exercising due care should have known, of the alleged negligent conduct.

Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic · filed 1974-10-28(2)

In malpractice actions, our State has adopted the “discovery rule” in determining when the action accrues under RCW 4.16.010 and 4.16.080(2), i.e., that the limitation period described in the statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party knows, or in the exercise of due care, should have known of the alleged negligent conduct.

For a tort action based on negligence, the three-year limitation period accrues when the wrongful act causes injury, and the discovery rule does not postpone accrual unless the legislature expressly provides for it.

Lindquist v. Mullen · filed 1954-12-09(2)

It is not our prerogative so to do. We are concerned here with the interpretation of a statute. We are satisfied that had the legislature intended the principle of discovery to apply to tort cases based on negligence, it would have specifically said so, as it did with regard to discovery in fraud cases.

Under § 4.16.080(2), a negligence claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers actual loss and, through reasonable diligence, first has the opportunity to discover an actionable claim.

Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co. · filed 1975-12-11(2)

Petitioner claims that under either RCW 4.16.080(2) providing a 3-year statute of limitation “for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated,” or RCW 4.16.130, providing a 2-year period of limitation for “[a]n action . . . not hereinbefore provided for,” respondent’s claim is barred. ... We therefore hold that respondent’s cause of action accrued when he first suffered actual loss and had the first opportunity by the exercise of reasonable diligence to discover he had an actionable claim for unauthorized cancellation of the “floater” policy. Thus, respondent’s cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations.

For fraud claims, the limitations period does not begin until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, and knowledge is inferred when due diligence would have revealed them.

Sherbeck v. Estate of Lyman · filed 1976-07-23(4)

By the express terms of RCW 4.16.080(4), a cause of action for fraud does not accrue “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limit on personal-injury claims, but under the discovery rule a products-liability claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered all essential elements of the possible cause of action.

Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital · filed 1979-08-16(2)

The statutes of limitation governing appellant's product liability action against Air Shields, Inc., are RCW 4.16.010 and RCW 4.16.080(2). They apply generally to a personal injury action and require the commencement of the action within 3 years after the cause of action accrued. ... While we agree with the trial court that the discovery rule should be extended to this products liability case, we disagree with the court's formulation and application of the rule. Like our above holding about Tacoma General, we now hold that appellant's claim against Air Shields did not accrue until after she discovered or reasonably should have discovered all the essential elements of her possible cause of action.

The three-year limitations period begins when a products-liability plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the essential elements of the claim.

Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1986-01-15(2)

The first issue is whether Edward Reichelt's cause of action had accrued by October 20, 1977. A products liability cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably ought to have discovered that (1) he suffers physical harm from a product which has a defective condition making it unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defendant seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (3) the product is expected to and does reach plaintiff without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. ... The trial court correctly concluded that, by October 20, 1977, Reichelt had discovered or reasonably ought to have discovered all the essential elements of his cause of action. Once Reichelt knew that he had asbestosis and that this disease was caused by exposure to asbestos products at work, he should have prosecuted his claim. Because he did not, the statute of limitations on his cause of action expired.

For fraud claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers, or through due diligence could discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

Interlake Porsche + Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz · filed 1986-12-02(4)

Under the 3-year limitation statute, RCW 4.16-.080(4), ... a cause of action for fraud does not accrue "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud". In a shareholder derivative action, which asserts a corporate cause of action, the corporation is the aggrieved party and the real party plaintiff. ... Actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it. The same rule applies in an action for fraud involving a fiduciary relation.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period that begins when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the defects comprising the elements of the cause of action.

Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. · filed 1987-11-19(2)

The applicable statute of limitations in this lawsuit is 3 years from the date of discovery under RCW 4.16.080(2). That statute should operate, however, as of the time the homeowners actually knew or reasonably should have known of the defects that comprised the elements of their causes of action.

For a three-year personal-injury action, the limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should have known that the particular defendant may be responsible.

Orear v. International Paint Co. · filed 1990-09-17(2)

We conclude that the statutes of limitations applicable to Orear's cause of action against Seaport did not begin to run until he knew or with reasonable diligence should have known that Seaport may have been a responsible party. On this record, whether Orear should have discovered Seaport's identity as a potentially responsible party prior to 1988 is an issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.

Subsection (2) is governed by the discovery rule in product-liability cases: the claim does not accrue until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, all essential elements of the possible cause of action.

Koker v. Armstrong Cork, Inc. · filed 1991-03-06(2)

Here, the applicable statute is RCW 4.16.080(2). The discovery rule applies to product liability cases. The claim does not accrue until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, all of the essential elements of the possible cause of action.

The three-year limitations period for a negligence claim runs when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the claim’s essential elements, and reasonable diligence is required.

Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp. · filed 1987-03-05(2)

Mr. Reichelt would have us adopt a rule that would in effect toll the statute of limitations until a party walks into a lawyer's office and is specifically advised that he or she has a legal cause of action; that is not the law.

For the three-year limitations period, a cause of action accrues when the claimant knows or, through due diligence, should have known all essential elements of the claim, including duty, breach, causation, and damages.

Hibbard v. Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca & O'Hern · filed 1992-03-26(2)

Recognizing our prior decisions and the policy behind the discovery rule, we conclude that, in this case, a correct formulation of the rule is that a cause of action accrues when a claimant knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, all the essential elements of the cause of action, specifically duty, breach, causation and damages. ... We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court which found that the "discoveiy rule" did not apply to the State in this case and that the negligence action against the State was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations, which began to run on December 6, 1977, the date Ms. Hibbard's parents were murdered and she was allegedly raped.

For a common-law fraud damages action, subsection (4)'s three-year limitation period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the fraud and sustains actual damage.

First Maryland Leasecorp v. Rothstein · filed 1993-12-28(4)

RCW 4.16.080(4) is a discovery-rule exception to the 3-year accrual period. That is, the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or, by reasonable diligence, would have discovered, the cause of action. ... We hold that the statute of limitation for a damage action based on common law fraud does not commence to run until the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the fact of fraud by due diligence and sustains some actual damage as a result therefrom.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule; when the plaintiff, through due diligence, should have discovered the basis for the cause of action is a question for the trier of fact.

Samuelson v. Community College District No. 2 · filed 1994-09-07(2)

Although we conclude that the discovery rule should have application to this case, we are unable to determine whether Samuelson’s cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. The discovery rule postpones the running of the statute of limitations only until the time that the plaintiff, through due diligence, should have discovered the basis for the cause of action. ... It is for the trier of fact to determine the point at which Samuelson, through due diligence, should have discovered his eligibility for TIAA/CREF. ... There are insufficient facts in the record before us to allow such a determination to be made. The most that can be said is that this is a fact question and the appellate court is not the fact finder.

Subsection (4) delays accrual of a fraud action until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, and applies when a fiduciary conceals material facts by breaching an affirmative duty to disclose.

Crisman v. Crisman · filed 1997-01-03(4)

Either method of proof will activate the statutory discovery rule for fraud, RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period, but under Washington’s discovery rule a claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known its essential elements, including duty, breach, causation, and damages.

Green v. APC (Am. Pharmaceutical Co.) · filed 1998-08-20(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) limits to three years a person's ability to file a claim for injuries. However, under Washington's discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a party knew or should have known the essential elements of the cause of action—duty, breach, causation, and damages.

For a personal-injury claim, § 4.16.080(2)’s three-year limitations period runs when the plaintiff knew or should have known the essential elements of the claim, and a limitations defense fails on summary judgment without evidence that the injury was discoverable more than three years before suit.

Niven v. E.J. Bartells Co. · filed 1999-09-20(2)

Rapid-American contends that the three-year personal injury statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(2), bars Niven’s present claim for lung cancer, even though it was filed within three years of his diagnosis of cancer. ... Under Washington’s “discovery rule,” a cause of action does not accrue until a party knew or should have known the essential elements of the cause of action—duty, breach, causation, and damages. ... The only question is whether Niven should have known of the presence of his lung cancer more than three years before he filed suit against Rapid-American. ... Absent from the record is any statement from a health care professional showing that Niven’s lung cancer could have been diagnosed more than three years before he filed the present suit. ... We conclude the dismissal of Niven’s case cannot be affirmed on the basis that it is time-barred.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year personal-injury period accrues under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knows the facts supporting all elements of the claim.

Davis v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP · filed 2000-12-11(2)

The argument is contrary to the well-established rule that an action accrues as soon as the plaintiff knows the facts supporting all elements of his action.

For fraud-based actions, the three-year limitations period runs from when the aggrieved party discovers, or with reasonable diligence would have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud.

Harry, Betty May, Timothy & Scott Corliss, Apps. v. Larry P. Hughes And Harry & Beth Hart, Resps. · filed 2014-02-18(4)

The parties agree that all claims are governed by RCW 4.16.080(4), which states that a three-year statute of limitations applies to "[a]n action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud." The statute begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence would have discovered, the cause of action. ... The party seeking to toll the statute of limitations based on the discovery rule has the burden to show the fraud could not have been discovered until three years before the commencement of the action.

The three-year limitations period for fraud claims may be subject to the discovery rule, and adverse domination can presumptively toll that period while culpable directors conceal the wrongdoing.

Alexander v. Sanford · filed 2014-05-12(4)

The discovery rule can apply to fraud claims. RCW 4.16.080(4). It is also widely accepted that the doctrine of adverse domination can apply to fraud claims. See, e.g., Grant, 901 P.2d at 815-16. ... Thus, the doctrine of adverse domination applies to Homeowners’ fraud claims. ... Therefore, with respect to the breach of board member duty of care claims, CPA claims, negligent misrepresentation claims, and fraud by omission and misrepresentation claims, the statute of limitations was presumptively tolled until April 24, 2011. On the face of the complaint, these claims were timely and the trial court erred by dismissing them as a matter of law.

Section 4.16.080(4) makes the three-year limitations period for fraud and misrepresentation accrue when the aggrieved party discovers, or through due diligence could discover, the facts constituting the fraud, once the claim's elements exist.

Shepard v. Holmes · filed 2014-12-23(4)

RCW 4.16.080(4) effectively codifies the discovery rule as the basis on which a claim for fraud or misrepresentation accrues. See First Md. Leasecorp v. Rothste in, 72 Wn. App. 278,282,864 P.2d 17 (1993) (characterizing RCW 4.16.080(4) as "a discovery-rule exception to the 3-year accrual period"). In applying the discovery rule, actual knowledge of fraud will be inferred for purposes of the statute if the aggrieved party, by the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered it. ... Here, the trial court applied RCW 4.16.080(4) and RCW 19.86.120 as statutes that limited the time within which Ms. Shepard must bring suit after her causes of action accrued. The limitations periods did not begin to run in 1998, because she had not yet been allegedly misled, taken action in reliance, and suffered resulting damage. ... The trial court (properly) recognized that it was not until the closing of her purchase in July 2007 that all elements of her claims existed and she had the right to apply to a court for relief.

For fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, subsection (4) applies a three-year limitations period that accrues under the discovery rule when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the facts giving rise to the claim.

Nielson v. Household Fin. Corp. III · filed 2019-03-07(4)

This court has recognized that “RCW 4.16.080(4) effectively codifies the discovery rule” for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Shepard v. Holmes, 185 Wn. App. 730, 739, 345 P.3d 786 (2014). That rule also applies to CPA claims. Id. at 740. Under the discovery rule, an action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts giving rise to the claim. RCW 4.16.080(4); Sabey v. Howard Johnson & Co., 101 Wn. App. 575, 593, 5 P.3d 730 (2000); First Maryland Leasecorp v. Rothstein, 72 Wn. App. 278, 283, 864 P.2d 17 (1993).

Section 4.16.080(4) delays accrual of a fraud claim until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud, starting the three-year limitations period then.

Khalid v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2019-11-21(4)

Plaintiff cites RCW 4.16.080(4), which states that the cause of action in a fraud case is “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud . . . .” RCW 4.16.080(4). ... The Court found that even if it liberally applied the discovery rule to Plaintiff’s case, his fraud claim is untimely. His complaint makes clear that by July 9, 2015 at the latest, he was aware of Microsoft’s intention to deny existence of the Exclusion List. ... Plaintiff’s fraud claim, see Dkt. #7 at ¶¶ 134-151, therefore began tolling no later than July 9, 2015. Because Plaintiff did not file this action until January 28, 2019, the three-year limitations period had already expired. Accordingly, the Court finds no manifest error in its decision that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is time-barred.

Subsection (2) requires the limitations period to run from accrual of the cause of action.

Cantrell v. United Services Automobile Association · filed 2019-05-20(2)

The statute of limitation does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues.

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on fraud claims, with accrual delayed until discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.

Roth v. CNR Products Inc · filed 2020-05-11(4)

The Court agrees with Defendants that the negligent misrepresentation claim is time-barred with respect to the alleged misrepresentation regarding CBR’s financial stability. ... A negligent misrepresentation claim must be commenced within three years of discovery of the misrepresentation under Washington law. ... Given that the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was placed on notice of the allege misrepresentation no later than December 2015 and given that Plaintiff did not institute this action until February 2019, the negligent misrepresentation claim, to the extent that it relies on allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation regarding CNR’s financial stability, is time-barred.

For fraud claims, the three-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers or should discover the facts constituting the fraud and sustains actual damage; later substantial or specific damages do not postpone accrual.

Daniel Szmania, V. Gillingham · filed 2021-12-14(4)

RCW 4.16.080(4) provides that actions alleging fraud “shall be commenced within three years,” and the cause of action is “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” ... The statutory period for fraud commences when “the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the fact of fraud by due diligence and sustains some actual damage as a result therefrom.” ... “The running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the substantial damages occur later, and is not postponed until the specific damages occur for which the plaintiff seeks recovery.” ... Once Szmania discovered the facts underlying his fraud claim and damage was no longer speculative, the statute of limitations began to run. RCW 4.16.080(4); Browning, 92 Wn. App. at 651; Hudson, 101 Wn. App. at 876.

A fraud claim has a three-year limitations period and does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Hoefs v. Sig Sauer Inc · filed 2022-03-18(4)

Plaintiff’s fraud claims are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See RCW 4.16.080(4) (a fraud claim does not accrue “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud”).

For fraud claims, section 4.16.080(4) delays accrual until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Sectra Communications AB v. Absolute Software Inc · filed 2024-01-08(4)

However, claims of fraud are “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” RCW 4.16.080(4). ... Plaintiffs plead identical language under each claim: that they “did not know and could not have known about NetMotion’s false, misleading and deceptive statements until NetMotion produced its documents in the ongoing litigation.” Dkt. #186 at 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 24. This does not satisfy the above standards, because Plaintiffs have not pleaded any impediments to earlier prosecution of these claims.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives negligence claims a three-year limitation period, with accrual tolled by the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or, through reasonable diligence, should know the facts necessary for the claim; here, the claim was barred because it was filed more than three years after October 1994.

Giraud v. Quincy Farm & Chemical · filed 2000-08-17(2)

The statute of limitations for the negligence action is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). ... The discovery rule operates to toll the date of accrual until the plaintiff knows or, through the exercise of due diligence, should have known all the facts necessary to establish a legal claim. ... After that date, the only reasonable interpretation of the facts is that the Girauds should have suspected they had a claim against Quincy Farm. ... Because the Girauds’s negligence claim against Quincy Farm was filed more than three years after October 1994, it is barred by RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period, with accrual delayed under Washington’s discovery rule until the claimant knew or should have known the facts necessary to establish the claim.

Aguirre v. Koruga · filed 2002-07-16

The applicable statute of limitations is three years. Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080. ... In Washington, the discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations when there is a delay between the injury and plaintiffs first discovery of it. See Crisman v. Crisman, 85 Wash.App. 15, 931 P.2d 163, 165—66 (Wash.Ct.App.1997) (explaining that the discovery rule “operates to toll the date of accrual until the plaintiff knows or, through the exercise of due diligence, should have known all the facts necessary to establish a legal claim”). Under the discovery rule, Tomas’s claim against the Korugas did not accrue until he discovered, or should have discovered, that the Korugas were asserting ownership over the funds. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Korugas, there are genuine issues of material fact as to the statute of limitations defense precluding summary judgment. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1074.

Section 4.16.080(4)'s discovery rule applies to the limitations period for a Washington Consumer Protection Act claim and can prevent strict enforcement of a contractual filing deadline.

Pickett v. Holland America Line-Westours · filed 2000-08-14(4)

Furthermore, because Washington law applies, the time limits are not strictly enforceable. "An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud." RCW 4.16.080(4). This rule has been applied to the Washington CPA's limitation provision. ... Even if Pickett had not timely filed her claim within the contractual limitations period, the limitations period is not strictly enforceable because Washington's discovery period applies.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions; when the plaintiff has inquiry notice, the claim accrues at the time of injury.

Martin v. Dematic · filed 2013-10-14(2)

The Martins also challenge the dismissal of their claims against FCCNA based on the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, RCW 4.16.080(2). ... Because the Martins were on inquiry notice that FCCNA was a successor, we decline to apply the discovery rule and conclude that the Martins’ claim began to accrue from the time of Mr. Martin’s accident.

Section 4.16.080(4) applies a three-year limitations period to a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation.

LaHue v. Keystone Investment Co. · filed 1972-04-24(4)

The quoted finding is a sufficient basis for applying the 3-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year limitations period for an action on an oral contract, so a claim filed more than three years after the breach is barred.

Trethewey v. Bancroft-Whitney Co. · filed 1975-05-05

The facts do not support plaintiffs. We agree with Bancroft’s contention that the alleged breach occurred either as a result of Bancroft’s May 6, 1969, letter or, at the latest, with its January 26, 1970, letter. ... Plaintiffs’ first claim is barred by the 3-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for an injury caused by an erroneous survey, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-07-12

The injury caused by an erroneous survey is subject to the 3-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080; Kundahl v. Barnett, supra. Thus, any cause of action brought against the respondent surveyors had to be brought within 3 years after it accrued, and it had to accrue within 6 years after the date of completion of construction. The earliest date that could be taken for the date of "substantial completion of construction" was August 1973. Assuming that any cause of action against the surveyors had to accrue within 6 years thereafter, the action had to accrue prior to August 1979. The cause of action did accrue in April of 1978 when the second survey uncovered the error of the respondents, and the appellants then had until April of 1981 to commence their action. The action was commenced within the 3-year time limit of RCW 4.16.080 and, therefore, was timely.

RCW 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitation period for the sexual-harassment claim; evidence of earlier discriminatory conduct may show a continuing pattern, and the defendant asserting the limitations defense must prove which damages are time-barred.

Henderson v. PENNWALT CORPORATION · filed 1985-08-20(2)

Pennwalt contends the trial court erred by refusing to exclude evidence of conduct outside the relevant limitation period of 2 years for the slander claim, RCW 4.16.100, and 3 years for the sexual harassment claim, RCW 4.16.080(2). ... Evidence of discriminatory treatment occurring before the limitations period is admissible to show a pattern of illegal conduct, purpose, or motivation with regard either to independent violations that occur after the limitation period or to continuing violations that began before and continue after the limitations period. ... The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and its elements must be proved by the party asserting it. ... Where a part of plaintiff's claim for damages is barred by the statute of limitations and a part of it is not, the defendant pleading the statute as an affirmative defense has the burden of specifically proving which portion of plaintiff's damages are barred by the statute. ... In fight of Pennwalt's failure to present evidence that specific portions of plaintiff's actual damages are time barred, we hold that Pennwalt did not meet its burden regarding the statute of limitations, and the court properly refused to give Pennwalt's proposed instruction 14.

Section 4.16.080(1) requires an action for trespass to land to be brought within three years of the invasion.

Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. · filed 1985-11-14(1)

It is appropriate, therefore, that having recognized this intrusion upon land as a trespass, the 3-year statute of limitations should apply. RCW 4.16.080(1). An action for trespass to land must be brought within 3 years of the invasion to the premises.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a three-year limitation period for a subrogation claim, measured by the period applicable to enforcing the underlying obligation; the court found the claim timely.

Newcomer v. Masini · filed 1986-09-04(2)

In subrogation claims, equity will enforce rights only when the action is brought within the time in which an action could have been brought to enforce the original obligation to which the right of subrogation is sought. ... The accident occurred January 19, 1982. Therefore, the 3-year statute of limitation on any claim which Mr. Newcomer might have brought against Mr. Masini expired 3 years later, January 19, 1985. Since Mr. Masini brought his third party claim August 4, 1983, he complied with the 3-year statute of limitation. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080 requires claims under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, and tort claims such as constructive wrongful discharge, to be brought within three years.

Douchette v. Bethel School District No. 403 · filed 1990-08-14

Claims under chapter 49.60 of the Revised Code of Washington (Law Against Discrimination) must be brought within the 3-year period of RCW 4.16.080.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Funkhouser v. Wilson · filed 1998-01-26(2)

The general statute of limitations applicable to all of the claims in this case is the three-year limit set on negligence actions. RCW 4.16.080(2). All of the acts of molestation occurred more than three years before this lawsuit was filed. Accordingly, Juanita’s claims are all time-barred unless preserved by either the statutory discovery rule applicable to claims based on child sexual abuse (RCW 4.16.340) or by the common-law discovery rule.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on the covered claims, subject to applicable tolling and accrual rules.

E.R.B. v. Church of God · filed 1998-01-30(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to each of plaintiffs’ claims. See RCW 4.16.080(2). But when the injured party is a minor, the three-year statute of limitations is tolled until the injured party reaches the age of 18. RCW 4.16.190; St. Michelle v. Robinson, 52 Wn. App. 309, 759 P.2d 467 (1988) (outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress).

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitations period does not bar a quid pro quo sexual-harassment claim when the related harassment continued within three years before suit, even if the promotion forming the original quid pro quo occurred earlier.

Henningsen v. Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2000-10-03(2)

WorldCom does not dispute that Henningsen had a valid claim for quid pro quo harassment based on Green's request for sexual favors and Henningsen's subsequent promotion, but contends that Henningsen's quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(2), because her promotion to sales representative—the last tangible employment action related to Green's quid pro quo sexual harassment of Henningsen, according to WorldCom—occurred more than three years before she filed suit. Although the trial court's judgment is fully supported by our ruling with respect to the hostile work environment claim, and we ordinarily would not need to address the quid pro quo harassment claim, here, the tangible employment action that supports vicarious liability for the hostile work environment claim is that same promotion—which indeed occurred more than three years before Henningsen filed the instant law suit. Accordingly, we will decide the statute of limitations question as it relates to the quid pro quo harassment claim. ... The evidence in the record supports the trial court's analysis. Henningsen made her final installment payment, as it were, within the three year statute of limitations, i.e., in October 1993, less than three years before she filed suit. In the typical quid pro quo harassment case, and this is certainly a classically typical case, an employee seeks damages from an employer's extortion or attempted extortion of sexual favors in exchange for a job benefit or the absence of a job detriment. Schonauer, 79 Wash.App. at 823, 905 P.2d 392. Here, Green extorted and attempted to extort sexual favors from Henningsen, as additional payment for the promotion or to avoid a job detriment, until his position with WorldCom was eliminated in November 1994—well within the limitation period. Accordingly, Henningsen's quid pro quo harassment claim had not expired, even though the promotion itself took place more than three years before she filed suit. This ruling provides an independent basis for the trial court's judgment for damages.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives tort claims, including product-liability, negligence, and wrongful-death claims, a three-year limitations period that accrues under the discovery rule when the claimant knew or should have known the claim's essential elements.

Clare v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc. · filed 2005-03-10(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year statute of limitations for torts, which includes product liability actions. Generally, accrual of the statute of limitations begins at the time the act or omission causing the tort injury occurs. ... In sum, under the discovery rule, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he or she knew or should have known the essential statutory elements of the claim. A plaintiff "should have known" when he or she is placed on notice that the statutory elements are in place, and the plaintiff is charged with what a reasonable or diligent inquiry would have discovered at that time.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for trespass, negligence, conversion, tortious interference, nuisance, and related property-injury claims.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States · filed 2005-06-03

The statutes of limitations for trespass, negligence, conversion, tortious interference, nuisance and actions under Washington Revised Code section 4.24.630 are three years. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, and the discovery and continuous-representation rules did not extend the period here.

Bertelsen v. Harris · filed 2006-10-23

Even if they had a valid breach of fiduciary duty claim, any such claim was barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080. The statute of limitations was not extended by the discovery rule or the continuous representation rule, even if those rules apply to a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for the claims at issue, accruing when the plaintiff knew or should have known all essential elements of the cause of action.

Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg · filed 2010-01-29

Because we must determine the limitations issue in accordance with Washington law, the applicable statute of limitations for all of Coto’s claims for relief is three years. RCW 4.16.080 ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known all of the essential elements of its applicable cause of action.

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year statute of limitations for the most analogous state cause of action when the federal claim has no limitations period of its own.

Roth v. Budsberg · filed 2011-05-04

Because § 322(b) does not have its own limitations period, we look to the most analogous state cause of action. See Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, the most analogous cause of action, Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080, has a three-year statute of limitations. ... Under Washington law, Hagler’s complaint needed to be filed by March 14, 2007—three years after the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for the Washington state-law claims at issue.

Hobson v. Hsc Real Estate Inc · filed 2012-05-22(2)

Hobson’s and Milan’s Washington state law claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 786 (Wash. 2004) (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)). Because Hobson and Milan have not explained why HSC’s denial of Milan’s tenancy application or eviction of Hobson constitute anything other than discrete acts, the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims against an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty.

Terri Block v. The Law Offices Of Ben F. Barcus & Associates, Pllc · filed 2015-07-27

Claims against an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty fall under RCW 4.16.080's three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year statute of limitations, and the limitations period runs no later than when the plaintiff has the information necessary to connect the defendant to the alleged loss and sue.

Darling v. Jeffereys · filed 2016-10-04

Mr. Darling's complaint against Auble is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080. At the very latest, the limitations period began to run in 2010 when Mr. Darling received the second of Auble's appraisals. At that point, Mr. Darling had all the information necessary to connect Auble to his financial losses and file suit. Yet Mr. Darling waited approximately four years. This was untimely.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Connie Potter v. Gaffney · filed 2016-12-19(3)

The statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3); Hudson v. Condon. 101 Wn. App. 866, 872-73, 6 P.3d 615 (2000).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for wrongdoing involving governmental appropriation of personal property.

Shupe v. City of Spokane · filed 2018-06-26

But Mr. Shupe’s case does not involve real property. He claims the City illegally seized his personal property. Adverse possession therefore is inapplicable. Rather, when it comes to personal property, a governmental appropriation is immediately apparent and a claim for wrongdoing is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080. Given the continued applicability of the three-year statute of limitations period, Mr. Shupe’s inverse condemnation claim fails as well.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for survival actions.

Estate Of Carl Murray, Wendy Murray, V City Of Vancouver · filed 2018-09-26(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), the relevant statute of limitation for survival actions is three years.

Section 4.16.080 generally gives tort claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues, including when the plaintiff knows enough facts to know that actual damage occurred.

State Department Of Transportation v. Seattle Tunnel Partners · filed 2019-02-05

Typically, tort claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080. The statutory period begins to run as soon as the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues and the plaintiff has the right to apply to a court for relief. ... In negligence actions, an aggrieved party need not know the full amount of damage sustained before a cause of action accrues; it need only know that some actual and appreciable damage occurred.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on the claim at issue, and the court held that the August 2013 failure-to-hire claim was timely.

Emami v. Seattle School District · filed 2019-02-25(2)

We do not need to address that issue because Emami confirmed her sole claim for damages arises out of the District's failure to hire her in August 2013. This claim falls within the three-year statute of limitations and is not time-barred.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury actions, running from when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Caril v. State of Washington · filed 2019-09-30(2)

For actions under § 1983 brought in this Court, a three-year statute of limitations applies. See Canatella v. Van de Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007); RCW 4.16.080(2). This means that plaintiff must bring his action within three years of when he knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires negligence claims and, if actionable, claims under RCW 71.09.070(5) to be brought within three years.

McReynolds v. State of Washington · filed 2019-12-19(2)

Under Washington law, the Plaintiff must bring his claim for false imprisonment within two years, RCW 4.16.100, his claim for negligence within three years, RCW 4.16.080(2) and, (to the extent there is a private right of action) his claim for violations of RCW 71.09.070(5) within three years RCW 4.16.080(2). The statute of limitation begins to run when a claim accrues.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for WLAD claims.

Taylor v. Lowe's Corporation · filed 2020-03-25(2)

The statute of limitations for claims under the WLAD is three years.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year statute of limitations for this Washington personal-injury action.

Ortiz v. Safeway Incorporated · filed 2020-03-26

In Washington, the statute of limitations for this action is three years. See RCW 4.16.080. Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 25, 2019, just days before the statute of limitations expired. But merely filing the complaint was not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Washington.

Gough v. Blackham · filed 2020-04-03(2)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed, not by the relief that is sought, but by the laws of the state in which the alleged violation occurred. ... In Washington, the statute of limitations is three years as mandated by RCW 4.16.080(2); See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991). ... Therefore, all claims arising more than three years before Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on September 11, 2019, are DISMISSED with prejudice as time barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a claim for violation of RCW 71.09.040(2), assuming a private right of action.

McReynolds v. State of Washington · filed 2020-04-07(2)

Under Washington law, the Plaintiff must bring his claim for false imprisonment within two years, RCW 4.16.100, and (to the extent there is a private right of action and to the extent he asserts one) his claim for violation of RCW 71.09.040(2) must be brought within three years, RCW 4.16.080(2). ... Accordingly, his claim for false imprisonment was barred in September of 2010 and the claim for violation of RCW 71.09.040(2) was barred in September of 2011; several years before this case was filed in 2019.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period that barred the plaintiff’s Bivens or § 1983 action filed more than five years after the alleged events, absent a basis for tolling.

Johnson v. Rembert · filed 2020-05-15(2)

Moreover, the proposed complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because the action, whether it is brought under Bivens or §1983, is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Subsections (4) and (2) impose three-year limitation periods: subsection (4) governs fraud and fraudulent inducement, accruing upon discovery of the fraud, while subsection (2) governs common-law torts not otherwise specifically enumerated.

Reed v. City of Vancouver, Washington · filed 2020-07-13(4) (2)

The statute of limitations for fraud and fraudulent inducement is three years; the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4); ... To the extent that the defendants’ conduct constituted any fraud, Ms. Reed’s claim accrued on February 22, 2016, when she received an email informing her that her 50% telecommute accommodation request was denied. ... Ms. Reed’s fraud in the inducement claim accrued on February 22, 2016; she thus needed to assert the claim no later than February 22, 2019. Ms. Reed did not file her fraud in the inducement claim until March 8, 2019. Therefore, Ms. Reed’s fraud in the inducement claim against Mr. Holmes, Mr. Potter, and Mr. Young is time-barred and should be dismissed. ... The statute of limitations on a tort claim of intentional interference with a business expectancy is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2) (establishing the limitations period for common law torts not specifically enumerated in other limitations sections); ... To the extent that defendants failed to disclose to Ms. Reed that her 50% telecommute accommodation was not possible because of the essential functions of her job, Ms. Reed’s claim accrued on February 22, 2016, when Ms. Reed received the email denying her accommodation request. Ms. Reed thus needed to assert her intentional interference with a business relationship claim no later than February 22, 2019. Ms. Reed did not file her intentional interference with a business relationship claim until March 8, 2019. Therefore, Ms. Reed’s intentional interference with a business relationship claim against Mr. Holmes, Mr. Potter, and Mr. Young is time-barred and should be dismissed.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims based on non-written contracts, trespass, negligence, tortious interference, general torts, and fraud.

Williams v. Prk Funding Services, Inc. · filed 2020-08-24

The district court also did not err in finding that Williams’s state law claims are time barred. Williams knew about the actions giving rise to his claims by at least 2010 and did not file suit until 2018. The longest statute of limitations applicable to his claims is six years, and most are three years. See RCW 4.16.080 (providing a three year statute of limitations for claims based on non-written contracts, trespass, negligence, tortious interference, general torts, and fraud); id. 4.16.040 (providing a six year statute of limitations for claims based on a contract in writing); Hudson v. Condon, 6 P.3d 615, 619 (Wa. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a three year statute of limitations applies to breach of fiduciary duty claims sounding in tort).

Subsection (3) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions based on contracts or liabilities that are not in writing or do not arise from a written instrument; subsection (4) gives fraud actions three years, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Microsoft Corporation v. Khalid · filed 2020-10-12(3) and (4)

Under RCW 4.16.080(3), a three-year statute of limitations applies to any “action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument.” ... The more analogous case is Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Ass’n v. Boeing Co., 139 Wn.2d 824, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000), in which the Supreme Court held the three-year statute of limitation under RCW 4.16.080(3) applied to claims under the Washington Minimum Wage Act (“WMWA”), ch. 49.46 RCW. ... For this reason, the most appropriate statute of limitations is RCW 4.16.080(3) and Khalid’s wage statute claims were appropriately dismissed as time-barred. ... Microsoft and Khalid agree the three-year statute of limitation for torts in RCW 4.16.080(4) applies to his fraud claims. Under this statute, any action for relief based on fraud must be commenced within three years, but the cause of action is not “deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”

Section 4.16.080(2) does not govern negligent injury to real property, which is subject to the two-year period in RCW 4.16.130, while § 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year period for loss-of-lateral-support claims because they sound in implied contract.

Ed Schumacher v. City Of Aberdeen · filed 2020-10-20(2) (3)

Relevant here, a three-year statute of limitations applies to “[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated.” RCW 4.16.080(2). ... This court in Nichols succinctly clarified that negligence claims for personal injury are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.080(2), but negligence claims for injury to real property are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.130. ... A cause of action for the loss of lateral support is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... As a result, the applicable statute of limitations is RCW 4.16.080(3), which is three years.