Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied by showing that the parent-child relationship has a damaging and destabilizing effect that impairs the child's integration into a stable, permanent home, even without an identified alternative placement.

In Re The Welfare Of: M.b.s. Mary Spehar, App. v. State Of Wa, Dshs, Res. · filed 2016-12-12(1)(f)

Under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(f), the petition for termination of parental rights must show that the "continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home."... Thus, the State must satisfy the second alternative—that the parent-child relationship had a damaging and destabilizing effect on M.B.S.—in order to prevail. The State meets this burden.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) permits a court to consider a proposed guardianship and potential adoptive home when deciding whether continued parental rights diminish a child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Welfare Of: J.b., Jr. · filed 2016-12-28(1)(f)

Under these principles, when the juvenile court in the present case was determining whether termination element (f) was met, it was permitted to consider the prospects of JB, Jr.’s current foster home placement and the grandparents’ suitability as guardians.

In a combined termination and guardianship proceeding, subsection (1)(f) permits the court to consider a proposed guardianship and potential adoptive home when deciding whether the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

In re the Parental Rights to J.B. · filed 2016-12-28(1)(f)

Under these principles, when the juvenile court in the present case was determining whether termination element (f) was met, it was permitted to consider the prospects of JB Jr.’s current foster home placement and the grandparents’ suitability as guardians.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when a child has prospects for a permanent home but the parent-child relationship prevents the child from obtaining it.

In Re The Dependency Of: B.m.a., Dob 10/26/08 Seth Gladstone, App v. Dshs, Resp · filed 2017-06-12(1)(f)

Where "prospects for a permanent home exist but the parent- child relationship prevents the child from obtaining that placement," RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require the Department to prove that no less restrictive alternative to termination exists.

In Re The Dependency Of: L.j.s. Amy Sweet, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2018-04-30(1)(f)

Contrary to Sweet's argument, this statutory element does not require that the Department prove there is no less restrictive alternative to termination.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires proof that continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: L.j., Dob: 12/10/13 Tijan Sumbundu v. Dshs · filed 2018-01-22(1)(f)

Sumbundu contends the Department failed to prove "[t]hat the continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home" as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). We disagree. ... Thus, substantial evidence supports the challenged findings.

Section 13.34.180 concerns the parent-child relationship in a termination petition and does not require consideration of other familial relationships.

Dependency Of M.s., 6/11/08 Danielle Gentry v. Dshs · filed 2018-03-05

The termination statutes center on the best interests of the child in relation to the parent in question. See RCW 13.34.180; RCW. 13.34.190. These statutes make no reference to other familial relationships for consideration upon petition for termination. RCW 13.34.180; RCW. 13.34.190.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require the State to show that a stable and permanent home is available for the child.

In re the Parental Rights of: R.M. · filed 2019-06-18(1)(f)

To prove the termination factor, the State does not have to show that a stable and permanent home is available.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied despite a possible guardianship when the continuing parent-child relationship harms the child and would undermine integration into a stable, permanent home.

In Re The Termination Of: M. H. W. P. · filed 2018-09-24(1)(f)

These findings demonstrate that L.B.'s relationship with M.P. is harmful to him and that a guardianship would negatively impact his integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied even when no permanent placement has been identified, if continuing the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

In re the Parental Rights to: S.A.J. & J.C.J. · filed 2019-03-14(1)(f)

Although it was not clear at trial what permanent placement options would be available for J.C.J. and S.A.J., the trial court had ample evidence to conclude that continuing Ms. Stueckle’s parental rights to J.C.J. and S.A.J. diminished the children’s prospects for early integration into stable and permanent homes, as contemplated by RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when a continuing parent-child relationship prevents a child with adoption prospects from moving toward a permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: J.l.p., William Parent v. Dshs · filed 2019-06-10(1)(f)

Here, the evidence established that, while the Department had not completed its investigation of potential adoptive homes, J.L.P. had multiple prospects for adoption. And, the effect of the continued legal relationship between the father and J.L.P. was that those adoption plans could not move forward.

The continuing parent-child relationship diminished the child’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: M.h. Dmitriy Timpanidi, App. v. State Of Wa., Dcyf, Res. · filed 2019-06-17(1)(f)

The record here thus supports the trial court's finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes M.H.'s prospect for integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires proof that continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home; when a parent is incarcerated, the inquiry considers the parent’s role, the State’s efforts, and barriers to services or contact.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to H.A.M. · filed 2019-12-05(1)(f)

When a parent is incarcerated, the permanency inquiry must take into account three specific elements: first, whether the parent maintains a meaningful role in the child’s life; second, whether the State made reasonable efforts to address the incarcerated person’s parental deficiencies; and third, whether particular barriers hindered the parent’s access to services or meaningful contact with the child.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require a specific prospective adoptive home to satisfy the early-integration requirement.

In Re The Dependency Of R.o.a., Sierra Cotter, App v. Dcyf, Resp · filed 2020-02-03(1)(f)

Neither is a specific prospective adoptive home necessary to satisfy the integration into a stable and permanent home requirement.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when the parent-child relationship prevents children with prospects for a permanent home from being placed there.

In the Matter of the Dependency of: J.G.A. · filed 2020-03-31(1)(f)

Here, the record establishes all four children have prospects for a permanent home, but the parent-child relationship is preventing this.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require the Department to prove that a stable and permanent home is available when parental rights are terminated.

Dependency Of L.a. T.-j. Dob 03/10/11, Janiece Thom v. Dcyf · filed 2020-04-27(1)(f)

But, as discussed, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require that the Department prove that a stable and permanent home is available at the time of termination.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) permits consideration of an identified potential guardianship when deciding whether a parent-child relationship delays permanence, but does not permit speculation about a possible guardianship.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to J.C. · filed 2019-12-31(1)(f)

R.H. and N.M. stand for the proposition that evidence of a potential identified guardianship is relevant to the subsection (1)(f) determination. They do not support the proposition that speculation about the possibility for a guardianship is relevant. ... In deciding whether the Department proved the element required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), it would have been improper for the trial court to speculate about whether guardianship either was an option, or, if it had been explored by the Department, might have been.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) permits a court to consider a child’s prospective permanent placement when deciding whether the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of A.a. · filed 2022-03-07(1)(f)

This was simply an analysis of whether the father’s parental rights were impeding A.A.’s welfare by diminishing her chances of obtaining permanency, which is exactly what the court was required to consider under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) may be satisfied when the parent-child legal relationship prevents a child from entering a likely permanent home, even if the child's current placement is stable.

In Re The Dependency Of L.a.h., Kautia Hopkins, App. V. Dcyf · filed 2021-05-10(1)(f)

Accordingly, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) may be satisfied when, but for the legal relationship between the parent and the child, there is a high probability that the child could be placed into a permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when the parent-child legal relationship prevents a child from obtaining a likely permanent adoptive home, even if the child is already in stable foster care.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: R.S. · filed 2021-12-21(1)(f)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied by the State showing that but for the legal relationship between parent and child, there is a high probability that the child could find a permanent adoptive home.

Subsection (1)(f) may be satisfied when a child lives in a stable home with caregivers open to adoption and the parent-child relationship impedes permanence.

In Re The Dependency Of A.m.f. · filed 2022-08-08(1)(f)

We are faced with a similar situation here. Since only a few days after his birth A.M.F. has lived with his maternal grandparents. The home is, by all accounts, caring and stable, which Y.R. acknowledges. A.M.F.’s grandparents appear open to adoption. Given these facts, the trial court’s finding that DCYF proved the requirements of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) to a highly probable degree is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied by showing that a parent’s legal relationship prevents adoption into available permanent homes, even when the children already live there.

In re the Welfare of: E.J.G. · filed 2022-08-16(1)(f)

The same analysis applies here: S.G.’s legal relationship with the children prevents their adoption. It is irrelevant that they are already integrated into the future adoptive homes.

Former RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes a child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

In Re Of The Dependency Of M.j. · filed 2023-02-06(1)(f)

This in turn supports conclusion of law 10 that continuation of the parent-child relationship would diminish M.J.’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home under former RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

Other supported findings can establish subsection (1)(f) despite an erroneous finding about guardianship efforts.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: E.B. · filed 2026-05-14(1)(f)

Regardless of the court’s erroneous finding of fact 2.14, the court’s other supported findings, in turn, support the court’s conclusion that RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) had been proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Subsection (1)(f) can be satisfied when the continuing parent-child relationship prevents adoption and diminishes the child’s prospects for a stable, permanent home.

In re Dependency of A.M.F. · filed 2023-03-30(1)(f)

A trial court can also find subsection .180(1)(f) satisfied when the parental relationship is an impediment to a legal, permanent placement in an adoptive home. ... Nor has she shown the trial court erred in concluding that continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminished AMF’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home or that termination is in his best interests.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider whether guardianship is viable when assessing the Department’s case for termination; it does not require the Department to disprove guardianship as an option.

In Re The Dependency Of G.c.b. · filed 2023-09-11(1)(f)

The plain language of the amended section requires the trial court to consider the viability of guardianship as a factor when assessing whether the Department has shown that “continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.”

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider DCYF’s guardianship efforts and whether guardianship is viable, but does not require findings or an on-record analysis.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To S.a.m-s. · filed 2025-02-10(1)(f)

Taking the latter argument first, we hold the court was not required to conduct an on-record analysis. RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) states the court need only “consider” DCYF’s efforts on guardianship and its viability. RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) says nothing about required findings or any on-record analysis.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider whether guardianship is available when assessing the child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home; the Department need not disprove its availability.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To S.k. · filed 2025-07-21(1)(f)

While we agree with J.S. that the Department provided limited testimony about its efforts toward a guardianship, “the Department need not disprove the availability of a guardianship placement to satisfy its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).” Id. ... In short, the trial court properly found that the Department did not have a willing guardian and that continuation of J.S.’s parental rights diminished S.R.K.’s prospects for early integration into a stable home.

A caregiver willing to serve as guardian only if coerced may be found unavailable as a guardianship option.

In Re The Dependency Of: N.b.g. · filed 2024-05-20(1)(f)

In other words, we hold that there was substantial evidence that S.G. would serve only if coerced, and that therefore she was unwilling, and thus unavailable, to serve as guardian.

A proposed guardian who would serve only if coerced is unavailable as a guardianship option under subsection (1)(f).

In Re The Dependency Of: N.B.G. · filed 2024-07-08(1)(f)

In other words, we hold that there was substantial evidence that S.G. would serve only if coerced, and that therefore she was unwilling, and thus unavailable, to serve as guardian.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider guardianship efforts and viability, but does not require findings or an on-record analysis.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To S.a.m-s. · filed 2025-03-17(1)(f)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) says nothing about required findings or any on-record analysis.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require prospective adoptive parents to explain why they prefer adoption over guardianship.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To M.l.s. · filed 2025-06-09(1)(f)

Nor does the statute require prospective adoptive parents to explain why they prefer adoption over guardianship.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the Department’s efforts to support guardianship and whether guardianship is available as a permanent option for the child.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To M.l.s. · filed 2025-07-07(1)(f)

At bottom, the trial court considered the Department’s efforts to support a guardianship and whether guardianship was available as a permanent option, but ultimately found that continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminished M.L.S.’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home via adoption by his life-long caregiver, T.M. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings relating to RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider guardianship when assessing a child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home, but does not require a separate finding about guardianship’s viability.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To C.j-l.h. · filed 2026-02-02(1)(f)

Similarly, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) states a court “must consider” guardianship in determining whether “continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.” The statute does not take the additional step of requiring a specific finding beyond stating the court “must consider” guardianship.

Other supported findings may establish subsection (1)(f) despite unsupported findings about the Department’s guardianship efforts.

In the Matter of the Dependency of: E.B. · filed 2026-06-16(1)(f)

Regardless of the court’s partial erroneous finding of fact 2.9.2 and unsupported finding of fact 2.14, the court’s other supported findings, in turn, support the court’s conclusion that RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) had been proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180’s requirements for terminating parental rights are satisfied when the findings substantially establish its statutory conditions.

In Re the Welfare of Frederiksen · filed 1980-04-08

The appellant lastly contends that the requirements of the statute relating to termination of the parent-child relationship have not been met. This statute, RCW 13.34.180 provided: ... Findings of fact Nos. 7-9 and 11-17 and supplemental findings of fact Nos. 1-5 show a substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.

Section 13.34.180’s termination requirements apply to Indian children, with the ICWA imposing an additional burden of proof.

In Re Roberts · filed 1987-02-09

Stratmeyer appears to suggest that this requirement replaces or supersedes RCW 13.34.180 where an Indian child is the subject of a deprivation proceeding. We hold that where an Indian child is involved, the ICWA merely imposes an additional burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by the parent "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."

Section 13.34.180's six termination requirements remain applicable when the child is Indian; the Indian Child Welfare Act adds a separate burden of proof.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Stratmeyer · filed 1987-02-09

Stratmeyer appears to suggest that this requirement replaces or supersedes RCW 13.34.180 where an Indian child is the subject of a deprivation proceeding. We hold that where an Indian child is involved, the ICWA merely imposes an additional burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by the parent "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."

Section 13.34.180 requires clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support findings in termination proceedings.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Chubb · filed 1988-10-20

The State has met its burden of providing clear, cogent and convincing evidence in support of the findings made in the termination proceedings, as required by RCW 13.34-.180.

Findings addressing RCW 13.34.180’s elements may track the statutory language if they are specific enough to permit meaningful review.

In Re the Dependency of C.B. · filed 1991-05-13

The real assertion underlying this second group of objections seems to be that it was improper for the trial court's findings to parallel and to a partial extent parrot the statutory elements set out in RCW 13.34.180. The degree of particularity required in findings of fact depends on the circumstances of the particular case, the basic requirement being that the findings must be sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. ... Here, the findings were adequate to meet this requirement.

Section 13.34.180's requirements for terminating parental rights are not met by findings that merely repeat statutory elements without supporting facts.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Brown · filed 1991-08-26

The court's "findings of fact" follow the testimony of Brown's caseworker and, accordingly, consist only of legal conclusions. Since the court's conclusions are not supported by facts and do not satisfy the mandate of proof by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence, they do not satisfy the requirements of RCW 13.34.180 and .190.

Section 13.34.180 does not require appointment of a guardian ad litem before a termination order may be entered.

May v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1997-11-14

Appointing a guardian ad litem is not among the requirements listed in RCW 13.34.180 and .190 as preconditions to entering a termination order.

Section 13.34.180 requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of dependency, a dispositional order, at least six months’ removal, available corrective services, little likelihood of timely reunification, and harm to the child’s prospects for a stable home if the relationship continues.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Priscilla S. · filed 1998-10-12

To terminate parental rights under RCW 13.34.180, the State must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the child has been found to be dependent; the court has entered a dispositional order; the child has been removed from the custody of the parent for a period of at least six months; the services ordered have been offered or provided and are reasonably available and capable of correcting the parental deficiencies; there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future; and continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires proof of all six termination factors by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re Welfare of Shantay Cj · filed 2004-06-08(1)

Before the court could enter orders terminating the parent-child relationships, the court was required to find that all of the six requisite allegations of RCW 13.34.180(1) were proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)'s dependency and near-future-remedy requirements establish harm to the child and satisfy substantive due process.

In Re Dependency of IJS · filed 2005-06-13(1)

Establishing the child is dependent under RCW 13.34.180(1)(a) and it is unlikely conditions can be remedied so the child can be returned in the near future under RCW 13.34.180(e) is equivalent to finding harm to the child. We conclude that unlike the third party visitation statutes in In re Smith, the termination statutes are narrowly drawn because the State must prove that the relationship with the parents harms or potentially harms the child before the court can terminate parental rights.

Findings that a child is dependent under subsection (1)(a) and that conditions are unlikely to be remedied in the near future under subsection (1)(e) are equivalent to a finding of harm to the child.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Vega · filed 2005-06-13(1)(a), (1)(e)

Establishing the child is dependent under RCW 13.34.180(1)(a) and it is unlikely conditions can be remedied so the child can be returned in the near future under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) is equivalent to finding harm to the child.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent, and convincing proof of the termination factors focused on parental fitness before a court considers the child's best interests.

In Re Welfare of AB · filed 2010-06-10(1)

By virtue of RCW 13.34.180(1) and RCW 13.34.190, a Washington court uses a two-step process when deciding whether to terminate the right of a parent to relate to his or her natural child. The first step focuses on the adequacy of the parents [1] and must be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. [2] The second step focuses on the child's best interests [3] and need be proved by only a preponderance of the evidence. [4] Only if the first step is satisfied may the court reach the second. [5] ... In making these and other similar statements, the trial court was obviously focusing on A.B.'s best interests, as opposed to Salas' current unfitness. Accordingly, we are required to hold that the trial court reasoned erroneously.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent, and convincing proof of each of its six termination factors.

Salas v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2010-06-10(1)

According to RCW 13.34.180(1), the first step involves six termination factors, each of which must be proved clearly, cogently, and convincingly.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires the State to prove each termination element independently; proof of subsection (e) does not automatically establish subsection (f).

Gladin v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2013-02-14(1)

We hold that the State must independently prove each element in RCW 13.34.180(1) before a trial court may order the termination of parental rights under RCW 13.34-.190(l)(a)(i). Proof of the element codified in RCW 13.34-.180(l)(e) does not necessarily prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(l)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) and (e) require proof that necessary, reasonably available services were offered or provided and that the child is unlikely to return to the parent in the near future.

In Re The Dep. Of M.a.: Modester Williams v. Dshs · filed 2013-08-05(1)(d), (1)(e)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the court's finding under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(d) that the Department offered or provided all necessary and reasonably available services capable of correcting Williams's parental deficiencies in the foreseeable future. ... Given the statutory presumption ... discussed above, we hold that substantial evidence supports the court's finding under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e) that reunification was not possible in the near future.

Section 13.34.180 sets out the first required step before a court may terminate parental rights.

In Re The Dep. Of B.i.t. S.g.t. G.j.t.: Rosa M. Torres v. Dshs · filed 2014-09-15(1)

RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190 provide a two-step process that must be followed before a court may terminate parental rights.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent and convincing evidence of dependency, at least six months’ removal, offered or provided remedial services, unlikely near-term remediation, and diminished prospects for a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: G.g., Jr., Itzel Salazar-jiminez v. Dshs · filed 2014-12-01(1)

A court may order termination of parental rights when shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been found dependent, (2) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six months as a result of the dependency, (3) all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting ... the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided, (4) there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, and (5) that continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that necessary remedial services were offered or provided and that conditions are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Salazar · filed 2015-02-09(1)

A court may order termination of parental rights when shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been found dependent, (2) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six months as a result of the dependency, (3) all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided, (4) there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, and (5) continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. ... The trial court found credible the evidence presented at trial that Salazar had parental deficiencies rendering her incapable of providing a stable, safe home for the children; that services were offered to help remedy these deficiencies; and that she consistently failed to participate in the required services.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent and convincing evidence of the grounds for terminating parental rights, including that necessary remedial services were offered or provided.

In Re The Dependency Of: G.g., Jr., Itzel Salazar-jiminez v. Dshs · filed 2015-02-09(1)

A court may order termination of parental rights when shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been found dependent, (2) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six months as a result of the dependency, (3) all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting ... the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided, (4) there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, and (5) that continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires evidence of dependency, a dispositional order, at least six months outside the parent's custody, necessary remedial services, little likelihood of remedying parental deficiencies, and diminished prospects for permanent placement if the parent-child relationship continues.

In re the Termination of: L.R.C. · filed 2015-11-19(1)

In order to terminate parental rights, the state must present evidence establishing that (1) the child has been found to be dependent, (2) the court has entered a dispositional order, (3) the child has been removed from the custody of the parent for at least six months, (4) all the necessary services have been afforded to the parent to correct the parental deficiencies, (5) there is little likelihood of remedying the parental deficiencies, and (6) continuation of the parent child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects of permanent placement. RCW 13.34.180(1). ... Unlike C.R.B., here the evidence meets the statutory requirements.

Termination requires sufficient evidence to support findings under subsections (1)(d) and (e).

In Re: D.m.m, D.m. And R.m. v. Dshs · filed 2018-03-12(1)(d) and (e)

The Department also concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination findings related to RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) and (e). ... We accept the Department's concessions. Accordingly, we reverse both termination orders and remand for further proceedings.

Proof of all six termination factors under RCW 13.34.180(1)(a)-(f) is sufficient to establish current parental unfitness.

In re the Parental Rights to: L.J. & L.B. · filed 2019-03-21(1)(a)-(f)

Because the finding of the six termination factors is sufficient to establish current parental unfitness and the court explicitly found parental unfitness, no further analysis is required.

Section 13.34.180 requires the State to prove the termination elements, including that it offered or provided necessary reunification services.

In Re The Welfare Of B.H. And G.H. · filed 2021-01-20(1)(a)-(f)

Considering the State’s interest in retaining the procedure used and the fiscal or administrative burden if additional safeguards were provided, we note that RCW 13.34.180 requires the State to prove a multitude of elements including offering T.H. reasonable and necessary services that would lead to his reunification with his children. ... The Department proved every element.

Section 13.34.180(1) does not include the status of sibling relationships among the required elements for terminating parental rights.

In Re The Dependency Of: J.d.p. And J.d.p. · filed 2021-06-01(1)

In contrast with dependency and placement requirements, the status of sibling relationships is not included within the six required elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) or RCW 13.34.190(1)(b).

Subsection (e) is satisfied when parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied within the child’s near future, and subsection (f) is satisfied when the continuing legal relationship impedes adoption into a stable home.

Dependency Of K.s.t. · filed 2023-08-21(e), (f)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that C.T.’s deficiencies are unlikely to be remediated in the near future as required to prove RCW 13.34.180(e). ... Because the legal parental relationship is an impediment to K.S.T.’s adoption, RCW 13.34.180(f) is satisfied.

Completing one ordered service does not defeat termination allegations under § 13.34.180(1) when other identified parental deficiencies remain unaddressed.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To A.g.l., A.s.l., L.e.l. · filed 2024-10-14(1)(d), (e)

There is simply nothing in the record that substance abuse treatment is primary to, “intertwined,” or obviates the need for E.L. to complete the entirety of his court-ordered obligations. Thus, proof of completion of one obligation does not defeat the State’s claim that E.L. has not met his obligation to address other outstanding parental deficiencies.

Sibling relationships, placement, contact, and visitation are irrelevant to whether a parent is unfit under RCW 13.34.180(1).

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: C.C.C. · filed 2024-11-20(1)

The status of sibling relationships, placement, contact, and visitation is irrelevant as to whether a parent is found to be unfit under RCW 13.34.180(1) and RCW 13.34.190(1)(a).

A parent does not show a prima facie defense to the termination elements by proving treatment for one parental deficiency while offering no evidence of addressing other identified deficiencies.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To A.g.l., A.s.l., L.e.l. · filed 2024-12-23(1)(d)-(e)

Thus, proof of completion of one obligation does not defeat the State’s claim that E.L. has not met his obligation to address other outstanding parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180 requires a petition alleging the statutory grounds before parental rights may be terminated.

Halsted v. Sallee · filed 1982-01-21

Finally, RCW 13.34.190 provides the court may enter an order terminating all parental rights if it finds that the allegations contained in the petition as provided in RCW 13.34.180(l)-(6) are established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. ... Here, the requirements for termination of parental rights were not followed.

Section 13.34.180(1) requires dismissal of a termination petition once the court determines that the Department has not proved its elements by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.

In Re The Dependency Of: M.i.k.-l. · filed 2021-03-15(1)

Lovejoy argues that his due process rights were violated when, after the trial court determined that the Department of Children, Youth and Families had not met its burden in proving the elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, it continued the hearing on the termination petition to allow the State to offer additional services to him. The State concedes that, based on the Matter of Welfare of D.E., 196 Wn.2d 92, 106, 469 P.3d 1163 (2020), once a trial court makes a determination that the Department has not met its burden, it must dismiss the petition. We accept the State’s concession.

Section 13.34.180(3) requires a total of six months of removal from parental custody before termination; the months need not be continuous.

State v. Arnold · filed 1989-10-02(3)

Once a child has been removed from parental custody for a total of 6 months, and the remaining requirements of RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190 can be established, no further delay in termination should be required. Construing RCW 13.34.180(3) to provide for a total period of 6 months fosters a flexible approach toward removal, an approach that, in conjunction with the additional requirements of RCW 13.34.180 and .190, serves to promote, not hinder, retention of the family unit.

Section 13.34.180 requires the State to show that termination prevents harm or risk of harm to children and survives strict scrutiny.

In Re Welfare of CB · filed 2006-08-01

Because RCW 13.34.180 and 13.34.190 require the State to prove in every instance that its request to terminate parental rights is based on prevention of harm or risk of harm to children, they survive strict scrutiny and are constitutional.

Section 13.34.180(1) survives strict scrutiny because its requirements, including services for the parent before termination, are narrowly drawn to prevent harm or risk of harm to the child.

In Re Dependency of TCCB · filed 2007-05-29(1)

C.B. makes clear that the State's compelling interest to prevent harm or risk of harm to the child is narrowly drawn because RCW 13.34.180(1) requires the State to provide the parent with services and an opportunity to engage in them before termination may be ordered. ... We conclude that Bryant has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that RCW 13.34.180 and 13.34.190 are unconstitutional.

Section 13.34.180 requires proof of harm or risk of harm to the child and provision of a less restrictive alternative before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re Welfare of MRH · filed 2008-06-17

Because RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190 require the Department to prove its request to terminate parental rights is based on the prevention of harm or risk of harm to the children and require the Department to provide the parent with a less restrictive alternative before termination, the statutes survive strict scrutiny and are constitutional.

Section 13.34.180 survived a constitutional challenge because its termination requirements are narrowly drawn to prevent harm to children.

In Re The Dependency Of M-a.f-s. · filed 2018-07-02

Because the termination statutes are narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling interest of the State to prevent harm to the children, we reject Franks' constitutional challenge to RCW 13.34.180 and .190.

Section 13.34.180 survives strict scrutiny because its termination requirements are narrowly drawn to prevent harm to children.

Franks v. State (In re M.-A.F.-S.) · filed 2018-07-02

Because the termination statutes are narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling interest of the State to prevent harm to the children, we reject Franks' constitutional challenge to RCW 13.34.180 and .190.

Section 13.34.180 survived a constitutional challenge because its termination requirements are narrowly drawn to prevent harm to children.

Franks v. State (In re M.-A.F.-S.) · filed 2018-04-30

Because the termination statutes are narrowly drawn to achieve the compelling interest of the State to prevent harm to the children, we reject Franks' constitutional challenge to RCW 13.34.180 and .190.

Section 13.34.180 permits a court to accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights when the parent enters it knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

In Re Dependency of JMR · filed 2011-04-04

Rousseau claims that without express statutory authority as provided in RCW 13.34.110 for entry of an order of dependency, the court does not have the authority to accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights under former RCW 13.34.180 and .190. We disagree. ... We reject Rousseau's argument that without express statutory authority, the court could not accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and affirm.

A court may accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights under section 13.34.180 if the parent enters it knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, despite the absence of express statutory authority for stipulations.

Rousseau v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2011-04-04

¶26 Rousseau claims that without express statutory authority as provided in RCW 13.34.110 for entry of an order of dependency, the court does not have the authority to accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights under former RCW 13.34.180 and .190. We disagree. ... ¶32 We reject Rousseau’s argument that without express statutory authority, the court could not accept a stipulation to terminate parental rights entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and affirm.

When considering termination of an incarcerated parent’s rights, the court must apply the version of subsection (1)(f) in effect when it rules and consider the statutory factors concerning the parent’s role, agency efforts, and barriers to contact.

Brian Mares And Brittany Knopff v. Dshs · filed 2014-08-04(1)(f)

This omission indicates both that the Pepartment failed to satisfy its burden of proof as to the termination factor contained within RCW 13.34.180(1 )(f) and that the trial court failed to apply the law in effect at the time of its ruling.

When a parent is incarcerated, subsection (1)(f) requires the trial court to consider the parent's meaningful role in the child's life, the agency's reasonable efforts, and barriers to contact.

In Re Welfare & Guardianship Of: A.n.b.a.j.b.a.c.b.a.j.b.: Carlos Benitez, App. v. Dshs, Resp. · filed 2015-02-23(1)(f)

Nevertheless, this record fails to show that the trial court considered all factors that the amended language of the statute requires. Specifically, there is nothing to indicate that the trial court considered each of the three requirements under the amended statute—whether Benitez maintained a meaningful role in his children's life, whether DSHS made "reasonable efforts," and whether particular barriers existed.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the statutory factors for an incarcerated parent before terminating parental rights; the agency fails to prove that termination element if the record does not show the court considered them.

In Re The Dependency Of: E.m.r.l., Corinna Lozano v. Dshs · filed 2015-04-20(1)(f)

Because the record does not demonstrate that the trial court considered all of the statutory factors under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(f) and .145(5)(b), the Department did not meet its burden of proof under RCW 13.34.180(1 )(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires a court to consider an incarcerated parent's ability to maintain a meaningful role in the child's life, but does not require written findings on that issue.

In re the Termination of: M.J. & M.J. · filed 2015-04-28(1)(f)

As to the necessity of findings in every case, the short answer to the argument is that the legislature did not require findings. It simply mandated consideration of the parent's ability to maintain a meaningful role despite her custodial status.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires courts to consider an incarcerated parent’s meaningful role in the child’s life but does not require written findings on that factor.

In re the Parental Rights to M.J. · filed 2015-04-28(1)(f)

As to the necessity of findings in every case, the short answer to the argument is that the legislature did not require findings. It simply mandated consideration of the parent’s ability to maintain a meaningful role despite her custodial status. RCW 13.34.180(l)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires courts to consider an incarcerated parent's role in the child's life, the Department's reasonable efforts, and barriers caused by incarceration; failure to do so can be harmless error.

In re the Termination of: K.J.B. · filed 2015-06-11(1)(f)

The amended statute does not contain an exception to the mandatory language. We therefore will not imply one. ... Therefore, unlike A.MM, we conclude that the trial court's failure to weigh the required considerations was harmless error, which does not require reversal.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires courts to consider an incarcerated parent’s meaningful role in the child’s life, the agency’s reasonable efforts, and barriers caused by incarceration. Failure to consider those factors may be harmless if the State’s case is strong or the factors are uncontested.

In re the Parental Rights to K.J.B. · filed 2015-06-11(1)(f)

The amended statute does not contain an exception to the mandatory language. We therefore will not imply one. ... Nevertheless, a failure to weigh the required considerations will not require reversal if the State’s case is strong or if the factors are not contested.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the added factors for incarcerated parents only when the parent is incarcerated at the termination hearing.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Saint-Louis · filed 2015-07-13(1)(f)

A reading of the plain language, along with the statutory scheme as a whole and related provisions within RCW 13.34.180, makes clear that the trial court is not required to consider the amended factors set forth in RCW 13.34.180(l)(f) if the parent is not incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing, even if the parent was previously incarcerated during the dependency.

Before terminating an incarcerated parent's rights, the court must consider the parent's role in the child's life, the agency's efforts, and barriers to contact; the State must prove the termination factor by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Dependency Of M.j.z. Christopher Rust v. Dshs · filed 2014-08-04(1)(f)

As in here, the trial court failed to consider the termination factor set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) and, in turn, RCW 13.34.145(5)(b), both of which became effective on July 28, 2013.3 ... Nor did the State prove by olear, cogent, and convincing evidence that this factor had been met.

The Department must prove subsection (1)(f) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; for an incarcerated parent, the court must consider the factors in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b).

Mares v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2014-08-04(1)(f)

It was the Department’s burden to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the six termination factors enumerated in RCW 13.34.180(1), most notably here, subsection (1)(f). Additionally, the trial court’s resolution of the (1)(f) factor was to be informed by evidence presented and conclusions reached regarding the six factors contained in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the incarcerated-parent factors only when the parent is incarcerated at the termination hearing.

Dependency Of D.l.b., Edelyn Saint-louis v. Dshs State Of Washington · filed 2015-07-13(1)(f)

A reading of the plain language, along with the statutory scheme as a whole and related provisions within RCW 13.34.180, makes clear that the trial court is not required to consider the amended factors set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) if the parent is not incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing, even if the parent was previously incarcerated during the dependency.

When a parent is incarcerated, section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the parent's role in the child's life, the agency's reasonable efforts, and barriers caused by incarceration, but does not require a particular outcome.

In re the Termination of: J.E.L.D. · filed 2016-02-09(1)(f)

In short, the trial court considered all incarceration factors before finding that the State proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that John Downs' ongoing relationship with Jessie prevented her from early integration into a stable, permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require consideration of incarceration factors when the parent is no longer incarcerated at the termination trial.

In re the Termination of: S. R. W. C. B-J. · filed 2016-05-19(1)(f)

Since the court was not required to consider the incarceration factors in applying RCW 13.34.180(l)(t), we need not examine what its consideration of the factors should have yielded.

Section 13.34.180 does not require the Department to provide visitation.

Welfare Of E.w. J.w. And S.w. v. Dshs · filed 2016-07-26(1)(f)

RCW 13.34.180 does not require the Department provide visitation.

Section 13.34.180(5) calls for consideration of a permanent placement that preserves an incarcerated parent's relationship with the child when the parent has maintained a meaningful role and the placement is in the child's best interests.

In Re The Welfare Of: A.m.m.a. Antonial Monroe, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2016-08-15(5)

Monroe's arguments rest primarily on RCW 13.34.180(5). RCW 13.34.180(5) provides that when an incarcerated parent has maintained a "meaningful role" in the child's life and it is in the best interests of the child, the Department should consider a permanent placement including, but not limited to, a guardianship that allows the parent to maintain a relationship with the child. For the reasons previously described, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Monroe did not maintain a meaningful role in A.M.M.A.'s life.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires courts to consider the incarceration factors but assigns them no mandatory weight.

In Re Welfare Of E. D. · filed 2016-08-30(1)(f)

The statute provides that the court “shall consider” the incarceration factors. Based on the plain language of the statute, no more than “consideration” is required. ... The statute notably does not mandate that a certain weight be afforded to the incarceration considerations.

When a parent is incarcerated, section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the parent's role in the child's life, the agency's reasonable efforts, and barriers to contact when assessing the child's prospects for a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dep Of T.m. Thomas Mcmahon, App. v. Dshs, State Of Wa, Resp · filed 2016-09-26(1)(f)

In short, the record is clear that the trial court properly considered the relevant statutory factors pertaining to incarcerated parents. The trial court's finding that McMahon's legal relationship with T.V.M. clearly diminished his prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home was supported by substantial evidence.

For an incarcerated parent, the court considers whether the department made reasonable efforts to offer necessary services reasonably available during incarceration.

Dep Of J.n., 7/28/13, Bryan Corbett, Jr. Aka Nichols, App v. Dshs, Resp · filed 2016-09-26(1)(f)

Here, social workers made at least five attempts to reach DOC to inquire about services available at the two different facilities where Corbett was contained. The record shows that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide and offer all necessary services that were reasonably available to Corbett during his incarceration.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the three factors concerning an incarcerated parent but does not require specific findings on each factor.

In Re The Termination Of Parental Rights Of S.j.a.v. Montel Jackson v. Dshs · filed 2016-12-12(1)(f)

The three (1)(f) incarcerated parent subfactors do not require specific findings.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires consideration of the additional incarcerated parent factors only when the parent is incarcerated at the time of termination.

In re the Welfare of: R.L. · filed 2015-11-19(1)(f)

We hold that the additional incarceration factors ofRCW 13.34.180(1)(f) only apply to parents incarcerated at the time of the termination.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the specified incarceration factors only if the parent is incarcerated at the termination hearing.

In re Dependency of D.L.B. · filed 2016-07-14(1)(f)

We hold that current RCW 13.34.180(l)(t) (LAWS OF 2013, ch. 173, § 4(1)(t)) applies only when a parent "is incarcerated" at the time of the termination hearing.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires the court to consider the incarceration-specific factors only when the parent is incarcerated at the termination hearing.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Saint-Louis · filed 2016-07-14(1)(f)

We hold that current RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) (Laws of 2013, ch. 173, § 4(1)(f)) applies only when a parent “is incarcerated” at the time of the termination hearing.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires courts to consider the incarceration factors but does not prescribe the weight those factors must receive.

Department of Social & Health Services v. L.H. · filed 2016-08-30(1)(f)

The statute provides that the court “shall consider” the incarceration factors. RCW 13.34.180(l)(f). Based on the plain language of the statute, no more than “consideration” is required.

The court found the trial court’s findings sufficient on subsection (1)(f)’s meaningful-role factor.

In re the Termination of: M.J. & M.J. · filed 2016-09-29(1)(f)

In affirming, we determine that the trial court's findings are sufficient. ... Due to the limited nature of the prior remand, this appeal focuses narrowly on a portion of the sixth element, the "meaningful role" factor contained within RCW 13.34.180(l)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires consideration of factors relevant to incarcerated parents but does not require formal written findings on those factors.

In Re The Welfare Of A.n.b, Carlos Benitez, App v. Dshs, Resp · filed 2017-01-09(1)(f)

The 2013 amendments do not require the entry of formal written findings of fact addressing the factors relevant to incarcerated parents.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires a court terminating an incarcerated parent’s rights to consider the incarceration factors, but does not require explicit findings on them.

J.B. v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2017-01-26(1)(f)

We hold that while explicit findings on the incarcerated parent factors are not statutorily required, consideration of the factors is mandatory.

For an incarcerated parent, subsection (1)(f) requires consideration of the parent's meaningful role in the child's life, the agency's reasonable efforts, and barriers to maintaining contact when deciding whether continued parental ties diminish the child's prospects for a permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: E.a.e. Jerry Jasso-rodriguez, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2017-04-24(1)(f)

The court also thoroughly considered the statutory incarceration factors: whether Jasso-Rodriguez played a meaningful role, whether the Department made reasonable efforts, and whether particular barriers existed. Substantial evidence, including the length and location of Jasso-Rodriguez's sentence, the circumstances of E.E.'s birth, her age, and the length of the dependency, supports the finding that Jasso-Rodriguez did not play a meaningful role in E.E.'s life and the determination that continuation of the parent-child relationship clearly diminished E.E.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires a court to consider the incarceration factors when terminating an incarcerated parent's rights, but does not require express findings on those factors.

In re Parental Rights to K.J.B. · filed 2017-01-26(1)(f)

We hold that while explicit findings on the incarcerated parent factors are not statutorily required, consideration of the factors is mandatory.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires a court considering termination of an incarcerated parent's rights to assess barriers to visitation or other meaningful contact with the child.

In Re The Dep Of Z.r., Tyreece Kingsly Dunbar v. Dshs · filed 2017-06-05(1)(f)

Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), the trial court must consider "whether particular barriers existed as described in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b) including, but not limited to, delays or barriers experienced in keeping the agency apprised of his or her location and in accessing visitation or other meaningful contact with the child."

When a parent is incarcerated at trial, subsection (1)(f) requires the court to consider whether the parent maintains a meaningful role in the child's life under the factors in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b).

In re the Parental Rights to: D.J.J. · filed 2018-01-18(1)(f)

If a parent is incarcerated at the time of trial, that subsection also requires the trial court to consider whether the incarcerated parent maintains a meaningful role in his child's life based on factors listed in RCW 13.34.145(5)(b).

The court’s findings addressed the mandatory incarceration factors in subsection (1)(f), including the parent’s role, agency efforts, and barriers to contact.

In Re The Dep Of N.a., John Ackah, App v. Dshs · filed 2018-01-22(1)(f)

Viewed in context, the court's detailed findings clearly addressed all of the mandatory statutory incarceration factors, including not only the "meaningful role" factor, but also the Department's "reasonable efforts" and the "particular barriers" that Ackah faced during his lengthy incarceration.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires consideration of the incarceration factors, but does not require any particular outcome.

Dep Of Ab., Marvin Jordan, App v. Dshs State Of Washington · filed 2019-11-18(1)(f)

And, although Jordan disagrees with the trial court's conclusion as to the incarceration factors, we may not reverse the trial court for those reasons because RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) only requires consideration of the factors not any particular outcome.

The court found that the termination court adequately considered the incarceration factors before terminating parental rights.

In Re The Dependency Of: S.d.m., Alexandrea Pedregon v. Dshs · filed 2018-11-13(f)

We conclude the court adequately considered the incarcerated parent factors before terminating Pedregon's parental rights.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires consideration of the incarcerated parent factors when the parent is incarcerated at the time of the termination ruling.

Dependency Of U.d.w., 9/15/15, Felton Warner, App v. Dshs, Resp · filed 2018-11-13(1)(f)

But this is not a material factual distinction. In D.L.B., the court analyzed the plain language of the statute, which uses the present tense and requires the court to analyze the incarcerated parent factors if the parent "is incarcerated" when the court determines whether RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) has been proved. ... The rationale of D.L.B. applies in these circumstances. The trial court did not err by failing to consider on the record the incarcerated parent factors.

In assessing whether an incarcerated parent maintains a meaningful role in a child’s life, the court may consider the child’s perspective.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: G.C. · filed 2022-01-11(1)(f)

The juvenile court’s assessment of whether D.C. maintained a meaningful role in G.C.’s life properly considered G.C.’s perspective.

For an incarcerated parent, subsection (1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide necessary services that are reasonably available at the correctional facility.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To J.h.w., Jr. · filed 2026-01-05(1)(d)

Once the father was incarcerated, the Department met its obligation pursuant to RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to offer or provide all necessary services reasonably available because no referred services were initially available at the King County jail or Coyote Ridge.

The additional factors for incarcerated parents apply only if the parent is incarcerated at the termination hearing.

In Re Dep: N.m.p.k-a., Dob: 03/16/08 Dean Alexis, App. v. Dshs, Resp. · filed 2015-07-13(1)(f)

... we concluded that the amended factors only apply if the parent is incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.

Section 13.34.180(6) requires a termination petition to include substantially prescribed notice of the parent's right to counsel.

In Re The Dependency Of: C.m.l. · filed 2023-10-30(6)

Under RCW 13.34.180(6), the petition must include, “in substantially the following form,” notice that the parents ... “have the right to have a lawyer represent you at the hearing.