Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires necessary services tailored to a parent’s needs; additional services are unnecessary when they would not correct parental deficiencies in the child’s foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of D.w.h., Lisa Harrison, App. v. Dcyf, Resp. · filed 2020-01-13(1)(d)

The services offered must be specifically tailored to the parent’s unique needs. ... The record does not support Harrison’s claim that the Department failed to provide the type of parent coaching recommended by Dr. Shepel. ... Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that providing additional services would be futile.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires proof that the Department expressly offered or provided reasonably available services capable of correcting the parent’s deficiencies.

In Re The Dependency Of: W.l.s. Jayna Palmer, App. v. State Of Wa., Dcyf, Res. · filed 2020-03-02(1)(d)

The evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that the Department expressly offered specific services to the mother capable of addressing her parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies; a parent’s belated request alone does not make a service necessary.

In Re The Dependency Of: F.y.o., Michael Foster Jr. v. Dcyf · filed 2020-03-02(1)(d)

A parent’s belated request for a service is not sufficient to convert that service to a necessary one.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require the Department to offer additional or different services when a parent cannot take advantage of services already offered and further services would be futile.

Dep Of S.t.l Samuel Ruben Noah v. Dcyf · filed 2020-03-09(1)(d)

In short, the record establishes that the offer of additional or different services would be futile because Noah could not take advantage of the services already offered. Thus, the trial court’s finding that the Department offered all necessary services is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary services in an understandable manner before parental rights are terminated.

In re the Parental Rights to: G.R.J.S. · filed 2018-12-13(1)(d)

Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the Department understandably offered K.T. services, as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

The court treated subsection (1)(d)’s court-ordered-services duty as limited to services ordered in the dependency action.

In re the Parental Rights to: J.N.S. & T.O. · filed 2019-03-28(1)(d)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) only applies to services ordered by the trial court in the dependency action.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires DSHS to offer ordered and necessary services; whether it reasonably did so depends on its efforts and the parent’s response over the course of the case.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: B.M., L.M., A.M. & P.M. · filed 2019-04-30(1)(d)

Nevertheless, based on the totality of the ... circumstances, we agree that the trial court, based on sufficient evidence, correctly found that the State reasonably offered services to Miller.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the State to offer or provide reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies; additional offers are unnecessary when they would be futile.

Dep Of Sls, Calvin Turner v. Dshs · filed 2020-01-21(1)(d)

Accordingly, substantial evidence establishes that the State proved that the Department offered or provided all reasonably available services capable of correcting Turner’s parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide court-ordered services and all reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of: L.a.c., Robert Caldwell, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2019-04-22(1)(d)

In view of this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that the Department offered or provided court-ordered and necessary and reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future and that any additional service referrals would be futile.

Subsection (d) requires the Department to offer necessary services before termination, but failure to offer a service can be excused if the offer would have been futile.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: G'Y.-L.G.M.P. · filed 2019-06-13(d)

Because the Department’s failure to offer services can be excused if the offer would have been futile, the trial court had ample basis for finding the Department had offered S.M. all reasonable services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide ordered and necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

Dependency Of: A.g.h., Dob: 09/22/2017, Jimyco Ja-ray Greene, App v. Dcyf, Resp · filed 2020-01-21(1)(d)

Thus, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to offer or provide all ordered and necessary services capable of correcting Jimyco’s parental deficiencies.

A parent’s admission that she knew of a service referral can establish the required notice even without documentation of the referral process.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: M.W. · filed 2019-07-02(1)(d)

That admission was sufficient to prove the Department had notified her of the referral, regardless of whether the Department documented the referral process.

The Department satisfies the services requirement when it provides services addressing a parent's primary deficiency and additional services cannot correct that deficiency within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of: K.b., Marcine Brown v. Dshs · filed 2019-08-05(1)(d)

Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that the Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) by offering or providing mental health services and that any additional services were futile because they were not capable of correcting Brown’s chronic mental health condition in the foreseeable future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer or provide reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dep Of Lal., Arion Lamb Sr. v. Dshs, State Of Wa. · filed 2019-09-23(1)(d)

To meet its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), the Department must prove that "the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably ... available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided." ... On this record, we conclude the Department fulfilled its duty to make reasonable efforts to refer the father to available services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires offering ordered services, but the failure to offer a service does not prevent termination when that service would have been futile.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: D.J.S. · filed 2020-01-28(1)(d)

Despite DSHS’s violation of the order for offering parenting classes, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the State complied with RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). We rely on the rule that DSHS need not afford futile services. The futility doctrine allows the trial court to terminate parental rights if either (1) the services would have been futile when offered or (2) offering the services would not remedy the parental deficiencies within the child’s foreseeable future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require the Department to provide a necessary service during a period when it is not reasonably available.

In re Parental Rights to D.H. · filed 2020-06-04(1)(d)

Substantial evidence supports that, here, the Department was not statutorily obligated to provide DBT during the period of delay because it was not reasonably available.

The Department satisfies subsection (1)(d) by expressly and understandably offering reasonably available and necessary services.

In Re The Welfare Of: K.d., Danielle Graves v. Dcyf · filed 2020-06-08(1)(d)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the Department expressly and understandably offered all reasonably available and necessary services as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require additional services when parents refuse treatment needed to address the deficiencies preventing reunification.

In the Matter of the Dependency of: O.R., B.W., O.S., & C.R. · filed 2020-07-07(1)(d)

Because RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) limits the services required to those capable of remedying parental deficiencies in the “foreseeable future,” a trial court can find that DSHS offered all reasonable services where “the record establishes that the offer of services would be futile.” ... The trial court concluded that requiring additional services was a futile gesture when the parents refused to engage in the treatment services mandated by the dependency order. Further proceedings were useless. The trial court correctly determined both that it was time to end the relationships and that it was in the best interest of the children to do so.

The Department satisfies the necessary-services requirement when it provides services capable of correcting parental deficiencies and additional services would be futile.

Dep Of A.s., J.w., R.s · filed 2020-07-27(1)(d)

The unchallenged findings show that she was provided with all necessary services and that the provision of additional services would be futile.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require the Department to offer reunification therapy when there is no evidence it could repair the parent-child bond within a time frame suited to the child’s emotional development and well-being.

In Re The Welfare Of: B.d.m.b., Brandon Burns, App v. Dcyf · filed 2020-09-28(1)(d)

Where there is no evidence that the parent- child bond could be repaired within a time frame that would be conducive to the child’s “emotional development and well-being[,]” the Department had met its obligation under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide all necessary, reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of: K.a.f., Crystal Leikam Tampico v. Dcyfs · filed 2020-11-09(1)(d)

Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Department met its burden to provide all necessary services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future; repeated referrals can satisfy that requirement when a parent fails to participate.

In Re The Dep Of J.b., Stephanie Baird v. Dcyf · filed 2020-11-16(1)(d)

In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Department satisfied RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) by referring Baird to Triple P multiple times.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require reunification therapy when there is no evidence it could repair the parent-child bond within a time frame suited to the child’s emotional needs.

In Re The Welfare Of: B.d.m.b., Brandon Burns, App v. Dcyf · filed 2020-11-23(1)(d)

Where there is no evidence that the parent- child bond could be repaired within a time frame that would be conducive to the child’s “emotional development and well-being[,]” the Department had met its obligation under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Under subsection (1)(d), a proposed service is futile when the parent shows no interest in participating and participation would harm the children.

Dep Of Vndf., Jesus Diaz Ardon v. Dcyf · filed 2021-03-08(1)(d)

Because Diaz did not demonstrate any interest in participating in the children’s therapy, and because ... his participation would have been harmful to the children, such a service was futile.

The Department must provide necessary, reasonably available services to address the condition that prevents reunification, but need not provide services that would not remedy that condition.

In Re The Welfare Of E. Z.-m., Claudia Zapata v. Dcyf · filed 2021-03-15(1)(d)

There is no evidence to indicate that parental coaching or instruction related to anxiety or ADHD would have remedied the lack of parent-child bond, which was the condition that precluded reunification. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Department satisfied its burden to provide necessary and reasonably available services under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) permits a finding that necessary services were provided when additional services would be futile.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: L.L., S.L. & J.L. · filed 2021-05-18(1)(d)

Clear and convincing evidence shows that providing training on his children’s behavioral needs would not have altered D.L.’s inability to regain custody of his children. Given this circumstance, we will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of parental fitness as to RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require housing assistance when housing is not a condition preventing reunification.

In Re The Dep Of D.c-c., Janaye M. Clausen, V. Dcyf · filed 2021-06-14(1)(d)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err inasmuch as it did not consider housing assistance a “necessary service” the Department was required to provide under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future; housing assistance is not required when lack of housing is not the barrier to reunification.

In the Matter of the Welfare of: Z.M.Y. · filed 2021-06-15(1)(d)

One of the six statutory elements in a termination proceeding is proof that the Department has offered all necessary services capable of correcting the specific parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... In this case, it is clear from the evidence, and the trial court’s findings, that lack of housing was not the primary parental deficiency that prevented reunification with the child. Instead, the father’s ongoing pattern of sexual deviant behavior along with his failure to engage in sex offender treatment and substance abuse treatment were the primary concern for the trial court. Providing the father with housing assistance would not have remedied these deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer or provide necessary, reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of H.l.h. · filed 2021-08-09(1)(d)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Department expressly and understandably offered services as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies in the near future; a psychological evaluation is not a necessary service when it would not enable reunification.

In The Matter Of The Dependency Of: K.d. · filed 2021-09-27(1)(d)

A psychological evaluation does not fall within this definition because an evaluation would not have enabled reunification.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer or provide necessary, reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of: R.s.h. · filed 2021-11-08(1)(d)

Here, the Department offered the services as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... We conclude that there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support the court’s finding that the Department has fulfilled its obligation to offer necessary services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Welfare Of: B.D.B.B. · filed 2021-11-17(1)(d)

Where there is no evidence that the parent-child bond could be repaired within a time frame that would be conducive to the child’s “emotional development and well-being[,]” the Department had met its obligation under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary, reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies; repeated referrals can satisfy that requirement when a parent fails to participate.

In Re The Dep Of J.B. · filed 2021-11-17(1)(d)

In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Department satisfied RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) by referring J.B.’s mother to Triple P multiple times.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require housing assistance when it is not needed to address a parental deficiency that prevents reunification.

In Re The Dep Of D.C-C. · filed 2021-11-17(1)(d)

In short, the record does not support the mother’s assertion that housing assistance was a service needed to address a parental deficiency for purposes of reunification. Accordingly, the trial court did not err inasmuch as it did not consider housing assistance a “necessary service” the Department was required to provide under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

A service that would not remedy parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future is not a necessary service under subsection (1)(d).

In Re The Dependency Of: S.e.l. · filed 2022-03-14(1)(d)

Accordingly, we conclude that FPS did not constitute a “necessary service” within the meaning of RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to prove that it expressly and understandably offered or provided all reasonably available services needed to correct parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future; the domestic violence services offered here satisfied that requirement.

In The Matter Of The Dependency Of R.d.a., I.o.a. · filed 2022-10-31(1)(d)

B.A. argues that DV services were a necessary service that the Department failed to offer before terminating her parental rights. We disagree. ... The record supports that the Department did offer all necessary services capable of correcting a parental deficiency.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not categorically prohibit providing necessary services sequentially.

In Re A.n.c · filed 2022-11-21(1)(d)

Given that, sequential provision of services is not categorically prohibited by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require the Department to offer additional services that cannot resolve a parent's deficiencies.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: L.P. · filed 2022-12-22(1)(d)

Both parents proved unwilling to take advantage of Department-referred services, the Department is not required to provide additional services with no connection or ability to resolve the parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) allows the department to rely on mental health services a parent already receives from another provider when no additional treatment is shown to be necessary.

In The Matter Of The Dependency Of: B.s. · filed 2023-01-03(1)(d)

DCYF was entitled to rely on the services already being provided to A.S. by Flowers.

Subsection (1)(d) does not require the Department to provide a therapist certified in motivational interviewing when that certification was not recommended and the service would have been futile.

In Re The Dependency Of K.w., Billy Anderson v. Dcyf · filed 2020-06-22(1)(d)

First, the record demonstrates that Dr. Shepel’s report did not recommend that Anderson receive mental health therapy from a provider certified in motivational interviewing. ... These findings establish that motivational interviewing with a therapist certified in that technique would have been futile.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d)’s services requirement is satisfied when a parent’s refusal to engage makes further offers of services futile.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: A.G.G. · filed 2020-10-06(1)(d)

Among the facts that must be shown during a termination hearing, the State must show, “[t]hat the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been ... expressly and understandably offered or provided.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... The evidence that R.G. refused a number of services along with Dr. MacLennan’s testimony that she was not likely to change was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that further offers of services would be futile.

The Department can meet subsection (1)(d)’s service requirement through sustained efforts to help a parent access treatment.

In Re The Dependency Of S.n.w. · filed 2022-03-07(1)(d)

While we agree that the Department could have done more to aid J.W. in receiving funding for DV treatment, the record demonstrates that the Department tried to assist J.W. for many years, through many services. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that all elements of RCW 13.34.180 were proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer or provide court-ordered services; timely referrals to DBT providers satisfied that requirement here.

In Re The Dependency Of C.g.s. · filed 2022-12-05(1)(d)

As relevant here, the Department must show “[t]hat the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided.” RCW 13.34.180(d). ... This evidence refutes M.S.’s contention that DBT referrals were provided to her “belatedly.”

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to refer a parent to housing resources to the extent reasonably possible when lack of housing is a parental deficiency.

In Re The Dependency Of S.e.s., Isaac Spear v. Dcyf · filed 2021-01-19(1)(d)

Where lack of housing is a parental deficiency, the Department unquestionably has an obligation to refer the parent to housing resources to the extent reasonably possible.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) treats housing services as necessary when lack of safe and stable housing is identified as a parenting deficiency that could prevent reunification.

In Re The Dependency Of: G.l.l. · filed 2021-12-13(1)(d)

Lack of safe and stable housing was explicitly identified as a parenting deficiency in the termination petition. As such, it certainly could have precluded reunification. This makes it a necessary service.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require the Department to offer or provide services that would be futile.

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.A. · filed 2021-03-23(1)(d)

In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s application of the futility doctrine that excused the Department from offering or providing S.D. with DBT, EMDR, and CPT.

When DCYF has reason to believe a parent may have an intellectual disability, section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires it to assess how the disability affects the parent’s understanding and tailor its offer of services accordingly.

In re Termination of Parental Rights to M.A.S.C. · filed 2021-05-20(1)(d)

Where DCYF has reason to believe that a parent may have an intellectual disability, it must make reasonable efforts to ascertain whether the parent does in fact have a disability and, if so, how the disability could interfere with the parent’s capacity to understand DCYF’s offer of services. DCYF must then tailor its offer of services in accordance with current professional guidelines to ensure that the offer is reasonably understandable to the parent.

The Department must prove that it understandably offered or provided services to a parent with an intellectual disability under subsection (1)(d).

In Re The Welfare Of D.H. And A.K. · filed 2023-01-24(1)(d)

For the reasons discussed below, the trial court erred in concluding that the Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to understandably offer and provide services to AH. We therefore reverse.

The Department satisfies subsection (1)(d) when it offers or provides all ordered and necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies.

In Re The Dependency Of M.r.d., Leanna Hanson, V. Dcyf · filed 2021-06-21(1)(d)

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to offer or provide all ordered and necessary services capable of correcting Hanson’s parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d)’s service requirement can be satisfied when court-ordered services were repeatedly offered before a parent’s incarceration, even if they cannot later be provided in prison.

Dep Of J.j.s. · filed 2022-01-24(1)(d)

One such factor requires the Department to prove that “the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... Regardless of whether it was possible to provide J.S. the ordered services while she was incarcerated, the trial court’s factual findings, supported by substantial evidence in the record, indicate that J.S. was offered these services repeatedly and failed to avail herself of them on multiple occasions over more than six months. ... The trial court was not required to make any additional findings with regard to these services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary, reasonably available services expressly and understandably and to tailor them to the parent’s individual needs.

Dep Of U.m.r.b. · filed 2022-02-22(1)(d)

Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), the Department must show that it “expressly and understandably” offered all “reasonably available” and “necessary” services capable of correcting a parent’s deficiencies within the near future. The Department must individually tailor such services to the needs of the parent. ... We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the Department offered express and understandable services tailored to L.B.’s individual needs, and affirm the order terminating L.B.’s parental rights to E.E.B. and U.M.R.B.

Before terminating parental rights, the Department must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that it expressly and understandably offered all court-ordered and necessary services to each parent.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: K.A. · filed 2022-05-17(1)(d)

All three challenges arise from the statutory requirement that before parental rights are terminated, the Department must prove that all court-ordered and necessary services were expressly and understandably offered to each parent. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... This court accepts the State’s concession that it did not carry its burden of proof. We reverse the termination of parental rights as to all three parents.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the child’s foreseeable future; further offers may be futile when a parent declines treatment.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: D.L.E. · filed 2023-02-16(1)(d)

Further offers of services would be futile.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires services needed to address conditions that prevent reunification; housing and domestic violence survivor services are unnecessary when neither addresses such a condition.

In Re The Dependency Of J.l.l.m-m. · filed 2023-04-10(1)(d)

As such, housing was not a necessary service for Ms. M. ... As domestic violence services were not needed to address any condition that precluded the reunification of Ms. M and J, such services were not necessary.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer reasonably available, necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of A.d.y. · filed 2023-05-30(1)(d)

Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) and RCW 13.34.190(a)(i), the Department was required to show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that it “expressly and understandably” offered all “reasonably available” and “necessary” services capable of correcting a parent's deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

The Department satisfied subsection (1)(d) by offering inpatient dual diagnosis treatment and other services.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: D.G.B. & B.D.B. · filed 2023-06-15(1)(d)

J.A. challenges the trial court’s conclusion on the fourth termination factor, which requires the Department to prove that “all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... Second, as we discuss below, it is undisputed that the Department offered inpatient dual diagnosis treatment to J.A., in addition to other forms of treatment.

Under subsection (1)(d), family therapy is not a necessary service when unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues prevent reunification.

In Re The Dependency Of M.l.w. · filed 2023-09-18(1)(d)

The trial court did not err in concluding that family therapy was not an ordered or necessary service under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require combined mental health and substance use treatment when DCYF offers both services simultaneously and the parent refuses to participate.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To L.g.v. · filed 2024-04-29(1)(d)

There is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that DCYF provided the necessary services to L.V. and she does not provide controlling authority to support her claim that a particular combination or kind of treatment was required to be offered.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide necessary services, but does not require anger management treatment without evidence that it is needed to address a condition preventing reunification.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To A.r.l. · filed 2024-07-15(1)(d)

In sum, the Department was not required to offer or provide anger management treatment to the mother in order to meet its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the child’s foreseeable future.

In re Dependency of M.L.W. · filed 2024-11-14(1)(d)

Applying this standard, we hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that family therapy was not a necessary service because it could not correct T.W.’s primary parental deficiency, substance abuse, within the foreseeable future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to prove it offered all reasonably available services necessary to correct parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To E.r.m. · filed 2025-06-30(1)(d)

In a trial to terminate parental rights, the Department must prove that it provided “all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding that R.M. was offered all necessary services by the Department.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) does not require a neuropsychological evaluation when the parent’s claimed memory issues are not a primary barrier to reunification.

In the Matter of Dependency of: J.S.P. & J.J.P · filed 2025-08-12(1)(d)

Here, we disagree with D.P. that a neuropsychological evaluation was a necessary service because it was not a “primary factor” preventing reunification with his children.

Subsection (1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary, reasonably available services that address conditions preventing reunification.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To: J.F.R. And J.T.R. · filed 2025-11-03(1)(d)

In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Department offered all necessary and reasonably available services to address the substance abuse that served as the barrier to reunification.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future to be expressly and understandably offered or provided, with services tailored to the parent’s needs.

In the Matter of the Dependency of: I.A.L. & L.J. · filed 2025-11-18(1)(d)

We also reject the mother’s contention that the DBT recommended by Dr. Cole had not been provided in a manner specifically tailored to her needs. The court found that DBT had been offered to the mother. Moreover, many of these providers had attempted to tailor programs to fit what the mother wanted but despite these efforts, the mother refused to engage. Significant evidence supports these findings.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary, reasonably available services capable of correcting the conditions that prevent reunification.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To: J.f.r. And J.t.r. · filed 2025-12-08(1)(d)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), quoted in full above, requires that the Department prove it has offered or provided necessary and reasonably available services capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future. ... In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the Department offered all necessary and reasonably available services to address the substance abuse that served as the barrier to reunification.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires DCYF to offer or provide all reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future before parental rights may be terminated.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To M.a.a.k. · filed 2026-04-20(1)(d)

Before a court can terminate a parent-child relationship, DCYF must satisfy its statutory obligations under RCW 13.34.180(1) and offer or provide “ ‘all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.’ ” K.M.M , 186 Wn.2d at 479 (quoting RCW 13.34.180). ... Accordingly, sufficient evidence existed to support the court’s findings that DCYF provided all necessary services.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires reversal of a termination order when the Department fails to prove it offered or provided the required services.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: C.G. · filed 2023-04-06(1)(d)

Given this failure of proof of the element required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), we conclude that the order terminating the father’s parental rights must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to expressly and understandably offer court-ordered services and necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

Dependency Of: D.j.p., C.j.p., J.j.p., A.j.p., N.v.p., T.j.c.p. · filed 2023-08-14(1)(d)

The trial court was entitled to rely on McGee’s testimony and substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding that the Department offered services including court ordered services under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Services requiring parent-child contact are not reasonably available when visitation is against the child’s best interests.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: C.W. · filed 2023-09-12(1)(d)

Because the evidence shows that visitation was not in the children’s best interest, the services dependent upon reunification were not “reasonably available.”

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer or provide necessary services that are reasonably available to correct parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To J.h.w., Jr. · filed 2026-02-09(1)(d)

Once the father was incarcerated, the Department met its obligation pursuant to RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) to offer or provide all necessary services reasonably available because no referred services were initially available at the King County jail or Coyote Ridge.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d)’s service requirement is subject to the futility doctrine for both court-ordered and necessary services.

In Re The Dependency Of R.e. L-g · filed 2023-10-09(1)(d)

We therefore conclude that the futility doctrine applies to both court-ordered and necessary services.

The Department must offer or provide court-ordered and necessary services capable of correcting parental deficiencies in the foreseeable future.

In Re The Dependency Of: R.l.s. · filed 2023-11-20(1)(d)

At issue here is the fourth element, which requires that the Department provide all court-ordered and necessary services reasonably available and capable of correcting parental deficiencies. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). ... Substantial evidence supports the finding that the Department proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that all necessary services capable of correcting the mother’s parenting deficiencies in the foreseeable future were offered or provided.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to investigate a parent’s apparent cognitive impairment and offer services tailored to the parent’s needs before parental rights may be terminated.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: E.J.O. · filed 2023-11-30(1)(d)

The Department’s obligation to provide all “necessary services” under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) entails meeting a parent where they are at and providing services in an understandable manner. If the Department has reason to believe a parent has a cognitive impairment, it must make reasonable efforts to investigate the nature of the impairment and then offer tailored services.

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer services addressing an alleged parenting deficiency to meet its burden in a termination case.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To R.j.c.s. · filed 2025-12-08(1)(d)

The Department also acknowledges that it failed to offer services to address the alleged parenting deficiency as necessary to meet its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). We accept the Department’s concessions. Accordingly, we reverse the order terminating the father’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires DCYF to offer necessary services in a way the parent can understand, including tailoring them to a parent’s potential intellectual disability.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: M.A.P. & M.M.B.-P. · filed 2026-02-19(1)(d)

Here, the trial court’s findings that Ms. P. understood the service plan and that DCYF specifically tailored the services to meet her potential cognitive disability are supported by substantial evidence.

Flaws in an evaluator’s testing methods do not by themselves make the services the evaluator recommends culturally inappropriate under subsection (1)(d).

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To I.c.m.m. · filed 2026-04-06(1)(d)

This argument is unavailing because it simply does not follow that problems with Dr. Swing’s testing methods inherently meant all the services in her report were culturally incompetent recommendations. Moreover, Mr. M. does not identify any particular service he claims was culturally inappropriate. ... Therefore, we do not disturb the court’s conclusion that DCYF satisfied RCW 13.34.180(1).

The Department may satisfy subsection (1)(d) without offering additional services when the record establishes that those services would be futile.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: J.E.M.R. · filed 2026-05-26(1)(d)

Because the record establishes that any further services that could have been offered by the Department would have proven futile, the court was permitted to find that the Department offered all reasonable services under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).

Section 13.34.180(4) and (5) require proof that reasonably available services to correct parental deficiencies were offered and that the conditions are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Ferguson · filed 1982-08-24(4), (5)

We hold that neither RCW 13.34.180(4) nor (5) has been proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180(5) requires a showing that conditions preventing the child's return to the parent are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

Churape v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1986-04-01(5)

Although we are not satisfied the clear, cogent, and convincing standard was met as to RCW 13.34.180(5) remediability, because considerable time has passed since the order of termination was entered, this court is reluctant to dismiss the termination proceeding. Intervening circumstances dictate the need to take additional testimony regarding whether problems necessitating state intervention have been remedied and whether reunification of the family can now or in the near future be effectuated, particularly in light of subsequent DSHS evaluations of the Churape home dated September and October 1985.

Section 13.34.180(5) requires clear, cogent and convincing evidence that parental deficiencies still exist and are unlikely to be remedied so the child can return in the near future.

Krause v. Catholic Community Services · filed 1987-05-20(5)

The Washington parental rights termination statutes require clear, cogent and convincing evidence of not only a prior determination that the parent has fallen below minimal standards, RCW 13.34.180(1), but of the fact that parental deficiencies still exist which are not likely to be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, RCW 13.34.180(5).

Section 13.34.180(5) requires a finding that parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the near future; persistent denial of violent conduct and lack of insight supported that finding.

Daniel B. v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1995-11-07(5)

RCW 13.34.190(2) requires the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that there is little likelihood parental deficiencies will be remedied in the near future, and (2) that continuation of the parent-child relationship clearly would interfere with placement in a stable, permanent home. RCW 13.34.180(5), (6). We find the record substantially supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

The child's age informs whether parental deficiencies can be remedied in the near future, and a delay in providing a stable home can support termination.

In Re AW · filed 1988-12-19(5)-(6)

Thus, if Johnson were to retain parental rights to A., his condition would delay A.'s integration into a stable and permanent home for at least 1 year, and perhaps indefinitely. The period of time which constitutes the foreseeable future depends in part on the age of the child. See In re Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 851, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983). Although 1 year may not be a long time for an adult decision maker, for a young child it may seem like forever. We find that the trial court's findings as to the fifth and sixth elements are supported by substantial evidence.

The foreseeable future for remedying parental deficiencies depends in part on the child's age.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Johnson · filed 1988-12-19(5)

The period of time which constitutes the foreseeable future depends in part on the age of the child.

Section 13.34.180(5) requires proof of a current parental deficiency that is unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re the Dependency of K.R. · filed 1994-09-20(5)

In other words, the State must show the current existence of an adverse condition, and further that there is little likelihood that this condition can be remedied. We note that in RCW 13.34.180, element (4) is controlled by element (5).

Section 13.34.180(5)(a) permits courts to consider a parent's substance use when deciding whether conditions will be remedied in the near future; it does not require proof of current use.

In Re Dependency of JC · filed 1996-10-10(5)(a)

The plain wording of RCW 13.34.180(5), including the recently added subsection (a), neither compels nor supports such a holding. We reach that conclusion because the statute does not indicate, explicitly, whether the "use" to which it refers is current use, past use, or the likelihood of future use. The statute simply permits a court to consider a parent's use of intoxicating or controlled substances as a factor in determining whether the "conditions will be remedied" in the near future.

Section 13.34.180(5)(a) permits a court to consider past substance abuse when deciding whether conditions can be remedied in the near future; proof of current use is not required.

K.C. v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1996-10-10(5)(a)

The Court of Appeals adopted the view of RCW 13.34.180(5) that "[w]hen the State relies on substance abuse to establish [that there is little likelihood that K.C.’s parental deficiencies will be remedied in the near future]” it must prove that the parent is currently abusing alcohol in order to justify an order terminating parental rights. ... The plain wording of RCW 13.34.180(5), including the recently added subsection (a), neither compels nor supports such a holding. We reach that conclusion because the statute does not indicate, explicitly, whether the "use” to which it refers is current use, past use, or the likelihood of future use.

Section 13.34.180(5)(b) permits courts to consider severe and chronic mental illness in termination proceedings when it affects a parent’s ability to care for the child.

B.S. v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1999-03-09(5)(b)

This same chapter at section 2 amended RCW 13.34, specifically adding RCW 13.34.180(5)(b) and expressly authorizing the courts to consider severe and chronic mental illness in termination proceedings.

Section 13.34.180(5)(b) permits courts to consider severe, chronic mental illness when deciding whether a parent can provide proper care in the near future.

In Re HS · filed 1999-04-15(5)(b)

That RCW 26.44.015(3) does not supersede RCW 13.34.180(5)(b) to prevent termination of parental rights in the face of a parent's chronic, severe mental illness is evident from the fact that RCW 26.44.015(3) and RCW 13.34.180(5)(b) were enacted in the same legislation.

The presumption that conditions are unlikely to be remedied shifts only the burden of producing evidence to the parent; the State retains the burden of persuasion.

In Re Welfare of CB · filed 2006-09-20(1)(e)

Having decided the presumption applies, we hold that because it implicates a parent's constitutional rights, this presumption shifts only the burden of production to the parent. ... Thus, even though the presumption applies, the State retains the burden of convincing the court that it is highly probable that Bartman would not have improved in the near future.

Under subsection (1)(e), substantial evidence supported the finding that the conditions preventing return were unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re Welfare of TB · filed 2009-06-16(1)(e)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied so the children could be returned to K.B. in the near future.

Subsection (1)(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there is little likelihood the conditions preventing a child’s return will be remedied in the near future.

Vandermeer v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2010-09-27(1)(e)

While it is undisputed that the foreseeable future for B.R. and T.V. is less than one year, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence does not support the conclusion that Vandermeer is unable to address the only identified parental deficiency within the foreseeable future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that parental deficiencies will not be remedied in the near future when necessary services have been offered or provided and the parent has not substantially improved within a year.

In re the Welfare of T.B. · filed 2009-04-07(1)(e)

If the State offers or provides all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future and the parent does not substantially improve within a year of the dependency order, a presumption arises that the State has established RCW 13.34.180(l)(e).

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conditions preventing a child's return are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re Dependency of BR · filed 2010-09-27(1)(e)

While it is undisputed that the foreseeable future for B.R. and T.V. is less than one year, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence does not support the conclusion that Vandermeer is unable to address the only identified parental deficiency within the foreseeable future.

Subsection (1)(e) focuses on whether a parent has corrected parental deficiencies so the child can return in the near future.

In Re: K.t.h-a. Tywan Hillis v. Dshs · filed 2013-04-29(1)(e)

The focus of RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e) is on whether a parent has corrected his or her parental deficiencies.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires evidence that conditions preventing a child's return cannot be remedied in the near future; those conditions must relate to parenting ability or risk of harm.

In Re The Dependency Of D. R. · filed 2013-10-15(1)(e)

Because the conditions identified in support of the finding required under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) were not tied to B.R's ability to parent or any risk of harm to the child, the evidence did not support the judgment.

The State retains the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re The Dependency Of J.m.s.: Christiana Marie Steele v. Dshs · filed 2013-10-07(1)(e)

Read as a whole, the record clearly demonstrates that despite Steele's contention, the court did not shift the burden of persuasion. Although Steele presented evidence that she had made some improvements after the Department filed the termination petition, the State proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Steele's parental deficiencies were unlikely to improve sufficiently to reunite the family anytime in J.M.S.'s near future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conditions preventing a child's return are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re: A.B. · filed 2014-09-18(1)(e)

The examples of past safety issues proved in this case do not establish by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that L.L. had "a demonstrated inability to recognize immediate or chronic concerns" that was unlikely to be remedied in the near future, if ever.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires proof that the identified parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In Re The Dependency Of: C.f.r., Donald Rayfield v. Dshs · filed 2015-09-21(1)(e)

The focus of RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e) is whether the identified deficiencies have been corrected.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)(i) does not require proof of current substance abuse when the State relies on substance abuse to show that parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the near future.

In re: H. T. · filed 2015-04-30(1)(e)(i)

When DSHS relies on substance abuse to establish that there is little likelihood that parental deficiencies will be remedied in the near future, it need not prove that the parent is currently abusing alcohol or another substance in order to justify an order terminating parental rights.

The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that conditions preventing return were unlikely to be remedied in the near future under subsection (1)(e).

Dependency Of: A.s., 5/8/11, Dshs v. Rohn · filed 2016-04-18(1)(e)

Therefore, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was little likelihood "that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future." RCW13.34.180(1)(e).

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) permits a presumption that conditions will not be remedied in the near future when the State offers all necessary, reasonably available services and the parent does not substantially improve within a year of the dependency order.

In re the Termination of: K. L. V-B. · filed 2016-09-27(1)(e)

Because DSHS offered all necessary services, reasonably available, and the mother did not substantially improve within a year of the dependency order, the presumption arose that there was little likelihood she would remedy her parental deficiencies in the near future. She presented no evidence to rebut the presumption.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires proof that conditions are unlikely to be remedied in the child’s near future, judged in light of the child’s age and circumstances.

In Re The Welfare Of C.h-k., A Minor Child · filed 2016-10-18(1)(e)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was little likelihood conditions could be remedied so CH-K could be returned to TK and IH’s care in the near future under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)'s rebuttable presumption applies only if the State offered all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parent's deficiencies.

In re the Welfare of: M.P. · filed 2015-11-03(1)(e)

The presumption only arises if the State showed it offered all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting Jacquelyn Pagel's parental deficiencies. Because the State did not offer all services even ordered by the trial court, we decline to employ the presumption.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)’s rebuttable presumption applies only if the State has offered all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parent’s deficiencies.

In re the Welfare of: M.P. · filed 2015-12-08(1)(e)

The presumption only arises if the State showed it offered all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting J.P.' s parental deficiencies. Because the State did not offer all services even ordered by the trial court, we decline to employ the presumption.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) concerns whether parental deficiencies can be corrected in the child's near future; improvement alone is insufficient.

Dependency Of: L.r., 3/26/10, Ladonia Rayford v. Dshs · filed 2016-03-07(1)(e)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) is concerned with the correction, not just the improvement, of parental deficiencies, and the correction must occur "in the near future."

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that reunification is unlikely in the near future when adequate services have been offered or provided and parental deficiencies have not substantially improved within 12 months of dependency.

In re the Termination Of: S. E. & A. E. · filed 2016-09-22(1)(e)

If adequate services have been offered or ... provided and parental deficiencies are not substantially improved within 12 months of dependency, a rebuttable presumption arises that this factor is established.

A parent's failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within 12 months after a dispositional order creates a rebuttable presumption that the child cannot be returned in the near future.

In Re The Dependency Of: T.s. Tyrell Shavers, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2016-11-21(1)(e)

The failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within 12 months following entry of the dispositional order gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e).

Ongoing substance use and inadequate treatment progress can support a finding that the child is unlikely to return to the parent in the near future.

In Re The Welfare Of: Q.t., Corrie Rosier v. Dshs · filed 2017-01-23(1)(e)

She contends that without a finding of unfitness, the Department cannot establish the "little likelihood" element in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). We disagree. ... The trial court did not err in finding that Rosier's failure to adequately address her substance use rendered her currently unfit to parent, nor in finding that there was little likelihood that the children could have been returned to Rosier in the near future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) permits a finding that parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the near future when a parent participates in services but makes little progress.

In re the Parental Rights to: T.D. · filed 2017-09-28(1)(e)

The trial court understandably concluded that her failure to improve to that point meant that she would not, in the near future, successfully overcome the many difficulties confronting her. The evidence supported the court's determination.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires proof that conditions are unlikely to be remedied in the near future so the child can return to the parent.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: J.L. · filed 2018-02-20(1)(e)

Ample facts justify the trial court’s findings as to the dim likelihood of improved parental conditions, pursuant to RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). ... The trial court was fully justified in finding by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conditions separating Ms. C. and her son would not be ... sufficiently remedied in the near future to allow for reunification.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that parental deficiencies will not be remedied in the near future when a parent fails to substantially improve them within twelve months of the dispositional order; a mere possibility of improvement does not rebut it.

In Re The Dependency Of J.k.i., Jacqueline Edwards v. Dshs · filed 2018-01-08(1)(e)

This possibility is insufficient to rebut the presumption in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). The trial court correctly found the requirement met by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires evidence that conditions are unlikely to be remedied so the child can return to the parent in the near future.

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to: A.L.O. · filed 2019-06-11(1)(e)

Termination of parental rights requires evidence showing “little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). ... Given these facts and opinions, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that O’Casey’s parental deficiencies could not be remedied within the foreseeable future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that conditions will not be remedied in the near future when necessary services have been offered and parental deficiencies have not substantially improved within 12 months.

In Re The Dependency Of: T.f. Tara Jo Hawkins, App. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, Res. · filed 2019-01-28(1)(e)

If the Department proves that all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future were offered or provided, and the parental deficiencies are not substantially improved within 12 months of the dependency order, a rebuttable presumption arises that this factor is established.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires proof that parental deficiencies are unlikely to be remedied in the child's near future, which depends on the child's circumstances.

In Re Arjh, Alonso Enrique Hernandez v. Dshs State Of Wa · filed 2019-07-29(1)(e)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that A.R.J.H. could be returned to Hernandez in the near future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) measures the “near future” for remedying parental deficiencies from the child’s vantage point.

In the Matter of the Dependency of: X.S. · filed 2020-04-16(1)(e)

The court determines the “near future” in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) from the child’s vantage point.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)’s twelve-month presumption applies when the State proves it clearly provided all necessary services and the parent presents no evidence to overcome the presumption.

In re the Parental Rights to: P.G. · filed 2019-03-07(1)(e)

We have found, however, that the State proved all necessary services were clearly provided. The trial court properly applied the rebuttable presumption and the father presented no evidence overcoming it.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires proof that conditions are unlikely to be remedied in time for the child to return to the parent in the near future, measured by the child’s age and placement circumstances.

In Re The Dep Of C.g.p., Cheryl Green v. Dcyf · filed 2020-03-09(1)(e)

In termination proceedings, the Department must prove that there is “little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.” RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e). ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that there was little likelihood C.G. could correct her deficiencies in a future near enough to successfully and safely parent C.G.-P.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the child is unlikely to return to the parent in the near future; an erroneous application of its rebuttable presumption is harmless if the Department independently meets that burden.

Dep Of A.s.o: Fallon Offield v. Dshs · filed 2020-03-09(1)(e)

Here, even if the trial court erroneously found that the statutory presumption applied, any such error was harmless because the Department established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there was little likelihood A.S.O. could be returned to Offield in the near future.

Subsection (1)(e) permits termination when parental deficiencies are unlikely to be corrected in the child’s near future, even if the parent may eventually correct them.

In Re The Welfare Of: L.j., Kelcy Lounsberry v. Dcyf · filed 2020-06-08(1)(e)

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that L.J. could be placed with Lounsberry in the near future. Even though Lounsberry points to evidence that she may eventually be able to correct parental deficiencies, termination was appropriate because the evidence showed the deficiencies would not be corrected within the near future.

Stable housing and the absence of new criminal charges did not overcome subsection (1)(e)’s presumption where other parental deficiencies remained.

In Re The Dependency Of G.r.r. · filed 2021-11-01(1)(e)

Fourth, as for A.R.’s stable housing and lack of new criminal charges, the trial court had a basis for finding these facts insufficient to overcome the presumption in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).

Section 13.34.180 requires housing referrals when lack of housing is a parental deficiency and measures the likelihood of remedying deficiencies against the child's near future, which may be less than three months.

In Re The Dependency Of S.E.S. · filed 2021-11-17(1)(d), (1)(e)

Where lack of housing is a parental deficiency, the Department unquestionably has an obligation to refer the parent to housing resources to the extent reasonably possible. In this case, where the Department alleged lack of housing as a parental deficiency in its petition for termination, the Department should have provided such services. However, this failure does not mandate reversal, because the trial court did not conclude that lack of safe and stable housing was a parental deficiency. ... We conclude that the trial court’s findings that S.E.S.’s near future was less than three months and that the father was unlikely to remedy his deficiencies in that time are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)’s rebuttable presumption does not shift the Department’s burden of persuasion to the parent; the Department must still prove its case by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

In Re The Dependency Of G.e.s. · filed 2022-08-29(1)(e)

Contrary to the mother’s argument, this presumption did not impermissibly shift the burden of persuasion; the Department still retained the burden to persuade the court by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The rebuttable presumption in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) is constitutional.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that conditions are unlikely to be remedied so the child can return to the parent in the near future.

In Re The Dependency Of: J.j. · filed 2023-02-21(1)(e)

RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) requires the ... Department prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that “there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.” ... The trial court’s conclusory finding that “there is no basis to find that Mr. [J] has the ability to remedy his parental deficiencies within a year, let alone three months” is unsupported by substantial evidence, much less to a degree that renders this fact “highly probable.”

The State must support the section’s six termination elements with substantial evidence.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To K.g.o. · filed 2024-05-06(1)(e)

Findings 2.153 and 2.185 are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the six elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) are supported by substantial evidence.

Section 13.34.180(1)(d) requires the Department to offer necessary services, and subsection (1)(e) requires proof that the parent is unlikely to remedy parental deficiencies in the near future.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To P.l.c.s. · filed 2024-12-23(1)(d), (1)(e)

Here, as discussed above, the Department met all the requirements of RCW 13.34.180(1). J.S. did not challenge four of the six elements under the statute. And although he challenged elements (d) and (e), substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that the Department expressly offered J.S. all necessary services and that there was little likelihood J.S. would remedy his parental deficiencies in the near future.

Section 13.34.180(1)(e)’s rebuttable presumption does not require the causal connection between substance use and inability to care described in subsection (1)(e)(i).

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To L.c.c-h. · filed 2025-09-08(1)(e)

In this case, the duration of the dependency and the failure of R.H. to complete any of the offered services to remedy his substance use implicated the rebuttable presumption in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), which does not require the same causal connection as the one set out in subsection (1)(e)(i).

Section 13.34.180(e) requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conditions preventing a child’s return are unlikely to be remedied in the child’s near future.

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To H.s.w. · filed 2024-12-23(e)

Thus, the State proved RCW 13.34.180(e), that “there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future,” by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Section 13.34.180(6) permits evidence of a child's adoptability once parental unfitness is established, though evidence that adoption prospects diminish with age can also support its early integration requirement.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Moseley · filed 1983-03-03(6)

Because the finding of unfitness is supported by the evidence, we do not believe the trial court erred in hearing evidence of Grace's adoptability. ... Although DSHS's mention of Grace's adoptability was meant as proof under RCW 13.34.180(6), we believe there are better ways to show: "That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home; . . ."We note DSHS proved its point with another witness by showing a child's adoption prospects diminish as the child grows older.

Section 13.34.180(6) permits termination when continued parental ties diminish a child's prospects for a stable and permanent home; adoption is not required.

In Re Esgate · filed 1983-03-24(6)

The statute makes no reference to "adoptive home". Had the Legislature intended termination only in those cases where the child would be adopted, it could have so provided by substituting that term for the words "stable and permanent home". It has not done so and we decline appellant's invitation to construe "stable and permanent home" to mean adoptive home.

A stable placement with a relative does not defeat a finding that continued parental rights diminish a child's prospects for early integration into a permanent home.

VanDam v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1991-08-26(6)

In light of the foregoing, we hold that DSHS proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that continuation of the parent-child relationship between V and her father would clearly diminish her prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Subsection (6) requires proof that continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home; that showing fails when termination would not change the child’s existing guardianship.

In Re the Welfare of S.V.B. · filed 1994-09-20(6)

However, in I’s case, Appellant’s parental rights are not interfering with I’s integration into a permanent home. I is living with his paternal grandmother pursuant to the court-established guardianship. The termination of Appellant’s paternal relationship with him will not cause this arrangement to change. Termination will merely deprive I of the benefits of a parent — the potential for nurturing support and the financial support that the law would otherwise obligate Appellant to provide. Because the State failed to prove RCW 13.34.180(6) by clear, cogent and convincing evidence with regard to I, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in ordering termination of Appellant’s parental relationship to I.

Section 13.34.180(6) focuses on whether the parent-child relationship impedes the child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home; the State need not prove that such a home is already available.

In Re Dependency of KSC · filed 1999-05-13(6)

Second, the main focus of the sixth allegation in RCW 13.34.180 is the parent-child relationship and whether it impedes the child's prospects for integration, not what constitutes a stable and permanent home. The State does not have to prove that a stable and permanent home is available at the time of termination.

Subsection (6) focuses on whether continuing the parent-child relationship impedes the child’s prospects for a stable and permanent home; the State need not prove that such a home is available at termination.

Burrell v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1999-05-13(6)

Second, the main focus of the sixth allegation in RCW 13.34.180 is the parent-child relationship and whether it impedes the child’s prospects for integration, not what constitutes a stable and permanent home. The State does not have to prove that a stable and permanent home is available at the time of termination.

Section 13.34.180(f) requires a court that rejects guardianship to decide whether continuing the legal parent-child relationship diminishes the child's prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home.

In Re Dependency of AC · filed 2004-09-20(f)

Whether continuation of the legal relationship between parent and child diminishes the child's chances of integration into a stable and permanent home is technically relevant only under the termination statute. But if a court has decided that guardianship is in the child's best interests, this question has been implicitly answered in the negative, because guardianship provides a stable and permanent home while maintaining parental rights. If guardianship is not appropriate, the court must confront this question directly, in determining whether to terminate parental rights and allow the opportunity for adoption.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) focuses chiefly on whether the continuing legal parent-child relationship obstructs adoption and early placement in a stable, permanent home.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Chaffin · filed 2004-09-20(1)(f)

While a detrimental personal relationship would not be irrelevant, this factor is mainly concerned with the continued effect of the legal relationship between parent and child, as an obstacle to adoption; it is especially a concern where children have potential adoption resources.

Subsection (1)(f) focuses on whether the continuing legal parent-child relationship impedes the child’s prospects for adoption.

In Re Ppt · filed 2010-04-05(1)(f)

The superior court committed obvious error in applying RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). It failed to focus on the effect of the legal relationship between Mr. Tsimbalyuk and the children on the children's adoption prospects and failed to enter a finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) consistent with its finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).

Section 13.34.180(1) requires clear, cogent, and convincing proof of its six termination elements before the court considers the child’s best interests.

Dependency Of: S.k., Dob: 11/10/04, Dshs, Resp v. Dominique Kirvin, App · filed 2013-08-12(1)(f)

A court may terminate parental rights if it finds that the Department of Social and Health Services (Department) has established the six statutory elements enumerated in RCW 13.34.180 by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that termination is in the best interests of the child. Because substantial evidence supports the court's findings, and the mother was unfit to parent at the time of termination, we affirm the order terminating the mother's parental rights.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) focuses on whether the continuing legal parent-child relationship impedes the child’s prospects for adoption.

In re the Dependency of P.P.T. · filed 2010-02-16(1)(f)

First, it mistakenly focused on what it believed constituted a stable and permanent home for P.P.T., J.J.I., and O.L.T., rather than on the continued effect of Mr. Tsimbalyuk’s legal relationship with the children on their prospects for adoption.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require a prospective adoptive placement when the State proves that continuing the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Tucker v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2012-06-11(1)(f)

Because DSHS does not need to demonstrate the certainty of placement, Tucker’s argument fails. The trial court did not err by finding that J.F.’s continuing relationship with Tucker would diminish her prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require the State to show that a permanent home is available when parental rights are terminated.

Dependency Of J.n.c. Donna Lynn Ruble v. Dshs · filed 2013-04-29(1)(f)

But, the State does not have to establish that a stable and permanent ... home is available at the time of termination.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) focuses on whether the parent-child relationship impedes the child's prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home.

In Re The Dependency Of: J. X. K. Shana Kalberer-bobo v. Dshs · filed 2013-07-22(1)(f)

When determining whether substantial evidence supports RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), the main focus is the parent-child relationship and whether it impedes the child's prospects for integration.

Former RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) requires proof that continuing the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home.

In re the Welfare of L.R. · filed 2014-04-24(1)(f)

D.R. also argues that the Department of Social and Health Services (Department) failed to prove that continuation of the parent-child relationship diminished the children’s prospects for integration into a stable and permanent home. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we adopt verbatim the commissioner’s recitation of facts and ruling that former RCW 13.34.180(l)(f) (2009) supported the trial court’s termination of D.R.’s parental rights.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) requires proof that continuing the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

In re the Welfare of: B.P. · filed 2015-06-04(1)(f)

Accordingly, continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminished B.P.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) makes evidence of an available guardianship relevant to whether the parent-child relationship diminishes the child’s prospects for a stable, permanent home, but does not require the State to disprove a guardianship placement.

In re the Welfare of R.H. · filed 2013-09-04(1)(f)

Although evidence of the availability of a guardianship is material to whether the State can meet its burden to prove RCW 13.34.180(l)(f), it is not necessary for the State to disprove the availability of a guardianship placement.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) does not require proof that no stable housing alternative exists while the parent and child relationship continues.

Dep Of S.b.l., Kevin Louch v. Dshs State Of Washington · filed 2014-08-25(1)(f)

There is no requirement for specific evidence that no stable housing alternatives are available if the parent maintains his or her legal relationship.

Evidence of a guardianship is material to the termination requirement only when a guardian has been identified.

In re the Welfare of N.M. · filed 2014-11-25(1)(f)

Our decision in R.H. does not hold that a trial court’s refusal to continue a termination trial to allow a parent to explore the possibility of a guardianship is per se a manifest abuse of discretion. R.H. stressed the need for an identified guardianship before the evidence becomes material. ... An “identified guardianship” requires, at a minimum, an identified guardian.

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when a parent's legal relationship prevents children from entering an available permanent adoptive home, even if their foster placement is stable.

Dependency Of A.d. Mohammad Dabbagh v. Dshs · filed 2016-04-18(1)(f)

Thus, the State has shown that, but for the legal relationship between Nakalji and her children, there is a high probability that the children could find a permanent adoptive home. We hold that this satisfies RCW 13.34.180(1 )(f).

Section 13.34.180(1)(f) is satisfied when the continuing legal parent-child relationship prevents children from being adopted into an available permanent home.

Department of Social & Health Services v. Dabbagh · filed 2016-04-18(1)(f)

Thus, the State has shown that, but for the legal relationship between Nakalji and her children, there is a high probability that the children could find a permanent adoptive home. We hold that this satisfies RCW 13.34.180(l)(f).

The parent’s home did not qualify as a stable and permanent home offering prospects for early integration under subsection (1)(f).

Dep Of N.c.u., Amanda Rule v. Dshs State Of Washington · filed 2016-11-21(1)(f)

Thus, Rule's home was not a "stable and permanent home" that offered "prospects for early integration." RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).