Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102

The causation opinion of a treating physician selected by the employee from the employer’s designated panel is presumed correct unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appleton, Danny v, Kellogg Company · filed 2019-03-20(14)(E)

In this case, the Court finds that Dr. Brophy is the treating physician selected by Mr. Appleton from Kellogg’s designated panel. Thus, his opinion on causation is presumed correct.

Section 50-6-102(14) gives panel physicians’ causation opinions a rebuttable presumption of correctness only when those physicians actually offer causation opinions.

Owens, Sheila v. Sitters, Etc. · filed 2019-01-25(14)

Dr. Mastey provided no opinion regarding causation and deferred to Dr. Pearce. Similarly, Dr. Hutcheson offered no causation opinion. Therefore, the Court holds that the statutory presumption of correctness afforded to Drs. Hutcheson and Mastey is not applicable.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) gives no causation presumption to a physician who was not selected from a panel, so competing opinions from nonpanel providers stand on equal footing.

Armstrong, Syvonia v. Chattanooga Billiard Club, Inc. · filed 2019-02-07(14)(E)

The compensability of the dental injuries hinges on the competing causation testimonies of Dr. Shabo and Dr. Johnson. Their opinions stand on equal footing because neither provider was selected from a panel.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) gives a treating physician’s causation opinion a presumption of correctness only when the employee selected that physician from the employer’s designated panel; a directly referred specialist’s opinion does not receive the presumption.

Rhodes, Jason v. Amazon.com, LLC · filed 2019-06-11(14)(E)

For example, in section 50-6-102(14)(E), in order for the causation opinion of a “treating physician” to be entitled to a presumption of correctness, that physician must have been “selected by the employee from the employer’s designated panel of physicians.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E) (2018). Thus, an employer or its insurer takes a significant risk by instructing its panel physicians to make direct referrals to specific physicians since the causation opinion of such a referral physician is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) gives a panel-selected physician’s causation opinion a presumption of correctness.

Ventura, Valdez v. Ccon Metals USA, Inc. · filed 2019-01-25(14)(E)

As the panel-selected physician, Dr. Linder’s causation opinion is afforded a presumption of correctness.

The panel treating physician’s opinion on causation is presumed correct unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Burton, Darnell v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water · filed 2019-07-12(14)(E)

The opinion of the treating physician, selected by the employee from the employer’s designated panel of physicians under § 50-6-204(a)(3), shall be presumed correct on the issue of causation, but this presumption shall be rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E).

A panel physician’s causation opinion is presumed correct, but competing medical testimony can rebut it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Cornelison, Jeanette v. JTN Lodging, LLC · filed 2019-07-16(14)(E)

Finally, the Court holds Ms. Cornelison rebutted the presumption of correctness attached to Dr. Masterson’s reversal of opinion contained in his medical records by a preponderance of the evidence through the sworn testimony of Dr. Smigielski.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) gives a treating physician’s causation opinion a presumption of correctness only when the employee selected that physician from a qualifying employer panel; a panel effectively containing only two physicians does not qualify.

Barnes, William v. Jack Cooper Transport Co. · filed 2019-12-09(14)(E)

The Court first addresses Jack Cooper’s contention that Dr. Garside’s opinion is presumed correct. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14)(E) establishes a presumption of correctness for some causation opinions. However this presumption only applies to opinions of a treating physician “selected by the employee from the employer’s designated panel of physicians pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3).” Gilbert v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 20, at *13 (June 7, 2019). While it is true that Mr. Barnes selected Dr. Garside from a list provided by Jack Cooper, the first doctor on the list had already refused to see him. Thus, in reality the panel only contained two physicians, which does not meet the statutory requirement of “a group of three or more independent reputable physicians.” Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Barnes did not select his treating doctor from a “designated panel of physicians pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3).” As aresult, Dr. Garside’s opinion is not presumed correct.

A panel physician’s causation opinion is presumed correct unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Mollica, Gena M. v. EHHI Holdings, Inc. DBA Advanced Home Care Management, Inc. DBA Encompass Home Health · filed 2019-12-16(14)(E)

As a panel physician, Dr. Musick’s opinions regarding causation “shall be presumed correct but this presumption shall be rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102 (14)(E). The psychological records that EHHI submitted from 2009 to the present, as well as Ms. Mollica’s acknowledgement of past psychological problems, do not rebut Dr. Musick’s opinion.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) presumes a panel physician’s causation opinion correct unless rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Harrison, Elixabeth v. Chattanooga Staffing · filed 2019-12-20(14)(E)

Applying these principles, the Court finds that Ms. Harrison presented no testimony or other proof to contradict Dr. Sielatycki’s causation responses. For that reason, the Court holds that Ms. Harrison failed to overcome the statutory presumption afforded to Dr. Sielatycki.

A treating physician selected by the employee from the employer’s panel has a presumptively correct opinion on injury causation.

Tunstall, Eric v. SAIA, Inc. · filed 2020-04-01(14)(E)

Moreover, Dr. Lovell’s causation opinion is presumed correct, as Mr. Tunstall selected him from a panel.

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) gives an authorized treating physician’s causation opinion a presumption of correctness only when the physician was selected from a valid panel.

Barnes, William v. Jack Cooper Transport Co. · filed 2020-04-09(14)(E)

As a result, Dr. Garside, although designated by Employer as an authorized treating physician, was not selected from a valid panel pursuant to section 50-6-204(a)(3), and his causation opinion is not entitled to a presumption of correctness as described in section 50-6- 102(14)(E).

Section 50-6-102(14)(E) presumes correct the opinion of a physician the employee selected from a panel, subject to contrary evidence sufficient to overcome that presumption.

Bratcher, Deborah v. Yates Services, LLC · filed 2019-08-27(14)(E)

Because Ms. Bratcher selected Dr. Steinagle from a panel of physicians, his opinion is presumed correct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E). Thus, the question is whether Ms. Bratcher submitted sufficient information to overcome this presumption.

A causation opinion from a physician selected from a panel is presumed correct, but the presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

Lane, Michael L. v. Viskase Companies, Inc. · filed 2019-11-21(14)(E)

The Court afforded Dr. Sanabria’s causation opinion a presumption of correctness since Mr. Lane selected him from a panel. ... This presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.

A causation opinion from a physician selected from the employer’s panel receives a rebuttable presumption of correctness that the employee must overcome to establish medical causation.

Dennis, Christopher v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water · filed 2019-12-23(14)(E)

The causation opinions of a physician selected from an employer’s panel, as was Dr. Jones, are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E). ... In short, we agree with the trial court that Employee did not rebut the presumption of correctness attributable to Dr. Jones’s causation opinion and did not come forward with sufficient proof at the expedited hearing to show he is likely to prevail at trial on the issue of medical causation.

A physician’s causation opinion receives the rebuttable presumption of correctness only when the physician was selected from a valid panel; authorization to treat alone does not confer the presumption.

Enriquez, Salvador v. Defender Services, Inc. · filed 2021-07-07(14)(E)

Although Dr. Waldrop was authorized to treat Mr. Enriquez, only a valid panel doctor has a presumption of correctness on causation.

A physician’s opinion is presumed correct when the employee chooses that physician from a panel.

Lee,Courtney v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2021-12-21(14)(E)

Of import, Dr. Wolf’s opinion is presumed correct because Ms. Lee chose him from a panel. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E). Therefore, Ms. Lee is entitled to continuing medical treatment with Dr. Wolf for any work-related condition.

A mental injury arises primarily from a physical injury only if the physical injury contributed more than fifty percent to causing the mental injury.

Benson, Roger v. Jones Bros. Contractors LLC · filed 2022-02-22(14)(B)

Using this definition as guidance, a mental injury only arises primarily out of a physical injury if the physical injury contributed more than fifty percent in causing the mental injury.

An injury must arise primarily from work to qualify under the workers’ compensation definition of injury; a fall at work and pain alone do not establish that connection.

Hutchison, Lisa v. Health Center at Standifer Place · filed 2022-08-17(14)

The Court has no reason to doubt Ms. Hutchison’s testimony that she fell at work and is in pain. But on this record, the Court cannot find that she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that she suffered an injury arising primarily from work. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Section 50-6-102(4) requires a sudden fright, shock, or unexpected emotional stress for a mental injury to qualify as an injury by accident or occupational disease; gradual job stress is insufficient.

Gatlin v. City of Knoxville · filed 1991-12-30(4)

In summary, our past decisions have established a threshold test that the mental stimulus causing a mental or physical injury must be fright, shock, or an acute sudden or unexpected emotional stress. This threshold test is based on our interpretation of the statutory language that injury “mean[s] an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death of the employee and shall include occupational diseases_” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(4) (1983 & Supp.1991).

Section 50-6-102(12) permits compensation for a work-related mental injury caused by a compensable physical injury or a sudden or unusual mental stimulus.

Cutler-Hammer v. Crabtree · filed 2001-09-07(12)

In crafting this balance, Tennessee courts have resolved that mental injuries should be compensable when shown to be work-related, but, under the statutory “injury by accident” requirement, there must be a specific incident that triggers the injury. ... Thus, Tennessee has allowed compensation for a mental injury when that injury has been caused by either (1) a compensable physical injury, or (2) a sudden or unusual mental stimulus, such as a fright, shock, or even excessive, unexpected anxiety.

Section 50-6-102(a)(5) covers an accidental injury precipitated by unusual or abnormal mental or emotional stress arising from employment.

Reeser v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 1997-02-24(a)(5)

Injuries are generally compensable as accidental injuries when they are precipitated by physical exertion or strain or a specific incident or series of incidents involving mental or emotional stress of an unusual or abnormal nature.

An injury attributed to mental or emotional stress arises out of employment only when the stress is unusual or abnormal for the worker’s occupation; ordinary occupational stress is insufficient.

Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc. · filed 2001-01-19(12)

The injury must have resulted from an incident involving mental stress of an unusual or abnormal nature, rather than the day-today mental stresses and tensions to which workers in that field are occasionally subjected.

Section 50-6-102(a)(5) requires a law enforcement officer whose heart disease presumption has been rebutted to show that a heart attack was immediately precipitated by a specific acute or sudden stressful event.

Margaret Benton, Admin.- Est.of Davis Benton v. City of Springfiled · filed 1998-06-15(a)(5)

Krick then held that a law enforcement officer's claim shall be analyzed under the general statutory provision defining occupational injuries in the Workers' Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-102(a)(5), -301; Id. at. 713. Once a law enforcement officer's claim is outside the purview of the "[l]aw enforcement and firefighters" statute, we must find the heart attack was "immediately precipitated by a specific acute or sudden stressful event." Id. at 713-714. The plaintiff has not shown a specific acute or sudden stressful event immediately preceding his heart attack.

Section 50-6-102(12) allows compensation for a heart attack caused by mental or emotional stress only when a specific unusual or abnormal event caused the injury, rather than ordinary stress of the worker’s occupation.

Robert Cunningham, Jr.,e t al v. Shelton Security Service, Inc. · filed 2000-10-17(12)

In order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, an employee must suffer an “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12) (1999). ... Accordingly, the rule is settled in this jurisdiction that physical or mental injuries caused by worry, anxiety, or emotional stress of a general nature or ordinary stress associated with the worker’s occupation are not compensable. The injury must have resulted from an incident of abnormal and unusual stressful proportions, rather than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which workers in that field are occasionally subjected.

A heart attack caused by emotional stress arises out of employment only when a specific, unusual or abnormal stressful event precipitates it; ordinary stress of the occupation is insufficient.

Cunningham v. Shelton Security Service, Inc. · filed 2001-03-01(12)

Accordingly, the rule is settled in this jurisdiction that physical or mental injuries caused by worry, anxiety, or emotional stress of a general nature or ordinary stress associated with the worker’s occupation are not compensable. The injury must have resulted from an incident of abnormal and unusual stressful proportions, rather than the day-to-day mental stresses and tensions which workers in that field are occasionally subjected.

A mental injury from fear of HIV exposure arises out of employment only if the worker was actually exposed to HIV through a medically recognized channel of transmission.

Guess v. Sharp Manufacturing Co. of America · filed 2003-08-27(12)

To summarize, after conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that a plaintiff seeking workers’ compensation benefits for a mental injury due to potential exposure to HIV must demonstrate actual exposure through a medically recognized channel of transmission.

Under § 50-6-102(12), a heart attack can arise out of employment when evidence links it to the physical activities of the work, even if the employee was not exerting himself when it occurred.

Clark v. Nashville MacHine Elevator Co. · filed 2004-03-10(12)

In the final analysis, the key in cases such as this one is whether the evidence links the physical activities of the employment with the heart attack, not merely whether there is proof of physical exertion at the moment the heart attack occurred, although such proof would make the employee’s case stronger.

Section 50-6-102(17) permits a compensable mental injury from a sudden or unusual work event, including an assault during a shoplifting incident, even when the employee has a preexisting mental condition.

Edwards, Glenda v. Fred's Pharmacy · filed 2017-11-27(17)

When coupled with her preexisting mental condition, the Court holds that the shoplifting incident qualifies as an incident capable of producing a compensable mental injury under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Section 50-6-102(17) permits compensation for a mental injury caused by an identifiable work event that produces a sudden mental stimulus unusual compared with the ordinary stress of the employee’s job.

Edwards, Glenda v. Fred's Pharmacy · filed 2018-02-15(17)

Cases focusing on the latter category make clear that (1) the injury must stem from an identifiable stressful, work-related event producing a sudden mental stimulus, and (2) the event must be unusual compared to the ordinary stress of the worker’s job.

A mental injury attributed to workplace stress requires a sudden or unusual stimulus from an identifiable work-related event; gradually occurring stress does not meet that definition.

Hall, Phillip v. Life C~re Center of Greeneville · filed 2018-05-17(17)

Mr. Hall is seeking benefits for an alleged mental injury caused by gradually-occurring stress rather than a sudden or unusual stimulus. Additionally, he did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that his stress was unusual compared to the ordinary stress of a CNA.

Section 50-6-102(14)(B) requires proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that employment contributed more than fifty percent to the need for treatment for a compensable mental injury.

Creasman, Matthew v. USF Holland, Inc. · filed 2019-01-17(14)(B)

Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, a compensable mental injury arises out of and occurs in the course and scope of employment only if it has been shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the need for medical treatment, considering all causes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(14)(B). ... Therefore, the Court holds Mr. Creasman failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the alleged events and his employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Section 50-6-102(17) requires a mental injury to arise primarily from a compensable physical injury or a sudden or unusual work event; anxiety attributable to general job stress does not qualify.

Holdway, Terri v. Lakeside Behavioral Health Systems · filed 2019-04-15(17)

In view of this authority, the Court holds that Ms. Holdway did not prove her mental-injury claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence showed that she experienced anxiety related to her job at Lakewood before she suffered her facial injury. This anxiety related to general job stress-increased workload, difficulty obtaining time off, concern about correctly performing her job, and obtaining her supervisor's affirmation-and it manifested in the depression and diminished concentration that she reported to her PCP's office in November 2016.

A mental injury arising primarily from a compensable physical injury does not require proof of a sudden or unusual mental stimulus.

Holdway, Terri v. Lakeside Behavioral Health Systems · filed 2019-08-15(17)

In making this determination, it is unnecessary to determine whether Employee identified a sudden or unusual mental stimulus beyond ordinary work stress because that requirement applies only in those cases where an employee is alleging a mental injury without an accompanying physical injury.

Section 50-6-102(17) excludes a mental injury claim based on a threatened loss of a work assignment as a loss of an employment opportunity.

Hathaway, Terika v. Davidson Transit Organization · filed 2020-08-11(17)

However, he did not threaten physical violence but rather the loss of her “run.” This falls into the category of a potential financial loss of an “employment opportunity,” which the statute says is not compensable.

Section 50-6-102(17) permits a mental injury arising from an identifiable work-related event that produces a sudden mental stimulus and is unusual compared with the ordinary stress of the job.

Lee, Dana v. Journeypure Holdings,Inc. · filed 2021-04-08(17)

To be compensable, a mental injury must arise “primarily out of a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work-related event resulting in a sudden or unusual mental stimulus.” /d. ... Based on this unrefuted testimony, the Court must conclude that this was an unusual event for this type of workplace and Ms. Lee is likely to prove a compensable incident at trial.

A mental injury is compensable under § 50-6-102(17) only if it arises primarily from a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work-related event causing a sudden or unusual mental stimulus.

Lewallen, Denise v. Home Healthcare of East Tennessee, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(17)

To qualify as compensable, a mental injury must arise “primarily out of a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work-related event resulting in a sudden or unusual mental stimulus.” Id. ... In addition, no medical doctor gave the opinion that her mental condition “arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment,” or words to that effect. Therefore, the Court holds she did not prove entitlement to treatment for PTSD and denies her request.

A mental injury from a work event requires a sudden or unusual stimulus measured objectively, and a response to threatened loss of employment or employment opportunities does not qualify.

Lawson, Julie v. COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION, INC · filed 2024-10-01(15)

So, CoStar has shown that although Ms. Lawson has identified a work event, her claim is missing an essential element: “a sudden or unusual stimulus” under an objective standard that “shall not include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or employment opportunities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15).

A mental injury arising from a work event must involve an extraordinary and unusual mental stimulus; an ordinary workplace argument does not automatically qualify.

Payne, Ian-Chanel v. Signet Jewelers · filed 2024-10-28(15)

Without proof that the incident was “extraordinary and unusual,” the Court cannot hold that Ms. Payne is likely to prove she suffered a mental injury arising primarily out of the work-related event, as required by section 50-6-102(15).

A mental injury without a physical component requires an identifiable work event producing a sudden or unusual stimulus; stress from routine machine maintenance does not satisfy that requirement.

Coleman, Dwaine v. W. K.Kellogg · filed 2024-11-06(15)

In considering the evidence objectively, W.K. Kellogg’s machines broke down regularly, and if a machine broke down in a certain way, Mr. Coleman attempted to fix it by hitting it with a hammer. Stress related to regular machine maintenance is not extraordinary compared to the stress ordinarily experienced by an employee in the same type of duty.

Section 50-6-102(15) requires a work-related mental stimulus to be sudden or unusual to a reasonable employee in similar circumstances, not merely to the claimant.

Payne, Ian-Chanel v. Signet Jewelers · filed 2025-01-24(15)

In other words, it is not sufficient for an employee to allege that the work-related event was “sudden or unusual” to that employee; instead, the employee must show that the work-related event would be deemed sudden or unusual by a reasonable employee in similar circumstances.

Section 50-6-102(15) allows a compensable temporary physical injury to support a mental injury claim; the physical injury need not cause permanent impairment.

Bednar, Jason v. Memorial Healthcare System d/b/a Memorial Hospital · filed 2025-04-11(15)

Thus, we conclude that the phrase “compensable physical injury,” as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(15), refers to any compensable physical injury, whether temporary or permanent in nature.

Section 50-6-102(15)(D) defines the maximum total benefit as 450 weeks times the state average weekly wage.

Williams, Linda (by Lawrence Williams, surviving spouse) v. Methodist Lebonheur Healthcare · filed 2022-02-10(15)(D)

Maximum total benefit is defined in section 102(D) as 450 weeks times the state ... average weekly wage, which for Ms. Williams’s date of injury was $994 per week.

Section 50-6-102(15)(D) caps total death benefits using the state’s average weekly wage as of the employee’s death; the deceased employee’s wage sets the weekly payment rate, not that total cap.

Williams, Lawrence v. Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare · filed 2022-04-29(15)(D)

Therefore, we conclude that although the rate at which dependents receive death benefits is based on the deceased employee’s average weekly wage, the potential duration of those payments is not tied to the deceased employee’s wages but is instead subject to an across-the-board limitation based on the state’s average weekly wage as of the date of death.

Section 50-6-102(a)(7)(A) set a $67,200 maximum total benefit for an employee injured in April 1986 and adjudged totally disabled.

Lindsey v. Strohs Companies · filed 1992-03-02(a)(7)(A)

Since the plaintiff was injured on April 23, 1986, and has been adjudged 100 percent disabled, the maximum total benefit to which he is entitled is $67,200.00. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(7)(A)(Supp.1986).

Permanent total disability awards are exempt from the 400-week maximum total benefit and remain payable until age 65.

Bomely v. Mid-America Corp. · filed 1998-06-01(a)(6)(C)

In sum, we hold that awards of permanent total disability are payable to age 65 under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) and are not subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6).

The 400-week maximum total benefit does not cap permanent total disability benefits, which are payable until the employee reaches age 65.

Love v. American Olean Tile Company · filed 1998-06-01(a)(6)(C)

We have recently decided this issue by concluding that awards of permanent total disability are payable to age 65 under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i), without regard to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6).

Section 50-6-102(a)(6)(C) exempts permanent total disability awards from the 400-week maximum total benefit limitation.

Gray v. Cullom MacHine, Tool & Die, Inc. · filed 2004-12-20(a)(6)(C)

It is not equitable to cap the employer’s liability at 400 weeks and require the Fund to pay the bulk of the award in light of the fact that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6)(C) specifically exempts permanent total disability awards from the 400 week maximum total benefit limitation and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) authorizes benefits to age 65 in cases of permanent and total disability.

Section 50-6-102(13)(C) excludes permanent total disability awards from the maximum total benefit, so previously paid temporary total disability benefits are not credited against those awards.

Vinson v. United Parcel Service · filed 2002-12-30(13)(C)

Finally, because awards of permanent total disability benefits are expressly excluded from the statutory definition of the term “maximum total benefit” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(13), we are of the opinion that appellees are liable for the total disability award without any credit for temporary total disability benefits heretofore paid to the appellant.

Section 50-6-102(15)(D) defines the maximum total benefit as 450 weeks times the maximum compensation rate.

Summers, Sonney v. RTR Trans Services · filed 2021-08-09(15)(D)

If neither contingency occurs, the benefits continue until they total the “maximum total benefit,” which is equal to 450 weeks times the maximum compensation rate.

Section 50-6-102(a)(6) defines “maximum total benefit” as the sum of all weekly benefits a worker may receive; the court treats it as synonymous with the total judgment calculated from the number of weeks and benefit rate.

West American Insurance Co. v. Montgomery · filed 1993-08-30(a)(6)

Subsection (h)(2) fixes computation of the judgment by the total number of weeks multiplied by the benefit rate. T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(6) defines “maximum total benefit” as the sum of all weekly benefits to which a worker may be entitled. These statutory terms are synonymous.

Section 50-6-102(2) permits average weekly wages for an occupational disease discovered after voluntary retirement to be determined from evidence of available work and its pay, even when the employee earned no wages in the preceding 52 weeks.

Mackie v. Young Sales Corporation · filed 2001-03-01(2)

The only remaining question for the trial judge, then, was determining the appropriate amount of benefits. The trial court’s determination that benefits should be based upon the maximum weekly rate was predicated upon evidence in the record regarding the nature of Mackie’s work, the retention of Mackie’s union membership, and the proof regarding the availability and pay for such work at the time Mackie learned of his work-related malignant mesothelioma. Our review indicates that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding.

The average weekly wage definition in section 50-6-102(2)(A) does not apply to temporary partial disability benefits under section 50-6-207(2).

Wilkins v. The Kellog Company · filed 2001-07-03(2)(A)

For the reasons explained above, we reverse the trial court and hold that temporary partial disability benefits are calculated in the precise manner specified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2), which does not take into consideration the “average weekly wages” definition found in section 102(2)(A).

For a gradually occurring injury, the date of injury used to calculate average weekly wage is the date the employee gives the employer actual notice of the injury if that notice precedes time missed from work because of the injury; otherwise, the last day worked rule applies.

Bone v. Saturn Corp. · filed 2004-11-02(2)(A)

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the last day worked rule does not apply when determining an employee’s compensation rate if the employee has given the employer actual notice of a gradually occurring injury prior to missing time from work on account of the injury.

For an employee who worked fewer than 52 weeks, average weekly wage is calculated by dividing actual earnings by the weeks worked, if the result is just and fair to both parties.

Dennis v. Erin Truckways, Ltd. · filed 2006-04-17(3)(B)

The Workers’ Compensation Law provides that where an employee has been employed for less than 52 weeks, the average weekly wage is determined by “dividing the earnings during that period by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee earned wages ... provided, that results just and fair to both parties will thereby be obtained.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-lQ2(3)(B). In other words, the statute provides that Dennis’ average weekly wage should be calculated by dividing his total actual earnings by twelve.

Section 50-6-102(2)(A) requires excluding days lost to sickness or disability from average weekly wages even when the employer paid short-term disability benefits for those days.

Cantrell v. Carrier Corp. · filed 2006-05-30(2)(A)

The plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated . section 50-6-102(2)(A) (1999) mandates that days be deducted from the computation of the average weekly wage “during the period when the injured employee did not work.” The statute does not contain an exception for those days in which the employee did not work due to illness or disability but received disability benefits from the employer.

Weeks an employee voluntarily spends on strike count in the fifty-two-week period used to calculate average weekly wages.

Goodman v. HBD Industries, Inc. · filed 2006-11-06(3)(A)

We hold that the trial court erred in excluding the weeks spent on strike in determining the employee’s average weekly wage.

For an employee who worked fewer than fifty-two weeks for an employer, average weekly wage is earnings divided by the weeks or parts of weeks actually worked.

Privette, Vestal v. Privette Construction · filed 2015-06-30(3)(B)

If an employee works less than fifty-two (52) weeks for an employer, the correct way to determine an employee's average weekly wage is to divide the employee's earnings by the number of weeks or parts of weeks the employee actually worked.

Section 50-6-102(3) excludes weeks of medical or bereavement leave from the divisor and expense-reimbursement per diem from earnings when calculating average weekly wages.

Sirkin, Shawn v. TRANS CARRIERS, INC · filed 2016-09-19(3)

Considering the above, the Court holds that the weeks that Ms. Sirkin was on medical leave or dealing with her daughter's passing should not be included in the calculation of her average weekly wage. ... Considering the foregoing, the Court holds the calculation of Ms. Sirkin's total gross wages should not include the per diem payment.

When an employee’s brief work history makes actual wages impracticable to use, section 50-6-102(3)(C) requires a similar employee’s wages for the 52 weeks before injury to calculate the compensation rate; a 28-week wage statement does not comply.

Lunsford, Shannon v. Deem First · filed 2016-10-05(3)(C)

Deem First shall provide a wage statement of a similar employee in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(3)(C) (2015) recording wages for fifty-two weeks prior to Mr. Lunsford's injury from which Mr. Lunsford's compensation rate for this clam shall be calculated.

Average weekly wages are earnings from the employment in which the employee was injured during the fifty-two weeks before the injury.

Richards, Michael v. A-1 Expert Tree Service · filed 2017-03-06(3)(A)

Average weekly wages are the earnings of an employee in the employment in which he was injured during a period of fifty-two weeks preceding the date of injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(3)(A) (2016). For this case, the fifty-two weeks in question cover the period from July 29, 2015, to July 29, 2016.

When brief employment leaves insufficient earnings to determine average weekly wage, subsection (3)(C) uses the income of a person in the same grade and work.

Ferrell, Michael v. Wade Norris Logging, LLC · filed 2019-03-13(3)(C)

Where employment was brief and the average weekly wage cannot be determined by the injured employee's earnings, it is based on the income of a person in the same grade and employed in the same work as employee. See Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-102(3)(C). ... Based on the testimony of both Mr. Ferrell and Mr. Norris, the Court finds Mr. Rainey was a person in the same grade and employed in the same work and based on his wage statement, the Court holds Mr. Ferrell's average weekly wage is $658.62 and his compensation rate is $439.10.

When employment lasted less than fifty-two weeks, average weekly wage may be calculated by dividing earnings by the actual weeks worked; 24.5 weeks is sufficient for that method.

West, Amber v. The Balanced Canine Training Academy · filed 2020-02-10(3)(B)

In this case, Ms. West received wages from January 9 until June 28, or approximately 24.5 weeks, which the Court finds to be ample time to calculate wages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 102(B).

Section 50-6-102(3)(A) calculates average weekly wage from earnings over the fifty-two weeks before injury, with an omitted vacation week included in that calculation.

Faulkner, Ivon v. United Parcel Service · filed 2020-08-24(3)(A)

The average weekly wage is calculated by dividing the employee’s earnings for fifty-two weeks before the date of injury by fifty- two. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(3)(A). ... UPS contended, and the wage statement reflected, that one week of benefits was mistakenly omitted — a vacation week — resulting in an incorrect average weekly wage and TTD compensation rate. The Court agrees and finds the correct average weekly wage is $1,338.95 resulting in a weekly compensation rate of $892.68.

Section 50-6-102(1) calculates average weekly wage from the employment in which the worker was injured, excluding earnings from a separate job.

Acklie v. Carrier · filed 1990-02-26(1)

The “average weekly wage” is defined as “the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury.” The statute goes on to describe several methods or formulas for computing the average weekly wage, none of which include the use of multiple employments.

Employer contributions to an employee’s health insurance premiums are not included in average weekly wages.

Pollard v. Knox County · filed 1994-10-10(a)(1)(D)

Had the Legislature intended the payments made to third parties on behalf of employees for the purpose of securing fringe benefits be considered earnings, it could have so stated. If the definition of average weekly wage is to be broadening to include the value of fringe benefits it is a function of the Legislature, not the Judiciary.

Section 50-6-102(14) treats hearing loss as a gradual injury rather than an occupational disease.

Hanneken, Kevin v. Consolidated Nuclear Services, LLC · filed 2016-11-30(14)

However, the Workers' Compensation Law does not define hearing loss as an occupational disease, but instead defines it as a gradual injury.

Section 50-6-102(14)’s course-and-scope requirement continues to cover injuries during authorized breaks under the personal comfort doctrine after the 2013 Reform Act.

Jacobs, Thomas Wayne v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC · filed 2018-02-07(14)

A key component of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act is the requirement that the injury for which benefits are sought arise “primarily out of and in the course and scope of the employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2017). ... We find nothing in the Reform Act of 2013 or subsequent amendments that have rendered the personal comfort doctrine no longer viable.

A medical opinion that a heart attack was work-related, without more, does not satisfy section 50-6-102(14)'s causation requirements.

Mitchell, Michael v. Bunge North America · filed 2018-08-07(14)

Although Dr. Weinstein’s testimony established that decedent’s heart attack was work-related, that testimony alone does not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 50-6-102(14).

Section 50-6-102(14) requires proof that employment was the primary cause of a heart attack, considering all causes; pre-existing heart disease does not itself bar compensation.

Mitchell, Michael v. Bunge North America · filed 2019-04-16(14)

Thus, while it still makes no difference that the employee, prior to the heart attack, suffered from pre- existing heart disease or that the heart attack was precipitated by the usual physical strain of the employee’s job, the proof must now establish the heart attack arose primarily from the employment considering all causes.

A compensable injury or occupational disease must arise out of and in the course of employment and cause disablement or death.

Fritts v. Safety National Casualty Corp. · filed 2005-04-21(12)

To be compensable, an injury or occupational disease must arise out of and in the course of employment and cause either disablement or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12) (1999).

When work causation of an alleged occupational disease is not obvious, simple and routine, medical proof is necessary to establish that it arose primarily out of the employment.

Pool, Ronald v. Jarmon D&Q Transport · filed 2015-11-17(13)(B)

Applying these principles, the court finds that this case is not obvious, simple and routine, and therefore medical proof of causation is necessary.

Section 50-6-102(14)(B) requires evidence that occupational exposure was the primary cause of an occupational disease, contributing more than 50% considering all causes.

Johnston, Johnny v. Siskin Steel & Supply Co./Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. · filed 2020-05-08(14)(B)

Thus, in the context of an alleged occupational disease, the evidence must indicate that the occupational exposure was the primary cause of the disease, contributing more than 50% to the death, disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

An occupational disease arises primarily out of employment when work contributes more than 50% to its cause, considering all causes; unrebutted medical opinions can show likely work causation at an expedited hearing.

Fouse, Benjamin v. City of Murfreesboro · filed 2015-12-06(13)(B)

The issue to be resolved is whether his histoplasmosis arose primarily arose from that exposure. “An injury “arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment” only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B) (2014). ... In the absence of any actual medical opinion to the contrary, the Court finds Mr. Fouse appears likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.

Occupational disease is an injury by accident under § 50-6-102(a)(5).

Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg · filed 1997-05-12(a)(5)

Occupational disease is an injury by accident. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(a)(5). Accordingly, in this case, Krick’s heart disease is deemed to be an occupational disease if it arose out of and in the course of his employment.

For an occupational disease, section 50-6-102(12)(B) requires evidence that employment contributed more than 50% to causing the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.

Randall, Wilma v. Food Lion and Delhaize America, Inc. · filed 2023-10-16(12)(B)

The phrase “arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment” has been defined to mean “that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing . . . the need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(B). Thus, at an expedited hearing where an employee seeks medical benefits allegedly necessitated by an occupational disease, the employee must come forward with sufficient evidence that he or she is likely to prevail at trial in proving that the employment contributed more than 50% in causing the occupational disease.

Occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment count as injuries under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Bazner v. American States Insurance Co. · filed 1991-11-18(a)(4)

In our analysis of this issue we first note that T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(4) and T.C.A. § 50-6-204, each recognize that occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment are synonymous with “injury” and “personal injury” for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

An injury caused by a natural hazard arises out of employment under § 50-6-102(14) only when the work exposes the employee to a greater risk than the general public faces at the same time and place.

Rosasco, Brett v. West Knoxville Painters, LLC · filed 2020-06-03(14)

Namely, as Dixon instructs, he must show a causal connection between the work he performed and the resulting injury. The Court cannot find that he did. Mr. Rosasco’s work as an exterior painter placed no increased risk peculiar to his employment that a dead tree might fall on him than the general public in the same place and at the same time might face.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires an injury from a natural hazard to arise from an increased risk peculiar to the employment, rather than a risk shared by the general public at the same time and place.

Rosasco, Brett v. West Knoxville Painters, LLC · filed 2020-11-19(14)

Applying this ruling to the facts of Mr. Rosasco’s case, the Court finds his work as a painter placed him at no increased risk peculiar to his employment that a dead tree might fall on him. The general public at the same time and in the same place bore the same risk.

An injury from a natural hazard arises out of employment only if the employee faces an increased risk peculiar to the employment rather than a hazard common to the general public at the same time and place.

Rosasco, Brett v. West Knoxville Painters, LLC · filed 2020-08-18(14)

When an employee is injured as a result of an “act of God” or a natural hazard, to satisfy the “arising out of” requirement, the employee must prove that the injury was caused by an increased risk peculiar to the nature of the employment and not a hazard common to the general public at the time and place where it occurred.

An injury caused by an act of God arises out of employment only when the work exposes the employee to a greater risk of injury than the general public faces.

MIKHAIL, RAFIK v. FEDEX SUPPLY CHAIN, INC. · filed 2026-04-17(12)

Instead, to be compensable, the injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12) (2025). ... Mr. Mikhail did not present any evidence his work subjected him to a greater risk of injury from the tornado than encountered by the general public.

Section 50-6-102(17) places the date of a mental injury without a physical injury at the identifiable work-related event causing a sudden or unusual stimulus.

Nickerson, Angela Varner v. Knox County Government · filed 2020-09-02(17)

In the present case, there was no physical injury alleged; thus, to determine the date of Employee’s alleged mental injury, we must look to the date of the “identifiable work related event [or events] resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.”

Section 50-6-102(17) dates a mental injury arising from a sudden or unusual work stimulus by the identifiable work-related event that caused it.

Nickerson v. Knox County, Tennessee · filed 2021-06-08(17)

Instead, we return to the language of sections 50-6-102(14) and 50-6-102(17), which provide the only statutory guidance for defining a mental injury and identifying the date of injury in such cases. A mental injury occurs when there is “a loss of mental faculties or a mental or behavioral disorder, arising primarily out of a physical injury or an identifiable work-related event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(17). In the present case, there was no physical injury alleged; thus, to determine the date of Employee’s alleged mental injury, we must look to the date of the “identifiable work-related event [or events] resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.”

A mental injury requires a work event whose stimulus is unusual for the employee’s type of work; an overdose scene with a distraught relative did not meet that standard for a police officer.

Mancino, III, Dominic v. City of Westmoreland · filed 2022-02-10(17)

Yet, the standard is not whether the event was unusual for the employee, but if it was unusual for the type of work the employee did. Edwards, at *7. The Court holds that the evidence did not prove that the overdose incident met this standard.

Section 50-6-102(15) requires a mental injury to arise primarily from a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work-related event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus; a vague account of cumulative workplace stress does not meet the latter definition.

Russell, David v. Hertz Corp. · filed 2023-09-18(15)

To be compensable, a mental injury must arise “primarily out of a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work-related event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15). ... This description is vague and lacks an identifiable work event resulting in a sudden mental stimulus. ... On this record, Mr. Russell has not proven a mental injury as that term is defined in the Workers’ Compensation Law.

A compensable mental injury may arise from a series of work-related events producing a sudden or unusual mental stimulus, but a gradual mental injury does not qualify.

Hoffman, Lindsey v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., dba TriStar Summit Medical Center · filed 2025-08-12(15)

Thus, in the present case, Employee’s assertion that she suffered a “gradual” mental injury supporting application of the “last day worked” rule is unavailing. However, a compensable mental injury may still be established if a series of work-related events caused a sudden or unusual mental stimulus resulting in a mental injury.

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) does not require a slip, trip, fall, faulty equipment, or unusual activity for an injury to be work-related.

Lawson, Charles v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2022-02-17(14)(A)

The Workers’ Compensation Law does not require that an injury occur due to a slip, trip, fall, faulty equipment, or unusual activity to be work-related. Because Dr. Sass based his opinion on factors contrary to and outside the statutory definition of an injury by accident, the Court assigns his opinion little weight.

An injury is compensable when it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment; a work injury that advances a pre-existing condition can qualify.

Prescott v. Premier Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2021-11-18(12)(A)(i)

“In the course of employment” means that the injury occurs while the employee is performing a duty he is hired to perform. Id. (focusing on the time, place, and circumstances of the injury). “Arising out of employment” refers to causation, meaning there is a “causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.” Id. at 571-72. ... For these reasons, we conclude Employee established he suffered a compensable work injury.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that employment contributed more than fifty percent to causing an injury, considering all causes.

Swartsell, Timothy v. Nashville Tempered Glass Corp. · filed 2021-12-22(14)(A)-(C)

It must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A)-(C). ... Therefore, the Court holds Mr. Swartsell has shown he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that his current shoulder condition is primarily related to work.

A compensable injury must arise primarily out of employment, with the work incident contributing more than 50% to the disability or need for treatment; the treating physician must find that causation more likely than not considering all causes.

McCullough, Jonathan v. Tenneco Automotive · filed 2022-07-08(14)

To prove that his back condition is a compensable injury, Mr. McCullough must show that it arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. This includes the requirement that he must show “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the incident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-102(14).

Under § 50-6-102(14)(A), evidence of a shoulder pop during a work shift can support a likelihood of proving the specific-incident element of an injury despite conflicting accounts of how the injury occurred.

Wilson, Derrick v. Randstad, Inc. · filed 2022-08-09(14)(A)

To prevail on this issue, Mr. Wilson must show that his shoulder tear was caused by a “specific incident or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment” with Randstad. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A). ... In summary, although this issue is again close, the Court holds that Mr. Wilson provided sufficient facts to show he is likely to prove a “specific event or series of events” while working at Randstad that injured his left shoulder.

An injury under § 50-6-102(14) must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment and cause disability or a need for medical treatment.

Hibbitts, Greg v. Kim Royal dba Royal Guttering · filed 2021-01-04(14)

To do so, he must present evidence that he suffered an injury “arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes . . . disablement or the need for medical treatment[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... However, he failed to provide any medical records from the hospital documenting the nature of the injury, his treatment, or the need for continued medical treatment. Further, he offered no evidence regarding any periods of temporary disability.

Section 50-6-102(14) defines an injury as an accidental injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment that causes a need for medical treatment.

Conner, Michael v. J & J Construction · filed 2018-01-19(14)

Workers’ Compensation Law defines an injury as “an injury by accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes . . . the need for medical treatment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... Based on his testimony, the Court holds he suffered a workplace injury.

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) includes aggravation of a pre-existing condition and a gradually-occurring injury within the definition of injury, even without a specific injury-causing event.

Campbell, Michael v. Clarksville Holdings, Inc dba Tennova Healthcare Clarksville · filed 2019-07-16(14)(A)

Tennova argued that he failed to allege a specific, injury- causing event. While that is true, the statutory definition of “injury” provides that, in addition to a specific event, an injury may include an aggravation of a pre-existing condition or a gradually-occurring injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A).

Section 50-6-102(14) defines an injury to include harm from a specific incident arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment that requires medical treatment.

Olson, Bradley v. Rock Solid Security, Inc. · filed 2019-08-23(14)

The injury must be caused “by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-102(14). ... By his testimony, Mr. Olson suffered an injury when the fence fell on him.

Section 50-6-102(14) defines an injury as one arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, with the causal link established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty rather than by speculation or possibility.

Cannon, Dorothy v. Spring Hill Residential, LLC · filed 2019-11-21(14)

Therefore, the Court looks to the statutory definition of “injury” to determine whether Ms. Cannon’s neck condition falls within it. The Workers’ Compensation Law defines an injury as one that arises “primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). Ms. Cannon must establish this by a “reasonable degree of medical certainty,” and it must be by more than “speculation or possibility.” Jd. ... In sum, the only proof the Court has that Ms. Cannon’s neck condition is related to her fall at work is her own testimony. Her testimony, while sincere, is insufficient to succeed at a hearing on the merits in proving a work-related neck injury, due to the absence of a medical opinion stating that causal link. Therefore, Ms. Cannon has not satisfied her burden.

Section 50-6-102(14) does not require an employee to be benefitting the employer when injured.

McGauvran, James v. ATOS Syntel, Inc. · filed 2021-12-03(14)

We are mindful that the statute in question was amended by the 2013 Reform Act to provide that an “injury” means one “arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). Nonetheless, the statute does not require that an employee must have been benefitting an employer at the time of the injury.

Section 50-6-102(14) includes burns suffered while performing work duties that require medical treatment within the definition of injury.

Wright. Rashard v. April Crowder, d/b/a Mr. P's Buffalo Wings Plus · filed 2021-12-06(14)

An “injury” means “an injury by ... accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment that causes . . . the need for medical treatment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... Here, Mr. Wright’s unrefuted testimony shows he suffered severe burns from hot grease while working for Mr. P’s.

An accidental injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment that requires medical treatment qualifies as a work injury.

Franco, Gilbert v. Jaime Rivera and Oscar Sanchaz, d/b/a J&O Construction and Remodeling · filed 2022-05-04(14)

A work injury is “an injury by accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment that causes . . . the need for medical treatment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... So, the Court finds he worked for an uninsured employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law, and he suffered a work injury necessitating treatment.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires expert medical testimony, stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that work contributed more than fifty percent to an alleged compensable death.

Espinosa, Rodolfo v. Maestro’s Pro Services, LLC · filed 2023-02-13(12)(A)-(D)

The determination of Mrs. Espinosa’s claim begins with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) (2022), which defines a compensable injury or death as one arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Mrs. Espinosa must prove this foundational element of her claim by expert medical testimony. A medical opinion about the work-relatedness of Mr. Espinosa’s death must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as opposed to with speculation or possibility, and the opinion must state that the alleged work-related cause contributed more than fifty percent to his death, considering all causes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A)-(D).

An injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment and involve a work-related incident or specific set of incidents identifiable by time and place.

Day, Michael V. GOLD CREEK FOODS, LLC · filed 2023-11-03(12)(A)

Specifically, Mr. Day must show that his injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment and prove a work-related incident, or specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A).

Section 50-6-102(12) requires a compensable injury to arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

BURDESHAW, CHARLES v. SCOTT MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2023-11-21(12)

According to section 50-6-102(12), an injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment to be compensable.

An employee claiming a back injury must present medical evidence that the work accident contributed more than 50% to the resulting disablement or need for treatment.

TOLEDO, FRANCISCO BELLO v. SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CO. · filed 2024-04-17(12)(A)-(D)

To prove a compensable injury, an employee must show “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the work accident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A)-(D) (2023). ... A back injury’s cause is not obvious, as they occur in numerous ways and for diverse, complicated reasons. Yet Mr. Bello Toledo produced no expert evidence showing his back condition is causally related to his work accident or even that further treatment is required. For this reason, the Court denies his request for benefits.

Section 50-6-102(14) requires a specific work incident and proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury arose primarily out of employment.

McCLANAHAN, MARK v. v. ) State File No. 80482-2019 BOBBY TUCKER · filed 2024-12-23(14)(A)-(C)

Here, Mr. McClanahan established his injury resulted from a specific incident, the drill twisting his arm, by both his uncontroverted testimony and Dr. Sweo’s C-32. Further, Dr. Sweo’s C-32 established that the injury arose primarily out of the employment to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

A compensable injury requires an incident or set of incidents identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Simpson, Vester v. Wiregrass North Central · filed 2025-03-31(12)(A)

Employee’s credibility on this issue goes directly to his statutory burden of proof. An injured worker is required to identify an “incident, or set of incidents, . . . identifiable by time and place of occurrence” to establish a compensable injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(A) (2024). Employee provided inconsistent and contradictory testimony on this point during the expedited hearing.

Section 50-6-102(a)(4)’s definition of injury does not exclude a work accident that causes disfigurement but no permanent disability from workers’ compensation coverage or its exclusive remedy.

Clayton v. Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 1984-07-16(a)(4)

There was no intent in the passage of the 1977 amendment to limit the coverage of the Worker’s Compensation Act, or its exclusivity. ... While Ms. Clayton is not entitled to recover permanent disability benefits as the result of her disfigurement, nevertheless her injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment, which brings the Worker’s Compensation Act into play.

An employee need not miss work for an injury to be compensable under the section’s injury definition.

Story v. Legion Insurance Co. · filed 1999-09-20(a)(5)

The Workers’ Compensation Act defines a compensable injury in pertinent part as “ ... an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death of the employee ...” T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(5). ... We hold that her failure to miss work is not fatal to her claim.

An injury sustained while performing regular work duties can arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Hosford, Jane v. Red Rover Preschool · filed 2014-09-17(13)(B)

In sum, the evidence preponderates in favor of concluding that Employee sustained an injury on July 7, 2014, that arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment with Employer.

An injury sustained while checking an employer’s truck messaging system for a work assignment arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Sirkin, Shawn v. Trans Carriers, Inc. · filed 2016-03-28(14)

As such, the Court finds Ms. Sirkin's right-shoulder injury occurred when she slipped and fell while leaving the truck while completing a work-related action of checking the Qualcomm on the truck. The Court finds Ms. Sirkin's injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of the employment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14) (2015).

An employee’s activity may arise primarily out of employment when it benefits the employer and is rationally related to the work, even if declining the assignment would not have harmed the employer.

Thomas, Horace Wade v. ZIpp Express · filed 2016-06-14(14)(A)

Furthermore, in this Court’s opinion the fact that failure to retrieve the load would not have harmed Zipp from a business standpoint makes no difference. Mr. Thomas’ retrieval of the load certainly benefitted Zipp because it was promised payment for the delivery. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas’ activity was rationally related to, and therefore arose primarily out of, his employment for Zipp.

Permitted side work may remain within the course and scope of employment and give rise to a compensable injury when it benefits the employer through sales.

Cross, Steven v. Cabinet Express, Inc. · filed 2018-05-25(14)

His passage into the remnant yard to look for granite for use in work on the side—work that Cabinet Express allows its employees to do—did not, in this Court’s opinion, take him outside the course and scope of his employment. Further, the Court holds the injury also arose out Mr. Cross’ employment because Cabinet Express allows its employees to work on the side and ultimately benefits through the sale of granite that would otherwise be discarded if left unsold.

Under § 50-6-102(14), whether a parking-lot injury arose out of and in the course of employment depends on the accident’s cause and the employee’s work-related purpose; the employer’s lack of ownership or maintenance of the lot does not defeat the claim as a matter of law.

Rowe, Tina v. Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. · filed 2021-05-28(14)

In this regard, Employer conflates the tenets underlying Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law with those pertaining to premises liability law. ... The trial court will be required to determine whether Employee’s accident “had its origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee while doing [her] work.” ... Moreover, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s test as originally set forth in Lollar, the trial court must further determine whether Employee remained in the course and scope of her employment when she left the building to walk to her car.

An employee injured while taking a direct route across a public way between the employer’s plant and parking lot is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits when the crossing is necessary.

Copeland v. Leaf, Inc. · filed 1992-03-23(a)(5)

Therefore, we hold that employees who must cross a public way that bisects an employer’s premises and who are injured on that public way while traveling a direct route between an employer’s plant facility and parking lot, are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

A member of a limited liability company must file a written election to be included as an employee under section 50-6-102(12)(B).

Ross, Markele v. · filed 2021-06-18(12)(B)

Moreover, he never filed a written election to be included as an employee. Therefore, the Court holds Mr. Ross is unlikely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that he was an employee of Immaculate under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 102(12)(B).

Section 50-6-102(14) treats an injury caused by a worksite hazard, such as stepping onto equipment while a foot is in a rut, as arising primarily out of employment rather than idiopathic.

Bailey, Joey v. Country Farm & Home Center, LLC · filed 2021-07-20(14)

The Court finds that Mr. Bailey’s attempt to step onto the moffett while his right foot was in a rut is a sufficient employment hazard to make the injury non-idiopathic. In addition, Dr. Bailey’s unrefuted opinion was that walking on uneven ground primarily caused Mr. Bailey’s tendon tear, resulting disability, and need for surgery. Thus, the Court holds that Mr. Bailey is likely to prove that he sustained a right-foot tendon tear on November 2, 2020, that primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2020).

Section 50-6-102(18) sets a minimum weekly benefit for missed work when an employee’s earnings fall below the statutory minimum rate.

Laboyteaux, Karen v. Benjamin Begley and Tiffany Begley d/b/a Homestead Family Table and Monstermash Concepts, LLC · filed 2022-08-30(18)

Ms. Laboyteaux is due the minimum weekly benefit because her earnings fell below the amount that the Workers’ Compensation Law determines as the minimum rate all employers must pay for missed work. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(18).

Section 50-6-102(18) supplies a minimum weekly benefit when a worker’s earnings fall below the statutory minimum compensation rate.

Laboyteaux, Karen v. Benjamin Begley & Tiffany Begley d/b/a/ Homestead Family Table & Monstermash Concepts, LLC · filed 2021-11-16(18)

Ms. Laboyteaux is due the minimum weekly benefit because her earnings fell below the amount that the Workers’ Compensation Law determines as the minimum rate all employers must pay for missed work. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(18).

A physician’s conditional opinion can support medical causation under the injury definition when the evidence establishes that the described workplace incident occurred.

Cato, Charles v. Huxtable Electric, Inc. · filed 2019-03-26(14)(C)

Upon considering both scenarios, the Court finds Dr. McGehee determined the injury arose primarily out of the employment in terms of medical causation when he agreed “if that is what happened, then that would be the causal event for treatment.” Because the evidence showed that the wind catching the plywood is what happened, it must follow that this is the causal event for treatment. The Court holds Mr. Cato would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits in proving his left-shoulder injury arose primarily out of and in the course of his employment for Huxtable.

Section 50-6-102(14) does not require a physician to recite its exact language; an opinion that a condition was “most likely” caused by work can satisfy its definition of an injury.

Hunter, Dale v. Doug's Automotive · filed 2019-12-12(14)

Although this statement does not include the phrase, “greater than fifty-percent,” it constitutes “sufficient proof from which the trial court can conclude that the statutory requirements of an injury as defined in section 50-6-102(14) are satisfied.”

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) permits medical proof of a work-related injury through a physician’s opinion reflected in treatment records, even when the opinion does not recite the statutory definition.

Woodrum, Dale v. Morgan Olson Corp · filed 2019-09-23(14)(A)

The Court next considers whether Ms. Woodrum presented sufficient medical proof of the work-relatedness of her back injury. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 102(14)(A). ... Based on the above and the Appeals Board’s ruling in Panzarella, the Court holds that Ms. Woodrum is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in establishing that Dr. Sanabria gave or agreed with the opinion that her back injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment.

Section 50-6-102(14) does not require a physician to use the statutory definition’s exact words to establish that an injury was caused by work.

Eicke, Richard v. Sellars · filed 2020-12-02(14)

In proving causation, it is not required that a physician use particular words or phrases included in the statutory definition of “injury.” Instead, a physician may give an opinion that meets the legal standard without couching the opinion in a “rigid recitation of the statutory definition.”

A physician need not use specific words to establish medical causation, but merely describing an injury as “related” to work does not satisfy the causation standard.

Furstnau, Tony v. PC Metro Bottling · filed 2020-12-04(14)(C)-(D)

Although the statute does not require physicians to use specific words when giving a causation opinion, the use of “related” does not on its own meet the standard to prove medical causation.

A medical causation opinion need not use the exact words of section 50-6-102(14), but it must satisfy the statutory standard for a compensable aggravation.

Reichenberger, Donald v. Cumberland Real Estate Services, Inc. · filed 2021-06-15(14)

The opinion does not have to contain specific language from Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14) for the Court to find causation, but it must be enough to meet the statutory standard.

A physician need not use the exact words of the statutory injury definition if the medical proof sufficiently establishes its requirements.

Ruggieri, June v. Amazon.Com LLC · filed 2021-06-16(14)

While neither doctor used the complete statutory definition in their opinions, their word choice comes very close. A physician need not use particular words or phrases included in the statutory definition of “injury” to show the requisite medical proof to succeed at trial, but rather what is necessary is sufficient proof from which the trial court can conclude that the statutory requirements of an injury as defined in section 50-6-102(14) are satisfied.

Section 50-6-102(12) requires a medical causation opinion to consider all causes and establish that work more likely than not contributed over fifty percent to the need for treatment or disability; speculative wording and no evidence that other causes were considered are insufficient.

Richards, Cory v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2023-03-16(12)

He must show, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the injury “contributed more than fifty percent in causing the disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” A “reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the physician’s opinion, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12). ... Reading this statement closely, it is insufficient proof of medical causation. Since Dr. Halford’s records are incomplete, no evidence suggests that he considered other potential causes for the foot pain. Moreover, the phraseology “it appears by his history” conveys to this Court an element of impermissible speculation.

An accidental injury arises primarily out of employment when a workplace hazard beyond ordinary walking, such as an elevated surface, causes the employee to fall.

Hickey, Curtis v. Hermitage Hall · filed 2015-11-25(13)(A)

The Court therefore finds that this constitutes a specific hazard of Mr. Hickey’s employment beyond mere ambulation, and he is likely to prevail on the issue of whether he suffered an accident arising primarily out of and in the course of his employment.

An injury arises primarily out of employment when an employment hazard causes the injury, even if the cause of the fall that led to it is disputed.

Goins, Brian K. v. Eagle Bluff Steel Erectors, Inc. · filed 2017-12-18(14)

While the cause of Mr. Goins’ fall is disputed, the cause of his injuries is not. He fell from three stories to a concrete floor, sustaining multiple injuries. His injuries arose primarily from a hazard incident to employment: the performance of his laborer duties at a height without a safety harness or handrails. Applying the rationale of Osborne and McCaffery, the Court concludes Mr. Goins demonstrated he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that his injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Eagle Bluff.

An injury from a step encountered while performing job duties can arise primarily out of employment when the step is a specific hazard beyond mere walking.

Bullard, Kimberly v. Facilities Performance Group · filed 2018-03-28(14)

The Court finds the step constituted a specific hazard of Ms. Bullard’s employment beyond mere ambulation, and she is likely to prevail on the issue of whether she suffered an accident arising primarily out of her employment.

Under § 50-6-102(14), workplace heat, fumes, and objects struck during a fall can be special hazards relevant to whether an injury arose primarily out of employment.

Miller, Sr., Reginald v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc. · filed 2018-08-30(14)

An injury “arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment” only if the “employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14). ... For all these reasons, the Court holds Mr. Miller would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits in his request for medical treatment.

A workplace step that an employee must use for her job can be a hazard from which an injury arises primarily out of employment.

Avery, Shannon v. Jacks Food Store, LLC · filed 2018-11-05(14)(A)

To be compensable, Ms. Avery must establish that her injury was caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, and identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-102(14)(A) (2018). ... Here, Ms. Avery was exposed to the step because of her work. Contrary to Jacks’ argument, she need not establish anything more than that; her job required her to step down from one level to another, and in so doing she injured her knee. ... Based on the evidence, the Court holds Ms. Avery likely would prevail at a hearing on the merits that her injury arose out of her employment.

An injury must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment; an unexplained fall does not establish the required work-related cause.

Mathis, Melinda v. Murfreesboro Medical Clinic · filed 2020-06-26(14)

To receive these benefits, Ms. Mathis must show that she is likely to establish at a hearing on the merits that her injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. The Court holds Ms. Mathis failed to meet this burden because the cause of her injury is unknown.

Section 50-6-102(14)(A) requires an accidental injury to arise primarily out of employment; an idiopathic fall without an employment hazard does not qualify.

Bermudez, Lorrain v. Southern Tenn. Med.Ctr., LLC · filed 2020-11-24(14)(A)

The central issue is causation. To prevail, Ms. Bermudez must prove an accidental injury that was "caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A) (2019). It is undisputed that she suffered a serious injury that occurred in the course and scope of her employment with STMC. However, she must also show that the injury arose primarily out of her employment. It is here that Ms. Bermudez's claim falls short, since her injury was idiopathic.

An injury from walking does not arise primarily out of employment under § 50-6-102(14) when the employee cannot identify an additional employment hazard.

Amsler, Charles v. United Ground Express · filed 2021-06-16(14)

Therefore, Mr. Amsler has not identified an employment hazard beyond his simple act of walking. He is unlikely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that he suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Utilization review is limited to evaluating medical care; a reviewer’s causation opinion exceeds its statutory scope.

Venable, Tim v. SUPERIOR ESSEX, INC · filed 2016-09-15(20)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(20) (2015) defines “Utilization review” as “evaluation of the necessity, appropriateness, efficiency and quality of medical care services.” Rule 0800-02-06-.04(2)(a) (2015) of the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations further states: “The utilization review agent shall only consider the medical necessity, appropriateness, efficiency, and quality of the recommended treatment for the employee’s condition.” Dr. Goldman’s causation opinion was therefore improper, as it exceeded the statutory scope of Utilization Review.

Utilization review evaluates the necessity, appropriateness, efficiency, and quality of medical care services; a causation opinion exceeds its scope.

Venable, Tim v. SUPERIOR ESSEX, INC · filed 2016-09-16(20)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(20) (2015) defines “Utilization review” as “evaluation of the necessity, appropriateness, efficiency and quality of medical care services.” ... Dr. Goldman’s causation opinion was therefore improper, as it exceeded the statutory scope of Utilization Review.