Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106

A court need not consider the preference of a child younger than twelve and should give greater weight to the preferences of older children.

Adams v. Adams · filed 2009-03-17(a)(7)

However, the court is not required to consider the preference of a child younger than twelve, and courts are instructed to give “greater weight” to the preferences of older children.

Older children’s custody preferences normally receive greater weight, but a child’s preference does not determine the best interest decision.

Allen v. Allen Jr. · filed 2013-04-03(7)(B)

While this factor certainly weighs in favor of Father, we note that the child was only thirteen when he expressed his preference and that “[t]he preferences of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(7)(B).

Section 36-6-106(a) directs courts to consider the child’s need for stability when deciding custody.

Grigsby v. Alvis-Crawford · filed 2017-01-31(a)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 does not address the stability of the parent, but subsection (a) provides that “the court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with . . . the child’s need for stability[.]”

A court may discount a child’s stated custody preference when parental alienation makes that preference unreasonable.

McClain v. McClain · filed 2017-09-21(a)(13)

Rather than failing to consider the Children’s preference, the trial court’s findings demonstrate that it listened closely to B.M.’s and C.M.’s respective testimonies but found that their stated preference was not “reasonable,” particularly in B.M.’s case, in light of the “vitriolic” statements he made against Mother without a reasonable basis in fact. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(13) (providing for consideration of the “reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older”) (emphasis added).

Section 36-6-106(a)(13) gives the trial court discretion to decide whether to hear the preference of a child under twelve.

Gensmer v. Gensmer · filed 2017-11-30(a)(13)

The use of the word “may” in the statute means the trial court has discretion to choose whether to hear the preference of a child under the age of twelve.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider relevant best interest factors when setting a residential schedule; a child’s preference does not necessarily outweigh the benefit of both parents’ participation.

JENNIFER BLAIR DEMATTEO TURK v. MICHAEL JOSEPH TURK, JR. · filed 2020-06-24(a)

However, to limit Mother’s parenting time in the manner suggested by them and Father would not allow her the maximum participation possible in the lives of the Children, all three of which will benefit from a relationship with their mother. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (“In taking into account the child’s best interest, the court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child[.]”). With all of the above considerations in mind, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the residential schedule.

Section 36-6-106(a)(13) requires courts to consider the reasonable preference of a child age twelve or older; the child need not testify if the court knows and considers that preference.

Robin Drewry Luttrell (Wassenberg) v. Wassenberg · filed 2020-07-09(a)(13)

Statute requires a court to consider the “reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(13). ... But the decision to exclude the child’s testimony does not necessarily violate the statutory mandate. ... Here, contrary to Father’s assertion, the court did consider the child’s preference.

Section 36-6-106(a)(13) requires consideration of a child’s reasonable preference, but the preference is not controlling and may be found unreasonable.

Krulewicz v. Krulewicz · filed 2022-02-01(a)(13)

The trial court’s finding that Preston’s preference was not reasonable or dispositive is supported by facts in the record.

Section 36-6-106(a)(13) requires courts to consider a child’s reasonable preference at age twelve or older where applicable, but does not always require the child to testify.

In Re Aiden W.-L. · filed 2022-12-15(a)(13)

In addition, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106 requires a court to consider the “reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older.” ... Nonetheless, the decision to exclude a child’s testimony does not necessarily violate the statutory mandate.

Section 36-6-106(7) gives weight to a child’s preference when deciding custody.

Roller v. Roller · filed 2000-05-12(7)

The fact that despite the change in custody Mother and Daughter seem to be spending more time together indicates the improved relationship and gives credence to the statutory weight accorded to a child’s preference. See Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-106(7) (Supp. 1999).

A child’s reasonable preference, if the child is twelve or older, is a factor in determining the child’s best interests.

Y. Ledbetter v. Dirr · filed 2011-05-03(a)(7)(A)

In light of the history of the case, as recounted in the November 2001 order, and the children’s unequivocal testimony in 2008 that they did not want to visit their Father, it is clear that the court gave thoughtful and deliberate consideration to its order; the record does not support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order mandatory visits between Father and the children. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(7)(A) (listing a number of factors that courts should consider in determining the best interests of a child, including “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if twelve (12) years of age or older”).

Section 36-6-106(8) allows courts to consider evidence of child abuse in deciding custody without first finding that abuse occurred.

Gaskill v. Gaskill · filed 1996-08-09(8)

This is a divorce proceeding, and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106(8) directs the courts to consider, among other factors, “[e]vidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child.” Instead of requiring the trial court to first find that child abuse has occurred, it simply allows the court to consider evidence of abuse in devising a custody arrangement that will be in the child’s best interests.

Section 36-6-106(9) makes the character and behavior of a person who lives in or frequents a parent’s home a significant custody consideration, while the primary fitness comparison remains between the parents.

Williams v. Williams · filed 1997-05-23(9)

Moreover, while another person who resides in or frequents the parent’s home is a significant consideration, the primary comparison regarding fitness for custody remains between the two parents.

Section 36-6-106(a)(9) requires courts deciding custody to consider the character and behavior of people who live in or frequent a parent’s home and their interaction with the child.

Kendrick v. Kendrick · filed 1997-06-26(a)(9)

When making both custody and relocation decisions, the courts must consider, among other factors, the character and behavior of other persons residing in or frequenting the parent’s home and these persons’ interaction with the child. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-106(a)(9), -108(c)(11), -404(b)(13).

Section 36-6-106(9) makes the character and behavior of a person living in a parent’s home a factor in custody decisions, including that person’s history of violence.

Peters v. Peters · filed 1999-05-10(9)

The statute also includes as a factor “the character and behavior of any person who resides in . . . the home of a parent . . . .” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(9) (Supp. 1998). The record indicates that Father cohabited with his current spouse prior to marriage. Mother’s current husband, Michael Moore, indicated that he has a good relationship with Brianna and assured the trial court that the earlier stabbing incident with Mother was an “accident” that would not happen again. Nevertheless, the history of violence must be considered.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires courts deciding custody to consider evidence of abuse of the other parent and make written findings about that evidence.

James Nelson s. Victoria Nelson · filed 2001-08-30(a)(8)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(8) specifically lists as one of the factors that the Trial Court “shall consider . . .” in making its custody determination is “[e]vidence of physical or emotional abuse . . . to the other parent . . . .” This subsection also mandates that “[t]he court shall include in its decision a written finding of all evidence, and all findings of fact connected thereto.”

Section 36-6-106(8) allows courts to consider evidence of child abuse when deciding custody without first finding that abuse occurred.

Gaskill v. Gaskill · filed 2001-12-07(8)

This is a divorce proceeding, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(8) directs the courts to consider, among other factors, “[e]vidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child.” Instead of requiring the trial court to first find that child abuse has occurred, it simply allows the court to consider evidence of abuse in devising a custody arrangement that will be in the child’s best interests.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires the court to make written findings about evidence of abuse when deciding a child's best interests in a custody case.

Griffith v. Griffith · filed 2002-09-12(a)(8)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–6-106(a)(8) is mandatory and provides that the Trial Court “shall” make a written finding of evidence and findings of fact concerning the allegations and proof of abuse presented to the Trial Court.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires written findings about evidence of abuse in a custody decision, but failing to put a finding in writing can be harmless when the court considered the evidence and made an oral finding.

McClain v. McClain · filed 2002-12-13(a)(8)

While the court did not incorporate this finding into a written and filed memorandum, order, or judgment, it clearly considered Mother’s testimony on emotional abuse and determined that there was no such abuse. The failure of the trial court to reduce its finding to the written form was contrary to the edict of the statute; however, the trial court’s failure does not amount to reversible error.

Section 36-6-106(a)(9) requires a custody court to consider the character and behavior of people who live in or frequent a parent’s home.

Crowe v. Crowe · filed 2005-07-14(a)(9)

However, section 36-6-106(a)(9) requires the trial court to consider the character and behavior of those who live in or frequent the homes of both parents.

When abuse is alleged, subsection (a)(8) requires consideration of evidence relevant to the child’s safety; excluding cumulative testimony about established past abuse may be harmless if it would not affect the visitation decision.

Tracey L. Williams Omohundro v. Arnsdorff · filed 2005-09-27(a)(8)

We recognize that Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-106(a)(8) does state that where there are allegations of abuse, “the court shall consider all evidence relevant to the physical and emotional safety of the child.” However, as we have stated, the trial court was aware of past abuse when it reached its decision in this matter, and it is our determination that further testimony in that regard would not have affected the trial court’s award of unsupervised visitation which was clearly based upon additional evidence showing that it is unlikely that Mother will commit abuse at present or in the future.

Section 36-6-106(a)(9) considers the character and behavior of people who reside in or frequent a parent’s home, rather than the parents’ own character.

In re: Madison K. P. · filed 2010-11-23(a)(9)

First, this factor pertains to the character and behavior of other persons who reside or frequent the home of a parent, it does not pertain directly to the credibility or character of Mother or Father.

Section 36-6-106(a)(9) allows a court to consider the character and behavior of someone who frequents a parent’s home when deciding the child’s best interests.

Mobley v. Mobley · filed 2013-04-30(a)(9)

Stated otherwise, in carrying out its best-interest analysis pursuant to Section 36-6-106(a), the trial court found that K.K.’s overwhelming presence in and effect on Mother’s life and theirs was not best for the Children. Accordingly, the court found that factor (9) weighed in Father’s favor. We conclude that the trial court was within its authority to prohibit K.K. from having unsupervised contact with the Children and to caution against overnight visits with Mother in their presence.

Section 36-6-106(a)(12) makes the character and conduct of a person who frequents a parent’s home relevant to the child’s best interests.

Camacho v. Camacho · filed 2022-10-07(a)(12)

To be sure, we agree that the character and conduct of Mr. Stamey is highly relevant to the best interests of the children at issue in this case. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(12).

Section 36-6-106(a)(11) requires courts to resolve disputed allegations of abuse when assessing a child’s best interest.

Bean v. Jordon Estes Bean · filed 2022-12-21(a)(11)

Thus, factor (11) was clearly at issue and the trial court was required to resolve the disputed issues of whether abuse occurred and, if so, who perpetrated that abuse.

Section 36-6-106(a)(11) allows a court to consider evidence of child abuse when assessing the child’s best interests without first finding that abuse occurred.

Rapp v. Rapp · filed 2024-10-31(a)(11)

The court was “simply allow[ed] to consider evidence of abuse,” Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d at 632, an analysis the court undertook. Therefore, we discern no error.

Section 36-6-106 applies to a custody modification only after a material and substantial change of circumstances has been shown.

Eberhart v. Eberhart · filed 1997-07-22

We agree with the appellant that T.C.A. § 36-6-106 is applicable to a modification of custody case just as it is to an original award of custody; however, in a modification case, the statute does not come into play unless and until there has been a showing of a material and substantial change of circumstances as described in Musselman.

After custody is awarded under the section’s best interest factors, a parent seeking to change custody must show new facts or changed circumstances.

Crowell v. Brown · filed 2000-03-31

Once custody is awarded to a parent by application of those statutory factors, custody cannot be changed from one parent to the other in the absence of a showing by the non-custodial parent of new facts or “changed circumstances” justifying an alteration of the original custody award.

Section 36-6-106’s best-interest considerations are reached in a custody modification proceeding only after a material change in circumstances is established.

Bridges v. King · filed 2001-01-31

While these are appropriate considerations in custody determinations under T.C.A. § 36-6-106, a court does not address those issues before determining that there has, indeed, been a material change in circumstances.

Section 36-6-106’s best-interest considerations apply to a custody modification only after the court finds a material change in circumstances.

Bridges v. King · filed 2001-04-11

While these are appropriate considerations in custody determinations under T.C.A. § 36-6-106, a court does not address those issues before determining that there has, indeed, been a material change in circumstances.

Section 36-6-106 requires a custody determination, including one following a material change in circumstances, to be based on the child’s best interest.

Varney v. Roemer · filed 2001-10-10

In any proceedings requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, such determination shall be made upon the basis of the best interest of the minor child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106. ... Because there was a material change of circumstances, the second part of the analysis must be considered: whether a change of custody is in the best interest of the children.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires a custody determination based on the child’s best interest.

P.E.K. v. J.M. and C.Y.M. · filed 2002-07-11(a)

We should also note that the trial court, in awarding custody to P.E.K., failed to comply with the provisions of T.C.A. § 36-6-106 (2001), which requires that any custody determination “shall be made upon the basis of the best interest of the child.”

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody disputes between parents with equal rights to be decided according to the children’s best interests.

Downs v. Crystal Bailey/Joni Downs · filed 2002-11-20(a)

As between Mother and Father, neither party has superior rights over the other, so custody of the children should be placed according to the children’s best interest. ... Moreover, in light of the deference given to the trial court’s assessment of the parties’ credibility, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the boys’ best interests are served by an award of custody to Father, rather than Mother.

Section 36-6-106(a) supplies the best interest factors for deciding whether to change a child’s primary residential parent after a material change in circumstances; the court need not repeat the comparative fitness analysis used for an initial custody decision.

Taylor v. McKinnie · filed 2008-08-05(a)

The factors to be considered in a “best interest” analysis are set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106. Id. In a proceeding to modify the designation of primary residential parent, however, the trial court “need not repeat the comparative fitness analysis that is appropriate at the time of the original custody decree.”

After finding a material change in circumstances, a court must consider the subsection (a) factors and decide whether modifying custody is in the child’s best interests.

Hardin v. Hardin · filed 2012-12-27(a)

Second, upon finding a material change in circumstances has occurred, the court must consider the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) and make a determination whether it is in the child's best interests to modify the current custody arrangement.

After a material change in circumstances, the court must decide whether changing the primary residential parent serves the child’s best interest; the parent seeking the change need not prove the current parent unfit.

Elizabeth Ann Woodard Maxwell v. Ronald Edward Woodard, Jr. · filed 2013-05-31(a)

If a material change in circumstances has occurred, the trial court then must ascertain whether a change in the designation of primary residential parent is in the child’s best interest, considering the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a). ... Thus, the trial court in effect held that, in order to prevail, Father was required to prove that Mother “is unfit to have custody” of the child. This is incorrect.

Section 36-6-106(a) supplies the best interest factors the court must apply after finding a material change in circumstances when considering a modification of the residential schedule.

Cook v. Cook · filed 2015-12-09(a)

The second step of the analysis requires a determination of the child‘s best interests, utilizing the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). See Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 705. Because the trial court did not engage in an analysis of the child‘s best interests, we remand the case for the trial court to do so.

Section 36-6-106(a)’s best interest factors must be applied to the proposed change to the residential parenting schedule.

Irvin v. Ernest J. Irvin, II · filed 2018-01-08(a)

In the present case, the trial court conducted a best interest analysis applying the statutory best interest factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) and concluded: “The best interest analysis weighs in favor of Mother continuing to be the primary residential parent with Father to have visitation.” ... The issue before the court was whether it was in the best interest of the children to modify the residential parenting schedule. The trial court failed to make this determination.

Section 36-6-106(a) permits a court to consider conduct predating the last parenting plan when that evidence is relevant to the child’s best interest.

Bowen v. William S. Wiseman, II · filed 2018-06-29(a)

Father avers that the trial court was not permitted to consider evidence concerning any events which took place before the entry of the January 2013 Agreed Order. However, we hold that the trial court was permitted to consider all evidence relevant to the best-interest factors. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1)–(15).

Section 36-6-106(a)’s best-interest factors need not be considered when a parent seeking to change the primary residential parent fails to establish a material change of circumstance.

Gider v. Hubbell · filed 2020-07-01(a)

Because Mother did not make the requisite showing of a material change of circumstance, the juvenile court was not required to undertake a best interest analysis and consider the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Section 36-6-106 does not require specific findings of fact in custody cases.

Durham v. Durham · filed 1998-12-14

A reference to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 does not reveal a requirement that the court make specific findings of facts in custody cases.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires written findings on alleged abuse against a minor family member, but not on alleged abuse against an adult family member.

Joiner v. Griffith · filed 2004-06-14(a)(8)

Thus, the affirmative duty of the trial court to make written findings of fact is limited to alleged abuse against a family member who is a minor child. Accordingly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(8) does not require the trial court to make written findings of fact when the alleged abuse is against an adult family member, as is the case before us.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires written findings for allegations of child abuse, but not for alleged abuse of another adult.

John Edward Bell, Jr. v. Bell · filed 2005-02-22(a)(8)

This Court has recently interpreted the “written finding” requirement as applying only to allegations involving child abuse, not to the alleged abuse of another adult. ... In light of this, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to issue any written findings regarding Father’s alleged spousal abuse.

Section 36-6-106(a)(8) requires written findings concerning child abuse when deciding custody.

Sutphin v. Sally Ann Osborne Sutphin · filed 2006-01-10(a)(8)

Also, while the chancery court did not make written findings of physical abuse of the children by Appellant as required by section 36-6-106(a)(8) of the Tennessee Code, several instances of abuse are uncontradicted in the record, namely Appellant slapping the oldest daughter, Appellant biting the oldest daughter, and Appellant digging her fingernails in the children.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider all relevant best-interest factors in custody decisions, but does not require an order to list each factor or explain its individual effect.

Woods v. Tidwell · filed 2011-05-03(a)

Mother also argues the trial court erred by failing to make “specific findings” regarding the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). ... While the trial court is obligated to consider all relevant factors in reaching its decision, it is not required to list in its opinions or orders each of those factors, nor is it required to explain how each factor affected its overall determination.

Section 36-6-106’s custody factors do not govern a permanent parenting plan in a divorce granted after July 1, 1997; courts apply the factors in §36-6-404 instead.

Dilley v. Dilley · filed 2011-05-23

Both Mother and Father rely on the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-106 in their arguments about whether or not the trial court erred in naming Mother the primary residential parent. However, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-404 was enacted to apply to divorces granted after July 1, 1997, with the result that we will consider the factors set out in the later statute.

Section 36-6-106 supplies factors for determining a child’s best interest when deciding custody.

Richards v. Richards · filed 2011-05-31

Based on the factors outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-106 and 36-6-404(b), we affirm the trial court’s naming of Mother to be the primary residential parent as being in the best interest of the Child.

Section 36-6-106(a) does not require a court to match each custody finding explicitly to a best-interest factor when its findings show that it considered the relevant factors.

Susan Lynn (Mery) Stansberry v. Mery · filed 2011-06-20(a)

While the Court did not explicitly relate each finding of fact to a particular statutory factor, it is clear from reviewing the Memorandum Opinion that the Court did consider the relevant statutory factors and made his decision accordingly. We conclude that the Trial Court did consider all of the relevant statutory factors regarding the children's best interests, and made specific findings of fact relating to the same.

Section 36-6-106(a) does not require trial judges to articulate every best interest factor in their custody findings.

In Re: Elaina M. · filed 2011-10-25(a)

The juvenile court judge determined that naming Father primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest; however, the judge failed to articulate any of the factors as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a). While this Court encourages trial judges to be as precise as possible in making child custody findings, trial judges are not required to articulate every factor and its application to the facts at issue.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires trial courts to consider all factors bearing on a child’s best interest when making a custody determination.

Shultz v. Kirby Fuller · filed 2012-01-04(a)

The language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) is not permissive; trial courts are required to consider all factors bearing on the child’s best interest.

Section 36-6-106 requires courts to consider best-interest factors when deciding custody and parenting time.

Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr. · filed 2012-01-05

The Court is mandated under T. C. A. § 36-6-106 to consider a number of factors in determining what is in the best interest of each child. ... We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court’s findings are supported by the preponderance of the evidence. The trial court’s decisions regarding who would be the primary residential parent and parenting time are not an abuse of discretion.

Section 36-6-106(a) calls for consideration of relevant best-interest factors, but the court need not discuss every listed factor when deciding custody.

In Re: Haven T. · filed 2012-01-31(a)

Mother fails to set forth any authority for the proposition that the court was bound to list and discuss each and every factor of both Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 and 36-6-108, including those that it did not find particularly relevant or weighty for either party. Thus, we fail to see the rationale of Mother’s argument. It does not persuade us to disturb our original conclusion that the trial court considered the appropriate factors and that the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to reflect the child’s best interest after consideration of the relevant statutory factors.

Alyson Leigh Amonette Eberting v. Eberting · filed 2012-02-27(a)

The record on appeal clearly shows that the Trial Court considered all of the relevant evidence in light of the applicable statutory factors when reaching its decision regarding parenting. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relative to this issue, and we find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s adopting the parenting plan filed by Wife on October 3, 2009, with the deletion, by the Trial Court, of specified language.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires a court deciding whether to modify a parenting plan to consider the best-interest factors relevant to the children.

Reed v. Reed · filed 2012-03-30(a)

A best interests analysis requires the trial court to consider, inter alia, factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) that are relevant to the case at hand. Further, the court’s duty to consider relevant factors bearing on the children’s best interests under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) is mandatory, not permissive.

Section 36-6-106(a) does not require a trial court to articulate every custody factor and its application to the facts.

Brown v. Lisa Denise Brown (Church) · filed 2012-04-13(a)

The court did not articulate each of the factors and their application to the facts at issue as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), but ... such is not required.

Section 36-6-106(a) supplies factors for assessing a child’s best interest when the court considers a change in custody.

Connors v. Lawson · filed 2012-05-16(a)

A best interest determination requires consideration of a number of factors, including those set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a) to make an initial custody determination, and those set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-404(b) to fashion a residential schedule. ... The overwhelming evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions that Father did not establish a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of the primary residential parent and that the best interest of the Child did not favor Father over Mother.

Section 36-6-106(a)(9) and (10) allow a court to consider a parent’s relationship with another person when determining the child’s best interest, even if the pleadings do not specifically raise that issue.

Stogner v. Roseann Stogner (Sullivan) · filed 2012-05-31(a)(9), (10)

The court properly considered Mother’s relationship with Ms. Jongema in its consideration of the issues presented by the parties. Among the factors to be taken into account by the court in making a determination as to the best interest of the child are those set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(9) and (10).2 The determination of the best interest of the child is an independent responsibility of the court and is not limited by the issues specifically raised by the pleadings.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to decide custody based on the child’s best interest after considering the listed factors.

Amber D. Brewster v. Galloway · filed 2012-07-11(a)

With all of the above considerations in mind, we conclude that the naming of Mother as the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the Child. In so holding, we note that factors one, two, three, and six favored Mother, while factor four favored Father and factors five, seven, eight, nine, and ten were either equally divided or favored neither parent.

Section 36-6-106(a) provides custody factors that are substantively similar to the parenting-plan factors in § 36-6-404(b) when assessing comparative fitness and a child’s best interests.

Dobbs v. Dobbs · filed 2012-08-07(a)

There is little substantive difference between the factors applicable to parenting plans, set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b), and those applicable to custody determinations, set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) as far as determining comparative fitness and the best interests of the child.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to serve the child’s best interest after consideration of relevant factors, including stability and continuity.

Tachek v. Tachek · filed 2012-08-15(a)

Considering the above factors, the Trial Court made the appropriate decision. As the Court found, the factors regarding love and emotional ties, disposition to provide for the children’s needs, and school/community record weighed equally for both parties. The other relevant factors, however, weighed heavily in the father’s favor.

Section 36-6-106(a) allows a court to give greater weight to a child’s recent circumstances when assessing the child’s best interest.

Herbert v. Harding · filed 2012-08-17(a)

Our legislature has set out a list of ten factors for the trial court to apply in cases involving custody to determine the best interest of a child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). ... We do not believe that giving more weight to Joseph’s more recent circumstances than to his earlier ones amounts to an error.

Section 36-6-106(a) provides factors for custody determinations that are substantially similar to the factors for setting a parenting plan and residential schedule.

Thompson v. Robert Harrison Thompson, III · filed 2012-10-24(a)

Although the parenting plan statutes are applicable herein, the legislature’s list of factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–6–404(b) for the court to consider in determining a parenting plan and residential schedule are substantially similar to the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–6–106(a), and both allow for consideration of any other factors the court deems relevant. In this case, as in most cases, the analysis and the result would be the same regardless of which set of factors is applied.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires a court to consider the best interest factors when making a parenting plan, but does not require an express analysis of each factor in its order.

Barnes v. Barnes · filed 2012-10-24(a)

A trial court faced with a parenting decision is directed to consider the factors set forth in Section 36-6-106(a) when fashioning a parenting plan. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404. However, it is not required to expressly analyze each factor in its order or explain how each factor affected its overall decision.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) requires courts assessing a child’s best interest to consider each parent’s past and potential parenting performance, including the ability to encourage the child’s relationship with both parents.

S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D. · filed 2012-10-25(a)(10)

The statute directs the trial court to take into account many factors, including the parties’ “past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents . . . to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(10). The trial court found that Mother was not fostering Father’s relationship with the child, but was instead interfering with it and was using the child as a “pawn” to control and antagonize Father.

Section 36-6-106 requires trial courts to consider the applicable best interest factors when making an initial custody decision.

In the Matter of: Connor S.L. · filed 2012-11-08(a)

While we agree that these facts, if found, would weigh in favor of Mother, these are not the only factors that the trial court is directed to consider. Indeed, there is no indication from the trial court’s oral findings, written order, or parenting plan that the trial court relied on, or even considered, these factors or any other factor as outlined in Tennessee Code Sections 36-6-106 or -404 in making its decision.

Subsection (a)(8) requires specific findings on allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse, but not on other alleged abuse.

Zahn v. Logan · filed 2015-02-02(a)(8)

It was only required to make specific findings with respect to any allegations of child abuse and child sexual abuse.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires a court modifying a parenting schedule to consider the relevant best interest factors, but does not require it to discuss every factor in its order.

In re: Landon R. · filed 2015-09-22(a)

While the trial court is obligated to consider all the relevant statutory factors in reaching its decision, it is not required to list, in its opinion or orders, each of those factors.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to weigh the applicable best-interest factors in light of the child’s circumstances; a tally of factors without supporting factual findings is insufficient.

Grissom v. Grissom · filed 2019-05-17(a)

Although the trial court has indicated which section 36-6-106 factors favor Mother and Father respectively, there are no factual findings whatsoever to underpin this allocation.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to address the child’s best interest; an order with no finding on that issue is reversible error.

Belinda Bentley Wright v. Wright · filed 2020-03-06(a)

The absence of any finding concerning the child’s best interest is, by itself, reversible error.

Section 36-6-106(a) does not require detailed findings on every best-interest factor when the order shows that the court considered the factors and made relevant findings.

In Re John B. · filed 2020-10-15(a)

We concede that the trial court did not make detailed findings as to each factor contained in section 36-6-106(a). The trial court’s order, however, indicates that the trial court did consider these factors and some specific findings were made relative to the factors.

After finding a material change in circumstances, a court must consider the factors in subsection (a) to decide whether modifying a residential parenting schedule is in the child’s best interests.

Drucker v. Daley · filed 2020-11-25(a)

Once the trial court determines that there has been a material change in circumstances, the second step in the modification analysis requires the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interests under the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts selecting a primary residential parent to consider the relevant best interest factors; findings showing that consideration can support the parenting plan.

Swick v. Swick · filed 2021-03-25(a)

In conducting this analysis, the court is required to consider the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). ... It is apparent from reviewing the trial court’s factual findings that it considered factors 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, and 14, and that they favored Mother.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody determinations to be based on the child’s best interest, considering the listed factors.

In Re Brilee E. · filed 2021-04-20(a)

Here, the trial court based its ruling on its analysis of the best interest factors for custody determinations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), which states that in “any . . . proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child.” ... Having reviewed the statutory factors in light of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that it is in Brilee’s best interest to remain in DCS custody and with her foster parents.

Section 36-6-106(a) provides the best interest factors a court applies after a petitioner establishes grounds to change the primary residential parent.

Honea v. Honea · filed 2021-04-22(a)

If the petitioner makes these showings, the trial court then conducts a best interest analysis by applying the factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-106(a) to the facts of the case.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider its best interest factors when modifying a residential parenting schedule or primary residential parent.

Gravatt v. Barczykowski · filed 2021-05-25(a)

Once the trial court determines that there has been a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule or primary residential parent, the second step in the modification analysis requires the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest under the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). ... Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that modification of the residential parenting schedule and of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child.

A custody order must apply the evidence to the statutory best-interest factors so the custody decision can be reviewed.

Colvard v. Colvard · filed 2021-07-01

Because the trial court’s order wholly fails to include any application of the specific facts adduced at the hearing to the statutory factors concerning the children’s best interests, we cannot review the propriety of the trial court’s ultimate custody decision.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts making custody determinations to consider all relevant best interest factors where applicable.

Richardson v. Richardson · filed 2021-09-17(a)

To determine a child’s best interest, section 36-6-106(a) provides that the trial court “shall consider all relevant factors [listed in the statute], where applicable[.]”

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider all relevant best interest factors, but they need not specifically discuss each factor.

Choate v. Amanda Kay Choate (Ralston) · filed 2021-10-25(a)

While trial courts must consider all relevant best interest factors, they need not specifically reference each factor.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider the statutory best interest factors when deciding custody; those factors can favor more parenting time for one parent.

Owens v. Owens · filed 2021-11-24(a)

The evidence presented and the factors contained in section 36-6-106(a) favor awarding Wife greater visitation than Husband.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to serve the child’s best interest after consideration of the applicable statutory factors.

Morgan v. Kenneth F. Morgan, Jr. · filed 2021-12-07(a)

A trial court making a custody determination must apply the following analysis proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106: ... The trial court specifically considered and incorporated the pertinent statutory factors in its analysis and decision regarding the parenting plan.

Section 36-6-106(a) provides the best interest factors courts consider when deciding which parent should be the primary residential parent.

Killian v. Moore · filed 2022-02-15(a)

The court engaged in a detailed discussion of the evidence and made findings in light of each factor set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a), including the parties’ moral, physical, mental, and emotional fitness, as set forth in subsection (a)(8). ... Ultimately, the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that it was in the child’s best interest for Father to be named primary residential parent.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to consider the child’s best interest factors and permit both parents maximum participation consistent with that interest.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2022-04-07(a)

The trial court also based its custody determination on the Child’s best interest as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a). ... In the case at bar, we determine that the trial court considered each of these factors in crafting a permanent parenting plan in which both parents would enjoy maximum participation with the Child consistent with the Child’s best interest.

Section 36-6-106(a) makes the child’s best interest the guide for a parenting plan; its factors can support substantially equal parenting time when both parents have shared caregiving responsibilities and can cooperate.

Smallbone v. Smallbone · filed 2022-05-04(a)

While a trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a parenting plan, the touchstone is the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (2017); Maupin v. Maupin, 420 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). ... By contrast, we discern no errors in the court’s analysis of the statutory factors here.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider applicable best interest factors but does not require a judgment to list each factor and its effect.

Sines v. Tinnin · filed 2022-10-20(a)

Although the court was obligated to consider the applicable statutory factors, “the statute does not require a trial court, when issuing a ... memorandum opinion or final judgment, to list every applicable factor along with its conclusion as to how that particular factor impacted the overall custody determination.”

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to base custody decisions on the child’s best interest and consider all applicable factors, including evidence of abuse.

Mangum v. Mangum · filed 2022-11-07(a)

On remand, the Trial Court considered each statutory factor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) and made findings as to the Children’s best interest, fully compliant with our instructions. The evidence does not preponderate against any of the Trial Court’s factual findings relative to this issue. The Trial Court neither applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical or unreasonable decision, nor based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. In short, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the Trial Court in its fashioning of the permanent parenting plan.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to consider all relevant best interest factors when modifying a parenting plan.

Boren v. David Wade, Jr. · filed 2022-11-18(a)

In a best interest analysis, the court “shall consider all relevant factors.”

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to serve the child’s best interest after consideration of the relevant statutory factors; the evidence supported awarding the father 90 days of parenting time per year.

Burnett v. Burnett · filed 2022-12-07(a)

A trial court making a custody determination must apply the following analysis provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106: ... Under the facts and circumstances presented here, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the children’s best interest that Husband be granted 90 days per year of co-parenting time.

Custody determinations must serve the child’s best interest, considering all relevant statutory factors and allowing both parents the maximum participation consistent with those factors.

Nikki Leanne Miles v. Miles · filed 2022-12-14(a)

In proceedings where the trial court must make a custody determination regarding a minor child, “the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). In considering a child’s best interest, “the court shall order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with the factors” set forth in the statute. Id. The trial court must consider all relevant factors set forth in the statute as to the best interest analysis.

Section 36-6-106(a) does not require a written analysis of every best-interest factor when the court’s findings show that it considered the relevant factors.

Chambers v. Chambers · filed 2021-02-04(a)

Here, the trial court did not write a factor-by-factor analysis of its consideration of the child’s best interest in formulating the modifications to the parenting plan, but “its findings demonstrate a consideration of the relevant factors.”

Section 36-6-106(a) requires a separate best interest analysis before a court modifies a parenting plan.

Gaby v. Gaby · filed 2021-08-23(a)

Moreover, the two steps of the analysis must be undertaken separately and explicitly. ... Although we leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that there has been a material change of circumstance, we vacate the trial court’s order based on its failure to conduct the necessary best interest analysis.

When modifying a parenting plan, a court must consider and discuss all relevant best interest factors.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2022-01-24(a)

In a best interest analysis, the court “shall consider all relevant factors.” ... And it must discuss those relevant factors. ... Due to the lack of a best interest analysis, we vacate the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan and remand the case for a determination of the minor child’s best interest.

Section 36-6-106(10) makes each parent's willingness and ability to encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent a factor in awarding custody.

Suntheimer v. Suntheimer · filed 2000-03-23(10)

In Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(10) (Supp. 1999) the legislature listed the willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, as a factor to be considered when awarding custody.

Section 36-6-106(10) requires courts deciding custody to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to encourage a close relationship between the child and the other parent.

Terry v. Terry · filed 2000-06-29(10)

Considering Father’s actions toward Mother during the marriage and the pendency of the divorce; wiretapping Mother’s telephone, asking a neighbor to watch her for him, forcing her to go to him for small amounts of money and sign receipts for it; we cannot say that the trial court erred in its finding that Mother was the more likely of the two to “encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child[ren] and the other parent.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(10). We find no error in the award of custody of the children to Mother.

Section 36-6-106(10) directs courts deciding custody to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to encourage the child’s close relationship with the other parent.

Killion v. Sweat · filed 2000-09-21(10)

In making a custody determination, a court should consider “the willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child.” T.C.A. § 36-6-106(10) (Supp. 1999). Dustin has a right to a “close and continuing” relationship with Father. Mother’s disparaging remarks, however, have had a profoundly negative effect on the child.

Section 36-6-106(10) directs courts to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to encourage the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Fain v. Fain · filed 2000-10-12(10)

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother is more willing and able to encourage a positive, meaningful relationship between the child “and the other parent.”

A parent’s willingness to communicate with the other parent bears on parenting responsibilities but is only one factor in determining the child’s best interests.

Jenkins v. Johnson · filed 2000-05-30(a)(10)

Accordingly, a court properly considers a parent’s reluctance or refusal to communicate with the other parent. This factor, however, is but one of many to be considered and does not provide a conclusive answer to a court’s inquiry by itself.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) requires courts deciding custody to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Lockmiller v. Lockmiller · filed 2003-12-30(a)(10)

He also found, and the evidence does not preponderate otherwise, that Father seems more predisposed than does Mother to foster a relationship between the children and the other parent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(10).

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) requires courts to consider each parent's willingness and ability to encourage the child's relationship with the other parent, but that is only one factor in deciding custody.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2004-11-09(a)(10)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(10) instructs a trial court to consider “the willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child,” but this is not the only relevant factor to be considered.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) makes a parent’s willingness and ability to support the child’s relationship with the other parent a factor in deciding custody.

In Re TCD · filed 2007-12-27(a)(10)

As noted, in making custody determinations, one of the relevant factors to be considered is the custodial parent’s ability to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(10). The evidence presented in this case overwhelmingly reveals that Mother intentionally interfered with Father’s visitation with his son, failed to adhere to the terms of the Parenting Plan, and was and is unwilling to encourage or facilitate a “close and continuing” relationship between Father and his son.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) considers a parent’s willingness to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent and may carry significant weight in a custody decision.

Alanna Christy Daniels Howe v. Howe · filed 2009-09-15(a)(10)

Factor 10 was the biggest determining factor for the Court, and it appears that the Court’s finding in this regard was appropriate, i.e. while both parents were willing to care for the child, it would appear that the father is more willing to facilitate a close and continuing relationship with the child and the mother than the mother was willing to do for the father. While factor 10 is not the most important or only factor to consider, it is important in deciding which parent is more fit to take on the primary role.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) allows a court to consider a parent’s unwillingness to encourage the child’s relationship with the other parent when that conduct predates an abuse investigation.

Cone v. Georgia Elise Dunn Cone · filed 2010-04-29(a)(10)

This court can appreciate that there are circumstances when reliance on factor 10 might be inappropriate. We do not, however, find this to be such a case. The trial court found that Mother engaged in a consistent pattern of statements and behaviors designed to establish abuse by Father. Without looking at the period of time covered by the DCS safety plan and indication, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother exhibited an unwillingness to encourage and promote the child’s relationship with Father. There are ample facts in the record to support a conclusion that, before the DCS investigation, Mother did not support a healthy relationship between Father and Child.

Section 36-6-106(10) makes a parent’s likelihood of fostering the child’s relationship with the other parent a factor in selecting the primary residential parent.

Deborah Miller Gentile v. Gentile · filed 2010-07-19(10)

Mr. Gentile also argues that the trial court erred when it found that Ms. Gentile would be more likely to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent, a factor listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(10). Mr. Gentile relies upon his suggestion that if he were the primary residential parent, then he would have the child spend considerable time with her mother. However, the overall evidence supports the trial courts’ conclusion that the child is more likely to have a relationship with both parents if Ms. Gentile is the primary residential parent.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) requires a court making or modifying a custody determination to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to support the child’s relationship with both parents.

Byars v. Young · filed 2010-05-20(a)(10)

Tennessee statutes mandate that, in making any custody determination, including an action to modify custody, the Juvenile Court must consider the willingness of Father and his wife to facilitate the child’s relationship with Mother: ... (10) . . . [T]he willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, consistent with the best interest of the child.

A parent’s willingness to encourage the child’s relationship with the other parent is a factor in deciding the child’s best interest.

In the Matter of: Jonathan S. C-B · filed 2012-07-31(a)(10)

Finally, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best interest that Father be named as his primary residential parent. The court discussed all of the best interest factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) and stated that most of them either favored both parents equally or gave Father the edge. But the court found ample evidence that Mother was not willing to allow Jonathan to enjoy a close relationship with Father, while Father was prepared to encourage and foster a positive relationship between Mother and child. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion.

Section 36-6-106(a)(10) allows a court to consider a parent’s pattern of moving without notifying the other parent when assessing willingness to foster their relationship with the child.

Skowronski v. Wade · filed 2015-10-27(a)(10)

The evidence in this case does not preponderate against the trial court‟s finding that factor 10 favored Father. The trial court properly considered Mother‟s pattern of moving without notifying Father as evidence of her unwillingness to foster a close relationship between Taylor and Father.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) directs courts to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to support the child’s relationship with the other parent when assessing the child’s best interest.

Gider v. Hubbell · filed 2017-03-29(a)(2)

The juvenile court properly considered Mother’s unwillingness to cooperate with Father in making educational decisions and her history of disregarding orders of the court. The evidence also demonstrates that Mother continued to share inappropriate information with the child concerning the parents’ relationship and the details of the custody dispute. We, therefore, agree with the juvenile court’s finding that Factor 2 favored Father over Mother.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) considers each parent’s ability to perform parenting responsibilities and support the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Wilson v. Phillips · filed 2017-11-15(a)(2)

The focus of this factor is each parent’s or caregiver’s ability to perform parenting responsibilities, including the facilitation of the children’s relationship with the other parent.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) requires courts to consider a parent’s likely compliance with parenting orders and any history of denying parenting time when assessing willingness to support the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Frederick Jerome Brown, Jr. v. Roxana Isabel Brown · filed 2018-08-30(a)(2)

The court erred by presuming that mother would seek to undermine the child’s relationship with father absent any evidence that mother had previously interfered with their relationship or threatened to do so in the future.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) considers a parent’s willingness to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent and honor court-ordered parenting arrangements.

Lindsey Bailey Harmon (Jean) v. Harmon · filed 2018-11-27(a)(2)

Accordingly, we must conclude that factor two of Tenn. Code Ann. section 36-6-106(a) weighs in favor of Father. While we reiterate that not all of the trial court’s findings in regard to this factor are supported by the record, our own review of the record causes us to question whether Mother is prepared to truly “honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements.”

A caregiver need not grant every request for additional visitation to show a willingness to support the child’s relationship with other caregivers.

In Re E.W.N. · filed 2018-11-19(a)(2)

Furthermore, it is not necessary for a parent or guardian to grant every request for additional visitation in order to demonstrate a willingness to facilitate and encourage a relationship between the child and his other caregiver(s).

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) requires courts to consider a parent’s willingness to encourage the child’s relationship with the other parent, including whether the parent is likely to honor parenting arrangements or has denied court-ordered parenting time.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2026-04-29(a)(2)

Thus, Mother’s refusal to encourage the relationship between Anna and Father is a factor to be considered, and it weighs against her in the best interest analysis. ... Thus, we deem this factor to favor Father, but we do not give it significant weight.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) requires courts to consider a parent’s history of denying court-ordered parenting time when deciding a child’s best interest.

Anderson v. Marshall · filed 2024-12-19(a)(2)

Upon our review of the record, Mother has demonstrated continuous contempt for the parenting plan and Father’s rights to visitation. Although Mother argues that she offers better stability for Child than Father, this argument fails muster when the record shows Mother cannot, or will not, maintain a regular visitation schedule. Conversely, Father has demonstrated compliance with the parenting plan. In light of Mother’s continuous efforts to prevent Father from visiting with Child, we conclude that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in Child’s best interest for Father to be the primary residential parent.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) requires courts to consider each parent’s willingness and ability to support the child’s continuing relationship with the other parent when deciding custody.

Ewald v. Ewald · filed 2026-02-03(a)(2)

In considering Factor (2), as noted above, a court evaluates each parent’s “past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child[ren] and both of the child[ren]’s parents . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2). ... From our review of the record, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding as to concern regarding Mother’s conduct or the trial court’s conclusion that coparenting favors Father.

Section 36-6-106(4) makes the stability of a parent’s family unit a factor in custody decisions.

Julian v. Julian · filed 2000-04-04(4)

The fact that Mr. Julian, as a single parent, will receive assistance from his mother is neither surprising nor inappropriate. The child custody statute recognizes that the stability of a parent’s family unit is a factor to consider in making a custody decision. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(4) (Supp. 1999).

Section 36-6-106 makes continuity in a child’s living situation a factor in deciding custody based on the child’s best interest.

Ward v. Turner · filed 2000-06-14(3)

Many of the factors listed in T.C.A. § 36-6-106 are either inapplicable, or do not justify awarding custody to one party over the other. Both the Wards and Turners are suitable as the primary custodians of the children. Both sets of grandparents clearly love these children. Nobody questions the parties’ emotional, physical, or financial ability to care for the children. However, we believe the trial court sought stability for the children by placing them with the Wards. The record indicates that the children have lived with the Wards for the majority of the time since their parents were killed. In our opinion, that is one factor which preponderates in favor of one party over the other.

Section 36-6-106 allows a court to give weight to a parent’s role as primary caregiver but does not require awarding custody to that parent.

Tompkins v. Rainey · filed 2000-07-11(2)

Although the trial court was not required to award custody of the child to the Mother on this basis, see Grover, 1999 WL 257653, at *5, we conclude that the court properly emphasized the Mother’s undisputed role as the child’s primary caretaker in making its custody decision.

Section 36-6-106(a)(3) makes continuity of a child’s stable placement a custody factor that favors the existing placement when other factors are evenly balanced.

Melissa Jane (Nichols) Steen v. Steen · filed 2001-05-23(a)(3)

When the consideration of all other factors results in an even balance, the presumption in favor of continuity of placement requires us to refuse a change of custody.

Section 36-6-106(c)(4) makes stability a factor in deciding which parent is better suited for custody.

Castle v. Baker · filed 2001-09-21(c)(4)

Father also prevails on the “stability” factor. See, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(c)(4). Since the parties’ divorce, Mother has been twice married and has moved a total of four times while Father has married only once and has remained in the same house – close to his family.

Section 36-6-106(a) makes continuity of a child’s placement one factor in deciding the child’s best interests, rather than a controlling factor.

Presley v. Clavin Herman Shadrick . · filed 2001-10-17(a)

Moreover, the interest of continuity of the Children’s placement is but one of a number of factors to be considered in determining the Children’s custody. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Section 36-6-106(4) makes the stability of each parent’s family unit a factor in deciding whether to modify custody.

Dayne O 'Bannon v. O'Bannon · filed 2003-10-16(4)

The instability of Wife’s current marriage is directly related to T.C.A. 36-6-106(4) - “[t]he stability of the family unit of the parents” - and is a proper ground for modification of custody.

Continuity is one of several factors considered in determining a child’s best interests; it does not control the custody decision by itself.

Misty Dawn Allen Villaneuva v. Allen · filed 2004-07-23(3)

As can be seen from the factors listed, however, continuity is only one of many factors which are to be considered in a best interest analysis.

The continuity of care factor may favor the child's current caregiver even if the other parent cared for the child for a longer period overall.

In Re. Mikayla Grace Clark, Samuel Kent Clark v. Cerden · filed 2007-01-22(a)(3)

Regardless of whether Mikayla had been in Mother’s care or Father’s care the longest period of time, at the time of trial, the factor of continuity of care weighed heavily in favor of allowing Mikayla to remain with Father.

Section 36-6-106 treats a child's continuity and stability with a caregiver as a factor in deciding custody.

In RE: T.H. A Child Under Eighteen Years of Age Karen Riley v. Summeour · filed 2009-08-27(a)(3)

Factor 3 deals with continuity and stability, and while the child had lived with both parties for periods of time, at the time of the hearing, the child had been living with Ms. Summeour for nearly two years, so this factor would favor Ms. Summeour.

Section 36-6-106(a)(3) makes continuity and a stable living environment important best-interest factors, but other evidence may outweigh them.

In Re Sidney J. · filed 2010-05-10(a)(3)

Continuity and “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment” are important factors in determining the best interests of a child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(3). In granting the paternal grandparents’ adoption petition, however, the trial court implicitly found that other evidence introduced at the hearing outweighed this factor. We agree.

Continuity and stability are factors in deciding a child’s best interest in a custody case.

Webb v. Pewitt · filed 2011-04-28(a)(3)

It is readily apparent that this child needs stability above all. Considering the relative lifestyles of the parties, as revealed by the record, we conclude that Mr. Pewitt’s lifestyle is more conducive to stability than that of Ms. Webb.

Section 36-6-106(a)(3) makes continuity in a child’s life a custody factor, but continuity does not establish stability when the existing home is unsatisfactory.

Wall v. Wall · filed 2011-07-14(a)(3)

The evidence in the record, however, shows that continuity in this case does not equal stability, because Mother has not provided Katelyn a “stable, satisfactory environment.” T.C.A. § 36-6-106(a)(3). From the evidence in this record, it appears that remaining in Mother’s care makes Katelyn feel less safe, not more safe. Considering the record as a whole, we must conclude that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that it is in Katelyn’s best interest to designate Father as Katelyn’s primary residential parent.

School continuity is a consideration under § 36-6-106(a), but it need not outweigh other factors favoring a parent’s designation as primary residential parent.

Griffin v. Griffin · filed 2020-08-19(a)

The General Assembly has declared that custody determinations “shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child” and must “permit[] both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child” consistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1)-(15). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). ... This concern, however, does not outweigh the factors favoring Wife’s designation as the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating Wife as the primary residential parent.

A parent may remain the child’s primary caregiver when a nanny provides limited after-school care.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2020-09-18(a)(5)

The fact that Father works full-time and employs a nanny to watch Child in the afternoons until Father returns home from work does not detract from Father’s status as Child’s primary caregiver since 2017 and the more reliable and responsible caregiver since 2015, when Mother was arrested for DUI.

Continuity is an important best interest factor, but it does not outweigh all other considerations when the child’s home lacks stability.

King v. Brittany Bourgeois Jones · filed 2022-07-18(a)(10)

Continuity is important. But it “does not trump all other considerations.” ... And the court found a marked lack of stability in Mother’s home. ... So we cannot fault the court for not assigning more weight to Mother’s role as primary caregiver.

The continuity factor considers the child’s need for continuity and whether the child’s living environment has been stable and satisfactory.

Calleja v. Bradfield · filed 2024-04-17(a)(10)

But Father’s argument misconstrues the continuity factor. The factor examines the child’s need for continuity and whether the child’s living environment has been stable and satisfactory.

Section 36-6-106 does not list a parent’s sexual orientation as a custody factor, but inappropriate sexual activity may bear on the parent’s ability to serve the child’s best interests.

Rieder v. Patricia Ann Cawley Rieder · filed 2001-10-05(a)

It is not listed as a factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 and we have not seen any indication that sexual preferences are linked to the love and affection a parent has for a child. We do find that sexual activity, whether heterosexual or homosexual, may occur in inappropriate times and places and reflect on the parent’s ability to serve the best interests of a child.

Section 36-6-106(a)(2) creates no preference or presumption for or against joint or sole custody and gives courts broad discretion to choose an arrangement in the child’s best interest.

Zabaski v. Zabaski · filed 2002-12-11(a)(2)

While this may once have been true, the Legislature has eliminated any legal presumption against joint custody with the 1996 passage of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2), which declares, “. . . neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody is established, but the court shall have the widest discretion to order a custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child.”

Section 36-6-106(a) does not include the tender years doctrine among the factors for deciding child custody.

In RE: Zaylen R. · filed 2004-09-27(a)

The current statute setting out the factors to be considered in custody cases does not mention, or contain even a reflection of, the tender years doctrine. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Section 36-6-106 remains in effect, and its custody factors are incorporated into the factors used to set a residential schedule under § 36-6-404(b).

Christopher Grey Cummings v. Pepper Lynne Werner Cummings · filed 2004-10-15

These factors incorporate those set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106, the statute which guided courts in custody determinations prior to the parenting plan legislation. That statute has not been repealed.

Section 36-6-106(a) supplies factors for custody determinations, but section 36-6-404(b) governs the designation of a primary residential parent in a parenting plan.

Sara Ann (Spencer) Wangerin v. Wangerin · filed 2011-08-26(a)

Father erroneously relies on the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) in his argument rather than those listed at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b).

Section 36-6-106(a)'s custody factors do not govern the choice of a primary residential parent under a permanent parenting plan; section 36-6-404(b)'s factors apply.

Ogle v. Ogle · filed 2011-11-16(a)

Husband erroneously relies on the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) rather than those found in section 36-6-404(b).

Section 36-6-106 requires a court to consider its best interest factors before modifying a parenting plan.

Jarnigan v. Ginger Nicole Jarnigan · filed 2013-11-04(a)

Contrary to Mother’s claim, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court considered any of the factors required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106. Rather, the court simply modified the parenting plan to reflect the parties’ original agreement according to Mother’s testimony. The court should have held a subsequent hearing regarding the best interests of the children before modifying the parties’ parenting plan. We therefore vacate the trial court’s amended parenting plan and remand so that the court may consider the children’s best interests.

Section 36-6-106(a)’s best interest factors apply when a court considers modifying a permanent parenting plan.

Rousos v. Kristi Boren (f/k/a Rousos) · filed 2014-08-26(a)

In the case before us, the trial court analyzed the statutory best interest factors of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106 and found that most of the factors were equal between the parties. ... The evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to each of these factors.

Section 36-6-106(a) provides the best interest factors a court must consider when modifying a parenting plan.

Spigner v. Spigner · filed 2014-12-08(a)

In order to modify a parenting plan, the moving party must show: (1) a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interests; and (2) that modification is in the child’s best interests pursuant to the factors outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a).

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts deciding whether to modify a parenting plan to sufficiently consider the relevant best-interest factors.

Allen v. Candy Rachelle Munn Allen · filed 2017-03-07(a)

Nevertheless, we conclude that these findings by the trial court do not constitute a sufficient analysis of the factors relevant to determining whether modification of a parenting plan was in the Children’s best interest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106.

Section 36-6-106 requires a court to consider the applicable best-interest factors when modifying a parenting plan, even after a default.

Heather Kailoni Lawson (Stewart) v. Stewart · filed 2017-09-28(a)

Indeed, the default order does not indicate that the trial court considered any of the factors required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106.

Section 36-6-106(a)’s best-interest factors include stability and continuity in the child’s home and school life, activities, and relationships.

Brunetz v. Brunetz · filed 2018-09-20(a)

As previously explained, the best interest factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) weighed in Mother’s favor with regard to stability and continuity in school and at home, as well as encouragement of the Children’s involvement in activities and their interpersonal relationships with relatives and peers.

Section 36-6-106(b) authorizes an initial custody determination when the custodial parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for intentionally and wrongfully killing the child's other parent or legal guardian.

In Re SLM · filed 2006-07-24(b)

In addition to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-216(a)(2), Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106(b) provides another statutory basis for the juvenile court's decision to enter an order regarding the custody of the March children. This statute, enacted in 2000 at the request of the Levines,[28] provides that in any proceeding requiring a court to make a custody determination, "the court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination regarding a minor child . . . upon finding that the custodial parent has been convicted of or found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent or legal guardian." It is undisputed that on June 21, 2004, a circuit court in Davidson County, having acquired personal jurisdiction over Mr. March, entered an order concluding that Ms. March was intentionally and wrongfully killed by Mr. March. This evidence provides a sufficient factual predicate for the juvenile court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction to enter both the August 15, 2005 and August 22, 2005 custody orders.

Section 36-6-106 supplies the best interest factors for an initial custody decision, including when a parent plans to relocate with the children.

Rudd v. Rudd · filed 2009-12-09(a)

As in Gregory, the record shows that, in this case, the trial court considered Mother’s relocation in making its best interests analysis under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-106. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err when it did not apply the factors in Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-108(d) in its decision to allow Mother to relocate.

Section 36-6-106(a) makes the child’s best interest the standard for an initial custody determination.

In the Matter of: Zamorah B. · filed 2013-02-15(a)

Accordingly, the Juvenile Court properly ruled that the proceeding before it was one to establish an initial custody order and that the proper standard of decision was the child’s best interest.

In an initial custody determination, subsection (a) requires consideration of the child’s best interest and both parents’ maximum possible participation in light of all relevant factors, including a proposed relocation.

Vermilyea v. Vermilyea · filed 2018-04-30(a)

We find and hold that the Trial Court did not apply an incorrect standard when making its determination regarding custody, and we find no error in the Trial Court’s determination regarding the custody of Cale and its determination that it was not in Cale’s best interest to relocate to Canada. The Trial Court exercised its discretion in a way so as to give effect to our General Assembly’s policy determination that it is in a child’s best interest for a custody arrangement to provide for “the maximum participation possible in the life of the child consistent with . . . all relevant factors . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (Supp. 2016).

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts to decide custody based on the child’s best interests; parents cannot submit parenting issues to binding arbitration.

Tuetken v. Tuetken · filed 2010-09-22(a)

Furthermore, “in any . . . proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (Supp. 2009). ... We therefore hold that parties may not submit parenting issues to binding arbitration.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires custody decisions to rest on the child’s best interest; a judge approving a mediated parenting plan must have a sufficient record to make that determination.

Fletcher v. Fletcher · filed 2011-09-26(a)

The statutes mandate that such a custody “determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (2010). ... We hold only that the trial judge, and the trial judge alone, has the solemn duty to determine whether a given parenting arrangement is in the best interest of a child in his charge, and that the record must reflect a sufficient basis for such a determination.

Section 36-6-106(a) requires courts setting a residential parenting schedule to consider the child’s best interest factors and permit each parent the maximum participation possible consistent with those factors.

Ciara Dawn Beaty v. Beaty · filed 2021-07-08(a)

Section 36-6-106(a) directs courts to order custody arrangements that permit the “maximum participation possible” for each parent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). ... The trial court’s order did not apply the statutory factors that may have guided the court in crafting the residential parenting schedule. Further, the trial court did not find that the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest.