R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15

Section 42-35-15(b) starts the thirty-day appeal period when the agency mails notice of its final decision; actual receipt is not required.

Biernacki v. Texeira, 01-2703 (2003) · filed 2003-03-27(b)

The Appellant's argument must fail because G.L. 1956 §42-35-15(b) requires only mailing notice.

Section 42-35-15(b)’s thirty-day filing deadline does not bar judicial review of a Pay Plan Board decision because the board is not an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Malachowski v. State · filed 2005-07-08(b)

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial justice erred in holding that the APA governed review of the Pay Plan Board’s decision to reduce plaintiffs pay grade and that plaintiffs failure to comply with § 42-35-15(b) was a bar to judicial review.

Section 42-35-15(b) requires an agency appeal to be filed in Superior Court within thirty days after the agency mails notice of its final decision.

Rivera v. Employees' Retirement System · filed 2011-03-16(b)

Reviewing the plain meaning of the language "within thirty (30) days after mailing notice of the final decision of the agency," this Court can only find this section requires filing within thirty days from the mailing of the notice.

Section 42-35-15(b) gives an aggrieved party thirty days to seek judicial review of an agency decision, with Rule 6(a) extending a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day.

McAninch v. State of Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training · filed 2013-04-19(b)

Thus, we hold that consistency demands that Rule 6(a) applies to the Superior Court’s review of administrative decisions. ... Section 42-35-15(b) says that a plaintiff is to be afforded thirty days.

Section 42-35-15(b)’s appeal period begins upon formal written notice of an agency’s final decision; informal communications do not trigger it.

City of Pawtucket v. The Rhode Island Department of Revenue · filed 2024-05-02(b)

Although § 45-13-5.2 does not specify what form notice must take, and while § 42-35-15(b) provides that an appeal may be made “after mailing notice of the final decision of the agency,” it is our opinion that the September 10, 2020 letter was the only final, formal, and written decision of the DOR from which an appeal could be taken.

Section 42-35-15(g)(1) permits a party to raise a constitutional due-process argument during judicial review of an administrative decision.

DiBattista v. State, Department of Children, Youth & Families · filed 1998-06-30(g)(1)

Because of the fragmentary record before us, we are unable to determine with certainty whether plaintiffs raised the constitutional due-process argument before the Family Court on its administrative appeal. However, we note that plaintiffs were certainly not barred from doing so.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits a reviewing court to affirming, remanding, reversing, or modifying an agency decision; it does not authorize equitable relief to unwind a completed asset sale.

Town of Tiverton v. Ahern · filed 2006-12-07(g)

The text of the APA defines a limited set of remedies for erroneous agency decisions: a court may "affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision." Section 42-35-15. ... If our General Assembly had seen fit to vest the Courts with broad remedial powers under the APA, it would have explicitly given that authorization.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a reviewing court to affirm an agency decision or remand the case for further proceedings.

Dame v. City of Providence · filed 2007-07-25(g)

The Court may affirm the agency decision, or it can remand the case for further proceedings before the agency. Section42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) does not allow a reviewing court to replace an agency’s decision with a subcommittee recommendation.

Champlin's Realty Associates v. Tikoian · filed 2010-02-18(g)

Section 42 — 35—15(g) does not permit the trial justice to substitute the agency’s decision with another agency document that is not truly a “decision.”

Section 42-35-15(e) confines judicial review to the certified agency record unless a party obtains leave to present additional evidence.

Dipaolo v. Marques · filed 2010-11-09(e)

It is well-settled that the Court will confine its review to an examination of the certified record, unless "application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence" pursuant to § 42-35-15(e). Sections 42-35-15(e)-(f); Nickerson v. Reitsma, 853 A.2d 1202,1205 (R.I. 2004). Accordingly, the Court will not consider the DBR's evidence and arguments about DiPaolo's post-revocation activities.

Section 42-35-15(f) generally confines judicial review of a contested administrative case to the record, without a jury or discovery.

Zell v. Ricci · filed 2018-03-30(f)

However, the APA generally does not permit discovery; instead review is "conducted *300by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record." See R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(f).

Section 42-35-15 requires judicial review of an agency decision to be conducted without a jury and confined to the record.

Clambake Club of Newport. v. Coastal Resources, 93-0394 (1998) · filed 1998-11-19(f)

The review shall be conducted by the court withouta jury and shall be confined to the record. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the appellant's aforementioned argument.

Subsection (g) allows a court to reverse or modify an agency decision but bars it from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Ambrosino v. State, 99-211 (2000) · filed 2000-01-07(g)

Section 42-35-15 (g) permits this Court to "reverse or modify" the agency's decision, provided it does not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Ordinarily, the relief this Court would grant in a case like this would be to remand this matter to the Board for a new hearing in order to allow the Board to accord the findings of the hearing officer the full deference to which they are, in fact and not merely formalistically, entitled. Since the conclusions of the hearing officer are plainly supported by substantial evidence in the record, the final order of the Board will be modified into the form proposed by the hearing officer on October 28, 1998.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or affected by legal error.

Williams v. Fugate · filed 2009-07-30(g)

Consequently, having found that the CRMC's denial of the Appellants' application was arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, and affected by error of law under § 42-35-15(g), the Council's decision is hereby reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits review of an agency decision reached by a tie vote, but the court must defer to the agency unless the record clearly provides no support for its decision.

Coventry Fire Dist. v. Ri Labor Relat. Board, 04-5950 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-10-31(g)

This Court agrees that it should have the ability to review tie decisions of an administrative agency, but that review should be limited. Only in cases such asTall Trees Corp., where there is clearly no support in the record for the agency's decision, is it appropriate for the Court to reverse the agency decision. Otherwise, the agency must be given deference. ... Consequently, because there was no clear error of law, the Board's decision is not reversible under § 42-35-15(g) and must stand.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal or remand of an agency decision only when an enumerated error has prejudiced the appellant's substantial rights.

Kent Co. Mem. Hos. v. Rhode Island Dept of Health, 05-2089 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-01-31(g)

A Superior Court reviewing an agency decision on appeal may reverse or remand only when substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced by an agency decision that is tainted by one of the six enumerated factors articulated in § 42-35-15 (g).

Section 42-35-15(a) preserves other legally available means of review and relief, including declaratory relief.

Town of Richmond v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management · filed 2008-01-25(a)

Finally, § 42-35-15(a) specifically provides that “utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law” is not precluded by its provisions.

Section 42-35-15 permits a court to remand an agency decision when the agency has not made the basic factual findings needed to support its conclusion.

Divorce Res. v. D.O.L. Training · filed 2009-03-16

The record before this Court reflects that the Hearing Officer "fail[ed] to disclose the basic findings upon which [her] ultimate findings are premised. . . ." Hooper, 104 R.I. at 44,241 A.2d at 815-816. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to the Department of Labor and Training for further and more specific findings.

Section 42-35-15(g)(6) permits a court to set aside an agency sanction that lacks legal authority or factual justification.

Vvsi v. the City of Newport · filed 2010-02-08(g)(6)

The Court evaluates the agency's sanctioning decisions under § 42-35-15(g)(6). An agency's sanction is arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion where the sanction is "unwarranted in law . . . or without justification in fact."

Section 42-35-15(d) requires an agency to transmit the certified record within thirty days after service of the complaint, unless the court allows more time; a late filing does not require reversal when it causes no prejudice.

Frost v. Rhode Island Ctl. Rsrs. Mgmt. · filed 2011-07-21(d)

It is true, as Frost posits, however, that § 42-35-15(d) of the Administrative Procedures Act requires that the agency "transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified record of the entire record of the proceeding under review." It must do so "[w]ithin thirty (30) days after the service of the complaint, or within further time allowed by the court." Section 42-35-15(d). ... Under these circumstances, and mindful that the Administrative Procedures Act establishes no penalty for the untimely filing of a certified record on appeal, seegenerally § 42-35-15, this Court declines to reverse the decision of the C.R.M.C. for its delay of less than two months in filing the certified administrative record.

Section 42-35-15(e) permits a court to require an agency to recertify its record before the court considers a corrected transcript.

Turcotte v. Retire. Bd. of Emp. Retire. · filed 2011-08-01(e)

Thus, for this Court to consider another transcript, the Retirement Board must re-certify the record with the corrected transcript. ... The Retirement Board shall present an appropriate motion pursuant to § 42-35-15(e), accompanied by an affidavit from the stenographer.

Section 42-35-15 allows the Superior Court to remand a case when an agency has left an issue unresolved and a remand is needed for meaningful judicial review.

Perrino v. the Rhode Isd. Bd. of Regents · filed 2011-08-02(g)

The Superior Court's power to order a remand under § 42-35-15 is "merely declaratory of the inherent power of the court to remand, in a proper case, to correct deficiencies in the record." ... Accordingly, this Court will remand the termination date issue to the agency to allow it to engage in the analysis of G.L. § 16-13-3 and § 16-12-6 prior to this Court's analysis.

Section 42-35-15 governs other appeals from retirement board decisions and does not provide counsel fees or costs to successful appellants.

Koback v. Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island · filed 2021-06-24

The APA—specifically § 42-35-15—which governs all other appeals of decisions of the retirement board, also does not provide for awards of counsel fees or costs to successful appellants.