R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to remand an agency decision for further proceedings when the record lacks evidence and findings needed for review.

Mitkem Corp. v. Reitsma, 2001-2175 (2001) · filed 2001-12-24(g)

Because the record is devoid of any evidence or findings of fact, this case is remanded to the agency for further proceedings; to take evidence, make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision in accordance therewith.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand an agency decision when the record does not adequately support or explain it.

Manglass v. Rhode Island Dhs, Pc 03-0125 (2003) · filed 2003-10-06(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15 (g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review for an appeal of a final agency decision. ... There is no reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, however, to support his reason for recommending 15 hours instead of 40. ... This Court thus remands this case to the agency for consideration of the requisite number of hours warranted by the evidence before it.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand an agency decision when inadequate findings prevent meaningful review.

Kershaw v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Services, 05-0632 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-12-06(g)

When record findings are not developed sufficiently, the Superior Court has the authority to remand a case "to correct deficiencies in the record and thus afford the litigants a meaningful review." ... Accordingly, the decision of the DHS is remanded to the DHS for a determination of findings of fact and application of the facts to the relevant regulations herein specified and pursuant to G.L. § 42-35-12.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand an agency decision when its findings lack adequate evidentiary support.

Boutin v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Services, Pc/05-2043 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-04-13(g)

Superior Court review of an administrative decision is made pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). ... After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the DHS failed to meet its burden at step five of the sequential evaluation process by not citing specific medical evidence in support of its conclusion that the appellant can perform sedentary work. Accordingly, the DHS decision is arbitrary and in violation of statutory provisions. Therefore, the matter must be remanded back to DHS for further findings consistent with this decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to vacate and remand an agency order when inadequate findings prevent meaningful judicial review.

Starlight Comm. Hold. v. R.I. D.L.T. · filed 2007-01-23(g)

This Court finds that the findings and conclusions in this case were legally insufficient and do not enable this Court to conduct an adequate review. Consequently, the Board's order is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits remand when missing agency findings prevent meaningful judicial review.

Barth v. Retire. Brd. Emp. Retire. Sys. · filed 2007-01-24(g)

Additionally, the Court may remand a case for further proceedings. Section 42- 35-15(g). ... The Court cannot determine whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence if those findings have not been made. Thus, the Court is unable to undertake an adequate review of the Decision, and remands the Decision to the Retirement Board with instructions to determine whether Barth's alleged re-injury in 1998 meets the statutory standard for an accidental disability pension under Section 36-14-10, making his application timely.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to remand a case to complete the agency record when a missing hearing transcript prevents meaningful review.

Iannotti Bros. Select Cars v. R.I. Dealers · filed 2011-11-01(g)

Under § 42-35-15(g) this Court has broad powers to remand a matter to an agency "to correct deficiencies in the record and thus afford . . . litigants a meaningful review." Lemoine v. Dep't of MentalHealth, Retardation and Hospitals,113 R.I. 285, 290, 320 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1974). Since the absence of a transcript prevents the litigants here from receiving a meaningful review, this Court remands this matter to the Board for the completion of the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits remand for further proceedings when missing factual findings prevent meaningful judicial review.

Riley v. The Narragansett Pension Board · filed 2022-06-02(g)

For that reason (and given the trial justice’s holding with respect to the procedural due process violations by the Board, which holding has not been contested before us), it is our view that, rather than reversing the Board’s decision as the trial justice did, it would be more appropriate for this case to be remanded, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g)12 as well as in the interests of justice, as remand affords all parties the opportunity to have meaningful review.

Section 42-35-15 requires petitioners seeking review to comply with the prescribed procedures.

Camara v. Murphy · filed 1975-02-20

Petition for writ of certiorari is denied for petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act. [G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §42-35-15].

Section 42-35-15(f) allows a court to decline an issue that was not raised in the administrative proceeding and is absent from the record.

Koslow v. R.I. Dept. of Business Regulation, 01-5881 (2002) · filed 2002-11-21(f)

As this issue was not raised during the administrative proceeding and is not contained in the record below, this Court need not consider this issue. General Laws § 42-35-15(f).

Section 42-35-15(f) permits the court to treat the parties’ submitted materials as a stipulated record for review when the agency has not filed a certified record.

Parenti v. McConaghy, 03-2262 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-05-11(f)

As such, this Court will not further await the filing of the certified record but will treat these attachments, although they constitute an unofficial and incomplete record of the proceedings before the hearing officer and the Director, as the stipulated record for purposes of appellate review under R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(f).

Section 42-35-15(g)(1) permits a party to raise a statutory violation in Superior Court even if the party did not raise it before the agency.

Daley v. Falaye · filed 2007-08-06(g)(1)

The Supreme Court's citation to § 42-35-15(g)(1) is important; since that section allows review for "violations of constitutional or statutory provisions," it follows that a statutory provision not raised at the administrative level can nonetheless be raised in the Superior Court.

Section 42-35-15’s review standards do not apply to awards under the State Police Arbitration Act.

State v. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25 · filed 1988-06-28

Clearly these grounds differ greatly from the provisions of § 42-35-15, which are totally irrelevant to this proceeding.

Section 42-35-15(b) gives the District Court jurisdiction over AAD appeals regardless of the amount of the fine.

Richmond Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. State · filed 1989-04-04(b)

Although the District Court is undoubtedly a court of limited jurisdiction, § 31-43-4(9) and § 42-35-15(b) bestows upon it jurisdiction to entertain AAD appeals irrespective of the amount of the fines imposed.

Section 42-35-15(b) governs judicial review of registrar decisions and requires the appeal procedure under the Administrative Procedures Act despite a conflicting provision for certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Larue v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 1990-01-09(b)

Therefore, the apparent conflict between § 42-35-15 and § 31-10-42, which provides for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, is resolved in favor of the procedures provided for in the Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 42-35-15(b) permits review in the superior court of the county where the cause of action arose.

East Greenwich Wine Spirits, Inc. v. Racine, 93-296 (1995) · filed 1995-02-07(b)

However, § 42-35-15(b) continues to state "or in the superior court in which the cause of action arose. . . ." Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the cause of action arose in Kent County and therefore the forum is proper.

Section 42-35-15(b) requires a complaint filed in Superior Court to invoke its jurisdiction for judicial review.

City of Pawtucket v. Laprade · filed 2014-07-02(b)

To do so, however, § 42-35-15(b) clearly dictates that to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, all such "[proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in the superior court * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 42-35-15 does not provide an appeal from a town council’s legislative amendment to a zoning ordinance.

Normand v. the Town Council of the Town of Cumberland, 89-2315 (1991) · filed 1991-02-01

Secondly, the defendant's seek to dismiss Count II of the complaint which purports to invoke the appeal provisions of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15 (1988 Reenactment). However, R.I.G.L. § 42-35-1 clearly states that an administrative agency, in contrast to the legislature and courts, is a governmental entity which either makes rules or determines contested cases. Thus, the plaintiff's appeal pursuant to this statute is inappropriate because when enacting an amendment to the zoning ordinances, a town council is acting in a purely legislative manner.

Section 42-35-15 permits immediate judicial review of a post-election certification ruling when administrative remedies are exhausted and a later election cannot moot the ruling.

Barrington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board · filed 1992-05-08(a)

There was no opportunity to moot the order through a subsequent representation election because the ruling was in the nature of a post-election challenge. All available administrative remedies had been exhausted. It was therefore the sort of agency action that was reviewable immediately pursuant to § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15 allows judicial review of a final agency order in a contested case and may allow immediate review of a nonfinal agency act or ruling when review of the final order would not provide an adequate remedy.

Talbot v. State Board of Registration, Pc-96-0869 (1998) · filed 1998-11-16

Section 42-35-15 permits any person aggrieved by the finalorder of a non-exempt agency in a contested case to obtain judicial review in this Court. Acts and rulings of any agency, which may not be final, may be reviewable immediately in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy. ... The Board has neither acted, nor ruled, nor decided on any matter before it, nor has it issued any order, final or otherwise.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits immediate review of an agency ruling on forum when waiting for a final order would not adequately resolve which forum should hear the case.

Rhode Island Edc v. State, Ri Commission, Human Rights, 02-0882 (2002) · filed 2002-06-27(a)

In this case, EDC's alleged waiver of a Superior Court trial is immediately reviewable because the issue of forum must be resolved before any final decision regarding Addison's claims against EDC is reached.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits immediate judicial review of an interlocutory agency ruling when review after the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.

Southern Union Co. v. Ridem · filed 2007-08-31(a)

In this case, review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy and irreparable harm could result if Mr. Souza, the eighty-seven (87) year old deponent who has already requested to stop one deposition session, is not protected from gratuitous comments and poor treatment from counsel during the course of his deposition because his testimony is likely to be affected. Therefore, this Court exercises its discretion under §42-35-15(a) to hear the present matter.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits immediate judicial review of an intermediate agency ruling when review after a final order would not provide an adequate remedy.

Irons v. the Rhode Island Ethics Comm. · filed 2008-10-29(a)

Though the Ethics Commission has not issued a final determination of the allegations against Irons, the Court notes that this matter is properly before the Superior Court pursuant to § 42-35-15(a), which provides, in relevant part: "Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy." Because Irons contends that the Ethics Commission lacks authority to question him about these allegations because of a deeply rooted constitutional privilege afforded to legislators, the Court concludes that final review of this matter by the Ethics Commission would be inefficient and needlessly waste the parties' resources.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits immediate review of an intermediate agency ruling when review of the final order would not provide an adequate remedy.

Atturio v. Evora · filed 2009-03-19(a)

Section 42-35-15(a) further provides that "[a]ny preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy." ... This Court finds that review of the final agency decision will not provide an adequate remedy to the issue in this case, and that the issue will not become moot in the course of litigation. Accordingly, this Court will exercise its power to review the interlocutory ruling at issue in this case.

Section 42-35-15(a) allows immediate review of an interlocutory agency ruling only when review after a final order would not provide an adequate remedy.

Mohammad Banki, M.D., D.M.D. v. Michael D. Fine, M.D. · filed 2020-01-22(a)

Therefore, for judicial intervention to have been appropriate in the present case, the physicians would have been required to meet the exception laid out in § 42-35-15(a) concerning the appealability of interlocutory orders.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires a final order in a contested case for Superior Court judicial review.

Calise v. Water Resources Board, 91-5689 (1993) · filed 1993-04-12(a)

In order for the Superior Court to take jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the A.P.A., plaintiff must be appealing a contested case. Such was not the case here.

Section 42-35-15 does not authorize judicial review of a parole release decision when no hearing is required and the proceeding is therefore not a contested case.

Pine v. Clark · filed 1994-02-01(a)

Under § 42-35-15, judicial review is authorized for final orders in such cases and in certain other circumstances. We do not find that a hearing is required for the granting of parole. We conclude that this proceeding does not fall under the statute’s definition of a contested case, and therefore, the judicial review section is inapplicable.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits judicial review of a final order in a contested case only when a hearing is required by law; a public comment period does not suffice.

Town of Johnston v. State Planning Council, 93-4099 (1995) · filed 1995-03-01(a)

Since nothing in the statute requires the Council to conduct a hearing, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case. Similarly, this Court lacks jurisdiction, under § 42-35-15, to declare SPC's Rule V-5 and State Guide Plan Element 171 unlawful.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires a contested case for an administrative appeal, except in circumstances not applicable here.

Ricci v. Fugate, 95-1897 (1996) · filed 1996-07-02(a)

Accordingly, the instant matter does not constitute a contested case under the provisions of § 42-35-1(c) and is therefore not appealable pursuant to § 42-35-15(a).

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review only after an agency enters a final decision; an appeal filed before then is premature.

Bayview Towing, Inc. v. Stevenson · filed 1996-05-21

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review of any final order entered by a state governmental board, commission, department, or officer, after hearing, in a contested case.

Section 42-35-15 does not permit an appeal from a board’s refusal to hold a formal hearing when that refusal is not a final decision.

State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board · filed 1997-12-17

The later refusal of the board to hold a formal hearing was also not a final decision from which an appeal could be taken under § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(a) allows judicial review of a final licensing decision as a contested case only when a hearing is required by law.

Mosby v. McAteer, 99-6504 (2001) · filed 2001-01-11(a)

Without the requisite hearing requirement, the application process at the Attorney General's office for a license to carry a concealed weapon cannot be considered a contested case that would subject it to the APA. Therefore, the Superior Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction to review the grant or denial of an application to carry a concealed weapon, and judicial review of a decision from the Attorney General to grant or deny a license under R.I.G.L. § 11-47-18 should be sought from the Supreme Court.

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review of a final order in a contested case after available administrative remedies have been exhausted; it does not permit an appeal of rulemaking that is not a contested case.

Interstate Navigation Company v. Division of Public Ut., 01-5095 (2002) · filed 2002-06-27(a)

Because a hearing in this administrative matter was not required, this cannot be considered a contested case. Therefore, the judicial review of contested agency cases allowed in G.L. § 42-35-15 of the APA is not applicable to the instant appeal of the Division's rulemaking, "and any exercise of jurisdiction predicated on this section by the Superior Court is invalid." Bradford Assocs., 772 A.2d at 489.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits judicial review of a CRMC permit extension only when an objection or hearing request makes the matter a contested case.

Bonnet Shores Beach Club v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources, 00-3255 (2003) · filed 2003-10-28(a)

Accordingly, the APA does not permit judicial review of the CRMC Executive Director's decision to grant or deny a permit extension unless a party filed an objection or requested a hearing on the matter.

Section 42-35-15 does not provide judicial review of an agency employment decision that is not a contested case.

Burgess v. Npha, 04-5801 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-08-02

However, this action is not a contested case and thus is not subject to the APA.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the reviewing court from reweighing agency findings of fact but permits it to review questions of law freely.

School Comm., Town of S. Kingstown v. St. of R.I. Comm., 91-8378 (1993) · filed 1993-08-31(g)

While the court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the agency regarding the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact, Costa v.Registry of Motor Vehicles, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (R.I. 1988), this court "may freely review questions of law to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Chenot v.Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891, 893 (R.I. 1989); Carmody v. RhodeIsland Conflict of Interest Commission, 509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986).

Subsection (g) leaves witness credibility and the weight of evidence to the agency when its findings have competent evidentiary support.

Marciano v. Department of Environmental Management, 91-4722 (1993) · filed 1993-09-14(g)

Clearly, the question of credibility and the weight to be given to such evidence was for the Board and not this Court. Because this Court finds there is competent evidence in the record to support the Board's findings, they will not be disturbed.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or the evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Zabchuck v. Ri Department of Human Services, 93-3072 (1993) · filed 1993-11-30(g)

When reviewing an agency decision this court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) prohibits a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Baker v. Department of Employment & Training Board of Review · filed 1994-02-11(g)

Accordingly, when reviewing an agency decision, the District Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to affirm an agency decision supported by substantial evidence when the decision is neither clearly erroneous nor arbitrary or capricious.

Kroll v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 93-3396 (1994) · filed 1994-04-11(g)

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds, after a review of the whole record, that the decision of the Agency was based on the substantial evidence before it. The Court further finds that the Agency's decision is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, substantial evidence contained in the record, it is not arbitrary or capricious, and it is not characterized by any abuse of the Agency's discretion. Accordingly, the decision of the Agency is affirmed.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing agency evidence or credibility and permits reversal of factual findings only when they lack competent evidentiary support.

E.G. G Sealol, Inc. v. Commission for Human Rights, 93-0836 (1994) · filed 1994-07-06(g)

The court's review of a decision of the Commission is controlled by G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g) which controls appeals from administrative agencies in general. ... Accordingly, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the credibility or weight of the evidence that was presented to the agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars a court from substituting its judgment for the agency's.

Stromberg v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 86-3396 (1994) · filed 1994-07-26(g)

This court is mindful that its jurisdiction is limited under § 42-35-15(g) and it, therefore, may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.

Section 42-35-15 limits review of an agency decision to whether competent evidence supports it.

Lafazia v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 93-0281 (1994) · filed 1994-10-26

In appeals such as this, the discretion of the reviewing justice is carefully circumscribed by both the controlling statute, R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15. and decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The criteria to be employed in reviewing the decision of the administrative body is the "some" or "any" evidence test.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of agency fact findings to whether legally competent evidence supports the decision; the court may not reweigh the evidence.

Moreau v. Department of Environmental Management, 91-6342 (1994) · filed 1994-11-03(g)

Superior Court review of an agency decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g) which provides: ... The court is limited to a determination of whether there is any legally competent evidence to support the decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that rests on an error of law or is clearly erroneous in light of the record.

RI Pub. Tel. Auth. v. RI Labor Rel. Bd. · filed 1994-12-02(g)

Under the terms of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (APA), § 42-35-15, judicial review is restricted to questions that the agency itself might properly entertain. ... We conclude, therefore, that the board's decision rested upon an error of law and was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record.

Section 42-35-15 restricts judicial review to questions the agency itself could properly consider.

Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board · filed 1994-12-02

Under the terms of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (APA), § 42-35-15, judicial review is restricted to questions that the agency itself might properly entertain.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Camp III v. Department of Human Services, 94-1792 (1995) · filed 1995-02-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence and limits review to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision.

Gould v. R.I. Building Contractors' Registration Board, Wc91-753 (1995) · filed 1995-04-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in a contested agency decision.

Sabetti v. R.I. Bd. of Registration Professional Engr., 93-5432 (1995) · filed 1995-05-26(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reassessing witness credibility or reweighing evidence on factual questions.

Coogan v. Barile, 90-4545 (1995) · filed 1995-05-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Alegria Constr. v. Bldg. Contractors' Registration Bd., 93-4135 (1995) · filed 1995-05-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) limits a court’s review of agency findings and allows reversal when specified defects prejudice an appellant’s substantial rights.

Ace Auto Service Sales v. R.I. Division of Pub. Util., 93-5415 (1995) · filed 1995-05-31(g)

Therefore, the PUC's decision was not "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of the whole record" nor "[a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion" nor "[i]n excess of [its] authority" thereby prejudicing the rights of the plaintiff. G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Peterson v. Horan, 92-1253 (1995) · filed 1995-06-05(g)

Section 42-35-15 precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

State of R.I. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Board, 94-1434 (1995) · filed 1995-06-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Doe v. Providence School Board, 94-5669 (1995) · filed 1995-07-20(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a court to uphold an agency decision when legally competent evidence supports it.

Gaynor v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 93-1959 (1993) · filed 1993-12-03(g)

This court's review of the DHS decision is governed by Section 42-35-15(g) of the Rhode Island General Laws which provides in part: ... Thus, the court must uphold the agency decision if it finds any legally competent evidence to support the agency decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Andreozzi v. Coastal Resource Management Council, 93-6791 (1995) · filed 1995-08-08(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

D'Allesandro v. Annerummo, 93-4913 (1995) · filed 1995-08-21(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Jerejian v. Rhode Island Dept. of Environmental Management, 94-2910 (1995) · filed 1995-09-25(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in an agency decision.

Norwood Motor Group, Inc. v. Hurd Buick-Gmc, Inc., 94-6889 (1995) · filed 1995-10-20(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Mitchell v. State, 92-5291 (1995) · filed 1995-10-20(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Messina v. Department of Human Services, 95-0741 (1995) · filed 1995-11-01(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency's factual findings to whether substantial evidence supports them.

Mattera v. Personnel Appeal Board, 94-1548 (1995) · filed 1995-11-07(g)

Therefore, this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and requires it to uphold findings supported by competent evidence in the record.

City of East Providence v. Bodell, 95-1778 (1995) · filed 1995-12-06(g)

Rather, this Court must confine itself to a review of the record to determine if legally competent evidence exists to support the agency decision. If competent evidence exists in the record considered as a whole, the Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Amaral v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 94-5874 (1995) · filed 1995-12-06(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Casinelli v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 94-2403 (1995) · filed 1995-12-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(4) permits a court to uphold an agency decision when the facts support more than one reasonable conclusion and the agency was not clearly wrong.

Rocky Hill School, Inc. v. State Department of Employment & Training, Board of Review · filed 1995-12-07(g)(4)

In the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the facts as found could have led to more than one reasonable conclusion. We cannot say that the board committed an error of law or was clearly wrong in resolving the mixed question of law and fact in concluding as it did that claimant had left his employment voluntarily with good cause. Therefore, the trial justice was correct under the standards set forth within G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g)(4), in upholding the decision of the board.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment for an agency’s on questions of fact.

D'Ioroio v. State, 92-8103 (1995) · filed 1995-12-08(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency’s factual findings.

Stolasz v. State, 92-1401 (1995) · filed 1995-12-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Lucier v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-0742 (1996) · filed 1996-01-06

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits reversal of an agency decision when it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Conte v. Department of Human Services, 92-4584 (1993) · filed 1993-10-06(g)(5)

For the reasons stated, this court finds that the decision of DHS was not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Section 42-35-15 does not require a reviewing court to defer to an administrator's factual conclusions when the administrator overlooks or misconceives patently material evidence.

Town of Lincoln Bd. of License Commissioners v. Racine, 93-1287 (1993) · filed 1993-11-26

This Court has no alternative other than to conclude that the Administrator overlooked or misconceived patently material evidence. Accordingly, this Court is not bound by § 42-35-15 to defer to the Administrator's fact-bound conclusions.

Section 42-35-15 requires courts to review agency fact-finding based on the record before the agency and the sufficiency of evidence supporting its findings.

Palazzolo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 86-1496 (1995) · filed 1995-01-05

First, under § 42-35-15 this Court reviews the agency's fact-finding on the basis of the record before the agency. It is the sufficiency of the evidence in the record to support the facts found by the agency which is tested judicially on administrative appeal.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

General Properties, Inc. v. Durfee, 93-4920 (1994) · filed 1994-10-05(g)

This Court is forbidden from substituting its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the administrative agency on questions of fact. § 42-35-15(g); EnvironmentalScientific Corporation v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200 (R.I. 1993).

Section 42-35-15 requires a reviewing court to affirm an agency decision when substantial evidence supports it and no other ground for reversal is shown.

Rhode Island Towing Assoc. v. R.I. Public Util. Comm., 93-5116 (1994) · filed 1994-09-29(g)

Moreover, the court must affirm if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision and no other violation under § 42-35-15 is shown.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows a court to reject agency factual findings that are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support.

Rocha v. State of R.I. Util. Comm., 94-1159 (1995) · filed 1995-05-30(g)

Thus, this court finds that under § 42-35-15(g), the PUC's findings that the Tempo was not stolen from Rocha's South Attleboro lot and that he "performed some kind of shell game to conceal the car" are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support.

Section 42-35-15 permits reversal of agency action when a specified error prejudices a party, including action beyond the agency's statutory authority.

Dionne v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 95-2085 (1995) · filed 1995-11-07

Pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, judicial review is limited, with reversal of agency action occurring only when there has been prejudice as a result of agency action which is 1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 2) In excess of statutory authority; 3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 4) Affected by other error of law; 5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion. ...For the reasons stated herein, the court finds the Order of the Commission was made in excess of statutory authority. The case is therefore remanded to the Commission with instructions to modify the Order by striking out the offending provisions so that it may accurately reflect the agreement of the parties.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Frament v. the R.I. Board of Registration for Engineers, 94-0681 (1996) · filed 1996-01-11(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Emond v. Durfee, 91-0237 (1996) · filed 1996-01-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Decredico v. City of Providence Board of Licenses, 95-1051 (1996) · filed 1996-01-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) allows a court to overturn an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Technic, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Employment & Training · filed 1996-01-23(g)(5)

Accordingly, we must consider whether the board’s determination that claimant was not discharged for reasons of proved misconduct within the meaning of § 28-44-18 was “[cjlearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Section 42-35-15(g)(5). ... Consequently, we hold that the decision of the board was clearly erroneous in view of the substantial, reliable, and undisputed evidence on the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Buonomano v. Coastal Resource Management Council, 95-1748 (1996) · filed 1996-01-25(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and permits reversal when an agency decision is clearly erroneous on the whole record and prejudices substantial rights.

Crawford v. State of R.I. and Providence Plantations, 94-6728 (1996) · filed 1996-02-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing Court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency regarding the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Ventetuolo v. Department of Health, 95-1222 (1996) · filed 1996-02-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing Court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an administrative appeal.

Diluglio v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 85-4556 (1996) · filed 1996-02-14(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

State of Rhode Island v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 93-7051 (1996) · filed 1996-03-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Pacheco v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, P-95-5172 (1996) · filed 1996-03-22(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights · filed 1996-04-05(g)

In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, the Superior Court shall not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” G.L.1956 § 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15 prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Armstrong v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-1809 (1996) · filed 1996-04-10

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Skaliotis v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-2438 (1996) · filed 1996-04-18(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Zona v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 93-5852 (1996) · filed 1996-05-01

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Carrier v. Personnel Appeal Board, 95-5591 (1996) · filed 1996-05-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Center for Behavioral Health, R.I., Inc. v. Barros, 94-3974 (1996) · filed 1996-05-16(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reassessing witness credibility or reweighing evidence on questions of fact.

Craveiro v. the Employees' Retirement System, 95-1816 (1996) · filed 1996-05-28(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Soares v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 95-1198 (1996) · filed 1996-06-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Sullivan v. Rhode Island Dept. of Environmental Management, 95-3817 (1996) · filed 1996-07-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows a reviewing court to decide questions of law independently of the agency’s conclusions.

Town of Coventry v. State Labor Relations Board, 92-980 (1996) · filed 1996-07-12(g)

However, Agency determinations as to questions of law are not binding upon a reviewing court and may be freely reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing agency factfinding.

McLaughlin Moran, Inc. v. State, 94-3361 (1996) · filed 1996-07-25(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or to the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Pellegrino v. Whitehouse, 95-5674 (1996) · filed 1996-07-29(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Wilcox v. Lindgren, 96-0329 (1996) · filed 1996-08-05(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Fiore v. Keeney, 96-0110 (1996) · filed 1996-08-22(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and permits reversal of an agency decision that lacks substantial evidentiary support.

Harold v. State, 95-5246 (1996) · filed 1996-09-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Fremming v. Rhode Island Dept. of Children, Youth Families, 93-6819 (1996) · filed 1996-09-20(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence but permits reversal of an agency decision that is arbitrary, procedurally unlawful, or clearly erroneous.

Yashar v. Whitehouse, 95-0193 (1996) · filed 1996-10-11(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Bay View Towing, Inc. v. State, Public Utilities Commission, 94-1952 (1996) · filed 1996-10-15(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Laprade v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 94-2933 (1996) · filed 1996-10-21(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Tyler Underwriting Services, Inc. v. Hittner, 96-1622 (1996) · filed 1996-11-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Mullen v. the Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 95-198 (1996) · filed 1996-11-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when the decision lacks substantial evidence or abuses discretion and prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights.

East Greenwich Oil Co., Inc. v. Kenney, Pc95-5901 (1996) · filed 1996-12-17(g)

After review of the entire record, this Court finds that the agency's decision was not supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record and constituted an abuse of discretion such that substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. The decision is hereby reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency’s factual findings.

Disano v. Personnel Appeal Board, 95-4754 (1997) · filed 1997-01-08(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Parkhurst v. Rhode Island Dept. of Environmental Management, 94-0371 (1997) · filed 1997-01-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on factual questions.

Bristol v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 95-6605 (1997) · filed 1997-01-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Fines v. Personnel Appeals Board, 95-5103 (1997) · filed 1997-03-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of evidence concerning facts.

Genao v. State, 96-6276 (1997) · filed 1997-05-09(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a court to uphold an agency decision supported by legally competent evidence unless a statutory ground for reversal applies.

Hebert v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 95-4006 (1997) · filed 1997-06-04(g)

If any legally competent evidence exists, this Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions unless they rest on any of the six criteria listed above.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing agency fact findings.

Francisco v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 94-6615 (1997) · filed 1997-08-04(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reassessing witness credibility or reweighing evidence on factual questions.

Rocha v. State of Rhode Island Utilities Commission, 95-4150 (1996) · filed 1996-02-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Shotcrete Systems Int'l v. Contractors' Registration Bd., 94-0569 (1997) · filed 1997-08-06(g)

This section precludes this Court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Brown University v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 95-4690 (1997) · filed 1997-08-06(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility and limits factual review to whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision.

Rhode Island Dep't, Corrections v. R.I. Comm'n, Human Rights, 97-0360 (1997) · filed 1997-08-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Subsection (g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

City of Pawtucket v. R.I. Dept. of Business Regulations, 96-2701 (1997) · filed 1997-09-29(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Cavanagh v. Department of Children, Youth, and Families, 94-1489 (1996) · filed 1996-01-26(g)

After a through review of the record, this Court finds that the decision of DCYF was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence. Accordingly, the February 8, 1994 decision of the DCYF is reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency fact findings and bars a court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s when competent evidence supports the findings.

Bunch v. Board of Review, Rhode Island Department of Employment & Training · filed 1997-02-25(g)

Judicial review of questions of fact is sharply limited in accordance with G.L.1956 § 42-35-15, which reads as follows in pertinent part: ... In the case at bar we conclude that the District Court judge substituted his judgment for that of the board of review in drawing the inference from all the relatively undisputed facts that claimant’s conduct was not job related.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to remand an agency decision when its findings lack reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.

Town of Warren v. Coastal Resource Management Council, 96-2634 (1997) · filed 1997-10-08(g)

The review of a decision of the Commission by this Court is controlled by R.I.G.L § 42-35-15(g), which provides for review of a contested agency decision: ... After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the agency decision is based on findings which are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the record. Accordingly, this case is remanded to CRMC for findings of fact with respect to the issue of MHW and MLW marks.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Bastien v. Haronian, Kc92-1232 (1997) · filed 1997-11-05(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Letts v. Building Contractors' Registration Board, Pc96-6157 (1997) · filed 1997-11-25(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility and permits remand when agency findings lack substantial evidentiary support.

Rhode Island Public Towing v. State, Division, Public Util., 97-3730 (1998) · filed 1998-01-07(g)

The review of a decision of the Division by this Court is controlled by R.I.G.L § 42-35-15(g), which provides for review of a contested agency decision: ... This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment for an agency’s on factual questions.

Pratt v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 96-6490 (1998) · filed 1998-02-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988); Carmody v. R.I. Conflict of Interest Commission,509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986).

Subsection (g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Marcello v. State, Coastal Resources Management Council, 95-0214 (1998) · filed 1998-02-11(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Pawtucket Housing Authority v. R.I. Labor Relations Board, 95-5908 (1998) · filed 1998-03-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or other factual evidence in an administrative appeal.

Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998) · filed 1998-04-24(g)

This statutory provision precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency regarding the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of an agency decision to the certified record and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros · filed 1998-05-20(g)

In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, the Superior Court is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine whether the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Section 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Giarrusso v. Vincent, 97-3848 (1998) · filed 1998-05-24(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on factual questions.

Olivieri Moderen Boating v. McLeod, 97-4189 (1998) · filed 1998-06-03(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

M.C. Woonsocket, Inc. v. Hittner, Pc97-0799 (1998) · filed 1998-10-01(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on factual questions.

Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Assoc. v. Nolan, 95-5301 (1998) · filed 1998-10-02(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Re-Nu Homes, Inc. v. Building Contractor's Registration, Pc 97-1278 (1998) · filed 1998-10-02(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Alpine Nursing Home v. Nolan, 98-3030 (1998) · filed 1998-11-19(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

El Gabri v. Rhode Island Bd. of Med. Lic., 97-4344 (1998) · filed 1998-12-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Dibiasio v. Salco Construction, Inc., Pc/98-4636 (1999) · filed 1999-04-19(g)

This Court is forbidden from substituting its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. G.L. § 42-35-15 (g).

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing factual evidence or substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility.

Gravino v. City of Warwick, 97-1533 (1999) · filed 1999-06-17(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Cortes v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 98-4667 (1999) · filed 1999-07-16(g)

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Tiverton Library Board v. State Labor Relations Board, 97-4529 (1999) · filed 1999-08-02(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing agency evidence and permits affirmance when substantial evidence supports the agency's decision.

Fatulli v. Bowen's Wharf, Co., Inc., 99-0284 (1999) · filed 1999-08-20(g)

The essential function of the CRMC is to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence at the hearing to determine whether or not Bowen's application should have been granted. This Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the CRMC. § 42-35-15 (g). The record contains substantial evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the decision of the CRMC.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities, 98-4804 (1999) · filed 1999-08-31(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 limits Superior Court review of agency factual findings: the court may not reweigh evidence or witness credibility when substantial evidence supports those findings.

State Dept. of Labor Training v. Rhode Island State Labor, 98-1467 (1999) · filed 1999-10-22(5)(g)

When reviewing a decision of an agency, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency board on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses, Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra,572 A.2d 286, 288 (R.I. 1990) (citing Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge,120 R.I. 283, 291, 387 A.2d 1034, 1038 (1978)); Center for BehavioralHealth, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998), where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the board's findings.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Rhode Island Dept. of Corrs. v. Rhode Island State Labor, 99-0230 (1999) · filed 1999-10-29(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Bourbon Street v. Newport Board of License Commissioners, 99-259 (1999) · filed 1999-12-06(g)

This section precludes a reviewing Court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency regarding the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 bars a reviewing court from reweighing factual evidence but permits it to review questions of law.

Manfredi v. State, 98-3217 (1999) · filed 1999-12-29

Although pursuant to § 42-35-15, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency regarding the weight of the evidence regarding questions of fact, this Court may properly review questions of law to determine the law's applicability to the facts.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reassessing witness credibility or the weight of evidence on factual questions.

Ruginis v. Rhode Island Contractors' Registration Board, 98-4005 (2000) · filed 2000-01-28(g)

When reviewing an order of an agency, this Court lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.