R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15

Section 42-35-15(b) supplies the procedures and standards for reviewing tax administrator decisions under §44-19-18; the Superior Court does not hear those appeals de novo.

Herald Press, Inc. v. Norberg · filed 1979-08-27(b)

In the present case, we believe that the procedures and standards of review contained in §42-35-15(b) were clearly intended to be incorporated into the provisions of §44-19-18. In fact, the only identifiable disparity between these sections is the period in which appeals must be filed. Accordingly, we conclude that Herald was not entitled to a de novo review in the Superior Court and that the procedure was properly conducted under the provisions of §42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15 provides judicial review of agency decisions after administrative remedies are exhausted; it does not govern an equitable enforcement action where no administrative process was initiated.

Wood v. Davis · filed 1985-03-12

Only following the exhaustion of administrative remedies may an appeal be taken to the Superior Court under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, for judicial review of the agency decision. ... These provisions, however, are not applicable to the instant ease. The defendants never applied for a permit to alter the wetland on their property, nor did they request an administrative hearing to challenge the orders issued by DEM against them.

Section 42-35-15 provides for Superior Court review after administrative remedies are exhausted, including review of an arbitrary or capricious agency decision that prejudices substantial rights.

Wellington Hotel Associates v. Miner · filed 1988-06-02

The petitioner is first required to seek relief from the CRMC. Chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act, provides for Superior Court review in situations in which all administrative remedies have been exhausted. One of the grounds for appeal set forth in § 42-35-15 is that substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because an administrative decision is arbitrary, or capricious or is characterized by an abuse of discretion.

Section 42-35-15(g) governs District Court review of administrative board decisions.

Delicato v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING · filed 1994-06-20(g)

The District Court’s review of board decisions is governed by G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g), which is part of the Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse an agency decision that prejudices substantial rights through legal error or arbitrary action.

Idc Clambakes, Inc. v. Gordon, 96-0584 (1997) · filed 1997-08-04(g)

Superior Court review of an administrative decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 (g), which provides: ... The denial of the application for a Class B Public Entertainment License in this matter was in violation of constitutional and statutory provisions. It was in excess of the statutory authority of the City Council. It was arbitrary and was characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Substantial rights of the plaintiff have been prejudiced thereby. Accordingly, the City Council's decision is hereby reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision affected by legal error or unsupported by substantial evidence when the decision prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Licht v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 97-3013 (1998) · filed 1998-03-09(g)

After a review of the record and the arguments of counsel, this Court finds that the Commission's decision that the appellant violated 36-14-5(a); 36-14-5(b) and 36-14-6 is based on findings which are not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record and is affected by error of law. By imposing a fine of $500.00, substantial rights of the appellant were prejudiced. Accordingly, the decision of the Commission is hereby reversed.

Section 42-35-15(a) does not authorize judicial review of a district court chief judge’s decision because courts are excluded from the APA’s definition of agency.

Kirk v. Constable Disciplinary Board, District Court, 98-5576 (2000) · filed 2000-07-03(a)

Rhode Island General Laws 1956 § 42-35-15 (a) provides that "[a]ny person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review." ... Based on this definition of "agency" that expressly excludes "the legislature or the courts" from its scope, this Court lacks the proper subject matter jurisdiction to review the instant appeal under the APA.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of zoning board decisions to the statutory standards, including whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Hayden v. Town or Westerly Zoning Board of Review, Wc 96-0600 (1998) · filed 1998-05-15(g)

When reviewing a decision of a zoning board, this section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of a zoning board in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact. ... Therefore, this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's decision. ... However, questions of law are not binding upon a reviewing court and may be freely reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts. ... As a result, this Court finds that substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the decision of the Zoning Board is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review of a final agency decision only for a person aggrieved by that decision.

DeCesare v. Board of Elections · filed 1968-06-05(a)

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the members of the local board and Thomas Ryan were not persons aggrieved by the decision of the state board within the intendment of §42-35-15, supra. Consequently, they were without standing in the superior court and the judgment adverse to the petitioner, which alone was before us, is quashed.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires a party seeking judicial review to be aggrieved; a local licensing authority lacks standing when the agency decision does not substantially affect its rights or impose a burden on it.

Ramsay v. Sarkas · filed 1972-10-12(a)

The trial justice then concluded that nothing in the record established that the decision of the state licensing authority adversely affected in any substantial manner some personal or property right of the local licensing authority or imposed any burden or obligation upon it. She further concluded that the local licensing authority was not aggrieved within the meaning of §42-35-15(a) and dismissed the appeal. With this conclusion we agree.

A person is aggrieved under §42-35-15 if they allege an injury in fact.

East Greenwich Yacht Club v. Coastal Resources Management Council · filed 1977-07-11

“The question is whether the person whose standing is challenged has alleged an injury in fact * * * if he has, he satisfies the requirement of standing.”...While not adopted with specific reference to the statute here in question, this standard accurately defines an aggrieved person within the meaning of §42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(b) requires an appeal from a tax administrator’s decision within thirty days; its deadline supersedes the older four-month period for tax appeals.

Great American Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Norberg · filed 1981-12-24(b)

Therefore, when the act became effective in 1964, its thirty-day limitation period obviously supplanted the four-month limitation period of § 44-11-35. ... In conclusion, we hold that the failure of the taxpayers to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act provision requiring appeals to be brought within thirty days of the tax administrator’s decision precluded relief in the District Court.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires a party seeking review to show an injury in fact based on circumstances existing when it files its appeal; a possible future injury is insufficient.

Newman-Crosby Steel, Inc. v. Fascio · filed 1980-12-19(a)

In order for such standing to exist, the company was required to demonstrate that it was “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 42-35-15(a) by the board’s exempting Ksen and his fellow employees from the six-week-waiting-period proviso to which we have previously alluded. ... This showing must be based on the facts existing at the time the action is brought; it cannot depend on circumstances that may exist sometime after suit is commenced.

Section 42-35-15 provides for judicial review of an agency decision on its merits; the court allowed thirty days from its opinion to seek that review.

Washington Highway Development, Inc. v. Bendick · filed 1990-06-13

As a result, we shall provide that Washington may have a period of thirty-days from the date of filing of this opinion in which to seek review of the director’s decision pursuant to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(a) allows an aggrieved person to seek judicial review, but an agency does not qualify as a person under the APA.

State of R.I. Dept. of Children v. Personnel Appeal Bd., 92-2428 (1995) · filed 1995-06-01(a)

If the "person" to whom judicial review is made available does not include an "agency," as the word is defined in § 42-35-1(g), then DCYF, being an agency, does not have standing to appeal an adverse decision of the PAB to this Court.

Section 42-35-15 gives an aggrieved person thirty days after mailing of an agency’s final decision to file for judicial review in Superior Court.

Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Dealers, Pc 97-3533 (1999) · filed 1999-05-19(a), (b)

However, the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35 of title 42 (A.P.A.), requires that persons aggrieved by a final order in a contested case file a complaint in the Superior Court "within thirty (30) days after mailing notice of the final decision of the agency," (G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 (a) (b). Accordingly, the mailing date of the Director's final decision will dictate whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.

The thirty-day period for seeking judicial review does not apply when the appellant has received no notice of a final agency decision.

Gunther v. State, 99-0499 (2002) · filed 2002-11-27(b)

The thirty-day time restriction for the Appellant to file with this Court under G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(b) is not applicable because he was never given a temporal reference via notice of a final decision in his appeal, as required by G.L. 1956 § 36-4-41.

Section 42-35-15(a) gives an aggrieved party standing to appeal an agency order even when the order is directed to someone else, if it could substantially affect the party’s property rights.

Providence Auto Body v. Dept. of Business Reg., 05-3580 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-12-01(a)

Section 42-35-15 gives standing to an "aggrieved" party. ... To obtain standing, therefore, the party need not be the individual to whom the Order is directed. Here, the Court finds, as did the DBR, that PAB has a proprietary interest in the documents. This interest could be injured were PAB not allowed to challenge the Order, as allegedly confidential or private information would be disclosed. Thus, PAB has standing to bring this appeal.

Section 42-35-15(a) permits judicial review only for an aggrieved party whose injury could be redressed by the requested relief.

Heritage Healthcare Serv. v. Marques, Pb · filed 2007-08-09(a)

Under the APA, only an "aggrieved" party is entitled to judicial review. Section 42-35-15(a). ... The creation of Castle Hill has not caused Heritage any "injury-in-fact" that could be redressed by the requested relief.

Section 42-35-15 requires a person bringing an administrative appeal to be aggrieved; an organization must allege a particular injury to its members to have standing.

Conservation Law Foundation v. Gray, 05-1958 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-01-27

Section 42-35-15 of the APA requires that in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal pursuant to that section, a party must be a "person aggrieved."

Section 42-35-15 permits an agency to seek judicial review under the public interest exception when the dispute involves a substantial public interest.

State of Rhode Island v. Personnel Appeal · filed 2007-10-24

After review of the record before it, the Court finds that the Department had standing to bring this appeal under the public interest exception to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, and that the PAB, while properly exercising its authority to review issues of salary in a reclassification case, lacked sufficient evidence and acted arbitrarily in ruling that McGovern would maintain his current salary.

Section 42-35-15 permits an agency to seek judicial review under the public interest exception when the issues involve a substantial public interest.

State v. State · filed 2008-01-22(a)

After review of the record before it, this Court finds that the Division of Personnel Administration had standing to bring the instant appeal under the public interest exception to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires a party appealing a final order in a contested case to show that it is aggrieved by the agency's decision.

Champlin's Realty Associates v. Tikoian · filed 2009-02-24(a)

Though the CRMC adjudicatory decision denying Champlin's application is a final order in a contested case and, therefore, a proper subject to judicial review under § 42-35-15 of the RIAPA, in order for the Town to bring such an appeal, the Town must first qualify as a aggrieved party. Because the Town fails to even allege injury in fact arising out of the decision and, examining the record, the Court cannot identify one, this Court must dismiss the Town's appeal.

Section 42-35-15 bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of evidence concerning factual questions.

Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Security · filed 1970-02-16

Section 42-35-15 prescribes the limitations on the fact-finding power of the Superior Court on a review of an administrative agency’s decisions. It provides, in pertinent part: “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” In the circumstances and in view of the statutory limitation on the Superior Court, we are of the opinion that it properly sustained the finding of the board of review that claimant’s employment was not within the coverage of §28-42-4.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) requires a court to affirm an agency's factual findings when more than one inference is possible, unless the findings are clearly erroneous.

Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare · filed 1980-01-18(g)(5)

In respect to such questions, when more than one inference is possible, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are “clearly erroneous.” Section 42-35-15(g)(5).

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of an agency decision: the court does not reweigh evidence and may sustain a decision supported by legal evidence.

Hamaker v. Gagnon · filed 1972-12-01(f), (g)

Our duty under the statute is not to weigh the evidence, but merely to examine the record to determine whether there is any legal evidence or reasonable inference therefrom to support the findings of the board and the Superior Court. ... In passing ón petitioner’s appeal, the trial justice, in accordancé with the powers conferred upon the Superior Court by the provisions of §42-35-15(f) and '(g), and on the basis of all the evidence and exhibits' presented, found that the board’s finding and decision were not clearly erroneous.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits reversal of an agency decision that prejudices a party’s rights when the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.

Millerick v. Fascio · filed 1978-04-06(g)(5)

This inference supports the trial justice’s conclusion that petitioners’ decision on remand prejudiced the rights of respondent because it was clearly erroneous in light of the only reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record. We hold therefore that the reversal by the trial justice of the amended decision of petitioners was appropriate under §42-35-15(g) (5).

Section 42-35-15 limits District Court review to the certified agency record unless procedural irregularities are alleged and bars the court from substituting its judgment on factual issues the agency resolved.

Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review · filed 1980-05-07(f) and (g)

Under subsections (f) and (g), absent allegations of irregularities in the administrative procedure, the District Court must review only the certified record and cannot substitute its judgment on issues of fact that the agency resolved.

Section 42-35-15 sets the standards for the first level of judicial review of an agency decision; the Supreme Court’s certiorari review is likewise confined by those standards.

Almstead v. Department of Employment Security · filed 1984-07-27

These standards are contained in G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-15 of our Adminis ... trative Procedures Act and govern the first level of judicial review.

Section 42-35-15 limits the District Court’s review of an agency decision for errors of law and clearly erroneous factual findings.

Hackett v. Murray · filed 1986-04-24

It is the District Court that is narrowly circumscribed in its appellate review by § 28-44-54, which prohibits the District Court from substituting its judgment on issues of fact resolved by the agency, Berberian v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I.1980), and by the provisions of § 42-85-15, the Administrative Procedures Act. ... It seems clear that the board’s determination of the claimant’s eligibility based upon her full-time employment with Amoriggi Sea Foods was not assailable on review by the District Court, either as an error of law or as a clearly erroneous finding of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of evidence on factual questions.

Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission · filed 1986-05-20(g)

The scope of this court’s review of administrative-agency decisions is limited by the Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15(g). The court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) and (6) limits when a court may reverse an agency finding of fact, including findings that are clearly erroneous on the record or arbitrary or capricious.

Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management · filed 1986-07-21(g)(5), (6)

General Laws 1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 42-35 — 15(g)(5), (6) does not allow a court to reverse a finding of fact by an administrative agency unless it is "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or * * * [arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of agency findings to whether legally competent evidence supports them.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of RI v. Caldarone · filed 1987-02-10(g)

The trial justice correctly stated that his review in this situation was limited to determining whether the findings of the director are supported by legally competent evidence.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review to matters the agency could properly consider; its provision for review of legal and constitutional errors does not permit a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute creating the agency.

Easton's Point Ass'n v. Coastal Resources Management Council · filed 1987-03-10(g)

The statutory reference to errors of law or violation of constitutional provisions does not extend the purview of the Superi- or Court to include consideration of challenges to the constitutionality of the statute upon which the administrative agency is based, but only determinations by the agency that might in themselves violate statutory or constitutional principles.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse or modify agency findings that are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Craig v. Pare · filed 1985-08-23(g)

Certainly, the findings of the hearing officer were not erroneous in view of the reliable evidence on the record. The hearing officer not only correctly relied on the accident report, as allowed by statute, but also had the benefit of Officer Mu-sard’s testimony in finding that Craig was the driver of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. We hold, therefore, that the probative evidence properly considered by the hearing officer was more than sufficient to support the hearing officer’s decision to suspend Craig’s license.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to uphold an agency’s resolution of a mixed question of law and fact when the supported facts allow more than one reasonable conclusion and the agency made no error of law.

D'Ambra v. Board of Review · filed 1986-11-18(g)

In the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the facts as found could have led to more than one reasonable conclusion. We cannot say that the board committed an error of law or was clearly wrong in resolving the mixed question of law and fact in concluding as it did that the employee had left his employment voluntarily without good cause. Therefore, the justice of the District Court was correct under the standards set forth in G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g), as amended by P.L.1981, ch. 40, § 1, in upholding the decision of the board.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions to questions of law; courts review whether the evidence supports the decision without weighing it anew.

St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray · filed 1989-04-26

Under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, ... judicial review of an agency determination is limited to questions of law. ... The court does not weigh evidence or findings of fact, but merely reviews them to see whether they support the agency’s decision.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review to whether competent evidence supports the decision and whether its legal conclusions are correct.

Robert Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Employment Security Board of Review, Department of Employment Security · filed 1990-03-29

Our review of the case is limited to a determination of whether there was competent evidence in the record to support the decision and whether the conclusions of law were correct. Section 42-35-15; see Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 482-83 (R.I.1980).

Section 42-35-15 limits Superior Court review of agency decisions and bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on questions of fact.

Ferreira v. Rhode Island Board of Accountancy, 90-3405 (1991) · filed 1991-01-14

General Laws 1956, § 42-35-15, as amended, confers appellate jurisdiction in this Superior Court to review decisions of the various state administrative agencies. The scope of review permitted, however, is limited by that statute. Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars a court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on factual questions.

Lincoln School Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 91-1214 (1991) · filed 1991-09-03(g)

The scope of review of administrative decisions of the state's agencies and boards is limited by G.L. 1956 §42-35-15(g). The Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the board in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 requires a court to uphold an agency decision when the record supports it and no statutory ground for reversal applies.

Sanroma v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 87-4038 (1992) · filed 1992-01-22

This Court further finds that the Council's decision is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence contained in the record; is not arbitrary or capricious, and, is not characterized by any abuse of discretion by the Council. Accordingly, pursuant to the specific legislative mandate contained in § 42-35-15 R.I.G.L. this Court must, and does, deny and dismiss the plaintiff-appellants' appeal.

Section 42-35-15 permits a court to reverse, modify, or remand an agency decision when specified defects prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights.

D'Agostino Auto Sales v. State of R.I. Pub. Util. Comm., 91-1564 (1992) · filed 1992-02-05

The Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, permits this Court to reverse, modify or remand an agency decision only in those instances where it finds that substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, or made upon unlawful procedure, or affected by other error of law, or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, or is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or by a clearly unwarranted exercise of the agency's discretion.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the agency's.

Southeastern Enter. v. R.I. Comm. for Human Rights, Nc910160 (1992) · filed 1992-04-16(g)

The Court here can neither weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Costa v. Registrar of MotorVehicles, 543 A.2d 1307 (R.I. 1988). The Court discerns no basis to fault the Commission underR.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g) as amended.

Subsection (g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Diprete v. Morsilli, 91-8642 (1992) · filed 1992-08-17(g)

Although empowered to review the decisions of an administrative agency this Court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions and requires the court to uphold a decision supported by substantial evidence when no statutory ground for reversal applies.

Caccia v. Personnel Appeal Board of the Rhode Island, 90-8077 (1992) · filed 1992-10-29(G)

This Court further finds that the Board's decision is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence contained in the record; is not arbitrary or capricious, and, is not characterized by any abuse of discretion by the Board. Accordingly, pursuant to the specific legislative mandate contained in § 42-35-15 R.I.G.L. this Court must, and does, deny and dismiss the plaintiff-appellants' appeal.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on questions of fact.

Treaster v. Rhode Island Mobile Mfd. Home Comm., 90-554 (1993) · filed 1993-02-23(g)

Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s factual findings when the record contains competent evidence to support them.

R.I. Pub. Telecom. Auth. v. the R.I. St. Labor Rel. Bd., 91-0499 (1993) · filed 1993-04-05(g)

Consistent with the legislative restraints placed upon this Court's consideration of the Board's decision, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Board on the factual determinations and findings made by it.

Section 42-35-15(g) leaves factual judgments to the agency and limits judicial review primarily to questions of law.

Hea v. State of Rhode Island Comm. for Human Rights, 90-1747 (1993) · filed 1993-05-18(g)

The strong language of G.L. § 42-35-15 indicates that judgments as to questions of fact (such as those necessary to answer the Newport Shipyard issues) are left to the sound discretion of the Commission. This court's judicial review is primarily limited to questions of law.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings but permits review of legal questions.

Liebling v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 88-1271 (1993) · filed 1993-07-13(g)

Although pursuant to § 42-35-15, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency regarding the weight of the evidence regarding questions of fact, this court may properly review questions of law to determine the law's applicability to the facts.

Subsection (g) requires a reviewing court to accept agency findings of fact supported by competent evidence.

Krupa v. Murray · filed 1989-05-09(g)

The District Court accepted these findings of fact as it was required to do pursuant to G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g), as amended by P.L.1984, ch. 183, § 2.

Section 42-35-15(f) confines judicial review of a contested agency decision to the record presented.

Easton's Point Ass'n v. Coastal Resources Management Council · filed 1989-06-02(f)

A reviewing justice, in his capacity as such, is limited by subsection (f) to the record presented.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing factual evidence and requires it to uphold an agency decision unless the findings are clearly erroneous in light of the whole record.

Derlien v. Barile, 90-6340 (1991) · filed 1991-03-04(g)

This court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. ... This court is required to uphold the agency's decision unless the agency's findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the whole record.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires the court to defer to agency fact findings supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence unless the decision is clearly erroneous.

Excelsior International Corporation v. Brooks, 88-2032 (1991) · filed 1991-07-16(g)

After its review of the whole record, this Court finds that the decision of the Rhode Island Human Rights Commission determining that Susan A. Brooks was discriminated against because of her sex with respect to the terms and conditions of termination was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility and the weight of factual evidence.

Rhode Island Automobile Insurance Plan v. Paradis, 91-2132 (1991) · filed 1991-11-05(g)

Essentially, when reviewing an agency decision, a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse or modify an administrative decision that is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

O'Neil v. Janes, 89-4997 (1992) · filed 1992-02-06(g)(5)

Of course, the Court may reverse or modify an administrative decision which is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. § 42-35-15(g)(5); Costa v. Registrar of MotorVehicles, supra.

A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of the evidence.

Nogueras v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 91-1056 (1992) · filed 1992-03-26(g)

Though the court is empowered to review the decisions of an administrative agency it is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s factual findings when the record contains reliable, probative evidence supporting them.

Griscom v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 89-6104 (1992) · filed 1992-03-27(g)

As stated above, this court's role in reviewing an agency decision is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Rather, this court must insure that the agency's decision is grounded upon the factual record. Section 42-35-15(g); St. Pius X Parish Corp. v. Murray,557 A.2d 1214, 1218 (R.I. 1989). ... After review of the entire record, this court is satisfied that the CRMC's decision was supported by reliable, probative evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency decision supported by competent evidence.

Oliver v. Singleton, 90-3923 (1992) · filed 1992-06-18(g)

The court is constrained to uphold the agency's decision if it determines that the decision was supported by competent evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

St. Joseph Hospital v. Scott, 89-5010 (1992) · filed 1992-10-16(g)

In its review of an agency decision, the Superior Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Vito v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 92-3034 (1992) · filed 1992-12-01(g)

Section 42-35-15 precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

On judicial review, the court may not reweigh witness credibility and must uphold agency factual findings supported by legally competent evidence.

Chase v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 90-7717 (1992) · filed 1992-12-16(g)

Mindful that, with regard to the credibility of witnesses, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, Carmody, 509 A.2d at 458, this Court is satisfied that there is competent evidence to support the hearing officer's dismissal of plaintiff's testimony as not credible.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and permits reversal or remand when an agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, or made upon unlawful procedure.

McDuffy v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 92-3311 (1993) · filed 1993-01-28(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency regarding the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary or lacks competent evidentiary support.

Sousa v. Coastal Resource Management Council, 89-6131 (1993) · filed 1993-05-21(g)

However, it may reverse or modify the agency's final decision if it is "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Section42-35-15(g)(5). ... After review of the record, this court finds the CRMC's decision to be arbitrary and devoid of competent evidentiary support.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of evidence.

Parrillo v. Durfee, 92-5722 (1993) · filed 1993-05-24(g)

Fundamental in this statute is the mandate that this Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to defer to the agency on witness credibility and the weight of factual evidence.

Williams v. Durfee, 92-1216 (1993) · filed 1993-07-06(g)

When reviewing an agency decision, this Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to accept an agency's factual and credibility determinations when substantial evidence supports them.

State of R.I. Dept. of Mental Health v. R.I. Commission, 91-4807 (1993) · filed 1993-07-15(g)

The language of G.L § 42-35-15 indicates that judgments as to questions of fact are left to the sound discretion of the Commission. Only if the Commission's factual determinations and concurrent credibility judgments are unsupported by "substantial evidence" within the record may this Court refuse to accept them.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is clearly erroneous on the whole record or affected by an error of law.

Burns v. Rhode Island Board of Accountancy, 90-3325 (1991) · filed 1991-04-09(g)

The record before this court demonstrates that the plaintiff possesses the required ability and experience required for certification and thus, that the Board's decision denying him this certification was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record and was affected by error of law.

Section 42-35-15(g)(1) authorizes a reviewing court to reverse or modify an agency decision that violates constitutional or statutory provisions.

Miller v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 89-2726 (1991) · filed 1991-12-13(g)(1)

General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g)(1) expressly confers jurisdiction on this Court to reverse or modify the decision of an administrative agency, "In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions."

Subsection (g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record and remand with directions to grant relief.

New England v. Rhode Island Motor Vehicle Dealers', 90-6848 (1991) · filed 1991-05-10(g)

This court therefore finds that AAA has satisfied all requirements necessary and a conditional approval of the dealer's license must issue as there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that issuance of a dealer's license to AAA would not be in the interest of the consuming public. Accordingly, the decision denying AAA's license is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Commission with direction to grant AAA's application for a dealer's license to deal in "used" vehicles.

Judicial review for substantial evidence must account for a hearing officer’s credibility findings when an agency reverses them.

Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee · filed 1993-03-02(g)(5)

Our review must conform to the standards set forth in § 42-35-15. ... The APA requires us to search the record for substantial evidence. Yet in our inquiry we cannot overlook the body of law that elevates the factfinder’s role when credibility is in issue. In light of our discussion the equation we use to determine whether substantial evidence exists factors in both credibility determinations and the corresponding deference to the hearing officer’s findings.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for an error of law only when the error prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Fort Barton Industries, Inc. v. Annarumo, 90-5344 (1992) · filed 1992-09-10(g)

Recognizing that § 42-35-15(g) permits the Court to set aside an agency decision only if substantial rights of an appellant have been prejudiced by administrative decisions affected by error of law, the applicant argues that the failure to permit it to explore putative misconduct during staff review of its application deprived it of a full and fair hearing. The applicant's argument is misplaced for two reasons. ... Put another way, if the rulings were errors of law, they were harmless, since they did not affect the ultimate decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal when unlawful agency procedure prejudices a party's substantial rights.

Strafach v. Durfee, 91-6788 (1992) · filed 1992-09-28(g)(3)

The hearing officer found that the plaintiff agreed to move the pool but the hearing officer did not grant a stay to allow negotiations. As a result, the findings concerning the pool were made upon unlawful procedure. Substantial rights of the plaintiff have been prejudiced by this error since the plaintiff has been forced to litigate an issue which could have been settled earlier in the proceedings.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Ure v. Bendick, 89-274 (1993) · filed 1993-08-02(g)(5)

However, the Court may reverse or modify the agency's final decision if it is "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record."Environmental Scientific Corp., supra, at 15, citing §42-35-15(g)(5). ... In conclusion, this Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to support the Director's conclusion of law that the proposal would increase the mortality rate of the fish by increasing the predation.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Rosado v. Ri Department of Human Services, 92-6281 (1993) · filed 1993-09-03(g)

Essentially, when reviewing an agency decision this court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of evidence.

Kukulka v. Durfee, 92-2865 (1993) · filed 1993-09-08(g)

Central to the grant of jurisdiction in this statute is the mandate that this court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in an agency appeal.

Manchester v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 93-1217 (1993) · filed 1993-09-09(g)

Accordingly, when reviewing an agency's decision this Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency fact findings and bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for the agency's.

Wetterau Incorporated v. Tammelleo, 92-4467 (1993) · filed 1993-09-30

General Laws 1956, § 42-35-15, as amended, confers appellate jurisdiction in this Superior Court to review decisions of the various state administrative agencies. The scope of review permitted, however, is limited by that statute. Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on questions of fact.

City of East Providence v. R.I. State Labor Rel. Bd., 92-5685 (1993) · filed 1993-09-30

General Laws 1956, § 42-35-15, as amended, confers appellate jurisdiction in this Superior Court to review decisions of the various state administrative agencies. The scope of review permitted, however, is limited by that statute. Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of the evidence.

Wayne Distributing Co. v. R.I. Comm. for Human Rights, 91-5094 (1993) · filed 1993-11-02(g)

This Court does not substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence for that of the Commission.

Section 42-35-15 allows an injured party to seek judicial review by filing a complaint in the appropriate court.

In Re Advisory From the Governor · filed 1993-11-15

That act provides, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-15, that the injured party is entitled to judicial review by filing a complaint in the appropriate court. Neither of the advisories has been appealed by any injured party. The Governor’s question is therefore not properly before this court.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

R.I. Public Towing Assoc. v. Public Utilities Comm., 93-1343 (1994) · filed 1994-01-24(g)

Section 42-35-15 precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses on the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 allows the Superior Court to fashion an adequate remedy on judicial review of an agency decision, even when the remedies listed in the Administrative Procedures Act are insufficient.

Liebling v. R.I. Department of Human, 88-1271 (1994) · filed 1994-02-24

This matter arises out of an administrative appeal brought by the plaintiff/appellant, Clara Liebling ("plaintiff"), from an adverse decision of the Department of Human Services ("D.H.S.") and made pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15. ... This court is not confined to the limited remedies provided in the Administrative Procedures Act where they do not constitute an adequate remedy at law.

Section 42-35-15 permits a court to reverse, modify, or remand an agency decision when specified errors prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.

National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Paradis, 92-6230 (1994) · filed 1994-03-02

The Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, permits this Court to reverse, modify or remand an agency decision only in those instances where it finds that substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, or made upon unlawful procedure, or affected by other error of law, or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, or is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or by a clearly unwarranted exercise of the agency's discretion.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Cotugno v. State of Rhode Island, 92-4238 (1994) · filed 1994-03-17(g)

Section 42-35-15 precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning question of fact.

Section 42-35-15 prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of the evidence.

Jimbo's Hispanic Cafe, Inc. v. Arico, 93-6779 (1994) · filed 1994-05-13(g)

In view of the evidence in the record, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Administrator, on the weight of the evidence, even if it wanted to.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars the reviewing court from substituting its judgment on questions of fact for the agency’s.

Saccoccia v. R.I. Board of Accountancy, 93-4902 (1994) · filed 1994-05-24

General Laws 1956, § 42-35-15, as amended, confers appellate jurisdiction in this Superior Court to review decisions of the various state administrative boards and agencies. The scope of review permitted, however, is limited by that statute. Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency factfinding to the record and requires legally competent evidence to support the agency's decision.

Creed v. Dimuro, 89-1828 (1994) · filed 1994-07-18(g)

Accordingly, when reviewing an agency's decision this Court must confine itself to a review of the record to determine if "legally competent evidence" exists to support the agency decision.

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on questions of fact.

Pilkington v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 94-0163 (1995) · filed 1995-03-02

General Laws 1956, § 42-35-15, as amended, confers appellate jurisdiction in this Superior Court to review decisions of the various state administrative agencies. The scope of review permitted, however, is limited by that statute. Fundamental in the statute is the basic legislative intention that this Court should not, and cannot, substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15 requires a reviewing court to accept agency findings of fact supported by competent evidence in the record.

Board of Trustees v. Rhode Island St. Labor Rel. Bd., 94-4260 (1995) · filed 1995-03-15

The scope of this Court's review under § 42-35-15 of the decision of the SLRB is strictly circumscribed. ... If there is competent evidence in the record to support the SLRB's findings of fact, the Court must accept those findings.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions and bars the court from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment on questions of fact.

Bianchini v. Burrillville Racing Association Inc., 94-5537 (1995) · filed 1995-08-30(g)

The scope of this Court's review is limited by R.I.G.L. §42-35-15. This Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence or on questions of fact. ... There is sufficient evidence contained in the agency record to support the agency decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review to the record of proceedings before the agency.

Department of Corrections of the St. of R.I. v. Tucker, 92-4474 (1993) · filed 1993-07-21(g)

As matters now stand, this Court's review is limited to the record of proceedings before the Commission. G.L. 1956 (1986Reenactment) § 28-5-29; G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) §42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision to determining whether substantial evidence supports it.

Wolf v. State, 94-1607 (1996) · filed 1996-06-12(g)

The review of a decision of the Board by this Court is controlled by G.L. § 42-35-15(g). This Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review to the certified record and permits a court to set aside an agency decision unsupported by legally competent evidence.

Legein v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 96-4148 (1997) · filed 1997-05-05(g)

With this statute as its polestar, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists in the record to support the agency's decision. ... Accordingly the Court finds that despite the validity of the policies and procedures utilized by the ORS in arriving at Legein's award, there exists no legally competent evidence in the record to support the DHS's decision to affirm the VR award made by the ORS to Legein.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from reweighing evidence when reviewing an agency’s factual findings; it must uphold findings supported by legally competent evidence.

Rocha v. State, Public Utilities Commission · filed 1997-06-09(g)

Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 42-35-15 the Superior Court is granted appellate jurisdiction to review final orders as well as certain interlocutory orders of state administrative agencies not exempted from the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act. In undertaking that review the Superior Court “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reassessing witness credibility or reweighing evidence on questions of fact.

Marold v. Fendetti, 95-0320 (1997) · filed 1997-08-28(g)

This Court's review of a final agency decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 (g) which provides for review of a contested agency decision: ... This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15 provides for Superior Court review of a Personnel Appeal Board decision under the Administrative Procedures Act, rather than through an independent action.

Borsay v. State · filed 1998-03-13

Had plaintiff elected to pursue her claim before the Personnel Appeal Board and been unsatisfied with the outcome of that process, she could have availed herself of the option of appealing to the Superior Court, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. G.L.1956 § 42-35-15. ... While this statement is, as a technical matter, incorrect — because plaintiff clearly had no administrative remedy available to her at that point — we affirm the trial justice’s ultimate conclusion that “[rjeview in this court of administrative hearings is by of the Administrative Procedures Act and not by way of an independent action.”

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Dobson v. State of Rhode Island, W 97-0102 (1998) · filed 1998-04-30(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in an agency appeal.

Mayhew v. McLeod, 98-1271 (1998) · filed 1998-11-04(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Melendez v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 98-2458 (1999) · filed 1999-08-05(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

David v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 00-1046 (2001) · filed 2001-01-24(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits affirmance of an agency decision supported by substantial evidence when the appellant's substantial rights have not been prejudiced.

Rodriguez v. R.I. D.H.S., 00-3586 (2001) · filed 2001-10-09(g)

After reviewing the entire record, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record and was not arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Moreover, substantial rights of the plaintiff have not been prejudiced. Accordingly, the decision of the DHS is affirmed.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Ferrante v. Department of Human Services, 01-4265 (2002) · filed 2002-04-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from "substituting its judgment for that of the agency concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact."

Section 42-35-15 limits judicial review of agency decisions to questions of law and does not permit the reviewing court to make factual findings.

Lee v. Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 186 · filed 2002-05-16

Since it is well settled that judicial review of agency decisions is limited to questions of law and the reviewing court may not make factual findings, we deem this finding to be a nullity.

Subsection (g) governs Superior Court review of agency decisions for substantial evidence and legal error.

Malko v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 01-4218 (2003) · filed 2003-02-05(g)

The standard of review for this Court's appellate consideration of a decision of the Department of Human Services is governed by G.L. §42-35-15(g) of the Administrative Procedures Act. ... After a thorough review of the entire record in this matter, this Court finds that the DHS's decision is supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence and was not made upon unlawful procedure or in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or affected by other error of law.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand an agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous in view of the evidence in the record.

Wolff v. Wynne, Cmrc, 01-4377 (2003) · filed 2003-03-25(g)

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Decision of the CRMC is arbitrary and capricious and clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. ... Accordingly, this Court remands the CRMC's July 24, 2001 Decision to the agency for specific findings with respect to the evidence, specifically, the evidence presented at the hearing of July 24, 2001 concerning Finding of Fact #42.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits the Superior Court to appellate review of contested agency decisions.

Onyx Acceptance Corp. v. McConaghy, 02-1203 (2003) · filed 2003-03-26(g)

When reviewing an agency decision, pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court with limited scope of review.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of agency decisions and requires the court to uphold a decision supported by sufficient competent evidence.

Clancy v. Ersri, 01-2680 (2003) · filed 2003-04-16(g)

When reviewing an agency decision, pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court with limited scope of review. ... If there is sufficient competent evidence in the record, the court must uphold the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires the Superior Court to defer to an agency’s factual findings and uphold its decision when substantial evidence supports it.

Maddalena v. R.I. D.H.S., 02-4737 (2003) · filed 2003-05-01(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review for an appeal of a final agency decision. ... Further, this Court's limited role requires deference to the Hearing Officer's factual findings and conclusions and permits only a determination of whether substantial evidence exists to support the Hearing Officer's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision to the record and does not permit the court to reweigh factual evidence.

Sterry Street Towing v. Division of Public Utilities, 02-5582 (2003) · filed 2003-09-18(g)

Thus, the Court's review is not de novo, but rather limited to the strictures of the General Laws.

Section 42-35-15 limits the court’s review of agency factfinding and does not allow it to reweigh evidence or witness credibility.

Brown v. Shumpert McConaghy, Pc99-5926 (2003) · filed 2003-10-02(g)

Regarding Appellant's claim of error in the Department's Decision, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 et seq. governs this Court's review of the matter. ... When reviewing determinations of an administrative agency, this Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review. Therefore, the Superior Court justice does not weigh evidence and the credibility of witnesses as to questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when the hearing officer ignores or improperly weighs relevant evidence.

Vendetti v. Rhode Island Dhs, 03-1126 (2003) · filed 2003-10-03(g)

Even though the scope of this Court's review is narrow, the Court will not affirm an agency decision where the hearing officer either ignores or erroneously weighs relevant evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency factfinding and permits a court to affirm an agency decision or remand it for further proceedings.

Brooks v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 03-1125 (2004) · filed 2004-04-22(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15 (g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review for an appeal of a final agency decision. ... Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's decision is affirmed in part and remanded in part.

Section 42-35-15 requires the Superior Court to apply a limited standard of review to administrative appeals.

Neuschatz v. Reitsma, 02-1589 (2004) · filed 2004-05-24

When considering an administrative appeal pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15, the Superior Court must apply a limited standard of review.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of factual findings to whether competent evidence in the record supports the decision.

City of East Providence v. Tellier, 04-0374 (2004) · filed 2004-09-22(g)

The court's role is limited to examining the record to determine if there is any competent evidence to support the agency's decision.

Subsection (g) limits the Superior Court’s review of final agency decisions and bars it from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on factual questions.

Town of Richmond v. Ri Labor Relations Board, 02-4786 (2004) · filed 2004-10-15(g)

Sitting as an appellate court with a limited scope of review, this Court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence as to questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of final agency orders, particularly review of factual findings.

Mild, Inc. v. R.I. Department of Environmental Management, 02-6281 (2004) · filed 2004-11-10(g)

When reviewing a final agency order, the Superior Court sits as an appellant court in accordance with the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. § 42-35-15(g). The review by the Superior Court is a continuation of the administrative process and is extremely limited in respect to findings of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that exceeds the agency's authority, is clearly erroneous in light of the record, or is arbitrary and capricious.

State v. Personnel Appeal Board, 04-3177 (2004) · filed 2004-12-02(g)

Specifically, this Court's scope of review is governed by § 42-35-15(g), which provides: ... The decision was in excess of the Board's authority, clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, and arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of the Board's discretion.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency factfinding and bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of the evidence.

Mejia v. Dhs, 04-1005 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-05-18(g)

The Superior Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review, under which the justice may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency with respect to credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence as to questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows a court to overturn an agency decision when it is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record.

School Dept. v. Lrb, Pc-03-3809 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-06-20(g)

This Court may overturn the Board's decision only if the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record. Sec.42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) directs the Superior Court to uphold an agency decision supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Connelly v. Personnel Appeal Board, 00-1022 (2001) · filed 2001-05-21(g)

This Court finds that the decision of the Personnel Appeal Board was not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. It was also made upon lawful procedure and not in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when the record lacks reliable, probative, and substantial evidence to support it.

Annarummo v. Department of Business Regulation, 02-4759 (2003) · filed 2003-09-30(g)(5)

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the decision of the Department was not supported by the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of the record. Accordingly, the June 26, 2002 Decision7 of the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation must be and is hereby reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to affirm an agency decision supported by substantial evidence that is neither arbitrary nor affected by legal error.

Riley v. Dem, 04-0987 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-04-27(g)

As such, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer's denial of said license was consistent with constitutional and statutory provisions, was not arbitrary or capricious or affected by error of law, and was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(f) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record, so the court may not consider evidence of later events.

Nickerson v. Reitsma · filed 2004-06-15(f)

Although the trial justice specifically noted that his review was limited to the certified record, he nevertheless proceeded to hear and consider extraneous evidence, including Nickerson’s testimony about post-hearing events, thereby exceeding his authority under the APA. See § 42 — 35—15(f) (“[t]he review shall * * * be confined to the record”).

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility when the agency's findings have competent evidentiary support.

Charlwood v. Doh, 03-4766 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-06-13(g)

Upon review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer was mindful of the opinions of both experts and, after viewing all of the testimonial evidence, the Hearing Officer made a credibility determination that is supported by sufficient and competent evidence in the record. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact concerning witness credibility.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision; the court may affirm when the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

Cavanaugh v. Rhode Island Dhs, 05-1501 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-11-30(g)

The Superior Court's review of an appeal of an agency decision is governed by § 42-35-15(g). ... After reviewing the record in the light of the limited scope of review of agency decisions, this Court does not find that the hearing officer's calculations or conclusions are clearly erroneous.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions to the certified record and permits relief when specified errors prejudice substantial rights.

Unistrut Corporation v. State, 04-6702 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-03-28(g)

This Court's review of an administrative agency decision under §42-35-15 is limited in scope. ... This Court's review is restricted "to an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision."

Section 42-35-15(g) limits review of an agency’s factual findings to the certified record and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Ceceri v. Department of Business Regulation, Pc/05-0365 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-06-22(g)

In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions and restricts when a court may reverse or modify them.

John Rocchio Corp. v. Division of Pub. Utilities, 04-6833 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-08-01(g)

This Court's review of an administrative agency decision under § 42-35-15 is limited in scope.

Section 42-35-15 permits a court to review a DBR rate decision for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, and abuse of discretion.

Medical Malpractice v. Marques · filed 2006-11-03(g)

Any decision of the DBR to modify the effective date of a rate request from that proposed by an insurer is subject to review by this Court, pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15, to ensure that it comports with the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 27-9-1 et seq., is not clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence of record and is not arbitrary or reflective an abuse of the agency's discretion.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence.

Jordan v. Rhode Island Dep. of Human Serv. · filed 2007-07-06(g)

This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of DHS with respect to the weight of evidence. R.I.G.L. section42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to affirm an agency decision when substantial evidence supports its findings and the appellant's substantial rights have not been prejudiced.

Baker v. R.I. Dept. of Business Regulation, Pc · filed 2007-04-05(g)

A review of the record reveals that this finding is supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence before the Court.

Subsection (g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in light of substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious.

Ziepniewski v. Coastal Res. Management · filed 2007-12-26(g)(5), (6)

Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the CRMC's decision on the § 120.A criteria. See Barros, 710 A.2d at 684. The CRMC's decision is therefore not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous in view of the record evidence. See § 42-35-15(g)(5), (6).

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a reviewing court to overturn an agency's erroneous interpretation of law.

Marciniak v. Employees' Retirement · filed 2008-09-05(g)

However, the Court does review the agency's decision for errors of law. § 42-35-15(g); Carmody v. R.I. Conflict of Interest Comm'n,509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986). The agency's findings of law are not binding on the reviewing court: the court may overturn erroneous interpretations of law by an administrative agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency fact findings to whether legally competent evidence supports the decision.

Stage Bands v. Dept. of Bus. Reg. for Ri · filed 2009-08-05(g)

This Court, when reviewing the administrative decision, is limited to determining whether legally competent evidence exists in the record to support the decision of the DBR.

Section 42-35-15 requires an appellant to take formal action within thirty days of the agency's final decision; a tardy rehearing request cannot revive an expired appeal period.

Mortgage Resource Prof. v. Orefice · filed 2009-11-30(b)

The legislature did not intend to create a loophole to allow litigants to revive an appeal period that had already run by filing a tardy request for reargument.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency fact finding to the certified record and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Corbin v. Dept. of Human Serv. · filed 2011-05-19(g)

The court reviews a contested administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15(g). ... In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review of a final agency decision.

Paquette v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human · filed 2011-10-18(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15 (g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review for an appeal of a final agency decision.

The 30-day period to seek judicial review begins the day after notice of the agency decision is mailed, and the Superior Court may equitably toll that deadline in appropriate circumstances.

Rivera v. Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island · filed 2013-04-08(b)

In our opinion, § 42-35-15(b) is unambiguous, and we hold that the thirty-day period for filing a complaint in the Superior Court begins to run the day after the notice is mailed. ... Therefore, we hold that the Superior Court has the equitable authority to determine whether the statute providing for judicial review of an administrative decision pursuant to § 42-35-15(b) should be tolled in appropriate circumstances.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on questions of fact or making its own factual findings.

Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, Board of Review · filed 2017-06-19(g)

The Administrative Procedures Act provides that the reviewing court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” G.L. 1956 § 42—35—15(g). ... It was beyond the District Court’s prescribed role to malee its own factual findings.

Subsections (f) and (g) confine judicial review of contested cases to the record and limit review of agency findings and decisions.

Town of New Shoreham v. Racine, 91-686 (1992) · filed 1992-04-16(f), (g)

There is no evidence in the record, nor has the petitioner alleged, that there were any irregularities in procedure before the Liquor Control Administrator pursuant to subsection (f). ... As discussed previously, this court' scope of review of the petitioner's appeal is detailed in, and limited by, section42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15 requires a taxpayer to pay the contested tax before seeking judicial review and limits review to appellate consideration of constitutional, statutory, and procedural claims.

Sterling Shoe Co. v. Norberg · filed 1976-04-06(b), (f), (g)

If a taxpayer is not satisfied with the administrator’s determination after hearing, he may seek judicial review in Rhode Island Superior Court under the APA, R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15. As a prerequisite to such judicial review, the taxpayer must pay the contested tax. § 42-35-15(b). Although the scope of judicial review is restricted and appellate in nature, § 42-35-15(f), (g), the reviewing court is expressly charged by § 42-35-15(g) to pass upon claims of violation of constitutional or statutory provisions (subsections (g)(1), (g)(2)), and failure to adhere to lawful procedure (subsection (g)(3)), among others.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand a case for further evidence, and subsection (e) does not limit that authority.

Lemoine v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, R. & HOSP. · filed 1974-06-10(e), (g)

Thus, as we have stated above, § 42-35-15(e) does not limit the authority of the Superior Court to remand under § 42-35-15(g) for the taking of further evidence; it merely affords the litigants a further opportunity to present additional evidence, and it likewise gives the agency a chance to modify its original action if warranted by the new evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows the Superior Court to remand an agency case for further evidence when the record is deficient.

Lemoine v. Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals · filed 1974-06-10(g)

For the reasons that follow we hold that the Superior Court, under §42-35-15 (g) of the Administrative Procedures Act, has authority to remand for the taking of further evidence in a proper case.

Section 42-35-15(e) permits a remand for additional agency evidence when the request is meritorious and the need is clear.

Santini v. Lyons · filed 1982-07-08(e)

The council should not take lightly its prerogative to request a remand, nor should a remand be ordered unless the request is meritorious and the need clear.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows the Superior Court to remand an agency decision for additional evidence, but the remand must be limited to the issues that need further development.

Birchwood Realty, Inc. v. Grant · filed 1993-06-25(g)

When the Superior Court reviews an agency decision, the court may affirm or reverse the decision or may remand the case for further proceedings. Section 42-35-15(g). It is clear that the Superior Court justice has some discretion in fashioning a remedy when hearing an appeal from an agency decision. The court may remand the case to the agency for the presentation of additional evidence. ... In this case, however, the Superior Court’s order of remand was simply too broad. ... We now hold, therefore, that the Superior Court should have remanded the case to DEM for the sole purpose of allowing Birchwood to present evidence on these issues.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits remand when an agency decision lacks support in reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Taylor v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 03-4514 (2004) · filed 2004-06-10(g)

After a review of the entire record, including medical assessments by Plaintiff's treating physicians, findings of the MART, and the testimony of Plaintiff at the administrative hearing, this Court finds the decision of the Hearing Officer to be unsupported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. ... Substantial rights of Plaintiff have been prejudiced. Accordingly, the decision of DHS is remanded to DHS for a determination of findings of fact and application of the facts to the relevant regulations herein specified and pursuant to G.L. §42-35-12.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to remand an agency decision for further proceedings, including the receipt of new evidence when the remand calls for it.

Brown Univ. v. Ri Commn. for Human Rights, 00-0286 (2001) · filed 2001-01-16(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g) provides that when the Superior Court reviews an agency decision, the court may affirm or reverse the decision or may remand the case for further proceedings. ... Although this Court's remand order did not explicitly state that the Commission should hear and consider new evidence, this Court's decision evidences that intent. ... Accordingly, this Court finds that the Commission's decision to reopen the record did not constitute an error of law or abuse of discretion, and was not made upon unlawful procedure.