R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(5) permits limited postconviction challenges to Parole Board proceedings based on alleged due process violations.

State v. Ouimette · filed 1976-12-31(a)(5)

The threshold question is whether §10-9.1-1, the post-conviction remedy statute, is an appropriate way to raise objections to Parole Board proceedings. Specifically, defendant asserts that, under §10-9.1-1 (a) (5), he qualifies since he is a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a crime and is “otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint” as a result of unlawful procedures by the board. We are of the opinion that this clause of the postconviction statute is a proper vehicle for raising limited objections to the proceedings of the Parole Board.

Section 10-9.1-1 permits a pro se petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel to be heard even when its request for sentence credit resembles a motion to reduce sentence.

Dewitt v. State, Pm · filed 2008-12-18

This Court will not agree to the State's argument that the petition is truly a Super R. Crim. P. Rule 35 Motion to Reduce Sentence dressed up in § 10-9.1-1 clothing. This Court will address the merits of the post-conviction petition.

Section 10-9.1-1 permits a convicted person to seek postconviction relief for a constitutional violation or newly discovered material facts.

Bleau v. State · filed 2009-04-22

Section 10-9.1-1 provides the right to seek postconviction relief to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either (1) that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or (2) that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.

Section 10-9.1-1 makes postconviction relief available to a convicted person who alleges a constitutional violation or newly discovered material facts requiring the conviction to be vacated.

Page v. State · filed 2010-05-26

By virtue of the provisions of § 10-9.1-1, “the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.” Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 (R.I.2008); see also Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 98 (R.I.2010); Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I.2007).

Section 10-9.1-1 permits a court to treat a motion as an application for postconviction relief when the parties have litigated it as one.

Brito-Batista v. State · filed 2008-08-21

While the Court recognizes that the matter presently before it is technically a motion pursuant to Rule 59 or Rule 60, the parties have addressed the matter as an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to § 10-9.1-1 . ... As such, the Court construes this matter as an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to § 10-9.1-1 .

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(1) permits a postconviction claim that the convicting court lacked personal jurisdiction over the accused.

Gomez v. State · filed 2008-06-26(a)(1)

A claim that a court lacked personal jurisdiction of an accused is properly considered under § 10-9.1-1 (a)(1) because such a claim is derived from the guarantee of procedural due process enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 , Section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution.

An applicant for postconviction relief under § 10-9.1-1 must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that relief is warranted.

Larngar v. Wall · filed 2007-04-05

Section 10-9.1-1 provides that postconviction relief is a remedy available to any person who has been convicted of a crime in this state and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated his or her constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires the vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice. The applicant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that post-conviction relief is warranted in his or her case.

Section 10-9.1-1 permits an application for postconviction relief only after the applicant’s conviction becomes final.

Leonardo v. Vose · filed 1996-03-11

Although the statute does not specifically make final conviction a prerequisite, common sense dictates that an appeal of a defendant’s conviction must be decided against the defendant before an application for postconviction relief can be considered. ... If and when that appeal is denied, the applicant is free to seek postconviction relief under G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1. At this time, however, Leonardo’s application for postconviction relief is premature.

Section 10-9.1-1 does not permit a prisoner to challenge the conditions of custody through post-conviction relief.

Guadagno v. Partridge, 92-0521 (1992) · filed 1992-04-21

There is nothing in the post-conviction relief statute, R.I.G.L. § 10-9.1-1 , which gives a petitioner the right to challenge the conditions of his prison custody.

Section 10-9.1-1 provides a postconviction remedy for a claimed sentencing error based on the trial justice’s mistaken understanding of an officer’s injuries.

State v. Simpson · filed 1990-04-24

Moreover, if defendant feels that he was prejudiced at retrial because the trial justice was unaware of the true extent of Wells’s injuries, his proper avenue to seek remedy is not dismissal of this matter for lack of a speedy trial, but rather to pursue an application for postconviction relief under G.L. 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 10-9.1-1.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) provides a procedure for seeking post-conviction relief based on evidence not previously presented and heard.

State v. Ouimette · filed 1975-12-05(a)(4)

However, as we shall point- out infra, we treat it as an application for post-conviction relief under G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §10-9.1-1 (a) (4).

Section 10-9.1-1 encompasses a post-conviction claim that newly discovered juror exposure to newspaper accounts denied the applicant a fair trial.

Palmigiano v. State · filed 1978-07-03

Palmigiano alleges that the newly discovered fact of the jurors’ exposure to newspaper accounts of his trial is evidence that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. This claim is clearly one encompassed by the statute.

Section 10-9.1-1 makes post-conviction relief the exclusive remedy for challenging a conviction or sentence, but its substitution for earlier remedies changes procedure only, not substance.

Palmigiano v. Mullen · filed 1977-08-31

Section 10-9.1-1 specifically states that the remedy provided pursuant to this Act “comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.” ... However, as we have previously stated, this Act’s substitution of one remedy for another was a change in procedure only, and not in substance.

Section 10-9.1-1(a) permits a person convicted of or sentenced for a crime to seek postconviction relief; an unamended application does not reach a later conviction.

Burke v. State of Rhode Island · filed 2017-12-04(a)

According to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1(a), only “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime * * * may institute” an application for postconviction relief.4 (Emphasis added.) Mr. Burke’s application related only to the breaking and entering and larceny charges, and they were the only charges at issue in the instant appeal concerning which he had been convicted or sentenced at the time he filed the instant application. That application has never been amended.

Section 10-9.1-1(b) makes postconviction relief the exclusive remedy for a collateral attack on a conviction that cannot be reviewed in the trial court proceedings or on direct appeal.

State v. Restitullo · filed 2024-04-11(b)

Similar to the defendant’s challenge to the validity of his plea, an application for postconviction relief is the proper vehicle to request a remedy under these circumstances. See G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1(b) (charging that postconviction relief under this chapter is the exclusive remedy for collateral attack of a conviction not otherwise reviewable “incident to the proceedings in the trial court” or through direct appellate review).

Section 10-9.1-1 makes postconviction relief available to people alleging constitutional violations and seeking to vacate their convictions.

State v. Tavares · filed 2024-10-21

Postconviction-relief petitions exist squarely for those who allege a violation of their constitutional rights and who accordingly seek a vacation of their conviction(s). See § 10-9.1-1.

Section 10-9.1-1(4) requires material facts not previously presented or considered and a showing that justice requires vacating the conviction or sentence.

Russo v. State · filed 2007-10-10(4)

In order to grant this petition for post-conviction relief, the Court must find that the evidence establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are material facts before the Court that were not previously presented or considered at the time of sentencing and, that these facts require vacating the sentence in the interest of justice.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) requires an evidentiary hearing when an applicant makes a prima facie showing of material facts not previously presented and heard, even after a nolo contendere plea.

State v. Fontaine · filed 1989-05-31(a)(4)

This statutory mandate does not depend upon the plea entered by the applicant or the question of whether the applicant has been convicted after trial. Consequently we believe that if a prima facia showing is made that such facts exist, an evidentiary hearing by the trial justice is required.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) requires a petitioner seeking relief based on newly discovered evidence to show that the evidence was discovered after trial and could not have been found earlier through ordinary diligence.

Jefferson v. State · filed 1984-03-02(a)(4)

Introduction of the evidence was sought under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-9.1-1(a)(4), as enacted by P.L.1974, ch. 220, § 3, claiming that there was evidence of material facts, not previously heard, requiring the vacation of his conviction and sentence. ... In order to receive a grant of postconviction relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence a defendant must establish two facts. First, he must show that the evidence was discovered after trial. Secondly, he must establish that its discovery could not have been made before or during trial through the exercise of ordinary diligence.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) requires a person seeking post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence to show that the evidence was not known and could not reasonably have been known in time to raise the issue at trial or in a timely motion for a new trial.

State v. Clark · filed 2000-05-18(a)(4)

We issue the caveat that to qualify for post-conviction relief in respect to this issue, it will be necessary for defendant to establish that evidence to be presented is newly discovered and was not known, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, would not have been known in time to raise the issue fully at trial or in a motion for new trial to have been filed within the time limitation after the rendition of the verdict.

Section 10-9.1-1 does not support post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence that is cumulative, impeaching or immaterial.

Bleau v. Wall · filed 2002-11-04

However, it is imperative that we do not allow that justified aggravation to blur our focus on the task before us; the law requires that we disregard newly discovered evidence that is cumulative, impeaching or immaterial.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) allows post-conviction relief based on a complaining witness's recantation when the new evidence warrants vacating the conviction in the interests of justice.

Brunelle v. State · filed 2009-05-07(a)(4)

The petitioner is correct in asserting that the recantation of accusations made by a complaining witness constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of post-conviction relief.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(4) allows postconviction relief when evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard requires vacating a conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.

State v. Thornton · filed 2010-10-21(a)(4)

Nor has Thornton demonstrated that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of [his] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." G. L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1 (a) (4).

Section 10-9.1-1 permits postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence only when the evidence was unavailable before trial despite due diligence.

State v. Thornton · filed 2013-06-19

The evidence must be “newly discovered or available only since trial” and must not have been “discoverable prior to trial despite the exercise of due diligence.” Id.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(1) permits a petition for post-conviction relief alleging an unconstitutional conviction, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Farlett · filed 1985-04-04(a)(1)

Under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-9.1-1(a)(1), as enacted by P.L.1974, ch. 220, § 3, persons claiming that their criminal convictions were obtained “in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state * * * ” may file a petition for post-conviction relief.

Section 10-9.1-1 provides the postconviction relief procedure for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which the court will not consider on direct appeal.

State v. Malstrom · filed 1996-03-11

This court has held, however, that it will not consider ineffeetive-assistance-of counsel claims on direct appeal. Such issues are considered only in an application for postcon-vietion relief filed under G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1.

Section 10-9.1-1 provides the postconviction procedure for raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

State v. Dunn · filed 1999-03-22

This Supreme Court has repeatedly held in past opinions that ineffective assistance of counsel claims “are considered only in an application for post conviction relief’ filed pursuant to G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1.

Section 10-9.1-1 provides the post-conviction relief procedure for ineffective assistance of counsel claims that cannot be considered when first raised on direct appeal.

State v. Brouillard · filed 2000-02-04(a)(1)

Such matters must be pursued in an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1.

Section 10-9.1-1(a)(1) provides a post-conviction remedy for ineffective-assistance claims raised for the first time on direct appeal.

State v. Grayhurst · filed 2004-06-23(a)(1)

Because defendant raises his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on direct appeal, however, he must pursue his claim through an application for post-conviction ... relief pursuant to G.L.1956 § 10-9.1-1.